Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and the
amendments thereto.
1. Amendments En Bloc to the Amendment in the Nature
of a Substitute (Mr. Swalwell of California (001), Ms.
Jackson Lee of Texas (005), Ms. Clarke of New York
(006), Mr. Carter of Louisiana (007), Mr. Carter of
Louisiana (008), Mr. Thompson of Mississippi (009). The
Amendments En Bloc failed by a recorded vote of 14 Yeas
to 16 Nays (Rollcall No. 17)
2. An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute offered by Mr. Menendez of New Jersey to
insert Section 3. The amendment failed by a recorded
vote of 14 Yeas to 16 Nays (Rollcall No. 18)
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3. An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute offered by Mr. Payne of New Jersey to insert
Section 3. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of
14 Yeas to 16 Nays (Rollcall No. 19)
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4. An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute offered by Mr. Magaziner of Rhode Island to
insert Section 3. The amendment failed by a recorded
vote of 14 Yeas to 16 Nays (Rollcall No. 20)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
5. An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute offered by Mr. Swalwell of California to
insert Section 3. The amendment failed by a recorded
vote of 14 Yeas to 16 Nays (Rollcall No. 21)
6. A motion by Mr. Green of Tennessee to report H.R.
4470, as amended, to the House with a favorable
recommendation, was agreed to by a vote of 30 Yeas and
0 Nays (Rollcall No. 22)
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Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
Correspondence With Other Committees
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC, July 18, 2023.
Hon. Mark E. Green, MD,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Green: I write to you concerning H.R. 4470,
the ``Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from
Terrorist Attacks Act of 2023,'' which was referred in addition
to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. I wanted to notify you
that the Committee will forgo action on the bill so that it may
proceed expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
This is done with the understanding that the Committee's
jurisdictional interests over this and similar legislation are
in no way diminished or altered. In addition, the Committee
reserves the right to seek conferees on H.R. 4470 and requests
your support when such a request is made.
I would appreciate your response confirming this
understanding with respect to H.R. 4470 and ask that a copy of
our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the
committee report on the bill or in the Congressional Record
during consideration of the bill on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Cathy McMorris Rodgers,
Chair.
------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, July 18, 2023.
Hon. Cathy Rodgers,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rodgers: Thank you for your letter regarding
H.R. 4470, the ``Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities
from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2023,'' of which the Committee on
Energy and Commerce received an additional referral. I
appreciate your support in bringing this legislation before the
House of Representatives, and that the Committee on Energy and
Commerce will forego further consideration of the bill.
The Committee on Homeland Security concurs with the mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of this bill at
this time, the Committee on Energy and Commerce does not waive
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this
legislation in the future. In addition, should a conference on
this bill be necessary, I would support your request to have
the Committee on the Energy and Commerce represented on the
conference committee.
I will include our letters on H.R. 4470 in the Committee
report on this measure and in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of this bill. I look forward to working
with you on this legislation and appreciate your cooperation on
this matter.
Sincerely,
Mark E. Green, MD,
Chairman.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement
Authority, and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office a statement as to
whether this bill contains any new budget authority, spending
authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in
revenues or tax expenditures.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Duplicative Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 4470 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 4470 is to reauthorize the CFATS program.
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff
Benefits
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that H.R. 4470 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section states the Act may be cited as the
``Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2023.''
Section. 2. Extension of authorization of Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards program of the Department of Homeland
Security
This section amends Section 5 of the Protecting and
Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014
(Public Law 113-254; 6 U.S.C. 621 note) by striking ``2023''
and inserting ``2025''.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
PROTECTING AND SECURING CHEMICAL FACILITIES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS ACT
OF 2014
* * * * * * *
SEC. 5. TERMINATION.
The authority provided under title XXI of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 2(a), shall terminate
on July 27, [2023] 2025.
Minority Views
While Committee Democrats strongly support the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, we are
disappointed that Committee Republicans have once again failed
to engage meaningfully in reauthorization and chose to ignore
the many challenges that have plagued this program for years.
As a result, Congress seems poised to pass yet another short-
term CFATS extension--an option that has gone from last resort
to status quo.
While H.R. 4470 would prevent the CFATS program from
lapsing, it also punts on a number of major, long-standing
issues that this Committee has uncovered through years of
diligent oversight. Committee Democrats offered 10 targeted
amendments to H.R. 4470 to address these persistent challenges
in measured, reasonable ways that would not disturb the program
or place new obligations on regulated facilities. Republicans
rejected all 10 amendments.
To understand the urgency of addressing these issues, it is
important to remember why CFATS was created in the first place,
and the vital role it plays in our national security.
CFATS was established in response to warnings from national
security experts of credible terrorist threats to U.S. chemical
plants. Research suggests more than 130 million Americans--and
one-third of U.S. schoolchildren--live, work, and go to school
in the ``vulnerability zone'' of a worst-case chemical
disaster.\1\ Studies also show that high-risk facilities tend
to be concentrated in low-income communities and communities of
color.\2\ After the 9/11 attacks, reports surfaced that one of
the hijackers had been scouting chemical plant sites, and media
outlets began reporting on a slew of government studies showing
the potential gravity of a terrorist attack on a chemical
plant.\3\ One leaked Army Surgeon General study estimated that
a terrorism-related chemical release in a densely populated
area could kill or injure as many as 2.4 million Americans.\4\
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\1\See, e.g., Paul Orum, Richard Moore, Michele Roberts, and
Joaquin Sanchez, Who's in Danger? Race, Poverty, and Chemical
Disasters, Environmental Justice and Health Alliance for Chemical
Policy Reform, (May 2014), http://comingcleaninc.org/assets/media/
images/Reports/Who%27s%20in%20Danger%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (examining
public filings under the EPA's Risk Management Program, a similar
program that applies to facilities with threshold quantities of
specified dangerous chemicals); Amanda Frank and Seth Moulton, Kids in
Danger Zones: One in Three U.S. Schoolchildren at Risk from Chemical
Catastrophes, Center for Effective Government, (September 2014), http:/
/www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/kids-in-danger-zones-
report.pdf.
\2\Orum et al., supra note 5, at 6.
\3\``Chemical Plants Are Feared as Targets,'' Washington Post,
(Dec. 16, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/
12/16/chemical-plants-are-feared-as-targets/82044d35-a3ff-499a-b4c1-
3174854e80a4/?utm_term=.2aff31c408cd.
\4\``Study Assesses Risk of Attack on Chemical Plant,'' Washington
Post, (Mar. 12, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2002/03/12/study-assesses-risk-of-attack-on-chemical-plant/dc3a51ae-
9988-459a-a6f7-00b26ccb5a56/.
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Despite these dire warnings, it took Congress years to
act--and even then, it only did so at the request of then-DHS
Secretary Michael Chertoff, and with validation from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) that ``chemical
facilities are among the most attractive targets for
terrorists,''\5\ yet ``DHS does not have the authority to
require chemical facilities to . . . implement security
measures.''\6\
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\5\DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, but
Additional Authority Is Needed, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Env't
& Pub. Works (June 21, 2006) (statement for the record by John B.
Stephenson, Nat. Res. & Env't, GAO), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-
899t.pdf.
\6\DHS is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities,
but Additional Authority is Needed, GAO-06-150, (Jan. 27, 2006),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-150.pdf.
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The original CFATS authorization came in the form of
appropriations language directing DHS to develop regulations to
secure high-risk chemical facilities against terrorist
attacks.\7\ The resulting regulations were flexible and non-
prescriptive; they required facilities with certain quantities
of dangerous chemicals to report to DHS, conduct a
vulnerability assessment, and adopt a Site Security Plan that
adhered to a broad set of security guidelines.\8\
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\7\Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub.
L. 109-295, Sec. 550, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006).
\8\Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17688
(Apr. 9, 2007) (codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27).
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The program was extended--on an annual basis--through
appropriations acts until 2014, when Congress passed the
Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2014, authorizing it for 4 years.\9\ Since that
time, CFATS has been extended multiple times through shorter-
term, change-the-date extensions without any substantive
improvements to the underlying legislative authority.\10\ These
short-term extensions are better than nothing, but they do not
support long-term planning and strategy, and they routinely
create uncertainty for the program and its regulated community.
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\9\Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-254, 128 Stat. 2898 (2014).
\10\Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program Extension
Act, Pub. L. 116-2, 133 Stat. 5 (2019); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. 116-136, Sec. 16007, 134
Stat. 281, 546 (2020); An Act to extend the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program of the Department of Homeland Security, and
for other purposes, Pub. L. 116-150, 134 Stat. 679 (2020) (extending
the program for a period of 3 years through July 27, 2023).
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Still, there is ample evidence that CFATS has made the
country safer. Through CFATS, DHS is able to work
collaboratively with high-risk facilities as they implement
security measures, address vulnerabilities, and reduce risks.
Further, DHS coordinates with interagency partners like the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to identify ``outlier'' facilities that
might otherwise fall through the cracks. Perhaps most
importantly, since CFATS was created in 2007, the number of
high-risk facilities has dropped by half--from more than 7,000
to 3,200 today. This indicates that CFATS is yielding real
security value for chemical sector stakeholders, as well as the
families, workers, and communities that might otherwise be in
harm's way.
We agree with our Republican colleagues that reauthorizing
CFATS is a national security imperative. No one is served by
allowing this vital security program to lapse.
At the same time, the program that exists today is riddled
with operational challenges, security gaps, and statutory
ambiguities that desperately need to be addressed--some of
which have been on this Committee's radar for almost a decade.
These long-standing issues have not--and will not--fix
themselves. It is therefore deeply disappointing that the
Committee is being asked to reauthorize CFATS without any
changes. And yet again, we would not be in this predicament if
Committee Republicans--preoccupied with MAGA investigations--
had acted in a timely fashion.
When I became Chair of this Committee again in 2019, CFATS
was just a few weeks away from sunsetting. I introduced a
short-term extension bill on the second day of the Congress,
and it became law by January 18th of that year.\11\ In February
2019, the Committee held a hearing with DHS officials
responsible for administering CFATS, as well an expert witness
from GAO to elaborate on their extensive body of work on
CFATS.\12\ The next month, the Committee followed that hearing
with a private-sector panel, featuring a wide range of chemical
security experts, chemical sector stakeholders, labor unions,
and environmental justice advocates.\13\ Witnesses raised
concerns about several issues, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program Extension
Act, supra note 12.
\12\Securing Our Nation's Chemical Facilities: Building on the
Progress of the CFATS Program, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019).
\13\Securing Our Nation's Chemical Facilities: Stakeholder
Perspectives on Improving the CFATS Program, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Prot. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the lack of coordination and information
sharing with first responders;
the adequacy of training for chemical
inspectors, particularly on cybersecurity;
the focus on physical security rather than
cybersecurity and questions about the value of
cybersecurity audits performed by untrained inspectors;
the methodology DHS uses to assess risk and
assign facilities to risk tiers;
potential security gaps presented by CFATS
statutory exemptions; and
local emergency response capacity to respond
to a terrorist attack at a chemical facility,
particularly in areas with multiple CFATS facilities or
other critical infrastructure nearby.
By August 2019, this Committee had moved a comprehensive,
vetted reauthorization bill that would have addressed these
issues and improved the security value of the program, with
extensive input from chemical security stakeholders.\14\
Unfortunately, after months of negotiations, the legislation
stalled due to partisan gridlock, and Committee Democrats had
to stomach a short-term extension, the purpose of which was to
give Congress more time to examine problems that we already
knew existed.
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\14\Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2019, H.R. 3256, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Congress, regrettably, the Committee has not held a
single dedicated hearing on the CFATS program. While Chairman
Green has initiated a GAO report to evaluate the CFATS program,
this Committee already has a robust oversight history with this
program and multiple GAO findings to draw from. We do not need
another GAO report to tell us what we already know: There are
problems with the CFATS program that Congress must address.
FIRST RESPONDER COORDINATION, INFORMATION SHARING, AND CAPACITY
In April 2013, an explosion at a fertilizer plant in West,
Texas, killed more than a dozen first responders and leveled
neighboring buildings. DHS had no knowledge of the facility,
even though the facility had reported threshold quantities of
CFATS chemicals to other Federal and State regulators.\15\ The
U.S. Chemical Safety Board found that first responders lacked
vital information about the West Fertilizer Company's complete
chemical holdings and the holdings' properties that would have
enabled them to make informed decisions in response to the
facility's fire and explosion.\16\
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\15\West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion Investigation Report
(Final), U.S. Chem. Safety & Hazard Investigation Bd., (Jan. 2016),
https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=5983.
\16\Id. at 116-117.
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In 2018, GAO found that DHS was still not doing enough to
ensure that CFATS facilities coordinate and engage with local
first responders.\17\ Many emergency response providers were
not even aware that there were CFATS facilities in their
communities, and some had not even heard of the program. Even
where coordination had occurred, many first responders did not
know what chemicals were stored onsite or how to handle those
chemicals safely during an emergency. It also remains unclear
if communities with multiple CFATS facilities have local
emergency response capacity to respond to a terrorist attack or
incident at a CFATS facility.
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\17\DHS Should Take Actions to Measure Reduction in Chemical
Facility Vulnerability and Share Information with First Responders,
GAO-18-538 (Aug 8, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-538.pdf.
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To improve coordination and outreach to first responders,
Representative Donald M. Payne, Jr., offered an amendment to
require that DHS disapprove any Site Security Plan that does
not cite the name, number, and other information about the
local emergency response provider and include a documented
policy to contact them at least annually. Further, the
amendment would have required DHS to audit compliance with this
section at least annually. Republicans rejected the Payne
amendment.
To improve information sharing with first responders,
Representative Seth Magaziner offered an amendment to require
DHS to make available, upon request, protected CFATS
information (e.g., Site Security Plans, vulnerability
assessments) to State and local government officials (including
law enforcement and emergency response providers) on CFATS
facilities in their jurisdiction unless it would be subject to
disclosure under State or local laws. Republicans rejected the
Magaziner amendment.
To better understand local emergency response capacity,
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee offered an amendment
requiring the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to
evaluate emergency response capacity in areas with high
concentrations of CFATS facilities--including whether they have
adequate evacuation plans, shelter-in-place protocols, and
chemical training--and identify opportunities to provide
additional support and training as necessary. Republicans
rejected the Jackson Lee amendment.
TRAINING FOR CFATS CHEMICAL SECURITY INSPECTORS, INCLUDING
CYBERSECURITY
For years, Congress has heard that training provided to
CFATS Chemical Security Inspectors (CSIs) is inadequate,
outdated, and relies too heavily on on-the-job training.
Moreover, inspectors are pushed to make hasty decisions or hit
target numbers for inspections, ultimately prioritizing volume
and speed over quality of inspections.\18\ CSIs particularly
lack training in cybersecurity, where threats and adversary
tactics are constantly evolving and identifying noncompliance
requires specialized expertise. At a Subcommittee roundtable in
May, the CSI union representative reiterated these same
complaints and suggested that DHS is unlikely to make changes
unless statutorily required to do so.\19\
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\18\Examining the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
Program, Roundtable Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff.,
115th Cong. (June 12, 2018) (statement of Jesse LeGros, Jr., Vice
President, Infrastructure Protection, AFGE National Local #918).
\19\Member Briefing with Representatives of the Chemical Sector
Industry, Subcomm. on Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Prot. of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 118th Cong. (May 24, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Robert Menendez offered an amendment to
require DHS to update its training program at least every 3
years and incorporate new minimum training opportunities for
newly hired inspectors and existing employees, including annual
refresher training, continuing education and professional
development tools, training on chemical hazards, and other
areas that would improve the value of inspections. Republicans
rejected the Menendez amendment.
Representative Eric Swalwell offered an amendment to
require that DHS provide training sufficient for CSIs to audit
compliance with respect to all risk-based performance
standards, including cybersecurity, and offer proper
credentials and certifications necessary to carry out
cybersecurity audits. Republicans rejected the Swalwell
amendment.
CYBERSECURITY
The CFATS program is almost entirely focused on physical
security rather than cybersecurity, even though cyberattacks on
chemical facilities and other critical infrastructure has
escalated rapidly in recent years. In 2020, GAO found that even
the minimal cybersecurity guidance contained in CFATS Risk-
Based Performance Standards Guidance was more than 10 years
old.\20\
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\20\Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at
High-Risk Chemical Facilities, GAO-20-453 (May 14, 2020), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-453.pdf.
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Representative Swalwell offered an amendment to require
that DHS review its current CFATS cybersecurity guidance
against the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's
(CISA) more recent Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance
Goals,\21\ identify any disparities, and report to Congress
with recommendations to address them. Republicans rejected the
Swalwell amendment.
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\21\CISA, Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, https://
www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals (last visited
July 14, 2023).
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BASELINE FREQUENCY OF INSPECTIONS
Representative Yvette D. Clarke offered an amendment to
require that DHS continue its current practice of inspecting
CFATS facilities for compliance at least every 24 months, in
response to concerns that DHS might reduce the frequency of
inspections--or use alternative inspection tools (e.g., virtual
consultations)--to cut costs. Republicans rejected the Clarke
amendment.
DRONE REPORTING
Representative Troy A. Carter offered an amendment to
require that DHS develop a secure communications platform to
allow CFATS owners and operators to voluntarily report
information on emerging threats, including terrorism threats,
posed by unmanned aircraft systems. Republicans rejected the
Carter amendment.
EVALUATING CFATS RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Representative Carter offered a second amendment requiring
GAO to evaluate the CFATS risk assessment methodology and
assess wheth