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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-157

SATELLITE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS STREAMLINING ACT

2023-07-25

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 1338, the ``Satellite and Telecommunications Streamlining Act'' or ``SAT Streamlining Act'' would amend the Communications Act of 1934 (``Act'') to add a new section clarifying the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) authority to grant licenses for geostationary (GSO) and non- geostationary (NGSO) satellite services, grants of market access for foreign-licensed GSO and NGSO satellite services, and authorizations for Earth stations (including gateway stations). H.R. 1338 would also direct how the FCC grants modifications to, and renewals of, a license or grant of market access granted under this authority. Finally, H.R. 1338 would require the FCC to issue rules within 18 months after the date of enactment to implement key provisions of the bill.

Background and Need for Legislation

The Committee on Energy and Commerce (Committee) has long prioritized closing the digital divide and encouraged investment and innovation in communications technologies. Communications services provided by satellite operators are an important component of the communications marketplace. Currently, satellite operators provide both broadband service to homes and businesses as well as mission critical services like voice, video, data, and observation capabilities to critical infrastructure companies and the Federal government.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\See, 2022 Communications Marketplace Report, Federal Communications Commission, at para. 174. Rel. December 30, 2022. Available at: https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/ consolidated-communications-marketplace-reports/CMR-2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FCC has jurisdiction and authority to regulate ``all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United States . . . and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided.''\2\ The FCC is also responsible for authorizing the use of electromagnetic spectrum (``spectrum'') in the United States, and has authority to ``[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such prescriptions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. . . .''\3\ The FCC has used this authority to regulate the transmission and reception of satellite communications for decades, and therefore plays an important role in advancing the availability of satellite- provided communications services in the United States.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\Communications Act of 1934 Sec. Sec. 2; 303 at 47 U.S.C. 152.; 303. \3\47 U.S.C. 303(r). \4\Supra, Note 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Satellites operate in either a geostationary satellite orbit (GSO) or in a non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO). GSO satellite systems rotate around the Earth at the same speed that the Earth rotates. This means they appear as stationary from Earth, and operate at approximately 22,300 miles above earth, which can result in a delay in transmitting a signal from Earth to the satellite, and back. NGSO systems, on the other hand, can operate at varying altitudes, and many current and proposed systems operate closer to Earth in low earth orbit (LEO). NGSO systems can also operate in medium earth orbit (MEO) or high earth orbit (HEO). Due to their closer proximity to Earth, NGSO satellites can offer lower latency services than their GSO counterparts. However, as any one satellite moves closer to Earth, the geographic area it serves becomes smaller. Thus, NGSO systems in low earth orbit require many satellites to cover the same area that may be served by only a few GSO satellites. In the same way cellular networks hand off your signal from one tower to the next, certain NGSO systems also hand off a signal to other satellites in the constellation as they pass over the consumer on Earth. Satellite operators must make tradeoffs when determining whether to design and operate a system in geostationary orbit or non-geostationary orbit. GSO systems require fewer satellites to provide ubiquitous coverage around the world, but may be more expensive to build and launch, have higher latency that could affect the quality of service, and require larger, higher powered ground stations.\5\ On the other hand, NGSO satellites may provide less latency, but require many more satellites to be launched and must operate as a constellation to reach a desired service level or ubiquitous coverage.\6\ Much like the terrestrial communications marketplace where broadband providers utilize fixed and wireless technologies, many satellite communications providers operate or partner with other terrestrial or satellite communications providers to utilize satellites in both geostationary and non-geostationary orbit for best service. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Supra, Note 1 at para.177. \6\Supra, Note 1 at para. 178. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The satellite communications marketplace has transformed in recent years, with record levels of pending applications at the FCC for the use of spectrum for satellite communications technologies.\7\ Recently, over twenty distinct applications have been submitted to the FCC for authorization of more than 70,000 satellites to provide communications services.\8\ This is largely because the economics of launching new satellites have become more affordable, and private capital investments in commercial satellite communications providers has increased.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\See A. Kriezis and W. Q. Lohmeyer, U.S. Market Access Authorization Timeline Analysis for Megaconstellation Networks, OSSTP (Apr, 2022), https://www.osstp.org/fcc-analysis. \8\Supra, Note 6. \9\See, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/future-space-economy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite advancements in technology and increased investment, the process by which the FCC reviews applications to provide satellite communications services has not substantially changed. In 2003, the FCC established a mechanism to review applications for authorization to operate a NGSO satellite system to provide Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) called ``processing rounds.''\10\ Under the processing round mechanism, if the application is the first application in a processing round, and the FCC determines it is acceptable for filing, the application serves as the ``lead application.'' The FCC then puts the lead application on public notice and sets a cutoff date by which other competing applications, pleadings, or petitions to deny may be filed.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\47 C.F.R. 25.157(c); See, ``In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies'', First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Communications Commission (IB Docket No. 02-34). Rel. May 19, 2003. Available at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-03-102A1.pdf. \11\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the completion of the processing round, the Commission grants any application that meets its requirements.\12\ Because NGSO FSS licensees share the same frequencies, they are also required to coordinate the use of spectrum with other users in those frequencies in good faith.\13\ Under the current rules, NGSO FSS systems revert to a band splitting procedure that reduces the use of spectrum by each system absent a coordination agreement to avoid system interference.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\47 C.F.R. 25.156. \13\47 C.F.R. 25.261(b). \14\47 C.F.R. 25.261(c). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Entities that are licensed to provide NGSO FSS services in another country may also serve the U.S. market.\15\ However, these entities must petition the FCC for authorization to transmit to Earth stations in the United States, also known as petitioning for ``market access.'' Under the FCC's current rules, petitions for a grant of market access are granted on the same basis as an application for a license. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\47 C.F.R. 25.137. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Due to the global nature of the satellite marketplace, the use of spectrum and orbital resources is coordinated by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). These resources are limited, and the ITU has devised a process that gives priority to systems that have filed their systems earlier than others. Domestic administrations, like the FCC, must ensure that their licensing rules for satellite systems are consistent with ITU Radio Regulations. While the ITU Radio Regulations provide requirements for how domestic administrations implement their licensing frameworks, many other countries do not take steps to ensure systems they license are good stewards of space or spectrum. Because the satellite marketplace is global, operators have a choice where they file for their license and may opt to file in certain jurisdictions over others to avoid perceived regulatory burdens, including those intended to ensure that operators are good stewards of space. To this end, the Committee has identified that the FCC's processing round mechanism incentivizes outcomes that result in delays in processing applications, gamesmanship of the FCC's rules by market participants, inefficient system designs, and entities seeking authorization and licensing of satellite services intended to serve the United States through foreign administrations. Specifically, the Committee recognizes that processing rounds may incentivize the parties to prolong the process, including by prompting the FCC to request substantial volumes of information after an application has been submitted to determine its acceptability for filing and whether the application is in the public interest. By their nature, processing rounds seek to resolve harmful interference between NGSO systems by comparing the system design and performance characteristics of each system in the round. However, this analysis drives supplemental information requests that burden applicants and are perceived by some applicants to be unnecessary. The Committee has received satellite application and processing data from the FCC that demonstrates that over time increased application volume and complexity has resulted in significant delays in processing new applications and modifications of existing applications for NGSO and GSO licenses and Earth Station authorizations via the processing round mechanism. Witness testimony and independent review of these data support this.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\See Testimony of Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Hearing Entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communication Technologies.'' and see also Note 8. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, the Committee finds that processing rounds are a barrier to new entrants in many cases. If a prospective applicant seeking authorization to use spectrum for a NGSO system misses the cutoff deadline for the processing round, the applicant must wait until the conclusion of the round before submitting an application that could begin a new processing round in the same frequency band. Furthermore, these later round systems are at a competitive disadvantage under the current processing round framework due to the weaker priority they receive from harmful interference to their spectrum usage. Given the cost of failing to submit an application before the cutoff deadline, prospective applicants are incentivized to design a system and submit the application in a short timeframe, which may result in inefficient system design. If an applicant is able to file an application in a timely manner that is acceptable for filing, placed on public notice, and included in a processing round, the Committee finds that some applicants believe there is a strong incentive for the applicants' competitors to repeatedly file spurious and repetitive technical and other documents in the record to raise the FCC's burden and delay approval of the application. Witness testimony supports the Committee's finding.\17\ This results in FCC staff needing to address concerns raised in the record to meet its burden under the Administrative Procedure Act.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\See Testimony of David Goldman, Hearing Entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.'' \18\5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee also finds that asymmetry between the FCC's satellite communications licensing framework and foreign administrations' licensing frameworks may place companies that choose to license in the United States at a competitive disadvantage. While the satellite marketplace is global, the United States' market is very lucrative one, driving many applicants to seek a license in a foreign administration and then seek market access to serve the United States in order to reap the benefits while avoiding certain regulatory requirements. Given the changes in the satellite marketplace since the establishment of processing rounds in 2003, the Committee finds that the FCC's current licensing framework is outdated as well as may limit competition and inhibit innovation in satellite communications technologies. Accordingly, H.R. 1338 establishes a new framework for licensing these systems to ensure the FCC's processes for licensing adequately respond to current market conditions and facilitate competition and innovation while also leveling the playing field for those satellite systems licensed in the United States.

Committee Action

On February 2, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Launching Into the State of the Satellite Marketplace.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Tom Stroup, President, Satellite Industry Association Julie Zoller, Head of Global Regulatory Affairs, Project Kuiper at Amazon Jennifer A. Manner, Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Echostar Corporation Margo Deckard, Co-Founder and Chief Operating Officer, Lynk Global, Inc. Kari Bingen, Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. On February 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.'' The Subcommittee received testimony on H.R. 1338 from: David Goldman, Senior Director of Satellite Policy, SpaceX Peter Davidson, Vice President of Global Government Affairs & Policy, Intelsat Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Professor of Engineering, Olin College of Engineering Danielle Pineres, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs & Compliance, Planet Labs On March 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 1338, without amendment, to the full Committee by a record vote of 23 yeas and 0 nays. On March 23, 2023, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 1338, as amended, favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 44 yeas and 0 nays.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during the Committee consideration: Oversight Findings and Recommendations Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report. New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that H.R. 1338 would result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues.

Congressional Budget Office Estimate

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general performance goal or objective of this legislation is to establish specific authority for the Federal Communications Commission that streamlines the process to grant licenses, market access, and authorizations for nongeostationary orbit satellite systems, geostationary orbit satellite systems, and earth stations, as well as modifications and renewals of those licenses, grants of market access, and authorizations. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 1338 is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 1338: On February 2, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Launching Into the State of the Satellite Marketplace.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Tom Stroup, President, Satellite Industry Association Julie Zoller, Head of Global Regulatory Affairs, Project Kuiper at Amazon Jennifer A. Manner, Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Echostar Corporation Margo Deckard, Co-Founder and Chief Operating Officer, Lynk Global, Inc. Kari Bingen, Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. On February 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.'' The Subcommittee received testimony on H.R. 1338 from: David Goldman, Senior Director of Satellite Policy, SpaceX Peter Davidson, Vice President of Global Government Affairs & Policy, Intelsat Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Professor of Engineering, Olin College of Engineering Danielle Pineres, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs & Compliance, Planet Labs Committee Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was filed, the estimate was not available. Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the Committee finds that H.R. 1338 contains no earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title This section designates that the short title may be cited as the ``Satellite and Telecommunications Streamlining Act'' or the ``SAT Streamlining Act''. Section 2. Authority Regarding Certain Licenses Subsection (a) amends Title III of the Communications Act of 1934 by creating a new section 346 titled, ``Radiofrequency Licensing Authority Regarding Certain Operations.'' This section provides authority for the FCC to authorize licenses and grants of market access for non-geostationary orbit and geostationary orbit satellite systems. This section also provides authority for the FCC to authorize the use of Earth stations to receive a signal from a NGSO or GSO space station licensed under section 346. This new authority would supersede any other authority the Commission has previously asserted. The newly created section 346 has several subsections that further define the FCC's authority and key terms. Subsection (a)(1) of the SAT Streamlining Act would require the FCC to establish rules within 18 months to implement various provisions of the new section. This subsection would apply to all NGSO applications for a license under subsection (b) and all NGSO applications for a grant of market access under subsection (c), and some provisions would apply to GSO applications. The FCC's rules must include: (1) Specific, measurable, and technology-neutral performance objectives for space safety and orbital debris; (2) Specific modifications or classes of modifications that warrant expedited review; (3) How the FCC should be notified of very minor modifications; (4) How grandfathered satellite systems are required to notify the FCC of modification requests; (5) Specific actions taken by a licensee that constitute a failure to coordinate shared spectrum in good faith; (6) A quantifiable level of interference protection for NGSO satellite systems; (7) Interim rules for grandfathered spectrum rights for certain NGSO satellite systems; and (8) Reportable foreign ownership that triggers a national security review of satellite applications. Subsection (a)(2) provides that with respect to the rules that establish technology neutral, measurable performance objectives for space safety and orbital debris, the FCC may not establish a performance objective that conflicts with any standard practice established in the Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices adopted by the United States Government. Subsection (b) establishes a 1-year shot clock for approval or denial of NGSO and GSO applications, except for applications that are subject to tolling under subsection (m) or national security review under subsection (n). Subsection (b) also requires NGSO and GSO applicants, as part of their application, to submit performance metrics with respect to the frequencies and transmission power to be used and a demonstration of compliance with the performance objectives established in the FCC's rules under subsection (a). Subsection (b) provides that an initial license term may be no more than 15 years. Finally, subsection (b)(6) establishes a streamlined approval process for small, FCC-licensed NGSO systems that meet additional, stringent requirements, including the good faith and interference requirements established under subsection (h). Subsection (c) provides that the FCC may grant petitions for market access by a foreign-licensed NGSO or GSO system. Subsection (c) requires the FCC to grant NGSO applications for a grant of market access subject to the same performance metrics and compliance required by applicants for a license under subsection (b). Finally, subsection (c) provides that an initial grant of market access term may be no more than 15 years. The Committee recognizes that the FCC currently grants access to the United States market by approving a ``petition'' for declaratory rulemaking, rather than an ``application.'' The Committee views these terms as interchangeable, and for purposes of section 346, the term application includes petitions for declaratory rulemaking regarding market access requests. Subsection (d) requires the FCC to grant authorizations for individually licensed Earth stations that receive a signal from, and send a signal to, a NGSO or GSO system approved by the FCC (including gateway stations) within 1 year of receiving the application. Subsection (d) also requires the FCC to grant authorizations for receive-only Earth stations that receive a signal from a NGSO or GSO system approved by the FCC within 30 days of receiving the application. The FCC would be permitted to pause these shot clocks if an application is subject to tolling under subsection (m) or national security review under subsection (n). Additionally, applications for individually licensed Earth stations (including gateway stations) and receive-only Earth stations would be deemed granted if the FCC fails to act on the application within the deadline, except in the case where subsections (m) or (n) are triggered by the FCC. Subsection (e) establishes the FCC's public interest authority to grant an application, modification or renewal of NGSO systems, GSO systems, and Earth stations. In determining whether an application, modification, or renewal of a NGSO license or grant of market access in a band with service rules for shared spectrum is in the public interest, the FCC is required to determine if the quantifiable level of protection established under subsection (h)(4) is satisfied. Additionally, for NGSO licenses or grants of market access that are required by the ITU to protect radioastronomy observatories, the FCC must find that such observatories are protected in determining whether an application, modification, or renewal for any license or grant of market access is in the public interest. Subsection (f) requires the FCC to renew a license or grant of market access for a NGSO system, GSO system, or Earth station previously approved by the Commission for a term not to exceed the initial term of the license or grant of market access if it meets the renewal requirements in section 309(k) of the Act and subsection (e). Subsection (f) also requires the FCC to grant or deny a renewal application within 180 days. The Committee notes that there may be circumstances where an applicant or the FCC determines that a renewal of a license or grant of market access should be for a term less than the initial term. The Committee finds that such a renewal is consistent with the legislation. Subsection (g) establishes the FCC's authority to approve modifications to NGSO systems, GSO systems, or Earth stations granted under subsections (b), (c), and (d). The FCC would be required to approve or deny major modifications to an FCC- licensed NGSO system within 1 year and may approve major modifications to other systems. In both cases, the FCC would determine modifications in the public interest established in subsection (e), and any applicable shot clocks would be subject to tolling under subsection (m) and national security review under subsection (n). Subsection (g)(2)(A) would also streamline the process for FCC-licensed NGSO systems to make minor modifications if the modification does not exceed the quantifiable level of protection in subsection (h)(4) and the request is limited to modifications, or a class of modifications that: (1) Increase transmission capacity; (2) Improve spectral efficiency, such as by improving compression technologies; (3) Improve the orbital variance efficiency of the constellation; or (4) Otherwise do not substantially modify the constellation. Subsection (g)(2)(B) would streamline the process for FCC- licensed GSO systems to make minor modifications if the FCC determines in the rulemaking under subsection (a)(1)(B) that the modification is minor and the request is limited to modifications, or a class of modifications that: (1) Increase transmission capacity; (2) Improve spectral efficiency, such as by improving compression technologies; or (3) Otherwise does not substantially modify the space station or space stations authorized by the license. Subsection (g)(3) provides that the FCC may approve emergency modifications in limited circumstances. The FCC may approve an emergency modification if there are extraordinary circumstances requiring temporary operations in the public interest and that delay in approving those temporary operations would seriously harm the public interest. However, the FCC may only grant emergency modifications for up to 180 days and is required to include a statement of the reasons why the Commission is approving the modification. The FCC would be permitted to extend an emergency modification for no more than 180 days at a time, and petitions for rehearing are required to get expeditious treatment. Subsection (g)(4) prohibits the FCC from considering modification requests to add an ancillary terrestrial component or modification requests to change the service provided between fixed satellite service and mobile satellite services as minor modifications for streamlined treatment. Such modifications could be considered by the FCC as major modifications. Subsection (g)(5) clarifies the FCC's authority to grant automatically a request to replace one space station (or a component of such space station) or one Earth station (or component of such Earth station) with a technically similar space station or Earth station (or component) that was previously approved by the Commission upon notification by the applicant to the FCC. Finally, subsection (g)(6) provides that the deadlines for major and minor modifications may be extended for applications subject to national security review under subsection (n). Subsection (h) establishes protections from harmful interference for NGSO systems approved under subsections (b) and (c) and directs the FCC to establish a quantifiable level of protection. The Committee notes that with respect to an entity with a covered authorization, the covered period applies on a specific basis to each covered authorization. Accordingly, the Committee expects that interim rules established under subsection (a)(1)(G) similarly apply to each covered authorization for the duration of the covered period. Subsection (h)(1) grandfathers both certain existing licenses or grants of market access for NGSO systems and pending applications for such licenses or grants of market access pending as of the date of enactment of H.R. 1338. As a result, applications for licenses or grants of market access that were pending as of the bill's enactment and that are ultimately granted by the Commission would not be treated as licensed under section 346 and would retain their protection from harmful interference consistent with the terms of such protection afforded before the date of enactment of the SAT Streamlining Act until the earliest of: (1) 11 years; or (2) the date on which a grandfathered license or grant of market access receives FCC approval for a major modification as if they were licensed under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1). Additionally, the Committee recognizes that some applications that are pending at the FCC on or before the date of enactment may be placed into a processing round after the date of enactment. The Committee finds that placing these covered applications into an existing processing round or creating a new processing round for certain covered applications is consistent with the intent of the legislation. Subsection (h)(2)(A) provides that a grandfathered NGSO license or grant of market access may seek renewal under subsection (f) and be treated as licensed under section 346 upon the expiration of the grandfathered license or grant of market access. Subsection (h)(2)(B) provides that a grandfathered NGSO license or grant of market access may modify their license or grant of market access consistent with the rules that govern such requests today. Grandfathered systems may also seek modification under subsection (g), which would end their covered period and therefore their grandfathered protections. The Committee finds that some entities with a covered authorization may choose voluntarily to end their covered period before the involuntary expiration of their covered period and seek treatment under section 346. Accordingly, subsection (h)(2) clarifies how such an entity may exercise that voluntary choice through a modification or renewal of its covered authorization as if it were licensed under section 346 and subject to the standard of review set forth in the section. Subsection (h)(3) would require NGSO systems in a spectrum band with service rules that require licensees or grantees of market access to share the spectrum to make a good faith effort to coordinate the use of the spectrum with any other licensee, grantee, or grandfathered entity that has authorization to use the band. Subsection (h)(4) requires the FCC to establish a quantifiable level of protection that certain NGSO licensees or grantees authorized under subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1) would be required to afford to any other licensee, grantee, or entity with an authorization to use spectrum in the band, except GSO systems authorized under subsections (b)(2) or (c)(2). Subsection (h)(4) also clarifies that for purposes of section 346, references to ``shared spectrum'' in this paragraph apply to only to those spectrum frequencies where more than one licensee or grantee under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1), including an entity with a covered authorization, is authorized to use the same frequencies of such spectrum. Additionally, subsection (h)(4)(B) provides that certain frequencies shall not be treated as being shared. The Committee notes that applicants under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1) to which subsection (h)(4) applies are required to demonstrate compliance with the quantifiable level of protection established by the FCC under subsection (a)(1)(F). The Committee further notes that the requirement under subsection (h)(4) is not intended to include telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) frequencies associated with the application for use of shared spectrum. The Committee expects that the FCC will continue to authorize use of TT&C frequencies for licensees under subsection (b), provided that the FCC determines such use is in the public interest. The Committee also finds that there are several types of services that could be provided by licensees granted under subsection (b) or grantees of a grant of market access under subsection (c) that share spectrum. The Committee understands that not all entities share spectrum in the manner contemplated in subsection (h)(4), and that some entities that seek a license under subsection (b) or a grant of market access under subsection (c) may not be required to comply with the quantifiable level of protection established in subsection (h)(4) if they do not share spectrum in the manner envisioned in this paragraph. However, the Committee notes that a determination regarding the inapplicability of that requirement is made on the basis of how a specific service uses spectrum, and not on the basis of what type of service is provided. The Committee expects that, as technology evolves, some services that do not share spectrum as envisioned in subsection (h)(4) may evolve to utilize technologies that enable the use of spectrum in the manner envisioned under this paragraph. Accordingly, the Committee expects that the requirements that apply to shared sp

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