Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1338, the ``Satellite and Telecommunications
Streamlining Act'' or ``SAT Streamlining Act'' would amend the
Communications Act of 1934 (``Act'') to add a new section
clarifying the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
authority to grant licenses for geostationary (GSO) and non-
geostationary (NGSO) satellite services, grants of market
access for foreign-licensed GSO and NGSO satellite services,
and authorizations for Earth stations (including gateway
stations). H.R. 1338 would also direct how the FCC grants
modifications to, and renewals of, a license or grant of market
access granted under this authority. Finally, H.R. 1338 would
require the FCC to issue rules within 18 months after the date
of enactment to implement key provisions of the bill.
Background and Need for Legislation
The Committee on Energy and Commerce (Committee) has long
prioritized closing the digital divide and encouraged
investment and innovation in communications technologies.
Communications services provided by satellite operators are an
important component of the communications marketplace.
Currently, satellite operators provide both broadband service
to homes and businesses as well as mission critical services
like voice, video, data, and observation capabilities to
critical infrastructure companies and the Federal
government.\1\
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\1\See, 2022 Communications Marketplace Report, Federal
Communications Commission, at para. 174. Rel. December 30, 2022.
Available at: https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/
consolidated-communications-marketplace-reports/CMR-2022.
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The FCC has jurisdiction and authority to regulate ``all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all
interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which
originates and/or is received within the United States . . .
and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as
hereinafter provided.''\2\ The FCC is also responsible for
authorizing the use of electromagnetic spectrum (``spectrum'')
in the United States, and has authority to ``[m]ake such rules
and regulations and prescribe such prescriptions and
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of the Act. . . .''\3\ The FCC has
used this authority to regulate the transmission and reception
of satellite communications for decades, and therefore plays an
important role in advancing the availability of satellite-
provided communications services in the United States.\4\
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\2\Communications Act of 1934 Sec. Sec. 2; 303 at 47 U.S.C. 152.;
303.
\3\47 U.S.C. 303(r).
\4\Supra, Note 2.
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Satellites operate in either a geostationary satellite
orbit (GSO) or in a non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO).
GSO satellite systems rotate around the Earth at the same speed
that the Earth rotates. This means they appear as stationary
from Earth, and operate at approximately 22,300 miles above
earth, which can result in a delay in transmitting a signal
from Earth to the satellite, and back. NGSO systems, on the
other hand, can operate at varying altitudes, and many current
and proposed systems operate closer to Earth in low earth orbit
(LEO). NGSO systems can also operate in medium earth orbit
(MEO) or high earth orbit (HEO). Due to their closer proximity
to Earth, NGSO satellites can offer lower latency services than
their GSO counterparts. However, as any one satellite moves
closer to Earth, the geographic area it serves becomes smaller.
Thus, NGSO systems in low earth orbit require many satellites
to cover the same area that may be served by only a few GSO
satellites. In the same way cellular networks hand off your
signal from one tower to the next, certain NGSO systems also
hand off a signal to other satellites in the constellation as
they pass over the consumer on Earth.
Satellite operators must make tradeoffs when determining
whether to design and operate a system in geostationary orbit
or non-geostationary orbit. GSO systems require fewer
satellites to provide ubiquitous coverage around the world, but
may be more expensive to build and launch, have higher latency
that could affect the quality of service, and require larger,
higher powered ground stations.\5\ On the other hand, NGSO
satellites may provide less latency, but require many more
satellites to be launched and must operate as a constellation
to reach a desired service level or ubiquitous coverage.\6\
Much like the terrestrial communications marketplace where
broadband providers utilize fixed and wireless technologies,
many satellite communications providers operate or partner with
other terrestrial or satellite communications providers to
utilize satellites in both geostationary and non-geostationary
orbit for best service.
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\5\Supra, Note 1 at para.177.
\6\Supra, Note 1 at para. 178.
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The satellite communications marketplace has transformed in
recent years, with record levels of pending applications at the
FCC for the use of spectrum for satellite communications
technologies.\7\ Recently, over twenty distinct applications
have been submitted to the FCC for authorization of more than
70,000 satellites to provide communications services.\8\ This
is largely because the economics of launching new satellites
have become more affordable, and private capital investments in
commercial satellite communications providers has increased.\9\
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\7\See A. Kriezis and W. Q. Lohmeyer, U.S. Market Access
Authorization Timeline Analysis for Megaconstellation Networks, OSSTP
(Apr, 2022), https://www.osstp.org/fcc-analysis.
\8\Supra, Note 6.
\9\See, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/future-space-economy.
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Despite advancements in technology and increased
investment, the process by which the FCC reviews applications
to provide satellite communications services has not
substantially changed. In 2003, the FCC established a mechanism
to review applications for authorization to operate a NGSO
satellite system to provide Fixed Satellite Services (FSS)
called ``processing rounds.''\10\ Under the processing round
mechanism, if the application is the first application in a
processing round, and the FCC determines it is acceptable for
filing, the application serves as the ``lead application.'' The
FCC then puts the lead application on public notice and sets a
cutoff date by which other competing applications, pleadings,
or petitions to deny may be filed.\11\
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\10\47 C.F.R. 25.157(c); See, ``In the Matter of Amendment of the
Commission's Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies'', First Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal
Communications Commission (IB Docket No. 02-34). Rel. May 19, 2003.
Available at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-03-102A1.pdf.
\11\Id.
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At the completion of the processing round, the Commission
grants any application that meets its requirements.\12\ Because
NGSO FSS licensees share the same frequencies, they are also
required to coordinate the use of spectrum with other users in
those frequencies in good faith.\13\ Under the current rules,
NGSO FSS systems revert to a band splitting procedure that
reduces the use of spectrum by each system absent a
coordination agreement to avoid system interference.\14\
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\12\47 C.F.R. 25.156.
\13\47 C.F.R. 25.261(b).
\14\47 C.F.R. 25.261(c).
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Entities that are licensed to provide NGSO FSS services in
another country may also serve the U.S. market.\15\ However,
these entities must petition the FCC for authorization to
transmit to Earth stations in the United States, also known as
petitioning for ``market access.'' Under the FCC's current
rules, petitions for a grant of market access are granted on
the same basis as an application for a license.
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\15\47 C.F.R. 25.137.
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Due to the global nature of the satellite marketplace, the
use of spectrum and orbital resources is coordinated by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). These resources
are limited, and the ITU has devised a process that gives
priority to systems that have filed their systems earlier than
others. Domestic administrations, like the FCC, must ensure
that their licensing rules for satellite systems are consistent
with ITU Radio Regulations.
While the ITU Radio Regulations provide requirements for
how domestic administrations implement their licensing
frameworks, many other countries do not take steps to ensure
systems they license are good stewards of space or spectrum.
Because the satellite marketplace is global, operators have a
choice where they file for their license and may opt to file in
certain jurisdictions over others to avoid perceived regulatory
burdens, including those intended to ensure that operators are
good stewards of space.
To this end, the Committee has identified that the FCC's
processing round mechanism incentivizes outcomes that result in
delays in processing applications, gamesmanship of the FCC's
rules by market participants, inefficient system designs, and
entities seeking authorization and licensing of satellite
services intended to serve the United States through foreign
administrations.
Specifically, the Committee recognizes that processing
rounds may incentivize the parties to prolong the process,
including by prompting the FCC to request substantial volumes
of information after an application has been submitted to
determine its acceptability for filing and whether the
application is in the public interest. By their nature,
processing rounds seek to resolve harmful interference between
NGSO systems by comparing the system design and performance
characteristics of each system in the round. However, this
analysis drives supplemental information requests that burden
applicants and are perceived by some applicants to be
unnecessary. The Committee has received satellite application
and processing data from the FCC that demonstrates that over
time increased application volume and complexity has resulted
in significant delays in processing new applications and
modifications of existing applications for NGSO and GSO
licenses and Earth Station authorizations via the processing
round mechanism. Witness testimony and independent review of
these data support this.\16\
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\16\See Testimony of Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Hearing Entitled,
``Liftoff: Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communication
Technologies.'' and see also Note 8.
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Additionally, the Committee finds that processing rounds
are a barrier to new entrants in many cases. If a prospective
applicant seeking authorization to use spectrum for a NGSO
system misses the cutoff deadline for the processing round, the
applicant must wait until the conclusion of the round before
submitting an application that could begin a new processing
round in the same frequency band. Furthermore, these later
round systems are at a competitive disadvantage under the
current processing round framework due to the weaker priority
they receive from harmful interference to their spectrum usage.
Given the cost of failing to submit an application before the
cutoff deadline, prospective applicants are incentivized to
design a system and submit the application in a short
timeframe, which may result in inefficient system design.
If an applicant is able to file an application in a timely
manner that is acceptable for filing, placed on public notice,
and included in a processing round, the Committee finds that
some applicants believe there is a strong incentive for the
applicants' competitors to repeatedly file spurious and
repetitive technical and other documents in the record to raise
the FCC's burden and delay approval of the application. Witness
testimony supports the Committee's finding.\17\ This results in
FCC staff needing to address concerns raised in the record to
meet its burden under the Administrative Procedure Act.\18\
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\17\See Testimony of David Goldman, Hearing Entitled, ``Liftoff:
Unleashing Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.''
\18\5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
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The Committee also finds that asymmetry between the FCC's
satellite communications licensing framework and foreign
administrations' licensing frameworks may place companies that
choose to license in the United States at a competitive
disadvantage. While the satellite marketplace is global, the
United States' market is very lucrative one, driving many
applicants to seek a license in a foreign administration and
then seek market access to serve the United States in order to
reap the benefits while avoiding certain regulatory
requirements.
Given the changes in the satellite marketplace since the
establishment of processing rounds in 2003, the Committee finds
that the FCC's current licensing framework is outdated as well
as may limit competition and inhibit innovation in satellite
communications technologies. Accordingly, H.R. 1338 establishes
a new framework for licensing these systems to ensure the FCC's
processes for licensing adequately respond to current market
conditions and facilitate competition and innovation while also
leveling the playing field for those satellite systems licensed
in the United States.
Committee Action
On February 2, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Launching Into the State
of the Satellite Marketplace.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
Tom Stroup, President, Satellite Industry
Association
Julie Zoller, Head of Global Regulatory
Affairs, Project Kuiper at Amazon
Jennifer A. Manner, Senior Vice President of
Regulatory Affairs, Echostar Corporation
Margo Deckard, Co-Founder and Chief
Operating Officer, Lynk Global, Inc.
Kari Bingen, Director of the Aerospace
Security Project and Senior Fellow at the International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
On February 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing
Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.'' The
Subcommittee received testimony on H.R. 1338 from:
David Goldman, Senior Director of Satellite
Policy, SpaceX
Peter Davidson, Vice President of Global
Government Affairs & Policy, Intelsat
Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Professor of
Engineering, Olin College of Engineering
Danielle Pineres, Vice President of
Regulatory Affairs & Compliance, Planet Labs
On March 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 1338,
without amendment, to the full Committee by a record vote of 23
yeas and 0 nays. On March 23, 2023, the full Committee on
Energy and Commerce met in open markup session and ordered H.R.
1338, as amended, favorably reported to the House by a record
vote of 44 yeas and 0 nays.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during
the Committee consideration:
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that
are reflected in this report.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and
Tax Expenditures
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee
finds that H.R. 1338 would result in no new or increased budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to
establish specific authority for the Federal Communications
Commission that streamlines the process to grant licenses,
market access, and authorizations for nongeostationary orbit
satellite systems, geostationary orbit satellite systems, and
earth stations, as well as modifications and renewals of those
licenses, grants of market access, and authorizations.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of
H.R. 1338 is known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, including any program that was included in a report to
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 1338:
On February 2, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Launching Into the State
of the Satellite Marketplace.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
Tom Stroup, President, Satellite Industry
Association
Julie Zoller, Head of Global Regulatory
Affairs, Project Kuiper at Amazon
Jennifer A. Manner, Senior Vice President of
Regulatory Affairs, Echostar Corporation
Margo Deckard, Co-Founder and Chief
Operating Officer, Lynk Global, Inc.
Kari Bingen, Director of the Aerospace
Security Project and Senior Fellow at the International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
On February 8, 2023, the Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology held a hearing entitled, ``Liftoff: Unleashing
Innovation in Satellite Communications Technologies.'' The
Subcommittee received testimony on H.R. 1338 from:
David Goldman, Senior Director of Satellite
Policy, SpaceX
Peter Davidson, Vice President of Global
Government Affairs & Policy, Intelsat
Whitney Q. Lohmeyer, Professor of
Engineering, Olin College of Engineering
Danielle Pineres, Vice President of
Regulatory Affairs & Compliance, Planet Labs
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was
filed, the estimate was not available.
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits
Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the
Committee finds that H.R. 1338 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section designates that the short title may be cited
as the ``Satellite and Telecommunications Streamlining Act'' or
the ``SAT Streamlining Act''.
Section 2. Authority Regarding Certain Licenses
Subsection (a) amends Title III of the Communications Act
of 1934 by creating a new section 346 titled, ``Radiofrequency
Licensing Authority Regarding Certain Operations.'' This
section provides authority for the FCC to authorize licenses
and grants of market access for non-geostationary orbit and
geostationary orbit satellite systems. This section also
provides authority for the FCC to authorize the use of Earth
stations to receive a signal from a NGSO or GSO space station
licensed under section 346. This new authority would supersede
any other authority the Commission has previously asserted.
The newly created section 346 has several subsections that
further define the FCC's authority and key terms.
Subsection (a)(1) of the SAT Streamlining Act would require
the FCC to establish rules within 18 months to implement
various provisions of the new section. This subsection would
apply to all NGSO applications for a license under subsection
(b) and all NGSO applications for a grant of market access
under subsection (c), and some provisions would apply to GSO
applications. The FCC's rules must include: (1) Specific,
measurable, and technology-neutral performance objectives for
space safety and orbital debris; (2) Specific modifications or
classes of modifications that warrant expedited review; (3) How
the FCC should be notified of very minor modifications; (4) How
grandfathered satellite systems are required to notify the FCC
of modification requests; (5) Specific actions taken by a
licensee that constitute a failure to coordinate shared
spectrum in good faith; (6) A quantifiable level of
interference protection for NGSO satellite systems; (7) Interim
rules for grandfathered spectrum rights for certain NGSO
satellite systems; and (8) Reportable foreign ownership that
triggers a national security review of satellite applications.
Subsection (a)(2) provides that with respect to the rules
that establish technology neutral, measurable performance
objectives for space safety and orbital debris, the FCC may not
establish a performance objective that conflicts with any
standard practice established in the Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standard Practices adopted by the United States Government.
Subsection (b) establishes a 1-year shot clock for approval
or denial of NGSO and GSO applications, except for applications
that are subject to tolling under subsection (m) or national
security review under subsection (n).
Subsection (b) also requires NGSO and GSO applicants, as
part of their application, to submit performance metrics with
respect to the frequencies and transmission power to be used
and a demonstration of compliance with the performance
objectives established in the FCC's rules under subsection (a).
Subsection (b) provides that an initial license term may be no
more than 15 years.
Finally, subsection (b)(6) establishes a streamlined
approval process for small, FCC-licensed NGSO systems that meet
additional, stringent requirements, including the good faith
and interference requirements established under subsection (h).
Subsection (c) provides that the FCC may grant petitions
for market access by a foreign-licensed NGSO or GSO system.
Subsection (c) requires the FCC to grant NGSO applications for
a grant of market access subject to the same performance
metrics and compliance required by applicants for a license
under subsection (b). Finally, subsection (c) provides that an
initial grant of market access term may be no more than 15
years.
The Committee recognizes that the FCC currently grants
access to the United States market by approving a ``petition''
for declaratory rulemaking, rather than an ``application.'' The
Committee views these terms as interchangeable, and for
purposes of section 346, the term application includes
petitions for declaratory rulemaking regarding market access
requests.
Subsection (d) requires the FCC to grant authorizations for
individually licensed Earth stations that receive a signal
from, and send a signal to, a NGSO or GSO system approved by
the FCC (including gateway stations) within 1 year of receiving
the application. Subsection (d) also requires the FCC to grant
authorizations for receive-only Earth stations that receive a
signal from a NGSO or GSO system approved by the FCC within 30
days of receiving the application. The FCC would be permitted
to pause these shot clocks if an application is subject to
tolling under subsection (m) or national security review under
subsection (n). Additionally, applications for individually
licensed Earth stations (including gateway stations) and
receive-only Earth stations would be deemed granted if the FCC
fails to act on the application within the deadline, except in
the case where subsections (m) or (n) are triggered by the FCC.
Subsection (e) establishes the FCC's public interest
authority to grant an application, modification or renewal of
NGSO systems, GSO systems, and Earth stations. In determining
whether an application, modification, or renewal of a NGSO
license or grant of market access in a band with service rules
for shared spectrum is in the public interest, the FCC is
required to determine if the quantifiable level of protection
established under subsection (h)(4) is satisfied. Additionally,
for NGSO licenses or grants of market access that are required
by the ITU to protect radioastronomy observatories, the FCC
must find that such observatories are protected in determining
whether an application, modification, or renewal for any
license or grant of market access is in the public interest.
Subsection (f) requires the FCC to renew a license or grant
of market access for a NGSO system, GSO system, or Earth
station previously approved by the Commission for a term not to
exceed the initial term of the license or grant of market
access if it meets the renewal requirements in section 309(k)
of the Act and subsection (e). Subsection (f) also requires the
FCC to grant or deny a renewal application within 180 days.
The Committee notes that there may be circumstances where
an applicant or the FCC determines that a renewal of a license
or grant of market access should be for a term less than the
initial term. The Committee finds that such a renewal is
consistent with the legislation.
Subsection (g) establishes the FCC's authority to approve
modifications to NGSO systems, GSO systems, or Earth stations
granted under subsections (b), (c), and (d). The FCC would be
required to approve or deny major modifications to an FCC-
licensed NGSO system within 1 year and may approve major
modifications to other systems. In both cases, the FCC would
determine modifications in the public interest established in
subsection (e), and any applicable shot clocks would be subject
to tolling under subsection (m) and national security review
under subsection (n).
Subsection (g)(2)(A) would also streamline the process for
FCC-licensed NGSO systems to make minor modifications if the
modification does not exceed the quantifiable level of
protection in subsection (h)(4) and the request is limited to
modifications, or a class of modifications that: (1) Increase
transmission capacity; (2) Improve spectral efficiency, such as
by improving compression technologies; (3) Improve the orbital
variance efficiency of the constellation; or (4) Otherwise do
not substantially modify the constellation.
Subsection (g)(2)(B) would streamline the process for FCC-
licensed GSO systems to make minor modifications if the FCC
determines in the rulemaking under subsection (a)(1)(B) that
the modification is minor and the request is limited to
modifications, or a class of modifications that: (1) Increase
transmission capacity; (2) Improve spectral efficiency, such as
by improving compression technologies; or (3) Otherwise does
not substantially modify the space station or space stations
authorized by the license.
Subsection (g)(3) provides that the FCC may approve
emergency modifications in limited circumstances. The FCC may
approve an emergency modification if there are extraordinary
circumstances requiring temporary operations in the public
interest and that delay in approving those temporary operations
would seriously harm the public interest. However, the FCC may
only grant emergency modifications for up to 180 days and is
required to include a statement of the reasons why the
Commission is approving the modification. The FCC would be
permitted to extend an emergency modification for no more than
180 days at a time, and petitions for rehearing are required to
get expeditious treatment.
Subsection (g)(4) prohibits the FCC from considering
modification requests to add an ancillary terrestrial component
or modification requests to change the service provided between
fixed satellite service and mobile satellite services as minor
modifications for streamlined treatment. Such modifications
could be considered by the FCC as major modifications.
Subsection (g)(5) clarifies the FCC's authority to grant
automatically a request to replace one space station (or a
component of such space station) or one Earth station (or
component of such Earth station) with a technically similar
space station or Earth station (or component) that was
previously approved by the Commission upon notification by the
applicant to the FCC.
Finally, subsection (g)(6) provides that the deadlines for
major and minor modifications may be extended for applications
subject to national security review under subsection (n).
Subsection (h) establishes protections from harmful
interference for NGSO systems approved under subsections (b)
and (c) and directs the FCC to establish a quantifiable level
of protection.
The Committee notes that with respect to an entity with a
covered authorization, the covered period applies on a specific
basis to each covered authorization. Accordingly, the Committee
expects that interim rules established under subsection
(a)(1)(G) similarly apply to each covered authorization for the
duration of the covered period.
Subsection (h)(1) grandfathers both certain existing
licenses or grants of market access for NGSO systems and
pending applications for such licenses or grants of market
access pending as of the date of enactment of H.R. 1338. As a
result, applications for licenses or grants of market access
that were pending as of the bill's enactment and that are
ultimately granted by the Commission would not be treated as
licensed under section 346 and would retain their protection
from harmful interference consistent with the terms of such
protection afforded before the date of enactment of the SAT
Streamlining Act until the earliest of: (1) 11 years; or (2)
the date on which a grandfathered license or grant of market
access receives FCC approval for a major modification as if
they were licensed under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1).
Additionally, the Committee recognizes that some
applications that are pending at the FCC on or before the date
of enactment may be placed into a processing round after the
date of enactment. The Committee finds that placing these
covered applications into an existing processing round or
creating a new processing round for certain covered
applications is consistent with the intent of the legislation.
Subsection (h)(2)(A) provides that a grandfathered NGSO
license or grant of market access may seek renewal under
subsection (f) and be treated as licensed under section 346
upon the expiration of the grandfathered license or grant of
market access.
Subsection (h)(2)(B) provides that a grandfathered NGSO
license or grant of market access may modify their license or
grant of market access consistent with the rules that govern
such requests today. Grandfathered systems may also seek
modification under subsection (g), which would end their
covered period and therefore their grandfathered protections.
The Committee finds that some entities with a covered
authorization may choose voluntarily to end their covered
period before the involuntary expiration of their covered
period and seek treatment under section 346. Accordingly,
subsection (h)(2) clarifies how such an entity may exercise
that voluntary choice through a modification or renewal of its
covered authorization as if it were licensed under section 346
and subject to the standard of review set forth in the section.
Subsection (h)(3) would require NGSO systems in a spectrum
band with service rules that require licensees or grantees of
market access to share the spectrum to make a good faith effort
to coordinate the use of the spectrum with any other licensee,
grantee, or grandfathered entity that has authorization to use
the band.
Subsection (h)(4) requires the FCC to establish a
quantifiable level of protection that certain NGSO licensees or
grantees authorized under subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1) would
be required to afford to any other licensee, grantee, or entity
with an authorization to use spectrum in the band, except GSO
systems authorized under subsections (b)(2) or (c)(2).
Subsection (h)(4) also clarifies that for purposes of section
346, references to ``shared spectrum'' in this paragraph apply
to only to those spectrum frequencies where more than one
licensee or grantee under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(1),
including an entity with a covered authorization, is authorized
to use the same frequencies of such spectrum. Additionally,
subsection (h)(4)(B) provides that certain frequencies shall
not be treated as being shared.
The Committee notes that applicants under subsection (b)(1)
or (c)(1) to which subsection (h)(4) applies are required to
demonstrate compliance with the quantifiable level of
protection established by the FCC under subsection (a)(1)(F).
The Committee further notes that the requirement under
subsection (h)(4) is not intended to include telemetry,
tracking, and control (TT&C) frequencies associated with the
application for use of shared spectrum. The Committee expects
that the FCC will continue to authorize use of TT&C frequencies
for licensees under subsection (b), provided that the FCC
determines such use is in the public interest.
The Committee also finds that there are several types of
services that could be provided by licensees granted under
subsection (b) or grantees of a grant of market access under
subsection (c) that share spectrum. The Committee understands
that not all entities share spectrum in the manner contemplated
in subsection (h)(4), and that some entities that seek a
license under subsection (b) or a grant of market access under
subsection (c) may not be required to comply with the
quantifiable level of protection established in subsection
(h)(4) if they do not share spectrum in the manner envisioned
in this paragraph. However, the Committee notes that a
determination regarding the inapplicability of that requirement
is made on the basis of how a specific service uses spectrum,
and not on the basis of what type of service is provided. The
Committee expects that, as technology evolves, some services
that do not share spectrum as envisioned in subsection (h)(4)
may evolve to utilize technologies that enable the use of
spectrum in the manner envisioned under this paragraph.
Accordingly, the Committee expects that the requirements that
apply to shared sp