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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-224

PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS ACT

2023-09-26

Committees

Associated legislation

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 5340] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5340) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure that pension plans provide notice to participants and beneficiaries on risks associated with certain investments, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act''. SEC. 2. BROKERAGE WINDOW DISCLOSURES. (a) In General.--Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(7) Notice requirements for brokerage windows.-- ``(A) In general.--In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and which provides a participant or beneficiary the opportunity to choose from designated investment alternatives, a participant or beneficiary shall not be treated as exercising control over assets in the account of the participant or beneficiary unless, with respect to any investment arrangement that is not a designated investment alternative, each time before such a participant or beneficiary directs an investment into, out of, or within such investment arrangement, such participant is notified of, and acknowledges, each element of the notice described under paragraph (B). ``(B) Notice.--The notice described under this paragraph is a four part information that is substantially similar to the following information: ``1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment alternatives prudently selected and monitored by fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio. In selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) compared with reasonably available investment alternatives. 2. The investments available through this investment arrangement are not designated investment alternatives, and have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a plan fiduciary. 3. Depending on the investments you select through this investment arrangement, you may experience diminished returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from the plan's designated investment alternatives. 4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent on your account balance projected to age 67. ``(C) Illustration.--The notice described under paragraph (B) shall also include a graph displaying the projected retirement balances of such participant or beneficiary at age 67 if the account of such individual were to achieve an annual return equal to each of the following: ``(i) 4 percent. ``(ii) 6 percent. ``(iii) 8 percent.''. (b) Designated Investment Alternative Defined.--Section 3 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1002) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(46) Designated investment alternative.-- ``(A) In general.--The term `designated investment alternative' means any investment alternative designated by a responsible fiduciary of an individual account plan described in subsection 404(c) into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts. ``(B) Exception.--The term `designated investment alternative' does not include brokerage windows, self- directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries to select investments beyond those designated by a responsible plan fiduciary.''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on January 1, 2025. Purpose Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits do not take a back seat to advancing political and social interests. Some plan sponsors have added brokerage windows to self-directed individual retirement accounts covered by ERISA in order to allow participants to direct their investments in products not offered by the plan, including investments made for their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) benefits that could sacrifice return on investment or increase the risk associated with investment. H.R. 5340 requires plans to remind participants of the impact that differences in return on their retirement savings can make on their standard of living during retirement.

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to Mental Health Benefits,'' which discussed the Biden administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by prioritizing ESG factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C.; Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.; and Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy, Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C. On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J. Walsh, Secretary, Department of Labor, Washington D.C. At this hearing, concerns were discussed regarding DOL's proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans, and the administration's view on incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. Second Session--Legislative Action On March 18, 2022, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 7151) with Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA) as an original co-sponsor. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on Financial Services. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the FY 2023 budget priorities of DOL. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022, rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights'' was discussed, including concerns regarding the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. First Session--Legislative Action On February 7, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden administration's DOL rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.'' The resolution rescinds the rule and would have the effect of reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule on ESG investing for ERISA plans titled ``Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments.'' On February 28, 2023, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210, with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20, the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the House failed to override the veto by a vote of 219-200. On June 21, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 4237) with Reps. Allen and Bill Huizenga (R- MI) as original co-sponsors. On September 5, 2023, Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) introduced the Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act (H.R. 5340). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5340 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23 to 19. The Committee adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) offered by Rep. Banks that made minor technical changes. Committee Views INTRODUCTION H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act, affects participant-directed ERISA individual account plans that allow participants to select investments from a menu of designated investment alternatives and through brokerage windows. The bill requires these plans to give critically important information, by means of an online notice at the time investments are directed, to participants before investing through a brokerage window. H.R. 5340 protects the retirement savings of the U.S. workforce, which is the purpose of ERISA. THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\ Courts have held that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c), 1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the ``exclusive purpose rule.'' \2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). \3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non- pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even if that goal is set out in the plan document.\5\ The Court stated, \4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock ownership). \5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific nonpecuniary goal set our in an ERISA plan.'') Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term `benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer stock.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Id. at 421. The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits. Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in which there are two economically equal investments. Fiduciaries who offer participant-directed investing through brokerage windows allow participants to exercise their investing preferences (including ESG preferences) through the brokerage window to purchase investments that might not have passed muster under ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty. ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the appropriateness of investments continually.\8\ However, for the last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits other than the financial interest of participants and beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B). \8\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015) (confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust investments). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- BROKERAGE WINDOWS IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS Under ERISA, individual account plans (also known as defined contribution plans) may allow participants to direct their investments among designated investment alternatives that are prudently selected and monitored by the plan's investment fiduciaries.\9\ Some defined contribution plans also offer brokerage windows or self-directed brokerage accounts, allowing participants to select investments beyond those designated investment alternatives. Brokerage windows are a common means for ERISA-defined contribution plans to satisfy participant demand for ESG-type investments that might not be prudent as a designated investment alternative. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a- 5(f). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When a participant invests through brokerage windows, the participant bypasses an ERISA plan's investment expertise. The participant's investment selection is not subject to any guardrails on ESG investments, such as the duty of prudence and loyalty under ERISA. As a result, participants may experience lower risk-adjusted returns and higher fees. An aggregate difference of 2 percent in diminished investment returns and higher fees over a 40-year savings period can result in a retirement balance that is 40 percent lower. BROKERAGE WINDOWS DISTINGUISHED FROM DESIGNATED INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES DOL guidance distinguishes between brokerage windows and a ``designated investment alternative.'' DOL generally defines a ``designated investment alternative'' as ``any investment alternative designated by the covered plan into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts.'' A designated investment alternative ``does not include brokerage windows, self-directed brokerage accounts, or similar arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries to select investments beyond those designated by the plan.''\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,910 (Oct. 20, 2010) (adding 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5 ``Fiduciary requirements for disclosure in participant-directed individual account plans''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An ERISA fiduciary is clearly subject to the duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in or contributed to their accounts.\11\ On the other hand, guidance on fiduciary duty with respect to the selection and monitoring of brokerage windows is limited. One view is that a fiduciary is subject to the duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring a brokerage window as an investment vehicle with respect to the service provider and the fees charged to participants but is not responsible for a participant's investment directions that are made through a brokerage window. However, it is not clear that implementing the brokerage window itself as an investment vehicle available to participants under an ERISA plan is subject to the duty of prudence and loyalty.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a- 5(f). \12\Id. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5(h)(4) (providing that a brokerage window is not itself a designated investment alternative because it is not an investment specifically identified as available under the plan by the plan fiduciary). But see ERISA Advisory Council, Report to the Honorable Martin Walsh, United States Secretary of Labor: Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed Retirement Plans (Dec. 2021) (referred to herein as the ``2021 EAC Report'') (reporting that plan sponsor representatives may decline to offer self-directed brokerage windows as being unsuitable for that particular employer's population (p.12); reporting ERISA fiduciary testimony that the decision to add a brokerage window is a fiduciary decision (p.15); reporting the testimony that the decision to implement a brokerage window is a fiduciary decision even if it is hardwired in the plan document (p. 26, p. 28); reporting testimony that even if a brokerage account is hardwired in the plan document, Dudenhoeffer suggests that the duty of prudence trumps (p. 28)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Case law on brokerage windows in individual account plans is also sparse.\13\ In Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp.3d 189 (D. Mass. 2020), the court stated, ``[I]n sum, there is a significant lack of clarity regarding the duties a fiduciary owes with respect to funds within a brokerage window.'' Existing case law suggests that an investment vehicle labeled by a plan as a brokerage window may nonetheless be subject to the same duties of prudence and loyalty to the extent that a plan fiduciary has significantly limited the selection of funds available through the window, causing such selections, in essence, to become designated investment alternatives.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Few cases have analyzed the extent of an ERISA fiduciary's duties with respect to a brokerage window. See Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp. 3d 189, 208 (D. Mass. 2020) (reviewing limited authority and stating ``there is a significant lack of clarity regarding the duties a fiduciary owes with respect to funds within a brokerage window); see also Larson v. Allina Health, 350 F. Supp. 3d 780, 799 (D. Colo. 2020) (refusing to dismiss claims against a fiduciary for failing to monitor funds offered through a mutual fund window limiting selections to 300 mutual fund options). Other court decisions have stated without analysis that investments offered within brokerage windows were not monitored. See, e.g., Ramos v. Banner Health, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1083 (D. Colo. 2020) (finding ``[Plan fiduciaries] did not monitor investments available through BrokerageLink nor were they required to do so.''). \14\Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 208-210 (holding that a brokerage window limiting investments to Fidelity's proprietary mutual fund menu was not itself a ``brokerage window'' and therefore Fidelity could face liability for failing to monitor funds offered through that window); Larson v. Allina Health, 350 F. Supp. 3d 780, 799 (D. Colo. 2020) (refusing to dismiss claims against a fiduciary for failing to monitor funds offered through a mutual fund window limiting selections to 300 mutual fund options). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 5340 does not seek to disturb or change the duties of prudence and loyalty associated with brokerage windows (or designated investment alternatives) but only to remind participants and beneficiaries, when investing through true brokerage windows, their individual selections are not being selected or monitored by a fiduciary bound by ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty. In that regard, however, ERISA implicitly affirms the prevailing view that under a true brokerage window, a participant's investment selections are not substantially winnowed, nor are they monitored by a fiduciary. 2021 EAC REPORT In 2021, the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans (EAC) published the first comprehensive study on brokerage windows in ERISA plans (2021 EAC Report).\15\ The Study was informed by testimony from industry experts and provides an insight into the prevalence of brokerage windows and why plan sponsors are choosing to offer brokerage windows, including to provide opportunities for ESG investing. The study also raised concerns about whether all participants using brokerage windows understand the difference between investing through a brokerage window and investing through a plan's designated investment alternatives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\EAC, Report to the Honorable Martin Walsh, United States Secretary of Labor: Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed Retirement Plans (Dec. 2021) (hereinafter 2021 EAC Report). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to the Plan Sponsor Council of America, just over 23 percent of all ERISA individual account plans offer a brokerage window.\16\ However, only 1.5 percent of ERISA assets are invested through brokerage windows.\17\ Testimony before the EAC from recordkeepers indicated that 46 percent of plans that use Alight as a recordkeeper offer a brokerage window; 23 percent of plans that use Fidelity as their recordkeeper offer a brokerage window, and 20 percent of plans that use Vanguard as their recordkeeper offer a brokerage window.\18\ Data presented to EAC demonstrated ``an uptick in Millennials investing through brokerage windows,''\19\ although recordkeepers reported low utilization overall (e.g., 3 percent for Fidelity\20\ and \1/2\ percent for Vanguard\21\). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Id. at 13 (citing the Plan Sponsor Council of America's 63rd Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans). \17\2021 EAC Report, supra note 15. \18\Id. at 16. \19\Id. at 44. \20\Id. at 32. \21\Id. at 35. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to plan sponsor representatives interviewed for the 2021 EAC Report, brokerage windows allow participants to customize their portfolios outside of the designated investment options, including investing for collateral goals associated with ESG.\22\ Recordkeepers similarly told EAC that plan sponsors add brokerage windows to their plans in response to participant requests for broader investment opportunities, including ESG funds, religion-compliant funds, and other investment options.\23\ A representative of brokerage service providers explained that plan sponsors often add brokerage windows to accommodate participants who want to customize their investme

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to require a notice be sent to retirement plan participants when they make certain investments. In general, Committee Democrats strongly support ensuring workers receive appropriate notices and disclosures regarding their retirement savings, particularly with respect to fees on investments. However, H.R. 5340 is not focused on that worthwhile goal. Lacking a policy rationale, the bill exists only to perpetuate House Republicans' curious and misguided agenda against environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing. H.R. 5340 is opposed by organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF). H.R. 5340 IS A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM A brokerage window is a feature of defined contribution (DC) plans, such as 401(k)s, that allows retirement plan participants to invest in a broader array of investments than the designated investment alternative options selected by the plan fiduciaries. A range of investment products can be offered in the brokerage window. Such products can include mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETF), and, in some cases, individual stocks and bonds. Of the mutual funds that may be offered, some may be ESG-themed funds--which is the clear target of H.R. 5340--but other themed investment funds, such as religious-based funds, could be implicated. Fewer than one- third of plans offer a brokerage window, and roughly two percent of plan participants with access to one chose to use it.\1\ The average brokerage window account balance exceeds $334,000--which is far greater than what many Americans have saved in their DC plans.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Advisory Council on Employee Welfare & Pension Benefit Plan, Report to the Hon. Secretary Walsh, United States Sec. of Labor, Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed Retirement Plans, [hereinafter ``Council Report'']. https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/ files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2021- understanding-brokerage-windows-in-self-directed- retirement-plans.pdf. \2\Id. at 23. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Democrats are currently not aware of any recent Department of Labor (DOL) enforcement actions targeting brokerage windows. Enforcement actions might have evidenced the need for greater transparency around brokerage window investments or additional protections for participants who use them. Moreover, in 2021, the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, which is usually referred to as the ERISA Advisory Council (Council), examined brokerage windows.\3\ The purpose of this examination was to ``gain a better understanding of their prevalence usages, and implementation.''\4\ The Council ``considered and debated at length'' whether additional disclosures were warranted for participants who invest through a brokerage window.\5\ Most Council members ``concluded that, on balance, the limited marginal benefits that might be obtained by requiring disclosures would be outweighed by associated costs.''\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\The ERISA Advisory Council was established under Section 512 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to advise the Secretary of Labor on matters related to welfare and pension benefit plans. \4\Council Report, supra note 1 at 4. \5\Council Report, supra note 1 at 46. \6\Council Report, supra note 1 at 47. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R.5340 IS POORLY DRAFTED AND THE PRODUCT OF A FLAWED LEGISLATIVE PROCESS In addition to there being no policy basis for H.R. 5340, the bill's required notice is designed to discourage participants from using the brokerage window. Specifically, H.R. 5340 requires that a notice be sent to participants or beneficiaries each time they invest in to, out of, or within an investment that is not a designated investment by the plan. The notice is defined in the bill as a ``four part information'' substantially like the following: 1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment alternatives prudently selected and monitored by fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio. In selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) compared with reasonably available investment alternatives. 2. The investments available through this investment arrangement are not designated investment alternatives and have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a plan fiduciary. 3. Depending on the investments you select through this investment arrangement, you may experience diminished returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from the plan's designated investment alternatives. 4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent on your retirement balance projected to age 67. The bill also requires the notice to include a graph displaying projected retirement balances if the account of such individual were to achieve an annual return of 4 percent, 6 percent, or 8 percent. H.R. 5340's notice represents a significant departure from ERISA's primary 401(k) fee disclosure that is objective, information-based, and required to be presented in a manner for the average participant to understand.\7\ The bill's required notice is clearly subjective and intended to discourage participants from using the brokerage window. According to the Americans for Financial Reform, ``[i]t is unclear why this bill would require a graph . . . . . . . The graph would likely be confusing and misleading to beneficiaries trying to make decisions about their retirement investments, suggesting that choosing an investment alternative not chosen by a fiduciary would necessarily result in a specific rate of return.''\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5. \8\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to Hon. Virginia Foxx and Hon. Bobby Scott (Sept. 13, 2023), https:// ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/9.13.23-Corporate Governance-Letter-of-Opposition-to-Anti-ESG Bills.pdf, at 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If H.R. 5340 became law, participants interested in an ESG- themed fund or bond, or a religiously themed fund offered in their plan's brokerage window may opt not to invest in it due to the language of the notice. Or those participants may look to make a themed investment via the commercial market outside of the ERISA-protected retirement system. Committee Members should question whether that potential outcome--driving retirement savers out of ERISA--makes sense and is in their best interests. H.R. 5340 was introduced on September 5, 2023, and the Committee on Education and the Workforce rushed to mark it up on September 14, 2023 without first convening a legislative hearing on the bill. This deprived Committee Members of the opportunity to learn more and ask questions about the bill's full implications. H.R. 5340 IS PART OF COMMITTEE REPUBLICANS' MISGUIDED WAR ON ESG INVESTING While H.R. 5340 would require notices for all brokerage window investments not just ESG-themed funds, Committee Republicans have tied this bill with their broader anti-ESG efforts. For example, the bill's author, Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN), said the bill would ``make sure ERISA participants are fully aware of the financial risks associated with ESG before they choose how to invest their hard-earned savings.''\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\Press Release, Office of Congressman Jim Banks, Rep. Banks Introduces Bill to Protect Pensions from ESG (September 6, 2023), https://banks.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? DocumentID=2199. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Republicans are wrong about ESG. Appropriate consideration of ESG factors--such as fossil fuel dependency-- remains central to retirement plan participants' long term economic interests. That is why Committee Democrats believe retirement plan fiduciaries should be permitted to consider ESG-related considerations when evaluating investments. Doing so makes sense and serves workers' long-term financial interest. H.R. 5340 is premised on the Committee Republicans' mistaken view that they--not retirement savers and plan fiduciaries--know best when it comes to ESG investing. Committee Democrats strongly disagree. CONCLUSION There is no apparent policy justification for H.R. 5340, or the other bills comprising Committee Republicans' baseless and unpopular anti-ESG agenda. For the reasons stated above, Committee Democrats opposed H.R. 5340 when the Committee on Education and the Workforce considered it on September 14, 2023. We urge the House of Representatives to do the same. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Ranking Member. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan. Mark DeSaulnier. Jahana Hayes. Haley M. Stevens. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/224