Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 5340]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5340) to amend the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure that pension plans
provide notice to participants and beneficiaries on risks
associated with certain investments, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Providing Complete Information to
Retirement Investors Act''.
SEC. 2. BROKERAGE WINDOW DISCLOSURES.
(a) In General.--Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(7) Notice requirements for brokerage windows.--
``(A) In general.--In the case of a pension plan
which provides for individual accounts and which
provides a participant or beneficiary the opportunity
to choose from designated investment alternatives, a
participant or beneficiary shall not be treated as
exercising control over assets in the account of the
participant or beneficiary unless, with respect to any
investment arrangement that is not a designated
investment alternative, each time before such a
participant or beneficiary directs an investment into,
out of, or within such investment arrangement, such
participant is notified of, and acknowledges, each
element of the notice described under paragraph (B).
``(B) Notice.--The notice described under this
paragraph is a four part information that is
substantially similar to the following information:
``1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment alternatives prudently selected and monitored by
fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio. In
selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk of loss
and the opportunity for gain (or other return) compared with reasonably available investment alternatives.
2. The investments available through this investment arrangement are not designated investment alternatives, and
have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a plan fiduciary.
3. Depending on the investments you select through this investment arrangement, you may experience diminished
returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from the plan's designated investment alternatives.
4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent
on your account balance projected to age 67.
``(C) Illustration.--The notice described under
paragraph (B) shall also include a graph displaying the
projected retirement balances of such participant or
beneficiary at age 67 if the account of such individual
were to achieve an annual return equal to each of the
following:
``(i) 4 percent.
``(ii) 6 percent.
``(iii) 8 percent.''.
(b) Designated Investment Alternative Defined.--Section 3 of such Act
(29 U.S.C. 1002) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(46) Designated investment alternative.--
``(A) In general.--The term `designated investment
alternative' means any investment alternative
designated by a responsible fiduciary of an individual
account plan described in subsection 404(c) into which
participants and beneficiaries may direct the
investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their
individual accounts.
``(B) Exception.--The term `designated investment
alternative' does not include brokerage windows, self-
directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan
arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries
to select investments beyond those designated by a
responsible plan fiduciary.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on January 1, 2025.
Purpose
Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide
employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one
purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the
financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their
benefits do not take a back seat to advancing political and
social interests. Some plan sponsors have added brokerage
windows to self-directed individual retirement accounts covered
by ERISA in order to allow participants to direct their
investments in products not offered by the plan, including
investments made for their environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) benefits that could sacrifice return on
investment or increase the risk associated with investment.
H.R. 5340 requires plans to remind participants of the impact
that differences in return on their retirement savings can make
on their standard of living during retirement.
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearings
On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor,
Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a
hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to
Mental Health Benefits,'' which discussed the Biden
administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and
social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by
prioritizing ESG factors when investing retirement plan assets.
Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs,
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
D.C.; Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague,
Washington, D.C.; Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and
Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.;
and Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy,
Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C.
On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).
Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J.
Walsh, Secretary, Department of Labor, Washington D.C. At this
hearing, concerns were discussed regarding DOL's proposed rule
titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden
administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's
duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring
investments for ERISA plans, and the administration's view on
incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans.
Second Session--Legislative Action
On March 18, 2022, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced the
Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 7151) with Rep. Rick Allen
(R-GA) as an original co-sponsor. The bill was referred to the
Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on Financial
Services.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearings
On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the FY
2023 budget priorities of DOL. Testifying before the Committee
was the Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington,
D.C. At this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022, rule titled
``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights'' was discussed, including
concerns regarding the Biden administration's efforts to
undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and
loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA
plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG
into the administration of ERISA plans.
First Session--Legislative Action
On February 7, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced a joint
resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the
Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden
administration's DOL rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in
Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.''
The resolution rescinds the rule and would have the effect of
reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule
on ESG investing for ERISA plans titled ``Financial Factors in
Selecting Plan Investments.'' On February 28, 2023, the House
of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210,
with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20,
the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the House failed
to override the veto by a vote of 219-200.
On June 21, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced the Ensuring Sound
Guidance Act (H.R. 4237) with Reps. Allen and Bill Huizenga (R-
MI) as original co-sponsors.
On September 5, 2023, Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) introduced the
Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act
(H.R. 5340). The bill was referred to the Committee on
Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the
Committee considered H.R. 5340 in legislative session and
reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 23 to 19. The Committee
adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS)
offered by Rep. Banks that made minor technical changes.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to Retirement
Investors Act, affects participant-directed ERISA individual
account plans that allow participants to select investments
from a menu of designated investment alternatives and through
brokerage windows. The bill requires these plans to give
critically important information, by means of an online notice
at the time investments are directed, to participants before
investing through a brokerage window. H.R. 5340 protects the
retirement savings of the U.S. workforce, which is the purpose
of ERISA.
THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW
Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the
interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\
Courts have held that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires
fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the
beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single
to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\
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\1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c),
1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the
``exclusive purpose rule.''
\2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted).
\3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non-
pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's
fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of
prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even
if that goal is set out in the plan document.\5\ The Court
stated,
\4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014)
(rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of
employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock
ownership).
\5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content
of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific
nonpecuniary goal set our in an ERISA plan.'')
Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term
`benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the
sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income)
that trustees who manage investments typically seek to
secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term
does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those
supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer
stock.\6\
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\6\Id. at 421.
The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits.
Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral
goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in which
there are two economically equal investments. Fiduciaries who
offer participant-directed investing through brokerage windows
allow participants to exercise their investing preferences
(including ESG preferences) through the brokerage window to
purchase investments that might not have passed muster under
ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty.
ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held
to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty
of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the
appropriateness of investments continually.\8\ However, for the
last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's
principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits
other than the financial interest of participants and
beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits'').
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\7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B).
\8\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015)
(confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust
investments).
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BROKERAGE WINDOWS IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS
Under ERISA, individual account plans (also known as
defined contribution plans) may allow participants to direct
their investments among designated investment alternatives that
are prudently selected and monitored by the plan's investment
fiduciaries.\9\ Some defined contribution plans also offer
brokerage windows or self-directed brokerage accounts, allowing
participants to select investments beyond those designated
investment alternatives. Brokerage windows are a common means
for ERISA-defined contribution plans to satisfy participant
demand for ESG-type investments that might not be prudent as a
designated investment alternative.
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\9\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-
5(f).
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When a participant invests through brokerage windows, the
participant bypasses an ERISA plan's investment expertise. The
participant's investment selection is not subject to any
guardrails on ESG investments, such as the duty of prudence and
loyalty under ERISA. As a result, participants may experience
lower risk-adjusted returns and higher fees. An aggregate
difference of 2 percent in diminished investment returns and
higher fees over a 40-year savings period can result in a
retirement balance that is 40 percent lower.
BROKERAGE WINDOWS DISTINGUISHED FROM DESIGNATED INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
DOL guidance distinguishes between brokerage windows and a
``designated investment alternative.'' DOL generally defines a
``designated investment alternative'' as ``any investment
alternative designated by the covered plan into which
participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of
assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts.''
A designated investment alternative ``does not include
brokerage windows, self-directed brokerage accounts, or similar
arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries to
select investments beyond those designated by the plan.''\10\
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\10\Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed
Individual Account Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,910 (Oct. 20, 2010) (adding
29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5 ``Fiduciary requirements for disclosure in
participant-directed individual account plans'').
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An ERISA fiduciary is clearly subject to the duties of
prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring designated
investment alternatives into which participants and
beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in or
contributed to their accounts.\11\ On the other hand, guidance
on fiduciary duty with respect to the selection and monitoring
of brokerage windows is limited. One view is that a fiduciary
is subject to the duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting
and monitoring a brokerage window as an investment vehicle with
respect to the service provider and the fees charged to
participants but is not responsible for a participant's
investment directions that are made through a brokerage window.
However, it is not clear that implementing the brokerage window
itself as an investment vehicle available to participants under
an ERISA plan is subject to the duty of prudence and
loyalty.\12\
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\11\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-
5(f).
\12\Id. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5(h)(4) (providing that a
brokerage window is not itself a designated investment alternative
because it is not an investment specifically identified as available
under the plan by the plan fiduciary). But see ERISA Advisory Council,
Report to the Honorable Martin Walsh, United States Secretary of Labor:
Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed Retirement Plans (Dec.
2021) (referred to herein as the ``2021 EAC Report'') (reporting that
plan sponsor representatives may decline to offer self-directed
brokerage windows as being unsuitable for that particular employer's
population (p.12); reporting ERISA fiduciary testimony that the
decision to add a brokerage window is a fiduciary decision (p.15);
reporting the testimony that the decision to implement a brokerage
window is a fiduciary decision even if it is hardwired in the plan
document (p. 26, p. 28); reporting testimony that even if a brokerage
account is hardwired in the plan document, Dudenhoeffer suggests that
the duty of prudence trumps (p. 28)).
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Case law on brokerage windows in individual account plans
is also sparse.\13\ In Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp.3d 189
(D. Mass. 2020), the court stated, ``[I]n sum, there is a
significant lack of clarity regarding the duties a fiduciary
owes with respect to funds within a brokerage window.''
Existing case law suggests that an investment vehicle labeled
by a plan as a brokerage window may nonetheless be subject to
the same duties of prudence and loyalty to the extent that a
plan fiduciary has significantly limited the selection of funds
available through the window, causing such selections, in
essence, to become designated investment alternatives.\14\
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\13\Few cases have analyzed the extent of an ERISA fiduciary's
duties with respect to a brokerage window. See Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451
F. Supp. 3d 189, 208 (D. Mass. 2020) (reviewing limited authority and
stating ``there is a significant lack of clarity regarding the duties a
fiduciary owes with respect to funds within a brokerage window); see
also Larson v. Allina Health, 350 F. Supp. 3d 780, 799 (D. Colo. 2020)
(refusing to dismiss claims against a fiduciary for failing to monitor
funds offered through a mutual fund window limiting selections to 300
mutual fund options). Other court decisions have stated without
analysis that investments offered within brokerage windows were not
monitored. See, e.g., Ramos v. Banner Health, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1067,
1083 (D. Colo. 2020) (finding ``[Plan fiduciaries] did not monitor
investments available through BrokerageLink nor were they required to
do so.'').
\14\Moitoso v. FMR LLC, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 208-210 (holding that a
brokerage window limiting investments to Fidelity's proprietary mutual
fund menu was not itself a ``brokerage window'' and therefore Fidelity
could face liability for failing to monitor funds offered through that
window); Larson v. Allina Health, 350 F. Supp. 3d 780, 799 (D. Colo.
2020) (refusing to dismiss claims against a fiduciary for failing to
monitor funds offered through a mutual fund window limiting selections
to 300 mutual fund options).
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H.R. 5340 does not seek to disturb or change the duties of
prudence and loyalty associated with brokerage windows (or
designated investment alternatives) but only to remind
participants and beneficiaries, when investing through true
brokerage windows, their individual selections are not being
selected or monitored by a fiduciary bound by ERISA's duties of
prudence and loyalty. In that regard, however, ERISA implicitly
affirms the prevailing view that under a true brokerage window,
a participant's investment selections are not substantially
winnowed, nor are they monitored by a fiduciary.
2021 EAC REPORT
In 2021, the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and
Pension Benefit Plans (EAC) published the first comprehensive
study on brokerage windows in ERISA plans (2021 EAC
Report).\15\ The Study was informed by testimony from industry
experts and provides an insight into the prevalence of
brokerage windows and why plan sponsors are choosing to offer
brokerage windows, including to provide opportunities for ESG
investing. The study also raised concerns about whether all
participants using brokerage windows understand the difference
between investing through a brokerage window and investing
through a plan's designated investment alternatives.
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\15\EAC, Report to the Honorable Martin Walsh, United States
Secretary of Labor: Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed
Retirement Plans (Dec. 2021) (hereinafter 2021 EAC Report).
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According to the Plan Sponsor Council of America, just over
23 percent of all ERISA individual account plans offer a
brokerage window.\16\ However, only 1.5 percent of ERISA assets
are invested through brokerage windows.\17\ Testimony before
the EAC from recordkeepers indicated that 46 percent of plans
that use Alight as a recordkeeper offer a brokerage window; 23
percent of plans that use Fidelity as their recordkeeper offer
a brokerage window, and 20 percent of plans that use Vanguard
as their recordkeeper offer a brokerage window.\18\ Data
presented to EAC demonstrated ``an uptick in Millennials
investing through brokerage windows,''\19\ although
recordkeepers reported low utilization overall (e.g., 3 percent
for Fidelity\20\ and \1/2\ percent for Vanguard\21\).
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\16\Id. at 13 (citing the Plan Sponsor Council of America's 63rd
Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans).
\17\2021 EAC Report, supra note 15.
\18\Id. at 16.
\19\Id. at 44.
\20\Id. at 32.
\21\Id. at 35.
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According to plan sponsor representatives interviewed for
the 2021 EAC Report, brokerage windows allow participants to
customize their portfolios outside of the designated investment
options, including investing for collateral goals associated
with ESG.\22\ Recordkeepers similarly told EAC that plan
sponsors add brokerage windows to their plans in response to
participant requests for broader investment opportunities,
including ESG funds, religion-compliant funds, and other
investment options.\23\ A representative of brokerage service
providers explained that plan sponsors often add brokerage
windows to accommodate participants who want to customize their
investme
Minority Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to Retirement
Investors Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) to require a notice be sent to retirement
plan participants when they make certain investments. In
general, Committee Democrats strongly support ensuring workers
receive appropriate notices and disclosures regarding their
retirement savings, particularly with respect to fees on
investments. However, H.R. 5340 is not focused on that
worthwhile goal. Lacking a policy rationale, the bill exists
only to perpetuate House Republicans' curious and misguided
agenda against environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
investing. H.R. 5340 is opposed by organizations such as the
AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum
for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF).
H.R. 5340 IS A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM
A brokerage window is a feature of defined contribution
(DC) plans, such as 401(k)s, that allows retirement plan
participants to invest in a broader array of investments than
the designated investment alternative options selected by the
plan fiduciaries. A range of investment products can be offered
in the brokerage window. Such products can include mutual
funds, exchange-traded funds (ETF), and, in some cases,
individual stocks and bonds. Of the mutual funds that may be
offered, some may be ESG-themed funds--which is the clear
target of H.R. 5340--but other themed investment funds, such as
religious-based funds, could be implicated. Fewer than one-
third of plans offer a brokerage window, and roughly two
percent of plan participants with access to one chose to use
it.\1\ The average brokerage window account balance exceeds
$334,000--which is far greater than what many Americans have
saved in their DC plans.\2\
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\1\Advisory Council on Employee Welfare & Pension Benefit Plan,
Report to the Hon. Secretary Walsh, United States Sec. of Labor,
Understanding Brokerage Windows in Self-Directed Retirement Plans,
[hereinafter ``Council Report'']. https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/
files/EBSA/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2021-
understanding-brokerage-windows-in-self-directed-
retirement-plans.pdf.
\2\Id. at 23.
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Committee Democrats are currently not aware of any recent
Department of Labor (DOL) enforcement actions targeting
brokerage windows. Enforcement actions might have evidenced the
need for greater transparency around brokerage window
investments or additional protections for participants who use
them. Moreover, in 2021, the Advisory Council on Employee
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, which is usually referred to
as the ERISA Advisory Council (Council), examined brokerage
windows.\3\ The purpose of this examination was to ``gain a
better understanding of their prevalence usages, and
implementation.''\4\ The Council ``considered and debated at
length'' whether additional disclosures were warranted for
participants who invest through a brokerage window.\5\ Most
Council members ``concluded that, on balance, the limited
marginal benefits that might be obtained by requiring
disclosures would be outweighed by associated costs.''\6\
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\3\The ERISA Advisory Council was established under Section 512 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to advise the Secretary of
Labor on matters related to welfare and pension benefit plans.
\4\Council Report, supra note 1 at 4.
\5\Council Report, supra note 1 at 46.
\6\Council Report, supra note 1 at 47.
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H.R.5340 IS POORLY DRAFTED AND THE PRODUCT OF A FLAWED LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
In addition to there being no policy basis for H.R. 5340,
the bill's required notice is designed to discourage
participants from using the brokerage window. Specifically,
H.R. 5340 requires that a notice be sent to participants or
beneficiaries each time they invest in to, out of, or within an
investment that is not a designated investment by the plan. The
notice is defined in the bill as a ``four part information''
substantially like the following:
1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment
alternatives prudently selected and monitored by
fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to
construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio.
In selecting and monitoring designated investment
alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk
of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return)
compared with reasonably available investment
alternatives.
2. The investments available through this investment
arrangement are not designated investment alternatives
and have not been prudently selected and are not
monitored by a plan fiduciary.
3. Depending on the investments you select through
this investment arrangement, you may experience
diminished returns, higher fees, and higher risk than
if you select from the plan's designated investment
alternatives.
4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of
the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8
percent on your retirement balance projected to age 67.
The bill also requires the notice to include a graph displaying
projected retirement balances if the account of such individual
were to achieve an annual return of 4 percent, 6 percent, or 8
percent.
H.R. 5340's notice represents a significant departure from
ERISA's primary 401(k) fee disclosure that is objective,
information-based, and required to be presented in a manner for
the average participant to understand.\7\ The bill's required
notice is clearly subjective and intended to discourage
participants from using the brokerage window. According to the
Americans for Financial Reform, ``[i]t is unclear why this bill
would require a graph . . . . . . . The graph would likely be
confusing and misleading to beneficiaries trying to make
decisions about their retirement investments, suggesting that
choosing an investment alternative not chosen by a fiduciary
would necessarily result in a specific rate of return.''\8\
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\7\See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-5.
\8\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to Hon. Virginia
Foxx and Hon. Bobby Scott (Sept. 13, 2023), https://
ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/9.13.23-Corporate
Governance-Letter-of-Opposition-to-Anti-ESG Bills.pdf, at 6.
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If H.R. 5340 became law, participants interested in an ESG-
themed fund or bond, or a religiously themed fund offered in
their plan's brokerage window may opt not to invest in it due
to the language of the notice. Or those participants may look
to make a themed investment via the commercial market outside
of the ERISA-protected retirement system. Committee Members
should question whether that potential outcome--driving
retirement savers out of ERISA--makes sense and is in their
best interests.
H.R. 5340 was introduced on September 5, 2023, and the
Committee on Education and the Workforce rushed to mark it up
on September 14, 2023 without first convening a legislative
hearing on the bill. This deprived Committee Members of the
opportunity to learn more and ask questions about the bill's
full implications.
H.R. 5340 IS PART OF COMMITTEE REPUBLICANS' MISGUIDED WAR ON ESG
INVESTING
While H.R. 5340 would require notices for all brokerage
window investments not just ESG-themed funds, Committee
Republicans have tied this bill with their broader anti-ESG
efforts. For example, the bill's author, Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN),
said the bill would ``make sure ERISA participants are fully
aware of the financial risks associated with ESG before they
choose how to invest their hard-earned savings.''\9\
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\9\Press Release, Office of Congressman Jim Banks, Rep. Banks
Introduces Bill to Protect Pensions from ESG (September 6, 2023),
https://banks.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=2199.
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Committee Republicans are wrong about ESG. Appropriate
consideration of ESG factors--such as fossil fuel dependency--
remains central to retirement plan participants' long term
economic interests. That is why Committee Democrats believe
retirement plan fiduciaries should be permitted to consider
ESG-related considerations when evaluating investments. Doing
so makes sense and serves workers' long-term financial
interest.
H.R. 5340 is premised on the Committee Republicans'
mistaken view that they--not retirement savers and plan
fiduciaries--know best when it comes to ESG investing.
Committee Democrats strongly disagree.
CONCLUSION
There is no apparent policy justification for H.R. 5340, or
the other bills comprising Committee Republicans' baseless and
unpopular anti-ESG agenda. For the reasons stated above,
Committee Democrats opposed H.R. 5340 when the Committee on
Education and the Workforce considered it on September 14,
2023. We urge the House of Representatives to do the same.
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott,
Ranking Member.
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan.
Mark DeSaulnier.
Jahana Hayes.
Haley M. Stevens.
[all]