Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 5339]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5339) to amend the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 to specify requirements concerning
the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement
Earnings Act'' or the ``RETIRE Act''.
SEC. 2. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 AMENDMENT.
(a) In General.--Section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(3) Interest based on pecuniary factors.--
``(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a
fiduciary shall be considered to act solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the
plan with respect to an investment or investment course
of action only if the fiduciary's action with respect
to such investment or investment course of action is
based only on pecuniary factors (except as provided in
subparagraph (B)). The fiduciary may not subordinate
the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in
their retirement income or financial benefits under the
plan to other objectives and may not sacrifice
investment return or take on additional investment risk
to promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals. The weight
given to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall
reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of such
factor on risk and return.
``(B) Use of non-pecuniary factors for investment
alternatives.--Notwithstanding paragraph (A), if a
fiduciary is unable to distinguish between or among
investment alternatives or investment courses of action
on the basis of pecuniary factors alone, the fiduciary
may use non-pecuniary factors as the deciding factor if
the fiduciary documents--
``(i) why pecuniary factors were not
sufficient to select a plan investment or
investment course of action;
``(ii) how the selected investment compares
to the alternative investments with regard to
the composition of the portfolio with regard to
diversification, the liquidity and current
return of the portfolio relative to the
anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan,
and the projected return of the portfolio
relative to the funding objectives of the plan;
and
``(iii) how the selected non-pecuniary factor
or factors are consistent with the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries in their
retirement income or financial benefits under
the plan.
``(C) Investment alternatives for participant-
directed individual account plans.--In selecting or
retaining investment options for a pension plan
described in subsection (c)(1)(A), a fiduciary is not
prohibited from considering, selecting, or retaining an
investment option on the basis that such investment
option promotes, seeks, or supports one or more non-
pecuniary benefits or goals, if--
``(i) the fiduciary satisfies the
requirements of paragraph (1) and subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of this paragraph in selecting or
retaining any such investment option; and
``(ii) such investment option is not added or
retained as, or included as a component of, a
default investment under subsection (c)(5) (or
any other default investment alternative) if
its investment objectives or goals or its
principal investment strategies include,
consider, or indicate the use of one or more
non-pecuniary factors.
``(D) Definitions.--For the purposes of this
paragraph:
``(i) The term `pecuniary factor' means a
factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is
expected to have a material effect on the risk
or return of an investment based on appropriate
investment horizons consistent with the plan's
investment objectives and the funding policy
established pursuant to section 402(b)(1).
``(ii) The term `investment course of action'
means any series or program of investments or
actions related to a fiduciary's performance of
the fiduciary's investment duties, and includes
the selection of an investment fund as a plan
investment, or in the case of an individual
account plan, a designated investment
alternative under the plan.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
to actions taken by a fiduciary on or after the date that is 12 months
after the date of enactment of this Act.
Purpose
Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide
employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one
purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1975 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the
financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their
benefits do not take a back seat to a fiduciary's
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) preferences. The
Biden administration's interpretation of ERISA reverses a
fiduciary's duty of loyalty by declaring that an investment
fiduciary may consider his or her political and social
preferences when investing ERISA plan assets. H.R. 5339 makes
clear that the financial interests of participants and
beneficiaries in their benefits come first.
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearings
On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor,
Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a
hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to
Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden
administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and
social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by
prioritizing ESG factors when investing retirement plan assets.
Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs,
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
D.C.; Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague,
Washington, D.C.; Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and
Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.;
and Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy,
Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C.
On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Labor.'' The purpose of the hearing was to
review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL). Testifying before the Committee was
the Honorable Martin J. Walsh, Secretary, DOL, Washington D.C.
At this hearing, concerns were discussed regarding DOL's
proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan
Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the
Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment
fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and
monitoring investments for ERISA plans, and the
administration's view on incorporating ESG into the
administration of ERISA plans.
Second Session--Legislative Action
On March 18, 2022, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced the
Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 7151) with Rep. Rick Allen
(R-GA) as an original co-sponsor. The bill was referred to the
Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on Financial
Services.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearings
On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor.'' The purpose of
the hearing was to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget
priorities of DOL. Testifying before the Committee was the
Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At
this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022, rule titled ``Prudence
and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights'' was discussed, including concerns
regarding the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an
investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when
selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the
administration's support for incorporating ESG into the
administration of ERISA plans.
First Session--Legislative Action
On February 7, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced a joint
resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the
Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden
administration's DOL rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in
Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.''
The resolution rescinds the rule and would have the effect of
reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule
on ESG investing for ERISA plans titled ``Financial Factors in
Selecting Plan Investments.'' On February 28, 2023, the House
of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210,
with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20,
the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the House failed
to override the veto by a vote of 219-200.
On June 21, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced the Ensuring Sound
Guidance Act (H.R. 4237) with Reps. Allen and Bill Huizenga (R-
MI) as original co-sponsors.
On September 5, 2023, Rep. Allen introduced the Roll Back
ESG to Increase Retirement Earnings Act or the RETIRE Act (H.R.
5339). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and
the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered
H.R. 5339 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as
amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of
23 to 19. The Committee adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute (ANS) offered by Rep. Allen that made minor
technical changes. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-
VA) offered a substitute amendment codifying the 2022 Biden
administration ESG investing rule. The amendment failed by a
recorded vote of 19-23.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5339, the Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement
Earnings Act, clarifies what ERISA and the U.S. Supreme Court
already require: that fiduciaries manage plan assets for the
exclusive purpose of a participant's or beneficiary's financial
interest in his or her benefits under the plan. This
legislation is needed because the Biden administration has
ignored ERISA's foundational principles in order to allow
activists to use ERISA plan assets to advance ESG goals at the
expense of the financial interests of ERISA plans. H.R. 5339
protects the retirement savings of the U.S. workforce, which is
the purpose of ERISA.
THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW
Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the
interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\
Courts have stated that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires
fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the
beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single
to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\
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\1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c),
1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the
``exclusive purpose rule.''
\2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted).
\3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non-
pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's
fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of
prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even
if that goal is set out in the plan document.\5\ The Court
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014)
(rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of
employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock
ownership).
\5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content
of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific
nonpecuniary goal set our in an ERISA plan.'')
Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term
`benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the
sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income)
that trustees who manage investments typically seek to
secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term
does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those
supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer
stock.\6\
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\6\Id. at 421.
The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits.
Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral
goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in which
there are two economically equal investments.
ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held
to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty
of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the
appropriateness of investments continually.\8\ However, for the
last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's
principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits
other than the financial interest of participants and
beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits'').
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\7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B).
\8\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015)
(confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust
investments).
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In 1994, DOL first articulated a ``tiebreaker rule'' in
broadly applicable guidance allowing an ERISA fiduciary to
consider ESG benefits (``collateral benefits'') when choosing
between two economically equal investments.\9\ From the
beginning, the tiebreaker rule was inherently inconsistent with
ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\10\ Over the next two decades,
DOL addressed the tiebreaker rule through sub-regulatory
guidance, with Democrat administrations promoting the
tiebreaker rule to use ERISA plan assets for collateral
benefits and Republican administrations attempting to limit
collateral benefit investing by reinforcing ERISA's exclusive
purpose rule.\11\
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\9\59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (June 23, 1994) (incorporated in the Code of
Federal Regulations as 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2509.94-1) (Interpretive Bulletin
(IB) 94-1)). The term used in IB 94-1 is ``economically targeted
investments.'' Prior to issuing 1B 94-1, DOL issued letters concerning
a fiduciary's ability to consider the non-pecuniary effects of an
investment and granted a variety of prohibited transaction exemptions
to both individual plans and pooled investment vehicles involving
investments that produce non-pecuniary benefits. See Financial Factors
in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,856, 72,856 n.6 (Nov.
13, 2020).
\10\See Max M. Schanzebach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling
Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG
Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stanford L. Rev. 381, 390, 408 (2020)
(stating that DOL's tiebreaker rule is ``dubious as a matter or
textbook financial economics and . . . contrary to the controlling
statute and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.); see also Edward Zelinsky,
ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Investments,
IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 Berkeley J. Emp.
Lab. L. 333 (1995) (criticizing DOL's first sub-regulatory guidance on
investing for collateral benefits using the tie breaker rule as
``unsound as a matter of logic and policy and . . . incompatible with
the statutory standards governing the investment decisions of pension
fiduciaries.'').
\11\Edward Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-01 and Economically
Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript
11, 12 (criticizing subsequent Republican subregulatory guidance as an
attempt to limit collateral investing rather than to repudiate it as
incoherent and incompatible with ERISA's duty of loyalty).
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Two distinguished professors wrote in the Stanford Law
Review in 2020 on ERISA's fiduciary duty and ESG investing:
``With respect to law, the tiebreaker is irreconcilable with
the strict `sole interest' or `exclusive benefit' rule [of
ERISA].''\12\ The article is skeptical that true economic ties
exist in the investment world, but if they do, then the
appropriate solution is to invest in both instruments for
purposes of diversification.
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\12\Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 408 (2020).
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TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ESG RULE
In November 2020, DOL issued a final rule on ESG investing
based on skepticism that a true tie can exist between two
investments. Under this rule, a fiduciary can consider
collateral benefits only if choosing between or among
``investment alternatives that the plan fiduciary is unable to
distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.''\13\ The
Trump rule requires a plan fiduciary to document (and, in
essence, prove) that two investments are indistinguishable
based on pecuniary factors before invoking the tiebreaker rule.
If a fiduciary invokes the tiebreaker rule, then the fiduciary
is required to document how any tiebreaking factor is
consistent with the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries in their financial benefits under the plan. This
provision is intended to prevent abuse of the tiebreaker. The
rule also prohibits fiduciaries from choosing default
investments that have objectives or principal strategies that
are non-pecuniary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
72,846, 72,884 (Nov. 13, 2020).
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BIDEN ADMINISTRATION ESG RULE
In December 2022, DOL issued a final rule rescinding the
Trump rule\14\ and allowing a fiduciary to consider collateral
benefits when choosing among or between investment alternatives
that ``equally serve the financial interests of the plan over
the appropriate time horizon.''\15\ As such, the fiduciary may
select an investment based on collateral benefits other than
investment returns. This tiebreaker rule is vague enough to
create a giant loophole, increasing ESG investing and
completely eroding ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.
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\14\Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights, 87 Fed. Reg. 73,822 (Dec. 1, 2022).
\15\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-1(c)(2).
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IMPACT ON THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS OF AMERICA'S WORKERS
DOL's subterfuge on this issue is not harmless. Promoting
the use of ERISA plan assets for collateral benefits undermines
a central cornerstone of ERISA. Further, such actions may lead
to increased risk and lower returns for retirement savings. The
cumulative harm, over the lifetime of retirement savings, could
have a substantial adverse impact on a participant's lifestyle
and welfare during his or her retirement years.
H.R. 5339, ROLL BACK OF ESG TO INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS ACT
H.R. 5339 protects the retirement savings and other ERISA-
covered benefits of the U.S. workforce and reinforces what the
Supreme Court has already stated: The exclusive purpose rule of
ERISA precludes the consideration of nonpecuniary benefits.\16\
ERISA's duty of loyalty does not provide any opportunity for an
investment fiduciary to choose an economically inferior
investment because it provides nonpecuniary benefits. H.R. 5339
also tightens the tiebreaker rule to require a fiduciary to
prove, by way of documentation, that a tie exists because the
plan fiduciary is ``unable to distinguish on the basis of
pecuniary factors alone.''\17\
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\16\Fifth Third Bancorp, 573 U.S. at 421 (the ``benefits'' to be
pursued by ERISA fiduciaries as their ``exclusive purpose'' does not
include ``nonpecuniary benefits'') (emphasis in original).
\17\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 72,884.
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CONCLUSION
To protect the financial interests of participants and
beneficiaries in their benefits and to reinforce ERISA's
existing duties of prudence and loyalty, H.R. 5339 ensures that
ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty will be honored. The
intent of ERISA's exclusive purpose rule, as enacted by
Congress and as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, remains
as clear now as when it was first signed into law. However, the
Biden administration's regulations and activist agendas are
undermining ERISA's protections. H.R. 5339 is essential for
restoring and upholding the intent of ERISA. The U.S. workforce
deserves nothing less.
Summary
H.R. 5339 SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY
Section 1. Short title
Names the bill as the ``Roll back ESG To
Increase Retirement Earnings Act'' or the ``RETIRE
Act''
Section 2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Amendment
Section 2(a) amends ERISA Section 404(a)
with the following provisions:
Clarifies that for purposes of
ERISA section 404(a)(1), a fiduciary shall be
considered to act solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries of the plan with
respect to an investment or investment course
of action only if the fiduciary's action with
respect to such investment or investment course
of action is based only on pecuniary factors
(except as provided in subparagraph (B)).
Expressly states that a
fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries in their
retirement income or financial benefits under
the plan to other objectives and may not
sacrifice investment return or take on
additional investment risk to promote non-
pecuniary benefits or goals.
Provides that the weight given
to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall
reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of
such factor on risk and return.
Adds a tiebreaker rule that
narrowly defines a tie and narrowly constrains
the factors used to consider in breaking a tie.
To have a tie, the fiduciary must be unable to
distinguish between or among investment
alternatives or alternative courses of action
on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.
Requires fiduciaries to
document, and in essence to prove, why
pecuniary factors were not sufficient to select
a plan investment or investment course of
action.
Requires other documentation to
ensure that the investment fiduciary does not
make decisions based
Minority Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5339, the Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement
Earnings (RETIRE) Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to codify a Trump
Administration regulation regarding environmental, social,
governance (ESG) investing. The Trump-era rule sought to impose
needless barriers and first-of-its kind paperwork requirements
related to ESG investing in defined contribution plans, such as
401k plans. H.R. 5339 is opposed by organizations such as the
AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum
for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF).
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\1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a).
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CONTEXT FOR H.R. 5339: ESG INVESTING AND THE LABOR DEPARTMENT'S
POSITION ON IT PRIOR TO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
ESG factors are categories of statistical data about
companies that inform investors, including retirement plans, of
potential risks and opportunities when evaluating a company for
inclusion in an investment portfolio. Workers across the
country are interested in ESG data, as it allows them to
evaluate whether an investment reflects their values on issues
such as combating climate change or promoting health and labor
standards, without sacrificing returns. Additionally, ESG-data
usage can be viewed as part of a risk mitigation strategy in
investment. Private sector retirement plans should be able to
consider investments that account for companies' negative
externalities, such as high liability risks, fossil fuel
dependent business practices, and poor treatment of workers.
These are among the factors that could cause a stock to suffer
over the decades, the type of long-term time horizon pivotal to
strong retirement investing.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) made a similar
point in its review of the use of ESG factors and retirement
plans, noting such ``plans have investment timelines spanning
decades and must manage investment risks to provide benefits
for workers for many years to come . . . The use of
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors has emerged
as a way for investors, such as retirement plans, to capture
information on climate change and other potential risks and
opportunities . . .''\2\ According to GAO, ``[w]hether or not
retirement plans consider the projected impacts from climate
change and other ESG risk factors could affect investment
returns and, in turn, the financial health of retirees.''\3\
This is an essential point about ESG investing: ESG factors can
impact a retirement saver's 401(k) plan whether plan
fiduciaries consider them or not. Committee Democrats believe
it is common sense for plan fiduciaries to be permitted to
consider ESG factors, and federal law should not discourage
them from doing so.
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\2\U.S. Govt. Accountability Off., GAO-18-398, Retirement Plan
Investing: Clearer Information on Consideration of Environmental,
Social, and Governance Factors Would be Helpful 7 (2018), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/700/691930.pdf.
\3\Id. at 1.
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Prior to the Trump Administration, the Department of Labor
(DOL) periodically issued guidance regarding ESG factors and
consistently ensured that retirement plan fiduciaries
exclusively focus on financial returns. However, in instances
when competing investments served the plan's economic interests
equally well, plan fiduciaries typically could use collateral
considerations--such as ESG risk factors--as ``tie breakers''
for an investment choice.\4\
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\4\See Interpretive Bulletin 94-1, 59 Fed. Reg. 32606 (June 23,
1994), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-06-23/html/94-
15162.htm.
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THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S UNSUBSTANTIATED CONCERN TOWARD PLAN
FIDUCIARIES AND ESG INVESTING
In 2020, the Trump Administration proposed a rule related
to ESG investing that significantly departed from the above-
mentioned guidance. The proposed rule's preamble said DOL ``is
concerned . . . that the growing emphasis on ESG investing may
be prompting ERISA plan fiduciaries to make investment
decisions for purposes distinct from providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan.''\5\ However, DOL failed to
provide any evidence to validate this concern. The proposed
rule did not cite any litigation from plan participants or
fiduciary breaches related to ESG investing. Additionally, the
proposed rule did not cite any agency enforcement actions
related to ESG; and this issue was not among DOL's enforcement
priorities in its budget for fiscal year (FY) 2020 when the
rule was proposed or their three prior budgets.\6\ Curiously,
the proposed rule even acknowledges that ``most fiduciaries are
operating in compliance'' with DOL's existing ESG
guidelines.\7\
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\5\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
39113 (June 30, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Proposed Rule], https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-30/pdf/2020-13705.pdf.
\6\See FY 2021 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/
general/budget, FY 2020 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://
www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2020, FY 2019 Budget, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, https://www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2019, FY 2018 Budget,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2018.
\7\2020 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 39120.
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Had Committee Republicans held a legislative hearing on
H.R. 5339, Committee Members could have heard testimony and
asked witnesses questions about the unsubstantiated claims
regarding ESG investing that informed the Trump-era rule and
H.R. 5339. Unfortunately, Committee Republicans failed to hold
such a legislative hearing and instead hastily marked up the
bill shortly after it was introduced.
H.R. 5339 CODIFIES A FLAWED TRUMP-ERA ESG RULE
Specifically, the Trump-era's ESG rule required that
fiduciaries make investment decisions solely based on
``pecuniary'' factors, defined in the final rule as ``a factor
that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a
material effect on the risk or return of an investment based on
appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's
investment objectives and the funding policy established
pursuant to section 402(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act or ERISA.''\8\ The Trump-era rule permitted
consideration of non-pecuniary (ESG) factors when a fiduciary
is unable to distinguish reasonably available alternatives on
the basis of pecuniary factors alone.\9\ However, in such ``tie
breaker'' cases, the Trump-era rule imposed a first-of-its-kind
``documentation requirement'' on a plan fiduciary when
concluding that a distinguishing factor could not be found and
why the selected investment was chosen based on the purposes of
the plan.\10\ This establishes some presumption by the Trump-
era DOL that ESG factors are ``non-pecuniary,'' a presumption
not supported by evidence. The rule's ``pecuniary'' vs. ``non-
pecuniary'' distinction is arbitrary, flawed, and out of step
with how ESG factors are considered by retirement asset
managers, and many other investors. The Trump-era rule also
prohibited investments with an objective, goal, or principal
investment strategy that includes the use of one or more non-
pecuniary (ESG) factors from being considered a qualified
default investment alternative (QDIAs), such as a target date
fund (TDF).\11\
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\8\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
72846 (Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final Rule], https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-13/pdf/2020-24515.pdf.
\9\Id. at 72851.
\10\Id. at 72851.
\11\Id. at 72851.
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H.R. 5339 CODIFIES AN UNPOPULAR TRUMP-ERA ESG RULE
Committee Democrats were not the first voices expressing
opposition to the Trump-era rule. Such opposition came from all
corners when the rule was proposed several years ago. According
to an analysis of the more than 8,700 public comments on the
proposed rule that was conducted by US SIF and other
organizations, 96 percent of the comments or petition
signatures from individuals expressed opposition.\12\ One of
the key findings of the analysis was that ``[o]pposition was
especially high among investment-related groups, with asset
managers, financial advisors, financial service providers,
asset owners, pension plans, and investment organizations
either unanimous or all but unanimous opposing the
proposal.''\13\ Specifically, BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street
Global Advisors, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard submitted opposing
comments to DOL.\14\
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\12\Press Release, Ceres, Investor Organizations and Financial
Industry Firms' Analysis of Public Comments on Department of Labor's
ESG Proposal Shows Landslide of Opposition (Aug. 20, 2020), https://
www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/investor-organizations-and-
financial-industry-firms-analysis-public.
\13\Id.
\14\Rachel Koning Beals, Trump's Labor Department's rule
discouraging ESG investing in retirement plans is finalized over swell
of objections, Marketwatch, (Oct. 30, 2020), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/trumps-labor-rule-discouraging-esg-investing-
in-retirement-plans-is-finalized-over-swell-of-objections-11604089492.
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DEMOCRATIC AMENDMENT OFFERED DURING MARKUP OF H.R. 5339
Committee Democrats put forward one substitute amendment to
improve the bill. Offered by Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA-10),
this amendment would have codified the Biden Administration's
ESG rule. The Biden Administration's ESG rule, which was
finalized in 2022 and replaced the Trump-era rule, retained the
long-standing duty of a fiduciary to focus on relevant risk-
return factors in selecting investments. The rule specified
that a fiduciary may not sacrifice investment returns or take
on additional investment risk for reasons unrelated to plan
performance. However, the Biden Administration's final rule
clarified that a fiduciary may reasonably conclude that
permissible factors relevant to their risk-return analysis
include the economic effects of climate change and other ESG
factors on a particular investment. The final rule thus permits
fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, but only when consistent
with the requirement that all investments must serve investors'
economic interests. It does not require consideration of ESG
factors, and moreover is explicit that ESG considerations alone
cannot justify lower investment returns or assuming additional
risk when inconsistent with underlying economic interests.
US SIF and other organizations conducted further analysis
of the comments submitted to DOL on the Biden Administration's
proposed ESG rule and found nearly the opposite results from
the Trump-era proposed rule. Of the over 22,000 comments
submitted by individuals, 97.4 percent were in support of the
proposed rule.\15\ And of the 144 letters submitted by
institutions--such as corporations, asset managers, financial
firms, trade groups, and labor organizations--83 percent were
supportive, with some recommending modifications.\16\
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\15\Eric Pitt, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Markets,
Bryan McGannon and Ginny Brooks, US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment, Garbriel Malek, Stephanie Jones, and Clare
Staib-Kaufman, Environmental Defense Fund, Public comments
overwhelmingly support the US Labor Department proposed rule addressing
the inclusion of ESG criteria and proxy voting in ERISA-governed
retirement plans, (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ussif.org/Files/
Public_Policy/DOL_Comment_Analysis_1.25.22.pdf.
\16\Id. at 3.
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Amendment Offered By Description Action Taken
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#2................................... Mr. DeSaulnier......... Codifies the Biden Defeated
Administration's final
ESG rule.
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CONCLUSION
H.R. 5339 would codify a deeply problematic and unpopular
Trump-era ESG rule that would harm retirement savers. For the
reasons stated above, Committee Democrats opposed H.R. 5339
when the Committee considered it on September 14, 2023. We urge
the House of Representatives to do the same.
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott,
Ranking Member.
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan.
Mark DeSaulnier.
Jahana Hayes.
Haley M. Stevens.
[all]