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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-225

ROLL BACK ESG TO INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS ACT

2023-09-26

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 5339] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5339) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement Earnings Act'' or the ``RETIRE Act''. SEC. 2. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 AMENDMENT. (a) In General.--Section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Interest based on pecuniary factors.-- ``(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a fiduciary shall be considered to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan with respect to an investment or investment course of action only if the fiduciary's action with respect to such investment or investment course of action is based only on pecuniary factors (except as provided in subparagraph (B)). The fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to other objectives and may not sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk to promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals. The weight given to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of such factor on risk and return. ``(B) Use of non-pecuniary factors for investment alternatives.--Notwithstanding paragraph (A), if a fiduciary is unable to distinguish between or among investment alternatives or investment courses of action on the basis of pecuniary factors alone, the fiduciary may use non-pecuniary factors as the deciding factor if the fiduciary documents-- ``(i) why pecuniary factors were not sufficient to select a plan investment or investment course of action; ``(ii) how the selected investment compares to the alternative investments with regard to the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification, the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan, and the projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan; and ``(iii) how the selected non-pecuniary factor or factors are consistent with the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan. ``(C) Investment alternatives for participant- directed individual account plans.--In selecting or retaining investment options for a pension plan described in subsection (c)(1)(A), a fiduciary is not prohibited from considering, selecting, or retaining an investment option on the basis that such investment option promotes, seeks, or supports one or more non- pecuniary benefits or goals, if-- ``(i) the fiduciary satisfies the requirements of paragraph (1) and subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph in selecting or retaining any such investment option; and ``(ii) such investment option is not added or retained as, or included as a component of, a default investment under subsection (c)(5) (or any other default investment alternative) if its investment objectives or goals or its principal investment strategies include, consider, or indicate the use of one or more non-pecuniary factors. ``(D) Definitions.--For the purposes of this paragraph: ``(i) The term `pecuniary factor' means a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's investment objectives and the funding policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1). ``(ii) The term `investment course of action' means any series or program of investments or actions related to a fiduciary's performance of the fiduciary's investment duties, and includes the selection of an investment fund as a plan investment, or in the case of an individual account plan, a designated investment alternative under the plan.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken by a fiduciary on or after the date that is 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act. Purpose Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1975 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits do not take a back seat to a fiduciary's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) preferences. The Biden administration's interpretation of ERISA reverses a fiduciary's duty of loyalty by declaring that an investment fiduciary may consider his or her political and social preferences when investing ERISA plan assets. H.R. 5339 makes clear that the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits come first.

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by prioritizing ESG factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C.; Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.; and Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy, Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C. On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor.'' The purpose of the hearing was to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J. Walsh, Secretary, DOL, Washington D.C. At this hearing, concerns were discussed regarding DOL's proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans, and the administration's view on incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. Second Session--Legislative Action On March 18, 2022, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 7151) with Rep. Rick Allen (R-GA) as an original co-sponsor. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on Financial Services. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor.'' The purpose of the hearing was to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of DOL. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022, rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights'' was discussed, including concerns regarding the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. First Session--Legislative Action On February 7, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden administration's DOL rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.'' The resolution rescinds the rule and would have the effect of reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule on ESG investing for ERISA plans titled ``Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments.'' On February 28, 2023, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210, with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20, the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the House failed to override the veto by a vote of 219-200. On June 21, 2023, Rep. Barr introduced the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act (H.R. 4237) with Reps. Allen and Bill Huizenga (R- MI) as original co-sponsors. On September 5, 2023, Rep. Allen introduced the Roll Back ESG to Increase Retirement Earnings Act or the RETIRE Act (H.R. 5339). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5339 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23 to 19. The Committee adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) offered by Rep. Allen that made minor technical changes. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D- VA) offered a substitute amendment codifying the 2022 Biden administration ESG investing rule. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 19-23. Committee Views INTRODUCTION H.R. 5339, the Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement Earnings Act, clarifies what ERISA and the U.S. Supreme Court already require: that fiduciaries manage plan assets for the exclusive purpose of a participant's or beneficiary's financial interest in his or her benefits under the plan. This legislation is needed because the Biden administration has ignored ERISA's foundational principles in order to allow activists to use ERISA plan assets to advance ESG goals at the expense of the financial interests of ERISA plans. H.R. 5339 protects the retirement savings of the U.S. workforce, which is the purpose of ERISA. THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\ Courts have stated that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c), 1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the ``exclusive purpose rule.'' \2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). \3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non- pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even if that goal is set out in the plan document.\5\ The Court stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock ownership). \5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific nonpecuniary goal set our in an ERISA plan.'') Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term `benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer stock.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Id. at 421. The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits. Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in which there are two economically equal investments. ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the appropriateness of investments continually.\8\ However, for the last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits other than the financial interest of participants and beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B). \8\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015) (confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust investments). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1994, DOL first articulated a ``tiebreaker rule'' in broadly applicable guidance allowing an ERISA fiduciary to consider ESG benefits (``collateral benefits'') when choosing between two economically equal investments.\9\ From the beginning, the tiebreaker rule was inherently inconsistent with ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\10\ Over the next two decades, DOL addressed the tiebreaker rule through sub-regulatory guidance, with Democrat administrations promoting the tiebreaker rule to use ERISA plan assets for collateral benefits and Republican administrations attempting to limit collateral benefit investing by reinforcing ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (June 23, 1994) (incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations as 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2509.94-1) (Interpretive Bulletin (IB) 94-1)). The term used in IB 94-1 is ``economically targeted investments.'' Prior to issuing 1B 94-1, DOL issued letters concerning a fiduciary's ability to consider the non-pecuniary effects of an investment and granted a variety of prohibited transaction exemptions to both individual plans and pooled investment vehicles involving investments that produce non-pecuniary benefits. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,856, 72,856 n.6 (Nov. 13, 2020). \10\See Max M. Schanzebach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stanford L. Rev. 381, 390, 408 (2020) (stating that DOL's tiebreaker rule is ``dubious as a matter or textbook financial economics and . . . contrary to the controlling statute and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.); see also Edward Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 Berkeley J. Emp. Lab. L. 333 (1995) (criticizing DOL's first sub-regulatory guidance on investing for collateral benefits using the tie breaker rule as ``unsound as a matter of logic and policy and . . . incompatible with the statutory standards governing the investment decisions of pension fiduciaries.''). \11\Edward Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-01 and Economically Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript 11, 12 (criticizing subsequent Republican subregulatory guidance as an attempt to limit collateral investing rather than to repudiate it as incoherent and incompatible with ERISA's duty of loyalty). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Two distinguished professors wrote in the Stanford Law Review in 2020 on ERISA's fiduciary duty and ESG investing: ``With respect to law, the tiebreaker is irreconcilable with the strict `sole interest' or `exclusive benefit' rule [of ERISA].''\12\ The article is skeptical that true economic ties exist in the investment world, but if they do, then the appropriate solution is to invest in both instruments for purposes of diversification. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 408 (2020). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ESG RULE In November 2020, DOL issued a final rule on ESG investing based on skepticism that a true tie can exist between two investments. Under this rule, a fiduciary can consider collateral benefits only if choosing between or among ``investment alternatives that the plan fiduciary is unable to distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.''\13\ The Trump rule requires a plan fiduciary to document (and, in essence, prove) that two investments are indistinguishable based on pecuniary factors before invoking the tiebreaker rule. If a fiduciary invokes the tiebreaker rule, then the fiduciary is required to document how any tiebreaking factor is consistent with the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their financial benefits under the plan. This provision is intended to prevent abuse of the tiebreaker. The rule also prohibits fiduciaries from choosing default investments that have objectives or principal strategies that are non-pecuniary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,884 (Nov. 13, 2020). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- BIDEN ADMINISTRATION ESG RULE In December 2022, DOL issued a final rule rescinding the Trump rule\14\ and allowing a fiduciary to consider collateral benefits when choosing among or between investment alternatives that ``equally serve the financial interests of the plan over the appropriate time horizon.''\15\ As such, the fiduciary may select an investment based on collateral benefits other than investment returns. This tiebreaker rule is vague enough to create a giant loophole, increasing ESG investing and completely eroding ERISA's exclusive purpose rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 87 Fed. Reg. 73,822 (Dec. 1, 2022). \15\29 C.F.R. Sec. 2550.404a-1(c)(2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- IMPACT ON THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS OF AMERICA'S WORKERS DOL's subterfuge on this issue is not harmless. Promoting the use of ERISA plan assets for collateral benefits undermines a central cornerstone of ERISA. Further, such actions may lead to increased risk and lower returns for retirement savings. The cumulative harm, over the lifetime of retirement savings, could have a substantial adverse impact on a participant's lifestyle and welfare during his or her retirement years. H.R. 5339, ROLL BACK OF ESG TO INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS ACT H.R. 5339 protects the retirement savings and other ERISA- covered benefits of the U.S. workforce and reinforces what the Supreme Court has already stated: The exclusive purpose rule of ERISA precludes the consideration of nonpecuniary benefits.\16\ ERISA's duty of loyalty does not provide any opportunity for an investment fiduciary to choose an economically inferior investment because it provides nonpecuniary benefits. H.R. 5339 also tightens the tiebreaker rule to require a fiduciary to prove, by way of documentation, that a tie exists because the plan fiduciary is ``unable to distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.''\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Fifth Third Bancorp, 573 U.S. at 421 (the ``benefits'' to be pursued by ERISA fiduciaries as their ``exclusive purpose'' does not include ``nonpecuniary benefits'') (emphasis in original). \17\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,884. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONCLUSION To protect the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits and to reinforce ERISA's existing duties of prudence and loyalty, H.R. 5339 ensures that ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty will be honored. The intent of ERISA's exclusive purpose rule, as enacted by Congress and as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, remains as clear now as when it was first signed into law. However, the Biden administration's regulations and activist agendas are undermining ERISA's protections. H.R. 5339 is essential for restoring and upholding the intent of ERISA. The U.S. workforce deserves nothing less. Summary H.R. 5339 SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY Section 1. Short title Names the bill as the ``Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement Earnings Act'' or the ``RETIRE Act'' Section 2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Amendment Section 2(a) amends ERISA Section 404(a) with the following provisions: Clarifies that for purposes of ERISA section 404(a)(1), a fiduciary shall be considered to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan with respect to an investment or investment course of action only if the fiduciary's action with respect to such investment or investment course of action is based only on pecuniary factors (except as provided in subparagraph (B)). Expressly states that a fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to other objectives and may not sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk to promote non- pecuniary benefits or goals. Provides that the weight given to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of such factor on risk and return. Adds a tiebreaker rule that narrowly defines a tie and narrowly constrains the factors used to consider in breaking a tie. To have a tie, the fiduciary must be unable to distinguish between or among investment alternatives or alternative courses of action on the basis of pecuniary factors alone. Requires fiduciaries to document, and in essence to prove, why pecuniary factors were not sufficient to select a plan investment or investment course of action. Requires other documentation to ensure that the investment fiduciary does not make decisions based

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 5339, the Roll back ESG To Increase Retirement Earnings (RETIRE) Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to codify a Trump Administration regulation regarding environmental, social, governance (ESG) investing. The Trump-era rule sought to impose needless barriers and first-of-its kind paperwork requirements related to ESG investing in defined contribution plans, such as 401k plans. H.R. 5339 is opposed by organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTEXT FOR H.R. 5339: ESG INVESTING AND THE LABOR DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON IT PRIOR TO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ESG factors are categories of statistical data about companies that inform investors, including retirement plans, of potential risks and opportunities when evaluating a company for inclusion in an investment portfolio. Workers across the country are interested in ESG data, as it allows them to evaluate whether an investment reflects their values on issues such as combating climate change or promoting health and labor standards, without sacrificing returns. Additionally, ESG-data usage can be viewed as part of a risk mitigation strategy in investment. Private sector retirement plans should be able to consider investments that account for companies' negative externalities, such as high liability risks, fossil fuel dependent business practices, and poor treatment of workers. These are among the factors that could cause a stock to suffer over the decades, the type of long-term time horizon pivotal to strong retirement investing. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) made a similar point in its review of the use of ESG factors and retirement plans, noting such ``plans have investment timelines spanning decades and must manage investment risks to provide benefits for workers for many years to come . . . The use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors has emerged as a way for investors, such as retirement plans, to capture information on climate change and other potential risks and opportunities . . .''\2\ According to GAO, ``[w]hether or not retirement plans consider the projected impacts from climate change and other ESG risk factors could affect investment returns and, in turn, the financial health of retirees.''\3\ This is an essential point about ESG investing: ESG factors can impact a retirement saver's 401(k) plan whether plan fiduciaries consider them or not. Committee Democrats believe it is common sense for plan fiduciaries to be permitted to consider ESG factors, and federal law should not discourage them from doing so. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\U.S. Govt. Accountability Off., GAO-18-398, Retirement Plan Investing: Clearer Information on Consideration of Environmental, Social, and Governance Factors Would be Helpful 7 (2018), https:// www.gao.gov/assets/700/691930.pdf. \3\Id. at 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prior to the Trump Administration, the Department of Labor (DOL) periodically issued guidance regarding ESG factors and consistently ensured that retirement plan fiduciaries exclusively focus on financial returns. However, in instances when competing investments served the plan's economic interests equally well, plan fiduciaries typically could use collateral considerations--such as ESG risk factors--as ``tie breakers'' for an investment choice.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\See Interpretive Bulletin 94-1, 59 Fed. Reg. 32606 (June 23, 1994), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-06-23/html/94- 15162.htm. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S UNSUBSTANTIATED CONCERN TOWARD PLAN FIDUCIARIES AND ESG INVESTING In 2020, the Trump Administration proposed a rule related to ESG investing that significantly departed from the above- mentioned guidance. The proposed rule's preamble said DOL ``is concerned . . . that the growing emphasis on ESG investing may be prompting ERISA plan fiduciaries to make investment decisions for purposes distinct from providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.''\5\ However, DOL failed to provide any evidence to validate this concern. The proposed rule did not cite any litigation from plan participants or fiduciary breaches related to ESG investing. Additionally, the proposed rule did not cite any agency enforcement actions related to ESG; and this issue was not among DOL's enforcement priorities in its budget for fiscal year (FY) 2020 when the rule was proposed or their three prior budgets.\6\ Curiously, the proposed rule even acknowledges that ``most fiduciaries are operating in compliance'' with DOL's existing ESG guidelines.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (June 30, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Proposed Rule], https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-30/pdf/2020-13705.pdf. \6\See FY 2021 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/ general/budget, FY 2020 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https:// www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2020, FY 2019 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2019, FY 2018 Budget, U.S. Dep't of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/general/budget/index-2018. \7\2020 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 39120. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Had Committee Republicans held a legislative hearing on H.R. 5339, Committee Members could have heard testimony and asked witnesses questions about the unsubstantiated claims regarding ESG investing that informed the Trump-era rule and H.R. 5339. Unfortunately, Committee Republicans failed to hold such a legislative hearing and instead hastily marked up the bill shortly after it was introduced. H.R. 5339 CODIFIES A FLAWED TRUMP-ERA ESG RULE Specifically, the Trump-era's ESG rule required that fiduciaries make investment decisions solely based on ``pecuniary'' factors, defined in the final rule as ``a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's investment objectives and the funding policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act or ERISA.''\8\ The Trump-era rule permitted consideration of non-pecuniary (ESG) factors when a fiduciary is unable to distinguish reasonably available alternatives on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.\9\ However, in such ``tie breaker'' cases, the Trump-era rule imposed a first-of-its-kind ``documentation requirement'' on a plan fiduciary when concluding that a distinguishing factor could not be found and why the selected investment was chosen based on the purposes of the plan.\10\ This establishes some presumption by the Trump- era DOL that ESG factors are ``non-pecuniary,'' a presumption not supported by evidence. The rule's ``pecuniary'' vs. ``non- pecuniary'' distinction is arbitrary, flawed, and out of step with how ESG factors are considered by retirement asset managers, and many other investors. The Trump-era rule also prohibited investments with an objective, goal, or principal investment strategy that includes the use of one or more non- pecuniary (ESG) factors from being considered a qualified default investment alternative (QDIAs), such as a target date fund (TDF).\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final Rule], https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-13/pdf/2020-24515.pdf. \9\Id. at 72851. \10\Id. at 72851. \11\Id. at 72851. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 5339 CODIFIES AN UNPOPULAR TRUMP-ERA ESG RULE Committee Democrats were not the first voices expressing opposition to the Trump-era rule. Such opposition came from all corners when the rule was proposed several years ago. According to an analysis of the more than 8,700 public comments on the proposed rule that was conducted by US SIF and other organizations, 96 percent of the comments or petition signatures from individuals expressed opposition.\12\ One of the key findings of the analysis was that ``[o]pposition was especially high among investment-related groups, with asset managers, financial advisors, financial service providers, asset owners, pension plans, and investment organizations either unanimous or all but unanimous opposing the proposal.''\13\ Specifically, BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street Global Advisors, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard submitted opposing comments to DOL.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Press Release, Ceres, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms' Analysis of Public Comments on Department of Labor's ESG Proposal Shows Landslide of Opposition (Aug. 20, 2020), https:// www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/investor-organizations-and- financial-industry-firms-analysis-public. \13\Id. \14\Rachel Koning Beals, Trump's Labor Department's rule discouraging ESG investing in retirement plans is finalized over swell of objections, Marketwatch, (Oct. 30, 2020), https:// www.marketwatch.com/story/trumps-labor-rule-discouraging-esg-investing- in-retirement-plans-is-finalized-over-swell-of-objections-11604089492. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEMOCRATIC AMENDMENT OFFERED DURING MARKUP OF H.R. 5339 Committee Democrats put forward one substitute amendment to improve the bill. Offered by Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA-10), this amendment would have codified the Biden Administration's ESG rule. The Biden Administration's ESG rule, which was finalized in 2022 and replaced the Trump-era rule, retained the long-standing duty of a fiduciary to focus on relevant risk- return factors in selecting investments. The rule specified that a fiduciary may not sacrifice investment returns or take on additional investment risk for reasons unrelated to plan performance. However, the Biden Administration's final rule clarified that a fiduciary may reasonably conclude that permissible factors relevant to their risk-return analysis include the economic effects of climate change and other ESG factors on a particular investment. The final rule thus permits fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, but only when consistent with the requirement that all investments must serve investors' economic interests. It does not require consideration of ESG factors, and moreover is explicit that ESG considerations alone cannot justify lower investment returns or assuming additional risk when inconsistent with underlying economic interests. US SIF and other organizations conducted further analysis of the comments submitted to DOL on the Biden Administration's proposed ESG rule and found nearly the opposite results from the Trump-era proposed rule. Of the over 22,000 comments submitted by individuals, 97.4 percent were in support of the proposed rule.\15\ And of the 144 letters submitted by institutions--such as corporations, asset managers, financial firms, trade groups, and labor organizations--83 percent were supportive, with some recommending modifications.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Eric Pitt, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Markets, Bryan McGannon and Ginny Brooks, US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, Garbriel Malek, Stephanie Jones, and Clare Staib-Kaufman, Environmental Defense Fund, Public comments overwhelmingly support the US Labor Department proposed rule addressing the inclusion of ESG criteria and proxy voting in ERISA-governed retirement plans, (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ussif.org/Files/ Public_Policy/DOL_Comment_Analysis_1.25.22.pdf. \16\Id. at 3. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amendment Offered By Description Action Taken ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #2................................... Mr. DeSaulnier......... Codifies the Biden Defeated Administration's final ESG rule. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONCLUSION H.R. 5339 would codify a deeply problematic and unpopular Trump-era ESG rule that would harm retirement savers. For the reasons stated above, Committee Democrats opposed H.R. 5339 when the Committee considered it on September 14, 2023. We urge the House of Representatives to do the same. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Ranking Member. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan. Mark DeSaulnier. Jahana Hayes. Haley M. Stevens. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/225