Skip to content

house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-227

RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION ACT

2023-09-26

Committees

Associated legislation

Text

Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 5337] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5337) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify the application of prudence and exclusive purpose duties to the exercise of shareholder rights, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Retirement Proxy Protection Act''. SEC. 2. EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS. (a) In General.--Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(f) Exercise of Shareholder Rights.-- ``(1) Authority to exercise shareholder rights.-- ``(A) In general.--The fiduciary duty to manage plan assets that are shares of stock includes the management of shareholder rights appurtenant to those shares, including the right to vote proxies. When deciding whether to exercise a shareholder right and in exercising such right, including the voting of proxies, a fiduciary must act prudently and solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable expenses of administering the plan. The fiduciary duty to manage shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise of every shareholder right. ``(B) Exception.--This subsection shall not apply to voting, tender, and similar rights with respect to securities that are passed through pursuant to the terms of an individual account plan to participants and beneficiaries with accounts holding such securities. ``(2) Requirements for exercise of shareholder rights.--A fiduciary, when deciding whether to exercise a shareholder right and when exercising a shareholder right-- ``(A) shall-- ``(i) act solely in accordance with the economic interest of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries; ``(ii) consider any costs involved; ``(iii) evaluate material facts that form the basis for any particular proxy vote or exercise of shareholder rights; and ``(iv) maintain a record of any proxy vote, proxy voting activity, or other exercise of a shareholder right, including any attempt to influence management; and ``(B) shall not subordinate the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to any non- pecuniary objective, or promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals unrelated to those financial interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. ``(3) Monitoring.--A fiduciary shall exercise prudence and diligence in the selection and monitoring of a person, if any, selected to advise or otherwise assist with the exercise of shareholder rights, including by providing research and analysis, recommendations on exercise of proxy voting or other shareholder rights, administrative services with respect to voting proxies, and recordkeeping and reporting services. ``(4) Investment managers and proxy advisory firms.--Where the authority to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder rights has been delegated to an investment manager pursuant to section 403(a), or a proxy voting advisory firm or other person who performs advisory services as to the voting of proxies or the exercise of other shareholder rights, a responsible plan fiduciary shall prudently monitor the proxy voting activities of such investment manager or advisory firm and determine whether such activities are in compliance with paragraphs (1) and (2). ``(5) Voting policies.-- ``(A) In general.--In deciding whether to vote a proxy pursuant to this subsection, the plan fiduciary may adopt a proxy voting policy, including a safe harbor proxy voting policy described in subparagraph (B), providing that the authority to vote a proxy shall be exercised pursuant to specific parameters designed to serve the economic interest of the plan. ``(B) Safe harbor voting policy.--With respect to a decision not to vote a proxy, a fiduciary shall satisfy the fiduciary responsibilities under this subsection if such fiduciary adopts and is following a safe harbor proxy voting policy that-- ``(i) limits voting resources to particular types of proposals that the fiduciary has prudently determined are substantially related to the business activities of the issuer or are expected to have a material effect on the value of the plan investment; or ``(ii) establishes that the fiduciary will refrain from voting on proposals or particular types of proposals when the assets of a plan invested in the issuer relative to the total assets of such plan are below 5 percent (or, in the event such assets are under management, when the assets under management invested in the issuer are below 5 percent of the total assets under management). ``(C) Exception.--No proxy voting policy adopted pursuant to this paragraph shall preclude a fiduciary from submitting a proxy vote when the fiduciary determines that the matter being voted on is expected to have a material economic effect on the investment performance of a plan's portfolio (or the investment performance of assets under management in the case of an investment manager); provided, however, that in all cases compliance with a safe harbor voting policy shall be presumed to satisfy fiduciary responsibilities with respect to decisions not to vote. ``(6) Review.--A fiduciary shall periodically review any policy adopted under this subsection.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to an exercise of shareholder rights occurring on or after January 1, 2024. Purpose Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits do not take a back seat to the political and social preferences of investment fiduciaries. The Biden administration's interpretation of ERISA pushes plans to outsource proxy voting decisions to proxy advisory firms that aggregate those votes and to exercise those votes on matters that may be driven by political or social preferences. H.R. 5337 ensures that shareholder rights, including proxy votes appurtenant to ERISA plan assets, are used only to promote the economic interests of plan participants in their benefits.

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by prioritizing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C.; Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.; and Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy, Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C. On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J. Walsh, Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing, concerns were discussed regarding the DOL's proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of loyalty when voting proxies for ERISA plans. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of DOL. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022, final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights'' was discussed, including concerns regarding the Biden administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. First Session--Legislative Action On February 7, 2023, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden administration's DOL final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.'' The resolution rescinds the Biden administration's rule and would have the effect of reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule titled ``Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments'' which included language on proxy voting for ERISA plans. On February 28, 2023, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219- 210, with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20, the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the House failed to override the veto by a vote of 219-200. On September 5, 2023, Rep. Erin Houchin (R-IN) introduced the Retirement Proxy Protection Act (H.R. 5337). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5337 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC) that made technical changes. Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (R-CA) offered a substitute amendment codifying the Biden administration ESG and proxy voting rule. The substitute amendment failed by a recorded vote of 19-23. Committee Views INTRODUCTION H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act, clarifies that acts to exercise shareholder rights and vote proxies in ERISA plans must be for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits under the plan and solely in the economic interest of the plan. The bill clarifies that plan assets may not be used to advance or promote interests other than the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits under the plan. Accordingly, the bill amends ERISA to provide that it does not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise of every shareholder right. ERISA, together with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, already set forth the requirement that a fiduciary's duty to act solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries means to act solely in their pecuniary interest in the benefits provided under the plan. However, the Biden administration's DOL has ignored the statute and Supreme Court precedent. H.R. 5337 provides clear guideposts for ERISA plan fiduciaries while reflecting the fiduciary principles inherent in ERISA since its enactment in 1974. H.R. 5337 protects the retirement savings of the U.S. workforce, which is the purpose of ERISA. The duty of prudence and loyalty under existing law Under ERISA an investment fiduciary must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\ Courts have stated that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c), 1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the ``exclusive purpose rule.'' \2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). \3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non- pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even if that goal is set out in the plan document,\5\ stating: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock ownership). \5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan.'') Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term ``benefits'' . . . must be understood to refer to the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer stock.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Id. at 421. The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits. Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral goals such as ESG by exercising shareholder rights (such as proxy votes) appurtenant to plan assets at the expense of the economic interest of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries. ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held to an expert prudence standard. However, for the last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits other than the financial interest of participants and beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits'') through the exercise of shareholder rights, including proxy voting exercised in the aggregate by proxy voting advisory firms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Exercising shareholder rights and voting proxies in ERISA plans DOL's longstanding position is that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets includes the management of voting rights (as well as other shareholder rights) that are inherent in a plan's investments.\8\ ERISA fiduciaries have interpreted DOL's guidance on proxy voting as a regulatory mandate to vote all proxies associated with assets held by an ERISA plan.\9\ That is, many institutional investors have historically interpreted DOL guidance to require fiduciaries to vote every share on every matter on a proxy.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 16, 2020). Id. at 81,658 (discussing letter from Alan D. Leibowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988)). \9\See James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, Mercatus Ctr. George Mason Univ., How to Fix Our Broken Proxy Advisory System 5, (2013) (``changes at [DOL] in the 1980s mandat[ed] that ERISA pension plan fiduciaries-- such as union, corporate, and other officials who control or manage a plan's assets--vote the plan's shares on the basis of active analysis, regardless of whether or not the fiduciary was certain that expending time and effort to analyze how to vote would create value for a fund.'') (internal citation omitted). \10\See Interpretive Bulletin 94-2: Interpretive Bulletin relating to written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting or guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 81,659 n.17 (July 29, 1994) (quoting comment letter); Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658, 81,666 (Dec. 16, 2020) (Trump administration proxy voting rule was intended ``to correct a misunderstanding among some fiduciaries and other stakeholders that ERISA requires every proxy to be voted.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result, plan fiduciaries turned to proxy advisor firms to vote proxies for the plan's investment holdings to comply with a perceived regulatory mandate.\11\ In 1985, seeing an opportunity to fill a void in the market created by DOL, a former high-ranking DOL official founded Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) to provide proxy voting services while spreading the cost across its many customers.\12\ By 2013, ISS, together with another proxy advisory firm, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), had a combined market share of 97 percent (61 percent for ISS and 36 percent for Glass Lewis).\13\ By 2020, ISS reported that it voted over 10 million ballots annually on behalf of clients representing 4.2 trillion shares in about 44,000 shareholder meetings.\14\ At the same time, Glass Lewis reported it provided services to 1,300 clients collectively managing more than $35 trillion in assets in about 20,000 shareholder meetings across 100 global markets per year.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-47, Corporate Shareholder Meetings: Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices (2016) (discussing increasing demand for proxy advisory firm services among institutional investors such as pension plans). \12\ISS, 25for25: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of Corporate Governance, in Celebration of ISS' 25th Anniversary iv (``[I]n 1985, Robert A.G. Monks founded Institutional Shareholder Services . . . with one simple goal: to help asset owners, and by extension, asset managers, to carry out their fiduciary obligations to vote their shares in a thoughtful and informed fashion.''); see also Labor Dept. Post Filled by Robert A.G. Monks, N.Y. Times (Dec. 23, 1983). \13\James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, supra note 9. \14\Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,082, 55,126 (Sept. 3, 2020). \15\Id. at 55,127. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In short, ISS and Glass Lewis dominate the proxy advisory market.\16\ The widespread reliance on proxy advisory firms gives these firms tremendous influence as they vote and otherwise wield significant influence on corporate governance matters. According to a Mercatus Center study, ``These firms weigh in on issues such as the composition and operation of corporate boards, disclosure and compensation practices, and companies' policies on recycling, renewable energy, and political contributions.''\17\ The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board wrote that ISS and Glass Lewis are ``the real driving force behind'' an onslaught of ESG proxy resolutions from progressive investors.\18\ Both ISS and Glass Lewis are foreign-owned.\19\ Neither proxy advisory firm appears to have significant investment in the success of the companies over which the proxy advisory firms wield such power. Instead, the economic impact of the ESG proxy voting policies of ISS and Glass Lewis affects ERISA plans and shareholders at large. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Editorial, Cracking the Proxy Advisory Duopoly, Wall St. J. (July 13, 2023) (ISS and Glass Lewis ``boast outsize clout in U.S. corporate elections and make up an estimated 97% of the proxy advisory market,'' citing a 2018 article in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance finding that ``the two firms can swing between 10% and 30% of the shareholder votes''). \17\James K. Glassman & Hester Pierce, supra note 9, at 1. \18\The Editorial Board, Cracking the Proxy Advisory Duopoly, Wall Street Journal (July 13, 2023). \19\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISS benchmark policy proxy voting guidelines for the United States demonstrate the activist agenda. For example, the guidelines state: For companies that are significant greenhouse gas . . . emitters . . . generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by case basis) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ISS, Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Changes for 2023: U.S., Canada, Brazil, and Americas Regional, available at https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/updates/Americas- Policy-Updates.pdf. ISS proxy voting guidelines include policies for gender diversity on board composition and an entire section dedicated to ``Social and Environmental Issues,'' including racial equity, political expenditures, and lobbying Congress. Similarly, Glass Lewis proxy voting guidelines for the United States also demonstrate its activist agenda. For example, the guidelines provide that Glass Lewis ``will generally recommend against a nominating and governance committee chair at companies in the Russell 1000 index if the company has not provided any disclosure of director diversity and skills in any of our tracked categories. . . .''\21\ Tracked categories include a ``percentage-based approach to board gender diversity.'' The guidelines also provide that ``we will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director in an underrepresented community. . . .'' The policy guidelines further extend to consideration of exposure to risk ``resulting from climate change or membership in trade associations with controversial political ties.'' In a search of the guidelines, ``diversity'' appears 47 times and ``climate'' appears 22 times. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\Glass Lewis, United States 2023 Policy Guidelines, available at https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/US-Voting- Guidelines-2023-GL.pdf?hsCtaTracking=45ff0e63-7af7-4e28-ba3c- 7985d01e390a%7C74c0265a-20b3-478c-846b-69784730ccbd. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, proxy voting firms may have conflicts of interest.\22\ Besides proxy advisory services, ISS provides advisory consulting services and other products and services through ISS Corporate Solutions, Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary).\23\ As early as 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found potential conflicts of interest between the consulting services provided by ISS and its proxy advisory services that could affect vote recommendations.\24\ ISS may also advise companies on how to frame proposals to get the most votes.\25\ At best, ISS advice influences the management of a corporation to adopt ISS policy preferences. At worst, a corporation purchases ISS advice in order to ensure an ISS affirmative vote on the corporation's proxy initiatives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,082, 55,126 (Sept. 3, 2020). \23\Id. \24\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., Gao 17-47, Corporate Shareholder Meetings: Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate Governance Practices 9 (2016) (``[V]arious conflicts of interest can arise that have the potential to influence the research conducted and voting recommendations made by proxy advisory firms. The most commonly cited potential for conflict involves ISS, which provides services to both institutional investor clients and corporate clients. . . .''). \25\James K. Glassman & Hester Pierce, supra note 9, at 2 (proxy advisory firms may advise companies, including how to help their ratings and get votes, and such conflicts of interest can affect recommendations). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Trump administration ESG rule In December 2020, the Trump administration issued a final rule on proxy voting.\26\ Key elements included the following provisions: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\Fiduciary Dutie

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to codify a Trump Administration regulation regarding proxy voting and shareholder rights.\2\ The Trump-era rule, which lacked a sound policy rationale and perpetuated a bias against environmental, social, governance (ESG) investing, sought to disenfranchise retirement plan fiduciaries from exercising their shareholder rights on behalf of workers. H.R. 5338 is opposed by organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104. \2\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81658, (Dec. 16, 2020), [hereinafter 2020 Final Rule], https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-202012-16/2020-27465. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTEXT FOR H.R. 5337 AND BACKGROUND ON THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S FLAWED VIEWS ON ESG Retirement savings plans covered by ERISA likely have stocks as part of their investment portfolios.\3\ Stock ownership provides an investor with certain shareholder rights, often including the right to vote on matters of corporate governance (e.g., electing the board of directors, executive compensation, shareholder proposals on ESG-related issues). ERISA pension plans often amass large amounts of stock in companies on behalf of workers invested in the plan. There has been a long-standing principle under ERISA that appropriate management of funds includes fiduciaries exercising shareholder rights and voting by proxy for individual investors on these corporate governance matters. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\See John. J. Topoleski & Elizabeth A. Myers, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12362, Department of Labor Guidance and Regulations on the Exercise of Shareholder Rights by Private-Sector Pension Plans (2023), https:// crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IF12362. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The voting of proxies is not an arbitrary exercise, but rather an economically important mechanism for shareholders to monitor and hold company management accountable and enhance long-term value of plan assets. For example, in the years since the scandal at WorldCom, a telecommunications corporation whose executives engaged in massive accounting fraud, it has become a common understanding that prudent corporate governance practices can mitigate the risk such malfeasance goes unnoticed. Proxy voting plays a pivotal role in enhancing investment returns by improving corporate accountability and potentially reducing the risk of wrongdoing. Over decades, the Department of Labor (DOL) has periodically issued guidance on proxy voting issues yet has consistently affirmed that ERISA's fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence apply to proxy voting by pension and employee benefit plans.\4\ This is because the exercise of shareholder rights is key to ensuring management's accountability to the shareholders that own the company, in this case retirement plan investors. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\See Letter from U.S. Dep't of Lab. to Mr. Helmuth Fandl, Chrmn. of the Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 198 WL 897696 (``In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.''). The Department subsequently restated this view in 1994 (Interpretive Bulletin 94-2); in 2008 (Interpretive Bulletin 2008-02); in 2016 (Interpretative Bulletin 2016- 01); and in 2018 (Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-01). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2020, the Trump Administration proposed a rule on proxy voting that overturned such long-standing guidance. The rule was based on a flawed premise that there is a ``persistent misunderstanding among stakeholders that ERISA fiduciaries are required to vote all proxies.''\5\ BlackRock, the world's largest asset manager, submitted a comment letter raising concerns with the premise of the Trump-era proxy voting rule, among other issues. Specifically, BlackRock noted that ``fiduciaries do not believe that they are required to vote all proxies; rather, they have concluded that under most circumstances, voting proxies is in the long-term economic interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.''\6\ Many other stakeholders agreed. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which is a broad coalition of institutional investors collectively representing over $500 billion in invested capital, ``[n]o evidence appears . . . supporting the notion that fiduciaries are confused about their obligations with respect to proxy voting.''\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 55222. \6\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0297, at 3, https:// www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0297. \7\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0301, at 2, https:// www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0301. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Trump-era DOL also claimed ``some fiduciaries . . . may be acting in ways that unwittingly allow plan assets to be used to support or pursue proxy proposals for environmental, social, or public policy agendas that have no connection to increasing the value of investments . . .''\8\ This claim reflected the Trump Administration's assumption that shareholder proposals addressing ESG investing by definition do not have an economic impact on the value of plan assets. This assumption is incorrect. Numerous retirement stakeholders, including publicly traded companies, submitted comments to DOL pointing out that it is often the case that voting proxies on ESG-related issues is in the economic interests of retirement savers. One organization explained that ``[c]onsideration of ESG is a well- developed risk management strategy aimed at integrating factors such as climate change and human capital management that evidence shows have a material impact on asset prices, especially when taking into account the risks that long-term, universal investors like pension plans face.''\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 55222. \9\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0227, at 2, https:// www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0227. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 5337 CODIFIES A DEEPLY FLAWED TRUMP-ERA RULE Notwithstanding many stakeholder concerns and opposition, the Trump Administraiton finalized its proxy rule that imposed first-of-its-kind restrictions on plan fiduciaries when it came to exercising shareholder rights. The Trump-era proxy voting rule specified that fiduciaries were not required to vote on all proxies and included two safe harbors that permitted fiduciaries to limit or refrain from voting in certain situations.\10\ The rule also imposed new onerous recordkeeping requirements and monitoring obligations regarding the exercise of shareholder rights. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Taken together, the requirements of the Trump-era proxy voting rule were seen by many as unnecessary and effectively disenfranchising ERISA fiduciaries and ultimately reducing the rights of retirement plan participants. To that same end, H.R. 5337 would ``put a thumb on the scale against fiduciaries exercising shareholder rights on behalf of workers whose deferred wages they are responsible for managing for them, which would result in enhancing the power of public companies'' management and decreasing the say and power of workers in the companies they are invested in.''\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to Chair Virginia Foxx and Ranking Member Bobby Scott, H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Full Committee Markup, (Sept. 13, 2023), at 4, https:// ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/9.13.23- CorporateGovernance-Letter-of-Opposition-to-Anti-ESG-Bills.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Had Committee Republicans held a legislative hearing on H.R. 5337, Committee Members could have heard testimony and asked witnesses' questions about the bill's deterrent effect on fiduciaries' exercising their shareholder rights. Unfortunately, Committee Republicans failed to hold a legislative hearing on H.R. 5337 and instead hastily marked up the bill shortly after it was introduced. DEMOCRATIC AMENDMENT OFFERED DURING MARKUP OF H.R. 5337 Committee Democrats put forward one substitute amendment to improve the bill. Offered by Ranking Member Scott (D-VA-3), this amendment would have codified the Biden Administration's proxy voting rule. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amendment Offered by Description Action taken ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #2................................... Mr. Scott.............. Codifies the Biden Defeated Administration's final proxy voting rule. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finalized in 2022, the Biden rule replaced the Trump-era rule and codified DOL's previously long-held view that a fiduciary's responsibilities include voting proxies. The rule also corrected several objectionable provisions of the Trump- era rule. For instance, it eliminated the language from the Trump-era rule stating that fiduciaries are not required to vote all proxies.\12\ It also eliminated the Trump-era rule's safe harbors permitting fiduciaries to limit or refrain from voting proxies in certain situations.\13\ The rule also put an end to Trump-era rule's recordkeeping requirements and monitoring obligations on proxy voting activities.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' 87 Fed. Reg. 73822-73886, (Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-01/pdf/2022- 25783.pdf. \13\ Id. at 73849. \14\ Id. at 73845. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, unlike the Trump-era rule, the Biden Administration's rule (which addressed both proxy voting and ESG investing generally) was popular and supported by individuals and stakeholder groups. US SIF and other organizations conducted an analysis of the comments submitted to DOL on the Biden Administration's proposed ESG and proxy voting rule. Of the over 22,000 comments submitted by individuals, 97.4 percent were in support of the proposed rule.\15\ And of the 144 letters submitted by institutions-- such as corporations, asset managers, financial firms, trade groups, and labor organizations--83 percent were supportive, with some recommending modifications.\16\ The amendment to codify this rule failed on a party line vote. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Eric Pitt, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Markets, Bryan McGannon and Ginny Brooks, US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, Garbriel Malek, Stephanie Jones, and Clare Staib-Kaufman, Environmental Defense Fund, Public comments overwhelmingly support the US Labor Department proposed rule addressing the inclusion of ESG criteria and proxy voting in ERISA-governed retirement plans, (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ussif.org/Files/ Public_Policy/DOL_Comment_Analysis_1.25.22.pdf. \16\ Id. at 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONCLUSION H.R. 5337 would codify an unnecessary, unpopular, and unreasonable Trump-era rule that curtailed the ability of plan fiduciaries to vote on proxies to the detriment of retirement savers. For the reasons stated above, Committee Democrats opposed H.R. 5337 when the Committee on Education and the Workforce considered it on September 14, 2023. We urge the House of Representatives to do the same. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Ranking Member. Mark DeSaulnier. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan. Jahana Hayes. Haley M. Stevens. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/227