Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 5337]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5337) to amend the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify the application of
prudence and exclusive purpose duties to the exercise of
shareholder rights, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Retirement Proxy Protection Act''.
SEC. 2. EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS.
(a) In General.--Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(f) Exercise of Shareholder Rights.--
``(1) Authority to exercise shareholder rights.--
``(A) In general.--The fiduciary duty to manage plan
assets that are shares of stock includes the management
of shareholder rights appurtenant to those shares,
including the right to vote proxies. When deciding
whether to exercise a shareholder right and in
exercising such right, including the voting of proxies,
a fiduciary must act prudently and solely in the
interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants
and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable expenses
of administering the plan. The fiduciary duty to manage
shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does
not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise
of every shareholder right.
``(B) Exception.--This subsection shall not apply to
voting, tender, and similar rights with respect to
securities that are passed through pursuant to the
terms of an individual account plan to participants and
beneficiaries with accounts holding such securities.
``(2) Requirements for exercise of shareholder rights.--A
fiduciary, when deciding whether to exercise a shareholder
right and when exercising a shareholder right--
``(A) shall--
``(i) act solely in accordance with the
economic interest of the plan and its
participants and beneficiaries;
``(ii) consider any costs involved;
``(iii) evaluate material facts that form the
basis for any particular proxy vote or exercise
of shareholder rights; and
``(iv) maintain a record of any proxy vote,
proxy voting activity, or other exercise of a
shareholder right, including any attempt to
influence management; and
``(B) shall not subordinate the interests of
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement
income or financial benefits under the plan to any non-
pecuniary objective, or promote non-pecuniary benefits
or goals unrelated to those financial interests of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries.
``(3) Monitoring.--A fiduciary shall exercise prudence and
diligence in the selection and monitoring of a person, if any,
selected to advise or otherwise assist with the exercise of
shareholder rights, including by providing research and
analysis, recommendations on exercise of proxy voting or other
shareholder rights, administrative services with respect to
voting proxies, and recordkeeping and reporting services.
``(4) Investment managers and proxy advisory firms.--Where
the authority to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder
rights has been delegated to an investment manager pursuant to
section 403(a), or a proxy voting advisory firm or other person
who performs advisory services as to the voting of proxies or
the exercise of other shareholder rights, a responsible plan
fiduciary shall prudently monitor the proxy voting activities
of such investment manager or advisory firm and determine
whether such activities are in compliance with paragraphs (1)
and (2).
``(5) Voting policies.--
``(A) In general.--In deciding whether to vote a
proxy pursuant to this subsection, the plan fiduciary
may adopt a proxy voting policy, including a safe
harbor proxy voting policy described in subparagraph
(B), providing that the authority to vote a proxy shall
be exercised pursuant to specific parameters designed
to serve the economic interest of the plan.
``(B) Safe harbor voting policy.--With respect to a
decision not to vote a proxy, a fiduciary shall satisfy
the fiduciary responsibilities under this subsection if
such fiduciary adopts and is following a safe harbor
proxy voting policy that--
``(i) limits voting resources to particular
types of proposals that the fiduciary has
prudently determined are substantially related
to the business activities of the issuer or are
expected to have a material effect on the value
of the plan investment; or
``(ii) establishes that the fiduciary will
refrain from voting on proposals or particular
types of proposals when the assets of a plan
invested in the issuer relative to the total
assets of such plan are below 5 percent (or, in
the event such assets are under management,
when the assets under management invested in
the issuer are below 5 percent of the total
assets under management).
``(C) Exception.--No proxy voting policy adopted
pursuant to this paragraph shall preclude a fiduciary
from submitting a proxy vote when the fiduciary
determines that the matter being voted on is expected
to have a material economic effect on the investment
performance of a plan's portfolio (or the investment
performance of assets under management in the case of
an investment manager); provided, however, that in all
cases compliance with a safe harbor voting policy shall
be presumed to satisfy fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to decisions not to vote.
``(6) Review.--A fiduciary shall periodically review any
policy adopted under this subsection.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
apply to an exercise of shareholder rights occurring on or after
January 1, 2024.
Purpose
Employee benefit plans have one purpose: to provide
employee benefits. Employee benefit plan assets have one
purpose: to fund those benefits. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was designed to ensure that the
financial interests of participants and beneficiaries in their
benefits do not take a back seat to the political and social
preferences of investment fiduciaries. The Biden
administration's interpretation of ERISA pushes plans to
outsource proxy voting decisions to proxy advisory firms that
aggregate those votes and to exercise those votes on matters
that may be driven by political or social preferences. H.R.
5337 ensures that shareholder rights, including proxy votes
appurtenant to ERISA plan assets, are used only to promote the
economic interests of plan participants in their benefits.
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearings
On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor,
Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a
hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to
Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden
administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and
social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by
prioritizing environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying
before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs, Resident
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Karen
Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C.; Amy
Matsui, Director of Income Security and Senior Counsel,
National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.; and Aron
Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy,
Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C.
On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023
budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).
Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J.
Walsh, Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing,
concerns were discussed regarding the DOL's proposed rule
titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden
administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's
duties of loyalty when voting proxies for ERISA plans.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearings
On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the
Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of DOL. Testifying before
the Committee was the Honorable Julie Su, Acting Secretary,
DOL, Washington, D.C. At this hearing, DOL's December 1, 2022,
final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan
Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights'' was discussed,
including concerns regarding the Biden administration's efforts
to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and
loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA
plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG
into the administration of ERISA plans.
First Session--Legislative Action
On February 7, 2023, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced a
joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the
Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify the Biden
administration's DOL final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty
in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights.'' The resolution rescinds the Biden administration's
rule and would have the effect of reinstating the Trump
administration's November 13, 2020, rule titled ``Financial
Factors in Selecting Plan Investments'' which included language
on proxy voting for ERISA plans. On February 28, 2023, the
House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-
210, with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On
March 20, the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, the
House failed to override the veto by a vote of 219-200.
On September 5, 2023, Rep. Erin Houchin (R-IN) introduced
the Retirement Proxy Protection Act (H.R. 5337). The bill was
referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On
September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5337 in
legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The
Committee adopted an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
offered by Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC) that made technical
changes. Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (R-CA) offered a substitute
amendment codifying the Biden administration ESG and proxy
voting rule. The substitute amendment failed by a recorded vote
of 19-23.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act, clarifies
that acts to exercise shareholder rights and vote proxies in
ERISA plans must be for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits under the plan and solely in the economic interest of
the plan. The bill clarifies that plan assets may not be used
to advance or promote interests other than the financial
interests of participants and beneficiaries in their benefits
under the plan. Accordingly, the bill amends ERISA to provide
that it does not require the voting of every proxy or the
exercise of every shareholder right. ERISA, together with U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, already set forth the requirement that
a fiduciary's duty to act solely in the interests of
participants and beneficiaries means to act solely in their
pecuniary interest in the benefits provided under the plan.
However, the Biden administration's DOL has ignored the statute
and Supreme Court precedent. H.R. 5337 provides clear
guideposts for ERISA plan fiduciaries while reflecting the
fiduciary principles inherent in ERISA since its enactment in
1974. H.R. 5337 protects the retirement savings of the U.S.
workforce, which is the purpose of ERISA.
The duty of prudence and loyalty under existing law
Under ERISA an investment fiduciary must act solely in the
interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\
Courts have stated that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires
fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the
beneficiaries''\2\ and to make decisions ``with an eye single
to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\
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\1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c),
1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the
``exclusive purpose rule.''
\2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted).
\3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non-
pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's
fiduciary standards.\4\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of
prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even
if that goal is set out in the plan document,\5\ stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014)
(rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of
employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock
ownership).
\5\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content
of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific
nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan.'')
Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term
``benefits'' . . . must be understood to refer to the
sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income)
that trustees who manage investments typically seek to
secure for the trust's beneficiaries. . . . The term
does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those
supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer
stock.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\Id. at 421.
The Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits.
Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral
goals such as ESG by exercising shareholder rights (such as
proxy votes) appurtenant to plan assets at the expense of the
economic interest of the plan and its participants and
beneficiaries.
ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of like character.''\7\ Thus, fiduciaries are held
to an expert prudence standard. However, for the last 30 years,
there have been attempts to erode ERISA's principles of
prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits other than
the financial interest of participants and beneficiaries (i.e.,
``collateral benefits'') through the exercise of shareholder
rights, including proxy voting exercised in the aggregate by
proxy voting advisory firms.
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\7\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exercising shareholder rights and voting proxies in ERISA plans
DOL's longstanding position is that the fiduciary act of
managing plan assets includes the management of voting rights
(as well as other shareholder rights) that are inherent in a
plan's investments.\8\ ERISA fiduciaries have interpreted DOL's
guidance on proxy voting as a regulatory mandate to vote all
proxies associated with assets held by an ERISA plan.\9\ That
is, many institutional investors have historically interpreted
DOL guidance to require fiduciaries to vote every share on
every matter on a proxy.\10\
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\8\See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 16, 2020). Id. at 81,658 (discussing
letter from Alan D. Leibowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, to Helmuth
Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23,
1988)).
\9\See James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, Mercatus Ctr. George Mason
Univ., How to Fix Our Broken Proxy Advisory System 5, (2013) (``changes
at [DOL] in the 1980s mandat[ed] that ERISA pension plan fiduciaries--
such as union, corporate, and other officials who control or manage a
plan's assets--vote the plan's shares on the basis of active analysis,
regardless of whether or not the fiduciary was certain that expending
time and effort to analyze how to vote would create value for a
fund.'') (internal citation omitted).
\10\See Interpretive Bulletin 94-2: Interpretive Bulletin relating
to written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting or
guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 81,659 n.17 (July 29, 1994) (quoting
comment letter); Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and
Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658, 81,666 (Dec. 16, 2020) (Trump
administration proxy voting rule was intended ``to correct a
misunderstanding among some fiduciaries and other stakeholders that
ERISA requires every proxy to be voted.'').
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As a result, plan fiduciaries turned to proxy advisor firms
to vote proxies for the plan's investment holdings to comply
with a perceived regulatory mandate.\11\ In 1985, seeing an
opportunity to fill a void in the market created by DOL, a
former high-ranking DOL official founded Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) to provide proxy voting
services while spreading the cost across its many
customers.\12\ By 2013, ISS, together with another proxy
advisory firm, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), had a
combined market share of 97 percent (61 percent for ISS and 36
percent for Glass Lewis).\13\ By 2020, ISS reported that it
voted over 10 million ballots annually on behalf of clients
representing 4.2 trillion shares in about 44,000 shareholder
meetings.\14\ At the same time, Glass Lewis reported it
provided services to 1,300 clients collectively managing more
than $35 trillion in assets in about 20,000 shareholder
meetings across 100 global markets per year.\15\
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\11\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-47, Corporate
Shareholder Meetings: Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and
Corporate Governance Practices (2016) (discussing increasing demand for
proxy advisory firm services among institutional investors such as
pension plans).
\12\ISS, 25for25: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of
Corporate Governance, in Celebration of ISS' 25th Anniversary iv
(``[I]n 1985, Robert A.G. Monks founded Institutional Shareholder
Services . . . with one simple goal: to help asset owners, and by
extension, asset managers, to carry out their fiduciary obligations to
vote their shares in a thoughtful and informed fashion.''); see also
Labor Dept. Post Filled by Robert A.G. Monks, N.Y. Times (Dec. 23,
1983).
\13\James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, supra note 9.
\14\Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85
Fed. Reg. 55,082, 55,126 (Sept. 3, 2020).
\15\Id. at 55,127.
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In short, ISS and Glass Lewis dominate the proxy advisory
market.\16\ The widespread reliance on proxy advisory firms
gives these firms tremendous influence as they vote and
otherwise wield significant influence on corporate governance
matters. According to a Mercatus Center study, ``These firms
weigh in on issues such as the composition and operation of
corporate boards, disclosure and compensation practices, and
companies' policies on recycling, renewable energy, and
political contributions.''\17\ The Wall Street Journal
Editorial Board wrote that ISS and Glass Lewis are ``the real
driving force behind'' an onslaught of ESG proxy resolutions
from progressive investors.\18\ Both ISS and Glass Lewis are
foreign-owned.\19\ Neither proxy advisory firm appears to have
significant investment in the success of the companies over
which the proxy advisory firms wield such power. Instead, the
economic impact of the ESG proxy voting policies of ISS and
Glass Lewis affects ERISA plans and shareholders at large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Editorial, Cracking the Proxy Advisory Duopoly, Wall St. J.
(July 13, 2023) (ISS and Glass Lewis ``boast outsize clout in U.S.
corporate elections and make up an estimated 97% of the proxy advisory
market,'' citing a 2018 article in the Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance finding that ``the two firms can swing between 10%
and 30% of the shareholder votes'').
\17\James K. Glassman & Hester Pierce, supra note 9, at 1.
\18\The Editorial Board, Cracking the Proxy Advisory Duopoly, Wall
Street Journal (July 13, 2023).
\19\Id.
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ISS benchmark policy proxy voting guidelines for the United
States demonstrate the activist agenda. For example, the
guidelines state:
For companies that are significant greenhouse gas . .
. emitters . . . generally vote against or withhold
from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee
(or other directors on a case-by case basis) in cases
where ISS determines that the company is not taking the
minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and
mitigate risks related to climate change to the company
and the larger economy.\20\
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\20\ISS, Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Changes
for 2023: U.S., Canada, Brazil, and Americas Regional, available at
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/updates/Americas-
Policy-Updates.pdf.
ISS proxy voting guidelines include policies for gender
diversity on board composition and an entire section dedicated
to ``Social and Environmental Issues,'' including racial
equity, political expenditures, and lobbying Congress.
Similarly, Glass Lewis proxy voting guidelines for the
United States also demonstrate its activist agenda. For
example, the guidelines provide that Glass Lewis ``will
generally recommend against a nominating and governance
committee chair at companies in the Russell 1000 index if the
company has not provided any disclosure of director diversity
and skills in any of our tracked categories. . . .''\21\
Tracked categories include a ``percentage-based approach to
board gender diversity.'' The guidelines also provide that ``we
will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating
committee of a board with fewer than one director in an
underrepresented community. . . .'' The policy guidelines
further extend to consideration of exposure to risk ``resulting
from climate change or membership in trade associations with
controversial political ties.'' In a search of the guidelines,
``diversity'' appears 47 times and ``climate'' appears 22
times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\Glass Lewis, United States 2023 Policy Guidelines, available at
https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/US-Voting-
Guidelines-2023-GL.pdf?hsCtaTracking=45ff0e63-7af7-4e28-ba3c-
7985d01e390a%7C74c0265a-20b3-478c-846b-69784730ccbd.
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In addition, proxy voting firms may have conflicts of
interest.\22\ Besides proxy advisory services, ISS provides
advisory consulting services and other products and services
through ISS Corporate Solutions, Inc. (a wholly owned
subsidiary).\23\ As early as 2007, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office found potential conflicts of interest
between the consulting services provided by ISS and its proxy
advisory services that could affect vote recommendations.\24\
ISS may also advise companies on how to frame proposals to get
the most votes.\25\ At best, ISS advice influences the
management of a corporation to adopt ISS policy preferences. At
worst, a corporation purchases ISS advice in order to ensure an
ISS affirmative vote on the corporation's proxy initiatives.
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\22\Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85
Fed. Reg. 55,082, 55,126 (Sept. 3, 2020).
\23\Id.
\24\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., Gao 17-47, Corporate
Shareholder Meetings: Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and
Corporate Governance Practices 9 (2016) (``[V]arious conflicts of
interest can arise that have the potential to influence the research
conducted and voting recommendations made by proxy advisory firms. The
most commonly cited potential for conflict involves ISS, which provides
services to both institutional investor clients and corporate clients.
. . .'').
\25\James K. Glassman & Hester Pierce, supra note 9, at 2 (proxy
advisory firms may advise companies, including how to help their
ratings and get votes, and such conflicts of interest can affect
recommendations).
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Trump administration ESG rule
In December 2020, the Trump administration issued a final
rule on proxy voting.\26\ Key elements included the following
provisions:
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\26\Fiduciary Dutie
Minority Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act, amends the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to
codify a Trump Administration regulation regarding proxy voting
and shareholder rights.\2\ The Trump-era rule, which lacked a
sound policy rationale and perpetuated a bias against
environmental, social, governance (ESG) investing, sought to
disenfranchise retirement plan fiduciaries from exercising
their shareholder rights on behalf of workers. H.R. 5338 is
opposed by organizations such as the AFL-CIO, Americans for
Financial Reform, and US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment (US SIF).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104.
\2\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights,
85 Fed. Reg. 81658, (Dec. 16, 2020), [hereinafter 2020 Final Rule],
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-202012-16/2020-27465.
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CONTEXT FOR H.R. 5337 AND BACKGROUND ON THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S
FLAWED VIEWS ON ESG
Retirement savings plans covered by ERISA likely have
stocks as part of their investment portfolios.\3\ Stock
ownership provides an investor with certain shareholder rights,
often including the right to vote on matters of corporate
governance (e.g., electing the board of directors, executive
compensation, shareholder proposals on ESG-related issues).
ERISA pension plans often amass large amounts of stock in
companies on behalf of workers invested in the plan. There has
been a long-standing principle under ERISA that appropriate
management of funds includes fiduciaries exercising shareholder
rights and voting by proxy for individual investors on these
corporate governance matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\See John. J. Topoleski & Elizabeth A. Myers, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
IF12362, Department of Labor Guidance and Regulations on the Exercise
of Shareholder Rights by Private-Sector Pension Plans (2023), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IF12362.
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The voting of proxies is not an arbitrary exercise, but
rather an economically important mechanism for shareholders to
monitor and hold company management accountable and enhance
long-term value of plan assets. For example, in the years since
the scandal at WorldCom, a telecommunications corporation whose
executives engaged in massive accounting fraud, it has become a
common understanding that prudent corporate governance
practices can mitigate the risk such malfeasance goes
unnoticed. Proxy voting plays a pivotal role in enhancing
investment returns by improving corporate accountability and
potentially reducing the risk of wrongdoing.
Over decades, the Department of Labor (DOL) has
periodically issued guidance on proxy voting issues yet has
consistently affirmed that ERISA's fiduciary duties of loyalty
and prudence apply to proxy voting by pension and employee
benefit plans.\4\ This is because the exercise of shareholder
rights is key to ensuring management's accountability to the
shareholders that own the company, in this case retirement plan
investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\See Letter from U.S. Dep't of Lab. to Mr. Helmuth Fandl, Chrmn.
of the Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 198 WL
897696 (``In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which
are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies
appurtenant to those shares of stock.''). The Department subsequently
restated this view in 1994 (Interpretive Bulletin 94-2); in 2008
(Interpretive Bulletin 2008-02); in 2016 (Interpretative Bulletin 2016-
01); and in 2018 (Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-01).
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In 2020, the Trump Administration proposed a rule on proxy
voting that overturned such long-standing guidance. The rule
was based on a flawed premise that there is a ``persistent
misunderstanding among stakeholders that ERISA fiduciaries are
required to vote all proxies.''\5\ BlackRock, the world's
largest asset manager, submitted a comment letter raising
concerns with the premise of the Trump-era proxy voting rule,
among other issues. Specifically, BlackRock noted that
``fiduciaries do not believe that they are required to vote all
proxies; rather, they have concluded that under most
circumstances, voting proxies is in the long-term economic
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.''\6\ Many
other stakeholders agreed. According to the Interfaith Center
on Corporate Responsibility, which is a broad coalition of
institutional investors collectively representing over $500
billion in invested capital, ``[n]o evidence appears . . .
supporting the notion that fiduciaries are confused about their
obligations with respect to proxy voting.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 55222.
\6\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0297, at 3, https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0297.
\7\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0301, at 2, https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0301.
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The Trump-era DOL also claimed ``some fiduciaries . . . may
be acting in ways that unwittingly allow plan assets to be used
to support or pursue proxy proposals for environmental, social,
or public policy agendas that have no connection to increasing
the value of investments . . .''\8\ This claim reflected the
Trump Administration's assumption that shareholder proposals
addressing ESG investing by definition do not have an economic
impact on the value of plan assets. This assumption is
incorrect. Numerous retirement stakeholders, including publicly
traded companies, submitted comments to DOL pointing out that
it is often the case that voting proxies on ESG-related issues
is in the economic interests of retirement savers. One
organization explained that ``[c]onsideration of ESG is a well-
developed risk management strategy aimed at integrating factors
such as climate change and human capital management that
evidence shows have a material impact on asset prices,
especially when taking into account the risks that long-term,
universal investors like pension plans face.''\9\
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\8\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 55222.
\9\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0227, at 2, https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0227.
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H.R. 5337 CODIFIES A DEEPLY FLAWED TRUMP-ERA RULE
Notwithstanding many stakeholder concerns and opposition,
the Trump Administraiton finalized its proxy rule that imposed
first-of-its-kind restrictions on plan fiduciaries when it came
to exercising shareholder rights. The Trump-era proxy voting
rule specified that fiduciaries were not required to vote on
all proxies and included two safe harbors that permitted
fiduciaries to limit or refrain from voting in certain
situations.\10\ The rule also imposed new onerous recordkeeping
requirements and monitoring obligations regarding the exercise
of shareholder rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\2020 Final Rule, supra note 1.
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Taken together, the requirements of the Trump-era proxy
voting rule were seen by many as unnecessary and effectively
disenfranchising ERISA fiduciaries and ultimately reducing the
rights of retirement plan participants. To that same end, H.R.
5337 would ``put a thumb on the scale against fiduciaries
exercising shareholder rights on behalf of workers whose
deferred wages they are responsible for managing for them,
which would result in enhancing the power of public companies''
management and decreasing the say and power of workers in the
companies they are invested in.''\11\
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\11\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to Chair
Virginia Foxx and Ranking Member Bobby Scott, H. Comm. on Educ. & the
Workforce, Full Committee Markup, (Sept. 13, 2023), at 4, https://
ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/9.13.23-
CorporateGovernance-Letter-of-Opposition-to-Anti-ESG-Bills.pdf.
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Had Committee Republicans held a legislative hearing on
H.R. 5337, Committee Members could have heard testimony and
asked witnesses' questions about the bill's deterrent effect on
fiduciaries' exercising their shareholder rights.
Unfortunately, Committee Republicans failed to hold a
legislative hearing on H.R. 5337 and instead hastily marked up
the bill shortly after it was introduced.
DEMOCRATIC AMENDMENT OFFERED DURING MARKUP OF H.R. 5337
Committee Democrats put forward one substitute amendment to
improve the bill. Offered by Ranking Member Scott (D-VA-3),
this amendment would have codified the Biden Administration's
proxy voting rule.
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Amendment Offered by Description Action taken
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#2................................... Mr. Scott.............. Codifies the Biden Defeated
Administration's final
proxy voting rule.
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Finalized in 2022, the Biden rule replaced the Trump-era
rule and codified DOL's previously long-held view that a
fiduciary's responsibilities include voting proxies. The rule
also corrected several objectionable provisions of the Trump-
era rule. For instance, it eliminated the language from the
Trump-era rule stating that fiduciaries are not required to
vote all proxies.\12\ It also eliminated the Trump-era rule's
safe harbors permitting fiduciaries to limit or refrain from
voting proxies in certain situations.\13\ The rule also put an
end to Trump-era rule's recordkeeping requirements and
monitoring obligations on proxy voting activities.\14\
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\12\``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' 87 Fed. Reg. 73822-73886, (Dec. 1,
2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-01/pdf/2022-
25783.pdf.
\13\ Id. at 73849.
\14\ Id. at 73845.
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Additionally, unlike the Trump-era rule, the Biden
Administration's rule (which addressed both proxy voting and
ESG investing generally) was popular and supported by
individuals and stakeholder groups. US SIF and other
organizations conducted an analysis of the comments submitted
to DOL on the Biden Administration's proposed ESG and proxy
voting rule. Of the over 22,000 comments submitted by
individuals, 97.4 percent were in support of the proposed
rule.\15\ And of the 144 letters submitted by institutions--
such as corporations, asset managers, financial firms, trade
groups, and labor organizations--83 percent were supportive,
with some recommending modifications.\16\ The amendment to
codify this rule failed on a party line vote.
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\15\Eric Pitt, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Markets,
Bryan McGannon and Ginny Brooks, US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment, Garbriel Malek, Stephanie Jones, and Clare
Staib-Kaufman, Environmental Defense Fund, Public comments
overwhelmingly support the US Labor Department proposed rule addressing
the inclusion of ESG criteria and proxy voting in ERISA-governed
retirement plans, (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ussif.org/Files/
Public_Policy/DOL_Comment_Analysis_1.25.22.pdf.
\16\ Id. at 3.
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CONCLUSION
H.R. 5337 would codify an unnecessary, unpopular, and
unreasonable Trump-era rule that curtailed the ability of plan
fiduciaries to vote on proxies to the detriment of retirement
savers. For the reasons stated above, Committee Democrats
opposed H.R. 5337 when the Committee on Education and the
Workforce considered it on September 14, 2023. We urge the
House of Representatives to do the same.
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott,
Ranking Member.
Mark DeSaulnier.
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan.
Jahana Hayes.
Haley M. Stevens.
[all]