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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-278

DEFENDING EDUCATION TRANSPARENCY AND ENDING ROGUE REGIMES ENGAGING IN NEFARIOUS TRANSACTIONS ACT

2023-11-24

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 5933] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5933) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to require additional information in disclosures of foreign gifts and contracts from foreign sources, restrict contracts with certain foreign entities and foreign countries of concern, require certain staff and faculty to report foreign gifts and contracts, and require disclosure of certain foreign investments within endowments, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act'' or the ``DETERRENT Act''. SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS. (a) In General.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS. ``(a) Disclosure Reports.-- ``(1) Aggregate gifts and contract disclosures.--An institution shall file a disclosure report in accordance with subsection (b)(1) with the Secretary on July 31 of the calendar year immediately following any calendar year in which-- ``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters into a contract with, a foreign source (other than a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern)-- ``(i) the value of which is $50,000 or more, considered alone or in combination with all other gifts from, or contracts with, that foreign source within the calendar year; or ``(ii) the value of which is undetermined; or ``(B) the institution receives a gift from a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern, or, upon receiving a waiver under section 117A to enter into a contract with such a country or entity, enters into such contract, without regard to the value of such gift or contract. ``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.--In the case of an institution that is substantially controlled (as described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or successor regulations)) by a foreign source, the institution shall file a disclosure report in accordance with subsection (b)(2) with the Secretary on July 31 of each year. ``(3) Treatment of affiliated entities.--For purposes of this section, any gift to, or contract with, an affiliated entity of an institution shall be considered a gift to or contract with, respectively, such institution. ``(b) Contents of Report.-- ``(1) Gifts and contracts.--Each report to the Secretary required under subsection (a)(1) shall contain the following: ``(A) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with, any foreign source-- ``(i) the terms of such gift or contract, including-- ``(I) the name of the individual, department, or benefactor at the institution receiving the gift or carrying out the contract; ``(II) the intended purpose of such gift or contract, as provided to the institution by such foreign source, or if no such purpose is provided by such foreign source, the intended use of such gift or contract, as provided by the institution; and ``(III) in the case of a restricted or conditional gift or contract, a description of the restrictions or conditions of such gift or contract; ``(ii) with respect to a gift-- ``(I) the total fair market dollar amount or dollar value of the gift, as of the date of submission of such report; and ``(II) the date on which the institution received such gift; ``(iii) with respect to a contract-- ``(I) the date on which such contract commences; ``(II) as applicable, the date on which such contract terminates; and ``(III) an assurance that the institution will-- ``(aa) maintain an unredacted copy of the contract until the latest of-- ``(AA) the date that is 4 years after the date on which the contract commences; ``(BB) the date on which the contract terminates; or ``(CC) the last day of any period that applicable State law requires a copy of such contract to be maintained; and ``(bb) upon request of the Secretary during an investigation under subsection (f)(1), produce such an unredacted copy of the contract; and ``(iv) an assurance that in a case in which information is required to be disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is not in English, such information is translated into English in compliance with the requirements of subsection (c)(1). ``(B) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with, a foreign source that is a foreign government (other than the government of a foreign country of concern)-- ``(i) the name of such foreign government; ``(ii) the department, agency, office, or division of such foreign government that approved such gift or contract, as applicable; and ``(iii) the physical mailing address of such department, agency, office, or division. ``(C) With respect to a gift received from, or contract entered into with, a foreign source (other than a foreign government subject to the requirements of subparagraph (B))-- ``(i) the legal name of the foreign source, or, if such name is not available, a statement certified by the compliance officer in accordance with subsection (f)(2) that the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such name; ``(ii) in the case of a foreign source that is a natural person, the country of citizenship of such person, or, if such country is not known, the principal country of residence of such person; ``(iii) in the case of a foreign source that is a legal entity, the country in which such entity is incorporated, or if such information is not available, the principal place of business of such entity; and ``(iv) the physical mailing address of such foreign source, or if such address is not available, a statement certified by the compliance officer in accordance with subsection (f)(2) that the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such address. ``(D) With respect to a contract entered into with a foreign source that is a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of concern-- ``(i) a complete and unredacted text of the original contract, and if such original contract is not in English, a translated copy of the text into English; ``(ii) a copy of the waiver received under section 117A for such contract; and ``(iii) the statement submitted by the institution for purposes of receiving such a waiver under section 117A(b)(1). ``(2) Foreign source ownership or control.--Each report to the Secretary required under subsection (a)(2) shall contain-- ``(A) the legal name and address of the foreign source that owns or controls the institution; ``(B) the date on which the foreign source assumed ownership or control; and ``(C) any changes in program or structure resulting from the change in ownership or control. ``(c) Translation Requirements.--Any information required to be disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is not in English shall be translated, for purposes of such disclosure, by a person that is not an affiliated entity or agent of the foreign source involved with such gift or contract. ``(d) Public Inspection.-- ``(1) Database requirement.--Beginning not later than 60 days before the July 31 immediately following the date of the enactment of the DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall-- ``(A) establish and maintain a searchable database on a website of the Department, under which all reports submitted under this section (including any report submitted under this section before the date of the enactment of the DETERRENT Act)-- ``(i) are made publicly available (in electronic and downloadable format), including any information provided in such reports (other than the information prohibited from being publicly disclosed pursuant to paragraph (2)); ``(ii) can be individually identified and compared; and ``(iii) are searchable and sortable by-- ``(I) the date the institution filed such report; ``(II) the date on which the institution received the gift, or entered into the contract, which is the subject of the report; ``(III) the attributable country of such gift or contract; and ``(IV) the name of the foreign source (other than a foreign source that is a natural person); ``(B) not later than 30 days after receipt of a disclosure report under this section, include such report in such database; ``(C) indicate, as part of the public record of a report included in such database, whether the report is with respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with-- ``(i) a foreign source that is a foreign government; or ``(ii) a foreign source that is not a foreign government; and ``(D) with respect to a disclosure report that does not include the name or address of a foreign source, indicate, as part of the public record of such report included in such database, that such report did not include such information. ``(2) Name and address of foreign source.--The Secretary shall not disclose the name or address of a foreign source that is a natural person (other than the attributable country of such foreign source) included in a disclosure report-- ``(A) as part of the public record of such disclosure report described in paragraph (1); or ``(B) in response to a request under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information Act'), pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of such section. ``(e) Interagency Information Sharing.--Not later than 30 days after receiving a disclosure report from an institution in compliance with this section, the Secretary shall transmit an unredacted copy of such report (that includes the name and address of a foreign source disclosed in such report) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Director of the National Institutes of Health. ``(f) Compliance Officer.--Any institution that is required to file a disclosure report under subsection (a) shall designate, before the filing deadline for such report, and maintain a compliance officer, who shall-- ``(1) be a current employee or legally authorized agent of such institution; and ``(2) be responsible, on behalf of the institution, for personally certifying accurate compliance with the foreign gift reporting requirement under this section. ``(g) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Affiliated entity.--The term `affiliated entity', when used with respect to an institution, means an entity or organization that operates primarily for the benefit of, or under the auspices of, such institution, including a foundation of the institution or a related entity (such as any educational, cultural, or language entity). ``(2) Attributable country.--The term `attributable country' means-- ``(A) the country of citizenship of a foreign source who is a natural person, or, if such country is unknown, the principal residence (as applicable) of such foreign source; or ``(B) the country of incorporation of a foreign source that is a legal entity, or, if such country is unknown, the principal place of business (as applicable) of such foreign source. ``(3) Contract.--The term `contract'-- ``(A) means-- ``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services by the foreign source; ``(ii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar transaction with a foreign source that involves the use or exchange of an institution's name, likeness, time, services, or resources; and ``(iii) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter, of property or services from a foreign source (other than an arms-length agreement for such acquisition from a foreign source that is not a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of concern); and ``(B) does not include an agreement made between an institution and a foreign source regarding any payment of one or more elements of a student's cost of attendance (as such term is defined in section 472), unless such an agreement is made for more than 15 students or is made under a restricted or conditional contract. ``(4) Foreign source.--The term `foreign source' means-- ``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a foreign government; ``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, created under the laws of a foreign state or states; ``(C) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, substantially controlled (as described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or successor regulations)) by a foreign source; ``(D) a natural person who is not a citizen or a national of the United States or a trust territory or protectorate thereof; and ``(E) an agent of a foreign source, including-- ``(i) a subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign legal entity, acting on behalf of a foreign source; ``(ii) a person that operates primarily for the benefit of, or under the auspices of, a foreign source, including a foundation or a related entity (such as any educational, cultural, or language entity); and ``(iii) a person who is an agent of a foreign principal (as such term is defined in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On June 24, 2021, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing, Representatives Virginia Foxx (R-North Carolina), Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina), Elise Stefanik (R-New York), Jim Banks (R-Indiana), and Burgess Owens (R-Utah) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona, Washington, DC. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On May 16, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing, Representatives Michelle Steel (R-California), James Comer (R- Kentucky), and Eric Burlison (R- Missouri) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was Miguel Cardona, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C. On May 24, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Breaking the System Part II: Examining the Implications of Biden's Student Loan Policies for Students and Taxpayers.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the Biden administration's policies surrounding student loans and the Office of Federal Student Aid. During the hearing, Representative Banks asked whether the Biden administration has opened any new investigations into foreign funding in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable James Kvaal, Under Secretary of Education, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., and Mr. Richard Cordray, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, D.C. On July 13, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Exposing the Dangers of the Influence of Foreign Adversaries on College Campuses.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the state of foreign influence in the American postsecondary education system. The hearing investigated how to prevent foreign adversaries from abusing America's academic system to steal sensitive intellectual property, limit free expression, control curriculum, and indoctrinate students. Testifying before the Committee was Mr. Paul Moore, J.D., Senior Counsel, Defense of Freedom Institute, Washington, D.C; Mr. John C. Yang, President and Executive Director, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Washington, D.C; Mr. Craig Singleton, China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C. Legislative Action On October 11, 2023, Representative Steel introduced the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act (H.R. 5933) with Representatives Foxx, Owens, Joe Wilson, Glenn Thompson (R-Pennsylvania), Glenn Grothman (R-Wisconsin), Stefanik, Lloyd Smucker (R-Pennsylvania), Lisa McClain (R-Michigan), Julia Letlow (R- Louisiana), Brandon Williams (R-New York), Erin Houchin (R-Indiana), Ron Estes (R-Kansas), and Tim Walberg (R- Michigan). The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On November 8, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5933 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 27-11. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 5933: 1. Representative Steel offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made changes to better align the bill with other federal laws and ensure more transparency around all types of donations among other changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 2. Representative Thompson offered an amendment to clarify the definition of batch reporting and define the frequency, participants, and reports from the standing user group. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 3. Representative Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) offered an amendment to clarify the waiver process for existing contracts between an institution of higher education (IHE) and a country or foreign entity of concern and to adjust the time deadlines for submission and approval of waivers. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 4. Representative Kathy Manning (D North Carolina) offered an amendment to strike the requirement that gifts and contracts to faculty be made publicly available. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 11-22. 5. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D- Virgnia) offered an amendment to exclude receptions, widely-attended events, charity events, and gifts of personal hospitality from being classified as ``gifts'' for purposes of reporting gifts and contracts to faculty and staff. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. 6. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to increase the threshold for reporting by faculty and staff to $25,000 (instead of $5,000) and to eliminate the $0 reporting threshold for countries of concern. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. 7. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute that provided a higher threshold for reporting for all foreign gifts or contracts and provided fewer public disclosures about the nature of the gifts and contracts. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. Committee Views INTRODUCTION Foreign enemies, like the Chinese Communist Party, are infiltrating America's colleges and universities to subvert United States' interests. Foreign adversaries recognize the value of American education and research and continually seek to exert their influence on students and faculty. To combat these threats, section 117 of the Higher Education Act (HEA) requires institutions that receive federal financial assistance to disclose semiannually to the U.S. Department of Education (ED or Department) any gifts received from and/or contracts with a foreign source or foreign government that are valued at $250,000 or more in a calendar year. These revisions are necessary due to section 117's current loose legislative language, the Biden administration's blatant crippling of enforcement efforts, and institutions' refusal to adhere to the law which have resulted in billions of dollars in foreign funds infiltrating the country undetected. The DETERRENT Act brings much-needed transparency, accountability, and clarity to foreign gift reporting requirements for colleges and universities across the nation. Section 117 Background Section 117 was enacted during the HEA reauthorization in 1986. The American Jewish Congress drafted and sponsored what was then-called section 1207 in response to large gifts from foreign governments, particularly a gift from Arab governments to Georgetown University for the purpose of creating a Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/16/opinion/l-education-act- would-curb-foreign-gifts- 148386.html?searchResultPosition=1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 details the contents of required disclosures as well as penalties. Each reported gift or contract from a foreign source needs to contain the aggregate dollar amount as well as the country of origin.\2\ The statute also requires institutions owned or controlled by a foreign entity to report additional information.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-765/pdf/COMPS-765.pdf, page 27. \3\https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-117- foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If an institution fails to properly disclose foreign gifts, the Attorney General may open a civil action to compel compliance and institutions can be found liable to pay for the subsequent investigation and enforcement costs. Section 117 Limitations Congress first required IHEs to publicly report their foreign gifts and contracts to ED in 1986. Although the requirements of section 117 have been in place for over 30 years, the loose language in statute, poor federal enforcement, and lack of congressional oversight have resulted in very few and vague disclosures from institutions. Most institutions fail to disclose the majority of foreign gifts they have received. A 2019 Senate report found that up to 70 percent of all institutions failed to comply with section 117 and that those that do comply often underreport.\4\ Investigations by the Trump administration discovered $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed gifts and contributions provided to elite colleges from countries that pose serious national security threats.\5\ A recent study by the Network Contagion Research Institute further analyzed data between 2014 and 2019 and found that approximately $13 billion in foreign gifts were undisclosed.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/ PSI%20Report%20China's %20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20Syst em.pdf. \5\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional- compliance-section-117.pdf. \6\https://networkcontagion.us/reports/11-6-23-the-corruption-of- the-american-mind/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even when data is submitted, the accuracy of the amounts of funding and the breadth of relationships are unclear. All data submitted is self-reported by institutions and there is no requirement that the numbers are audited for accuracy by an independent body such as the Department's Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office (GAO).\7\ In 2022, research from the Lincoln Policy Network found that nearly 30 percent of reported payments had no receipt date, making it hard to discern when payments began or to notice any changes over time.\8\ The statute also allows institutions to report gift sources as ``anonymous.'' In 2020, the Department estimated that schools had anonymized $8.4 billion in foreign money over the past decade.\9\ Finally, several colleges and universities have affiliated nonprofit foundations or other entities that receive gifts for the university, and section 117 does not mention such entities explicitly.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the- foreign-payrol. \8\https://lincolnpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Foreign- Influence-in-American-Higher-Education.pdf. \9\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/stanford-and-fordham- swept-up-in-education-department-investigation-into-chinese-influence. \10\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/ 2019-02-28%20Zais%20Testimony%20-%20PSI.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Problems of Foreign Influence American universities often resemble multinational corporations and collaborate with global partners. International partnerships may have academic and research advantages; however, not all foreign partnerships are innocuous. Over 60 percent of foreign money given to U.S. universities comes from four sources: China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.\11\ Nations that pose a heightened security risk shroud their contracts and gifts in secrecy, enabling these intellectual property, restricting academic freedom, recruiting foreign agents, and monitoring students on campus. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\https://www.meforum.org/64411/reed-rubinstein-on-foreign- influence-on-campus. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- China China is one of the largest contributors to universities, with partnerships occurring in many forms. One of the most common is Confucius Institutes (CIs), Chinese government-funded centers on college campuses that claim to foster intercultural exchange through language classes and cultural celebrations. The Chinese government provides American campuses with funding and partnerships with Chinese institutions in return for hosting CIs. At the program's peak in 2017 there were nearly 120 CIs in the United States, with China spending over $158 million on CIs between 2006 and 2019.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because the Chinese government provides the funding for CIs, they pose risks for U.S. host institutions regarding academic freedom, freedom of expression, governance, and national security.\13\ A 2019 Senate report further found that the Chinese government ``approves all teachers, events, and speakers'' at CIs and sometimes limits discussion of political topics unfavorable to China such as the independence of Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre.\14\ A 2019 GAO report also revealed that some schools were hesitant to reveal details of CI contracts and that some of these contracts even included nondisclosure agreements.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/27065/foreign-funded- language-and-culture-institutes-at-us-institutions-of-higher-education. \14\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/ PSI%20Report%20 China's%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf. \15\https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278-highlights.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Increased political attention to CIs at the state and federal levels caused a vast majority to close, leaving an estimated fewer than five still operating in the United States as of October 2023.\16\ However, the National Association of Scholars estimates that at least 28 schools simply replaced their CI with a similar program and at least 58 still have close relationships with their former CI partner.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf. \17\https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/ how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- American institutions also have extensive partnerships with Chinese businesses and academic institutions. In June 2020, a Bloomberg analysis found that 115 schools received nearly $1 billion from Chinese sources between 2013 and 2020.\18\ Many schools maintain relationships and exchange programs with Chinese universities that are linked to the Chinese military.\19\ China has continually blurred the lines between its military and civilian research through self-proclaimed ``military-civil fusion.''\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-06/harvard- leads-u-s-colleges-that-received-1-billion-from-china#xj4y7vzkg. \19\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/rubio-calls-on-us- universities-to-cut-ties-with-china-military-industrial-complex/. \20\https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/16/world/asia/spy-balloon- military-china.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Middle East Countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar also are some of the largest foreign contributors to American universities. In 2017 alone, Saudi individuals, companies, and the Kingdom itself spent over $89 million on gifts and contracts to IHEs including Columbia University, Tufts University, and the University of Southern California.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the- foreign-payroll. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Countries from the Middle East have a history of large contributions to fund academic centers (often known as Middle East Studies Centers, or MESCs) on college campuses. MESCs, whose stated goal is to promote Middle Eastern studies, have been criticized for giving students a biased perspective on issues pertaining to the Middle East, including Islam, women's rights, terrorism, and slavery.\22\ Additionally, the Network Contagion Research Institute found that institutions that received and did not report funding from Middle Eastern donors had, on average, 300 percent more antisemitic incidents than other institutions.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\https://www.nas.org/reports/hijacked/full-report. \23\https://networkcontagion.us/reports/11-6-23-the-corruption-of- the-american-mind/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Administration Response Under the Trump administration, then-Secretary Betsy DeVos took many steps to increase transparency and combat foreign influence. Secretary DeVos opened over a dozen section 117 investigations, issued guidance on section 117 reporting, and modernized the online section 117 portal to make compliance easier.\24\ The Trump administration also issued improved disclosure requirements, including requiring the names of foreign sources to be listed.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional- compliance-section-117.pdf. \25\https://www.highereddive.com/news/ed-dept-steps-up-scrutiny-of- college-foreign-gifts-reporting/580376/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite foreign influence continuing to be a major issue on American campuses, the Biden administration has failed to view foreign influence as a serious threat. Secretary Cardona has said little on this issue and has failed to build on the work done in the previous administration. The Department's most recent notice of investigation was in January 2021.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\https://www.dailysignal.com/2023/02/06/two-years-later-little- evidence-biden-admin-enforcing-law-higher-ed- gifts-foreign-countries- china/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Biden administration also has failed to open any additional section 117 investigations since taking office.\27\ In August 2022, the American Counc

Minority Views

Introduction H.R. 5933, the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to impose increased reporting requirements for foreign gifts and contracts. If enacted, H.R. 5933 would force institutions of higher education to comply with overly burdensome and duplicative reporting requirements with no discernable increase of security or oversight. Further, H.R. 5933 would jeopardize the essential global partnerships among institutions that play a critical role in the United States' social, economic, and technological progress. Research and Development in Higher Education Institutions of higher education have long been incubators of research and development that advances the scientific knowledge of the United States. Institutions conduct innovative, collaborative, multidisciplinary research with the goal to improve the economy, international competitiveness, and quality of life for individuals.\1\ Federal investment has played a key role in this collaborative process for over 80 years: the National Science Foundation was established in 1950 based federal government sponsorship of university research to aid the Allied effort in World War II; the first federal student loans were authorized to increase technical and scientific knowledge of U.S. scientists to help prevail in the Cold War.\2\ The system has evolved to a point where institutions heavily rely on federal investments to advance their research and development priorities. The federal government, via grants from a multitude of federal agencies, provides roughly $30 billion annually to institutions to support research and development efforts, and this federal funding accounts for roughly 60 percent of institutions' research and development budgets.\3\ Institutions also collaborate with a range of international entities on grants received from the federal government through partnerships with foreign universities and faculty. The research community and Committee Democrats agree: to successfully advance complex research, it is essential to have a ``diversity of research capabilities, perspectives, and access to resources.''\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\See generally e.g., Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Public Impact Research: APLU Impact, Our Work: Fostering Research & Innovation To Meet Societal Needs, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/2-fostering- research-innovation/public-impact-research/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2023); Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univ., University Innovation and Entrepreneurship Showcase: APLU Impact, Our Work: Econ. Dev. & Cmty. Engagement, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/5-archived-projects/economic- development-and-community-engagement/university-innovation-and- entrepreneurship-showcase/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2023). \2\National Science Foundation, History, https://new.nsf.gov/about/ history; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title II, Pub. L. 85- 864; 72 Stat. 1580, Sept. 2, 1958. \3\See Am. Ass'n for the Advantage of Sci., R&D at Colleges and Universities, Programs: R D Budget And Pol'y (Oc. 2022) https:// www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/rd-colleges-and- universities. \4\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Addressing Undue Foreign Influence in Research Due to the inherent international nature of research, protecting against undue foreign influence is important for institutions and the federal government.\5\ Institutions recognize they have a responsibility to safeguard research and protect against intellectual property theft, but unwarranted or overinflated concerns of undue foreign influence can inhibit the ability of institutions and individual scholars to develop a global perspective in their research and teaching. Unfortunately, these unjustifiable concerns may also often lead to the fueling of xenophobic rhetoric and behaviors, particularly towards Asians, Asian Americans, and Middle Eastern Americans conducting research in the United States or in collaboration with American partners. This rhetoric is extremely harmful, and it contributes to the diminishing of the United States' ``superpower of attracting global scientific talent.''\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\See generally e.g., Candice N. Wright, Agency Actions Needed to Address Foreign Influence, U.S. Gov. Acct. Off.: Fed. Rsch. 1, Testimony before the Subcmte. on Investigation & Oversight, and the Subcmte. on Rsch. & Technology of the H. Comm. on Sci, Space & Tech. (Oct. 5, 2021) https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105434.pdf; Off. of the Chief of Rsch Section Strategy & Pol'y, Research Security at the National Science Foundation, Nat'l Sci. Found.: Rsch Section https:// new.nsf.gov/research-security (last visited Nov. 13, 2023). \6\Dr. Eric Lander, Guidance for U.S. Scientific Research Security That Preserves International Collaboration, The White House: OSTP Ostp Blog (Jan. 4, 2022) https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2022/ 01/04/guidance-for-u-s-scientific-research-security-that-preserves- international-collaboration/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Republicans argue that institutions refuse ``to adhere to the law'' with respect to foreign influence,\7\ but this could not be further from reality. The country's leading research universities have proven they are committed to securing federally funded research and are demonstrating that commitment by constantly working to ensure compliance with foreign influence laws and regulations. In 2020, the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) conducted a survey that found institutions are consistently working to improve their disclosure policies, enhancing training around foreign security risks, and developing robust risk mitigation strategies and assessments.\8\ Further, a recent letter signed by seventeen of the leading higher education organizations emphasized that institutions have increasingly strengthened relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other security agencies to ensure ``compliance with export- control laws and other federal requirements.''\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\See H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Fact Sheet, DETERRENT ACT, https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 10.11.23_deterrent_act_118th_congress_bill_fact_sheet_ final_pdf.pdf. \8\See generally Ass'n of Am. Univ., University Actions to Address Concerns About Security Threats and Undue Foreign Government Influence on Campus, Actions Taken By Univ. To Address Sci. And Sec. Concerns 1-2 (May 19, 2020) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key- Issues/Science-Security/2020-Effective-Science-Security-Practices- Summary.pdf. \9\Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to Chairwoman Virginia Foxx & Ranking Member Bobby Scott, U.S. H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce 1-2 (Nov. 6, 2023) (on file with Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Minority Staff). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal Policies on Foreign Influence Institutions have expressed that to better address research security at institutions, intentional federal interagency coordination is essential.\10\ As described in detail below, the federal government has acted on this concern and established robust coordinated policies to ensure institutions can address undue foreign influence in a manner that is not overly duplicative or burdensome. While Committee Republicans argue the Department of Education should be leading the fight against foreign influence, this position fails to recognize that the overwhelming majority of research funding flowing to our institutions are coming from agencies and Departments other than the Department of Education. This push to centralize operations at the Department of Education ignores the multitude of policies and initiatives within the federal government that already exist to address research security and protect institutions from undue foreign influence. Through these policies and initiatives, most of which are outside the jurisdiction of this Committee, the Biden Administration is already establishing one cohesive compliance process across agencies, one that adoption of H.R. 5933 would needlessly complicate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\See generally Letter from Ass'n of Am. Univ., to Dr. Eric Lander, Assistant to the President & Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2021) https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-OSTP- Presidential-Memo-NSPM-33-093021.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Office for Science and Technology Policy and NSPM-33 Federal Guidance The Office for Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) advises the President on matters related to Science and Technology.\11\ OSTP coordinates with federal agencies, Congress, and external partners, including institutions of higher education, to support research, regulation, and innovation.\12\ In 2021, President Biden issued the Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy (NSPM-33) to direct ``action to strengthen protections of United States Government-supported Research and Development against foreign government interference and exploitation.''\13\ This guidance establishes the priorities of OSTP and other agencies involved in enforcing disclosures of funds, foreign influence, and other research security risks.\14\ NSPM 33 outlines the central priorities of enforcement on foreign influence for all institutions including: sharing awareness of risks and disclosure requirements, limiting access and vetting foreign students, and providing research to ``protect federally funded R&D from foreign government interference.''\15\ NSPM-33 plays an integral role ``in advancing American competitiveness and keeping America at the forefront of innovation and technological development.'' For example, OSTP is currently working to standardize the forms utilized for reporting across all agencies, to ensure that institutions report accurate and consistent information.\16\ Through engaging with the U.S. research community, this guidance establishes robust requirements to safeguard against undue foreign influence.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\See generally Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ (2022) (explaining that how the OSTP was established by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organizations and Priorities Act of 1976). \12\Id. Six teams that steer the recommendations through the OSTP: Climate and Environment, Energy, Health Outcomes, National Security and Science and Society, Technology. For further specifics see Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ (2022). \13\Exec. Off. of the President, Presidential Memorandum on United States Government: Supported Research and Development National Security Policy, Nat'l Section Presidential Memorandum 33, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential- memorandumunited-states-government-supported-research-development- national-security-policy/ (Jan. 14, 2021) (calling on various Executive Officials to work on increasing roles, responsibilities and priorities to combat the significant influence from foreign entities on U.S. Research and Development). \14\See id. (elaborating on how the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy on the National Science and Technology Council to work as representative of their fields to develop coordinated activities for protection and outreach). \15\See generally Morgan Dwyer, Christina Ciocca Eller, & Ryan Donohue, An Update on Research Security: Streamlining Disclosure Standards to Enhance Clarity, Transparency, and Equity, The White House: OSTPstp Blog https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2022/ 08/31/an-update-on-research-securitystreamlining-disclosure-standards- to-enhance-clarity-transparency-and-equity/ (Aug. 31, 2022) (elaborating the other priorities include, information sharing amongst agencies, reviewing funding agencies, identifying risks and conduct analysis and promoting international research and development cooperation). \16\Id. \17\See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHIPS and Science Act The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 establishes the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the primary agency charged with coordinating research security initiatives, since it provides the relevant prohibitions, guidance, and disclosure requirements ``around foreign talent recruitment programs and potential conflicts of interest.''\18\ NSF is required to create policies, protocols, and resources to identify and address any potential security risks to research integrity for institutions.\19\ Furthermore, the Act requires NSF to create a Research Security and Policy Office in the Office of the Director to coordinate all security policies and conduct due diligence regarding compliance with any security standards set forth.\20\ Similarly, CHIPS and Science Act requires that all institutions must annually report to NSF in any financial information associated with a foreign country of concern and directs NSF to create guardrails around foreign talent programs.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\CHIPS and Science Act, Sec. 10631, Pub. L. 117-167, 72 Stat. 1580, Aug. 9, 2022 (``Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination with the interagency working group established under . . . [23 U.S.C. 6601] . . . shall publish and widely distribute a uniform set of guidelines for federal research agencies regarding foreign talent recruitment programs.''). The CHIPS and Science Act also requires that the N.S.F. establishes an independent risk assessment center to help institutions and researchers understand and mitigate security risks. See Nat'l Sci. Found., CHIPS and Science, Nat'l Sci. Found. https://new.nsf.gov/chips (last visited Nov. 13, 2023). \19\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10331(1). \20\Id.; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security Provisions, The CHIPS & p And s And Sci. Act Of 2022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/ sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/ CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf (quoting H.R. 4346, 117th Cong. Sec. 10331 (2022)). \21\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10339B, 10631; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security Provisions, The THE CH& And Sci. Act Of 2022 022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU- Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/ CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While Republicans argue that the Biden Administration is ``crippling'' its enforcement of foreign influence,\22\ it is evident that the administration has already committed to implementing a cohesive, interagency plan to combat undue foreign influence by passing robust provisions doing so into law. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\See Press Release, Congresswoman Michelle Steel Press Off., Steel, Foxx Bill Will Deter Foreign Adversaries' Influences in Postsecondary Education, (Oct. 11, 2023) https://steel.house.gov/media/ press-releases/steel-foxx-bill-will-deter-foreign-adversaries- influence-postsecondary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 of the Higher Education Act While other federal agencies may dominate the research security space, the Department of Education (Department) does have a role to play. HEA section 117 requires institutions of higher education receiving federal financial assistance to disclose any gifts received from, and contracts with, foreign sources valued at $250,000 or more per year.\23\ This disclosure is designed to ``promote public transparency about the role of foreign funding in U.S. higher education'' and protect government-funded activities from foreign influence.\24\ Although Congress first required institutions to report foreign gifts and contracts to the Department in 1986, institutions only recently received formal guidance from the Department on Section 117 compliance through the creation of a website containing written guidance, webinars, and other resources to assist institutions.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\Higher Education Act of 1965, Sec. 117, 20 U.S.C. 1011f (2023); see Off. of Fed. Student Aid, Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Reporting, Knowledge Ctr Home: Topics: Fed. Student Aid (May 15, 2023) https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section- 117-foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting. \24\Id. \25\See e.g., Pub. Law 99-498, Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Title XII, Section 1206, adding HEA Title XII, Sec. 1207 (Oct. 17, 1986) (then codified at 20 U.S.C. 1145(d)); Off. of Fed. Student Aid, Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Reporting, Knowledge Ctr Home: Topics: Fed. Student Aid (May 15, 2023) https://fsapartners.ed.gov/ knowledge-center/topics/section-117-foreign-gift-and-contract- reporting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 Enforcement and Changes Under the Trump Administration, the Department's Office of General Counsel (OGC) initiated 12 civil investigations to ensure Section 117 compliance.\26\ These investigations did not ultimately lead to charges of criminal activity by any institution. In 2020, the Department created an online portal for institutions to submit reports on contracts with, and gifts from, foreign sources. Currently, gift and contract report submissions occur through the portal, rather than through the institution's process for accessing federal student aid program participation. This was a strong step forward for streamlining the reporting requirements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\Institutions investigated include Georgetown Univ, Texas A&M Univ., Rutgers Univ., Cornell Univ., Univ. of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Tech., Harvard Univ., Yale Univ., Univ. of Texas, Case Western Reserve Univ., Fordham Univ., and Stanford Univ. See for further information on institution actions, U.S. Dept. Of Educ., Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Oct. 2020). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/278