Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 5933]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5933) to amend the Higher Education Act
of 1965 to require additional information in disclosures of
foreign gifts and contracts from foreign sources, restrict
contracts with certain foreign entities and foreign countries
of concern, require certain staff and faculty to report foreign
gifts and contracts, and require disclosure of certain foreign
investments within endowments, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that
the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Defending Education Transparency and
Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act'' or the
``DETERRENT Act''.
SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.
(a) In General.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1011f) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.
``(a) Disclosure Reports.--
``(1) Aggregate gifts and contract disclosures.--An
institution shall file a disclosure report in accordance with
subsection (b)(1) with the Secretary on July 31 of the calendar
year immediately following any calendar year in which--
``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters
into a contract with, a foreign source (other than a
foreign country of concern or foreign entity of
concern)--
``(i) the value of which is $50,000 or more,
considered alone or in combination with all
other gifts from, or contracts with, that
foreign source within the calendar year; or
``(ii) the value of which is undetermined; or
``(B) the institution receives a gift from a foreign
country of concern or foreign entity of concern, or,
upon receiving a waiver under section 117A to enter
into a contract with such a country or entity, enters
into such contract, without regard to the value of such
gift or contract.
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.--In
the case of an institution that is substantially controlled (as
described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal
Regulations) (or successor regulations)) by a foreign source,
the institution shall file a disclosure report in accordance
with subsection (b)(2) with the Secretary on July 31 of each
year.
``(3) Treatment of affiliated entities.--For purposes of this
section, any gift to, or contract with, an affiliated entity of
an institution shall be considered a gift to or contract with,
respectively, such institution.
``(b) Contents of Report.--
``(1) Gifts and contracts.--Each report to the Secretary
required under subsection (a)(1) shall contain the following:
``(A) With respect to a gift received from, or a
contract entered into with, any foreign source--
``(i) the terms of such gift or contract,
including--
``(I) the name of the individual,
department, or benefactor at the
institution receiving the gift or
carrying out the contract;
``(II) the intended purpose of such
gift or contract, as provided to the
institution by such foreign source, or
if no such purpose is provided by such
foreign source, the intended use of
such gift or contract, as provided by
the institution; and
``(III) in the case of a restricted
or conditional gift or contract, a
description of the restrictions or
conditions of such gift or contract;
``(ii) with respect to a gift--
``(I) the total fair market dollar
amount or dollar value of the gift, as
of the date of submission of such
report; and
``(II) the date on which the
institution received such gift;
``(iii) with respect to a contract--
``(I) the date on which such contract
commences;
``(II) as applicable, the date on
which such contract terminates; and
``(III) an assurance that the
institution will--
``(aa) maintain an unredacted
copy of the contract until the
latest of--
``(AA) the date that
is 4 years after the
date on which the
contract commences;
``(BB) the date on
which the contract
terminates; or
``(CC) the last day
of any period that
applicable State law
requires a copy of such
contract to be
maintained; and
``(bb) upon request of the
Secretary during an
investigation under subsection
(f)(1), produce such an
unredacted copy of the
contract; and
``(iv) an assurance that in a case in which
information is required to be disclosed under
this section with respect to a gift or contract
that is not in English, such information is
translated into English in compliance with the
requirements of subsection (c)(1).
``(B) With respect to a gift received from, or a
contract entered into with, a foreign source that is a
foreign government (other than the government of a
foreign country of concern)--
``(i) the name of such foreign government;
``(ii) the department, agency, office, or
division of such foreign government that
approved such gift or contract, as applicable;
and
``(iii) the physical mailing address of such
department, agency, office, or division.
``(C) With respect to a gift received from, or
contract entered into with, a foreign source (other
than a foreign government subject to the requirements
of subparagraph (B))--
``(i) the legal name of the foreign source,
or, if such name is not available, a statement
certified by the compliance officer in
accordance with subsection (f)(2) that the
institution has reasonably attempted to obtain
such name;
``(ii) in the case of a foreign source that
is a natural person, the country of citizenship
of such person, or, if such country is not
known, the principal country of residence of
such person;
``(iii) in the case of a foreign source that
is a legal entity, the country in which such
entity is incorporated, or if such information
is not available, the principal place of
business of such entity; and
``(iv) the physical mailing address of such
foreign source, or if such address is not
available, a statement certified by the
compliance officer in accordance with
subsection (f)(2) that the institution has
reasonably attempted to obtain such address.
``(D) With respect to a contract entered into with a
foreign source that is a foreign country of concern or
a foreign entity of concern--
``(i) a complete and unredacted text of the
original contract, and if such original
contract is not in English, a translated copy
of the text into English;
``(ii) a copy of the waiver received under
section 117A for such contract; and
``(iii) the statement submitted by the
institution for purposes of receiving such a
waiver under section 117A(b)(1).
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control.--Each report to
the Secretary required under subsection (a)(2) shall contain--
``(A) the legal name and address of the foreign
source that owns or controls the institution;
``(B) the date on which the foreign source assumed
ownership or control; and
``(C) any changes in program or structure resulting
from the change in ownership or control.
``(c) Translation Requirements.--Any information required to be
disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is
not in English shall be translated, for purposes of such disclosure, by
a person that is not an affiliated entity or agent of the foreign
source involved with such gift or contract.
``(d) Public Inspection.--
``(1) Database requirement.--Beginning not later than 60 days
before the July 31 immediately following the date of the
enactment of the DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall--
``(A) establish and maintain a searchable database on
a website of the Department, under which all reports
submitted under this section (including any report
submitted under this section before the date of the
enactment of the DETERRENT Act)--
``(i) are made publicly available (in
electronic and downloadable format), including
any information provided in such reports (other
than the information prohibited from being
publicly disclosed pursuant to paragraph (2));
``(ii) can be individually identified and
compared; and
``(iii) are searchable and sortable by--
``(I) the date the institution filed
such report;
``(II) the date on which the
institution received the gift, or
entered into the contract, which is the
subject of the report;
``(III) the attributable country of
such gift or contract; and
``(IV) the name of the foreign source
(other than a foreign source that is a
natural person);
``(B) not later than 30 days after receipt of a
disclosure report under this section, include such
report in such database;
``(C) indicate, as part of the public record of a
report included in such database, whether the report is
with respect to a gift received from, or a contract
entered into with--
``(i) a foreign source that is a foreign
government; or
``(ii) a foreign source that is not a foreign
government; and
``(D) with respect to a disclosure report that does
not include the name or address of a foreign source,
indicate, as part of the public record of such report
included in such database, that such report did not
include such information.
``(2) Name and address of foreign source.--The Secretary
shall not disclose the name or address of a foreign source that
is a natural person (other than the attributable country of
such foreign source) included in a disclosure report--
``(A) as part of the public record of such disclosure
report described in paragraph (1); or
``(B) in response to a request under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the
`Freedom of Information Act'), pursuant to subsection
(b)(3) of such section.
``(e) Interagency Information Sharing.--Not later than 30 days after
receiving a disclosure report from an institution in compliance with
this section, the Secretary shall transmit an unredacted copy of such
report (that includes the name and address of a foreign source
disclosed in such report) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Director
of the National Science Foundation, and the Director of the National
Institutes of Health.
``(f) Compliance Officer.--Any institution that is required to file a
disclosure report under subsection (a) shall designate, before the
filing deadline for such report, and maintain a compliance officer, who
shall--
``(1) be a current employee or legally authorized agent of
such institution; and
``(2) be responsible, on behalf of the institution, for
personally certifying accurate compliance with the foreign gift
reporting requirement under this section.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Affiliated entity.--The term `affiliated entity', when
used with respect to an institution, means an entity or
organization that operates primarily for the benefit of, or
under the auspices of, such institution, including a foundation
of the institution or a related entity (such as any
educational, cultural, or language entity).
``(2) Attributable country.--The term `attributable country'
means--
``(A) the country of citizenship of a foreign source
who is a natural person, or, if such country is
unknown, the principal residence (as applicable) of
such foreign source; or
``(B) the country of incorporation of a foreign
source that is a legal entity, or, if such country is
unknown, the principal place of business (as
applicable) of such foreign source.
``(3) Contract.--The term `contract'--
``(A) means--
``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter of property or
services by the foreign source;
``(ii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar
transaction with a foreign source that involves
the use or exchange of an institution's name,
likeness, time, services, or resources; and
``(iii) any agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter, of property or
services from a foreign source (other than an
arms-length agreement for such acquisition from
a foreign source that is not a foreign country
of concern or a foreign entity of concern); and
``(B) does not include an agreement made between an
institution and a foreign source regarding any payment
of one or more elements of a student's cost of
attendance (as such term is defined in section 472),
unless such an agreement is made for more than 15
students or is made under a restricted or conditional
contract.
``(4) Foreign source.--The term `foreign source' means--
``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a
foreign government;
``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise,
created under the laws of a foreign state or states;
``(C) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise,
substantially controlled (as described in section
668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations)
(or successor regulations)) by a foreign source;
``(D) a natural person who is not a citizen or a
national of the United States or a trust territory or
protectorate thereof; and
``(E) an agent of a foreign source, including--
``(i) a subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign
legal entity, acting on behalf of a foreign
source;
``(ii) a person that operates primarily for
the benefit of, or under the auspices of, a
foreign source, including a foundation or a
related entity (such as any educational,
cultural, or language entity); and
``(iii) a person who is an agent of a foreign
principal (as such term is defined in section 1
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On June 24, 2021, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was
to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department
of Education. During the hearing, Representatives Virginia Foxx
(R-North Carolina), Joe Wilson (R-South Carolina), Elise
Stefanik (R-New York), Jim Banks (R-Indiana), and Burgess Owens
(R-Utah) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign
influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the
Committee was Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona,
Washington, DC.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On May 16, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose
of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of
the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing,
Representatives Michelle Steel (R-California), James Comer (R-
Kentucky), and Eric Burlison (R- Missouri) made comments and
asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary
education. Testifying before the Committee was Miguel Cardona,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.
On May 24, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Breaking the System Part II:
Examining the Implications of Biden's Student Loan Policies for
Students and Taxpayers.'' The purpose of the hearing was to
examine the Biden administration's policies surrounding student
loans and the Office of Federal Student Aid. During the
hearing, Representative Banks asked whether the Biden
administration has opened any new investigations into foreign
funding in postsecondary education. Testifying before the
Committee was the Honorable James Kvaal, Under Secretary of
Education, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., and
Mr. Richard Cordray, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Federal
Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, D.C.
On July 13, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Exposing the Dangers of the
Influence of Foreign Adversaries on College Campuses.'' The
purpose of the hearing was to examine the state of foreign
influence in the American postsecondary education system. The
hearing investigated how to prevent foreign adversaries from
abusing America's academic system to steal sensitive
intellectual property, limit free expression, control
curriculum, and indoctrinate students. Testifying before the
Committee was Mr. Paul Moore, J.D., Senior Counsel, Defense of
Freedom Institute, Washington, D.C; Mr. John C. Yang, President
and Executive Director, Asian Americans Advancing Justice,
Washington, D.C; Mr. Craig Singleton, China Program Deputy
Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, Washington, D.C.
Legislative Action
On October 11, 2023, Representative Steel introduced the
Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes
Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act (H.R. 5933)
with Representatives Foxx, Owens, Joe Wilson, Glenn Thompson
(R-Pennsylvania), Glenn Grothman (R-Wisconsin), Stefanik, Lloyd
Smucker (R-Pennsylvania), Lisa McClain (R-Michigan), Julia
Letlow (R- Louisiana), Brandon Williams (R-New York), Erin
Houchin (R-Indiana), Ron Estes (R-Kansas), and Tim Walberg (R-
Michigan).
The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education
and the Workforce. On November 8, 2023, the Committee
considered H.R. 5933 in legislative session and reported it
favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a
recorded vote of 27-11. The Committee considered the following
amendments to H.R. 5933:
1. Representative Steel offered an Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made changes to
better align the bill with other federal laws and
ensure more transparency around all types of donations
among other changes. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
2. Representative Thompson offered an amendment to
clarify the definition of batch reporting and define
the frequency, participants, and reports from the
standing user group. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
3. Representative Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) offered
an amendment to clarify the waiver process for existing
contracts between an institution of higher education
(IHE) and a country or foreign entity of concern and to
adjust the time deadlines for submission and approval
of waivers. The amendment was adopted by voice vote.
4. Representative Kathy Manning (D North Carolina)
offered an amendment to strike the requirement that
gifts and contracts to faculty be made publicly
available. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of
11-22.
5. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-
Virgnia) offered an amendment to exclude receptions,
widely-attended events, charity events, and gifts of
personal hospitality from being classified as ``gifts''
for purposes of reporting gifts and contracts to
faculty and staff. The amendment failed by a recorded
vote of 14-24.
6. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to
increase the threshold for reporting by faculty and
staff to $25,000 (instead of $5,000) and to eliminate
the $0 reporting threshold for countries of concern.
The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24.
7. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute that provided a higher threshold
for reporting for all foreign gifts or contracts and
provided fewer public disclosures about the nature of
the gifts and contracts. The amendment failed by a
recorded vote of 14-24.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
Foreign enemies, like the Chinese Communist Party, are
infiltrating America's colleges and universities to subvert
United States' interests. Foreign adversaries recognize the
value of American education and research and continually seek
to exert their influence on students and faculty. To combat
these threats, section 117 of the Higher Education Act (HEA)
requires institutions that receive federal financial assistance
to disclose semiannually to the U.S. Department of Education
(ED or Department) any gifts received from and/or contracts
with a foreign source or foreign government that are valued at
$250,000 or more in a calendar year. These revisions are
necessary due to section 117's current loose legislative
language, the Biden administration's blatant crippling of
enforcement efforts, and institutions' refusal to adhere to the
law which have resulted in billions of dollars in foreign funds
infiltrating the country undetected. The DETERRENT Act brings
much-needed transparency, accountability, and clarity to
foreign gift reporting requirements for colleges and
universities across the nation.
Section 117 Background
Section 117 was enacted during the HEA reauthorization in
1986. The American Jewish Congress drafted and sponsored what
was then-called section 1207 in response to large gifts from
foreign governments, particularly a gift from Arab governments
to Georgetown University for the purpose of creating a Center
for Contemporary Arab Studies.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/16/opinion/l-education-act-
would-curb-foreign-gifts- 148386.html?searchResultPosition=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 117 details the contents of required disclosures as
well as penalties. Each reported gift or contract from a
foreign source needs to contain the aggregate dollar amount as
well as the country of origin.\2\ The statute also requires
institutions owned or controlled by a foreign entity to report
additional information.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-765/pdf/COMPS-765.pdf,
page 27.
\3\https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-117-
foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If an institution fails to properly disclose foreign gifts,
the Attorney General may open a civil action to compel
compliance and institutions can be found liable to pay for the
subsequent investigation and enforcement costs.
Section 117 Limitations
Congress first required IHEs to publicly report their
foreign gifts and contracts to ED in 1986. Although the
requirements of section 117 have been in place for over 30
years, the loose language in statute, poor federal enforcement,
and lack of congressional oversight have resulted in very few
and vague disclosures from institutions.
Most institutions fail to disclose the majority of foreign
gifts they have received. A 2019 Senate report found that up to
70 percent of all institutions failed to comply with section
117 and that those that do comply often underreport.\4\
Investigations by the Trump administration discovered $6.5
billion in previously undisclosed gifts and contributions
provided to elite colleges from countries that pose serious
national security threats.\5\ A recent study by the Network
Contagion Research Institute further analyzed data between 2014
and 2019 and found that approximately $13 billion in foreign
gifts were undisclosed.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
PSI%20Report%20China's
%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20Syst em.pdf.
\5\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-
compliance-section-117.pdf.
\6\https://networkcontagion.us/reports/11-6-23-the-corruption-of-
the-american-mind/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even when data is submitted, the accuracy of the amounts of
funding and the breadth of relationships are unclear. All data
submitted is self-reported by institutions and there is no
requirement that the numbers are audited for accuracy by an
independent body such as the Department's Inspector General or
the Government Accountability Office (GAO).\7\ In 2022,
research from the Lincoln Policy Network found that nearly 30
percent of reported payments had no receipt date, making it
hard to discern when payments began or to notice any changes
over time.\8\ The statute also allows institutions to report
gift sources as ``anonymous.'' In 2020, the Department
estimated that schools had anonymized $8.4 billion in foreign
money over the past decade.\9\ Finally, several colleges and
universities have affiliated nonprofit foundations or other
entities that receive gifts for the university, and section 117
does not mention such entities explicitly.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the-
foreign-payrol.
\8\https://lincolnpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Foreign-
Influence-in-American-Higher-Education.pdf.
\9\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/stanford-and-fordham-
swept-up-in-education-department-investigation-into-chinese-influence.
\10\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
2019-02-28%20Zais%20Testimony%20-%20PSI.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Problems of Foreign Influence
American universities often resemble multinational
corporations and collaborate with global partners.
International partnerships may have academic and research
advantages; however, not all foreign partnerships are
innocuous. Over 60 percent of foreign money given to U.S.
universities comes from four sources: China, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.\11\ Nations that pose a
heightened security risk shroud their contracts and gifts in
secrecy, enabling these intellectual property, restricting
academic freedom, recruiting foreign agents, and monitoring
students on campus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\https://www.meforum.org/64411/reed-rubinstein-on-foreign-
influence-on-campus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China
China is one of the largest contributors to universities,
with partnerships occurring in many forms. One of the most
common is Confucius Institutes (CIs), Chinese government-funded
centers on college campuses that claim to foster intercultural
exchange through language classes and cultural celebrations.
The Chinese government provides American campuses with funding
and partnerships with Chinese institutions in return for
hosting CIs. At the program's peak in 2017 there were nearly
120 CIs in the United States, with China spending over $158
million on CIs between 2006 and 2019.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the Chinese government provides the funding for
CIs, they pose risks for U.S. host institutions regarding
academic freedom, freedom of expression, governance, and
national security.\13\ A 2019 Senate report further found that
the Chinese government ``approves all teachers, events, and
speakers'' at CIs and sometimes limits discussion of political
topics unfavorable to China such as the independence of Taiwan
or the Tiananmen Square massacre.\14\ A 2019 GAO report also
revealed that some schools were hesitant to reveal details of
CI contracts and that some of these contracts even included
nondisclosure agreements.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/27065/foreign-funded-
language-and-culture-institutes-at-us-institutions-of-higher-education.
\14\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
PSI%20Report%20
China's%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf.
\15\https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278-highlights.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased political attention to CIs at the state and
federal levels caused a vast majority to close, leaving an
estimated fewer than five still operating in the United States
as of October 2023.\16\ However, the National Association of
Scholars estimates that at least 28 schools simply replaced
their CI with a similar program and at least 58 still have
close relationships with their former CI partner.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\17\https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/
how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
American institutions also have extensive partnerships with
Chinese businesses and academic institutions. In June 2020, a
Bloomberg analysis found that 115 schools received nearly $1
billion from Chinese sources between 2013 and 2020.\18\ Many
schools maintain relationships and exchange programs with
Chinese universities that are linked to the Chinese
military.\19\ China has continually blurred the lines between
its military and civilian research through self-proclaimed
``military-civil fusion.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-06/harvard-
leads-u-s-colleges-that-received-1-billion-from-china#xj4y7vzkg.
\19\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/rubio-calls-on-us-
universities-to-cut-ties-with-china-military-industrial-complex/.
\20\https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/16/world/asia/spy-balloon-
military-china.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Middle East
Countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar
also are some of the largest foreign contributors to American
universities. In 2017 alone, Saudi individuals, companies, and
the Kingdom itself spent over $89 million on gifts and
contracts to IHEs including Columbia University, Tufts
University, and the University of Southern California.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the-
foreign-payroll.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries from the Middle East have a history of large
contributions to fund academic centers (often known as Middle
East Studies Centers, or MESCs) on college campuses. MESCs,
whose stated goal is to promote Middle Eastern studies, have
been criticized for giving students a biased perspective on
issues pertaining to the Middle East, including Islam, women's
rights, terrorism, and slavery.\22\ Additionally, the Network
Contagion Research Institute found that institutions that
received and did not report funding from Middle Eastern donors
had, on average, 300 percent more antisemitic incidents than
other institutions.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\https://www.nas.org/reports/hijacked/full-report.
\23\https://networkcontagion.us/reports/11-6-23-the-corruption-of-
the-american-mind/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration Response
Under the Trump administration, then-Secretary Betsy DeVos
took many steps to increase transparency and combat foreign
influence. Secretary DeVos opened over a dozen section 117
investigations, issued guidance on section 117 reporting, and
modernized the online section 117 portal to make compliance
easier.\24\ The Trump administration also issued improved
disclosure requirements, including requiring the names of
foreign sources to be listed.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-
compliance-section-117.pdf.
\25\https://www.highereddive.com/news/ed-dept-steps-up-scrutiny-of-
college-foreign-gifts-reporting/580376/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite foreign influence continuing to be a major issue on
American campuses, the Biden administration has failed to view
foreign influence as a serious threat. Secretary Cardona has
said little on this issue and has failed to build on the work
done in the previous administration. The Department's most
recent notice of investigation was in January 2021.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\https://www.dailysignal.com/2023/02/06/two-years-later-little-
evidence-biden-admin-enforcing-law-higher-ed- gifts-foreign-countries-
china/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Biden administration also has failed to open any
additional section 117 investigations since taking office.\27\
In August 2022, the American Counc
Minority Views
Introduction
H.R. 5933, the Defending Education Transparency and Ending
Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT)
Act would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to
impose increased reporting requirements for foreign gifts and
contracts. If enacted, H.R. 5933 would force institutions of
higher education to comply with overly burdensome and
duplicative reporting requirements with no discernable increase
of security or oversight. Further, H.R. 5933 would jeopardize
the essential global partnerships among institutions that play
a critical role in the United States' social, economic, and
technological progress.
Research and Development in Higher Education
Institutions of higher education have long been incubators
of research and development that advances the scientific
knowledge of the United States. Institutions conduct
innovative, collaborative, multidisciplinary research with the
goal to improve the economy, international competitiveness, and
quality of life for individuals.\1\ Federal investment has
played a key role in this collaborative process for over 80
years: the National Science Foundation was established in 1950
based federal government sponsorship of university research to
aid the Allied effort in World War II; the first federal
student loans were authorized to increase technical and
scientific knowledge of U.S. scientists to help prevail in the
Cold War.\2\ The system has evolved to a point where
institutions heavily rely on federal investments to advance
their research and development priorities. The federal
government, via grants from a multitude of federal agencies,
provides roughly $30 billion annually to institutions to
support research and development efforts, and this federal
funding accounts for roughly 60 percent of institutions'
research and development budgets.\3\ Institutions also
collaborate with a range of international entities on grants
received from the federal government through partnerships with
foreign universities and faculty. The research community and
Committee Democrats agree: to successfully advance complex
research, it is essential to have a ``diversity of research
capabilities, perspectives, and access to resources.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\See generally e.g., Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Public
Impact Research: APLU Impact, Our Work: Fostering Research & Innovation
To Meet Societal Needs, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/2-fostering-
research-innovation/public-impact-research/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2023); Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univ., University Innovation and
Entrepreneurship Showcase: APLU Impact, Our Work: Econ. Dev. & Cmty.
Engagement, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/5-archived-projects/economic-
development-and-community-engagement/university-innovation-and-
entrepreneurship-showcase/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2023).
\2\National Science Foundation, History, https://new.nsf.gov/about/
history; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title II, Pub. L. 85-
864; 72 Stat. 1580, Sept. 2, 1958.
\3\See Am. Ass'n for the Advantage of Sci., R&D at Colleges and
Universities, Programs: R D Budget And Pol'y (Oc. 2022) https://
www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/rd-colleges-and-
universities.
\4\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Addressing Undue Foreign Influence in Research
Due to the inherent international nature of research,
protecting against undue foreign influence is important for
institutions and the federal government.\5\ Institutions
recognize they have a responsibility to safeguard research and
protect against intellectual property theft, but unwarranted or
overinflated concerns of undue foreign influence can inhibit
the ability of institutions and individual scholars to develop
a global perspective in their research and teaching.
Unfortunately, these unjustifiable concerns may also often lead
to the fueling of xenophobic rhetoric and behaviors,
particularly towards Asians, Asian Americans, and Middle
Eastern Americans conducting research in the United States or
in collaboration with American partners. This rhetoric is
extremely harmful, and it contributes to the diminishing of the
United States' ``superpower of attracting global scientific
talent.''\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\See generally e.g., Candice N. Wright, Agency Actions Needed to
Address Foreign Influence, U.S. Gov. Acct. Off.: Fed. Rsch. 1,
Testimony before the Subcmte. on Investigation & Oversight, and the
Subcmte. on Rsch. & Technology of the H. Comm. on Sci, Space & Tech.
(Oct. 5, 2021) https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105434.pdf; Off. of
the Chief of Rsch Section Strategy & Pol'y, Research Security at the
National Science Foundation, Nat'l Sci. Found.: Rsch Section https://
new.nsf.gov/research-security (last visited Nov. 13, 2023).
\6\Dr. Eric Lander, Guidance for U.S. Scientific Research Security
That Preserves International Collaboration, The White House: OSTP Ostp
Blog (Jan. 4, 2022) https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2022/
01/04/guidance-for-u-s-scientific-research-security-that-preserves-
international-collaboration/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee Republicans argue that institutions refuse ``to
adhere to the law'' with respect to foreign influence,\7\ but
this could not be further from reality. The country's leading
research universities have proven they are committed to
securing federally funded research and are demonstrating that
commitment by constantly working to ensure compliance with
foreign influence laws and regulations. In 2020, the
Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association
of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) conducted a survey
that found institutions are consistently working to improve
their disclosure policies, enhancing training around foreign
security risks, and developing robust risk mitigation
strategies and assessments.\8\ Further, a recent letter signed
by seventeen of the leading higher education organizations
emphasized that institutions have increasingly strengthened
relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and
other security agencies to ensure ``compliance with export-
control laws and other federal requirements.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\See H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Fact Sheet, DETERRENT
ACT, https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
10.11.23_deterrent_act_118th_congress_bill_fact_sheet_
final_pdf.pdf.
\8\See generally Ass'n of Am. Univ., University Actions to Address
Concerns About Security Threats and Undue Foreign Government Influence
on Campus, Actions Taken By Univ. To Address Sci. And Sec. Concerns 1-2
(May 19, 2020) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-
Issues/Science-Security/2020-Effective-Science-Security-Practices-
Summary.pdf.
\9\Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to
Chairwoman Virginia Foxx & Ranking Member Bobby Scott, U.S. H. Comm. on
Educ. & the Workforce 1-2 (Nov. 6, 2023) (on file with Comm. on Educ. &
the Workforce, Minority Staff).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Policies on Foreign Influence
Institutions have expressed that to better address research
security at institutions, intentional federal interagency
coordination is essential.\10\ As described in detail below,
the federal government has acted on this concern and
established robust coordinated policies to ensure institutions
can address undue foreign influence in a manner that is not
overly duplicative or burdensome. While Committee Republicans
argue the Department of Education should be leading the fight
against foreign influence, this position fails to recognize
that the overwhelming majority of research funding flowing to
our institutions are coming from agencies and Departments other
than the Department of Education. This push to centralize
operations at the Department of Education ignores the multitude
of policies and initiatives within the federal government that
already exist to address research security and protect
institutions from undue foreign influence. Through these
policies and initiatives, most of which are outside the
jurisdiction of this Committee, the Biden Administration is
already establishing one cohesive compliance process across
agencies, one that adoption of H.R. 5933 would needlessly
complicate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\See generally Letter from Ass'n of Am. Univ., to Dr. Eric
Lander, Assistant to the President & Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y
1-2 (Sept. 30, 2021) https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-OSTP-
Presidential-Memo-NSPM-33-093021.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office for Science and Technology Policy and NSPM-33 Federal Guidance
The Office for Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) advises
the President on matters related to Science and Technology.\11\
OSTP coordinates with federal agencies, Congress, and external
partners, including institutions of higher education, to
support research, regulation, and innovation.\12\ In 2021,
President Biden issued the Presidential Memorandum on United
States Government-Supported Research and Development National
Security Policy (NSPM-33) to direct ``action to strengthen
protections of United States Government-supported Research and
Development against foreign government interference and
exploitation.''\13\ This guidance establishes the priorities of
OSTP and other agencies involved in enforcing disclosures of
funds, foreign influence, and other research security
risks.\14\ NSPM 33 outlines the central priorities of
enforcement on foreign influence for all institutions
including: sharing awareness of risks and disclosure
requirements, limiting access and vetting foreign students, and
providing research to ``protect federally funded R&D from
foreign government interference.''\15\ NSPM-33 plays an
integral role ``in advancing American competitiveness and
keeping America at the forefront of innovation and
technological development.'' For example, OSTP is currently
working to standardize the forms utilized for reporting across
all agencies, to ensure that institutions report accurate and
consistent information.\16\ Through engaging with the U.S.
research community, this guidance establishes robust
requirements to safeguard against undue foreign influence.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\See generally Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off.
Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ (2022)
(explaining that how the OSTP was established by the National Science
and Technology Policy, Organizations and Priorities Act of 1976).
\12\Id. Six teams that steer the recommendations through the OSTP:
Climate and Environment, Energy, Health Outcomes, National Security and
Science and Society, Technology. For further specifics see Off. of Sci.
& Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ (2022).
\13\Exec. Off. of the President, Presidential Memorandum on United
States Government: Supported Research and Development National Security
Policy, Nat'l Section Presidential Memorandum 33, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandumunited-states-government-supported-research-development-
national-security-policy/ (Jan. 14, 2021) (calling on various Executive
Officials to work on increasing roles, responsibilities and priorities
to combat the significant influence from foreign entities on U.S.
Research and Development).
\14\See id. (elaborating on how the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy on the National Science and Technology
Council to work as representative of their fields to develop
coordinated activities for protection and outreach).
\15\See generally Morgan Dwyer, Christina Ciocca Eller, & Ryan
Donohue, An Update on Research Security: Streamlining Disclosure
Standards to Enhance Clarity, Transparency, and Equity, The White
House: OSTPstp Blog https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2022/
08/31/an-update-on-research-securitystreamlining-disclosure-standards-
to-enhance-clarity-transparency-and-equity/ (Aug. 31, 2022)
(elaborating the other priorities include, information sharing amongst
agencies, reviewing funding agencies, identifying risks and conduct
analysis and promoting international research and development
cooperation).
\16\Id.
\17\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHIPS and Science Act
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 establishes the National
Science Foundation (NSF) as the primary agency charged with
coordinating research security initiatives, since it provides
the relevant prohibitions, guidance, and disclosure
requirements ``around foreign talent recruitment programs and
potential conflicts of interest.''\18\ NSF is required to
create policies, protocols, and resources to identify and
address any potential security risks to research integrity for
institutions.\19\ Furthermore, the Act requires NSF to create a
Research Security and Policy Office in the Office of the
Director to coordinate all security policies and conduct due
diligence regarding compliance with any security standards set
forth.\20\ Similarly, CHIPS and Science Act requires that all
institutions must annually report to NSF in any financial
information associated with a foreign country of concern and
directs NSF to create guardrails around foreign talent
programs.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\CHIPS and Science Act, Sec. 10631, Pub. L. 117-167, 72 Stat.
1580, Aug. 9, 2022 (``Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, in coordination with the interagency working group
established under . . . [23 U.S.C. 6601] . . . shall publish and widely
distribute a uniform set of guidelines for federal research agencies
regarding foreign talent recruitment programs.''). The CHIPS and
Science Act also requires that the N.S.F. establishes an independent
risk assessment center to help institutions and researchers understand
and mitigate security risks. See Nat'l Sci. Found., CHIPS and Science,
Nat'l Sci. Found. https://new.nsf.gov/chips (last visited Nov. 13,
2023).
\19\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10331(1).
\20\Id.; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant
Univs., Research Security Provisions, The CHIPS & p And s And Sci. Act
Of 2022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/
sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/
CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf (quoting H.R. 4346,
117th Cong. Sec. 10331 (2022)).
\21\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10339B, 10631; See Ass'n of Am.
Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security
Provisions, The THE CH& And Sci. Act Of 2022 022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last
updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-
Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/
CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Republicans argue that the Biden Administration is
``crippling'' its enforcement of foreign influence,\22\ it is
evident that the administration has already committed to
implementing a cohesive, interagency plan to combat undue
foreign influence by passing robust provisions doing so into
law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\See Press Release, Congresswoman Michelle Steel Press Off.,
Steel, Foxx Bill Will Deter Foreign Adversaries' Influences in
Postsecondary Education, (Oct. 11, 2023) https://steel.house.gov/media/
press-releases/steel-foxx-bill-will-deter-foreign-adversaries-
influence-postsecondary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 117 of the Higher Education Act
While other federal agencies may dominate the research
security space, the Department of Education (Department) does
have a role to play. HEA section 117 requires institutions of
higher education receiving federal financial assistance to
disclose any gifts received from, and contracts with, foreign
sources valued at $250,000 or more per year.\23\ This
disclosure is designed to ``promote public transparency about
the role of foreign funding in U.S. higher education'' and
protect government-funded activities from foreign
influence.\24\ Although Congress first required institutions to
report foreign gifts and contracts to the Department in 1986,
institutions only recently received formal guidance from the
Department on Section 117 compliance through the creation of a
website containing written guidance, webinars, and other
resources to assist institutions.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Higher Education Act of 1965, Sec. 117, 20 U.S.C. 1011f
(2023); see Off. of Fed. Student Aid, Section 117 Foreign Gift and
Contract Reporting, Knowledge Ctr Home: Topics: Fed. Student Aid (May
15, 2023) https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-
117-foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting.
\24\Id.
\25\See e.g., Pub. Law 99-498, Higher Education Amendments of 1986,
Title XII, Section 1206, adding HEA Title XII, Sec. 1207 (Oct. 17,
1986) (then codified at 20 U.S.C. 1145(d)); Off. of Fed. Student Aid,
Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Reporting, Knowledge Ctr Home:
Topics: Fed. Student Aid (May 15, 2023) https://fsapartners.ed.gov/
knowledge-center/topics/section-117-foreign-gift-and-contract-
reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 117 Enforcement and Changes
Under the Trump Administration, the Department's Office of
General Counsel (OGC) initiated 12 civil investigations to
ensure Section 117 compliance.\26\ These investigations did not
ultimately lead to charges of criminal activity by any
institution. In 2020, the Department created an online portal
for institutions to submit reports on contracts with, and gifts
from, foreign sources. Currently, gift and contract report
submissions occur through the portal, rather than through the
institution's process for accessing federal student aid program
participation. This was a strong step forward for streamlining
the reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Institutions investigated include Georgetown Univ, Texas A&M
Univ., Rutgers Univ., Cornell Univ., Univ. of Maryland, Massachusetts
Institute of Tech., Harvard Univ., Yale Univ., Univ. of Texas, Case
Western Reserve Univ., Fordham Univ., and Stanford Univ. See for
further information on institution actions, U.S. Dept. Of Educ.,
Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (Oct. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------