Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 1042]
The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 1042) to prohibit the importation into the
United States of unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is
produced in the Russian Federation, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 4
Committee Action................................................. 7
Committee Votes.................................................. 8
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 11
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 11
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 11
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 11
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 11
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 11
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings...................... 11
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 12
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits....... 12
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 13
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 13
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 13
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 13
Minority Views................................................... 22
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports
Act''.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT.
(a) Prohibition on Imports.--Section 3112A of the USEC Privatization
Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(d) Prohibition on Imports of Low-Enriched Uranium.--
``(1) Prohibition.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days
after the date of enactment of this subsection, and subject to
paragraphs (2) and (3), no unirradiated low-enriched uranium
that is produced in the Russian Federation may be imported into
the United States.
``(2) Waiver.--
``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the
Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Commerce, may waive
application of paragraph (1) to authorize the
importation of unirradiated low-enriched uranium that
is produced in the Russian Federation if the Secretary
of Energy determines that--
``(i) no alternative viable source of low-
enriched uranium is available to sustain the
continued operation of a nuclear reactor or a
United States nuclear energy company; or
``(ii) importation of low-enriched uranium
that is produced in the Russian Federation is
in the national interest.
``(B) Limitation on amounts of imports of low-
enriched uranium.--
``(i) In general.--The importation into the
United States of low-enriched uranium,
including low-enriched uranium obtained under
contracts for separative work units, that is
produced in the Russian Federation, whether or
not such low-enriched uranium is derived from
highly enriched uranium of weapons origin, may
not exceed--
``(I) in calendar year 2023, 578,877
kilograms;
``(II) in calendar year 2024, 476,536
kilograms;
``(III) in calendar year 2025,
470,376 kilograms;
``(IV) in calendar year 2026, 464,183
kilograms; and
``(V) in calendar year 2027, 459,083
kilograms.
``(ii) Termination.--Any waiver issued under
this subsection shall terminate not later than
January 1, 2028.
``(C) Administration.--The Secretary of Commerce
shall--
``(i) administer the import limitations
described in subparagraph (B) in accordance
with the provisions of the Suspension
Agreement, including the provisions described
in subsection (c)(2)(B)(i);
``(ii) be responsible for enforcing the
import limitations described in subparagraph
(B); and
``(iii) enforce the import limitations
described in subparagraph (B) in a manner that
imposes a minimal burden on the commercial
nuclear industry.
``(D) Notification to congress.--Upon issuing a
waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Energy
shall submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives, the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources of the Senate a notification that a
waiver has been issued, which shall include
identification of the recipient of the waiver.
``(3) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply to
imports--
``(A) by or under contract to the Department of
Energy for national security or nonproliferation
purposes, as determined by the Secretary of Energy; or
``(B) of non-uranium isotopes.
``(4) Termination.--The provisions of this subsection shall
terminate on December 31, 2040.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) In general.--Section 3112A(c) of the USEC Privatization
Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(c)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)--
(I) in clause (viii), by inserting
``and'' after the semicolon at the end;
(II) in clause (ix), by striking the
semicolon and inserting a period; and
(III) by striking clauses (x) through
(xxvii); and
(ii) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking
``paragraph (10)'' and inserting ``paragraph
(9)'';
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``United States''
and all that follows through ``for processing'' and
inserting ``United States for processing'';
(C) by striking paragraph (5);
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (12) as
paragraphs (5) through (11), respectively;
(E) in paragraph (5), as redesignated by subparagraph
(D), by striking ``In addition to the adjustment under
paragraph (5)(A), the'' and inserting ``The'';
(F) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (7), as so
redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (10)'' and
inserting ``paragraph (9)'';
(G) in paragraph (8), as so redesignated, by striking
``December 31, 2040'' and inserting ``the date
described in subsection (d)(1)''; and
(H) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (9), as so
redesignated, by striking ``paragraphs (2)(C) and (8)''
and inserting ``paragraphs (2)(C) and (7)''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment to section
3112A(c)(2)(A)(x) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C.
2297h-10a(c)(2)(A)(x)) made by paragraph (1)(A) of this
subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after
the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 3. MARKET EVALUATION AND SUPPORT.
Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate a report that includes--
(1) an evaluation, with respect to the 5-year period that
begins on the date of enactment of this Act, of the anticipated
supply of low-enriched uranium (as defined in section 3112A(a)
of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(a)))
available to replace imports of low-enriched uranium produced
in the Russian Federation, taking into account--
(A) waivers authorized to be issued under section
3112A(d) of the USEC Privatization Act (as added by
section 2 of this Act);
(B) private and government inventories of low-
enriched uranium;
(C) market demand for low-enriched uranium products;
and
(D) current orders and announced plans for expansion
of low-enriched uranium production capacity, including
domestic production capacity; and
(2) a description of proposed Department of Energy
assistance, if the Secretary determines such assistance is
needed based on the evaluation under paragraph (1), to support
the expansion of domestic low-enriched uranium production
capacity sufficient to meet domestic market demand for low-
enriched uranium, taking into consideration--
(A) market competition for low-enriched uranium
production services;
(B) low-enriched uranium supply diversity; and
(C) the long-term uranium fuel supply needs of the
United States.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1042 would amend the USEC Privatization Act to
prohibit the importation into the United States of
unirradiated, low-enriched uranium that is produced in the
Russian Federation.
H.R. 1042 would provide a date certain, after which no
Russian-sourced unirradiated, low-enriched uranium\1\ will be
available for U.S. nuclear reactors through at least 2040. This
would create the market conditions for the long-term commercial
contracts that domestic fuel producers need to invest in new
U.S. supply capacity, including uranium conversion and
enrichment capacity, which has atrophied substantially over the
past decade.
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\1\Unirradiated, or fresh, fuel has not yet been used in a reactor.
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To reduce supply disruption risks and to allow time for new
production capacity to come on-line, H.R. 1042 would provide
the Secretary of Energy waiver authority through 2027 to
authorize certain imports of such low-enriched uranium, subject
to specific limits, if no alternative source of the uranium is
available to sustain U.S. nuclear operations or if such imports
are in the public interest. (The prohibition on imports would
not apply to imports for national security purposes.) In
addition, H.R. 1042 would require the Secretary to conduct a
thorough market evaluation of the anticipated supply of low-
enriched uranium, to determine what, if any, U.S. federal
assistance may be needed to support expansion of production
capacity sufficient to replace Russian supplies.
Background and Need for Legislation
Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the looming
threat to global energy security created by dependence on
Russian-supplied fuels. The threat extends beyond oil and gas
to include reliance on Russian-sourced enriched uranium for the
U.S. nuclear fuel market.
With production capacity that far outstrips its own
domestic requirements and a vertically integrated, state-owned
system that excludes external competition, Russia maintains an
influential position in global nuclear fuel supply chains,
particularly in uranium conversion and enrichment--two
essential processing steps in the production of nuclear fuels
for reactors. It is the largest enricher, with about 46 percent
of global capacity. It maintains roughly 20 percent of global
uranium conversion capacity and has been supplying some 40
percent of conversion services, including to the United
States.\2\
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\2\For general data on global capacities see World Nuclear
Association at https://world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx.
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The U.K. and European Union's enrichment capacity is also
substantially larger than European domestic requirements and
provides a large portion of conversion and enrichment services
to the U.S. market.\3\ By contrast, while the United States
maintains the largest market globally for nuclear fuels, its
current domestic enrichment capacity can supply just 30 percent
of domestic fuel requirements at present. Its one conversion
facility is restarting and will be able to supply the
equivalent of about 40 percent of U.S. market demand in the
near term.\4\
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\3\A Canadian supplier also provides substantial conversion
services.
\4\Honeywell's ConverDyn Metropolis Works facility, the only U.S.
uranium conversion facility, had shuttered in 2017 due to a collapse in
market prices, but has restarted in 2023 to previous production levels.
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The size of Russian state-owned enrichment capacity, along
with its large enriched-uranium inventories, enables it to
export enriched uranium products at prices that would undercut
allied and domestic producers, to the detriment of domestic
supply chains, as U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
investigations have repeatedly found over the past 30 years.\5\
In point of fact, this past March 2023, the ITC's five year
review of uranium from Russia found that, absent current import
limits, Russian suppliers would likely undersell domestic
supplies and depress prices, to the detriment of U.S. supply
chains.\6\
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\5\See Uranium from Russia: Investigation No. 731-TA-539-C (Fifth
Review), U.S. International Trade Administration, March 2023 Publican
5416.
\6\Id.
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Given Russia's long-standing ability to flood markets and
undercut prices--and indications it would do so if provided the
opportunity--the United States has established import limits on
Russian-sourced uranium fuels.\7\ Yet under these limits, the
United States continues to import more than 20 percent of
enriched uranium from Russia's state-owned nuclear power
company, Rosatom and its subsidiary Tenex.\8\
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\7\The limits were established in the so-called Russian Suspension
agreement, first established in 1992, the continuance of which was
signed in October 2020. See https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-09/pdf/2020-22431.pdf. In addition, Congress has
enacted the import limits into law, in the USEC Privatization Act,
updating the October limits in the Energy Act of 2020. H.R. 1042 is
amending these statutory limits.
\8\Under the Russian Suspension Agreement, Russia is scheduled to
export to U.S. utilities and fuel brokers the equivalent of 24% of U.S.
domestic supply in 2023. This limit declines to 20% of the market in
2024 and down to 15% of the market in 2028 through 2040.
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Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, the U.S. domestic
nuclear fuel supply chain atrophied over the past decade.
Nuclear fuel market disruptions in the wake of Japanese and
German nuclear reactor shutdowns following the Fukushima
accident in 2011, as well as U.S. reactor shutdowns over the
past decade, depressed global nuclear fuel demand and
undermined domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment
services as market prices for uranium product collapsed. This
eroded U.S. domestic nuclear fuel infrastructure--and created a
vulnerability to supply disruptions and dependence on cheap
Russian fuels.\9\
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\9\USEC (now Centrus Energy) ceased enrichment operations in 2013;
The French nuclear fuel cycle company AREVA (now Orano) canceled plans
to build an enrichment facility in the United States, and GLE, or
Global Laser Enrichment, had slowed efforts to commercialize new
enrichment technology in the United States due to market conditions,
ITC's Fifth Review reports. Op. Cit.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine raises concerns that access
to Russian supplies may cease without adequate new capacity to
fill the gap.\10\ The impacts of Russian cut-off would not be
immediate, given the long lead times of nuclear refueling,
current utility and U.S. government stocks, and Western
movement to take actions to wean off of Russian supplies have
been mitigating supply risks.\11\ Nevertheless, more capacity
from U.S. and Western producers is necessary before the end of
the decade to eliminate vulnerabilities, and to meet increasing
demand, including for advanced reactors. As the Department of
Energy's (DOE's) top nuclear energy official stated in
testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources:
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\10\Continuing reliance on Russian fuels also raises concerns about
U.S. industry revenues supporting Rosatom, which helps finance the
Ukraine War and China's nuclear weapons breakout. See Catherine Belton,
``Russia's state nuclear company aids war effort, leading to calls for
sanctions,'' The Washington Post, January 20, 2023, and March 16, 2023,
letter to the Honorable Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for
National Security, from House Armed Services Committee Chair Mike D.
Rogers, Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul, and Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligency Chair Michael R. Turner.
\11\U.S. reactors typically maintain working inventories of fuel to
cover a refuel every 18 to 24 months. There are additional liquid
inventories that could also cover short-term domestic gaps from loss of
Russian imports, including U.S. utility surplus inventories, American
Assured Fuel Supply, MOX backup, Asian inventories, contract
restructuring, and enrichment optimization (reversal of underfeeding),
according to public information compiled by Urenco USA. Meantime, DOE
reported to Congress that ``ConverDyn could increase capacity from 7
million kgU to 13 million kgU by late 2024 eliminating shortfalls [from
Russian cut off] after 2024.''
Conversion and enrichment services from trusted
sources are insufficient to replace current U.S.
imports from Russia. Without expansion of the domestic
and international allies' and partners' fuel cycle
capacity, the United States cannot reliably make
sufficient low enriched uranium (LEU) or high-assay LEU
(HALEU) available to support the needs of today's power
reactor fleet, advanced reactors, research reactors,
and medical isotope production facilities. This
strategic vulnerability is unsustainable.\12\
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\12\Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary of Nuclear
Energy, Department of Energy, before the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, March 9, 2023.
Restoration of America's domestic nuclear fuel supply chain
is a national and energy security imperative. A robust nuclear
sector is essential for the nation's defense and nuclear
industrial base, for energy security, and the long-term health
of the domestic nuclear industry. It is key to strengthening
the geostrategic relationships necessary to compete with Russia
and China.
Restoration of America's domestic nuclear fuel supply chain
requires ending Russia's supply of cheap fuels to the domestic
market for the long-term, without the prospect of Russia
reentering the market after the Ukraine war, for example. For
capacity to be built, ``U.S. suppliers need certainty that
investments will not be undercut by policy reversal,'' DOE
states in its Uranium Strategy, presented to Congress. What is
necessary, DOE states, is ``long term stability in import
policy.''\13\ This means long-term certainty that, should
Russia be excluded from U.S. markets, suppliers know there is
no chance Russia will be back in the market for a long time.
That certainty would create the market conditions for the long-
term commercial contracts that producers need to invest in
expanded capacity.
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\13\U.S. DOE Uranium Strategy, presented to congressional
authorizing and appropriations committees, August, 2022. (Official Use
Only.)
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Restoration also takes time for new capacity to be built.
Investment decisions must be made well in advance of needed
capacity. Fortunately, provided adequate contracts and demand
signals, current conversion and enrichment suppliers in the
United States have the requisite licensing to build out
capacity to fill the Russian-supply gap.\14\ Other companies
are expected to join the competition for supplying U.S. nuclear
demand, provided appropriate market certainty.\15\
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\14\For example, Honeywell's ConverDyn uranium conversion facility,
Centrus Energy's enrichment facility, and Urenco USA's enrichment
facility all have Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses that allow
expansion to capacity to meet U.S. needs.
\15\Global Laser Enrichment, already under the contract with the
Department of Energy to produce fuel from depleted uranium, has signed
engagement letters with three major American utilities in support of
its emerging technology and diversity of domestic enrichment supplies.
See https://www.gle-us.com/news/.
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The Committee recognizes that, for advanced nuclear fuels--
the so-called high assay, low enriched uranium or HALEU fuels--
there is a federal role to assist with buildout. Because there
is no domestic HALEU infrastructure, and the future market
demand is uncertain, the Committee developed legislation
authorizing the Department of Energy to stand up a program to
support building capacity for these fuels, in coordination with
the private sector. The 116th Congress enacted this
legislation, the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability program, in
the Energy Act of 2020. Although the program has been plagued
by delay, it provides an essential framework upon which DOE,
and Congress, may continue to assist developing an advanced
fuel infrastructure.\16\
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\16\Current legislative proposals in the House and Senate
concerning nuclear fuel security provide direction to DOE consistent
with this framework. Notably, Centrus Energy, with DOE support under
the program, expects to be producing HALEU in 2023.
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The role for federal support for conventional low-enriched
uranium (LEU) used to supply the existing fleet of U.S.
reactors requires closer scrutiny. The existing, multi-billion-
dollar market for LEU is well-developed. It would not need the
type of taxpayer support that HALEU infrastructure may require,
because there already is a mature market and identifiable
demand.
The DOE's proposal to purchase LEU for existing reactors
and then resell it to utilities\17\ risks distorting pricing
and the orderly signals of mature supply and demand. While this
may be a workable approach for incentivizing HALEU for advanced
reactors, for the existing fleet it creates a dynamic where
utilities will be bidding against DOE for limited supply of
fuel, which will drive up costs and increase scarcity of an
already challenged fuel supply. ``Simply creating demand-side
pressure is not constructive in an already constrained
market,'' one industry official explained to the Committee in
testimony.\18\
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\17\Uranium Strategy, op cit.
\18\June 6, 2023, Response to questions for the record by Regis
Repko, Senior Vice President, Generation and Transmission Strategy,
Duke Energy, for hearing entitled: ``American Nuclear Energy Expansion:
Powering a Clean and Secure Future,'' Subcommittee on Energy, Climate,
and Grid Security, April 19, 2023.
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The Committee finds that, while targeted DOE support may be
necessary, the most important action to address the urgency of
Russian threats and the imperative to build out capacity is to
establish that, after a date certain, Russian sourced LEU will
not be allowed into U.S. markets. The U.S. industry generally
relies on long-term contracting, and operates with long-term
horizons, which means market signals and forecasts become
increasingly important as the market rebalances away from
Russian sources.\19\
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\19\See International Trade Commission, Post-Preliminary Analysis
Memorandum in the 2017-2108 Administrative Review of the Agreement
Suspending the Antidumping Investigation of Uranium from the Russian
Federation, June 17, 2020.
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To protect taxpayers and ensure the benefits of efficient
market response to supply constraints, the appropriate sequence
of Congressional action is first to create the long-term
certainty that Russian fuels will not enter the U.S. market.
This allows accurate evaluation of the market response, and
other priorities for nuclear infrastructure, to identify what,
if any, additional federal support is necessary to assist
diverse and adequate capacity expansion.
H.R. 1042, as amended and reported by the Committee, would
take this approach. It would provide the appropriate market
signal, waivers to allow time to transition to U.S. and Western
supplies, and a timely evaluation to identify where, if
necessary, federal and taxpayer assistance is needed. It would
provide the information for targeted, appropriate assistance.
The Committee disagrees with the view that infrastructure must
be constructed before a ban can be put in place. This gets the
sequencing backwards and risks market distortions and taxpayer
waste.
H.R. 1042 would establish the market conditions that would
responsibly secure our supply chains, protect taxpayers, and
ensure a robust nuclear future.
Committee Action
On February 7, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy, Climate,
and Grid Security and the Subcommittee on Environment,
Manufacturing, and Critical Materials held a joint hearing on
17 pieces of legislation, including a discussion draft that
would become H.R. 1042. The title of the hearing was
``Unleashing American Energy, Lowering Energy Costs, and
Strengthening Supply Chains.'' The Subcommittees received
testimony from:
The Honorable Mark Menezes, Former United
States Deputy Secretary of Energy, Department of
Energy;
The Honorable Bernard McNamee, Former
Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
Jeffrey Eshelman, II, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Independent Petroleum Association of
America;
Katie Sweeney, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer, National Mining Association;
Raul Garcia, Legislative Director for
Healthy Communities, Earthjustice; and
Tyson Slocum, Director of the Energy
Program, Public Citizen.
H.R. 1042, Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, was
introduced by Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA) and Rep.
Robert E. Latta (R-Ohio) on February 14, 2023.
On May 16, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and
Grid Security met in open markup session and forwarded H.R.
1042, with amendment, to the full Committee by a record vote of
18 yeas and 12 nays.
On May 24, 2023, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce
met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 1042 favorably
reported, as amended, to the House by a record vote of 29 yeas
and 21 nays.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during
the Committee consideration:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that
are reflected in this report.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee
finds that H.R. 1042 would result in no new or increased budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to ensure
there is an adequate and reliable supply of critical energy
resources that are essential to the energy security of the
United States.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of
H.R. 1042 is known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, including any program that was included in a report to
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
related hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 1042:
On January 31, 2023, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce held an oversight hearing entitled,
``American Energy Expansion: Strengthening Economic,
Environmental, and National Security.'' The Committee
received testimony from:
The Honorable Paul Dabbar,
Former Under Secretary of Energy, Department of
Energy;
Robert McNalley, President,
Rapidan Energy Group, LLC;
Donna Jackson, Director of
Membership Development--National Center for
Public Policy Research, Project 21; and
Ana Unruh Cohen, Former Majority
Staff Director, U.S. House Select Committee on
the Climate Crisis.
On February 7, 2023, the Subcommittee on
Energy, Climate, and Grid Security and the Subcommittee
on Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Materials
held a joint legislative hearing entitled, ``Unleashing
American Energy, Lowering Energy Costs, and
Strengthening Supply Chains,'' on 17 pieces of
legislation, including a discussion draft that would
become H.R. 1042. The Subcommittees received testimony
from:
The Honorable Mark Menezes,
Former United States Deputy Secretary of
Energy, Department of Energy;
The Honorable Bernard McNamee,
Former Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission;
Jeffrey Eshelman, II, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Independent
Petroleum Association of America;
Katie Sweeney, Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer, National
Mining Association;
Raul Garcia, Legislative
Director for Healthy Communities, Earthjustice;
and
Tyson Slocum, Director of the
Energy Program, Public Citizen.
On April 18, 2023, the Subcommittee on
Energy, Climate, and Grid Security held an oversight
hearing entitled, ``American Nuclear Energy Expansion:
Powering a Clean and Secure Future.'' The Subcommittee
received testimony from:
Jess C. Gehin, Ph.D., Associate
Laboratory Director, Nuclear Science and
Technology, Idaho National Laboratory;
Regis Repko, Senior Vice
President, Generation and Transmission, Duke
Energy;
Jeremy Harrell, Board of
Directors Chair, U.S. Nuclear Industry Council
and Chief Strategy Officer, ClearPath; and
Armond Cohen, Executive
Director, Clean Air Task Force.
On May 11, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy,
Climate, and Grid Security held an oversight hearing
entitled, ``The Fiscal Year 2024 Department of Energy
Budget.'' The Committee received testimony from:
The Honorable Jennifer Granholm,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was
filed, the estimate was not available.
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits
Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the
Committee finds that H.R. 1042 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides that the Act may be cites as the
``Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act.''
Section 2. Amendments to the USEC Privatization Act
Section 2 amends the USEC Privatization Act to prohibit the
importation of unirradiated, low-enriched uranium that is
produced in the Russian Federation. The prohibition begins 90
days after enactment of the Act. The provision provides waiver
authority until January 2028 to the Secretary of Energy to
authorize the importation of such uranium, subject to certain
limits specified in the text, if no alternative, viable source
of low-enriched uranium is available to sustain U.S. nuclear
reactor or U.S. nuclear company operations or is determined to
be in the national interest. This prohibition would not apply
to imports of non-uranium isotopes or certain imports for
national security or nonproliferation purposes. The prohibition
terminates on December 31, 2040.
Section 3. Market evaluation and support
Section 3 directs the Secretary of Energy to submit to
Congress an evaluation of anticipated low-enriched uranium
supplies to replace Russian supplies and proposed Department of
Energy assistance, if determined necessary, to support
expansion of domestic low-enriched uranium production capacity
sufficient to meet domestic demand, accounting for market
competition, supply diversity, and long-term fuel supply needs
of the United States.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--RESCISSIONS AND OFFSETS
CHAPTER 1--ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
Subchapter A--United States Enrichment Corporation Privatization
* * * * * * *
SEC. 3112A. INCENTIVES FOR ADDITIONAL DOWNBLENDING OF HIGHLY ENRICHED
URANIUM BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Completion of the russian heu agreement.--The
term ``completion of the Russian HEU Agreement'' means
the importation into the United States from the Russian
Federation pursuant to the Russian HEU Agreement of
uranium derived from the downblending of not less than
500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium of weapons
origin.
(2) Downblending.--The term ``downblending'' means
processing highly enriched uranium into a uranium
product in any form in which the uranium contains less
than 20 percent uranium-235.
(3) Highly enriched uranium.--The term ``highly
enriched uranium'' has the meaning given that term in
section 3102(4).
(4) Highly enriched uranium of weapons origin.--The
term ``highly enriched uranium of weapons origin''
means highly enriched uranium that--
(A) contains 90 percent or more uranium-235;
and
(B) is verified by the Secretary of Energy to
be of weapons origin.
(5) Low-enriched uranium.--The term ``low-enriched
uranium'' means a uranium product in any form,
including uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and
uranium oxide (UO2), in which the uranium
contains less than 20 percent uranium-235, including
natural uranium, without regard to whether the uranium
is incorporated into fuel rods or complete fuel
assemblies.
(6) Russian heu agreement.--The term ``Russian HEU
Agreement'' has the meaning given that term in section
3102(11).
(7) Suspension agreement.--The term ``Suspension
Agreement'' has the meaning given that term in section
3102(13).
(8) Uranium-235.--The term ``uranium-235'' means the
isotope U.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to support the continued downblending of highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin in the Russian
Federation in order to protect the essential security
interests of the United States with respect to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
(2) to reduce reliance on uranium imports in order to
protect essential national security interests;
(3) to revive and strengthen the supply chain for
nuclear fuel produced and used in the United States;
and
(4) to expand production of nuclear fuel in the
United States.
(c) Promotion of Downblending of Russian Highly Enriched
Uranium.--
(1) Completion of the russian heu agreement.--Prior
to the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement, the
importation into the United States of low-enriched
uranium, including low-enriched uranium obtained under
contracts for separative work units, that is produced
in the Russian Federation and is not imported pursuant
to the Russian HEU Agreement, may not exceed the
following amounts:
(A) In the 4-year period beginning with
calendar year 2008, 16,559 kilograms.
(B) In calendar year 2012, 24,839 kilograms.
(C) In calendar year 2013 and each calendar
year thereafter through the calendar year of
the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement,
41,398 kilograms.
(2) Incentives to continue downblending russian
highly enriched uranium after the completion of the
russian heu agreement.--
(A) In general.--After the completion of the
Russian HEU Agreement, the importation into the
United States of low-enriched uranium,
including low-enriched uranium obtained under
contracts for separative work units, that is
produced in the Russian Federation, whether or
not such low-enriched uranium is derived from
highly enriched uranium of weapons origin, may
not exceed--
(i) in calendar year 2014, 485,279
kilograms;
(ii) in calendar year 2015, 455,142
kilograms;
(iii) in calendar year 2016, 480,146
kilograms;
(iv) in calendar year 2017, 490,710
kilograms;
(v) in calendar year 2018, 492,731
kilograms;
(vi) in calendar year 2019, 509,058
kilograms;
(vii) in calendar year 2020, 514,754
kilograms;
(viii) in calendar year 2021, 596,682
kilograms; and
(ix) in calendar year 2022, 489,617
kilograms[;].
[(x) in calendar year 2023, 578,877
kilograms;
[(xi) in calendar year 2024, 476,536
kilograms;
[(xii) in calendar year 2025, 470,376
kilograms;
[(xiii) in calendar year 2026,
464,183 kilograms;
[(xiv) in calendar year 2027, 459,083
kilograms;
[(xv) in calendar year 2028, 344,312
kilograms;
[(xvi) in calendar year 2029, 340,114
kilograms;
[(xvii) in calendar year 2030,
332,141 kilograms;
[(xviii) in calendar year 2031,
328,862 kilograms;
[(xix) in calendar year 2032, 322,255
kilograms;
[(xx) in calendar year 2033, 317,536
kilograms;
[(xxi) in calendar year 2034, 298,088
kilograms;
[(xxii) in calendar year 2035,
294,511 kilograms;
[(xxiii) in calendar year 2036,
286,066 kilograms;
[(xxiv) in calendar year 2037,
281,272 kilograms;
[(xxv) in calendar year 2038, 277,124
kilograms;
[(xxvi) in calendar year 2039,
277,124 kilograms; and
[(xxvii) in calendar year 2040,
267,685 kilograms.]
(B) Administration.--
(i) In general.--The Secretary of
Commerce shall administer the import
limitations described in subparagraph
(A) in accordance with the provisions
of the Suspension Agreement,
including--
(I) the limitations on sales
of enriched uranium product and
separative work units plus
conversion, in amounts
determined in accordance with
Section IV.B.1 of the
Suspension Agreement (as
amended by the amendment
published in the Federal
Register on October 9, 2020 (85
Fed. Reg. 64112));
(II) the export limit
allocations set forth in
Appendix 5 of the Suspension
Agreement (as so amended);
(III) the requirements for
natural uranium returned feed
associated with imports of low-
enriched uranium, including
pursuant to sales of
enrichment, with or without
conversion, from the Russian
Federation, as set forth in
Section IV.B.1 of the
Suspension Agreement (as so
amended);
(IV) any other provisions of
the Suspension Agreement (as so
amended); and
(V) any related
administrative guidance issued
by the Department of Commerce.
(ii) Effect of termination of
suspension agreement.--Clause (i) shall
remain in effect if the Suspension
Agreement is terminated.
(C) Additional imports in exchange for a
commitment to downblend an additional 300
metric tons of highly enriched uranium.--
(i) In general.--In addition to the
amount authorized to be imported under
subparagraph (A) and except as provided
in clause (ii), if the Russian
Federation enters into a bilateral
agreement with the United States under
which the Russian Federation agrees to
downblend an additional 300 metric tons
of highly enriched uranium after the
completion of the Russian HEU
Agreement, 4 kilograms of low-enriched
uranium, whether or not such low-
enriched uranium is derived from highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin and
including low-enriched uranium obtained
under contracts for separative work
units, may be imported in a calendar
year for every 1 kilogram of Russian
highly enriched uranium of weapons
origin that was downblended in the
preceding calendar year, subject to the
verification of the Secretary of Energy
under [paragraph (10)] paragraph (9).
(ii) Maximum annual imports.--Not
more than 120,000 kilograms of low-
enriched uranium may be imported in a
calendar year under clause (i).
(3) Exceptions.--The import limitations described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to low-enriched
uranium produced in the Russian Federation that is
imported into the United States--
(A) for use in the initial core of a new
nuclear reactor; or
(B) for processing and to be certified for
reexportation and not for consumption in th
Minority Views
We support restrictions on the importation of uranium from
Russia. However, we need to partner any effort to lessen our
dependence on Russian uranium with efforts to boost the
domestic uranium fuel cycle supply chain. Otherwise, we risk
swapping our dependence on one country for dependence on
another. Right now, the United States has only one enrichment
facility that produces roughly one-third of the enriched
uranium that our domestic nuclear power fleet consumes.
In testimony before the Energy Subcommittee, Secretary of
Energy Jennifer Granholm indicated that she would consider a
ban on Russian uranium if the United States developed its own
domestic supply of enriched uranium.\1\ The Administration
underscored the importance of this issue when it included in a
recent supplemental funding request $2.16 billion to secure the
nuclear fuel supply chain by supporting the expansion of
domestic uranium enrichment services. The request states that
``expanding domestic fuel capacity would require both funding
and a long-term ban on enriched uranium product imports from
the Russian Federation into the United States.''\2\
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\1\House Committee on Energy & Commerce, Hearing on Fiscal Year
2024 Department of Energy Budget Request, 118th Cong. (May 11, 2023).
\2\The White House, Funding Request to Meet Critical Needs, (Oct.
2023) (www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Funding-Request-
to-Meet-Critical-Needs.pdf).
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For these reasons, we believe it is critical to pair a ban
on Russian uranium with support for expanding domestic nuclear
fuel cycle capabilities.
Frank Pallone Jr.,
Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
[all]