Additional Views
[To accompany H.R. 6611]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 6611) to amend the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 to make certain reforms to the
authorities under such Act, to reauthorize title VII of such
Act, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that
the bill do pass
Section-by-Section
SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF FISA REFORM AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF
2023
TITLE I--RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUERIES
Section 101. Revoking Federal Bureau of Investigation authority to
conduct queries unrelated to national security.
Section 101 prohibits the FBI from conducting any query of
Section 702 information that is designed solely to retrieve
evidence of a crime, with narrow exceptions for when the FBI
has a reasonable belief that the query could assist in
mitigating or eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily
harm, or when the query is necessary to comply with criminal
court-related litigation or discovery obligations.
Section 102. Strictly limiting Federal Bureau of Investigation
personnel authorizing United States person queries.
Section 102 requires an FBI supervisor or FBI attorney to
provide prior approval of every U.S. person query conducted by
the FBI, unless the FBI employee seeking to conduct the U.S.
person query has a reasonable belief that the query could
assist in mitigating or eliminating a threat to life or serious
bodily harm. Compared to the status quo, Section 102 will
reduce FBI personnel authorized to approve U.S. person queries
by over 90 percent.
Section 103. Notification for certain queries conducted by Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Section 103 requires the FBI Director, in the event the FBI
conducts a query of the name or other personally identifying
information of a Member of Congress, to notify both that Member
of Congress and congressional leadership. Section 103 allows a
temporary exception if such notification would impede an
ongoing national security or law enforcement investigation.
Section 104. Requirement for congressional consent prior to certain
Federal Bureau of Investigation queries for purpose of
defensive briefings.
Section 104 requires the FBI to obtain a Member of
Congress's consent before conducting a query for the purpose of
supplementing a defensive briefing for that Member on a
counterintelligence threat to the Member, unless the Deputy
Director of the FBI determines that exigent circumstances exist
to justify the query. Section 104 further requires the FBI
Director to notify congressional leadership when such consent
was sought or when such exigent circumstances existed.
Section 105. Restrictions relating to conduct of certain queries by
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 105 codifies additional requirements on the FBI,
including requiring specialized training, higher-level approval
for sensitive queries (such as those involving public
officials, members of the media, or religious leaders) and
those involving batch job technology, case-specific recorded
query justifications, and standardized FBI systems to protect
against inadvertent over-broad querying, with the ability for
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to waive
certain requirements.
Section 106. Prohibition on involvement of political appointees in
process to approve Federal Bureau of Investigation queries.
Section 106 prohibits any political appointee at the FBI
from being able to approve any FBI query, including any U.S.
person query, of Section 702 information.
Section 107. Requirement for adoption of certain minimum accountability
standards.
Section 107 requires the FBI Director to issue minimum
accountability standards to ensure appropriate consequences for
FBI employees who conduct noncompliant U.S. person queries of
Section 702 information, including zero tolerance for willful
misconduct, escalating consequences for unintentional
noncompliance, and consequences for FBI supervisors who oversee
individuals who conduct noncompliant U.S. person queries.
Section 107 further requires the FBI Director to submit these
standards to the congressional intelligence and judiciary
committees within 90 days of enactment, and to submit an annual
report for three years on each adverse personnel action taken
pursuant to these accountability standards.
Section 108. Restriction on certain information available to Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Section 108 codifies a prohibition on the FBI storing
unminimized Section 702 information in its databases unless the
information pertains to a foreign target who is relevant to an
existing, open, predicated, full national security
investigation by the FBI, with narrow exceptions if the FBI
agreed to assist another federal agency or if the Director of
the National Security Agency determines that exigent
circumstances exist and subsequently notifies Congress.
Section 109. Mandatory audits of United States person queries conducted
by Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 109 requires the National Security Division of the
Department of Justice to independently audit every U.S. person
query conducted by the FBI no later than 180 days after each
query was conducted.
Section 110. Prohibited purposes for queries using United States person
query terms.
Section 110 prohibits any U.S. person query of Section 702
information if the purpose is either (1) to suppress or burden
criticism, dissent, or the free expression of ideas or
political opinions by that U.S. person, or (2) to disadvantage
or harm that U.S. person based on their ethnicity, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Section 110 is
intended to provide further assurance that U.S. government
employees conduct U.S. person queries of Section 702
information in order to retrieve foreign intelligence
information, and not for any other purpose.
TITLE II--FISA APPLICATIONS AND ORDERS
Section 201. Requirement for sworn statements for factual assertions.
Section 201 requires the U.S. government, when applying for
a probable cause order under FISA, to include a sworn statement
of the facts by the U.S. government applicant.
Section 202. Prohibition on use of politically derived information in
applications for certain orders by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.
Section 202 requires the U.S. government to certify under
oath, when applying for a probable cause order to conduct
electronic surveillance or physical search, that none of the
information in the application is opposition research from a
political organization, unless the information is independently
corroborated and the government's application clearly
identifies the political organization source and the
investigative techniques used to corroborate the information.
Section 203. Prohibition on use of press reports in applications for
certain orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Section 203 requires the U.S. government to certify under
oath, when applying for a probable cause order to conduct
electronic surveillance or physical search, that none of the
information in the application is solely attributable to or
derived from media source content, unless the application
clearly identifies each author and publisher, as applicable.
Section 204. Description of techniques carried out before application.
Section 204 requires the U.S. government, when applying for
a probable cause order to conduct electronic surveillance of a
U.S. person, to include a statement summarizing the
investigative techniques carried out before making the
application.
Section 205. Requirement for certain justification prior to extension
of orders.
Section 205 requires the U.S. government, when applying for
an extension of a probable cause order to conduct electronic
surveillance or physical search of a U.S. person, to include a
summary of the foreign intelligence information obtained
pursuant to prior FISC orders relating to that U.S. person or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such
information.
Section 206. Requirement for certifications regarding accuracy of
applications.
Section 206 requires the U.S. government, in all
applications to the FISC, to certify that the Attorney General
or designated attorney for the government has notice of all
information that might call into question the accuracy of that
application or otherwise raise doubts about probable cause.
Section 206 also requires the Attorney General, in consultation
with the FBI Director, to issue procedures governing case file
reviews to ensure that applications to the FISC regarding U.S.
persons are accurate and complete.
Section 207. Requirement for justification of underlying criminal
offense in certain applications.
Section 207 requires the U.S. government, when applying for
a probable cause order to conduct electronic surveillance or
physical search of a U.S. person alleged to be acting as an
agent of a foreign power, to justify its belief that the
respective U.S. person is in violation of or about to violate
U.S. criminal law.
Section 208. Modification to duration of approved period under certain
orders for non-United States persons.
Section 208 modifies to one year the period of time that
the U.S. government can, under a probable cause order from the
FISC, conduct electronic surveillance or physical search of a
non-U.S. person.
TITLE III--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW
Section 301. Designation of counsel to scrutinize applications for
United States persons.
Section 301 requires a FISC judge to designate an attorney
to scrutinize a U.S. government application to conduct
electronic surveillance of a U.S. person, and to provide a
written analysis to the judge regarding (1) the sufficiency of
the government's evidence that the judge will use to make the
determination whether there is probable cause to believe the
U.S. person is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; (2)
any material weaknesses, flaws, or other concerns in the
application; and (3) a recommendation as to whether the judge
should approve, deny, or require the government to supplement
or otherwise modify the application.
Section 302. Requirement for transcripts of proceedings.
Section 302 requires that all hearings before the FISC or
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC-R)
be transcribed and stored.
Section 303. Requirement for notification to Congress of certain
transcripts.
Section 303 requires notification to the congressional
intelligence and judiciary committees when a transcript is
produced from any proceeding before the FISC or FISC-R. Section
303 also provides that if either committee requests to review
an existing transcript, the Attorney General shall facilitate
that request within three business days.
Section 304. Judicial consistency for extensions.
Section 304 requires that, to the extent practicable and
absent exigent circumstances, the FISC judge who originally
issued a probable cause order authorizing electronic
surveillance regarding a U.S. person shall be the same judge
who decides whether to grant or deny an application to extend
that order.
Section 305. Mandatory appointment of amicus curiae in judicial review
of annual section 702 certifications and procedures.
Section 305 requires the FISC to appoint amicus curiae to
assist in considering any Section 702 certification or related
procedures submitted for court review, unless the FISC issues a
finding that such appointment is not appropriate or is likely
to result in undue delay. Section 305 also requires that the
FISC, when appointing amicus under this requirement, shall to
the maximum extent practicable appoint an individual who
possesses expertise in both privacy and civil liberties and
intelligence collection. Section 305 further requires the FISC
to issue an order approving or not approving the government's
continued use of Section 702 within 60 days and authorizes the
FISC to extend that 60-day deadline only if the FISC issues an
order finding that extraordinary circumstances necessitate
additional time for review and that such an extension is
consistent with national security.
TITLE IV--FISA PENALTIES
Section 401. Removal or suspension of federal officers for misconduct
before Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Section 401 mandates disciplinary action, including removal
or suspension without pay, for any employee or officer of the
U.S. government who engages in intentional misconduct with
respect to proceedings before the FISC or FISC-R.
Section 402. Penalties for unauthorized disclosure of application for
electronic surveillance.
Section 402 adds a new criminal offense under FISA for the
knowing and willful disclosure or use of a FISA electronic
surveillance application, in whole or in part, in any way that
prejudices the safety or interest of the United States or
benefits any foreign government to the United States'
detriment.
Section 403. Increased criminal penalties for offense under FISA.
Section 403 amends the criminal penalties in FISA to
provide that a person who is found guilty of a criminal offense
under FISA is punishable by imprisonment of not more than 10
years and/or a fine under Title 18 of the United States Code,
which can be up to $250,000.
Section 404. Criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of certain
incidentally collected United States person information.
Section 404 adds a new criminal offense for the knowing and
willful disclosure or use of the classified contents of a
communication acquired under Section 702 to which a known
United States person is a party, in any manner that prejudices
the safety or interest of the United States or benefits any
foreign government to the United States' detriment. Section 404
further provides that a person who is found guilty of this
offense is punishable by imprisonment of not more than 8 years
and/or a fine under Title 18 of the United States Code, which
can be up to $250,000.
Section 405. Contempts constituting crimes.
Section 405 amends the criminal code to include the FISC
and FISC-R for purposes of crimes constituting contempt of
court.
Section 406. Sentencing enhancement for false declarations before FISC.
Section 406 amends the criminal code to include a
sentencing enhancement with imprisonment of up to 10 years for
knowingly making a false material declaration before the FISC
or FISC-R.
Section 407. Annual reporting on disciplinary actions by Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Section 407 requires the FBI Director to annually submit a
report to the congressional intelligence and judiciary
committees that describes the accountability actions taken by
the FBI in the preceding 12-month period for noncompliant
querying of Section 702 information, including ongoing
personnel investigations and any related adverse personnel
actions taken.
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 501. Inclusion of counternarcotics in definition of foreign
intelligence.
Section 501 amends the definition of ``foreign intelligence
information'' in FISA to include information that relates to
the ``international production, distribution, or financing of
illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs
driving overdose deaths, or any controlled substance designated
by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), or
precursors of the aforementioned,'' to authorize the U.S.
government to seek, and for the FISC to approve, the creation
of a certification under Section 702 focused on international
drug production, distribution, and financing, to include the
foreign production, distribution, and financing of fentanyl.
Section 502. Revocation of statutory reporting exemption and additional
reporting requirement for Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 502 repeals language that exempts the FBI from
having to publicly report certain information on U.S. person
queries. Section 502 requires the FBI Director to annually
report to the congressional intelligence and judiciary
committees on the number of U.S. person queries conducted, the
number of batch queries conducted, the number of queries
conducted by the FBI solely to retrieve evidence of a crime, an
estimate of the number of U.S. person queries conducted to
protect that U.S. person, and an estimate of the number of U.S.
person queries conducted where that person is currently under
FBI investigation. Section 502 further requires this report be
made public, subject to a declassification review.
Section 503. Notification to Congress of certain unauthorized
disclosures.
Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to notify the congressional intelligence committees within 7
days of becoming aware of a significant unauthorized disclosure
or compromise of Section 702-acquired information.
Section 504. Definition of electronic communication service provider.
Section 504 modifies the definition of ``electronic
communication service provider'' to account for technological
changes in transmitting and storing such communications and to
ensure that foreign intelligence information can continue to be
collected under Section 702 in a manner consistent with
congressional intent.
Section 505. Vetting of non-United States persons.
Section 505 ensures that, consistent with the framework
approved by the FISC, all foreign nationals seeking to come to
the United States for any purpose or period of time are vetted
using Section 702 information to ensure they do not pose a
terrorism or other national security threat.
Section 506. Accountability measures for executive leadership of
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 506 requires the FBI Director to establish measures
to hold FBI executive leaders accountable for FISA
noncompliance in their field office or headquarters component,
to include potentially withholding a promotion or compensation
from any FBI executive leader who oversees a field office or
headquarters component which has underperformed with respect to
FISA compliance. Section 506 also requires the FBI Director to
regularly brief Congress on adverse personnel actions taken
pursuant to these measures.
Section 507. Report on technology needed for near-real time monitoring
of Federal Bureau of Investigation compliance.
Section 507 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the National Security Agency and FBI, to
study technological enhancements that would enable the FBI to
conduct ``near real-time'' monitoring of compliance with the
court-approved querying and other procedures under Section 702.
Section 507 requires the submission of the study to the
congressional intelligence and judiciary committees within one
year of enactment.
Section 508. Inspector General report on Federal Bureau of
Investigation querying practices.
Section 508 requires the Department of Justice Inspector
General to prepare a comprehensive report on the FBI's querying
compliance under Section 702, with an emphasis on U.S. person
Background and Need for Legislation
In January 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
(the Church Committee) was established to investigate the
legality, propriety, and ethicality of intelligence activities
undertaken by U.S. government intelligence agencies.\1\ The
inquiry was prompted by ``allegations of abuse and improper
activities by the intelligence agencies of the United States,
and great public concern that the Congress take action to bring
the intelligence agencies under the constitutional
framework.''\2\ After holding 126 full committee meetings, 40
subcommittee hearings, interviewing approximately 800
witnesses, and reviewing 110,000 documents, the Church
Committee published its final report in April 1976.\3\ The
Committee concluded that ``intelligence activities have
undermined the constitutional rights of citizens and that they
have done so primarily because checks and balances designed by
the framers of the Constitution to assure accountability have
not been applied.''\4\
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\1\S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (Jan. 1975).
\2\S. Select Comm. to Study Gov't Operations with Respect to Intel.
Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976), at Book I, p. III.
\3\A History of Notable Senate Investigations: Senate Select
Committee to Study Govern Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (The Church Committee), U.S. Senate Historical Office (last
visited July 26, 2023).
\4\S. Select Comm. to Study Gov't Operations with Respect to Intel.
Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976), at Book II, p. 289.
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The Church Committee issued 96 recommendations, both
legislative and regulatory, ``to place intelligence activities
within the constitutional scheme for controlling government
power.''\5\ In response to the Church Committee's findings, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was carefully
designed to establish safeguards on intelligence operations
regarding the collection of foreign intelligence.\6\ FISA was
also a response to a 1972 Supreme Court case, United States v.
U.S. District Court, in which the Court held that while
warrantless electronic surveillance for purposes of domestic
intelligence collection violated the Fourth Amendment, it
``express[ed] no opinion as to the [the surveillance of the]
activities of foreign powers or their agents.''\7\ When the
Court declined to comment on the exact type of protections that
should be afforded to foreign powers or their agents, Congress
stepped in to provide a constitutional legal framework.\8\ On
October 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed FISA into law.\9\
FISA has been amended several times over the years, either
expanding or limiting its scope.\10\
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\5\U.S. Senate Historical Office, A History of Notable Senate
Investigations: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (The Church
Committee) (last visited July 26, 2023).
\6\Edward C. Liu, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An
Overview, Cong. Research Serv. (Apr. 6, 2021) (``Following revelations
regarding widespread privacy violations by the federal government
during the Watergate era, Congress enacted FISA to establish guidelines
for government collection of foreign intelligence.'').
\7\United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-24
(1972); see also In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2008) (holding that the foreign intelligence surveillance of targets
reasonably believed to be outside of the United States qualifies for
the ``special needs'' exception to the warrant requirement).
\8\See James Petrila, A Brief History of Programmatic Collection
Pre-Section 702, Lawfare (Apr. 12, 2023); Edward C. Liu,
Reauthorization of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, Cong. Research Serv. (Mar. 17, 2023); James G. McAdams, III,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview, Fed. Law
Enforcement Training Ctrs. (2009).
\9\Bureau Of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (last visited Sept. 18, 2023).
\10\Id.
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On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the worst
attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor, when 2,977 Americans
died during four coordinated terrorist attacks carried out by
al-Qaeda.\11\ The 9/11 Commission, established to investigate
how such an attack could occur, found that:
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\11\The 9/11 Memorial & Museum, 9/11 FAQs (last visited Aug. 16,
2023).
The September 11 attacks fell into the void between
the foreign and domestic threats. The foreign
intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to
foreign threats to U.S. interests there. The domestic
agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat
from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was
looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets.\12\
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\12\The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), at 263.
Prior to 9/11, the intelligence community ``struggled to
retrieve and share pertinent information that was being
communicated among terrorists using the rapidly evolving
technology of the internet and cell phones.''\13\ Had such
information been more readily available to our intelligence
community, 9/11 might have been prevented.\14\
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\13\The White House, President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB)
and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) Review of FISA Section 702 and
Recommendations for Reauthorization (July 2023).
\14\Id.
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In response to the gaps and shortcomings identified in the
wake of 9/11, Congress enacted a series of important changes to
national security laws over the following years designed to
better protect the American people.\15\ One of these was the
FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which included Section 702.\16\ The
FAA was signed into law by President George W. Bush in July
2008, after Congress recognized the need to authorize the
intelligence community ``to acquire foreign intelligence
information of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States.''\17\
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\15\Id.
\16\Id.
\17\Id.
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Section 702 has been reauthorized by Congress twice. It was
first reauthorized in 2012 by President Barack Obama and a
second time in 2018 by President Donald Trump.\18\ Section 702
is set to expire on December 31, 2023, if not reauthorized.
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\18\James Petrila, A Brief History of Programmatic Collection Pre-
Section 702, Lawfare (Apr. 12, 2023).
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Recent FBI Abuses
In the past, the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has noted the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) ``fell far short'' of compliance with FISA.\19\ These
shortcomings have continued. In May 2023, the intelligence
community made publicly available an April 2022 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Order) detailing ``significant'' querying violations by
the FBI.\20\ Most of these violations occurred before the FBI
implemented corrective reforms to its querying procedures.\21\
In one incident, an FBI analyst conducted a batch query of over
19,000 donors to a congressional campaign, after the analyst
believed ``the campaign was a target of foreign
influence.''\22\ However, the DOJ National Security Division
(NSD), in an audit of that query, found that ``only eight
identifiers used in the query had sufficient ties to foreign
influence activities to comply with the querying
standard.''\23\
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\19\Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary: Fixing FISA: How
a Law Designed to Protect Americans Has Been Weaponized Against Them,
118th Cong. (2023) (statement of Michael Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, ``Our review of the Department's applications to
authorize FISA surveillance of Carter Page found that FBI personnel
fell far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that
all factual statements in a FISA application are `scrupulously
accurate.' We identified multiple instances in which factual assertions
relied upon by the FISC in the FISA applications were inaccurate,
incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon
information the FBI had in its possession at the time the applications
were filed.'').
\20\FISA Ct. re Section 702 2021 Certification (Apr. 21, 2022), at
26.
\21\Id.
\22\Id. at 29.
\23\Id.
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Prior to 2022, most of the FBI's compliance failures appear
to have been caused by a culture at the FBI where searches of
FISA databases were done with impunity by poorly trained agents
and analysts with easy access to a database that was in dire
need of better safeguarding. For example, prior to reforms made
in 2021, FBI systems for storing raw Section 702 information
did not require personnel to affirmatively ``opt-in'' to query
that information, leading to many inadvertent, noncompliant
queries of Section 702 data.\24\ Now, FBI personnel are
required to affirmatively ``opt-in'' before they query the
Section 702 database.\25\ It also seems that FBI management
failed to take query compliance incidents seriously and were
slow to implement reforms that would have addressed many of the
problems. However, the FBI has realized the depth and breadth
of its issues, thanks in part to stringent oversight by
Congress and the FISC. The FBI has implemented a series of
recent revisions to its querying procedures, to include systems
modifications and heightened oversight.\26\
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\24\Press Release, FBI Releases FISA Query Guidance, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation (Apr. 24, 2023).
\25\Id.
\26\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Recent Efforts to Strengthen FISA
Compliance (Feb. 28, 2023).
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In its April 2022 Order, the FISC was ``encouraged'' by
``the amendments to the FBI's querying procedures and the
substantial efforts to improve FBI querying practices,
including heightened documentation requirements, several
systems changes, and enhanced guidance, training, and oversight
measures.''\27\ The Court noted that preliminary indications
showed ``that some of these measures are having the desired
effect.''\28\
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\27\FISA Ct. re Section 702 2021 Certification (Apr. 21, 2022), at
49.
\28\Id.
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FBI Abuses in Title I
FISA abuses are not limited to Section 702, which is why
this bipartisan legislation reforms other areas of FISA. Title
I of FISA, a different legal authority than Section 702, has
also been the victim of significant abuse as was apparent in
the FBI counterintelligence operation, codenamed Crossfire
Hurricane.
Two independent investigations by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Office of Inspector (OIG) General Michael Horowitz and
Special Counsel John Durham found abuses by the FBI in the
opening and subsequent investigation of Crossfire
Hurricane.\29\ In particular, the DOJ OIG found ``so many basic
and fundamental errors,'' including ``at least 17 significant
errors or omissions'' in the Crossfire Hurricane FISA
applications.\30\
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\29\See generally, Horowitz Report and Durham Report.
\30\Horowitz Report, at vii-xii.
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Special Counsel John Durham similarly found ``unsettling''
behavior by FBI Crossfire Hurricane investigators regarding the
Crossfire Hurricane FISA applications.\31\ Durham concluded:
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\31\Durham Report, at 219 (``Later that day, however, in the second
meeting between CHS-I and Papadopoulos, there was an explicit
discussion about the allegation which predicated the opening of the
Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The Crossfire Hurricane
investigative team's interpretation of that conversation, as included
in the initial and subsequent Page FISA applications, is
unsettling.'').
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Based on the review of Crossfire Hurricane and
related intelligence activities, we conclude that the
Department and the FBI failed to uphold their important
mission of strict fidelity to the law in connection
with certain events and activities described in this
report. As noted, former FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith
committed a criminal offense by fabricating language in
an email that was material to the FBI obtaining a FISA
surveillance order. In other instances, FBI personnel
working on that same FISA application displayed, at
best, a cavalier attitude towards accuracy and
completeness. FBI personnel also repeatedly disregarded
important requirements when they continued to seek
renewals of that FISA surveillance while
acknowledging--both then and in hindsight--that they
did not genuinely believe there was probable cause to
believe that the target was knowingly engaged in
clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a
foreign power, or knowingly helping another person in
such activities. And certain personnel disregarded
significant exculpatory information that should have
prompted investigative restraint and re-examination.
Our investigation also revealed that senior FBI
personnel displayed a serious lack of analytical rigor
towards the information that they received, especially
information received from politically affiliated
persons and entities. This information in part
triggered and sustained Crossfire Hurricane and
contributed to the subsequent need for Special Counsel
Mueller's investigation. In particular, there was
significant reliance on investigative leads provided or
funded (directly or indirectly) by Trump's political
opponents. The Department did not adequately examine or
question these materials and the motivations of those
providing them, even when at about the same time the
Director of the FBI and others learned of significant
and potentially contrary intelligence.\32\
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\32\Id. at 17-8.
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The Durham Report did not recommend any wholesale changes
to the guidelines and policies that the Department and the FBI
currently have in place.\33\ Rather, Durham highlighted that it
is incumbent on the FBI to properly follow existing guidelines,
policies, and laws. Durham wrote:
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\33\Id. at 18.
[T]he answer is not the creation of new rules but a
renewed fidelity to the old. The promulgation of
additional rules and regulations to be learned in yet
more training sessions would likely prove to be a
fruitless exercise if the FBI's guiding principles of
``Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity'' are not engrained
in the hearts and minds of those sworn to meet the FBI'
s mission of ``Protect[ing] the American People and
Uphold[ing] the Constitution of the United
States.''\34\
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\34\Id. at 18-9.
There was only one specific FBI reform that Durham
recommended. Durham suggested that ``one possible way to
provide additional scrutiny of politically sensitive
investigations would be to identify, in advance, an official
who is responsible for challenging the steps taken in the
investigation.''\35\ He noted that former NSA General Counsel
Stewart Baker has proposed having a ``career position for a
nonpartisan FBI agent or lawyer to challenge the FISA
application and every other stage of the investigation'' in
investigations that ``pose partisan risk.''\36\ Durham
recommended that the Department ``seriously consider'' Baker's
proposal.\37\
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\35\Id. at 306.
\36\Id.
\37\Id.
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Recent FBI Reforms
Over the last few years, the FBI has implemented a series
of reforms to address FISA abuses. In response to the 17
``significant errors and omissions'' identified by OIG Horowitz
in the Title I applications, the FBI issued the following
corrective actions:
New FISA Request and Verification
Requirements--In February 2020, it became mandatory for
FBI personnel seeking to collect information under FISA
to use updated versions of two important forms--the
FISA Request Form, which FBI personnel use to initiate
the process of developing a FISA application in
coordination with DOJ attorneys, and the FISA
Verification Form (or ``Woods Form''), which serves to
ensure documentation for FISA applications is complete
and accurate.
Changes in these forms ensure
agents identify any information that might
undermine probable cause, and provide all
material information about the reliability of
sources, assets, or contacts in the FISA
application--even sources operated by other
U.S. or foreign government agencies.
Accuracy Guidance--In July 2021, the FBI and
DOJ revised their joint accuracy policy, incorporating
OIG recommendations to ensure adequate procedures are
in place for DOJ to obtain all relevant and accurate
information during the drafting of any FISA
application.
Field Agents as Affiants--The accuracy and
completeness of FISA applications are now attested to
by a field agent and field supervisor knowledgeable of
the
Committee Action
H.R. 6611 was introduced on December 6, 2023, by
Representative Michael Turner (R-OH)and Representative Jim
Himes (D-CT). The bill was referred to the House--Intelligence
(Permanent Select); Judiciary. On December 7, 2023, the Select
Committee on Intelligence met to consider the bill. The bill
was adopted and ordered favorably reported to the House of
Representatives by voice vote.
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6) of House rule XIII, the
following hearings and events was used to develop or consider
this measure: On March 9, 2023 The Committee held an open
hearing Titled ``Worldwide Threats,'' which in great part was a
kickoff discussion regarding the need to reform and reauthorize
FISA. Subsequently the Committee held over 30 open and closed
events and discussions directly related to the need to reform
and reauthorize FISA. All of these led to the introduction of
H.R. 6611.
Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Regarding clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the
descriptive portion of the report.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
As required by clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goals and objectives of H.R. 6611 are to amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 so that the
nation's national security is made more efficient and
effective. The Act and the oversight findings and
recommendations in the descriptive portion of the report
reflect in detail the Committee's specific performance goals
and objectives.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Existing Programs
This bill does not establish or reauthorize a program of
the federal government known to be duplicative of another
program.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
The Act does not establish or authorize the establishment
of an advisory committee within the definition of section 5(b)
of the appendix to title 5, United States Code.
Earmark Statement
This bill does not contain any Congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined
under clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI of the Rules of
the House of Representatives.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement
H,R. 6611 does not contain any unfunded mandates pursuant
to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
Preemption of State, Local, or Tribal Law
Any preemptive effect of this bill over state, local, or
tribal law is intended to be consistent with the bill's
purposes and text and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
U.S. Constitution.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
Cost of Legislation and the Congressional Budget Act. With
respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of
the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to
requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) and clause 3(d) of rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, on December 7, 2023, the
Committee transmitted H.R. 6611 to the Congressional Budget
Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in
carrying out the bill, including any federal mandates. Pursuant
to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee adopts as
its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
definitions
Sec. 101. As used in this title:
(a) ``Foreign power'' means--
(1) a foreign government or any component,
thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations,
not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by
a foreign government or governments to be
directed and controlled by such foreign
government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization,
not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled
by a foreign government or governments; or
(7) an entity not substantially composed of
United States persons that is engaged in the
international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
(b) ``Agent of a foreign power'' means--
(1) any person other than a United States
person, who--
(A) acts in the United States as an
officer or employee of a foreign power,
or as a member of a foreign power as
defined in subsection (a)(4),
irrespective of whether the person is
inside the United States;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a
foreign power which engages in
clandestine intelligence activities in
the United States contrary to the
interests of the United States, when
the circumstances indicate that such
person may engage in such activities,
or when such person knowingly aids or
abets any person in the conduct of such
activities or knowingly conspires with
any person to engage in such
activities;
(C) engages in international
terrorism or activities in preparation
therefore;
(D) engages in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, or activities in
preparation therefor; or
(E) engages in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, or activities in
preparation therefor, for or on behalf
of a foreign power, or knowingly aids
or abets any person in the conduct of
such proliferation or activities in
preparation therefor, or knowingly
conspires with any person to engage in
such proliferation or activities in
preparation therefor; or
(2) any person who--
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine
intelligence gathering activities for
or on behalf of a foreign power, which
activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an
intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any
other clandestine intelligence
activities for or on behalf of such
foreign power, which activities involve
or are about to involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United
States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or
international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefor, for
or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United
States under a false or fraudulent
identity for or on behalf of a foreign
power or, while in the United States,
knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent
identity for or on behalf of a foreign
power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any
person in the conduct of activities
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C) or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in activities
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C).
(c) ``International terrorism'' means activities
that--
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended--
(A) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(C) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or
kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to coerce or
intimidate, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
(d) ``Sabotage'' means activities that involve a
violation of chapter 105 of title 18, United States
Code, or that would involve such a violation if
committed against the United States.
(e) ``Foreign intelligence information'' means--
(1) information that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect
against--
(A) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage, international
terrorism, or the international
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power[; or];
(C) clandestine intelligence
activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an
agent of a foreign power; or
(D) international production,
distribution, or financing of illicit
synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or
other drugs driving overdose deaths, or
any controlled substance designated by
the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), or precursors of
any aforementioned; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign
power or foreign territory that relates to, and
if concerning a United States person is
necessary to--
(A) the national defense or the
security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United States.
(f) ``Electronic surveillance'' means--
(1) the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communications
sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is
in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United
States person, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a
person in the United States, without the
consent of any party thereto, if such
acquisition occurs in the United States, but
does not include the acquisition of those
communications of computer trespassers that
would be permissible under section 2511(2)(i)
of title 18, United States Code;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any radio
communication, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender
and all intended recipients are located within
the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device in the
United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio
communication, under circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes.
(g) ``Attorney General'' means the Attorney General
of the United States (or Acting Attorney General), the
Deputy Attorney General, or, upon the designation of
the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General
designated as the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security under section 507A of title 28,
United States Code.
(h) ``Minimization procedures'', with respect to
electronic surveillance, means--
(1) specific procedures, which shall be
adopted by the Attorney General, that are
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
technique of the particular surveillance, to
minimize the acquisition and retention, and
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly
available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons consistent with the need
of the United States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information;
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly
available information, which is not foreign
intelligence information, as defined in
subsection (e)(1), shall not be disseminated in
a manner that identifies any United States
person, without such person's consent, unless
such person's identity is necessary to
understand foreign intelligence information or
assess its importance;
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2),
procedures that allow for the retention and
dissemination of information that is evidence
of a crime which has been, is being, or is
about to be committed and that is to be
retained or disseminated for law enforcement
purposes; and
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3), with respect to any electronic
surveillance approved pursuant to section
102(a), procedures that require that no
contents of any communication to which a United
States person is a party shall be disclosed,
disseminated, or used for any purpose or
retained for longer than 72 hours unless a
court order under section 105 is obtained or
unless the Attorney General determines that the
information indicates a threat of death or
serious bodily harm to any person.
(i) ``United States person'' means a citizen of the
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated
association a substantial number of members of which
are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation
which is incorporated in the United States, but does
not include a corporation or an association which is a
foreign power, as defined in subsection (a) (1), (2),
or (3).
(j) ``United States'', when used in a geographic
sense, means all areas under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(k) ``Aggrieved person'' means a person who is the
target of an electronic surveillance or any other
person whose communications or activities were subject
to electronic surveillance.
(l) ``Wire communication'' means any communications
while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other
like connection furnished or operated by any person
engaged as a common carrier in pro
Additional Views
H.R. 6611, the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023,
is the product of extensive oversight by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. The bill reflects input from
Members and outside experts across the political spectrum. In a
time of hyper-partisanship, it charts a bipartisan path forward
on a topic of unsurpassed national significance--the safety of
the American people.
Taken together, the bill's provisions would constitute the
most extensive reforms ever made to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), while being carefully crafted to
preserve the power and efficacy of a law used every day by the
intelligence community to collect foreign intelligence, inform
policymakers, and protect our country.
The bill reauthorizes FISA Title VII, including Section
702, for eight years. The importance of Section 702 to U.S.
intelligence collection and U.S. national security, especially
in the current threat environment, cannot be overstated. As the
President's Intelligence Advisory Board wrote: ``If Congress
fails to reauthorize Section 702, history may judge [it] as one
of the worst intelligence failures of our time.''
It is not hyperbole to say that congressional failure to
reauthorize Section 702 would be a catastrophic self-inflicted
wound, dramatically reducing our ability to combat threats from
adversary nations, terrorists, and drug trafficking
organizations; to support U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues
ranging from peace negotiations to climate negotiations; to
protect U.S. service members and execute the national defense
strategy; and to protect our homeland and our people.
At the same time, reauthorization must be accompanied by
reform. Accordingly, this bill makes tough, targeted reforms to
FISA--to both Section 702 and ``traditional FISA''--in order to
safeguard the privacy rights and civil liberties of Americans,
to address well-documented and unacceptable compliance failures
by the FBI, and to prevent future abuses.
For example, the bill:
prohibits the FBI from conducting queries of
Section 702-acquired information that are designed to
retrieve evidence of a crime, thus making clear that
Section 702 is an instrument to acquire foreign
intelligence and not a tool of domestic law
enforcement.
requires an FBI supervisor or FBI attorney
(about 550 individuals) to approve every U.S. person
query of Section 702 information, thereby reducing the
number of FBI personnel authorized to approve U.S.
person queries by over 90 percent compared to the
status quo.
mandates that the FBI Deputy Director
personally approve certain ``sensitive'' U.S. person
queries, like queries of U.S. elected officials,
political candidates, executive branch appointees, and
members of the media.
requires the Department of Justice to audit
100 percent of FBI's U.S. person queries, until the
Attorney General certifies to the satisfaction of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that the FBI's
Office of Internal Auditing is fully performing this
task.
prohibits the FBI and other U.S. government
agencies from conducting a query to suppress a U.S.
person's free expression of political opinions, or to
disadvantage or harm that U.S. person based on their
ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or
religion.
mandates that the FBI Director annually
publish detailed information about the number and type
of FBI U.S. person queries, including queries conducted
for defensive purposes, and requires the Department of
Justice's Office of the Inspector General to prepare a
comprehensive report for Congress and the public
regarding the FBI's querying compliance.
In addition, the bill enhances accountability for FBI and
other government officials who fail to comply with the laws and
rules governing FISA. For instance, the bill:
requires the FBI Director to hold the
Bureau's executive leaders accountable for FISA
noncompliance in the field office or headquarters
component those leaders oversee, including by
withholding promotions or compensation.
requires the FBI Director to ensure
appropriate consequences for Bureau employees who
conduct noncompliant U.S. person queries, including
zero tolerance for willful misconduct and escalating
consequences for unintentional noncompliance.
creates new criminal and administrative
penalties, and increases existing penalties, for
government officials who engage in a range of
intentional misconduct related to FISA, such as leaking
FISA-derived information or making a false declaration
before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Furthermore, the bill makes key reforms to strengthen the
fairness, independence, and adversarial nature of proceedings
held before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
For example, the bill:
requires a FISC judge to appoint amicus
curiae (``friend of the court'') in the annual Section
702 reauthorization process to ensure Americans'
privacy and civil liberties are protected.
requires a FISC judge, when considering a
government application to electronically surveil a U.S.
person under traditional FISA, to appoint an attorney
to review the application and to advise the judge on
the sufficiency of the government's evidence and any
deficiencies in the application.
prohibits the government, when applying for
a probable cause order from the FISC to conduct
electronic surveillance or a physical search under
traditional FISA, from including in its application
information that is solely (1) derived from opposition
research on a political candidate or (2) based on media
reports.
Finally, the bill modernizes FISA to keep pace with the
evolving threat landscape. For example, the bill:
enhances the government's ability to use
Section 702 to collect information on foreign nationals
located abroad who are involved in the production,
distribution, and financing of illicit drugs,
especially fentanyl.
ensures that, consistent with the strict
legal and policy framework already approved by the
FISC, foreign nationals seeking to come to the United
States for any purpose or period of time are vetted
using Section 702 information to ensure they do not
pose a terrorism or other national security threat.
I am proud to co-lead this bill and look forward to working
with my colleagues in the House and Senate, both Democrat and
Republican, to reauthorize and reform this critical national
security tool.
James A. Himes.
Additional Views
The reform and reauthorization of FISA 702 is one of the
most important tasks that this Committee has, and this will be
my second authorization process as a member of the Intelligence
Committee.
I want to first thank Chairman Turner, Ranking Member
Himes, and my colleagues on the Committee, and also all of the
staff, both Republican and Democrat, for their efforts over the
last year in investigating the uses and abuses of this
authority and proposing reforms.
The process that Chairman Turner and Ranking Member Himes
set up has been a thoughtful and earnest one. Over the last
year, we have participated in numerous engagements with the
intelligence community, the FBI, and others that have the
responsibility to use these important tools authorized by law.
Through that process, including as a part of the bipartisan
working group, I have come to appreciate the immense value of
the FISA 702 authority in protecting Americans and countering
our adversaries.
There is no question that this authority is critical for
America's national security.
It has saved American lives.
It has informed our diplomats as they negotiate with our
adversaries.
Everything I have seen during my time in this committee has
led me to believe that FISA 702 should be reauthorized.
But, as they say, the devil is in the details.
Just as I have come to appreciate the importance of FISA
702, I have also come to understand the serious risks that the
abuse of such an authority can and has led to in our country.
Under current practice and law, intelligence agencies and
the FBI are able to search the 702 database for communications
between foreign nationals and U.S. citizens or residents.
This, understandably, raises privacy and civil liberties
risks, and while there are many legitimate cases where such
searches need to be conducted, it's our responsibility to
ensure that this is done in an appropriate manner.
This Committee's bill implements and codifies a number of
important reforms to constrain the privacy and civil liberties
risks to American citizens, but I am open to more restrictions
on when the government can conduct such U.S. person queries in
FISA 702, including judicial review of US person queries if
structured appropriately.
In addition to what may not be in the bill, I also have
serious concerns with certain provisions in the Committee's
bill which prevent me from lending my support to it at this
time.
The most important is the language in Section 505 which
codifies a process to ``vet'' non-citizens who attempt to enter
the United States or wish to enter the United States for
immigration, tourism, business, or personal reasons, through
the 702 database.
I represent San Antonio, Texas, and I have family who live
in the border communities along both sides of the Rio Grande.
My constituents--and those in South Texas--have a very
different relationship with the border than most Americans.
We have deep family ties with communities in Mexico that go
back generations.
We depend on trade with Mexico to sustain our economies.
Thousands of people cross the border every day to visit
family, commute to work, or to simply shop at the malls.
I am increasingly concerned by the rhetoric from many parts
of this Congress and from leading public figures and
presidential candidates who want to ``shut down the border''
and to stop those seeking refuge in the United States from
attempting to.
Between 2017 and 2021, I spent four years fighting an ever-
increasing barrage of the most ill-conceived and malicious
policies to harm migrants and border communities, and I am
increasingly concerned that we will re-live those experiences
again.
I fear that codifying this provision--especially without
meaningful safeguards--would give those who capitalize on fear
and xenophobia an important tool to pursue their agenda.
I do not believe that this is the intention of the authors
of the bill, but we cannot trust that those who will wield
these powers that we present to them in the future will not
abuse them.
Protecting the civil liberties of Americans against
surveillance is personal issue to me.
My mother, a civil rights activist in the 1960s and 70s and
even now, was surveilled by the FBI back then as were many of
her colleagues in the Mexican-American civil rights movement
and those who were in the African American civil rights
movement and other political movements.
So, my family knows what it means for the government to
turn these powerful tools against it.
It's clear that serious reforms of the FISA 702 authorities
are needed.
There are important proposals on reforming the authority
being debated in the Senate and, of course, in other Committees
in the House of Representatives.
I will remain engaged with my colleagues in this Committee,
the Judiciary Committee, and the Senate to come up with a way
to re-authorize FISA 702 in a manner that appropriately
protects civil liberties and minimizes its potential for abuse
regardless of who sits in the oval office.
Joaquin Castro.
[all]