Purpose and Summary
H.R. 6570, introduced by Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ),
reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) for three years with significant
reforms. It requires the government to obtain an order from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or a warrant
prior to conducting U.S. person queries of information
collected through Section 702. It provides for greater scrutiny
of applications submitted to the FISC, increases transparency
in surveillance applications, requires more frequent and
detailed reports and audits, and establishes additional
penalties for government employees who violate FISA or mislead
the FISC.
The bill also closes the legal loophole that allows data
brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law
enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government
agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. If the
agency were to gather this information itself, it would be
required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other legal order.
By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government agencies
from conducting an end-run around the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
Background and Need for the Legislation
A. BACKGROUND
i. History and Overview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
In 1978, Congress enacted FISA in response to revelations
that the federal government had seriously abused warrantless
surveillance, resulting in rampant privacy violations.\1\ FISA
provides a statutory framework for government agencies to
conduct surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes through
electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers and
trap and trace devices, or the production of certain business
records.\2\ FISA also established the FISC to provide judicial
oversight of government applications to conduct electronic
surveillance, physical searches, and other forms of
investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes.\3\
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\1\S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (Book II, Intelligence Activities and
the Rights of Americans).
\2\See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Bureau of
Justice Assistance U.S. Department of Justice, https://bja.ojp.gov/
program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/
1286#::text=FISA%20was%20initially%20enacted%20in,collection%20of%20for
eign%20
intelligence%20information (last visited Apr. 12, 2023).
\3\See id.
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Subsequent legislation expanded federal statutes involving
foreign intelligence gathering. After the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to
``provid[e] enhanced legislative tools'' to ``assist in the
prevention of future terrorist activities and the preliminary
acts and crimes which further such activities.''\4\ The Patriot
Act and, later, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),\5\ further amended FISA.
Specifically, section 206 of the Patriot Act permitted roving
wiretaps\6\ and Section 6001(a) of IRTPA permitted the
targeting of non-U.S. persons who are shown to be engaged in
international terrorism without requiring evidence connecting
those persons to a foreign power or terrorist group (lone-wolf
provision).\7\
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\4\H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, at 41 (2001).
\5\Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004).
\6\See Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
\7\Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004).
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Section 215 of the Patriot Act enlarged the scope of FISA's
business records provision so that the government could request
``any tangible thing'' about a U.S. person based on a showing
that ``there are reasonable grounds to believe'' that those
records are ``relevant'' to an ``authorized investigation''
into ``international terrorist or clandestine intelligence
activities.''\8\ This section also authorized the bulk
collection of telephone metadata. In 2015, however, Congress
passed the USA FREEDOM Act to reform intelligence gathering
programs in the wake of Edward Snowden's disclosures.\9\ The
Act prohibited the bulk collection of records under Section 215
of the Patriot Act, thus narrowing Section 215's FISA
authorities.\10\
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\8\See Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
\9\Pub. L. No. 114-23 (2015).
\10\See H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
available at https://
judiciary.house.gov/usa-freedom-act (last visited Dec. 3, 2023).
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In 2008, Congress enacted FISA Section 702, which allows
the government to acquire foreign intelligence by targeting
non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be outside of
the United States, for the purpose of obtaining foreign
intelligence information.\11\ More details about Section 702
are below.
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\11\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881a(a), (b)(3).
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In 2018, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments
Reauthorization Act of 2017 into law, which extended Section
702 through December 31, 2023.\12\ The bill required the FBI to
seek a warrant when conducting queries during the
``predicative'' stage of an investigation but allowed the
warrantless queries under Section 702 to continue in other
situations.\13\ Prior to 2018, Congress last reauthorized
Section 702 in 2012.\14\
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\12\Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018).
\13\See Martin Matishak and Cory Bennett, Surveillance bill heads
to Trump's desk, Politico (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/01/18/fisa-bill-senate-pass-trump-293130. The
``predicative'' stage is the last stage before the FBI begins a formal
investigation. Prior to this stage, the FBI can query communications
without seeking a warrant as they build cases in non-security matters.
\14\P.L. 112-238 (Dec. 2012).
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In 2020, Section 215 of the Patriot Act, along with the
lone wolf provision and the roving wiretap provision,
expired.\15\ However, some of the provisions remained in effect
due to a sunset clause that authorized the continued effect of
the amendments regarding investigations that started, or
potential offenses that took place, prior to the provisions'
sunset date.\16\
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\15\See India McKinney, Section 215 Expired: Year in Review 2020,
Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2020/12/section-215-expired-year-review-2020.
\16\Id.
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a. FISA Title I
Title I of FISA established the procedures for the
government to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance and
established the FISC.\17\ Under Title I, the government may
apply to the FISC for an order authorizing the government to
conduct electronic surveillance against a particular
target.\18\ In applying for an order, the government must
demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.\19\
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\17\The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISC),
Bureau of Justice Assistance Department of Justice, https://
bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/
1286 (last visited Apr. 15, 2023).
\18\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1804.
\19\Id. at Sec. 1805.
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The FISC sits in Washington, D.C., and is composed of 11
district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the
United States from at least seven of the judicial circuits, and
three of the judges must reside within 20 miles of the District
of Columbia.\20\ Typically, judges sit on the court for one
week at a time on a rotational basis.\21\ The presiding judge
of the FISC is selected by the Chief Justice.\22\ These judges
are eligible to serve one term of seven years.\23\
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\20\Andrew Nolan and Richard M. Thompson II, Reform of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Procedural and Operational Changes at
3, Cong. Research Service, (Aug. 26, 2014).
\21\Id.
\22\Id.
\23\United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, About
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (last visited May 30,
2021).
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The FISC is tasked with authorizing the government's
surveillance applications.\24\ Proceedings before the court are
generally ex parte, meaning only the government is represented.
In 2015, Congress amended FISA to authorize the FISC to appoint
five amici curiae to assist with review of applications or to
interpret the law or provide guidance on novel issues.\25\ In
his review of the FISA program, Department of Justice Inspector
General Michael Horowitz highlighted the concerns many have
with the FISC:
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\24\Id.
\25\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1803(i)(2).
FISC proceedings are ex parte, meaning that unlike
most court proceedings, the government is present but
the government's counterparty is not, and FISA orders
generally are not subject to scrutiny through
subsequent adversarial proceedings. As a result, the
FBI and [DOJ's National Security Division] FISA
application process is critical to ensuring that DOJ
officials asked to authorize FISA applications, and
judges on the FISC asked to approve them, have a
complete and accurate set of facts in the FISA
application on which they can rely.\26\
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\26\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Audit of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Execution of Its Woods Procedures for
Applications Filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Relating to U.S. Persons at i (2021).
Because of the secretive nature of FISC proceedings, it is
vital that the intelligence community comply with its own
procedures for surveillance and provide the FISC with all
necessary information needed to issue orders. However, as
evidenced by Inspector General Horowitz's investigation and
audit of the FBI's use of its FISA authorities, as well as
Special Counsel John Durham's investigation of the FBI's
surveillance of Carter Page, it is clear that the FBI has
failed to consistently comply with these procedures and that
the FISC is in need of reform.
b. FISA Section 702
Congress enacted Section 702 of FISA in 2008 as part of the
FISA Amendments Act.\27\ Section 702 provides an alternative to
the surveillance requirements of Title I of FISA. Title VII of
FISA (which includes Section 702) generally addresses
electronic surveillance directed at targets outside the United
States.\28\ Section 702 may only be used to target:
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\27\Pub. L. 110-261 (2008).
\28\See Edward C. Liu, Cong. Research Serv., R47477,
Reauthorization of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (2023).
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(1) non-U.S. persons;
(2) who are reasonably believed to be outside of the
United States;
(3) for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence
information.\29\
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\29\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881a(a), (b)(3).
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The statute only permits the acquisition of information
``from or with the assistance of an electronic communications
service provider.''\30\ The FISC supervises such surveillance
by approving certifications submitted jointly by the Attorney
General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
ensuring that the surveillance complies with the statutory
requirements of Section 702.\31\ The certification must detail
the targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and querying
procedures that the government intends to use in its
surveillance.\32\ But unlike orders under Title I of FISA, the
statute does not require the FISC to make probable cause
determinations as to individual surveillance targets.\33\
Rather, the court reviews and certifies the Attorney General
and DNI's targeting procedures to ensure they are properly
limited, with such authorizations effective for one year.\34\
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\30\Id. Sec. 1881a(h)(2)(A)(vi).
\31\Id. Sec. 1881a(j)(1)(A).
\32\Id.
\33\Id. Sec. 1881a(j)(2).
\34\Id. Sec. 1881a(a), (h)(1)(A).
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1. Communications Collection
Once the FISC approves targeting procedures, the government
has various ways to conduct surveillance and collect
communications. These methods include downstream collection,
upstream collection, and about collection.
In downstream collection, the government may direct a
communications service provider (internet service provider,
telephone provider, or email provider) to provide all
communications to or from a selector, such as an email address,
associated with a Section 702 target.\35\ In upstream
collection, the government directs its requests to
telecommunications ``backbone'' providers, such as companies
that operate internet cables.\36\
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\35\See Liu, supra note 28 at 10-11.
\36\Id. at 11.
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About, or abouts, collection has been the subject of
controversy over the years. About collection involves the
government capturing vast amounts of communications in which
the selector (e.g., email address) of a target appeared
somewhere in communications, even when the target is not a
party to the communication.\37\ A declassified FISC opinion
shed light on this type of collection, noting that it resulted
in the collection of ``tens of thousands of wholly domestic
communications each year'' by the National Security Agency
(NSA).\38\ In 2017, the NSA announced that it was no longer
performing ``about'' collection and in 2018 Congress amended
Title VII to prohibit ``about'' collection unless the Attorney
General and DNI notify the House and Senate Judiciary and
Intelligence Committees that the NSA plans to resume such
collection.\39\ While the NSA is not currently performing this
type of collection, it is free to resume it at any time,
provided it notifies Congress.
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\37\Id. (citing Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., Report on the
Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act 37 (July 2, 2014), https://
documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ba65702c-3541-4125-
a67d-92a7f974
fc4c/702-Report-2%20-%20Complete%20-%20Nov%2014%202022%201548.pdf).
\38\Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *15 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011).
\39\See Liu, supra note 28 at 12 (citing 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 1881a(b)(5)).
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2. Minimization Procedures
Under Section 702, the government is required to ``minimize
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination,
of nonpublicly available information concerning nonconsenting
U.S. persons consistent with the need of the United States to
obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
information.''\40\ For example, if the government collects
communications discussing or mentioning a U.S. person, but it
contains no foreign intelligence information, it must be
deleted as soon as practicable but no later than five years
from the Section 702 authorization's expiration subject to
certain exceptions.\41\
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\40\Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801(h)).
\41\Id.
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3. Querying Procedures
Much of the controversy surrounding Section 702 involves
the government's querying of Section 702-acquired
communications already in the government's possession, nearly
always without first obtaining a warrant. While the government
is required to minimize the sharing and retention of U.S.
person information and communications, the NSA ``routinely
shares raw Section 702 data'' with the other intelligence
agencies.\42\ Each of the intelligence agencies that have
access to Section 702-acquired information--the FBI, CIA,
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the NSA--establish
procedures that govern how they may query such information.\43\
While these agencies are required to establish procedures to
limit the number of Americans affected, the amount of
information available to the government is significant.
According to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB), an independent federal agency established to uphold
civil liberties with respect to terrorism-related policies,
``[a]part from communications acquired by mistake, U.S.
persons'' communications are not typically purged or eliminated
from agency databases, even when they do not contain foreign
intelligence information, until the data is aged off in
accordance with retention limits.''\44\
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\42\Elizabeth Goitein, The Year of Section 702 Reform, Part I:
Backdoor Searches, Just Security (Feb. 13, 2023), https://
www.justsecurity.org/85068/the-year-of-section-702-reform-part-i-back
door-searches/ (citing Attorney General and Director of National
Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and
Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (Sep. 2021)).
\43\See Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., Report on the Surveillance
Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act 8 (July 2, 2014), https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/
Documents/OversightReport/ba65702c-3541094125-a67d-92a7f
974fc4c/702-Report-2%20-%20Complete%20-%20Nov%2014%202022%201548.pdf.
\44\See id. at 8.
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Members of Congress and privacy and civil liberties
advocates have raised concerns about the querying of Section
702 data for Americans' communications as a ``backdoor
search.'' Critics disparage the tactic as an end-run around of
the warrant requirement because ``backdoor searches'' purpo
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 6570: ``Fixing
FISA: How a Law Designed to Protect Americans Has Been
Weaponized Against Them'' a hearing held on April 27, 2023,
before the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government
Surveillance of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Committee
heard testimony from the following witnesses:
Mr. Michael Horowitz, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General;
Ms. Sharon Bradford Franklin, Chair, Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and
Ms. Beth A. Williams, Board Member, Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
The hearing addressed the use of FISA authorities and non-
compliance with established statutory and administrative
procedures intended to safeguard Americans' civil liberties.
The Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government
Surveillance also held a hearing on July 14, 2023, titled
``Fixing FISA, Part II.'' The Committee heard testimony from
the following witnesses:
Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington
University Law School;
Mr. Phil Kiko, Principal, Williams & Jensen;
Mr. Gene Schaerr, General Counsel, Project
for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and
Ms. Elizabeth Goitein, Senior Director,
Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for
Justice.
The hearing further addressed the deficient safeguards in
FISA, and contemplated the necessity of imposing a warrant
requirement for Section 702 queries.
Committee Consideration
On December 6, 2023, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 6570, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
35 to 2, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 6570:
1. Vote on Amendment #3 to H.R. 6570 ANS, offered by
Mr. Swalwell, failed 9-20
2. Vote on Amendment #4 to H.R. 6570 ANS, offered by
Mr. Buck, failed 4-22
3. Vote on Favorably Reporting H.R. 6570, as amended,
passed 35-2
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has
requested but not received from the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill
contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax
expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional
Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost
estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant
to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate
to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by
the Committee.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 6570 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 6570 reauthorizes Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for three years
with significant reforms. It requires the government to obtain
an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) or a warrant prior to conducting U.S. person queries of
information collected through Section 702. It provides for
greater scrutiny of applications submitted to the FISC,
increases transparency in surveillance applications, requires
more frequent and detailed reports and audits, and establishes
additional penalties for government employees who violate FISA
or mislead the FISC.
The bill also closes the legal loophole that allows data
brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law
enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government
agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. If the
agency were to gather this information itself, it would be
required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other legal order.
By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government agencies
from conducting an end-run around the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 6570
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Sec. 1. Short title
The Act is the ``Protect Liberty and End
Warrantless Surveillance Act.''
Sec. 2. Query procedure reform
Limits the number of FBI employees who may perform
United States person queries to 5 employees per field office.
Limits the number of FBI employees at FBI
headquarters who may perform U.S. person queries to 5.
Prohibits U.S. person queries of Section 702-
acquired information if the compelled production of that
information would require a probable cause warrant if sought
for law enforcement purposes in the United States.
Provides an exception when the subject
of a query is subject to an order or emergency
authorization under Title I or Title III of FISA, or a
criminal warrant.
Provides an exception when there is a
reasonable belief that an emergency exists involving an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm and the
information is sought for the purpose of preventing or
mitigating the threats. Requires a description of the
query to be sent to FISC, House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, and House and Senate Intelligence
Committees.
Provides an exception where the U.S.
person gives consent to the query.
Provides an exception where the query
uses a known cybersecurity threat signature as a query
term, and query is conducted for sole purpose of
mitigating or preventing such a threat. Requires these
queries to be reported to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC).
Permits queries for communications metadata but
prohibits use of results of a metadata query as a basis for
access to communications and other protected information.
Requires that queries must be reasonably likely to
retrieve foreign intelligence information.
For all U.S. person queries, requires
documentation of the query term, date of query, identifier for
person conducting query, and statement of facts showing that
query was reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence
information or in furtherance of the exceptions.
Sec. 3. Limitation on use of information obtained under section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to
United States persons and persons located in the United States
in criminal, civil, and administrative actions
Prohibits the use in criminal, civil, and
administrative proceedings and investigations, of information
acquired under section 702, except with prior approval of the
Attorney General and provided that the proceeding or
investigation involves terrorism, actions necessitating
counterintelligence, the proliferation or use of a weapon of
mass destruction, a cybersecurity breach or attack from a
foreign country, incapacitation or destruction of critical
infrastructure, an attack against the armed forces of the
United States or an ally of the United States or to other
personnel of the United States Government or a government ally
of the United States, or international narcotics trafficking.
Sec. 4. Repeal of authority for the resumption of abouts collection
Repeals the authority to resume ``abouts''
collection under Section 702. Existing law permits the
resumption of ``abouts'' collection with notice to Congress.
Sec. 5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reform
Requires the same FISC judge to hear FISA renewal
applications unless that judge is no longer serving on the
FISC.
Allows the FISC to appoint one or more amicus
curiae in a case and expands the types of cases where the FISC
shall appoint an amicus curiae, unless the court issues a
finding that such appointment is not appropriate. Such cases
would include: A case that presents a novel or significant
interpretation of the law (current law only provides for amicus
participation in these such cases); a case that presents
significant concerns with respect to the activities of a U.S.
person that are protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution; a case that presents or involves a Sensitive
Investigative Matter; a case that presents a request for
approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of
existing technology; a case that presents a request for
reauthorization of programmatic surveillance; a case that
otherwise presents novel or significant civil liberties issues;
and a case that involves the activities of a U.S. person.
Defines Sensitive Investigative Matter (SIM) to be
an investigative matter involving the activities of: a domestic
public official or political candidate, or a staff member of
such an official or candidate; a domestic religious or
political organization, or a U.S. person prominent in such an
organization; or the domestic news media.
SIM also includes ``any other
investigative matter involving a domestic entity or a
known or suspected U.S. person that,'' in the judgment
of the applicable court, is as sensitive as a Sensitive
Investigative Matter.
Grants amici the authority to seek review of FISC
decisions to the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) and of FISCR decisions to
the United States Supreme Court, and requires the FISC to
provide a written statement of reasons for a denial of a
petition for review by an amicus.
Provides amici with access to certain documents in
connection with the matter, including classified information.
Sec. 6. Application for an order approving electronic surveillance
Requires the application to include a statement
describing the normal investigative techniques taken before
submitting the application and an explanation as to why those
techniques are insufficient.
Applications for electronic surveillance must
include all information material to an application, including
exculpatory information.
Each federal employee who contributes to the
drafting of a FISA application must sign an affidavit attesting
to the accuracy of the application.
Prohibits the use of opposition research and news
media in FISA applications unless that information disclosed in
the application and provided that it is not the sole source of
the information justifying the allegations in the application.
Sec. 7. Public disclosure and declassification of certain documents
Currently, 50 U.S.C. 1871(c) requires the Attorney
General to share with the House and Senate Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees certain FISC decisions, orders, and
opinions within 45 days of issuance. This provision would
require that the Attorney General also share copies of those
documents that have undergone declassification review at that
same time.
Amends 50 U.S.C. 1872(a) to require the Director
of National Intelligence and Attorney General to conclude their
declassification review not later than 45 days after
commencement of such review.
Sec. 8. Transcriptions of proceedings; attendance of certain
Congressional Officials at certain proceedings
Allows the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees and the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees, or their designated staff, to attend
all FISC and FISCR proceedings. Allows the Chairs and Ranking
Members to designate 2 Members of Congress to attend
proceedings on their behalf.
Requires transcripts of FISC proceedings to be
maintained and available for review by those permitted to
attend proceedings not later than 45 days after any such
proceedings.
Sec. 9. Annual Audit of FISA Compliance by Inspector General
Requires the DOJ IG to complete an annual report
of alleged violations and failures to comply with the
requirements of FISA and to submit that report to the
congressional intelligence committees and House and Senate
Judiciary Committees by June 30 of each year.
Sec. 10. Reporting on accuracy and completeness of applications
Requires an existing annual report by the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
include an additional analysis of the accuracy and completeness
of applications and certifications.
Sec. 11. Annual report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Requires the FBI to annually report to Congress a
comprehensive account of ongoing disciplinary investigations,
adjudication of concluded investigations, and subsequent
disciplinary actions resulting from violations of the
requirements of FISA.
Requires the FBI to annually report to Congress on
the number of U.S. person queries conducted, what terms were
used, the number of warrants issued and denied, and the number
of times exceptions from the warrant requirement were alleged.
Sec. 12. Extension of Title VII of FISA; expiration of FISA
authorities; effective dates
Extends Title VII (including Section 702 of FISA)
for 3 years, until December 31, 2026.
Sec. 13. Criminal penalties for violations of FISA
Increases the maximum penalty for a person who
intentionally engages in electronic surveillance under color of
law or intentionally discloses or uses information obtained
under color of law by electronic surveillance not authorized by
law. Makes these offenses punishable by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 8 years, or both.
Adds criminal penalty for knowingly making a false
material declaration or material omission in any document
submitted to or statement made before the FISC or FISCR. Makes
this offense punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than 8 years, or both.
Adds criminal penalty for intentionally disclosing
a FISA application or classified information contained in the
application to any person not entitled to receive such
information. Makes this offense punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 8 years, or
both.
Sec. 14. Contempt power of FISC and FISCR
Provides FISC and FISCR with the authority to
prosecute a person for contempt and requires the FISC and FISCR
to jointly submit an annual report to Congress on the use of
this authority.
Sec. 15. Increased penalties for civil actions
Increases civil damages for a U.S. person harmed
by a violation of FISA to $10,000 (current statute is $1,000
for an aggrieved person).
If a court finds a person violated the Act, the
head of the agency that employs that person shall submit a
report to Congress on the administrative action taken against
that person and report their name to the FISC.
Sec. 16. Accountability procedures for incidents relating to queries
conducted by the FBI
Requires the Director of the FBI to establish
procedures to hold FBI employees accountable for violations of
law, guidance, and procedures governing queries of Section 702-
acquired information.
The accountability procedures shall include
centralized tracking of incidents, minimum consequences for
initial and subsequent incidents. Includes a clarification for
requirements for referring intentional misconduct and reckless
conduct to the FBI's Inspection Division for investigation and
disciplinary action by the FBI's Office of Professional
Responsibility.
Requires a report to Congress detailing the
accountability procedures and an annual report describing
disciplinary actions taken and a description of the
circumstances surrounding each such disciplinary action.
Sec. 17. Agency procedures to ensure compliance
Requires each agency that acquires foreign
intelligence information under FISA to establish clear rules on
what constitutes a violation of the Act, and procedures for
taking appropriate adverse personnel actions against any
officer or employee who engages in such a violation, including
more severe adverse actions for any subsequent violation.
Requires the head of each federal department or agency to
report to Congress on such procedures not later than 3 months
after the date of enactment.
Sec. 18. Protection of records held by data brokers
Defines various terms and prevents law enforcement
and intelligence agencies from buying data about a United
States person, located anywhere in the world, or data about any
person located in the United States that:
Is data about a person's device, from
their online account, or created or shared by a
technology and telecommunications company providing a
service to that person;
Was obtained from a technology or
communications company providing service to the target
in a manner that violated a contract, or the company's
terms of service or privacy policy;
Was obtained by deceiving the person
whose information was obtained; or
Was obtained by accessing the person's
device or online account without authorization.
Also prohibits the use or sharing by the
government of any information obtained in violation of this
section, including as evidence in court or before a grand jury,
regulatory body, or in another similar proceeding. This section
further requires the Attorney General to adopt specific
procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of this
information, and to prohibit its dissemination.
Sec. 19. Required disclosure
Prohibits the use or sharing by the government of
any information obtained in violation of this section,
including as evidence in court or before a grand jury,
regulatory body, or in another similar proceeding. This section
further requires the Attorney General to adopt specific
procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of this
information, and to prohibit its dissemination.
Sec. 20. Intermediary service providers
Extends the protections in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act to data held by intermediary service
providers, which are entities that directly or indirectly
deliver, store, or process communications for or on behalf of
technology or communications firms.
Sec. 21. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence
purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978
Narrows a legal carveout in FISA permitting the
intelligence community, without an order issued by a court, to
buy or obtain through other methods, metadata about calls,
texts, emails, and web browsing, where at least one end of the
communication is located abroad. This section limits the
carveout such that it only applies to the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information of non-Americans located
outside the United States.
Specifies that FISA authorities shall be the
exclusive means by which the government obtains information
inside the U.S. or from U.S. technology or communications
companies electronic communications transactions records, call
detail records, or other metadata about the communications of
United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any
person located in the United States.
Specifies that Title I and sections 303, 304, 703,
704, and 705 of FISA shall be the exclusive means by which the
government obtains inside the location information of U.S.
persons or persons inside the United States, web browsing
history, Internet search history, or any other data that would
require a court order to compel, about United States persons,
located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the
United States.
Sec. 22. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities,
or technical assistance to the government absent a court order
Removes the Attorney General's authority to grant civil
immunity to those that provide unlawful assistance for
government surveillance not required or permitted by federal
law. Immunity remains for any surveillance assistance ordered
by a court.
Sec. 23. Prohibition on reverse targeting of United States persons and
persons located in the United States
Prohibits the acquisition of communications if a
significant purpose is to acquire the information of one or
more United States person or persons believed to be located in
the United States.
Sec. 24. Required disclosure of relevant information in Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 applications
Requires the Attorney General to establish a set of
accuracy procedures to ensure that an application for a court
order under FISA includes all information that might reasonably
call into question the accuracy of the information or
reasonableness of any assessment in the application. Requires
the application to include a description of the accuracy
procedures and a certification that the federal officer making
the application has reviewed it for accuracy and completeness.
Sec. 25. Enhanced annual reports by Director of National Intelligence
Requires enhanced reports on statistics regarding persons
targeted for surveillance under Section 702, and other reports
including the number of disseminated intelligence reports
derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the
identities of U.S. persons, the number of disseminated
intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by
FISA containing the identities of U.S. persons, the number of
queries conducted to find communications or information of or
about U.S. persons, the number of criminal proceedings in which
the government entered into evidence or otherwise used or
disclosed in a criminal proceeding any information obtained or
derived from an acquisition conducted without a court order,
subpoena, or other legal process established by statute.
Sec. 26. Quarterly report
Requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, to submit quarterly reports
to the congressional intelligence committees and Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
that include the total number of warrants issued to conduct a
query of information acquired under section 702, the total
number of times a query was conducted pursuant to an exception,
the total number of queries that were conducted using a United
States person query term.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES REGARDING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 709. Accountability procedures for incidents relating to queries
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE VIII--PROTECTION OF PERSONS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT
Sec. 801. Definitions.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 605. Annual audit of FISA compliance by Inspector General.
Sec. 606. Annual report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 607. Agency procedures to ensure compliance.
TITLE IX--Certification regarding accuracy procedures
Sec. 901. Certification regarding accuracy procedures.
TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN