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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-307

PROTECT LIBERTY AND END WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 2023

2023-12-11

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 6570, introduced by Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ), reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for three years with significant reforms. It requires the government to obtain an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or a warrant prior to conducting U.S. person queries of information collected through Section 702. It provides for greater scrutiny of applications submitted to the FISC, increases transparency in surveillance applications, requires more frequent and detailed reports and audits, and establishes additional penalties for government employees who violate FISA or mislead the FISC. The bill also closes the legal loophole that allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. If the agency were to gather this information itself, it would be required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other legal order. By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government agencies from conducting an end-run around the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Background and Need for the Legislation A. BACKGROUND i. History and Overview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act In 1978, Congress enacted FISA in response to revelations that the federal government had seriously abused warrantless surveillance, resulting in rampant privacy violations.\1\ FISA provides a statutory framework for government agencies to conduct surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes through electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, or the production of certain business records.\2\ FISA also established the FISC to provide judicial oversight of government applications to conduct electronic surveillance, physical searches, and other forms of investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (Book II, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans). \2\See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Bureau of Justice Assistance U.S. Department of Justice, https://bja.ojp.gov/ program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/ 1286#::text=FISA%20was%20initially%20enacted%20in,collection%20of%20for eign%20 intelligence%20information (last visited Apr. 12, 2023). \3\See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subsequent legislation expanded federal statutes involving foreign intelligence gathering. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to ``provid[e] enhanced legislative tools'' to ``assist in the prevention of future terrorist activities and the preliminary acts and crimes which further such activities.''\4\ The Patriot Act and, later, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),\5\ further amended FISA. Specifically, section 206 of the Patriot Act permitted roving wiretaps\6\ and Section 6001(a) of IRTPA permitted the targeting of non-U.S. persons who are shown to be engaged in international terrorism without requiring evidence connecting those persons to a foreign power or terrorist group (lone-wolf provision).\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, at 41 (2001). \5\Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004). \6\See Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001). \7\Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 215 of the Patriot Act enlarged the scope of FISA's business records provision so that the government could request ``any tangible thing'' about a U.S. person based on a showing that ``there are reasonable grounds to believe'' that those records are ``relevant'' to an ``authorized investigation'' into ``international terrorist or clandestine intelligence activities.''\8\ This section also authorized the bulk collection of telephone metadata. In 2015, however, Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act to reform intelligence gathering programs in the wake of Edward Snowden's disclosures.\9\ The Act prohibited the bulk collection of records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, thus narrowing Section 215's FISA authorities.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\See Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001). \9\Pub. L. No. 114-23 (2015). \10\See H.R. 2048, the USA Freedom Act, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, available at https:// judiciary.house.gov/usa-freedom-act (last visited Dec. 3, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2008, Congress enacted FISA Section 702, which allows the government to acquire foreign intelligence by targeting non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be outside of the United States, for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.\11\ More details about Section 702 are below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881a(a), (b)(3). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2018, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 into law, which extended Section 702 through December 31, 2023.\12\ The bill required the FBI to seek a warrant when conducting queries during the ``predicative'' stage of an investigation but allowed the warrantless queries under Section 702 to continue in other situations.\13\ Prior to 2018, Congress last reauthorized Section 702 in 2012.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018). \13\See Martin Matishak and Cory Bennett, Surveillance bill heads to Trump's desk, Politico (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/ story/2018/01/18/fisa-bill-senate-pass-trump-293130. The ``predicative'' stage is the last stage before the FBI begins a formal investigation. Prior to this stage, the FBI can query communications without seeking a warrant as they build cases in non-security matters. \14\P.L. 112-238 (Dec. 2012). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2020, Section 215 of the Patriot Act, along with the lone wolf provision and the roving wiretap provision, expired.\15\ However, some of the provisions remained in effect due to a sunset clause that authorized the continued effect of the amendments regarding investigations that started, or potential offenses that took place, prior to the provisions' sunset date.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\See India McKinney, Section 215 Expired: Year in Review 2020, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.eff.org/ deeplinks/2020/12/section-215-expired-year-review-2020. \16\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. FISA Title I Title I of FISA established the procedures for the government to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance and established the FISC.\17\ Under Title I, the government may apply to the FISC for an order authorizing the government to conduct electronic surveillance against a particular target.\18\ In applying for an order, the government must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISC), Bureau of Justice Assistance Department of Justice, https:// bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/ 1286 (last visited Apr. 15, 2023). \18\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1804. \19\Id. at Sec. 1805. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FISC sits in Washington, D.C., and is composed of 11 district court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the United States from at least seven of the judicial circuits, and three of the judges must reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia.\20\ Typically, judges sit on the court for one week at a time on a rotational basis.\21\ The presiding judge of the FISC is selected by the Chief Justice.\22\ These judges are eligible to serve one term of seven years.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\Andrew Nolan and Richard M. Thompson II, Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Procedural and Operational Changes at 3, Cong. Research Service, (Aug. 26, 2014). \21\Id. \22\Id. \23\United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, About the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (last visited May 30, 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FISC is tasked with authorizing the government's surveillance applications.\24\ Proceedings before the court are generally ex parte, meaning only the government is represented. In 2015, Congress amended FISA to authorize the FISC to appoint five amici curiae to assist with review of applications or to interpret the law or provide guidance on novel issues.\25\ In his review of the FISA program, Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz highlighted the concerns many have with the FISC: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\Id. \25\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1803(i)(2). FISC proceedings are ex parte, meaning that unlike most court proceedings, the government is present but the government's counterparty is not, and FISA orders generally are not subject to scrutiny through subsequent adversarial proceedings. As a result, the FBI and [DOJ's National Security Division] FISA application process is critical to ensuring that DOJ officials asked to authorize FISA applications, and judges on the FISC asked to approve them, have a complete and accurate set of facts in the FISA application on which they can rely.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Execution of Its Woods Procedures for Applications Filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to U.S. Persons at i (2021). Because of the secretive nature of FISC proceedings, it is vital that the intelligence community comply with its own procedures for surveillance and provide the FISC with all necessary information needed to issue orders. However, as evidenced by Inspector General Horowitz's investigation and audit of the FBI's use of its FISA authorities, as well as Special Counsel John Durham's investigation of the FBI's surveillance of Carter Page, it is clear that the FBI has failed to consistently comply with these procedures and that the FISC is in need of reform. b. FISA Section 702 Congress enacted Section 702 of FISA in 2008 as part of the FISA Amendments Act.\27\ Section 702 provides an alternative to the surveillance requirements of Title I of FISA. Title VII of FISA (which includes Section 702) generally addresses electronic surveillance directed at targets outside the United States.\28\ Section 702 may only be used to target: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\Pub. L. 110-261 (2008). \28\See Edward C. Liu, Cong. Research Serv., R47477, Reauthorization of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) non-U.S. persons; (2) who are reasonably believed to be outside of the United States; (3) for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.\29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881a(a), (b)(3). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The statute only permits the acquisition of information ``from or with the assistance of an electronic communications service provider.''\30\ The FISC supervises such surveillance by approving certifications submitted jointly by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), ensuring that the surveillance complies with the statutory requirements of Section 702.\31\ The certification must detail the targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and querying procedures that the government intends to use in its surveillance.\32\ But unlike orders under Title I of FISA, the statute does not require the FISC to make probable cause determinations as to individual surveillance targets.\33\ Rather, the court reviews and certifies the Attorney General and DNI's targeting procedures to ensure they are properly limited, with such authorizations effective for one year.\34\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\Id. Sec. 1881a(h)(2)(A)(vi). \31\Id. Sec. 1881a(j)(1)(A). \32\Id. \33\Id. Sec. 1881a(j)(2). \34\Id. Sec. 1881a(a), (h)(1)(A). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Communications Collection Once the FISC approves targeting procedures, the government has various ways to conduct surveillance and collect communications. These methods include downstream collection, upstream collection, and about collection. In downstream collection, the government may direct a communications service provider (internet service provider, telephone provider, or email provider) to provide all communications to or from a selector, such as an email address, associated with a Section 702 target.\35\ In upstream collection, the government directs its requests to telecommunications ``backbone'' providers, such as companies that operate internet cables.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\See Liu, supra note 28 at 10-11. \36\Id. at 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- About, or abouts, collection has been the subject of controversy over the years. About collection involves the government capturing vast amounts of communications in which the selector (e.g., email address) of a target appeared somewhere in communications, even when the target is not a party to the communication.\37\ A declassified FISC opinion shed light on this type of collection, noting that it resulted in the collection of ``tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications each year'' by the National Security Agency (NSA).\38\ In 2017, the NSA announced that it was no longer performing ``about'' collection and in 2018 Congress amended Title VII to prohibit ``about'' collection unless the Attorney General and DNI notify the House and Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees that the NSA plans to resume such collection.\39\ While the NSA is not currently performing this type of collection, it is free to resume it at any time, provided it notifies Congress. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\Id. (citing Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 37 (July 2, 2014), https:// documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ba65702c-3541-4125- a67d-92a7f974 fc4c/702-Report-2%20-%20Complete%20-%20Nov%2014%202022%201548.pdf). \38\Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *15 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). \39\See Liu, supra note 28 at 12 (citing 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881a(b)(5)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Minimization Procedures Under Section 702, the government is required to ``minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning nonconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.''\40\ For example, if the government collects communications discussing or mentioning a U.S. person, but it contains no foreign intelligence information, it must be deleted as soon as practicable but no later than five years from the Section 702 authorization's expiration subject to certain exceptions.\41\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1801(h)). \41\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Querying Procedures Much of the controversy surrounding Section 702 involves the government's querying of Section 702-acquired communications already in the government's possession, nearly always without first obtaining a warrant. While the government is required to minimize the sharing and retention of U.S. person information and communications, the NSA ``routinely shares raw Section 702 data'' with the other intelligence agencies.\42\ Each of the intelligence agencies that have access to Section 702-acquired information--the FBI, CIA, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the NSA--establish procedures that govern how they may query such information.\43\ While these agencies are required to establish procedures to limit the number of Americans affected, the amount of information available to the government is significant. According to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent federal agency established to uphold civil liberties with respect to terrorism-related policies, ``[a]part from communications acquired by mistake, U.S. persons'' communications are not typically purged or eliminated from agency databases, even when they do not contain foreign intelligence information, until the data is aged off in accordance with retention limits.''\44\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\Elizabeth Goitein, The Year of Section 702 Reform, Part I: Backdoor Searches, Just Security (Feb. 13, 2023), https:// www.justsecurity.org/85068/the-year-of-section-702-reform-part-i-back door-searches/ (citing Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Sep. 2021)). \43\See Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 8 (July 2, 2014), https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/ Documents/OversightReport/ba65702c-3541094125-a67d-92a7f 974fc4c/702-Report-2%20-%20Complete%20-%20Nov%2014%202022%201548.pdf. \44\See id. at 8. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Members of Congress and privacy and civil liberties advocates have raised concerns about the querying of Section 702 data for Americans' communications as a ``backdoor search.'' Critics disparage the tactic as an end-run around of the warrant requirement because ``backdoor searches'' purpo

Hearings

For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 6570: ``Fixing FISA: How a Law Designed to Protect Americans Has Been Weaponized Against Them'' a hearing held on April 27, 2023, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Committee heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Michael Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General; Ms. Sharon Bradford Franklin, Chair, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and Ms. Beth A. Williams, Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The hearing addressed the use of FISA authorities and non- compliance with established statutory and administrative procedures intended to safeguard Americans' civil liberties. The Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance also held a hearing on July 14, 2023, titled ``Fixing FISA, Part II.'' The Committee heard testimony from the following witnesses: Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School; Mr. Phil Kiko, Principal, Williams & Jensen; Mr. Gene Schaerr, General Counsel, Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and Ms. Elizabeth Goitein, Senior Director, Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice. The hearing further addressed the deficient safeguards in FISA, and contemplated the necessity of imposing a warrant requirement for Section 702 queries.

Committee Consideration

On December 6, 2023, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 6570, favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 35 to 2, a quorum being present.

Committee Votes

In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 6570: 1. Vote on Amendment #3 to H.R. 6570 ANS, offered by Mr. Swalwell, failed 9-20 2. Vote on Amendment #4 to H.R. 6570 ANS, offered by Mr. Buck, failed 4-22 3. Vote on Favorably Reporting H.R. 6570, as amended, passed 35-2 Committee Oversight Findings In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 6570 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program. Performance Goals and Objectives The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of House rule XIII, H.R. 6570 reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for three years with significant reforms. It requires the government to obtain an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or a warrant prior to conducting U.S. person queries of information collected through Section 702. It provides for greater scrutiny of applications submitted to the FISC, increases transparency in surveillance applications, requires more frequent and detailed reports and audits, and establishes additional penalties for government employees who violate FISA or mislead the FISC. The bill also closes the legal loophole that allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. If the agency were to gather this information itself, it would be required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other legal order. By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government agencies from conducting an end-run around the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Advisory on Earmarks In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 6570 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI. Federal Mandates Statement An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104- 1).

Section-by-Section Analysis

Sec. 1. Short title The Act is the ``Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act.'' Sec. 2. Query procedure reform Limits the number of FBI employees who may perform United States person queries to 5 employees per field office. Limits the number of FBI employees at FBI headquarters who may perform U.S. person queries to 5. Prohibits U.S. person queries of Section 702- acquired information if the compelled production of that information would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States. Provides an exception when the subject of a query is subject to an order or emergency authorization under Title I or Title III of FISA, or a criminal warrant. Provides an exception when there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm and the information is sought for the purpose of preventing or mitigating the threats. Requires a description of the query to be sent to FISC, House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Provides an exception where the U.S. person gives consent to the query. Provides an exception where the query uses a known cybersecurity threat signature as a query term, and query is conducted for sole purpose of mitigating or preventing such a threat. Requires these queries to be reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Permits queries for communications metadata but prohibits use of results of a metadata query as a basis for access to communications and other protected information. Requires that queries must be reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. For all U.S. person queries, requires documentation of the query term, date of query, identifier for person conducting query, and statement of facts showing that query was reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information or in furtherance of the exceptions. Sec. 3. Limitation on use of information obtained under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to United States persons and persons located in the United States in criminal, civil, and administrative actions Prohibits the use in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings and investigations, of information acquired under section 702, except with prior approval of the Attorney General and provided that the proceeding or investigation involves terrorism, actions necessitating counterintelligence, the proliferation or use of a weapon of mass destruction, a cybersecurity breach or attack from a foreign country, incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure, an attack against the armed forces of the United States or an ally of the United States or to other personnel of the United States Government or a government ally of the United States, or international narcotics trafficking. Sec. 4. Repeal of authority for the resumption of abouts collection Repeals the authority to resume ``abouts'' collection under Section 702. Existing law permits the resumption of ``abouts'' collection with notice to Congress. Sec. 5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reform Requires the same FISC judge to hear FISA renewal applications unless that judge is no longer serving on the FISC. Allows the FISC to appoint one or more amicus curiae in a case and expands the types of cases where the FISC shall appoint an amicus curiae, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate. Such cases would include: A case that presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law (current law only provides for amicus participation in these such cases); a case that presents significant concerns with respect to the activities of a U.S. person that are protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution; a case that presents or involves a Sensitive Investigative Matter; a case that presents a request for approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of existing technology; a case that presents a request for reauthorization of programmatic surveillance; a case that otherwise presents novel or significant civil liberties issues; and a case that involves the activities of a U.S. person. Defines Sensitive Investigative Matter (SIM) to be an investigative matter involving the activities of: a domestic public official or political candidate, or a staff member of such an official or candidate; a domestic religious or political organization, or a U.S. person prominent in such an organization; or the domestic news media. SIM also includes ``any other investigative matter involving a domestic entity or a known or suspected U.S. person that,'' in the judgment of the applicable court, is as sensitive as a Sensitive Investigative Matter. Grants amici the authority to seek review of FISC decisions to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) and of FISCR decisions to the United States Supreme Court, and requires the FISC to provide a written statement of reasons for a denial of a petition for review by an amicus. Provides amici with access to certain documents in connection with the matter, including classified information. Sec. 6. Application for an order approving electronic surveillance Requires the application to include a statement describing the normal investigative techniques taken before submitting the application and an explanation as to why those techniques are insufficient. Applications for electronic surveillance must include all information material to an application, including exculpatory information. Each federal employee who contributes to the drafting of a FISA application must sign an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the application. Prohibits the use of opposition research and news media in FISA applications unless that information disclosed in the application and provided that it is not the sole source of the information justifying the allegations in the application. Sec. 7. Public disclosure and declassification of certain documents Currently, 50 U.S.C. 1871(c) requires the Attorney General to share with the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees certain FISC decisions, orders, and opinions within 45 days of issuance. This provision would require that the Attorney General also share copies of those documents that have undergone declassification review at that same time. Amends 50 U.S.C. 1872(a) to require the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General to conclude their declassification review not later than 45 days after commencement of such review. Sec. 8. Transcriptions of proceedings; attendance of certain Congressional Officials at certain proceedings Allows the Chair and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, or their designated staff, to attend all FISC and FISCR proceedings. Allows the Chairs and Ranking Members to designate 2 Members of Congress to attend proceedings on their behalf. Requires transcripts of FISC proceedings to be maintained and available for review by those permitted to attend proceedings not later than 45 days after any such proceedings. Sec. 9. Annual Audit of FISA Compliance by Inspector General Requires the DOJ IG to complete an annual report of alleged violations and failures to comply with the requirements of FISA and to submit that report to the congressional intelligence committees and House and Senate Judiciary Committees by June 30 of each year. Sec. 10. Reporting on accuracy and completeness of applications Requires an existing annual report by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to include an additional analysis of the accuracy and completeness of applications and certifications. Sec. 11. Annual report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Requires the FBI to annually report to Congress a comprehensive account of ongoing disciplinary investigations, adjudication of concluded investigations, and subsequent disciplinary actions resulting from violations of the requirements of FISA. Requires the FBI to annually report to Congress on the number of U.S. person queries conducted, what terms were used, the number of warrants issued and denied, and the number of times exceptions from the warrant requirement were alleged. Sec. 12. Extension of Title VII of FISA; expiration of FISA authorities; effective dates Extends Title VII (including Section 702 of FISA) for 3 years, until December 31, 2026. Sec. 13. Criminal penalties for violations of FISA Increases the maximum penalty for a person who intentionally engages in electronic surveillance under color of law or intentionally discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance not authorized by law. Makes these offenses punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 8 years, or both. Adds criminal penalty for knowingly making a false material declaration or material omission in any document submitted to or statement made before the FISC or FISCR. Makes this offense punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 8 years, or both. Adds criminal penalty for intentionally disclosing a FISA application or classified information contained in the application to any person not entitled to receive such information. Makes this offense punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 8 years, or both. Sec. 14. Contempt power of FISC and FISCR Provides FISC and FISCR with the authority to prosecute a person for contempt and requires the FISC and FISCR to jointly submit an annual report to Congress on the use of this authority. Sec. 15. Increased penalties for civil actions Increases civil damages for a U.S. person harmed by a violation of FISA to $10,000 (current statute is $1,000 for an aggrieved person). If a court finds a person violated the Act, the head of the agency that employs that person shall submit a report to Congress on the administrative action taken against that person and report their name to the FISC. Sec. 16. Accountability procedures for incidents relating to queries conducted by the FBI Requires the Director of the FBI to establish procedures to hold FBI employees accountable for violations of law, guidance, and procedures governing queries of Section 702- acquired information. The accountability procedures shall include centralized tracking of incidents, minimum consequences for initial and subsequent incidents. Includes a clarification for requirements for referring intentional misconduct and reckless conduct to the FBI's Inspection Division for investigation and disciplinary action by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility. Requires a report to Congress detailing the accountability procedures and an annual report describing disciplinary actions taken and a description of the circumstances surrounding each such disciplinary action. Sec. 17. Agency procedures to ensure compliance Requires each agency that acquires foreign intelligence information under FISA to establish clear rules on what constitutes a violation of the Act, and procedures for taking appropriate adverse personnel actions against any officer or employee who engages in such a violation, including more severe adverse actions for any subsequent violation. Requires the head of each federal department or agency to report to Congress on such procedures not later than 3 months after the date of enactment. Sec. 18. Protection of records held by data brokers Defines various terms and prevents law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying data about a United States person, located anywhere in the world, or data about any person located in the United States that: Is data about a person's device, from their online account, or created or shared by a technology and telecommunications company providing a service to that person; Was obtained from a technology or communications company providing service to the target in a manner that violated a contract, or the company's terms of service or privacy policy; Was obtained by deceiving the person whose information was obtained; or Was obtained by accessing the person's device or online account without authorization. Also prohibits the use or sharing by the government of any information obtained in violation of this section, including as evidence in court or before a grand jury, regulatory body, or in another similar proceeding. This section further requires the Attorney General to adopt specific procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of this information, and to prohibit its dissemination. Sec. 19. Required disclosure Prohibits the use or sharing by the government of any information obtained in violation of this section, including as evidence in court or before a grand jury, regulatory body, or in another similar proceeding. This section further requires the Attorney General to adopt specific procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of this information, and to prohibit its dissemination. Sec. 20. Intermediary service providers Extends the protections in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to data held by intermediary service providers, which are entities that directly or indirectly deliver, store, or process communications for or on behalf of technology or communications firms. Sec. 21. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Narrows a legal carveout in FISA permitting the intelligence community, without an order issued by a court, to buy or obtain through other methods, metadata about calls, texts, emails, and web browsing, where at least one end of the communication is located abroad. This section limits the carveout such that it only applies to the acquisition of foreign intelligence information of non-Americans located outside the United States. Specifies that FISA authorities shall be the exclusive means by which the government obtains information inside the U.S. or from U.S. technology or communications companies electronic communications transactions records, call detail records, or other metadata about the communications of United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the United States. Specifies that Title I and sections 303, 304, 703, 704, and 705 of FISA shall be the exclusive means by which the government obtains inside the location information of U.S. persons or persons inside the United States, web browsing history, Internet search history, or any other data that would require a court order to compel, about United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the United States. Sec. 22. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities, or technical assistance to the government absent a court order Removes the Attorney General's authority to grant civil immunity to those that provide unlawful assistance for government surveillance not required or permitted by federal law. Immunity remains for any surveillance assistance ordered by a court. Sec. 23. Prohibition on reverse targeting of United States persons and persons located in the United States Prohibits the acquisition of communications if a significant purpose is to acquire the information of one or more United States person or persons believed to be located in the United States. Sec. 24. Required disclosure of relevant information in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 applications Requires the Attorney General to establish a set of accuracy procedures to ensure that an application for a court order under FISA includes all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or reasonableness of any assessment in the application. Requires the application to include a description of the accuracy procedures and a certification that the federal officer making the application has reviewed it for accuracy and completeness. Sec. 25. Enhanced annual reports by Director of National Intelligence Requires enhanced reports on statistics regarding persons targeted for surveillance under Section 702, and other reports including the number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of U.S. persons, the number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by FISA containing the identities of U.S. persons, the number of queries conducted to find communications or information of or about U.S. persons, the number of criminal proceedings in which the government entered into evidence or otherwise used or disclosed in a criminal proceeding any information obtained or derived from an acquisition conducted without a court order, subpoena, or other legal process established by statute. Sec. 26. Quarterly report Requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees and Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives that include the total number of warrants issued to conduct a query of information acquired under section 702, the total number of times a query was conducted pursuant to an exception, the total number of queries that were conducted using a United States person query term. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978''. TABLE OF CONTENTS * * * * * * * TITLE VII--ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES REGARDING CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES * * * * * * * Sec. 709. Accountability procedures for incidents relating to queries conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. TITLE VIII--PROTECTION OF PERSONS ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT Sec. 801. Definitions. * * * * * * * Sec. 605. Annual audit of FISA compliance by Inspector General. Sec. 606. Annual report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Sec. 607. Agency procedures to ensure compliance. TITLE IX--Certification regarding accuracy procedures Sec. 901. Certification regarding accuracy procedures. TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/307