Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 4767]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 4767) to make revisions to the Federal
securities laws with respect to shareholder proposals, proxy
voting, and the registration of proxy advisory firms, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting
Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
TITLE I--PERFORMANCE OVER POLITICS
Sec. 101. Exclusion of certain substantially similar shareholder
proposals.
TITLE II--NO EXPENSIVE, STIFLING GOVERNANCE
Sec. 201. Exclusion of certain shareholder proposals.
TITLE III--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Sec. 301. Exclusion of certain ESG shareholder proposals.
TITLE IV--EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY
ISSUE
Sec. 401. Exclusions available regardless of significant social policy
issue.
TITLE V--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION
Sec. 501. Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder
proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process.
TITLE VI--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Sec. 601. Registration of proxy advisory firms.
TITLE VII--LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL
INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS
Sec. 701. Liability for certain failures to disclose material
information or making of material misstatements.
TITLE VIII--DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION
FUNDS
Sec. 801. Duties of investment advisors, asset managers, and pension
funds.
TITLE IX--PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS
Sec. 901. Requirements related to proxy voting.
TITLE X--EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS
Sec. 1001. Proxy voting of passively managed funds.
TITLE XI--PROTECTING RETAIL INVESTORS' SAVINGS
Sec. 1101. Best interest based on pecuniary factors.
Sec. 1102. Study on climate change and other environmental disclosures
in municipal bond market.
Sec. 1103. Study on solicitation of municipal securities business.
TITLE I--PERFORMANCE OVER POLITICS
SEC. 101. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS.
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall revise the resubmission
requirements in section 240.14a-8(i)(12) of title 17, Code of Federal
Regulations, to provide that a shareholder proposal may be excluded by
an issuer from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting
of the shareholders of such issuer if the shareholder proposal
addresses substantially the same subject matter as a proposal, or
proposals, previously included in the proxy or consent solicitation
material for a meeting of the shareholders of such issuer--
(1) for a meeting of the shareholders conducted in the
preceding 5 calendar years; and
(2) if the most recent vote--
(A) occurred in the preceding 3 calendar years; and
(B)(i) if voted on once during such 5-year period,
received less than 10 percent of the votes cast;
(ii) if voted on twice during such 5-year period,
received less than 20 percent of the votes cast; or
(iii) if voted on three or more times during such 5-
year period, received less than 40 percent of the votes
cast.
TITLE II--NO EXPENSIVE, STIFLING GOVERNANCE
SEC. 201. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS.
(a) Exclusion of Certain Shareholder Proposals.--A shareholder
proposal submitted to an issuer pursuant to section 240.14a-8 of title
17, Code of Federal Regulations, may be excluded by an issuer from its
proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of the
shareholders of such issuer if the shareholder proposal--
(1) has been substantially implemented by the issuer by
implementing policies, practices, or procedures that compare
favorably with the guidelines of the proposal and address the
proposal's underlying concerns; or
(2) substantially duplicates by having the same principal
thrust or principal focus as another proposal previously
submitted to the issuer by another proponent that will be
included in such material.
(b) Nullification of Proposed Rule.--The Securities and Exchange
Commission may not finalize or apply the positions contained in the
proposed rule entitled ``Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and
Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8''
(87 Fed. Reg. 45052), issue any substantially similar rule, or apply
any substantially similar rule, including with respect to a no-action
or other interpretive request.
TITLE III--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
SEC. 301. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS.
A shareholder proposal submitted to an issuer pursuant to section
240.14a-8 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, may be excluded by
an issuer from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting
of the shareholders of such issuer if the subject matter of the
shareholder proposal is environmental, social, or political (or a
similar subject matter).
TITLE IV--EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY
ISSUE
SEC. 401. EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY
ISSUE.
An issuer may exclude a shareholder proposal pursuant to section
240.14a-8(i) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard
to whether such shareholder proposal relates to a significant social
policy issue.
TITLE V--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION
SEC. 501. STUDY OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS, PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS, AND THE PROXY
PROCESS.
Section 4(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78d(j)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(10) Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder
proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this paragraph, and every 5
years thereafter, the Commission shall conduct a
comprehensive study on shareholder proposals, proxy
advisory firms, and the proxy process.
``(B) Scope of study.--The studies required under
subparagraph (A) shall cover--
``(i) the previous 10 years, with respect to
the initial study; and
``(ii) the previous 5 years, with respect to
each other study.
``(C) Contents.--Each study required under
subparagraph (A) shall address the following issues:
``(i) The financial and other incentives and
obligations of all groups involved in the proxy
process.
``(ii) A consideration of whether financial
and other incentives have created a process
that no longer serves the economic interests of
long-term retail investors.
``(iii) An analysis of whether regulations
and financial incentives have created and
protected the outsized influence of proxy
advisors or a duopoly in proxy advice, and if
so, what are the benefits and costs of that
outsized influence or duopoly.
``(iv) The costs incurred by issuers in
responding to politically-, environmentally-,
or socially-motivated shareholder proposals.
``(v) An assessment, including a cost-benefit
analysis, of the adequacy of the current
submission thresholds in Rule 14a-8 (17 CFR
240.14a-8) to ensure that shareholder
proponents have demonstrated a meaningful
economic stake in a company, which is
appropriate to effectively serve markets and
shareholders at large.
``(vi) An examination of the extent to which
the politicization of the shareholder proposal
process is increasing the operating costs of
public companies.
``(vii) An analysis of the impact that
shareholder proposals have on discouraging
private companies from going public.
``(viii) An evaluation of the risk that
shareholder proposals may contribute to the
balkanization of the U.S. economy over time.
``(ix) A thorough assessment of the economic
analysis, if any, conducted by proxy advisory
firms and institutional shareholders when
recommending or voting in favor of shareholder
proposals.
``(x) A review of the extent to which
institutional investors, who owe fiduciary
duties, rely on proxy advisory firm
recommendations.
``(xi) An assessment of whether, in light of
their significant influence on corporate
actions and vote outcomes, proxy advisors are
subject to sufficient and effective regulation
to ensure that their policies and
recommendations are accurate, free of
conflicts, and benefit the economic best
interest of shareholders at large.
``(D) Report.--At the completion of each study
required under subparagraph (A) the Commission shall
issue a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives that
includes the results of the study.''.
TITLE VI--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
SEC. 601. REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS.
(a) Amendment.--The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15G the following new
section:
``SEC. 15H. REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS.
``(a) Conduct Prohibited.--It shall be unlawful for a proxy advisory
firm to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to provide proxy voting advice, research, analysis,
ratings or recommendations to any client, unless such proxy advisory
firm is registered under this section.
``(b) Registration Procedures.--
``(1) Application for registration.--
``(A) In general.--A proxy advisory firm shall file
with the Commission an application for registration, in
such form as the Commission shall require, by rule, and
containing the information described in subparagraph
(B).
``(B) Required information.--An application for
registration under this section shall contain--
``(i) a certification that the applicant is
able to consistently provide proxy advice based
on accurate information;
``(ii) with respect to clients of the
applicant that vote shares held on behalf of
shareholders, a certification that the
applicant--
``(I) will provide proxy voting
advice only in the best economic
interest of those shareholders; and
``(II) has the requisite expertise to
ensure that voting recommendations are
in the best economic interest of those
shareholders;
``(iii) information on the procedures and
methodologies that the applicant uses to ensure
that proxy voting recommendations are in the
best economic interest of the ultimate
shareholders;
``(iv) information on the organizational
structure of the applicant;
``(v) an explanation of whether or not the
applicant has in effect a code of ethics, and
if not, the reasons therefor;
``(vi) a description of any potential or
actual conflict of interest relating to the
provision of proxy advisory services, including
those arising out of or resulting from the
ownership structure of the applicant or the
provision of other services by the applicant or
any person associated with the applicant;
``(vii) the policies and procedures in place
to publicly disclose and manage conflicts of
interest under subsection (f);
``(viii) information related to the
professional and academic qualifications of
staff tasked with providing proxy advisory
services; and
``(ix) any other information and documents
concerning the applicant and any person
associated with such applicant as the
Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
``(2) Review of application.--
``(A) Initial determination.--Not later than 90 days
after the date on which the application for
registration is filed with the Commission under
paragraph (1) (or within such longer period as to which
the applicant consents) the Commission shall--
``(i) by order, grant registration; or
``(ii) institute proceedings to determine
whether registration should be denied.
``(B) Conduct of proceedings.--
``(i) Content.--Proceedings referred to in
subparagraph (A)(ii) shall--
``(I) include notice of the grounds
for denial under consideration and an
opportunity for hearing; and
``(II) be concluded not later than
120 days after the date on which the
application for registration is filed
with the Commission under paragraph
(1).
``(ii) Determination.--At the conclusion of
such proceedings, the Commission, by order,
shall grant or deny such application for
registration.
``(iii) Extension authorized.--The Commission
may extend the time for conclusion of such
proceedings for not longer than 90 days, if the
Commission finds good cause for such extension
and publishes its reasons for so finding, or
for such longer period as to which the
applicant consents.
``(C) Grounds for decision.--The Commission shall
grant registration under this subsection--
``(i) if the Commission finds that the
requirements of this section are satisfied; and
``(ii) unless the Commission finds (in which
case the Commission shall deny such
registration) that--
``(I) the applicant has failed to
certify to the Commission's
satisfaction that it is able to
consistently provide proxy advice based
on accurate information and to
materially comply with the procedures
and methodologies disclosed under
paragraph (1)(B) and with subsections
(f) and (g); or
``(II) if the applicant were so
registered, its registration would be
subject to suspension or revocation
under subsection (d).
``(3) Public availability of information.--Subject to section
24, the Commission shall make the information and documents
submitted to the Commission by a proxy advisory firm in its
completed application for registration, or in any amendment
submitted under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c),
publicly available on the Commission's website, or through
another comparable, readily accessible means.
``(c) Update of Registration.--
``(1) Update.--Each registered proxy advisory firm shall
promptly amend and update its application for registration
under this section if any information or document provided
therein becomes materially inaccurate, except that a registered
proxy advisory firm is not required to amend the information
required to be filed under subsection (b)(1)(B)(i) by filing
information under this paragraph, but shall amend such
information in the annual submission of the organization under
paragraph (2) of this subsection.
``(2) Certification.--Not later than 90 calendar days after
the end of each calendar year, each registered proxy advisory
firm shall file with the Commission an amendment to its
registration, in such form as the Commission, by rule, may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for
Purpose and Summary
Introduced on July 20, 2023, by Representative Bryan Steil,
H.R. 4767, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from
Politics Act, would enact measures aimed at preserving the
integrity of the proxy voting process by reducing the impact of
political activists, proxy advisory firms, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in introducing political elements
into proxy voting.
Background and Need for Legislation
H.R. 4767 is a compilation of 11 previously introduced
bills, including:
H.R. 4641, the Performance Over Politics Act
H.R. 4644, the No Expensive, Stifling Governance (No ESG)
Act
H.R. 4640, a bill to authorize the exclusion of shareholder
proposals from proxy or consent solicitation material if the
subject matter of the shareholder proposal is environmental,
social, or political
H.R. 4657, a bill to clarify that an issuer may exclude a
shareholder proposal pursuant to section 240.14a-8(i) of title
17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard to whether such
proposal relates to a significant social policy issue
H.R. 4662, the Corporate Governance Examination Act
H.R. 4589, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms,
and for other purposes
H.R. 4590, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose
material information in connection with proxy voting advice,
and for other purposes
H.R. 4648, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for duties of certain investment advisors,
asset managers, and pension funds with respect to voting on
shareholder proposals, and for other purposes
H.R. 4656, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act
H.R. 4645, the Empowering Shareholders Act
H.R. 4600, the Protecting Retail Investors' Savings Act
The shareholder proxy process has lost its effectiveness in
efficiently promoting long-term shareholder value. At present,
unbridled shareholder activism diverts attention and resources
away from core business matters, ultimately eroding the appeal
of U.S. markets and discouraging companies from pursuing public
offerings. The SEC has exacerbated this problem by promulgating
changes that facilitate the inclusion of politically motivated
shareholder proposals in annual proxy statements while also
rolling back crucial reforms to proxy solicitation rules. This
shift towards advancing environmental, social, and political
agendas detracts from the primary purpose of public markets,
which is to enable companies to raise capital and stimulate
economic growth.
H.R. 4767 represents a vital step in addressing these
challenges. It seeks to curb the influence of activists, proxy
firms, and the SEC in politicizing the proxy process, which
will enable companies and their shareholders to refocus on the
fundamental issues that drive growth and long-term value
creation.
Title I--H.R. 4641, the Performance Over Politics Act, was introduced
on July 14, 2023, by Representative Scott Fitzgerald
Title I of the bill raises the resubmission thresholds for
shareholder proposals that have faced repeated rejections by a
substantial majority of shareholders.
Background
The costs associated with shareholder proposals are
significant. Apart from diverting management's attention from
long-term value creation, immaterial shareholder proposals
often siphon capital away from crucial initiatives like
research, development, and corporate strategy. When management
discussions are inundated with numerous immaterial proposals,
it detracts from addressing economically significant matters.
These expenses escalate significantly when ideological or
political shareholder proposals undergo repeated resubmissions,
placing added strain on both the company and its shareholders.
According to the 2020 update to Rule 14a-8(i)(12), companies
can potentially exclude similar shareholder proposals based on
the levels of support they receive-less than 5 percent, 15
percent, or 25 percent-when proposed once, twice, or three or
more times within the previous five years. Despite this rule,
the current influence of proxy advisors effectively hinders
companies from excluding numerous repeat environmental, social
and governance (ESG) related proposals, regardless of prior
rejections. Proxy advisor firms' endorsements frequently gather
25 percent investor support easily, perpetuating the cycle of
resubmission, even if these proposals don't align with the
company's long-term interests.
To address these challenges, Title I aims to adjust the
thresholds under Rule 14a-8(i)(12) to 10 percent, 20 percent,
and 40 percent, respectively. This adjustment seeks to strike a
balance between encouraging shareholder engagement and
fostering a more efficient and focused decision-making process.
Title II--H.R. 4644, the No Expensive, Stifling Governance Act, was
introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Erin Houchin
Title II of the bill prevents the SEC from finalizing or
implementing the positions contained in a proposed rule called
``Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission of
Shareholder Proposals under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8'' (87 Fed.
Reg. 45052).
Background
In 2022, the SEC proposed a rule to narrow the exclusion
criteria available to companies under Rule 14a-8. The SEC's
proposed rule would make it more difficult for companies to
exclude shareholder proposals that have already been
substantially implemented, are duplicative of other proposals
on a given year's proxy ballot or have been rejected by a large
percentage of shareholders in previous years. This proposal
would benefit activists while reducing the power of issuers and
long-term shareholders.
Title II of the bill aims to uphold the current exclusion
criteria, which would strengthen the process for companies to
manage their proxy ballot by preventing an overflow of
substantially implemented, duplicative, and resubmitted
proposals.
Title III--H.R. 4640, a bill to authorize the exclusion of shareholder
proposals from proxy or consent solicitation material if the
subject matter of the shareholder proposal is environmental,
social, or political, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by
Representative Byron Donalds
Title III clarifies that companies may exclude shareholder
proposals that seek to advance environmental, social, and
political matters unrelated to their business.
Background
The recent rise in ESG-related proposals largely stems from
SEC decisions that introduced ambiguities in the Rule 14a-8 no-
action letter process. Notably, the SEC's November 2021
guidance (Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L or ``SLB 14L'') mandated
the inclusion of proposals addressing ``broad societal
impact,'' even if disconnected from a company's operations.
Maintaining a boardroom focus on robust financial
management is crucial to prevent it from evolving into a
platform for partisan politics. Multiple studies have revealed
a direct link between increased shareholder activism advocating
social causes and diminished stock returns. Title III ensures
that the proxy ballot remains dedicated to matters pertinent to
long-term growth and the creation of shareholder value.
Title IV--H.R. 4657, a bill to clarify that an issuer may exclude a
shareholder proposal pursuant to section 240.14a-8(i) of title
17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard to whether such
proposal relates to a significant social policy issue, was
introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative John Rose
Title IV clarifies that Rule 14a-8 exclusions permit a
company to exclude a shareholder proposal from their proxy
ballot regardless of whether the SEC deems an issue a
``significant policy'' matter.
Background
In November 2021, SLB 14L rescinded the SEC's content-
neutral guardrails that previously enabled companies and
investors to take a company-specific approach to evaluating the
relevance and suitability of shareholder proposals submitted to
company proxy ballots.
Instead, SLB 14L declared that the SEC would ``no longer
focus on determining the nexus between a policy issue and the
company.'' Instead, it mandated the inclusion of all proposals
with a ``broad societal impact'' to be included on the proxy
ballot when they are submitted. Consequently, politically
motivated proposals surged in annual proxy statements, with a
51 percent increase in environmental proposals and a 20 percent
rise in social proposals. Meanwhile, companies are now 25
percent less likely to seek SEC no-action relief.
Title IV would overturn this detrimental policy, enabling
companies to exclude shareholder proposals based on the Rule
14a-8 exclusion criteria, regardless of whether they pertain to
a significant social policy issue. SLB 14L has incentivized
activists to submit proposals entirely unrelated to long-term
value creation. Reversing this change would signify a return to
a proxy process focused on fostering business growth and
enhancing investor value.
Title V--H.R. 4662, the Corporate Governance Examination Act, was
introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Ann Wagner
Title V requires the SEC to conduct a comprehensive study
focused on shareholder proposals, proxy advisors, and the proxy
process. The study is to be initiated within 180 days of the
bill's enactment, with subsequent reviews every five years.
Initially, it will cover the previous 10 years, followed by
evaluations of the previous 5 years in subsequent studies.
Background
The comprehensive study will delve into critical proxy
issues including the financial incentives and responsibilities
of involved parties, their impact on the long-term interests of
retail investors, the influence wielded by proxy advisory
firms, and the costs companies incur in response to shareholder
proposals. The study will also evaluate existing submission
thresholds and explore how the politicization of these matters
influences a company's decision to go public.
Title VI--H.R. 4589, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms,
and for other purposes, was introduced on July 12, 2023, by
Representative Bryan Steil
Title VI would require proxy advisory firms to register
with the SEC. It would also establish protocols for managing
conflicts of interest and mandate the disclosure of certain
information.
Background
The outsized influence of proxy advisory firms, such as
Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, within the
proxy voting system has sparked concerns regarding bias and
accountability. These firms dominate 97 percent of the market
and significantly shape the voting decisions of institutional
investors, impacting the fairness and transparency of corporate
governance. Their escalating influence stems from providing
voting recommendations to time-constrained institutional
investors and the growing prevalence of passive investing,
which amplifies their sway over voting choices.
Investment advisors cannot delegate fiduciary duties to
proxy advisors without ensuring additional oversight or
involvement. Moreover, the SEC must actively oversee investment
advisors to ensure they fulfill their duties. Under this title,
proxy advisors would be required to provide economic analysis
when evaluating social and political issues, aligning their
recommendations with the fiduciary obligations of investment
advisors.
This title also bolsters transparency and accountability by
compelling proxy advisors to share draft reports with issuers,
disclose methodologies and information sources, and publish
annual reports summarizing their activities. These measures
seek to enhance the clarity and responsibility of proxy
advisory firms in the corporate governance landscape.
Title VII--H.R. 4590, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose
material information in connection with proxy voting advice,
and for other purposes, was introduced on July 12, 2023, by
Representative Bryan Steil
Title VII amends section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to state that any failure to disclose material
information or the inclusion of material misstatements in proxy
voting advice would be deemed false or misleading concerning
material facts under section 18.
Background
Proxy advisory firms wield significant influence in shaping
the voting decisions of institutional investors, who heavily
rely on their recommendations. Inaccurate or incomplete
information provided by these firms could lead to ill-informed
decisions by investors, potentially resulting in adverse
effects on their investments. Introducing liability for proxy
advisory firms becomes crucial in safeguarding investors,
preserving market integrity, fostering transparency, and
establishing legal recourse for cases involving erroneous or
misleading proxy voting guidance.
Holding proxy advisory firms accountable for material
misstatements or non-disclosures serves as a pivotal measure to
foster accuracy, objectivity, and independence in their
recommendations. This title aims to protect the interests of
shareholders and bolster confidence in the corporate governance
process.
Title VIII--H.R. 4648, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to provide for duties of certain investment advisors,
asset managers, and pension funds with respect to voting on
shareholder proposals, and for other purposes, was introduced
on July 14, 2023, by Representative Barry Loudermilk
Title VIII requires that proxy advisor clients furnish
beneficiaries and customers with annual reports detailing their
voting behavior on shareholder proposals and whether those
votes align with the recommendations provided by proxy
advisors. Additionally, larger entities are required to conduct
economic analyses for votes contrary to board recommendations,
which will subsequently be made public.
Background
Ensuring transparency and accountability necessitates the
mandatory publication of detailed annual reports by proxy
advisory firm clients. These reports should encompass certain
data, including the percentage of votes cast in accordance with
proxy advisory recommendations, the percentage of votes
supporting ESG-related shareholder proposals, and an
elucidation of how firms reconcile their votes with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best economic interest of
shareholders. Such comprehensive reporting empowers investors
with invaluable insights into the decision-making processes of
proxy advisory firm clients, enabling them to assess whether
these firms are meeting their fiduciary obligations
effectively.
Similarly, larger asset managers must exhibit their
commitment to accountability and transparency by publicly
disclosing the economic analysis underpinning their shareholder
voting decisions. The ESG Working Group led by Republicans on
the Committee on Financial Services has highlighted instances
where the boards of several asset managers recommended voting
against certain proposals at their annual meetings, while their
investment arms voted in favor of identical proposals at other
companies. By sharing the rationale behind their voting
decisions, including the financial considerations informing
their opposition to boards of independent directors, asset
managers should clarify these inconsistencies and empower
shareholders to comprehend how economic interests are
prioritized. This elevated level of transparency fosters trust
and enables investors to evaluate the alignment of voting
decisions with their individual financial objectives
effectively.
Title IX--H.R. 4656, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act, was
introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Zach Nunn
Title IX prohibits robo-voting, the automated practice of
casting proxy votes based solely on recommendations from proxy
advisory firms. Additionally, it clarifies that individuals are
not obligated to cast votes on proxy materials.
Background
Investment advisers bear the ultimate responsibility for
overseeing the proxy advisory firms they retain. While the
SEC's Staff Legal Bulletin 20 provides a foundation for this
responsibility, it's essential to examine whether institutional
investors genuinely fulfill their fiduciary duties when relying
on these firms' recommendations. Concern arises when
institutional investors unquestioningly follow proxy advisory
recommendations without conducting thorough evaluations. This
rushed approach not only undermines the quality of decision-
making but also hampers companies' ability to effectively
challenge the factual accuracy of proxy advisor
recommendations.
While proxy advisory firms have a role in the proxy voting
analysis, they should not wield undue influence over voting
decisions. Institutional investors hold the responsibility to
diligently assess recommendations and ensure alignment with
their clients' best interests. By eliminating the robo-voting
mechanism, this title will compel institutional investors to
critically evaluate proxy advisory firm recommendations,
fostering due diligence and safeguarding the financial
interests of retail investors.
Title X--H.R. 4645, the Empowering Shareholders Act, was introduced on
July 14, 2023, by Representative Bill Huizenga
Title X requires investment advisers to vote proxies in
accordance with issuer voting instructions for covered
securities held by passive index funds, allowing exceptions for
routine matters or when beneficial owners' voting instructions
dictate otherwise.
Background
The dominant position held by the Big Three asset managers
in the index fund market gives them unparalleled influence,
collectively representing about a quarter of the shareholder
votes in most S&P 500 companies during shareholder meetings.
However, passive index funds are inherently passive by design.
Their objective is not to select winners and losers but to
replicate the underlying index's performance more broadly.
Consequently, utilizing these funds as a platform to advance
specific social and political ideologies may deviate from the
core essence of passive investing and potentially divert
management attention from maximizing investor returns.
This discrepancy in the intended nature of passive index
funds raises concerns regarding the prioritization of political
ideologies over the financial interests of retail investors by
proxy advisors. Hence, it is crucial to take steps to preserve
these funds' integrity and ensure their alignment with true
passive investment objectives. For instance, when an investment
adviser has proxy voting authority linked to a passively
managed fund, deference should be given to board
recommendations on shareholder proposals associated with social
or political policy issues.
Title X aligns with this principle, upholding the essence
of passive investing. This safeguards the long-term financial
health of these funds and prevents them from being used as a
platform to advocate social or political preferences.
Title XI--H.R. 4600, the Protecting Retail Investors' Savings Act, was
introduced on July 13, 2023, by Representative Andy Barr
Title XI amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to
specify requirements regarding the consideration of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary factors. It grants investors the option to
consent to the utilization of non-pecuniary factors in
decision-making. Additionally, it mandates the SEC to conduct
comprehensive studies on climate change and other environmental
disclosures within the municipal bond market, as well as on the
solicitation of municipal securities business.
Background
Investment advisers bear a fiduciary duty to act in the
best financial interest of their clients. Title XI is designed
to ensure that investment advisers do not prioritize non-
financial objectives over financial returns without explicit
consent of their clients. Furthermore, this title mandates the
provision of information to clients regarding the anticipated
pecuniary impacts, along with all associated fees, costs, and
other expenses incurred due to the consideration of non-
pecuniary factors. Such requirements will safeguard investors
from potential adverse consequences and guarantee that ESG
investing does not compromise the fiduciary duty of investment
advisers.
In addition, this title directs the SEC to conduct studies
focusing on climate change and other environmental disclosures
within the municipal bond market. These studies are pivotal in
evaluating the influence of ESG-related factors on municipal
bond investments and assessing the accuracy and reliability of
climate change disclosures for investors.
Hearing
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
hearing was used to develop H.R. 4767: The Subcommittee on
Capital Markets of the Committee on Financial Services held a
hearing on July 13, 2023, titled ``Reforming the Proxy Process
to Safeguard Investor Interests.''
Committee Consideration
The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on
July 27, 2023, and ordered H.R. 4767 to be reported favorably
to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21
nays (Record vote no. FC-91), a quorum being present. Before
the question was called to order the bill favorably reported,
the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a
substitute offered by Mr. Steil by voice vote.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.R.
4767 was ordered reported favorably to the House as amended by
a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC-91),
a quorum being present.
An amendment offered by Mr. Vargas, no. 13, was not agreed
to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays
(Record vote no. FC-90).
An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 14, was not agreed
to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays
(Record vote no. FC-90).
An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 15, was not agreed
to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays
(Record vote no. FC-90).
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 4767 is to enact
measures aimed at preserving the integrity of the proxy voting
process by reducing the impact of political activists, proxy
advisory firms, and the SEC in introducing political elements
into proxy voting.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
The Committee has requested but not received a cost
estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been
prepared.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
The Committee has requested but not received an estimate
from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However,
pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, once an estimate has been prepared by
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, as required by
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1973, the
Committee will adopt as its own the estimate of new budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the
Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act. The Committee will adopt the estimate once
it has been prepared by the Director.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Earmark Identification
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the
rule.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
This section cites H.R. 4767 as the ``Protecting Americans'
Retirement Savings from Politics Act.'' This section also
provides the table of contents for the separate bills that make
up H.R. 4767.
Section 101. Exclusion of certain substantially similar shareholder
proposals
This section mandates the SEC to modify its resubmission
criteria concerning shareholder proposals within the context of
proxy or consent solicitations for company shareholder
meetings. The section grants issuers the authority to omit a
shareholder proposal from their proxy materials if the proposal
substantially covers the same subject matter as a prior
proposal included in the proxy materials for meetings held
within the preceding five years. The exclusion criteria are
based on the frequency of voting on the same or similar
proposals and the level of support received from shareholders
in those instances. Specifically, if a proposal has been voted
on once within the five-year period and garnered less than 10
percent of the votes cast, or if voted on multiple times and
received less than 20 percent or 40 percent of the votes cast
based on the number of occurrences, the issuer is permitted to
exclude a substantially similar proposal from its proxy
materials for the upcoming shareholder meeting.
Section 201. Exclusion of certain shareholder proposals
This section formalizes two exclusion criteria utilized by
the SEC for shareholder proposals. First, it confirms that
issuers have the right to exclude a shareholder proposal from
their proxy or consent solicitation materials for shareholder
meetings if the proposal has been substantially implemented by
the issuer. This implementation involves adopting policies,
practices, or procedures that align with the proposal's
guidelines and address its underlying concerns. Second, it
grants issuers the ability to exclude a shareholder proposal if
it substantially duplicates another proposal previously
submitted to the issuer by a different proponent and slated for
inclusion in the meeting materials.
Additionally, the section nullifies the SEC's ability to
finalize, implement, or issue rules similar to those contained
in a proposed rule titled ``Substantial Implementation,
Duplication, and Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals under
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8'' (87 Fed. Reg. 45052). It restricts
the SEC from applying or considering substantially similar
rules, including in cases involving no-action requests or
interpretations.
Section 301. Exclusion of certain ESG shareholder proposals
This section permits an issuer to exclude a shareholder
proposal from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a
shareholder meeting if the proposal pertains to environmental,
social, or political subject matter, or a similar category of
subject matter.
Section 401. Exclusions available regardless of significant social
policy issue
This section enables companies to exclude a shareholder
proposal based on Rule 14a-8 exclusion criteria, regardless of
whether the shareholder proposal pertains to a significant
social policy issue.
Section 501. Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder
proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process
This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
directing the SEC to conduct comprehensive studies every five
years on shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the
proxy process. They will examine various aspects, such as
financial incentives, impacts on retail investors, the
influence of proxy advisors, costs to issuers, thresholds for
shareholder proponents, effects on operating costs and company
decisions, potential impacts on the economy, and the regulatory
oversight of proxy advisors. The section also requires the SEC
to issue reports to specific congressional committees after
completing each study.
Section 601. Registration of proxy advisory firms
This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
mandating the registration of proxy advisory firms with the
SEC. It outlines the application process, requiring proxy
advisors to furnish certifications of accuracy, procedures
ensuring alignment of voting advice with shareholders' best
economic interest, organizational structure details,
disclosures regarding conflicts of interest, and staff
qualifications. The SEC is mandated to review these
applications within specified timeframes.
Additionally, registered firms are required to promptly
update their registration for any materially inaccurate
information and annually certify its accuracy. Furthermore,
this section grants the SEC authority to censure, limit
activities, suspend, or revoke the registration of firms found
violating regulations, lacking financial resources, or
possessing conflicts of interest detrimental to investors.
Moreover, this section mandates proxy advisory firms to
establish policies for managing and publicly disclosing
conflicts of interest. The SEC is obligated to issue rules
specifically addressing such conflicts within a year.
This section also establishes reliability standards for
proxy advisory services, including access to issuer
information, the presence of an ombudsman, and the disclosure
of unresolved issuer complaints in client reports.
Additionally, it provides a private right of action concerning
proxy advisor recommendations violating state or federal law.
It also requires proxy advisory firms to designate a compliance
officer, prohibits certain unfair, coercive, or abusive
conduct, mandates proxy advisors to provide specific statements
on their financial condition, and publishes an annual report
summarizing their voting recommendations.
Section 701. Liability for certain failures to disclose material
information or making of material misstatements
This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
specify that the failure to disclose material information--such
as a proxy voting advice business's methodology, sources of
information, or conflicts of interest--or the issuance of a
material misstatement regarding proxy voting advice directed at
a security holder's vote, consent, or authorization on a
specific matter for which approval is sought from security
holders, will be considered false or misleading concerning a
material fact.
Section 801. Duties of investment advisors, asset managers, and pension
funds
This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
mandating disclosure requirements for institutional investment
managers engaging proxy advisory firms and exercising voting
power concerning equity securities. It mandates these managers
to file an annual report with the SEC containing detailed
explanations of their voting practices related to shareholder
proposals. The report must include information such as the
alignment of voting with proxy advisory firm recommendations,
the consideration of these recommendations in voting decisions,
the reconciliation of votes with shareholders' economic
interests, and the involvement of investment professionals in
voting decisions. Additionally, larger institutional investment
managers meeting specific value criteria are required to
provide customer clarifications regarding voting obligations,
conduct economic analyses before voting on shareholder
proposals, and include these analyses in their annual reports.
Each report is to be certified by the institution's Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. The section
defines ``best economic interest'' as decisions aiming to
maximize investment returns in alignment with the fund's
investment objectives and risk profile.
Section 901. Requirements related to proxy voting
This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
mandating the SEC to issue definitive regulations prohibiting
the practice of ``robovoting'' concerning proxy or consent
solicitations. Robovoting is defined as the automatic casting
of votes in accordance with a proxy advisory firm's
recommendations or pre-filling votes on a proxy advisory firm's
electronic platform without independent review and analysis.
Additionally, this section prohibits institutional investors
from outsourcing their voting decisions regarding proxy or
consent solicitation materials. It also establishes that no
individual can be compelled to cast votes on such materials.
Furthermore, it specifies that proxy advisory firms must
calculate vote results for proxy or consent solicitation
materials concerning an issuer in compliance with the laws of
the state in which the issuer is incorporated.
Section 1001. Proxy voting of passively managed funds
This section amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to
specify how investment advisers must handle proxy voting for
passively managed funds. It mandates advisers to vote according
to the beneficial owner's instructions, the issuer's voting
directions, or abstain, with exceptions for routine matters.
Additionally, it offers a safe harbor, shielding advisers from
liabilities related to soliciting voting instructions or voting
based on issuer guidance on non-routine matters.
Section 1101. Best interest based on pecuniary factors
This section amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to
specify criteria for determining a customer's best interest
based on pecuniary factors. It states that the best interest of
a customer must primarily consider financial factors and cannot
be subordinated to or limited by non-financial factors unless
the customer explicitly consents in writing to consider such
non-pecuniary factors. If a customer provides this consent, the
broker, dealer, or investment adviser must disclose the
expected financial effects of these non-pecuniary factors over
a period selected by the customer, up to three years.
Additionally, at the end of this period, they must disclose the
actual financial effects, including fees, costs, and expenses
incurred due to considering these non-pecuniary factors,
compared to a comparable index or basket of securities chosen
by the customer. The term ``pecuniary factor'' is defined as a
factor that a fiduciary reasonably determines will materially
affect an investment's risk or return based on appropriate
investment timelines. The section directs the SEC to create or
adjust rules within 12 months of the bill's enactment to
implement these changes.
Section 1102. Study on climate change and other environmental
disclosures in municipal bond market
This section mandates the SEC to conduct a comprehensive
study focused on disclosures made by issuers of municipal
securities regarding climate change and other environmental
aspects. The SEC is required to examine how frequently these
disclosures are made, assessing whether they align with
disclosures made in different contexts or to audiences beyond
investors. The study will also delve into voluntary or
mandatory disclosure standards adopted by issuers and analyze
the extent to which investors take these disclosures into
account when making investment decisions. Additionally, the SEC
is empowered to include any other pertinent information they
deem relevant for this investigation.
Within a year of the bill's enactment, the SEC must present
a report to the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs and the House of Representatives' Committee on
Financial Services. This report will encompass the study's
findings, a detailed exploration of the financial risks
associated with investing in municipal securities, an
assessment of whether these risks are adequately disclosed to
investors, and recommendations for potential regulatory or
legislative actions to address any concerns highlighted in the
study.
Section 1103. Study on solicitation of municipal securities business
This section directs the SEC to conduct a study assessing
the effectiveness of specific rules aimed at preventing the
exchange of funds to elected officials or candidates in return
for government business related to the offer or sale of
municipal securities. The SEC is tasked with evaluating the
impact of these rules, including their intended effects and any
unintended adverse consequences. The study will investigate the
enforcement actions taken under these rules, analyze compliance
policies of entities subject to these rules, and examine how
these rules affect participation in the political process in
comparison to those soliciting government business unrelated to
municipal securities. Additionally, the study will consider the
influence of other state and federal laws on the solicitation
of municipal securities business and any other pertinent
information as determined by the SEC.
Within a year of the bill's enactment, the SEC is required
to present a report to the Senate's Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House of Representatives'
Committee on Financial Services. This report will contain the
study's findings, an analysis of the impact of these rules on
small businesses, including minority and women-owned
businesses, and recommendations for potential regulatory or
legislative actions to address any identified concerns.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
TITLE I--REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES
* * * * * * *
definitions and application of title
Sec. 3. (a) When used in this title, unless the context
otherwise requires--
(1) The term ``exchange'' means any organization,
association, or group of persons, whether incorporated
or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or
provides a market place or facilities for bringing
together purchasers and sellers of securities or for
otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as
that term is generally understood, and includes the
market place and the market facilities maintained by
such exchange.
(2) The term ``facility'' when used with respect to
an exchange includes its premises, tangible or
intangible property whether on the premises or not, any
right to the use of such premises or property or any
service thereof for the purpose of effecting or
reporting a transaction on an exchange (including,
among other things, any system of communication to or
from the exchange, by ticker or otherwise, maintained
by or with the consent of the exchange), and any right
of the exchange to the use of any property or service.
(3)(A) The term ``member'' when used with respect to
a national securities exchange means (i) any natural
person permitted to effect transactions on the floor of
the exchange without the services of another person
acting
Minority Views
This bill is part of the Republican war on so-called ``woke
capitalism.'' H.R. 4767 would make it harder for shareholders
to offer proposals to strengthen the companies that they own,
targeting shareholder proposals that push companies to be more
diverse, more inclusive, better managed, and more concerned
about their impact on our climate. These are all issues that
research has demonstrated have a significant impact on a
company's profitability. For example, corporations that are
actively managing and planning for climate change--which
includes providing public climate-related disclosures--secure
an 18% higher return on investment than companies that aren't--
and 67% higher than companies who refuse to disclose their
emissions.\1\ Furthermore, research shows that diverse boards
lead to improved financial results; indeed, companies with the
highest percentages of women board directors outperformed those
with the least by 53% when it comes to return on equity.\2\
Ultimately, this bill runs counter to the most basic principles
of capitalism and democracy by taking away the ability of the
holders of capital--investors--from being able to influence
corporate decisions and make informed investment decisions.
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\1\The Guardian, ``Sustainable corporations perform better
financially, report finds'' (accessed Sep. 25, 2023).
\2\BoardReady, Lessons from the Pandemic: Board Diversity and
Performance, (Jul. 13, 2021).
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In addition to making it harder for shareholders to offer
proposals this bill also places burdensome new requirements on
proxy advisory firms, which provide independent analysis and
data to help shareholders and their representatives to make
informed voting decisions on the proposals that are voted on at
a company's annual meeting. Proxy advisory firms level the
playing field for investors as their research and
recommendations offer an independent perspective on proposals
that can differ from what management is recommending. Proxy
advisory firms effectively provide a check on management's
ability to influence votes in their favor, overall increasing
ordinary investors' say in the corporate decision-making
process. This bill caters to corporate managers who don't want
to be bothered by the true owners of the company they run and
who dislike the fact that proxy advisory firms help
shareholders get information and analysis beyond what corporate
managers provide.
The bill is comprised of eleven titles, each briefly
discussed below.
Title I is a direct attempt by Republicans
and the corporate managerial class to limit the ability
of shareholders to influence the direction of the
companies they are invested in. This title would
increase the thresholds to resubmit a proposal, in
effect, making it harder for shareholders to have their
proposals included in a company's annual meeting.
Title II, like Title I, also makes it harder
for shareholders to have their proposals included in a
company's annual meeting. Specifically, this title
nullifies the SEC's pending amendments\3\ to its
shareholder proposal rule regarding implementation,
duplication, and resubmission.
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\3\Sidley, SEC Proposes Amendments to the Substantial
Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission Bases (Jul. 2022).
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Title III directly limits shareholders'
ability to call for votes on environmental, social, or
corporate governance (``ESG'') -related topics--in the
process making management less accountable to the
desires of their investors. Research shows that the
vast majority of investors want companies to disclose
information about what they are doing to combat climate
risk, instate diverse workforces, and invest in their
employees.\4\
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\4\PRNewswire, Nuveen ESG Investor Survey (Feb. 2, 2023).
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Title IV would allow company management to
wholesale exclude any shareholder proposal related to
ESG issues.
Title V asks the SEC to use economic cost-
benefit analysis to examine the totality of the proxy
process; cost-benefit analyses are often used by
conservative policy makers as a justification to strike
down regulations they find unfavorable.\5\ Cost-benefit
analyses are also often flawed because the full impact
of many regulations is hard to quantify accurately;
they disregard benefits, such as stronger corporate
governance or the long term impacts on climate change,
that can be difficult to measure but are still critical
to the goals of regulation.\6\
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\5\Center for American Progress, Reckoning With Conservatives' Bad
Faith Cost-Benefit Analysis (Aug. 2020).
\6\Id.
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Title VI would compromise the independence
of proxy advisory firms by inserting corporate
management into their decision-making process. Proxy
advisors are a valuable part of our capital markets in
large part because they are independent. They help
provide independent advice to shareholders to help them
make more informed voting decisions.
Title VII makes proxy advisors liable for
failures to disclose material information (such as a
proxy advisor's methodology, sources of information,
and conflicts of interest) or making material
misstatements regarding that advice.
Title VIII would effectively discourage the
use of proxy advisors by requiring extensive and
burdensome reporting for institutional investors who
choose to utilize the services of a proxy advisor. The
title needlessly requires institutional investors who
hire proxy advisors to certify that their voting
decisions were based solely on the best economic
interest of the shareholders they represent; to be
clear, institutional investment managers already have
existing fiduciary duties and legal obligations to vote
proxies in accordance with the best interests of their
beneficiaries.
Title IX outlaws the ability of investment
advisers, asset managers, and pension funds--who do not
have the ability to conduct their own independent
investment research given the sheer number of proxies
they must cast on behalf of their investors--to trust
the advice of their proxy advisors, and straps the
former with the burden of having to conduct their own
research which is costly and likely not to be as high
quality as the research provided by the expert proxy
advisors whom they outsource this task to.\7\
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\7\Id.
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Title X effectively prevents investment
advisers that vote on behalf of shares held by
passively managed funds--funds that merely track an
industry or market index rather than employing an
active buy-or-sell strategy--from voting based on the
advice of a proxy advisor.
Title XI, amongst other things, prevents an
investment adviser from considering ESG-related metrics
when investing their client's money. Furthermore, the
latter part of the title is just another attempt by
Republicans to limit the availability of investors to
see information related to climate risk as well as to
prevent shareholders from having a say in corporate
decision-making, this time within the context of
municipal (ie, government-issued) bonds.
Democratic members offered three amendments to this bill,
all of which Republicans rejected:
1. An amendment offered by Rep. Vargas which prohibits the
bill from taking effect if the SEC's economic analysis of the
bill concludes the bill would limit information that investors
consider material or limit the ability for shareholders to
submit proposals.
2. An amendment offered by Rep. Casten that prohibits the
bill from going into effect unless the SEC has determined that
no provisions in the bill will negatively affect State pension
fund earnings, increase municipal borrowing costs and
indirectly increase costs to taxpayers.
3. An amendment offered by Rep. Casten expressing a sense
of Congress that praises the virtues of capitalism and
expresses concerns that government should not interfere with
investor choice and market forces.
H.R. 4767 is opposed by several groups, including (but not
limited to): Americans for Financial Reform, Better Markets, US
SIF, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Ceres,
OUT Leadership, the US Impact Investing Alliance, the
Shareholder Rights Group, Green America, PRI, the Family Farm
Defenders, Food and Water Watch, the Institute for Agriculture
and Trade Policy, and the Union for Concerned Scientists.
For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 4767.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member, Committee on
Financial Services.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Brad Sherman,
Gregory W. Meeks,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Emanuel Cleaver II,
Bill Foster,
Juan Vargas,
David Scott,
Al Green,
Jim Himes,
Joyce Beatty,
Vicente Gonzalez,
Sean Casten,
Rashida Tlaib,
Nikema Williams,
Ayanna Pressley,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Brittany Pettersen.
Members of Congress.
[all]