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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-324

PROTECTING AMERICANS' RETIREMENT SAVINGS FROM POLITICS ACT

2023-12-19

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[To accompany H.R. 4767] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4767) to make revisions to the Federal securities laws with respect to shareholder proposals, proxy voting, and the registration of proxy advisory firms, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents. TITLE I--PERFORMANCE OVER POLITICS Sec. 101. Exclusion of certain substantially similar shareholder proposals. TITLE II--NO EXPENSIVE, STIFLING GOVERNANCE Sec. 201. Exclusion of certain shareholder proposals. TITLE III--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS Sec. 301. Exclusion of certain ESG shareholder proposals. TITLE IV--EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE Sec. 401. Exclusions available regardless of significant social policy issue. TITLE V--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION Sec. 501. Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process. TITLE VI--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS Sec. 601. Registration of proxy advisory firms. TITLE VII--LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS Sec. 701. Liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements. TITLE VIII--DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION FUNDS Sec. 801. Duties of investment advisors, asset managers, and pension funds. TITLE IX--PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS Sec. 901. Requirements related to proxy voting. TITLE X--EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS Sec. 1001. Proxy voting of passively managed funds. TITLE XI--PROTECTING RETAIL INVESTORS' SAVINGS Sec. 1101. Best interest based on pecuniary factors. Sec. 1102. Study on climate change and other environmental disclosures in municipal bond market. Sec. 1103. Study on solicitation of municipal securities business. TITLE I--PERFORMANCE OVER POLITICS SEC. 101. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall revise the resubmission requirements in section 240.14a-8(i)(12) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, to provide that a shareholder proposal may be excluded by an issuer from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of the shareholders of such issuer if the shareholder proposal addresses substantially the same subject matter as a proposal, or proposals, previously included in the proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of the shareholders of such issuer-- (1) for a meeting of the shareholders conducted in the preceding 5 calendar years; and (2) if the most recent vote-- (A) occurred in the preceding 3 calendar years; and (B)(i) if voted on once during such 5-year period, received less than 10 percent of the votes cast; (ii) if voted on twice during such 5-year period, received less than 20 percent of the votes cast; or (iii) if voted on three or more times during such 5- year period, received less than 40 percent of the votes cast. TITLE II--NO EXPENSIVE, STIFLING GOVERNANCE SEC. 201. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS. (a) Exclusion of Certain Shareholder Proposals.--A shareholder proposal submitted to an issuer pursuant to section 240.14a-8 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, may be excluded by an issuer from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of the shareholders of such issuer if the shareholder proposal-- (1) has been substantially implemented by the issuer by implementing policies, practices, or procedures that compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal and address the proposal's underlying concerns; or (2) substantially duplicates by having the same principal thrust or principal focus as another proposal previously submitted to the issuer by another proponent that will be included in such material. (b) Nullification of Proposed Rule.--The Securities and Exchange Commission may not finalize or apply the positions contained in the proposed rule entitled ``Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8'' (87 Fed. Reg. 45052), issue any substantially similar rule, or apply any substantially similar rule, including with respect to a no-action or other interpretive request. TITLE III--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS SEC. 301. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ESG SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS. A shareholder proposal submitted to an issuer pursuant to section 240.14a-8 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, may be excluded by an issuer from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of the shareholders of such issuer if the subject matter of the shareholder proposal is environmental, social, or political (or a similar subject matter). TITLE IV--EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE SEC. 401. EXCLUSIONS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE. An issuer may exclude a shareholder proposal pursuant to section 240.14a-8(i) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard to whether such shareholder proposal relates to a significant social policy issue. TITLE V--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION SEC. 501. STUDY OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS, AND THE PROXY PROCESS. Section 4(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78d(j)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(10) Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process.-- ``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study on shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process. ``(B) Scope of study.--The studies required under subparagraph (A) shall cover-- ``(i) the previous 10 years, with respect to the initial study; and ``(ii) the previous 5 years, with respect to each other study. ``(C) Contents.--Each study required under subparagraph (A) shall address the following issues: ``(i) The financial and other incentives and obligations of all groups involved in the proxy process. ``(ii) A consideration of whether financial and other incentives have created a process that no longer serves the economic interests of long-term retail investors. ``(iii) An analysis of whether regulations and financial incentives have created and protected the outsized influence of proxy advisors or a duopoly in proxy advice, and if so, what are the benefits and costs of that outsized influence or duopoly. ``(iv) The costs incurred by issuers in responding to politically-, environmentally-, or socially-motivated shareholder proposals. ``(v) An assessment, including a cost-benefit analysis, of the adequacy of the current submission thresholds in Rule 14a-8 (17 CFR 240.14a-8) to ensure that shareholder proponents have demonstrated a meaningful economic stake in a company, which is appropriate to effectively serve markets and shareholders at large. ``(vi) An examination of the extent to which the politicization of the shareholder proposal process is increasing the operating costs of public companies. ``(vii) An analysis of the impact that shareholder proposals have on discouraging private companies from going public. ``(viii) An evaluation of the risk that shareholder proposals may contribute to the balkanization of the U.S. economy over time. ``(ix) A thorough assessment of the economic analysis, if any, conducted by proxy advisory firms and institutional shareholders when recommending or voting in favor of shareholder proposals. ``(x) A review of the extent to which institutional investors, who owe fiduciary duties, rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations. ``(xi) An assessment of whether, in light of their significant influence on corporate actions and vote outcomes, proxy advisors are subject to sufficient and effective regulation to ensure that their policies and recommendations are accurate, free of conflicts, and benefit the economic best interest of shareholders at large. ``(D) Report.--At the completion of each study required under subparagraph (A) the Commission shall issue a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that includes the results of the study.''. TITLE VI--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS SEC. 601. REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS. (a) Amendment.--The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15G the following new section: ``SEC. 15H. REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS. ``(a) Conduct Prohibited.--It shall be unlawful for a proxy advisory firm to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to provide proxy voting advice, research, analysis, ratings or recommendations to any client, unless such proxy advisory firm is registered under this section. ``(b) Registration Procedures.-- ``(1) Application for registration.-- ``(A) In general.--A proxy advisory firm shall file with the Commission an application for registration, in such form as the Commission shall require, by rule, and containing the information described in subparagraph (B). ``(B) Required information.--An application for registration under this section shall contain-- ``(i) a certification that the applicant is able to consistently provide proxy advice based on accurate information; ``(ii) with respect to clients of the applicant that vote shares held on behalf of shareholders, a certification that the applicant-- ``(I) will provide proxy voting advice only in the best economic interest of those shareholders; and ``(II) has the requisite expertise to ensure that voting recommendations are in the best economic interest of those shareholders; ``(iii) information on the procedures and methodologies that the applicant uses to ensure that proxy voting recommendations are in the best economic interest of the ultimate shareholders; ``(iv) information on the organizational structure of the applicant; ``(v) an explanation of whether or not the applicant has in effect a code of ethics, and if not, the reasons therefor; ``(vi) a description of any potential or actual conflict of interest relating to the provision of proxy advisory services, including those arising out of or resulting from the ownership structure of the applicant or the provision of other services by the applicant or any person associated with the applicant; ``(vii) the policies and procedures in place to publicly disclose and manage conflicts of interest under subsection (f); ``(viii) information related to the professional and academic qualifications of staff tasked with providing proxy advisory services; and ``(ix) any other information and documents concerning the applicant and any person associated with such applicant as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. ``(2) Review of application.-- ``(A) Initial determination.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the application for registration is filed with the Commission under paragraph (1) (or within such longer period as to which the applicant consents) the Commission shall-- ``(i) by order, grant registration; or ``(ii) institute proceedings to determine whether registration should be denied. ``(B) Conduct of proceedings.-- ``(i) Content.--Proceedings referred to in subparagraph (A)(ii) shall-- ``(I) include notice of the grounds for denial under consideration and an opportunity for hearing; and ``(II) be concluded not later than 120 days after the date on which the application for registration is filed with the Commission under paragraph (1). ``(ii) Determination.--At the conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission, by order, shall grant or deny such application for registration. ``(iii) Extension authorized.--The Commission may extend the time for conclusion of such proceedings for not longer than 90 days, if the Commission finds good cause for such extension and publishes its reasons for so finding, or for such longer period as to which the applicant consents. ``(C) Grounds for decision.--The Commission shall grant registration under this subsection-- ``(i) if the Commission finds that the requirements of this section are satisfied; and ``(ii) unless the Commission finds (in which case the Commission shall deny such registration) that-- ``(I) the applicant has failed to certify to the Commission's satisfaction that it is able to consistently provide proxy advice based on accurate information and to materially comply with the procedures and methodologies disclosed under paragraph (1)(B) and with subsections (f) and (g); or ``(II) if the applicant were so registered, its registration would be subject to suspension or revocation under subsection (d). ``(3) Public availability of information.--Subject to section 24, the Commission shall make the information and documents submitted to the Commission by a proxy advisory firm in its completed application for registration, or in any amendment submitted under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), publicly available on the Commission's website, or through another comparable, readily accessible means. ``(c) Update of Registration.-- ``(1) Update.--Each registered proxy advisory firm shall promptly amend and update its application for registration under this section if any information or document provided therein becomes materially inaccurate, except that a registered proxy advisory firm is not required to amend the information required to be filed under subsection (b)(1)(B)(i) by filing information under this paragraph, but shall amend such information in the annual submission of the organization under paragraph (2) of this subsection. ``(2) Certification.--Not later than 90 calendar days after the end of each calendar year, each registered proxy advisory firm shall file with the Commission an amendment to its registration, in such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for

Purpose and Summary

Introduced on July 20, 2023, by Representative Bryan Steil, H.R. 4767, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act, would enact measures aimed at preserving the integrity of the proxy voting process by reducing the impact of political activists, proxy advisory firms, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in introducing political elements into proxy voting.

Background and Need for Legislation

H.R. 4767 is a compilation of 11 previously introduced bills, including: H.R. 4641, the Performance Over Politics Act H.R. 4644, the No Expensive, Stifling Governance (No ESG) Act H.R. 4640, a bill to authorize the exclusion of shareholder proposals from proxy or consent solicitation material if the subject matter of the shareholder proposal is environmental, social, or political H.R. 4657, a bill to clarify that an issuer may exclude a shareholder proposal pursuant to section 240.14a-8(i) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard to whether such proposal relates to a significant social policy issue H.R. 4662, the Corporate Governance Examination Act H.R. 4589, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms, and for other purposes H.R. 4590, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose material information in connection with proxy voting advice, and for other purposes H.R. 4648, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for duties of certain investment advisors, asset managers, and pension funds with respect to voting on shareholder proposals, and for other purposes H.R. 4656, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act H.R. 4645, the Empowering Shareholders Act H.R. 4600, the Protecting Retail Investors' Savings Act The shareholder proxy process has lost its effectiveness in efficiently promoting long-term shareholder value. At present, unbridled shareholder activism diverts attention and resources away from core business matters, ultimately eroding the appeal of U.S. markets and discouraging companies from pursuing public offerings. The SEC has exacerbated this problem by promulgating changes that facilitate the inclusion of politically motivated shareholder proposals in annual proxy statements while also rolling back crucial reforms to proxy solicitation rules. This shift towards advancing environmental, social, and political agendas detracts from the primary purpose of public markets, which is to enable companies to raise capital and stimulate economic growth. H.R. 4767 represents a vital step in addressing these challenges. It seeks to curb the influence of activists, proxy firms, and the SEC in politicizing the proxy process, which will enable companies and their shareholders to refocus on the fundamental issues that drive growth and long-term value creation. Title I--H.R. 4641, the Performance Over Politics Act, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Scott Fitzgerald Title I of the bill raises the resubmission thresholds for shareholder proposals that have faced repeated rejections by a substantial majority of shareholders.

Background

The costs associated with shareholder proposals are significant. Apart from diverting management's attention from long-term value creation, immaterial shareholder proposals often siphon capital away from crucial initiatives like research, development, and corporate strategy. When management discussions are inundated with numerous immaterial proposals, it detracts from addressing economically significant matters. These expenses escalate significantly when ideological or political shareholder proposals undergo repeated resubmissions, placing added strain on both the company and its shareholders. According to the 2020 update to Rule 14a-8(i)(12), companies can potentially exclude similar shareholder proposals based on the levels of support they receive-less than 5 percent, 15 percent, or 25 percent-when proposed once, twice, or three or more times within the previous five years. Despite this rule, the current influence of proxy advisors effectively hinders companies from excluding numerous repeat environmental, social and governance (ESG) related proposals, regardless of prior rejections. Proxy advisor firms' endorsements frequently gather 25 percent investor support easily, perpetuating the cycle of resubmission, even if these proposals don't align with the company's long-term interests. To address these challenges, Title I aims to adjust the thresholds under Rule 14a-8(i)(12) to 10 percent, 20 percent, and 40 percent, respectively. This adjustment seeks to strike a balance between encouraging shareholder engagement and fostering a more efficient and focused decision-making process. Title II--H.R. 4644, the No Expensive, Stifling Governance Act, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Erin Houchin Title II of the bill prevents the SEC from finalizing or implementing the positions contained in a proposed rule called ``Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8'' (87 Fed. Reg. 45052).

Background

In 2022, the SEC proposed a rule to narrow the exclusion criteria available to companies under Rule 14a-8. The SEC's proposed rule would make it more difficult for companies to exclude shareholder proposals that have already been substantially implemented, are duplicative of other proposals on a given year's proxy ballot or have been rejected by a large percentage of shareholders in previous years. This proposal would benefit activists while reducing the power of issuers and long-term shareholders. Title II of the bill aims to uphold the current exclusion criteria, which would strengthen the process for companies to manage their proxy ballot by preventing an overflow of substantially implemented, duplicative, and resubmitted proposals. Title III--H.R. 4640, a bill to authorize the exclusion of shareholder proposals from proxy or consent solicitation material if the subject matter of the shareholder proposal is environmental, social, or political, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Byron Donalds Title III clarifies that companies may exclude shareholder proposals that seek to advance environmental, social, and political matters unrelated to their business.

Background

The recent rise in ESG-related proposals largely stems from SEC decisions that introduced ambiguities in the Rule 14a-8 no- action letter process. Notably, the SEC's November 2021 guidance (Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L or ``SLB 14L'') mandated the inclusion of proposals addressing ``broad societal impact,'' even if disconnected from a company's operations. Maintaining a boardroom focus on robust financial management is crucial to prevent it from evolving into a platform for partisan politics. Multiple studies have revealed a direct link between increased shareholder activism advocating social causes and diminished stock returns. Title III ensures that the proxy ballot remains dedicated to matters pertinent to long-term growth and the creation of shareholder value. Title IV--H.R. 4657, a bill to clarify that an issuer may exclude a shareholder proposal pursuant to section 240.14a-8(i) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, without regard to whether such proposal relates to a significant social policy issue, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative John Rose Title IV clarifies that Rule 14a-8 exclusions permit a company to exclude a shareholder proposal from their proxy ballot regardless of whether the SEC deems an issue a ``significant policy'' matter.

Background

In November 2021, SLB 14L rescinded the SEC's content- neutral guardrails that previously enabled companies and investors to take a company-specific approach to evaluating the relevance and suitability of shareholder proposals submitted to company proxy ballots. Instead, SLB 14L declared that the SEC would ``no longer focus on determining the nexus between a policy issue and the company.'' Instead, it mandated the inclusion of all proposals with a ``broad societal impact'' to be included on the proxy ballot when they are submitted. Consequently, politically motivated proposals surged in annual proxy statements, with a 51 percent increase in environmental proposals and a 20 percent rise in social proposals. Meanwhile, companies are now 25 percent less likely to seek SEC no-action relief. Title IV would overturn this detrimental policy, enabling companies to exclude shareholder proposals based on the Rule 14a-8 exclusion criteria, regardless of whether they pertain to a significant social policy issue. SLB 14L has incentivized activists to submit proposals entirely unrelated to long-term value creation. Reversing this change would signify a return to a proxy process focused on fostering business growth and enhancing investor value. Title V--H.R. 4662, the Corporate Governance Examination Act, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Ann Wagner Title V requires the SEC to conduct a comprehensive study focused on shareholder proposals, proxy advisors, and the proxy process. The study is to be initiated within 180 days of the bill's enactment, with subsequent reviews every five years. Initially, it will cover the previous 10 years, followed by evaluations of the previous 5 years in subsequent studies.

Background

The comprehensive study will delve into critical proxy issues including the financial incentives and responsibilities of involved parties, their impact on the long-term interests of retail investors, the influence wielded by proxy advisory firms, and the costs companies incur in response to shareholder proposals. The study will also evaluate existing submission thresholds and explore how the politicization of these matters influences a company's decision to go public. Title VI--H.R. 4589, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms, and for other purposes, was introduced on July 12, 2023, by Representative Bryan Steil Title VI would require proxy advisory firms to register with the SEC. It would also establish protocols for managing conflicts of interest and mandate the disclosure of certain information.

Background

The outsized influence of proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, within the proxy voting system has sparked concerns regarding bias and accountability. These firms dominate 97 percent of the market and significantly shape the voting decisions of institutional investors, impacting the fairness and transparency of corporate governance. Their escalating influence stems from providing voting recommendations to time-constrained institutional investors and the growing prevalence of passive investing, which amplifies their sway over voting choices. Investment advisors cannot delegate fiduciary duties to proxy advisors without ensuring additional oversight or involvement. Moreover, the SEC must actively oversee investment advisors to ensure they fulfill their duties. Under this title, proxy advisors would be required to provide economic analysis when evaluating social and political issues, aligning their recommendations with the fiduciary obligations of investment advisors. This title also bolsters transparency and accountability by compelling proxy advisors to share draft reports with issuers, disclose methodologies and information sources, and publish annual reports summarizing their activities. These measures seek to enhance the clarity and responsibility of proxy advisory firms in the corporate governance landscape. Title VII--H.R. 4590, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose material information in connection with proxy voting advice, and for other purposes, was introduced on July 12, 2023, by Representative Bryan Steil Title VII amends section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to state that any failure to disclose material information or the inclusion of material misstatements in proxy voting advice would be deemed false or misleading concerning material facts under section 18.

Background

Proxy advisory firms wield significant influence in shaping the voting decisions of institutional investors, who heavily rely on their recommendations. Inaccurate or incomplete information provided by these firms could lead to ill-informed decisions by investors, potentially resulting in adverse effects on their investments. Introducing liability for proxy advisory firms becomes crucial in safeguarding investors, preserving market integrity, fostering transparency, and establishing legal recourse for cases involving erroneous or misleading proxy voting guidance. Holding proxy advisory firms accountable for material misstatements or non-disclosures serves as a pivotal measure to foster accuracy, objectivity, and independence in their recommendations. This title aims to protect the interests of shareholders and bolster confidence in the corporate governance process. Title VIII--H.R. 4648, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for duties of certain investment advisors, asset managers, and pension funds with respect to voting on shareholder proposals, and for other purposes, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Barry Loudermilk Title VIII requires that proxy advisor clients furnish beneficiaries and customers with annual reports detailing their voting behavior on shareholder proposals and whether those votes align with the recommendations provided by proxy advisors. Additionally, larger entities are required to conduct economic analyses for votes contrary to board recommendations, which will subsequently be made public.

Background

Ensuring transparency and accountability necessitates the mandatory publication of detailed annual reports by proxy advisory firm clients. These reports should encompass certain data, including the percentage of votes cast in accordance with proxy advisory recommendations, the percentage of votes supporting ESG-related shareholder proposals, and an elucidation of how firms reconcile their votes with their fiduciary duty to act in the best economic interest of shareholders. Such comprehensive reporting empowers investors with invaluable insights into the decision-making processes of proxy advisory firm clients, enabling them to assess whether these firms are meeting their fiduciary obligations effectively. Similarly, larger asset managers must exhibit their commitment to accountability and transparency by publicly disclosing the economic analysis underpinning their shareholder voting decisions. The ESG Working Group led by Republicans on the Committee on Financial Services has highlighted instances where the boards of several asset managers recommended voting against certain proposals at their annual meetings, while their investment arms voted in favor of identical proposals at other companies. By sharing the rationale behind their voting decisions, including the financial considerations informing their opposition to boards of independent directors, asset managers should clarify these inconsistencies and empower shareholders to comprehend how economic interests are prioritized. This elevated level of transparency fosters trust and enables investors to evaluate the alignment of voting decisions with their individual financial objectives effectively. Title IX--H.R. 4656, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Zach Nunn Title IX prohibits robo-voting, the automated practice of casting proxy votes based solely on recommendations from proxy advisory firms. Additionally, it clarifies that individuals are not obligated to cast votes on proxy materials.

Background

Investment advisers bear the ultimate responsibility for overseeing the proxy advisory firms they retain. While the SEC's Staff Legal Bulletin 20 provides a foundation for this responsibility, it's essential to examine whether institutional investors genuinely fulfill their fiduciary duties when relying on these firms' recommendations. Concern arises when institutional investors unquestioningly follow proxy advisory recommendations without conducting thorough evaluations. This rushed approach not only undermines the quality of decision- making but also hampers companies' ability to effectively challenge the factual accuracy of proxy advisor recommendations. While proxy advisory firms have a role in the proxy voting analysis, they should not wield undue influence over voting decisions. Institutional investors hold the responsibility to diligently assess recommendations and ensure alignment with their clients' best interests. By eliminating the robo-voting mechanism, this title will compel institutional investors to critically evaluate proxy advisory firm recommendations, fostering due diligence and safeguarding the financial interests of retail investors. Title X--H.R. 4645, the Empowering Shareholders Act, was introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Bill Huizenga Title X requires investment advisers to vote proxies in accordance with issuer voting instructions for covered securities held by passive index funds, allowing exceptions for routine matters or when beneficial owners' voting instructions dictate otherwise.

Background

The dominant position held by the Big Three asset managers in the index fund market gives them unparalleled influence, collectively representing about a quarter of the shareholder votes in most S&P 500 companies during shareholder meetings. However, passive index funds are inherently passive by design. Their objective is not to select winners and losers but to replicate the underlying index's performance more broadly. Consequently, utilizing these funds as a platform to advance specific social and political ideologies may deviate from the core essence of passive investing and potentially divert management attention from maximizing investor returns. This discrepancy in the intended nature of passive index funds raises concerns regarding the prioritization of political ideologies over the financial interests of retail investors by proxy advisors. Hence, it is crucial to take steps to preserve these funds' integrity and ensure their alignment with true passive investment objectives. For instance, when an investment adviser has proxy voting authority linked to a passively managed fund, deference should be given to board recommendations on shareholder proposals associated with social or political policy issues. Title X aligns with this principle, upholding the essence of passive investing. This safeguards the long-term financial health of these funds and prevents them from being used as a platform to advocate social or political preferences. Title XI--H.R. 4600, the Protecting Retail Investors' Savings Act, was introduced on July 13, 2023, by Representative Andy Barr Title XI amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to specify requirements regarding the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors. It grants investors the option to consent to the utilization of non-pecuniary factors in decision-making. Additionally, it mandates the SEC to conduct comprehensive studies on climate change and other environmental disclosures within the municipal bond market, as well as on the solicitation of municipal securities business.

Background

Investment advisers bear a fiduciary duty to act in the best financial interest of their clients. Title XI is designed to ensure that investment advisers do not prioritize non- financial objectives over financial returns without explicit consent of their clients. Furthermore, this title mandates the provision of information to clients regarding the anticipated pecuniary impacts, along with all associated fees, costs, and other expenses incurred due to the consideration of non- pecuniary factors. Such requirements will safeguard investors from potential adverse consequences and guarantee that ESG investing does not compromise the fiduciary duty of investment advisers. In addition, this title directs the SEC to conduct studies focusing on climate change and other environmental disclosures within the municipal bond market. These studies are pivotal in evaluating the influence of ESG-related factors on municipal bond investments and assessing the accuracy and reliability of climate change disclosures for investors. Hearing Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 4767: The Subcommittee on Capital Markets of the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on July 13, 2023, titled ``Reforming the Proxy Process to Safeguard Investor Interests.''

Committee Consideration

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on July 27, 2023, and ordered H.R. 4767 to be reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC-91), a quorum being present. Before the question was called to order the bill favorably reported, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Steil by voice vote.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.R. 4767 was ordered reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC-91), a quorum being present. An amendment offered by Mr. Vargas, no. 13, was not agreed to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays (Record vote no. FC-90). An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 14, was not agreed to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays (Record vote no. FC-90). An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 15, was not agreed to through an en bloc recorded vote of 20 ayes to 29 nays (Record vote no. FC-90). Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 4767 is to enact measures aimed at preserving the integrity of the proxy voting process by reducing the impact of political activists, proxy advisory firms, and the SEC in introducing political elements into proxy voting. Congressional Budget Office Estimates The Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been prepared. New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures The Committee has requested but not received an estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, once an estimate has been prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, as required by section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1973, the Committee will adopt as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The Committee will adopt the estimate once it has been prepared by the Director. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Earmark Identification With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title; table of contents This section cites H.R. 4767 as the ``Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act.'' This section also provides the table of contents for the separate bills that make up H.R. 4767. Section 101. Exclusion of certain substantially similar shareholder proposals This section mandates the SEC to modify its resubmission criteria concerning shareholder proposals within the context of proxy or consent solicitations for company shareholder meetings. The section grants issuers the authority to omit a shareholder proposal from their proxy materials if the proposal substantially covers the same subject matter as a prior proposal included in the proxy materials for meetings held within the preceding five years. The exclusion criteria are based on the frequency of voting on the same or similar proposals and the level of support received from shareholders in those instances. Specifically, if a proposal has been voted on once within the five-year period and garnered less than 10 percent of the votes cast, or if voted on multiple times and received less than 20 percent or 40 percent of the votes cast based on the number of occurrences, the issuer is permitted to exclude a substantially similar proposal from its proxy materials for the upcoming shareholder meeting. Section 201. Exclusion of certain shareholder proposals This section formalizes two exclusion criteria utilized by the SEC for shareholder proposals. First, it confirms that issuers have the right to exclude a shareholder proposal from their proxy or consent solicitation materials for shareholder meetings if the proposal has been substantially implemented by the issuer. This implementation involves adopting policies, practices, or procedures that align with the proposal's guidelines and address its underlying concerns. Second, it grants issuers the ability to exclude a shareholder proposal if it substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the issuer by a different proponent and slated for inclusion in the meeting materials. Additionally, the section nullifies the SEC's ability to finalize, implement, or issue rules similar to those contained in a proposed rule titled ``Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8'' (87 Fed. Reg. 45052). It restricts the SEC from applying or considering substantially similar rules, including in cases involving no-action requests or interpretations. Section 301. Exclusion of certain ESG shareholder proposals This section permits an issuer to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy or consent solicitation material for a shareholder meeting if the proposal pertains to environmental, social, or political subject matter, or a similar category of subject matter. Section 401. Exclusions available regardless of significant social policy issue This section enables companies to exclude a shareholder proposal based on Rule 14a-8 exclusion criteria, regardless of whether the shareholder proposal pertains to a significant social policy issue. Section 501. Study of certain issues with respect to shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, directing the SEC to conduct comprehensive studies every five years on shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms, and the proxy process. They will examine various aspects, such as financial incentives, impacts on retail investors, the influence of proxy advisors, costs to issuers, thresholds for shareholder proponents, effects on operating costs and company decisions, potential impacts on the economy, and the regulatory oversight of proxy advisors. The section also requires the SEC to issue reports to specific congressional committees after completing each study. Section 601. Registration of proxy advisory firms This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, mandating the registration of proxy advisory firms with the SEC. It outlines the application process, requiring proxy advisors to furnish certifications of accuracy, procedures ensuring alignment of voting advice with shareholders' best economic interest, organizational structure details, disclosures regarding conflicts of interest, and staff qualifications. The SEC is mandated to review these applications within specified timeframes. Additionally, registered firms are required to promptly update their registration for any materially inaccurate information and annually certify its accuracy. Furthermore, this section grants the SEC authority to censure, limit activities, suspend, or revoke the registration of firms found violating regulations, lacking financial resources, or possessing conflicts of interest detrimental to investors. Moreover, this section mandates proxy advisory firms to establish policies for managing and publicly disclosing conflicts of interest. The SEC is obligated to issue rules specifically addressing such conflicts within a year. This section also establishes reliability standards for proxy advisory services, including access to issuer information, the presence of an ombudsman, and the disclosure of unresolved issuer complaints in client reports. Additionally, it provides a private right of action concerning proxy advisor recommendations violating state or federal law. It also requires proxy advisory firms to designate a compliance officer, prohibits certain unfair, coercive, or abusive conduct, mandates proxy advisors to provide specific statements on their financial condition, and publishes an annual report summarizing their voting recommendations. Section 701. Liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to specify that the failure to disclose material information--such as a proxy voting advice business's methodology, sources of information, or conflicts of interest--or the issuance of a material misstatement regarding proxy voting advice directed at a security holder's vote, consent, or authorization on a specific matter for which approval is sought from security holders, will be considered false or misleading concerning a material fact. Section 801. Duties of investment advisors, asset managers, and pension funds This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, mandating disclosure requirements for institutional investment managers engaging proxy advisory firms and exercising voting power concerning equity securities. It mandates these managers to file an annual report with the SEC containing detailed explanations of their voting practices related to shareholder proposals. The report must include information such as the alignment of voting with proxy advisory firm recommendations, the consideration of these recommendations in voting decisions, the reconciliation of votes with shareholders' economic interests, and the involvement of investment professionals in voting decisions. Additionally, larger institutional investment managers meeting specific value criteria are required to provide customer clarifications regarding voting obligations, conduct economic analyses before voting on shareholder proposals, and include these analyses in their annual reports. Each report is to be certified by the institution's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. The section defines ``best economic interest'' as decisions aiming to maximize investment returns in alignment with the fund's investment objectives and risk profile. Section 901. Requirements related to proxy voting This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, mandating the SEC to issue definitive regulations prohibiting the practice of ``robovoting'' concerning proxy or consent solicitations. Robovoting is defined as the automatic casting of votes in accordance with a proxy advisory firm's recommendations or pre-filling votes on a proxy advisory firm's electronic platform without independent review and analysis. Additionally, this section prohibits institutional investors from outsourcing their voting decisions regarding proxy or consent solicitation materials. It also establishes that no individual can be compelled to cast votes on such materials. Furthermore, it specifies that proxy advisory firms must calculate vote results for proxy or consent solicitation materials concerning an issuer in compliance with the laws of the state in which the issuer is incorporated. Section 1001. Proxy voting of passively managed funds This section amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to specify how investment advisers must handle proxy voting for passively managed funds. It mandates advisers to vote according to the beneficial owner's instructions, the issuer's voting directions, or abstain, with exceptions for routine matters. Additionally, it offers a safe harbor, shielding advisers from liabilities related to soliciting voting instructions or voting based on issuer guidance on non-routine matters. Section 1101. Best interest based on pecuniary factors This section amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to specify criteria for determining a customer's best interest based on pecuniary factors. It states that the best interest of a customer must primarily consider financial factors and cannot be subordinated to or limited by non-financial factors unless the customer explicitly consents in writing to consider such non-pecuniary factors. If a customer provides this consent, the broker, dealer, or investment adviser must disclose the expected financial effects of these non-pecuniary factors over a period selected by the customer, up to three years. Additionally, at the end of this period, they must disclose the actual financial effects, including fees, costs, and expenses incurred due to considering these non-pecuniary factors, compared to a comparable index or basket of securities chosen by the customer. The term ``pecuniary factor'' is defined as a factor that a fiduciary reasonably determines will materially affect an investment's risk or return based on appropriate investment timelines. The section directs the SEC to create or adjust rules within 12 months of the bill's enactment to implement these changes. Section 1102. Study on climate change and other environmental disclosures in municipal bond market This section mandates the SEC to conduct a comprehensive study focused on disclosures made by issuers of municipal securities regarding climate change and other environmental aspects. The SEC is required to examine how frequently these disclosures are made, assessing whether they align with disclosures made in different contexts or to audiences beyond investors. The study will also delve into voluntary or mandatory disclosure standards adopted by issuers and analyze the extent to which investors take these disclosures into account when making investment decisions. Additionally, the SEC is empowered to include any other pertinent information they deem relevant for this investigation. Within a year of the bill's enactment, the SEC must present a report to the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House of Representatives' Committee on Financial Services. This report will encompass the study's findings, a detailed exploration of the financial risks associated with investing in municipal securities, an assessment of whether these risks are adequately disclosed to investors, and recommendations for potential regulatory or legislative actions to address any concerns highlighted in the study. Section 1103. Study on solicitation of municipal securities business This section directs the SEC to conduct a study assessing the effectiveness of specific rules aimed at preventing the exchange of funds to elected officials or candidates in return for government business related to the offer or sale of municipal securities. The SEC is tasked with evaluating the impact of these rules, including their intended effects and any unintended adverse consequences. The study will investigate the enforcement actions taken under these rules, analyze compliance policies of entities subject to these rules, and examine how these rules affect participation in the political process in comparison to those soliciting government business unrelated to municipal securities. Additionally, the study will consider the influence of other state and federal laws on the solicitation of municipal securities business and any other pertinent information as determined by the SEC. Within a year of the bill's enactment, the SEC is required to present a report to the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House of Representatives' Committee on Financial Services. This report will contain the study's findings, an analysis of the impact of these rules on small businesses, including minority and women-owned businesses, and recommendations for potential regulatory or legislative actions to address any identified concerns. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 TITLE I--REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES * * * * * * * definitions and application of title Sec. 3. (a) When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-- (1) The term ``exchange'' means any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange. (2) The term ``facility'' when used with respect to an exchange includes its premises, tangible or intangible property whether on the premises or not, any right to the use of such premises or property or any service thereof for the purpose of effecting or reporting a transaction on an exchange (including, among other things, any system of communication to or from the exchange, by ticker or otherwise, maintained by or with the consent of the exchange), and any right of the exchange to the use of any property or service. (3)(A) The term ``member'' when used with respect to a national securities exchange means (i) any natural person permitted to effect transactions on the floor of the exchange without the services of another person acting

Minority Views

This bill is part of the Republican war on so-called ``woke capitalism.'' H.R. 4767 would make it harder for shareholders to offer proposals to strengthen the companies that they own, targeting shareholder proposals that push companies to be more diverse, more inclusive, better managed, and more concerned about their impact on our climate. These are all issues that research has demonstrated have a significant impact on a company's profitability. For example, corporations that are actively managing and planning for climate change--which includes providing public climate-related disclosures--secure an 18% higher return on investment than companies that aren't-- and 67% higher than companies who refuse to disclose their emissions.\1\ Furthermore, research shows that diverse boards lead to improved financial results; indeed, companies with the highest percentages of women board directors outperformed those with the least by 53% when it comes to return on equity.\2\ Ultimately, this bill runs counter to the most basic principles of capitalism and democracy by taking away the ability of the holders of capital--investors--from being able to influence corporate decisions and make informed investment decisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\The Guardian, ``Sustainable corporations perform better financially, report finds'' (accessed Sep. 25, 2023). \2\BoardReady, Lessons from the Pandemic: Board Diversity and Performance, (Jul. 13, 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to making it harder for shareholders to offer proposals this bill also places burdensome new requirements on proxy advisory firms, which provide independent analysis and data to help shareholders and their representatives to make informed voting decisions on the proposals that are voted on at a company's annual meeting. Proxy advisory firms level the playing field for investors as their research and recommendations offer an independent perspective on proposals that can differ from what management is recommending. Proxy advisory firms effectively provide a check on management's ability to influence votes in their favor, overall increasing ordinary investors' say in the corporate decision-making process. This bill caters to corporate managers who don't want to be bothered by the true owners of the company they run and who dislike the fact that proxy advisory firms help shareholders get information and analysis beyond what corporate managers provide. The bill is comprised of eleven titles, each briefly discussed below. Title I is a direct attempt by Republicans and the corporate managerial class to limit the ability of shareholders to influence the direction of the companies they are invested in. This title would increase the thresholds to resubmit a proposal, in effect, making it harder for shareholders to have their proposals included in a company's annual meeting. Title II, like Title I, also makes it harder for shareholders to have their proposals included in a company's annual meeting. Specifically, this title nullifies the SEC's pending amendments\3\ to its shareholder proposal rule regarding implementation, duplication, and resubmission. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\Sidley, SEC Proposes Amendments to the Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission Bases (Jul. 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title III directly limits shareholders' ability to call for votes on environmental, social, or corporate governance (``ESG'') -related topics--in the process making management less accountable to the desires of their investors. Research shows that the vast majority of investors want companies to disclose information about what they are doing to combat climate risk, instate diverse workforces, and invest in their employees.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\PRNewswire, Nuveen ESG Investor Survey (Feb. 2, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title IV would allow company management to wholesale exclude any shareholder proposal related to ESG issues. Title V asks the SEC to use economic cost- benefit analysis to examine the totality of the proxy process; cost-benefit analyses are often used by conservative policy makers as a justification to strike down regulations they find unfavorable.\5\ Cost-benefit analyses are also often flawed because the full impact of many regulations is hard to quantify accurately; they disregard benefits, such as stronger corporate governance or the long term impacts on climate change, that can be difficult to measure but are still critical to the goals of regulation.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Center for American Progress, Reckoning With Conservatives' Bad Faith Cost-Benefit Analysis (Aug. 2020). \6\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title VI would compromise the independence of proxy advisory firms by inserting corporate management into their decision-making process. Proxy advisors are a valuable part of our capital markets in large part because they are independent. They help provide independent advice to shareholders to help them make more informed voting decisions. Title VII makes proxy advisors liable for failures to disclose material information (such as a proxy advisor's methodology, sources of information, and conflicts of interest) or making material misstatements regarding that advice. Title VIII would effectively discourage the use of proxy advisors by requiring extensive and burdensome reporting for institutional investors who choose to utilize the services of a proxy advisor. The title needlessly requires institutional investors who hire proxy advisors to certify that their voting decisions were based solely on the best economic interest of the shareholders they represent; to be clear, institutional investment managers already have existing fiduciary duties and legal obligations to vote proxies in accordance with the best interests of their beneficiaries. Title IX outlaws the ability of investment advisers, asset managers, and pension funds--who do not have the ability to conduct their own independent investment research given the sheer number of proxies they must cast on behalf of their investors--to trust the advice of their proxy advisors, and straps the former with the burden of having to conduct their own research which is costly and likely not to be as high quality as the research provided by the expert proxy advisors whom they outsource this task to.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title X effectively prevents investment advisers that vote on behalf of shares held by passively managed funds--funds that merely track an industry or market index rather than employing an active buy-or-sell strategy--from voting based on the advice of a proxy advisor. Title XI, amongst other things, prevents an investment adviser from considering ESG-related metrics when investing their client's money. Furthermore, the latter part of the title is just another attempt by Republicans to limit the availability of investors to see information related to climate risk as well as to prevent shareholders from having a say in corporate decision-making, this time within the context of municipal (ie, government-issued) bonds. Democratic members offered three amendments to this bill, all of which Republicans rejected: 1. An amendment offered by Rep. Vargas which prohibits the bill from taking effect if the SEC's economic analysis of the bill concludes the bill would limit information that investors consider material or limit the ability for shareholders to submit proposals. 2. An amendment offered by Rep. Casten that prohibits the bill from going into effect unless the SEC has determined that no provisions in the bill will negatively affect State pension fund earnings, increase municipal borrowing costs and indirectly increase costs to taxpayers. 3. An amendment offered by Rep. Casten expressing a sense of Congress that praises the virtues of capitalism and expresses concerns that government should not interfere with investor choice and market forces. H.R. 4767 is opposed by several groups, including (but not limited to): Americans for Financial Reform, Better Markets, US SIF, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Ceres, OUT Leadership, the US Impact Investing Alliance, the Shareholder Rights Group, Green America, PRI, the Family Farm Defenders, Food and Water Watch, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and the Union for Concerned Scientists. For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 4767. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services. Nydia M. Velazquez, Brad Sherman, Gregory W. Meeks, Stephen F. Lynch, Emanuel Cleaver II, Bill Foster, Juan Vargas, David Scott, Al Green, Jim Himes, Joyce Beatty, Vicente Gonzalez, Sean Casten, Rashida Tlaib, Nikema Williams, Ayanna Pressley, Sylvia R. Garcia, Brittany Pettersen. Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/324