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H. Rept. 118-326

BUSINESSES OVER ACTIVISTS ACT

2023-12-19

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 4655] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4655) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit the Securities and Exchange Commission from compelling the inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals or proxy or consent solicitation materials, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Businesses Over Activists Act''. SEC. 2. LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO COMPELLING THE INCLUSION OR DISCUSSION OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Limitation with respect to compelling inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Commission may not compel an issuer to include in a proxy statement of the issuer-- ``(A) any shareholder proposal; or ``(B) any discussion (either from the issuer or otherwise) related to a shareholder proposal contained in the proxy statement. ``(4) Rule of construction relating to state authority.-- Nothing in this Act or any other securities law shall be construed to provide the Commission the authority to preempt the State regulation of shareholder proposals or proxy or consent solicitation materials.''.

Purpose and Summary

Introduced on July 14, 2023, by Representative Ralph Norman, H.R. 4655, the Businesses Over Activists Act, would prohibit the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from compelling the inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals and clarify that the agency does not have the authority to override state regulation of shareholder proposals or proxy materials.

Background and Need for Legislation

The SEC's regulatory authority over proxy solicitations is limited by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act''). Section 14 of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to prevent deceptive or insufficient disclosures in proxy solicitations aimed at obtaining authorization for corporate actions. Therefore, it lacks the authority to mandate the inclusion of shareholder proposals in corporate proxy statements. Any expansion of the SEC's powers requires explicit congressional action, as exemplified by Dodd-Frank, which granted the SEC the authority to mandate the inclusion of shareholder nominees for the board in proxy statements. However, Congress has yet to take similar action concerning shareholder proposals. Outside the SEC's limited authority, corporate governance falls under state law. In states such as Delaware, shareholders have the right to present proposals for shareholder voting during annual meetings. State law does not compel companies to include these proposals on their ballots. The SEC's practice of mandating the inclusion of particular shareholder proposals on public company proxy ballots exceeds its statutory authority. The federal government cannot force companies into discussions regarding politically motivated proposals and mandate their subsidization of activist speech by publishing these proposals in their proxy materials. H.R. 4655 would prevent the SEC from compelling companies to include any shareholder proposal on their proxy ballots, ensuring companies and their shareholders from being forced to deliberate irrelevant and politically motivated proposals. Hearing Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 4655: The Subcommittee on Capital Markets of the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on July 13, 2023, titled ``Reforming the Proxy Process to Safeguard Investor Interests.'' The Subcommittee on Capital Markets of the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on July 18, 2023, titled ``Oversight of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.''

Committee Consideration

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on July 27, 2023, and ordered H.R. 4655 to be reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21 nays (Record vote FC-94), a quorum being present. Before the question was called to order the bill favorably reported, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Norman by voice vote.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.R. 4655 was ordered reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 29 ayes to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC-94), a quorum being present. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 4655 is to prohibit the SEC from compelling the inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals and clarifies that the agency does not have the authority to override state regulation of shareholder proposals or proxy materials. Congressional Budget Office Estimates Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1973. Federal Mandates Statement Pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of the Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Earmark Identification With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title Establishes the short title of the bill as the ``Business Over Activists Act.'' Section 2. Limitation with respect to compelling the inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals Amends Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act to clarify that the SEC cannot compel a company to include any shareholder proposal or related discussion in their proxy statement, except as provided in paragraph (2) of the Exchange Act. Additionally, the bill clarifies that the SEC does not have the authority to preempt state regulations regarding shareholder proposals or proxy and consent solicitation materials under the Exchange Act or any other securities law. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 TITLE I--REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES * * * * * * * proxies Sec. 14. (a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title. (2) The rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under paragraph (1) may include-- (A) a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issuer; and (B) a requirement that an issuer follow a certain procedure in relation to a solicitation described in subparagraph (A). (3) Limitation with respect to compelling inclusion or discussion of shareholder proposals.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Commission may not compel an issuer to include in a proxy statement of the issuer-- (A) any shareholder proposal; or (B) any discussion (either from the issuer or otherwise) related to a shareholder proposal contained in the proxy statement. (4) Rule of construction relating to state authority.--Nothing in this Act or any other securities law shall be construed to provide the Commission the authority to preempt the State regulation of shareholder proposals or proxy or consent solicitation materials. (b)(1) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange, or any broker or dealer registered under this title, or any bank, association, or other entity that exercises fiduciary powers, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to give, or to refrain from giving a proxy, consent, authorization, or information statement in respect of any security registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or any security issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and carried for the account of a customer. (2) With respect to banks, the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under paragraph (1) shall not require the disclosure of the names of beneficial owners of securities in an account held by the bank on the date of enactment of this paragraph unless the beneficial owner consents to the disclosure. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the case of a bank which the Commission finds has not made a good faith effort to obtain such consent from such beneficial owners. (c) Unless proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of a security registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or a security issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, are solicited by or on behalf of the management of the issuer from the holders of record of such security in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, prior to any annual or other meeting of the holders of such security, such issuer shall, in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission, file with the Commission and transmit to all holders of record of such security information substantially equivalent to the information which would be required to be transmitted if a solicitation were made, but no information shall be required to be filed or transmitted pursuant to this subsection before July 1, 1964. (d)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the information specified in section 13(d) of this title, and such additional information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. All requests or invitations for tenders or advertisements making a tender offer or requesting or inviting tenders, of such a security shall be filed as a part of such statement and shall contain such of the information contained in such statement as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional material soliciting or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial solicitation or request shall contain such information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, and shall be filed with the Commission not later than the time copies of such material are first published or sent or given to security holders. Copies of all statements, in the form in which such material is furnished to security holders and the Commission, shall be sent to the issuer not later than the date such material is first published or sent or given to any security holders. (2) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a ``person'' for purposes of this subsection. (3) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any percentage of a class of any security, such class shall be deemed to consist of the amount of the outstanding securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer. (4) Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. (5) Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, and at any time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. (6) Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders, for less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to securities deposited within ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration offered to security holders, as described in paragraph (7), is first published or sent or given to security holders. (7) Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to holders of such securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to each security holder whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up by such person before the variation of the tender offer or request or invitation. (8) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of, any security-- (A) if the acquisition of such security, together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during the preceding twelve months, would not exceed 2 per centum of that class; (B) by the issuer of such security; or (C) which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection. (e) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. (f) If, pursuant to any arrangement or understanding with the person or persons acquiring securities in a transaction subject to subsection (d) of this section or subsection (d) of section 13 of this title, any persons are to be elected or designated as directors of the issuer, otherwise than at a meeting of security holders, and the persons so elected or designated will constitute a majority of the directors of the issuer, then, prior to the time any such person takes office as a director, and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission, the issuer shall file with the Commission, and transmit to all holders of record of securities of the issuer who would be entitled to vote at a meeting for election of directors, information substantially equivalent to the information which would be required by subsection (a) or (c) of this section to be transmitted if such person or persons were nominees for election as directors at a meeting of such security holders. (g)(1)(A) At the time of filing such preliminary proxy solicitation material as the Commission may require by rule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that concerns an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of substantially all the assets of a company, the person making such filing, other than a company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, shall pay to the Commission the following fees: (i) for preliminary proxy solicitation material involving an acquisition, merger, or consolidation, if there is a proposed payment of cash or transfer of securities or property to shareholders, a fee at a rate that, subject to paragraph (4), is equal to $92 per $1,000,000 of such proposed payment, or of the value of such securities or other property proposed to be transferred; and (ii) for preliminary proxy solicitation material involving a proposed sale or other disposition of substantially all of the assets of a company, a fee at a rate that, subject to paragraph (4), is equal to $92 per $1,000,000 of the cash or of the value of any securities or other property proposed to be received upon such sale or disposition. (B) The fee imposed under subparagraph (A) shall be reduced with respect to securities in an amount equal to any fee paid to the Commission with respect to such securities in connection with the proposed transaction under section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)), or the fee paid under that section shall be reduced in an amount equal to the fee paid to the Commission in connection with such transaction under this subsection. Where two or more companies involved in an acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of substantially all the assets of a company must file such proxy material with the Commission, each shall pay a proportionate share of such fee. (2) At the time of filing such preliminary information statement as the Commission may require by rule pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the issuer shall pay to the Commission the same fee as required for preliminary proxy solicitation material under paragraph (1) of this subsection. (3) At the time of filing such statement as the Commission may require by rule pursuant to subsection (d)(1) of this section, the person making the filing shall pay to the Commission a fee at a rate that, subject to paragraph (4), is equal to $92 per $1,000,000 of the aggregate amount of cash or of the value of securities or other property proposed to be offered. The fee shall be reduced with respect to securities in an amount equal to any fee paid with respect to such securities in connection with the proposed transaction under section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)), or the fee paid under that section shall be reduced in an amount equal to the fee paid to the Commission in connection with such transaction under this subsection. (4) Annual adjustment.--For each fiscal year, the Commission shall by order adjust the rate required by paragraphs (1) and (3) for such fiscal year to a rate that is equal to the rate (expressed in dollars per million) that is applicable under section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)) for such

Minority Views

This rule effectively disenfranchises shareholders, crippling their ability influence decision making by corporations that they own. Specifically, SEC Rule 14a-8 (the ``shareholder proposal rule'') stipulates that a company must include a shareholder proposal in the company's proxy materials unless the proposal falls under any one of several bases for exclusion.\1\ This bill would effectively remove this rule from existence, preventing shareholders from being able to raise important issues at a company's annual meeting. Promulgated over 80 years ago, the shareholder proposal rule is grounded in the recognition that a company's annual meeting is a crucial forum for companies to provide transparency on certain important issues and for investors to raise matters, electy directors and advise the board and management on significant issues facing the company. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Skadden, SEC Proposes Amendments to the Shareholder Proposal Rules (Jul. 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This bill is part of the Republican war against ``woke capitalism.'' It is an attempt to stifle shareholder proposals that push companies to be more diverse, more inclusive, better managed, and more concerned about their impact on our climate. These are all issues that research has demonstrated have a significant impact on a company's profitability. For example, corporations that are actively managing and planning for climate change--which includes providing public climate-- related disclosures--secure an 18% higher return on investment than companies that aren't--and 67% higher than companies who refuse to disclose their emissions.\2\ Furthermore, research shows that diverse boards lead to improved financial results; indeed, companies with the highest percentages of women board directors outperformed those with the least by 53% when it comes to return on equity.\3\ Shareholders should be able to hold the companies they own accountable for these critical issues that affect the return on their investments. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\The Guardian, ``Sustainable corporations perform better financially, report finds'' (accessed Sep. 25, 2023). \3\BoardReady, Lessons from the Pandemic: Board Diversity and Performance, (Jul. 13. 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many groups are opposed to H.R. 4656. According to Americans for Financial Reform, the bill would ``insulate 'the management of public companies from investor input and accountability.''\4\ Similarly, the AFL-CIO stated that the bill ``if adopted . . . will disenfranchise shareholders from the ability to hold corporate CEOs accountable on ESG issues.''\5\ Other groups opposed to the bill include (but are not limited to): Better Markets, US SIF, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Ceres, OUT Leadership, the US Impact Investing Alliance, the Shareholder Rights Group, Green America, PRI, the Family Farm Defenders, Food and Water Watch, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and the Union for Concerned Scientists. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Americans for Financial Reform, Dangerous Crypto and Accountability Bills Clear Congressional Committees Despite Major Objections from Consumer Advocacy Groups. Labor Unions and More (Jul. 28, 2023). \5\AFL-CIO, Letter Opposing Legislation That Would Interfere with the SEC's Mandate to Protect Investors (Aug. 16, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For these reasons, the minority opposes H.R. 4655. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services. Nydia M. Velazquez, Gregory W. Meeks, Stephen F. Lynch, Emanuel Cleaver II, Brad Sherman, David Scott, Al Green, Jim Himes, Bill Foster, Juan Vargas, Sean Casten, Rashida Tlaib, Nikema Williams, Joyce Beatty, Vicente Gonzalez, Ayanna Pressley, Sylvia R. Garcia, Brittany Pettersen, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/326