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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-338

PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL UNDER CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, OF THE RULE SUBMITTED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RELATING TO "STANDARD FOR DETERMINING JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS"

2024-01-03

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.J. Res. 98] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 98) providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the National Labor Relations Board relating to ``Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status'', having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass. PURPOSE The purpose of H.J. Res. 98 is to disapprove of the rule related to ``Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status'' that was first announced on September 7, 2022, and published as a final rule in the Federal Register on October 27, 2023.

Committee Action

113TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On June 24, 2014, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) oversight hearing titled ``What Should Workers and Employers Expect Next from the National Labor Relations Board?'' Witnesses were Mr. Andrew F. Puzder, CEO, CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc., Carpinteria, CA; Mr. Seth H. Borden, Partner, McKenna Long & Aldridge, New York, NY; Mr. James B. Coppess, Associate General Counsel, AFL--CIO, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. G. Roger King, Of Counsel, Jones Day, Columbus, OH. Witnesses discussed upcoming NLRB cases and policy and cited changes to the joint employer standard as one of the most significant and controversial issues before the Board at that time. On September 9, 2014, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing on potential changes to the NLRB's joint employer standard titled ``Expanding Joint Employer Status: What Does It Mean for Workers and Job Creators?'' Witnesses were Mr. Todd Duffield, Shareholder, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak and Stewart, Atlanta, GA; Mr. Clint Ehlers, President, FASTSIGNS of Lancaster and Willow Grove, Lancaster and Willow Grove, PA, testifying on behalf of the International Franchise Association; Mr. Harris Freeman, Professor, Western New England University School of Law, Springfield, MAs; Ms. Catherine Monson, Chief Executive Officer, FASTSIGNS International, Inc., Carrollton, TX, testifying on behalf of the International Franchise Association; and Mrs. Jagruti Panwala, owner of multiple hotel franchises in the northeastern United States, Bensalem, PA. Witnesses spoke about how an expanded joint employer standard would negatively impact franchises and other small businesses. 114TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On August 25, 2015, the HELP Subcommittee held a field hearing titled ``Redefining `Employer' and the Impact on Alabama's Workers and Small Business Owners'' in Mobile, Alabama, in anticipation of the NLRB creating a new joint employer standard. Witnesses were Mr. Marcel Debruge, Burr and Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL; Mr. Chris Holmes, CEO, CLH Development Holdings, Tallahassee, L; and Col. Steve Carey, USAF, Ret., Owner and Operator, CertaPro Painters of Mobile and Baldwin Counties, Daphne, AL, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses and the International Franchise Association. Witnesses testified that the new joint employer standard would threaten the independence of small businesses and deter franchisors from licensing new franchisees. On August 27, 2015, the HELP Subcommittee held a field hearing titled ``Redefining `Employer' and the Impact on Georgia's Workers and Small Business Owners'' in Savannah, Georgia, regarding the NLRB's joint employer standard. Witnesses were Mr. Jeffrey M. Mintz, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Atlanta, GA; Mr. Kalpesh ``Kal'' Patel, President and COO, Image Hotels, Inc., Pooler, GA; Mr. Alex Salguerio, Savannah Restaurants Corp., Savannah, GA; and Mr. Fred Weir, President, Meadowbrook Restaurant Company Inc., Cumming, GA, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses and the International Franchise Association. Witnesses testified the new joint employer standard would hurt small business growth in Georgia and create barriers to entry for potential franchise owners. On September 29, 2015, the HELP Subcommittee held a legislative hearing on H.R. 3459, the Protecting Local Business Opportunity Act. Witnesses at the hearing were Mr. Ed Braddy, President, Winlee Foods, LLC, Timonium, MD, testifying on behalf of himself and the National Franchisee Association; Mr. Kevin Cole, CEO, Enniss Electric Company, Manassas, VA, testifying on behalf of the Independent Electrical Contractors; Mr. Charles Cohen, former Member of the NLRB and Senior Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Mara Fortin, President and CEO, Nothing Bundt Cakes, San Diego, CA, testifying on behalf of herself and the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Mr. Michael Harper, Professor, Boston University School of Law, Boston, MA; and Dr. Anne Lofaso, Professor, West Virginia University College of Law, Morgantown, WV. Witnesses testified that H.R. 3459 would restore the joint employer standard that had worked well for workers and business owners for decades and would protect opportunities for small business growth. First Session--Legislative Action On September 9, 2015, then-Committee on Education and the Workforce (Committee) Chairman John Kline (R-MN) introduced the Protecting Local Business Opportunity Act (H.R. 3459, 114th Congress). Recognizing the threat to small businesses posed by the NLRB's August 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (Browning-Ferris),\1\ the legislation amended the NLRA to restore the long-held standard that two or more employers can only be considered joint employers for purposes of the Act if each shares and exercises control over essential terms and conditions of employment and such control over these matters is actual, direct and immediate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On October 28, 2015, the Committee considered and marked up H.R. 3459, the Protecting Local Business Opportunity Act. Representative Buddy Carter (R-GA) offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, making a technical change to clarify the Act. The Committee voted to adopt the amendment in the nature of a substitute by voice vote. The Committee then favorably reported H.R. 3459, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a vote of 21 to 15. 115TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On February 14, 2017, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing titled ``Restoring Balance and Fairness to the National Labor Relations Board.'' Witnesses decried the extreme, partisan decisions of the NLRB during the Obama administration, including the expanded joint employer standard. Witnesses were Ms. Reem Aloul, BrightStar Care of Arlington, Arlington, VA, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Ms. Susan Davis, Partner, Cohen, Weiss and Simon, LLP, New York, NY; Mr. Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., Vice President, National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Springfield, VA; and, Mr. Kurt G. Larkin, Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, VA. On July 12, 2017, the Committee held a hearing titled ``Redefining Joint Employer Standards: Barriers to Job Creation and Entrepreneurship'' to examine the impact of expanding joint employer standards across federal labor laws, including the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Witnesses were Mr. Michael Harper, Professor, Boston University School of Law, Boston, MA; Mr. Richard Heiser, Vice President, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Chicago, IL; Mr. G. Roger King, Senior Labor and Employment Counsel, HR Policy Association, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Jerry Reese II, Director of Franchise Development, Dat Dog, New Orleans, LA, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Ms. Catherine K. Ruckelhaus, General Counsel, National Employment Law Project, New York, NY; and Ms. Mary Kennedy Thompson, Chief Operating Officer of Franchise Brands, Dwyer Group, Waco, TX, testifying on behalf of the International Franchise Association. Witnesses testified about the importance of reigning in expanding joint employer standards. On September 13, 2017, the HELP and Workforce Protections Subcommittees held a joint legislative hearing on H.R. 3441. Witnesses were Mr. Zachary D. Fasman, Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY; Ms. Tamara Kennedy, President, Twin Cities T.J.'s Inc., Roseville, MN, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Mr. Granger MacDonald, Chief Executive Officer, The MacDonald Companies, Kerrville, TX, testifying on behalf of the National Association of Home Builders; and Mr. Michael Rubin, Partner, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA. Witnesses testified that H.R. 3441 clarifies the joint employer standard used under both the NLRA and FLSA and benefits workers and business owners. First Session--Legislative Action On July 27, 2017, then-Subcommittee on Workforce Protections Chairman Bradley Byrne (R-AL) introduced the Save Local Business Act (H.R. 3441, 115th Congress). In response to expanding joint employer standards under the NLRA and FLSA, the bill amends both laws to provide that two or more employers can only be considered joint employers if each shares and exercises control over essential terms and conditions of employment and if such control over those matters is actual, direct, and immediate. On October 4, 2017, the Committee considered and marked up H.R. 3441. Then-Subcommittee on Workforce Protections Chairman Byrne offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, making technical changes.\2\ The Committee voted to adopt the amendment in the nature of a substitute by voice vote. The Committee then favorably reported H.R. 3441, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a vote of 23 to 17. On November 7, 2017, H.R. 3441 passed the House by a vote of 242 to 181. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\The amendment in the nature of a substitute clarified that a list of terms and conditions of employment included in the act are examples of what can be considered in a joint employer analysis, but not a comprehensive list, and control of every term and condition is not required for joint employment to be found. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On May 8, 2019, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing titled ``Protecting the Right to Organize Act: Deterring Unfair Labor Practices.'' Witnesses were Mr. Roger King, Senior Labor and Employment Counsel, HR Policy Association, Arlington, VA; Mr. Josue Alvarez, Truck Driver, XPO Logistics, Bell Gardens, CA; Ms. Charlotte Garden, Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Seattle, WA; and Mr. Richard Griffin, Of Counsel, Bredhoff and Kaiser, P.L.L.C, Washington, D.C. Republican Members and Mr. King criticized the Protecting the Right to Organize Act's potential harmful impact on workers and businesses, including its expanded joint employer standard. On July 25, 2019, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing titled ``Protecting the Right to Organize Act: Modernizing America's Labor Laws.'' Witnesses were Mr. Richard Trumka, President, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Jim Status, Former University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Employee, Pittsburgh, PA; Mr. Phillip Miscimarra, Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; and Mr. Mark Gaston, Former Chairman, NLRB, Washington, D.C. Republican Members and Mr. Miscimarra criticized the Protecting the Right to Organize Act's expanded joint employer standard, among other provisions. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearings On March 28, 2023, the Committee held a hearing titled ``Unleashing America's Opportunities for Hiring and Employment.'' Witnesses were Chris Spear, President, American Trucking Association, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Jerry Akers, Franchisee/Owner, Sharpness, Inc. DBA Great Clips and the Joint Chiropractic, Palo, IA; Dr. Heidi Shirholz, President, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow in Economics, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. Witnesses discussed how Biden administration policies, including the NLRB's joint employer proposed rule, were making it harder to create jobs and overcome inflation. First Session--Legislative Action On November 9, 2023, Representative John James (R-MI) introduced H.J. Res 98, Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the National Labor Relations Board relating to ``Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status'' with Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC) and Representatives Mike Johnson (R-LA), Jim Banks (R-IN), Aaron Bean (R-FL), Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter (R-GA), Tom Cole (R-OK), James Comer (R-KY), Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford (R-AR), Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI), Bob Good (R-VA), Lance Gooden (R-TX), Diana Harshbarger (R-TN), Clay Higgins (R-LA), Ashley Hinson (R-IA), Erin Houchin (R-IN), Jake LaTurner (R-OK), Julia Letlow (R-LA), Lisa McClain (R-MI), John R. Moolenaar (R-MI), Alexander X. Mooney (R-WV), Greg Pence (R-IN), John W. Rose (R-TN), Adrian Smith (R-NE), Michelle Steel (R-CA), Glenn Thompson (R-PA), Tim Walberg (R-MI), Elise Stefanik (R-NY), and David G. Valadao (R- CA). The resolution was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On December 12, 2023, the Committee considered H.J. Res. 98 in legislative session and reported it favorably to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 25-20. COMMITTEE VIEWS INTRODUCTION Small businesses are still recovering from the pandemic, and owners are not optimistic about the current economic environment.\3\ Survey after survey finds inflation is the top challenge for small businesses.\4\ ``Bidenomics'' and the current administration's policies have led to skyrocketing inflation and high prices for American households and employers. Consumer sentiment is equally pessimistic, falling for the fourth straight month, according to the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\https://www.nfib.com/content/press-release/economy/nfib- celebrates-50-years-of-small-business-economic-data-with-october- survey/. \4\https://www.uschamber.com/sbindex/quarterly-spotlight. \5\http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Instead of changing course in light of economic conditions, the Biden administration has continued to issue costly regulations that harm workers, small businesses, and consumers. In total, the Biden administration has finalized 724 regulations, costing $434.8 billion and imposing 223,725,800 paperwork burden hours on the public.\6\ Such rapid accumulation of rules slows economic growth\7\ while imposing more significant costs on small businesses.\8\ The NLRB's ``Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status'' significantly adds to existing regulatory burdens and will cause devastating economic consequences for small businesses, workers, consumers, and the economy.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\https://www.regrodeo.com/ ?year%5B0%5D=2023&year%5B1%5D=2022&year%5B2%5D=2021. \7\https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/regulatory- accumulation -and-its-costs#::text=By%20distorting%20the%20investment% 20choices,rate%20of%20the%20US%20GDP. \8\https://ldr.lafayette.edu/concern/publications/6q182k69n. \9\Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 88 Fed. Reg. 53,946 (Oct. 27, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Background on joint employer status under the National Labor Relations Act Predictability and transparency are crucial to upholding the rule of law. Regulated parties deserve clear rules and standards that make it obvious what is proscribed or permitted by law. Without a clear understanding of the rules, it is extremely difficult for the regulated community to plan for the future or know how to act in order to comply with the rules. H.J. Res. 98 will bring the necessary certainty to the joint employer standard under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). From 1984 to August 2015, the NLRB's joint employer standard provided such certainty and clarity. It examined whether two or more employers shared control over or co- determined the essential terms and conditions of employment to determine whether two separate entities should be considered ``joint employers'' under the NLRA.\10\ Essential terms and conditions of employment included hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction of employees. Under this standard, the joint employers' control over these employment matters must have been actual, direct, and immediate.\11\ This predictable and clear standard ensured employers would not be saddled with collective bargaining obligations or with liability of a company they do not control. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris Indus. of Calif., Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). \11\See Airborne Express, 338 NLRB 597, 597 n.1 (2002) (``[The] essential element in [joint employer] analysis is whether a putative joint employer's control over employment matters is direct and immediate.''); AM Prop. Holding Corp., 350 NLRB 998, 1000 (2007) (``In assessing whether a joint employer relationship exists, the Board . . . looks to the actual practice of the parties.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2015, the Obama NLRB issued a decision in Browning- Ferris Industries of California (Browning-Ferris) that upended decades of Board precedent by dramatically expanding the definition of joint employer under the NLRA.\12\ Under this standard, two entities were deemed joint employers based on the mere existence of reserved control, indirect control, or control that was limited and routine. As a result, Browning- Ferris greatly increased the universe of potential joint employers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld portions of Browning-Ferris.\13\ While the D.C. Circuit ruled that evidence of reserved or indirect control could be appropriate factors in determining joint employer status, the court also ruled that the Board applied the concept of ``indirect control'' too broadly.\14\ The D.C. Circuit returned the case to the Board, directing that it reevaluate the case by considering ``indirect control'' of only those factors directly related to the terms and conditions of employment of the relevant employees.\15\ The court noted that by ``failing to distinguish evidence of indirect control that bears on workers'' essential terms and conditions from evidence that simply documents the routine parameters of company-to- company contracting,'' the Board had exceeded its authority and ``overshot the common-law mark.''\16\ Moreover, the court held, ```global oversight' is a routine feature of independent contracts'' which should not be a factor relevant to the analysis of a joint-employment relationship.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Browning-Ferris Indus. of Calif., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.J. Res. 98, Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the National Labor Relations Board relating to ``Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status,'' would nullify the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB's or the Board's) final joint employer rule ensuring that workers, who are hired through subcontractors, temporary staffing agencies, and other intermediaries, can hold all the entities that control their working conditions accountable for their right to bargain collectively for higher pay, better benefits, and safer workplaces. If enacted, H.J. Res. 98 would reinstate the deficient Trump-era rule that weakened workers' ability to hold their employers accountable by narrowing the joint employer standard to only cover entities that directly exercise control over workers' terms and conditions of employment. H.J. Res. 98 is opposed by numerous organizations including: A Better Balance, AFL-CIO, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Center for Law and Social Policy, Communications Workers of America, Demos, Economic Policy Institute, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Jobs With Justice, National Center for Law and Economic Justice, National Domestic Workers Alliance, National Education Association, National Employment Law Project, National Organization for Women, National Partnership for Women and Families, National Women's Law Center, Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Legal Aid Society, Transport Workers Union of America, United Auto Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and Young Invincibles. HISTORY OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT & THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT For most of the time since the 1935 enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),\1\ the NLRB has held that an entity may be liable to bargain with the employees of a contractor as a joint employer even if its control over terms and conditions of employment was indirect, such as exercised through an intermediary, or reserved but not yet exercised.\2\ This traditional standard is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's requirement that the NLRB interpret the NLRA's definition of employer as consistent with the common law\3\ as well as with the legislative history of the NLRA's 1947 amendments.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 151-169. \2\See, e.g., Greyhound Corp., 153 NLRB 1488, 1495 (1965) (the first case in which the Board examined the right to control employees' work and their terms and conditions of employment as determinative in analyzing whether entities were joint employers of particular employees); TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798 (1984) (finding that two separate entities are joint employers of a single work force if the evidence shows that they ``share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment''); Floyd Epperson, 202 NLRB 23, 23 (1973) (finding joint employer status where client employer had ``some indirect control over [employees'] wages'' and ``some control, albeit indirect, over [employee] discipline''), enforced 491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974); Franklin Stores Corp., 199 NLRB 52, 53 (1972) (finding joint employment where one employer, ``by virtue of the lease arrangement with'' the other employer, ``has the right to veto the employment of employees by'' the other ``and to insist on the discharge of employees by'' the other). \3\See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (requiring the Board to ``apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the Act''). \4\See House Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020 at 32-33 (1947) reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 536-37 (1948) (explaining the exclusion of independent contractors from the definition of employee in order to overturn a Supreme Court decision that ``held that ordinary tests of the law of agency could be ignored by the Board'' in determining the existence of employment relationships). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Without providing any explanation, the NLRB departed from this traditional standard in 1984, discounting indirect and reserved control from the joint employer analysis in two decisions.\5\ In another decision in 2002, the NLRB explicitly limited the joint employer standard to only ``direct and immediate'' control.\6\ In recent decades, temporary and contingent employment arrangements proliferated rapidly, and the NLRB's departure from the common law enabled corporations to use intermediaries to evade any obligation to bargain collectively with workers.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798, 803 (1984); Laerco Transportation, 269 NLRB 324, 325-26 (1984). \6\Airborne Freight Co., 338 NLRB 597 (2002) (finding the ``essential element'' to be ``whether a putative joint employer's control over employment matters is direct and immediate''). \7\Testimony of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, EDUC. & THE WRKF. COMM. DEMS. (July 12, 2017), https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/ hearings/redefining-joint-employer-standards-barriers-to-job-creation- and-entrepreneurship, at 4 (``Between 2005 and 2015, the number of contract workers grew by more than half, while the overall workforce grew by only five percent.'') (submitted to Redefining Joint Employer Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Wrkf., 115th Cong. (Jul. 12, 2017)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the 2015 Browning-Ferris decision, the NLRB restored earlier precedent considering an entity's reserved and indirect control over working conditions.\8\ The NLRB's previous Republican majority initiated an attempt to overturn Browning- Ferris by rulemaking.\9\ While that rulemaking was pending, the D.C. Circuit upheld Browning-Ferris ``as fully consistent with the common law [because] both reserved authority to control and indirect control can be relevant factors in the joint-employer analysis.''\10\ Specifically, the court held that consideration of a company's right to control ``is an established aspect of the common law of agency,'' and that Browning-Ferris was also correct that ``an employer's indirect control over employees can be a relevant consideration.''\11\ The D.C. Circuit also warned that, ``[t]he Board's rulemaking . . . must color within the common-law lines identified by the judiciary.''\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\362 NLRB 1599, 1600 (2015). \9\See The Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 46681 (Sept. 14, 2018). \10\Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018). \11\Id. at 1209. \12\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rather than adhering to the court's warning, in 2020, the NLRB's Republican majority issued a final rule (2020 Rule) that narrowed the joint employer standard to only cover entities that ``possess and actually exercise substantial direct and immediate control over employees'' essential terms and conditions of employment.''\13\ To justify sidelining consideration of indirect and reserved control, which the D.C. Circuit emphasized, the 2020 Rule stated that indirect and reserved control may still be considered but could not, ``without more[,] establish a joint-employer relationship.''\14\ In a 2022 decision, the D.C. Circuit described this claim as ``dubious,'' emphasizing that it ``took great pains to inform the Board that the failure to consider reserved or indirect control is inconsistent with the common law of agency.''\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\The Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status, 85 Fed. Reg. 11184, 11185 (Feb. 26, 2020) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103). \14\Id. at 11220. \15\Sanitary Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 350 v. NLRB, 45 F.4th 38, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (considering issues in Browning-Ferris that the Board addressed after the D.C. Circuit remanded in 2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The 2020 Rule eroded workers' rights significantly. For example, as Committee Democrats observed, the failure to include safety in the list of ``essential terms and conditions of employment'' meant that ``if a hospital controls the workplace safety standards, but refuses to bargain with the temporary agency workers, these workers will lack recourse against the party setting working conditions.''\16\ More broadly, the 2020 Rule created what the AFL CIO described as ``a roadmap to retain ultimate control over key aspects of workers'' lives--like wages and working conditions--while avoiding their duty to bargain'':\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., CORRUPTION, CONFLICTS, AND CRISIS: THE NLRB'S ASSAULT ON WORKERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 3 (Oct. 2020), https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/ NLRB%20Report%20(Final).pdf. \17\House Letter Supporting NLRB Joint-Employer Rule, AFL-CIO (Nov. 8, 2023), https://aflcio.org/about/advocacy/legislative-alerts/house- letter-supporting-nlrb-joint-employer-rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Companies are adopting business structures specifically designed to maintain control over the workers who keep their businesses running while simultaneously disclaiming any responsibility for those workers under labor and employment laws. Such businesses often insert second and third-level intermediaries between themselves and their workers. These companies seek to have it both ways--to control the workplace like an employer but dodge the legal responsibilities of an employer. . . . For example, if employees of a subcontractor were to unionize and bargain only with the subcontractor, it might simply refuse to bargain over certain issues because its contract with the prime contractor governs those aspects of the work (e.g., pay, hours, safety, etc.). This harms workers because the entity that effectively determines workplace policy is not at the bargaining table, placing workers' desired improvements out of reach.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The radical change effected by the 2020 Rule ``made it impossible for hundreds of thousands of workers to access the rights guaranteed them under the NLRA to join a union and collectively bargain.''\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Celine McNicholas et al., EPI Comments on NLRB's Proposed Rulemaking on the Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, ECON. POL. INST. (Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.epi.org/publication/epi- comments-on-nlrbs-proposed-rulemaking-on-the-standard-for-determining- joint-employer-status/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In light of these consequences of the 2020 Rule, the Biden- era NLRB issued a notice and invitation in September 2022 to file briefs for a proposed rule to update the standard for determining joint employer status.\20\ The NLRB issued its new joint employer rule in October 2023 (2023 Rule),\21\ which will take effect on February 26, 2024.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 87 Fed. Reg. 54641 (Sept. 7, 2022). \21\Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status, 88 Fed. Reg. 73946 (Oct. 27, 2023) [hereinafter 2023 Rule]. \22\Id. at 74017. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The 2023 Rule rescinded the 2020 Rule and adopted a new standard ``grounded in established common-law agency principles.''\23\ Specifically, the 2023 Rule restores the NLRB's ability to consider evidence of an employer's reserved and/or indirect control, along with direct control, whether it is exercised or not, if employers share or codetermine one or more of the employees' essential terms and conditions of employment when determining joint-employer status. Such essential terms and conditions are defined as the following: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs. Nat'l Lab. Rel. Bd. Board Issues Final Rule on Joint-Employer Status (Oct. 26, 2023), https:// www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-final-rule-on-joint- employer-status. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Wages, benefits, and other compensation; (2) Hours of work and scheduling; (3) The assignment of duties to be performed; (4) The supervision of the performance of duties; (5) Work rules and directions governing the manner, means, and methods of the performance of duties and the grounds for discipline; (6) The tenure of employment, including hiring and discharge; and (7) Working conditions related to the safety and health of employees.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\2023 Rule, supra note 21, at 74017-74018. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The 2023 Rule aligns with the joint employer provision of the Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2023 (PRO Act),\25\ which would require the Board or a court of competent jurisdiction to consider as relevant direct control, indirect control, reserved authority to control, and control exercised in fact. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2023, H.R. 20, 118th Cong. (2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE 2023 RULE AND THE ``FISSURED WORKPLACE'' Joint employment is a flashpoint because of the recent trend toward ``fissuring,'' or the disintegration of the firm using overlapping arrangements of contracting, subcontracting, franchising, and temping.\26\ The trend appears to be growing, especially in low-wage work. ``It seems to be spreading like wildfire,'' says Nelson Lichtenstein, a Research Professor in the Department of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara. ``All of these companies, wherever they possibly can, want to create a workforce that doesn't work for them.''\27\ The most visible fissured relationship is temping: approximately 3.1 million workers in America are employed by a temporary staffing agency on any given day, performing work on behalf of a client company that directs their work but does not write their paycheck.\28\ Fissured work arrangements are associated with increased incidence of a host of workplace violations.\29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\See generally David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It (2014). \27\Dave Jamieson, Romney Campaign Boxes Itself in on Outsourcing, Offshoring Debate, Huff. Post (June 26, 2012), https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/romney-campaign-outsourcing- offshore_n_1627761. \28\Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry Sector and Selected Industry Data, Bur. of Lab. Stats., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ empsit.t17.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2023). \29\Weil, supra note 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rise of the ``fissured workplace'' can weaken workers' bargaining power. Absent an appropriate joint employment doctrine, workers hired by an intermediary firm but laboring for a larger, more powerful firm with actual control over their working conditions and wages will find it difficult to bargain meaningfully. In an age of increased workplace fissuring, it is imperative that companies not be able to point to another entity in order to evade bargaining and liability. The 2023 Rule's return to the NLRB's traditional standard is necessary to mitigate the fissuring of the workplace, which exacerbated in the decades after the NLRB departed from considering indirect and reserved control.\30\ If a lead business controls any of its subsidiary's workers' terms and conditions of employment but is not deemed a joint employer, then those workers cannot engage in collective bargaining with the lead business to improve their terms and conditions of employment that are within the lead business's control.\31\ This opens workers to retaliation even when they attempt to organize a union with the subsidiary alone. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., The Future of Work: How Congress Can Support Workers in the Modern Economy 4-5 (2020), https://democrats- edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/ Future%20of%20Work%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf [hereinafter The Future of Work]; see also Ruckelshaus Testimony, supra note 7, at 4. \31\The Future of Work, supra note 30, at 6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By holding employers accountable for their bargaining obligations when they exercise control, whether direct or indirect, organized workers can engage in meaningful negotiations and share in the prosperity they have helped create. According to the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), the Biden-era NLRB's proposed 2023 Rule is estimated to raise workers' earnings by $1.06 billion dollars annually.\32\ Conversely, the Trump-era NLRB's 2020 Rule would transfer $1.3 billion each year from workers to their bosses.\33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\McNicholas et al., supra note 19. \33\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE 2023 RULE'S IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS The 2023 Rule's potential impact on small businesses has been thoroughly reviewed. In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,\34\ the NLRB, prior to finalizing the 2023 Rule, conducted an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of its impact on small businesses. The analysis concluded that ``since the only quantifiable impact that [the NLRB] ha[s] identified is the $151.51 or $99.64 that may be incurred in reviewing and understanding the rule, [the NLRB] d

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/338