Background and Need for Legislation
Communications technologies and networks underpin the daily
lives of the American public and economy. Foreign adversaries
have used access to Americans' data, communications networks,
devices, and applications as entry points to disrupt Americans'
daily lives, conduct espionage activities, and push
disinformation and propaganda campaigns in an attempt to
undermine our democracy and gain worldwide influence and
control. This is all a detriment to our national security
interests.
One such adversary that has aggressively pursued this
strategy is the People's Republic of China (PRC). It has backed
hackers to disrupt our communications networks\1\ and used
``deceptive and coercive methods'' to shape global information.
As described by the U.S. Department of State, its goals are to
promote ``digital authoritarianism.''\2\ They have accomplished
some of these goals through coercion of companies headquartered
in the PRC. One way it does so is through its National
Intelligence Law of 2017, which requires PRC individuals and
entities to support PRC intelligence services, including by
providing data without regard to where that data was collected
and without any mechanism of due process.\3\
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\1\https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-
038a.
\2\https://www.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-
republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/.
\3\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, Policy
& Plans, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for
Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment From Firms Linked to the
People's Republic of China at 6 (December 22, 2020), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-
business-advisory.pdf.
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Beijing ByteDance Technology is a Chinese internet
technology company headquartered in Beijing and operating in
the United States through a holding company (``ByteDance
Ltd.'') incorporated in the Cayman Islands.\4\ ByteDance Ltd.,
founded and headquartered in Beijing, was formed in 2012 and
launched a number of applications and products which became
extremely popular, including TikTok.\5\
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\4\Beijing ByteDance Technology and its Cayman Island holding
company, ByteDance Ltd., will interchangeably be referred to as
``ByteDance.''
\5\Joe Tidy and Sophia Smith Galer, TikTok: The story of a social
media giant, BBC News (5 August 2020). https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-53640724.
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TikTok is now one of the most popular social media
platforms in the world. It is available in over 150 countries
and serves over 1 billion users.\6\ In the United States,
TikTok has over 170 million users and is especially popular
among teenagers and young adults who represent 35 percent of
its American user base.\7\
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\6\TikTok Statistics For 2024: Users, Demographics, Trend, What's
The Big Data (Nov. 29, 2023), https://whatsthebigdata.com/tiktok-
statistics/.
\7\Jamie Ding, Why TikTok is dangerously good at making you spend
money, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 2023), https://www.latimes.com/business/
story/2023-12-03/why-tiktok-is-dangerously-good-at-making-you-spend-
money.
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Foreign adversary controlled applications present a clear
threat to the national security of the United States. This
includes TikTok due to ByteDance, Ltd.'s ownership of the
application.\8\
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\8\Judy Woodruff, CIA Director Bill Burns on War in Ukraine,
Intelligence Challenges Posed by China, PBS (Dec. 16, 2022, 6:50 P.M.),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/cia-director-bill-burns-on-war-in-
ukraine-intelligence-challenges-posed-by-china.
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Outside reporting has indicated the breadth of TikTok's
reach, suggesting that its data collection practices extend to
age, phone number, precise location, internet address, device
used, phone contacts, social network connections, the content
of private messages sent through the application, and videos
watched.\9\ The risk posed by TikTok though is exacerbated by
the difficulty in assessing precisely which categories of data
it collects. For example, outside researchers have found
embedded vulnerabilities that allow the company to collect more
data than the app's privacy policy indicates.\10\
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\9\Geoffrey A. Fowler, Is it time to delete TikTok? A guide to the
rumors and the real privacy risks, Wash. Post (July 13, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/13/tiktok-privacy/. See also
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, ``Operations Security (OPSEC)
Advisory, TikTok Concerns and Vulnerabilities'' (Mar. 2023), https://
www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/nittf/OPSEC_Advisory_
TikTok_Concerns_and_Vulnerabilities.pdf.
\10\Fowler, supra note 2.
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Additionally, public reporting has repeatedly confirmed
statements made by the Executive Branch regarding the tight
interlinkages between ByteDance Ltd., TikTok, and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). For example, the Secretary of ByteDance
Ltd.'s CCP committee, Zhang Fuping, also serves as ByteDance
Ltd.'s Editor-in-Chief and Vice President and has vowed that
the CCP committee would ``take the lead'' across ``all product
lines and business lines,'' which includes TikTok.
Moreover, pursuant to the PRC's laws, the PRC can require a
company headquartered in the PRC to surrender all its data to
the PRC, making companies headquartered there an espionage tool
of the CCP:
The National Intelligence Law, passed in
China in 2017, requires that ``any organization'' must
assist or cooperate with CCP intelligence work.\11\
Such assistance or cooperation must also remain secret
at the PRC's request.\12\
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\11\Joe McDonald & Zen Soo, Why Does US See Chinese-Owned TikTok as
a Security Threat?, AP News (Mar. 24, 2023, 10:24 A.M.), https://
apnews.com/article/tiktok-bytedance-shou-zi-chew-
8d8a6a9694357040d484670b7f4833be.
\12\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy,
Policy & Plans, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and
Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment From
Firms Linked to the People's Republic of China at 6 (December 22,
2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
20_1222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf/.
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The PRC's 2014 Counter-Espionage Law
requires that ``relevant organizations . . . may not
refuse'' to collect evidence for an investigation.\13\
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\13\McDonald & Soo, infra note 5.
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The PRC's Data Security Law of 2021
establishes that the PRC has the power to access and
control private data.\14\
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\14\Code Civil, Data Security Law of the People's Republic of
China, 2021, art (China).
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The PRC's Counter-Espionage Law grants PRC
security agencies nearly unfettered discretion, if
acting under an unrestricted understanding of national
security, to access data from companies.\15\
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\15\Library of Congress, China: Counterespionage Law Revised,
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-09-21/china-
counterespionage-law-revised/.
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As a result, the Department of Homeland Security has warned
that ``[t]he PRC's data collection actions result innumerous
risks to U.S. businesses and customers, including: the theft of
trade secrets, of intellectual property, and of other
confidential business information; violations of U.S. export
control laws; violations of U.S. privacy laws; breaches of
contractual provisions and terms of service; security and
privacy risks to customers and employees; risk of PRC
surveillance and tracking of regime critics; and reputational
harm to U.S. businesses.''\16\ These risks are imminent, but
other, unforeseen risks may also exist.
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\16\Data Security Business Advisory, supra note 6.
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Prior to 2022, several federal agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, issued
orders banning TikTok on devices for which those specific
agencies are responsible.\17\ A majority of states in the
United States have banned TikTok on state government devices
due to the national security threat posed by the application
under its current ownership.\18\
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\17\See, e.g., Neil Vigdor, ``U.S. Military Branches Block Access
to TikTok App Amid Pentagon Warning,'' N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/tiktok-pentagon-military-
ban.html.
\18\Sawdah Bhainmiya, Here's a full list of the US states that have
introduced full or partial TikTok bans on government devices over
mounting security concerns, Business Insider (Jan. 15, 2023, 5:00 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-banned-us-government-state-
devices-2023-1.
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As has been widely reported, TikTok. has proposed an
alternative to a ban, a proposal referred to as ``Project
Texas,'' which is an initiative to try and satisfy concerns
relating to TikTok's handling of U.S. user data. This proposal
was rolled out in July 2022. Under the proposal, U.S. user data
would be stored in the United States, using the infrastructure
of a trusted third party.\19\ However, under the initiative,
the application algorithm, source code, and development
activities would remain in China under ByteDance Ltd.'s control
and subject to PRC laws, subject to proposed safeguards
relating to cloud infrastructure and other data security
concerns. Project Texas would also allow ByteDance Ltd. to
continue to have a role in certain aspects of TikTok's U.S.
operations.\20\
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\19\TikTok Response to Sen Blackburn, June 30, 2022, https://
www.blackburn.senate.gov/services/files/A5027CD8-73DE-4571-95B0-
AA7064F707C1, p.2.
\20\See, e.g., TikTok v. Trump, 490 F.Supp.3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,
2020); Marland v. Trump, 20-cv-04597 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2020).
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Additionally, Project Texas would allow TikTok to continue
to rely on the engineers and back-end support in China to
update its algorithms and the source code needed to run the
TikTok application in the U.S.\21\ But allowing code
development in and access to U.S. user data from China
potentially exposes U.S. users to malicious code, backdoor
vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and other
problematic activities tied to source code development.
Furthermore, allowing back-end support, code development, and
operational activities to remain in China would also require
TikTok to continue to send U.S. user data to China to update
the machine learning algorithms and source code for the
application, and to conduct related back-end services, like
managing users' accounts.\22\
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\21\Id., p.3-5.
\22\See, e.g., Emily Baker White, EXCLUSIVE: TikTok Spied On Forbes
Journalists, Forbes (December 22, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
emilybaker-white/2022/12/22/tiktok-tracks-forbes-journalists-bytedance/
?sh=68c05b5d7da5.
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As of March 2024, Project Texas has not been completed.
Until Project Texas is complete, Beijing-based employees of
TikTok can access U.S. user data.\23\
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\23\Christianna Silva, What is Project Texas, TikTok's Best Chance
to Avoid a Deal, Mashable (March 28, 2023), https://mashable.com/
article/project-texas-tiktok.
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Finally, as TikTok's popularity continues to grow in the
United States, so does the risk it poses. Attempted action by
the Executive Branch to mitigate these risks has proven
unsuccessful, and therefore Congress must act to provide
congressional authority to protect U.S. national security.
Congress has previously taken such action with respect to
media companies in passing the Communications Act of 1934,
which limits foreign investment in television and radio
broadcast licenses.\24\ These foreign ownership restrictions
were originally adopted to protect national security interests
during wartime by preventing the airing of foreign propaganda
on broadcast stations.\25\ Today, applications like TikTok
operate in similar manner as other media companies in the
United States, and therefore they should be subject to foreign
ownership scrutiny too.
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\24\47 U.S.C. 310(b).
\25\In re Commission Policies and Procedures Under Section
310(b)(4) of the Communications Act, Foreign Investment in Broadcast
Licenses, 28 FCC Rcd 16244 (2013), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
clarifies-policy-foreign-investment-broadcast-licensees-0.
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Below is a list of public statements that have been made
regarding the national security risks posed by ByteDance Ltd.,
TikTok, and the CCP as well as past and ongoing actions being
taken to mitigate the national security risks associated with
these entities and similarly situated companies:
In May 2019, in connection with a review by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), a company based in the PRC agreed to
divest its interest in a popular software application
reportedly due to concerns relating to potential access
by the PRC to American user data from the
application.\26\
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\26\Zack Whittaker, Grindr sold by Chinese owner after US raised
national security concerns, Tech Crunch. (March 6, 2020, 1:06 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/06/grindr-sold-china-national-security/.
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On May 15, 2019, the President of the United
States (President) issued an Executive Order on
Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain, which stated that
``unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States
of information and communications technology or
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied
by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries . . .
constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States.''\27\
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\27\Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 FR 22689 (May 15, 2019), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-
information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain.
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On August 2, 2020, then-Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo stated that PRC-based companies ``are
feeding data directly to the Chinese Communist Party,
their national security apparatus.''\28\
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\28\Ronn Blitzer, Pompeo Warns TikTok Users' Personal Info Could Be
Going `Directly to the Chinese Communist Party, Fox News (Aug. 2, 2020,
12:39 P.M.), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pompeo-warns-tiktok-
users-data-including-facial-pattern-residence-phone-number-could-be-
going-directly-to-the-chinese-communist-party.
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On August 6, 2020, the President concluded
that TikTok ``automatically captures vast swaths of
information from its users'' and that TikTok's
ownership by ByteDance Ltd. enables the PRC and CCP to
gain access to ``Americans' personal and proprietary
information,'' potentially allowing the CCP ``to track
the locations of Federal employees and contractors,
build dossiers of personal information for blackmail,
and conduct corporate espionage.''\29\
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\29\Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/
addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-to-
address-the-national-emergency (revoked by Exec. Order No. 14,034 (June
9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/11/2021-
12506/protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries).
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On August 6, 2020, the President issued an
Executive Order (E.O. 13942) that directed the
Secretary of Commerce to take actions that would have
prohibited certain transactions related to TikTok in 45
days if ByteDance failed to divest its ownership of
TikTok.\30\ The companies and content creators using
the TikTok mobile application filed lawsuits
challenging those prohibitions, as a result of which
two district courts issued preliminary injunctions
enjoining the prohibitions.\31\
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\30\Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 51297 (Aug. 6, 2020).
\31\See, e.g., TikTok v. Trump, 490 F.Supp.3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,
2020); Marland v. Trump, 20-cv-04597 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2020).
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On August 14, 2020, the President found
``there is credible evidence . . . tha
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to force a
divesture or prohibit the distribution, maintenance, or
updating of foreign adversary controlled applications.
DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of
H.R. 7521 is known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, including any program that was included in a report to
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
RELATED COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 7521:
On March 23, 2023, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce held a full committee hearing. The title
of the hearing was ``TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard
American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online
Harms.'' The Committee received testimony from:
Shou Chew, CEO, TikTok Inc.
On March 7, 2024, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce held a full committee hearing to review
H.R. 7521. The title of the hearing was ``Legislation
to Protect Americans from the National Security Threats
Posed by Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications.''
The Committee met in executive session pursuant to a
motion by Chair Rodgers, which was adopted by a record
vote of 43 yeas and 0 nays.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was
filed, the estimate was not available.
EARMARK, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS
Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the
Committee finds that H.R. 7521 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This Section provides that the Act may be cited as the
``Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act''.
Section 2. Prohibition of Foreign-Adversary Controlled Applications
Subsection (a)(1) makes it unlawful for an entity to
distribute, maintain, update, or enable the distribution,
maintenance, or updating of a foreign adversary controlled
application in the United States.
Subsection (a)(2) provides the applicable dates of
prohibitions in subsection (a)(1), which is 180 days after
enactment for the foreign adversary controlled applications in
(g)(3)(A), and beginning 180 days after the relevant
determination in (g)(3)(B) that such application poses an
unacceptable risk to national security.
Subsection (b) requires a foreign adversary controlled
application to provide any U.S. user with all available data
related to their account provided by that application, upon
request by the user, in a machine readable format, including
any data maintained by the application regarding the user's
account, such as the user's content and all other account
information.
Subsection (c) provides the exemptions for the prohibition
in subsection (a). It provides that the prohibition in
subsection (a) does not apply to a foreign adversary controlled
application regarding which a qualified divestiture is executed
and shall cease to apply if a qualified divestment is executed
after the effective date. This subsection also states that
subsection (a) also does not apply to services provided with
respect to a foreign adversary controlled application that are
necessary for an entity to attain compliance with this Act.
Subsection (d) outlines the civil penalties for an entity
found violating subsection (a) or subsection (b). An entity
found violating subsection (a) shall be subject an amount not
to exceed the amount that results from multiplying $5,000 by
the number of U.S. users determined to have accessed,
maintained, or updated an application. An entity found
violating subsection (b) shall be subject to a civil penalty in
an amount not to exceed $500 per U.S. user with an account
provided by that application. This subsection also directs the
Attorney General to conduct investigations related to potential
violations of this Act and pursue enforcement if a violation
has occurred.
Subsection (e) is a severability provision. If any
provision of this section or the application of this section to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity
shall not affect the other provisions or applications of this
section that can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application. This subsection also clarifies that any
invalidity of subsection (g)(3)(A) shall not affect or preclude
the application from a determination as a foreign adversary
controlled application under subsection (g)(3)(B).
Subsection (f) is a rule of construction stating that
nothing in this Act may be construed to authorize the Attorney
General to pursue enforcement other than what is specifically
stated in this Act. It does not authorize the Attorney General
to pursue enforcement against any individual user of the
foreign adversary controlled application, nor does it alter or
affect any other authority provided by or established under
another provision of Federal law.
Subsection (g) defines key terms used throughout Section 2,
including:
(1) The term ``Controlled by a Foreign Adversary'' means
(A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, headquartered in,
has its principal place of business in, or is organized under
the laws of a foreign adversary country; (B) an entity in which
an entity or combination of entities identified in subparagraph
(A), directly or indirectly owns a twenty percent stake or
greater; or (C) an entity subject to the direction, or control,
or of an entity identified in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(2) The term ``Covered Company'' means an entity that
operates, directly or indirectly, including through its parent
company, subsidiaries, or affiliates, a website, desktop
application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive
technology application that permits a user to create an account
or profile to generate, share, and view text, images, videos,
real-time communications, or similar content; has more than
1,000,000 monthly active users for a majority of months during
the preceding 3 months the Presidential determination; enables
one or more users to generate or distribute content that can be
viewed by other users of the website, desktop application,
mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology; and
enables one or more users to view content generated by other
users of the website, desktop application, mobile application,
or augmented or immersive technology.
(3) The term does not include any website, desktop
application, or mobile application in the United States whose
primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews,
business reviews, or travel information and reviews.
(4) The term ``Foreign Adversary Controlled Application''
means a website, desktop application, mobile application, or
augmented or immersive technology application is that is
operated, directly or indirectly, including through its parent
company, subsidiaries, or affiliates by:
(A) any of (i) ByteDance, Ltd.; (ii) TikTok; (iii) a
subsidiary of or a successor to ByteDance, Ltd. or
TikTok that is controlled by a foreign adversary; or
(iv) a company owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by such an entity; or
(B) a covered company that is controlled by a foreign
adversary; and that is determined by the President to
present a significant threat to the national security
of the United States following the issuance of a public
notice of the proposed presidential determination, a
public report to Congress, to be submitted not less
than 30 days prior to the presidential determination,
describing the specific national security concern,
which shall contain a classified annex, and describing
what assets would need to be divested to be a qualified
divestiture.
(5) The term ``Foreign Adversary Country'' means the
countries identified pursuant to section 4872(d)(2) of title
10, United States Code (North Korea, People Republic of China,
Russia, Iran).
(6) The term ``Internet Hosting Service'' means a service
through which storage and computing resources are provided to
an individual or organization for the accommodation and
maintenance of one or more websites or online services, and
which may include file hosting, domain name server hosting,
cloud hosting, and virtual private server hosting.
(7) The term ``Qualified Divestiture'' means a divestiture
or similar transaction that the President, through an
interagency process, determines results in the foreign
adversary controlled application no longer being controlled by
a foreign adversary; and the President determines, through an
interagency process, precludes the establishment or maintenance
of any operational relationship between the foreign adversary
controlled application's United States operations after the
date of the transaction and any formerly affiliated entities
that are controlled by a foreign adversary, including, but not
limited to, any cooperation with respect to the operation of a
content recommendation algorithm or agreement with respect to
data sharing.
(8) The term ``Source Code'' means the combination of text
and other characters comprising the content, both viewable and
nonviewable, of a software application, including any
publishing language, programming language, protocol, or
functional content, as well as any successor languages or
protocols.
(9) The term ``United States'' means the ``United States''
including the territories of the United States.
Section 3. Judicial review
This section requires any review challenging this Act to be
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Subsection (b) provides that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to
this Act, or any action, finding, or determination under this
Act. Subsection (c) places, upon enactment, a 165-day statute
of limitation on any challenge to this Act. This subsection
also places a 90-day statute of limitations on any challenges
to an action, finding, or determination under this Act.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
This legislation does not amend any existing Federal
statute.
[all]