Purpose and Summary
H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act,
introduced by Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH), closes the legal
loophole that allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal
information to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and
other government agencies without the agency first acquiring a
warrant. If the agency were to gather this information itself,
it would be required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other
legal order. By closing this loophole, the bill prevents
government agencies from conducting an end-run around the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Background and Need for the Legislation
I. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA) to limit the government's ability to access
digital communications.\1\ Under ECPA, the government must seek
a warrant or other court order before compelling certain
electronic communications services providers to disclose the
contents and records of electronic communications. These
warrant and order requirements, however, only apply to certain
communications services providers.
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\1\Carey Shenkman, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Greg Nojeim, Dhanaraj
Thakur, Legal Loopholes and Data for Dollars: How Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Agencies Are Buying Your Data from Brokers, Center for
Democracy & Technology at 15 (2021).
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ECPA prevents a Remote Computing Service (RCS) and an
Electronic Communications Service (ECS) provider from knowingly
disclosing communications contents to third parties under
certain circumstances. An RCS provider engages in the
``provision to the public of computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system.''\2\
An ECS provider offers ``any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.''\3\ These include phone companies like AT&T
and Verizon, and tech companies like Google, Microsoft, and
Facebook.
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\2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2711(2).
\3\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(15).
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An ECS provider is prohibited from disclosing to third
parties ``the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service,''\4\ while an RCS provider cannot
disclose ``the contents of any communication which is carried
or maintained on that service.''\5\ Both providers are
prohibited from knowingly divulging non-content information to
the government absent an exception.\6\ The government may
obtain subscriber information, like names, addresses, and phone
numbers, from an RCS or ECS by obtaining a subpoena.\7\ The
government may obtain more sensitive non-content information,
like traffic or transactional information, by obtaining a
separate order after demonstrating ``specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe''
that the information is ``relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.''\8\ When the government seeks to
obtain the content of electronic communications, it must obtain
a probable cause warrant.\9\
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\4\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(1).
\5\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(2).
\6\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(3), (b).
\7\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2703(c)(2).
\8\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 16; See also 18 U.S.C. Sec.
2703(d).
\9\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 16.
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However, ECPA does not restrict the ability of these
electronic communications services providers to voluntarily
providing non-content information to non-government third
parties.\10\ As long as those third parties are not RCS or ECS
providers, then ECPA does not apply to them and does not
prohibit their selling the information to the government.\11\
This has led to a loophole whereby RCS and ECS providers can
transfer data to private third parties and the government is
able to purchase the data from those third parties without
obtaining the otherwise required court order, subpoena, or
warrant.
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\10\Id.
\11\Id.
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At a hearing of the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal
Government Surveillance on July 14, 2023, witnesses addressed
this data broker loophole.\12\ One witness testified that ``the
law is woefully outdated. It does not cover digital data
brokers or many app developers, for the simple reason that they
did not exist in 1986, when the law was passed. This gap
creates an easy end-run around the law's protections.''\13\
Data brokers serve as a ``middleman'' and allow the government
to sidestep the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.\14\
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\12\See Fixing FISA, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime
and Fed. Gov't Surveillance, 117th Cong. (2023).
\13\Id. (Testimony of Elizabeth Goitein at 39).
\14\Id.
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II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON LOCATION DATA
Over 40 years ago, the Supreme Court held that ``a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.''\15\ The Court has
relied on this ``third-party doctrine'' over the years to find
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect records or
information voluntarily shared with someone else.\16\ In 2018,
in Carpenter v. United States, however, the Court held ``that
the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before acquiring'' cell-site location
information for a seven-day period.\17\ Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the ``seismic shifts in
digital technology'' that makes tracking a person's location
possible.\18\ The Court recognized that location information
``provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing
not only his particular movements, but through them, his
`familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.'''\19\
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\15\Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (citing United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)).
\16\See Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Court holds that police will
generally need a warrant for sustained cellphone location information,
SCOTUSblog (Jun. 22, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-
analysis-court-holds-that-police-will-generally-need-a-warrant-for-
cellphone-location-information/.
\17\Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
\18\Id. at 2219.
\19\Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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While the Court's decision in Carpenter dealt with cell-
site location information, rather than commercially available
geolocation data available for purchase from data brokers,
``the Court's reasoning surrounding the privacy concerns of
location data strongly suggest that collection of a multitude
of sensitive digital information . . . is also covered by the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.''\20\ However, the
government has construed Carpenter's holding as limited to the
facts of the case. Indeed, the Court ``expressly declined to
consider what other types of information might qualify for
Fourth Amendment protection despite being disclosed to a third
party.'''\21\
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\20\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 18.
\21\See Fixing FISA, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime
and Fed. Gov't Surveillance, 117th Cong. (2023) (Testimony of Elizabeth
Goitein at 41).
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III. DATA COLLECTION, RETENTION, AND SALE
Today, data is often referred to as the world's most
valuable resource, even surpassing oil.\22\ It can include
information from public sources, such as ``demographic
information, property records, court filings, criminal
convictions, professional licenses, census data, birth
certificates, marriage licenses, divorce records,'' bankruptcy
records, and voter registration information, among others.\23\
Commercially-sourced data may include ``purchase history,
warranty registration, credit information, employment
registration, loyalty card data, membership data,
subscriptions, etc.''\24\ And still yet, even more intimate
data can be procured through the collection of information
originating from ``social media profiles, web browsing
activity, mobile apps, media reports, websites, mail-in rebate
forms, forum posts, web browser cookies, plugins, addons,
device data, IP fingerprints, network data, metadata'' and so
on.\25\
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\22\Kiran Bhageshpur, Data Is The New Oil--And That's A Good Thing,
Forbes (Nov. 15, 2019).
\23\Henrik Twetman, Gundars Bergmanis-Korats, Data Brokers and
Security: Risks and vulnerabilities related to commercially available
data, NATO Strategic Commc'ns Ctre. of Excellence 11 (Jan. 20, 2020).
\24\Id.
\25\Id.
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Data brokers aggregate, package, and sell the data acquired
from a variety of sources, including those described above.
Often, data brokers have thousands of different data points
reflecting information about a person that, when combined,
reveal valuable and intimate insights about an individual that
would otherwise be unavailable.\26\ In other words, for data
brokers, consumers and their information are the product.\27\
For example, data brokers can receive geolocation data,
sometimes accurate to just a few yards, from a mobile device up
to 14,000 times per day.\28\ This data allows a purchaser to
identify patterns that can reveal where a person lives, where
they work, and where they spend their free time.\29\ This
information can be useful in commercial applications, such as
advertising.\30\ But it can also be exploited to learn about a
person's daily life and to track their historic movements.\31\
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\26\What Are Data Brokers--And What Is Your Data Worth?, WEBFX
(Mar. 16, 2020).
\27\See Data Brokers, Electronic Privacy Information Center,
https://epic.org/issues/consumer-privacy/data-brokers/.
\28\Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, et al., Your Apps Know Where You
Were Last Night, and They're Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. Times (Dec.
10, 2018).
\29\See Id.
\30\Id.
\31\Id.
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As a result of the nature of this information, it is
extremely attractive to government agencies, and recent
reporting indicates that data-based policing is becoming
increasingly prevalent. For example, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD) have all purchased
geolocation information from data brokers.\32\ And other
experts have found that the practice of law enforcement and
intelligence agencies buying sensitive data--ranging from
geolocation to personal communications--is increasing, with
some agencies spending ``tens of millions of dollars on multi-
year contracts.''\33\
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\32\Elizabeth Goitein, The government can't seize your digital
data. Except by buying it., Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2021).
\33\Sharon Bradford Franklin, Greg Nojeim & Dhanaraj Thakur, Legal
Loopholes and Data for Dollars: How Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Agencies Are Buying Your Data from Brokers, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech.
(Dec. 9, 2021).
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In recent years, the government has turned to data brokers
like Venntel to purchase location data from Americans'
smartphones. The IRS purchased access to a commercial database
that ``records the locations of millions of American
cellphones'' to attempt to ``identify and track potential
criminal suspects.''\34\ Another data broker, Clearview AI,
developed a facial recognition software to create a database of
photos from sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter and
marketed to law enforcement.\35\ Because ECPA does not protect
consumers from data brokers that collect their information, the
government purchases data as way to avoid seeking a warrant as
would otherwise be required by the Fourth Amendment.\36\
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\34\See Byron Tau, IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to Try to Find
Suspects, Wall Street Journal (Jun. 19, 2020).
\35\See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy
as We Know It, The New York Times (Jan. 18, 2020).
\36\See Alex Deise, Bill of the Month: The Fourth Amendment is Not
for Sale Act, FreedomWorks (Jul. 29, 2022).
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Last year, the FBI admitted to buying ``precise geolocation
data derived from mobile-phone advertising.''\37\ At a hearing
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director
Wray stated that the FBI now seeks court orders when obtaining
phone data from commercial vendors, but the data broker
loophole in ECPA would permit the FBI to resume purchasing such
data in the future.\38\ Leaked documents also revealed that
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) purchased cell phone location data, and ICE
also purchased utility data and information from private
license plate reader databases.\39\ Defense contractors
reportedly purchased location data from Muslim prayer apps and
dating apps.\40\ The Secret Service and DOD have also purchased
smart phone location data.\41\
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\37\See Byron Tau, FBI Once Bought Mobile-Phone Data for
Warrantless Tracking. Other Agencies Still Do., Wall Street Journal
(Mar. 10, 2023).
\38\Id.
\39\See Laura Hecht-Felella, Federal Agencies Are Secretly Buying
Consumer Data, Brennan Center for Justice (Apr. 16, 2021).
\40\Id.
\41\Id.
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As part of the Committee on the Judiciary's investigation
into the IRS's troubling visit to the home of journalist Matt
Taibbi on the day he testified before the Select Subcommittee
on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, the Committee
discovered that the IRS collected personal data from data
brokers to use in its investigation of Taibbi.\42\ For example,
the IRS collected data from the data broker Anywho, a People
Search Website.\43\ It is concerning enough that the IRS would
take the extreme step of visiting someone's home on the day he
testified before Congress, but the IRS also compiled its
information from a data broker, potentially accessing vast
amounts of Taibbi's private information.
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\42\See Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Hon. Daniel Werfel, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service (May 24, 2023).
\43\See Yael Grauer, Here's a Long List of Data Broker Sites and
How to Opt-Out of Them, VICE (Mar. 27, 2018).
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These actions allow government agencies and law enforcement
to evade the Fourth Amendment and collect limitless information
of Americans. The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act closes
this legal loophole and stops data brokers from selling
Americans' personal information to the government by requiring
the government to obtain a court order before acquiring
customer or subscriber information from a third party.
On July 19, 2023, the Committee unanimously approved H.R.
4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.\44\ During the
markup of H.R. 4639, Members expressed a concern regarding
warrantless government surveillance of Americans' data.\45\
Specifically, Members criticized the developing practice
wherein government agencies are able to exploit a legal
loophole to purchase massive amounts of Americans' information
from data brokers, even though that same information would
ordinarily require the agency to obtain a court order if
gathering the information themselves.\46\
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\44\Markup of H.R. 1531, H.R. 4250, and H.R. 4639 Before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2023).
\45\See generally id.
\46\Id.
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As technology continues to advance and Americans
incidentally share more data through the devices we use every
day, it is important for Congress to protect privacy interests
and ensure that government agencies and law enforcement abide
by the Fourth Amendment. In the Fourth Amendment Is Not For
Sale Act, Congress has the opportunity to codify the Supreme
Court's decision in Carpenter and address ``additional
categories of highly sensitive information that merit the
protection of a warrant regardless of whether they are held by
third parties.''\47\
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\47\Id.
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Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 4639: ``Fixing
FISA, Part II,'' a hearing held on July 14, 2023, before the
Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance, of
the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard
testimony from the following witnesses:
Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington
University Law School;
Mr. Phil Kiko, Principal, Williams & Jensen;
Mr. Gene Schaerr, General Counsel, Project
for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and
Ms. Elizabeth Goitein, Senior Director,
Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for
Justice.
The hearing addressed the need for protections regarding
the federal government's purchase of data from data brokers.
Committee Consideration
On July 19, 2023, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 4639, favorably reported without
amendment, by a roll call vote of 30-0-1, a quorum being
present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 4639:
1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 4639--passed 30 ayes to
0 nays, 1 present.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 has been timely submittedprior to filing of the report and
is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included in this
report.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has
received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4639 from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office:
H.R. 4639 would prohibit law enforcement and intelligence
agencies from purchasing personal information about customers
or subscribers of electronic and remote computing service
providers (for example, social media, cell phone, email, and
cloud-computing companies) from a third party. Current law
prohibits those entities from disclosing such information,
which includes names, addresses, phone numbers, and location,
directly to government agencies without a court order. However,
those companies are permitted to voluntarily disclose such
information to third parties, which can then provide it to the
government. H.R. 4639 would require a law enforcement or
intelligence agency to obtain a court order before acquiring
customer or subscriber information from a third party. Under
the bill, any information purchased from a third party would be
inadmissible as evidence in court.
H.R. 4639 would affect the operating costs of federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, which are subject to
annual appropriations. The magnitude and direction of those
effects is subject to significant uncertainty. The bill could
reduce costs by preventing those agencies from purchasing
customer or subscriber information. The bill could increase
costs for those agencies' investigative and intelligence-
gathering activities if they require additional administrative
resources or personnel to obtain information they currently
purchase at a lower cost. CBO has no basis on which to estimate
the net cost of those changes. Any change in spending from
implementing H.R. 4639 would be subject to future appropriation
actions.
CBO has not reviewed H.R. 4639 for intergovernmental or
private-sector mandates. Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act excludes from the application of that act any
legislative provisions that would enforce the constitutional
rights of individuals. CBO has determined that the bill falls
within that exclusion because it extends protections against
the unreasonable search and seizure of personal data.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jeremy Crimm
(for the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security), Bill Ma
(for the Department of Defense), and Erich Dvorak (for
mandates). The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss,
Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 4639 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 4639 closes the legal loophole that
allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal information to
law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government
agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 4639
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Sec. 1. Short title
The Act is the ``Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale
Act.''
Sec. 2. Protection of records held by data brokers
Defines various terms and prevents law enforcement
and intelligence agencies from buying data about a United
States person, located anywhere in the world, or data about any
person located in the United States that:
Is data about a person's device, from
their online account, or created or shared by a
technology and telecommunications company providing a
service to that person;
Was obtained from a technology or
communications company providing service to the target
in a manner that violated a contract, or the company's
terms of service or privacy policy;
Was obtained by deceiving the person
whose information was obtained; or
Was obtained by accessing the person's
device or online account without authorization.
Also prohibits the use or sharing by the
government of any information obtained in violation of this
section. This section further requires the Attorney General to
adopt specific procedures to minimize the acquisition and
retention of this information, and to prohibit its
dissemination.
Sec. 3. Required disclosure
Extends the protections in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act--which requires the government to
obtain a warrant to compel technology and communications
companies to turn over their customers' data--to the categories
of data protected in Section 2 held by data brokers.
Sec. 4. Intermediary service providers
Extends the protections in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act to data held by intermediary service
providers, which are entities that directly or indirectly
deliver, store, or process communications for or on behalf of
technology or communications firms.
Sec. 5. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence
purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978
Narrows a legal carveout in FISA permitting the
intelligence community, without an order issued by a court, to
buy or obtain through other methods, metadata about calls,
texts, emails, and web browsing, where at least one end of the
communication is located abroad. This section limits the
carveout such that it only applies to the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information of non-Americans located
outside the United States.
Specifies that FISA authorities shall be the
exclusive means by which the government obtains information
inside the U.S. or from U.S. technology or communications
companies electronic communications transactions records, call
detail records, or other metadata about the communications of
United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any
person located in the United States.
Specifies that Title I and sections 303, 304, 703,
704, and 705 of FISA shall be the exclusive means by which the
government obtains inside the location information of U.S.
persons or persons inside the United States, web browsing
history, Internet search history, or any other data that would
require a court order to compel, about United States persons,
located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the
United States.
Sec. 6. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities,
or technical assistance to the government absent a court order
Removes the Attorney General's authority to grant
civil immunity to those that provide unlawful assistance for
government surveillance not required or permitted by federal
law. Immunity remains for any surveillance assistance ordered
by a court.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART I--CRIMES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 119--WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND
INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2511. Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications prohibited
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter
any person who--
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures
any other person to use or endeavor to use any
electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept
any oral communication when--
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise
transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or
other like connection used in wire
communication; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by
radio, or interferes with the transmission of
such communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to
know, that such device or any component thereof
has been sent through the mail or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes
place on the premises of any business or other
commercial establishment the operations of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining
information relating to the operations of any
business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(v) such person acts in the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or
any territory or possession of the United
States;
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in
violation of this subsection; or
(e)(i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by means
authorized by sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)-(c),
2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii)
knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of such a
communication in connection with a criminal
investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the
information in connection with a criminal
investigation, and (iv) with intent to improperly
obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized
criminal investigation,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be
subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an
operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of
a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
communication in the normal course of his employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service, except that a
provider of wire communication service to the public shall not
utilize service observing or random monitoring except for
mechanical or service quality control checks.
(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or
electronic communication service, their officers, employees,
and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are
authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical
assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire,
oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider, its
officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other
specified person, has been provided with--
(A) a court order directing such assistance or a
court order pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the
authorizing judge, or
[(B) a certification in writing by a person specified
in section 2518(7) of this title or the Attorney
General of the United States that no warrant or court
order is required by law, that all statutory
requirements have been met, and that the specified
assistance is required,]
(B) a certification in writing--
(I) by a person specified in section 2518(7)
or the Attorney General of the United States;
(II) that the requirements for an emergency
authorization to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication under section 2518(7)
have been met; and
(III) that the specified assistance is
required,
setting forth the period of time during which the provision of
the information, facilities, or technical assistance is
authorized and specifying the information, facilities, or
technical assistance required. No provider of wire or
electronic communication service, officer, employee, or agent
thereof, or landlord, custodian, or other specified person
shall disclose the existence of any interception or
surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception
or surveillance with respect to which the person has been
furnished a court order or certification under this chapter,
except as may otherwise be required by legal process and then
only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to the
principal prosecuting attorney of a State or any political
subdivision of a State, as may be appropriate. Any such
disclosure, shall render such person liable for the civil
damages provided for in section 2520. No cause of action shall
lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic
communication service, its officers, employees, or agents,
landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing
information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the
terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or
certification under this chapter.
[(iii) If a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B) for
assistance to obtain foreign intelligence information is based
on statutory authority, the certification shall identify the
specific statutory provision and shall certify that the
statutory requirements have been met.]
(iii) For assistance provided pursuant to a certification
under subparagraph (ii)(B), the limitation on causes of action
under the last sentence of the matter following subparagraph
(ii)(B) shall only apply to the extent that the assistance
ceased at the earliest of the time the application for a court
order was denied, the time the communication sought was
obtained, or 48 hours after the interception began.
(b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an
officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Communications
Commission, in the normal course of his employment and in
discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the
Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the
United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic
communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or
to disclose or use the information thereby obtained.
(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication, where such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception.
(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States or of any State.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or
section 705 or 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, it shall
not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of the
United States in the normal course of his official duty to
conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
authorized by that Act.
[(f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121 or 206
of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of
1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United
States Government of foreign intelligence information from
international or foreign communications, or foreign
intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise
applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic
communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic
surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this
chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act,
and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic
communications may be conducted.]
(f)(i)(A) Nothing contained in this chapter, chapter 121 or
206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) shall be deemed to affect an
acquisition or activity described in clause (B) that is carried
out utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance, as
defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
(B) An acquisition or activity described in this clause is--
(I) an acquisition by the United States Government of
foreign intelligence information from international or
foreign communications that--
(aa) is acquired pursuant to express
statutory authority; or
(bb) only includes information of persons who
are not United States persons and are located
outside the United States; or
(II) a foreign intelligence activity involving a
foreign electronic communications system that--
(aa) is conducted pursuant to express
statutory authority; or
(bb) only involves the acquisition by the
United States Government of information of
persons who are not United States persons and
are located outside the United States.
(ii) The procedures in this chapter, chapter 121, and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic
communications may be conducted.
(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter
121 of this title for any person--
(i) to intercept or access an electronic
communication made through an electronic communication
system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general
public;
(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is
transmitted--
(I) by any station for the use of the general
public, or that relates to ships, aircraft,
vehicles, or persons in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement,
civil defense, private land mobile, or public
safety communications system, including police
and fire, readily accessible to the general
public;
(III) by a station operating on an authorized
frequency within the bands allocated to the
amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio
services; or
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical
communications system;
(iii) to engage in any conduct which--
(I) is prohibited by section 633 of the
Communications Act of 1934; or
(II) is excepted from the application of
section 705(a) of the Communications Act of
1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;
(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic
communication the transmission of which is causing
harmful interference to any lawfully operating station
or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent
necessary to identify the source of such interference;
or
(v) for other users of the same frequency to
intercept any radio communication made through a system
that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals
engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if
such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
(h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter--
(i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace device
(as those terms are defined for the purposes of chapter
206 (relating to pen registers and trap and trace
devices) of this title); or
(ii) for a provider of electronic communication
service to record the fact that a wire or electronic
communication was initiated or completed in order to
protect such provider, another provider furnishing
service toward the completion of the wire or electronic
communication, or a user of that service, from
fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service.
(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person
acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic
communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to,
through, or from the protected computer, if--
(I) the owner or operator of the protected computer
authorizes the interception of the computer
trespasser's communications on the protected computer;
(II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully
engaged in an investigation;
(III) the person acting un