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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-459

FOURTH AMENDMENT IS NOT FOR SALE ACT

2024-04-15

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, introduced by Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH), closes the legal loophole that allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. If the agency were to gather this information itself, it would be required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other legal order. By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government agencies from conducting an end-run around the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Background and Need for the Legislation I. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to limit the government's ability to access digital communications.\1\ Under ECPA, the government must seek a warrant or other court order before compelling certain electronic communications services providers to disclose the contents and records of electronic communications. These warrant and order requirements, however, only apply to certain communications services providers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Carey Shenkman, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Greg Nojeim, Dhanaraj Thakur, Legal Loopholes and Data for Dollars: How Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Are Buying Your Data from Brokers, Center for Democracy & Technology at 15 (2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ECPA prevents a Remote Computing Service (RCS) and an Electronic Communications Service (ECS) provider from knowingly disclosing communications contents to third parties under certain circumstances. An RCS provider engages in the ``provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.''\2\ An ECS provider offers ``any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.''\3\ These include phone companies like AT&T and Verizon, and tech companies like Google, Microsoft, and Facebook. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2711(2). \3\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(15). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An ECS provider is prohibited from disclosing to third parties ``the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service,''\4\ while an RCS provider cannot disclose ``the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service.''\5\ Both providers are prohibited from knowingly divulging non-content information to the government absent an exception.\6\ The government may obtain subscriber information, like names, addresses, and phone numbers, from an RCS or ECS by obtaining a subpoena.\7\ The government may obtain more sensitive non-content information, like traffic or transactional information, by obtaining a separate order after demonstrating ``specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe'' that the information is ``relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.''\8\ When the government seeks to obtain the content of electronic communications, it must obtain a probable cause warrant.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(1). \5\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(2). \6\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(a)(3), (b). \7\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2703(c)(2). \8\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 16; See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2703(d). \9\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 16. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, ECPA does not restrict the ability of these electronic communications services providers to voluntarily providing non-content information to non-government third parties.\10\ As long as those third parties are not RCS or ECS providers, then ECPA does not apply to them and does not prohibit their selling the information to the government.\11\ This has led to a loophole whereby RCS and ECS providers can transfer data to private third parties and the government is able to purchase the data from those third parties without obtaining the otherwise required court order, subpoena, or warrant. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\Id. \11\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At a hearing of the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance on July 14, 2023, witnesses addressed this data broker loophole.\12\ One witness testified that ``the law is woefully outdated. It does not cover digital data brokers or many app developers, for the simple reason that they did not exist in 1986, when the law was passed. This gap creates an easy end-run around the law's protections.''\13\ Data brokers serve as a ``middleman'' and allow the government to sidestep the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\See Fixing FISA, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Fed. Gov't Surveillance, 117th Cong. (2023). \13\Id. (Testimony of Elizabeth Goitein at 39). \14\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON LOCATION DATA Over 40 years ago, the Supreme Court held that ``a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.''\15\ The Court has relied on this ``third-party doctrine'' over the years to find that the Fourth Amendment does not protect records or information voluntarily shared with someone else.\16\ In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, however, the Court held ``that the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring'' cell-site location information for a seven-day period.\17\ Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the ``seismic shifts in digital technology'' that makes tracking a person's location possible.\18\ The Court recognized that location information ``provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them, his `familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.'''\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)). \16\See Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Court holds that police will generally need a warrant for sustained cellphone location information, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 22, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion- analysis-court-holds-that-police-will-generally-need-a-warrant-for- cellphone-location-information/. \17\Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). \18\Id. at 2219. \19\Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the Court's decision in Carpenter dealt with cell- site location information, rather than commercially available geolocation data available for purchase from data brokers, ``the Court's reasoning surrounding the privacy concerns of location data strongly suggest that collection of a multitude of sensitive digital information . . . is also covered by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.''\20\ However, the government has construed Carpenter's holding as limited to the facts of the case. Indeed, the Court ``expressly declined to consider what other types of information might qualify for Fourth Amendment protection despite being disclosed to a third party.'''\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\Shenkman, et al. supra note 1 at 18. \21\See Fixing FISA, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Fed. Gov't Surveillance, 117th Cong. (2023) (Testimony of Elizabeth Goitein at 41). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. DATA COLLECTION, RETENTION, AND SALE Today, data is often referred to as the world's most valuable resource, even surpassing oil.\22\ It can include information from public sources, such as ``demographic information, property records, court filings, criminal convictions, professional licenses, census data, birth certificates, marriage licenses, divorce records,'' bankruptcy records, and voter registration information, among others.\23\ Commercially-sourced data may include ``purchase history, warranty registration, credit information, employment registration, loyalty card data, membership data, subscriptions, etc.''\24\ And still yet, even more intimate data can be procured through the collection of information originating from ``social media profiles, web browsing activity, mobile apps, media reports, websites, mail-in rebate forms, forum posts, web browser cookies, plugins, addons, device data, IP fingerprints, network data, metadata'' and so on.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\Kiran Bhageshpur, Data Is The New Oil--And That's A Good Thing, Forbes (Nov. 15, 2019). \23\Henrik Twetman, Gundars Bergmanis-Korats, Data Brokers and Security: Risks and vulnerabilities related to commercially available data, NATO Strategic Commc'ns Ctre. of Excellence 11 (Jan. 20, 2020). \24\Id. \25\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data brokers aggregate, package, and sell the data acquired from a variety of sources, including those described above. Often, data brokers have thousands of different data points reflecting information about a person that, when combined, reveal valuable and intimate insights about an individual that would otherwise be unavailable.\26\ In other words, for data brokers, consumers and their information are the product.\27\ For example, data brokers can receive geolocation data, sometimes accurate to just a few yards, from a mobile device up to 14,000 times per day.\28\ This data allows a purchaser to identify patterns that can reveal where a person lives, where they work, and where they spend their free time.\29\ This information can be useful in commercial applications, such as advertising.\30\ But it can also be exploited to learn about a person's daily life and to track their historic movements.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\What Are Data Brokers--And What Is Your Data Worth?, WEBFX (Mar. 16, 2020). \27\See Data Brokers, Electronic Privacy Information Center, https://epic.org/issues/consumer-privacy/data-brokers/. \28\Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They're Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. Times (Dec. 10, 2018). \29\See Id. \30\Id. \31\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result of the nature of this information, it is extremely attractive to government agencies, and recent reporting indicates that data-based policing is becoming increasingly prevalent. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD) have all purchased geolocation information from data brokers.\32\ And other experts have found that the practice of law enforcement and intelligence agencies buying sensitive data--ranging from geolocation to personal communications--is increasing, with some agencies spending ``tens of millions of dollars on multi- year contracts.''\33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\Elizabeth Goitein, The government can't seize your digital data. Except by buying it., Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2021). \33\Sharon Bradford Franklin, Greg Nojeim & Dhanaraj Thakur, Legal Loopholes and Data for Dollars: How Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Are Buying Your Data from Brokers, Ctr. For Democracy & Tech. (Dec. 9, 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In recent years, the government has turned to data brokers like Venntel to purchase location data from Americans' smartphones. The IRS purchased access to a commercial database that ``records the locations of millions of American cellphones'' to attempt to ``identify and track potential criminal suspects.''\34\ Another data broker, Clearview AI, developed a facial recognition software to create a database of photos from sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter and marketed to law enforcement.\35\ Because ECPA does not protect consumers from data brokers that collect their information, the government purchases data as way to avoid seeking a warrant as would otherwise be required by the Fourth Amendment.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\See Byron Tau, IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to Try to Find Suspects, Wall Street Journal (Jun. 19, 2020). \35\See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, The New York Times (Jan. 18, 2020). \36\See Alex Deise, Bill of the Month: The Fourth Amendment is Not for Sale Act, FreedomWorks (Jul. 29, 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Last year, the FBI admitted to buying ``precise geolocation data derived from mobile-phone advertising.''\37\ At a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director Wray stated that the FBI now seeks court orders when obtaining phone data from commercial vendors, but the data broker loophole in ECPA would permit the FBI to resume purchasing such data in the future.\38\ Leaked documents also revealed that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) purchased cell phone location data, and ICE also purchased utility data and information from private license plate reader databases.\39\ Defense contractors reportedly purchased location data from Muslim prayer apps and dating apps.\40\ The Secret Service and DOD have also purchased smart phone location data.\41\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\See Byron Tau, FBI Once Bought Mobile-Phone Data for Warrantless Tracking. Other Agencies Still Do., Wall Street Journal (Mar. 10, 2023). \38\Id. \39\See Laura Hecht-Felella, Federal Agencies Are Secretly Buying Consumer Data, Brennan Center for Justice (Apr. 16, 2021). \40\Id. \41\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As part of the Committee on the Judiciary's investigation into the IRS's troubling visit to the home of journalist Matt Taibbi on the day he testified before the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, the Committee discovered that the IRS collected personal data from data brokers to use in its investigation of Taibbi.\42\ For example, the IRS collected data from the data broker Anywho, a People Search Website.\43\ It is concerning enough that the IRS would take the extreme step of visiting someone's home on the day he testified before Congress, but the IRS also compiled its information from a data broker, potentially accessing vast amounts of Taibbi's private information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\See Letter from Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Hon. Daniel Werfel, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (May 24, 2023). \43\See Yael Grauer, Here's a Long List of Data Broker Sites and How to Opt-Out of Them, VICE (Mar. 27, 2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These actions allow government agencies and law enforcement to evade the Fourth Amendment and collect limitless information of Americans. The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act closes this legal loophole and stops data brokers from selling Americans' personal information to the government by requiring the government to obtain a court order before acquiring customer or subscriber information from a third party. On July 19, 2023, the Committee unanimously approved H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.\44\ During the markup of H.R. 4639, Members expressed a concern regarding warrantless government surveillance of Americans' data.\45\ Specifically, Members criticized the developing practice wherein government agencies are able to exploit a legal loophole to purchase massive amounts of Americans' information from data brokers, even though that same information would ordinarily require the agency to obtain a court order if gathering the information themselves.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\Markup of H.R. 1531, H.R. 4250, and H.R. 4639 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 118th Cong. (2023). \45\See generally id. \46\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As technology continues to advance and Americans incidentally share more data through the devices we use every day, it is important for Congress to protect privacy interests and ensure that government agencies and law enforcement abide by the Fourth Amendment. In the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, Congress has the opportunity to codify the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter and address ``additional categories of highly sensitive information that merit the protection of a warrant regardless of whether they are held by third parties.''\47\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\Id. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hearings

For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 4639: ``Fixing FISA, Part II,'' a hearing held on July 14, 2023, before the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance, of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard testimony from the following witnesses: Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington University Law School; Mr. Phil Kiko, Principal, Williams & Jensen; Mr. Gene Schaerr, General Counsel, Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability; and Ms. Elizabeth Goitein, Senior Director, Liberty & National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice. The hearing addressed the need for protections regarding the federal government's purchase of data from data brokers.

Committee Consideration

On July 19, 2023, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 4639, favorably reported without amendment, by a roll call vote of 30-0-1, a quorum being present.

Committee Votes

In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 4639: 1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 4639--passed 30 ayes to 0 nays, 1 present. Committee Oversight Findings In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been timely submittedprior to filing of the report and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included in this report. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4639 from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office: H.R. 4639 would prohibit law enforcement and intelligence agencies from purchasing personal information about customers or subscribers of electronic and remote computing service providers (for example, social media, cell phone, email, and cloud-computing companies) from a third party. Current law prohibits those entities from disclosing such information, which includes names, addresses, phone numbers, and location, directly to government agencies without a court order. However, those companies are permitted to voluntarily disclose such information to third parties, which can then provide it to the government. H.R. 4639 would require a law enforcement or intelligence agency to obtain a court order before acquiring customer or subscriber information from a third party. Under the bill, any information purchased from a third party would be inadmissible as evidence in court. H.R. 4639 would affect the operating costs of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which are subject to annual appropriations. The magnitude and direction of those effects is subject to significant uncertainty. The bill could reduce costs by preventing those agencies from purchasing customer or subscriber information. The bill could increase costs for those agencies' investigative and intelligence- gathering activities if they require additional administrative resources or personnel to obtain information they currently purchase at a lower cost. CBO has no basis on which to estimate the net cost of those changes. Any change in spending from implementing H.R. 4639 would be subject to future appropriation actions. CBO has not reviewed H.R. 4639 for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates. Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions that would enforce the constitutional rights of individuals. CBO has determined that the bill falls within that exclusion because it extends protections against the unreasonable search and seizure of personal data. The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jeremy Crimm (for the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security), Bill Ma (for the Department of Defense), and Erich Dvorak (for mandates). The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 4639 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program. Performance Goals and Objectives The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of House rule XIII, H.R. 4639 closes the legal loophole that allows data brokers to sell Americans' personal information to law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and other government agencies without the agency first acquiring a warrant. Advisory on Earmarks In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 4639 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104- 1).

Section-by-Section Analysis

Sec. 1. Short title The Act is the ``Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act.'' Sec. 2. Protection of records held by data brokers Defines various terms and prevents law enforcement and intelligence agencies from buying data about a United States person, located anywhere in the world, or data about any person located in the United States that: Is data about a person's device, from their online account, or created or shared by a technology and telecommunications company providing a service to that person; Was obtained from a technology or communications company providing service to the target in a manner that violated a contract, or the company's terms of service or privacy policy; Was obtained by deceiving the person whose information was obtained; or Was obtained by accessing the person's device or online account without authorization. Also prohibits the use or sharing by the government of any information obtained in violation of this section. This section further requires the Attorney General to adopt specific procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of this information, and to prohibit its dissemination. Sec. 3. Required disclosure Extends the protections in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act--which requires the government to obtain a warrant to compel technology and communications companies to turn over their customers' data--to the categories of data protected in Section 2 held by data brokers. Sec. 4. Intermediary service providers Extends the protections in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to data held by intermediary service providers, which are entities that directly or indirectly deliver, store, or process communications for or on behalf of technology or communications firms. Sec. 5. Limits on surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes other than under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Narrows a legal carveout in FISA permitting the intelligence community, without an order issued by a court, to buy or obtain through other methods, metadata about calls, texts, emails, and web browsing, where at least one end of the communication is located abroad. This section limits the carveout such that it only applies to the acquisition of foreign intelligence information of non-Americans located outside the United States. Specifies that FISA authorities shall be the exclusive means by which the government obtains information inside the U.S. or from U.S. technology or communications companies electronic communications transactions records, call detail records, or other metadata about the communications of United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the United States. Specifies that Title I and sections 303, 304, 703, 704, and 705 of FISA shall be the exclusive means by which the government obtains inside the location information of U.S. persons or persons inside the United States, web browsing history, Internet search history, or any other data that would require a court order to compel, about United States persons, located anywhere in the world, or any person located in the United States. Sec. 6. Limit on civil immunity for providing information, facilities, or technical assistance to the government absent a court order Removes the Attorney General's authority to grant civil immunity to those that provide unlawful assistance for government surveillance not required or permitted by federal law. Immunity remains for any surveillance assistance ordered by a court. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE * * * * * * * PART I--CRIMES * * * * * * * CHAPTER 119--WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS * * * * * * * Sec. 2511. Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-- (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when-- (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or (ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or (iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States; (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; (d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; or (e)(i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by means authorized by sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)-(c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of such a communication in connection with a criminal investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and (iv) with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation, shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5). (2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks. (ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service, their officers, employees, and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person, has been provided with-- (A) a court order directing such assistance or a court order pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the authorizing judge, or [(B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7) of this title or the Attorney General of the United States that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required,] (B) a certification in writing-- (I) by a person specified in section 2518(7) or the Attorney General of the United States; (II) that the requirements for an emergency authorization to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication under section 2518(7) have been met; and (III) that the specified assistance is required, setting forth the period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or technical assistance is authorized and specifying the information, facilities, or technical assistance required. No provider of wire or electronic communication service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian, or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order or certification under this chapter, except as may otherwise be required by legal process and then only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to the principal prosecuting attorney of a State or any political subdivision of a State, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure, shall render such person liable for the civil damages provided for in section 2520. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or certification under this chapter. [(iii) If a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B) for assistance to obtain foreign intelligence information is based on statutory authority, the certification shall identify the specific statutory provision and shall certify that the statutory requirements have been met.] (iii) For assistance provided pursuant to a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B), the limitation on causes of action under the last sentence of the matter following subparagraph (ii)(B) shall only apply to the extent that the assistance ceased at the earliest of the time the application for a court order was denied, the time the communication sought was obtained, or 48 hours after the interception began. (b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Communications Commission, in the normal course of his employment and in discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or to disclose or use the information thereby obtained. (c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. (d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or section 705 or 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, it shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized by that Act. [(f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.] (f)(i)(A) Nothing contained in this chapter, chapter 121 or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) shall be deemed to affect an acquisition or activity described in clause (B) that is carried out utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). (B) An acquisition or activity described in this clause is-- (I) an acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications that-- (aa) is acquired pursuant to express statutory authority; or (bb) only includes information of persons who are not United States persons and are located outside the United States; or (II) a foreign intelligence activity involving a foreign electronic communications system that-- (aa) is conducted pursuant to express statutory authority; or (bb) only involves the acquisition by the United States Government of information of persons who are not United States persons and are located outside the United States. (ii) The procedures in this chapter, chapter 121, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. (g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person-- (i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public; (ii) to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted-- (I) by any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress; (II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public; (III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or (IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications system; (iii) to engage in any conduct which-- (I) is prohibited by section 633 of the Communications Act of 1934; or (II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act; (iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or (v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted. (h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter-- (i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace device (as those terms are defined for the purposes of chapter 206 (relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices) of this title); or (ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service. (i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if-- (I) the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's communications on the protected computer; (II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully engaged in an investigation; (III) the person acting un

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/459