Dissenting Views
[To accompany H.R. 4555]
The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 4555) to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002
to allow the use of requirements payments to conduct a post-
election audit with respect to an election for Federal office
in a State, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Committee Action................................................. 7
Committee Consideration.......................................... 8
Committee Votes.................................................. 8
Statement of Constitutional Authority............................ 8
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 9
Statement of Budget Authority and Related Items.................. 9
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 9
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 9
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 9
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 9
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 10
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 10
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 10
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10
Changes in Existing Law as Reported.............................. 10
Dissenting Views................................................. 14
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Election Audit Act''.
SEC. 2. USE OF REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION AUDITS.
(a) Permitting Use of Payments for Audits.--Section 251(b)(1) of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001(b)(1)) is amended by
inserting ``, including to conduct and publish an audit of the
effectiveness and accuracy of the voting systems, nonvoting election
technology (as defined in paragraph (4)(B)), election procedures, and
outcomes used to carry out an election for Federal office in the State
and the performance of the State and local election officials who
carried out the election, but only if the audit meets the requirements
of paragraph (4)(A)'' after ``requirements of title III''.
(b) Requirements for Audits; Nonvoting Election Technology Defined.--
Section 251(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21001(b)) is amended by adding at
the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) Requirements for audits conducted with requirements
payments.--
``(A) In general.--An audit described in paragraph
(1) meets the requirements of this paragraph if--
``(i) no individual who participates in
conducting the audit is an employee or
contractor of an office of the State or local
government which is responsible for the
administration of elections for Federal office
or of a subsidiary or affiliate of such an
office; and
``(ii) the audit includes an examination of
compliance with established processes for voter
registration, voter check-in, voting,
tabulation, canvassing, post-election
proceedings (such as recounts and recanvasses),
and reporting of results.
``(B) Nonvoting election technology defined.--In
paragraph (1), the term `nonvoting election technology'
means technology used in the administration of
elections for Federal office which is not used directly
in the casting, counting, tabulating, or collecting of
ballots or votes, including each of the following:
``(i) Electronic pollbooks or other systems
used to check in voters at a polling place or
verify a voter's identification.
``(ii) Election result reporting systems.
``(iii) Electronic ballot delivery systems.
``(iv) Online voter registration systems.
``(v) Polling place location search systems.
``(vi) Sample ballot portals.
``(vii) Signature systems.
``(viii) Such other technology as may be
recommended for treatment as nonvoting election
technology as the Standards Board may
recommend.''.
(c) Sense of Congress Regarding Timing of Audits.--It is the sense of
Congress that post-election audits of the effectiveness and accuracy of
the voting systems, election procedures, and outcomes used to carry out
an election for Federal office in a State and the performance of the
State and local election officials who carried out the election are
most effective when the audits are completed before the expiration of
the period during which persons are authorized under State law to
challenge the results of the election.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 4555, the Federal Election Audit Act, introduced by
Representative Gregory Murphy (NC-03) permits a State to use
federal Help America Vote Act (``HAVA'') Requirements Payments
to conduct a post-election audit for federal offices in a
State. Currently, HAVA funds are allowed to go towards a wide
range of non-partisan, election administration activities. This
bill authorizes federal dollars received from HAVA to be used
by States to help conduct their post-election audits. Such
audits conducted by the State using HAVA funds can be used to
audit compliance with established processes for voter
registration, voter check-in, voting, tabulation, canvassing,
post-election proceedings, and reporting of results. However,
the audit must be completed by individuals who are independent
from the office that administered the election. Election
transparency is crucial for the American people's confidence
that our election process is free and fair, and audits of our
elections will help to ensure transparency.
Background
Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution\1\
(``the Elections Clause'') explains that the States have the
primary authority over election administration, the ``times,
places, and manner of holding elections, which includes post-
election audits. Conversely, the Constitution grants the
Congress a purely secondary role\2\ to alter or create election
laws only in the extreme cases of invasion, legislative
neglect, or obstinate refusal to pass election laws. As do
other aspects of our federal system, this division of
sovereignty continues to serve to protect one of American
citizens most precious freedoms, the right to vote.\3\
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\1\U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 4, cl. 1 (``[t]he Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . .'').
\2\Although the text of the Elections Clause, read literally,
without context, might suggest Congress has unlimited authority in this
space, an examination of an examination of history, precedent, the
Framers' words, debates concerning ratification, the Supreme Court, and
the Constitution itself provide that this is not the case. See Report:
The Elections Clause: States' Primary Constitutional Authority Over
Elections, Comm. on H. Admin. (Republicans) (Aug. 12, 2021), https://
republicanscha.house.gov/sites/republicans.cha.house.gov/files/
documents/Report_The%20
Elections%20Clause_States%20Primary%20Constitutional%20Authority%20over%
20Elections
%20%28Aug%2011%202021%29.pdf.
\3\Id.
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Following the 2000 presidential election, Congress enacted
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (``HAVA'') to help States and
territories upgrade their voting systems and to improve the
administration of federal elections. HAVA authorizes three
distinct State\4\ funding programs. Section 101 provides
``general improvements'' payments to improve the administration
of elections for federal office, educate voters on voting
procedures, secure voting rights, improve voting technology,
and to train election officials, poll workers, and election
volunteers.\5\ Section 102 provides States with payments to
help replace punch card or lever voting machines.\6\ Finally,
Section 251 directs the Election Assistance Commission
(``EAC'') to provide ``requirements payments'' to help States
carry out other parts of HAVA such as implementation of
provisional voting, providing information at polling places,
developing and maintaining a computerized voter registration
list, and implementing identification requirements for first-
time voters who register by mail.\7\ Each program must follow a
formula that determines the funds available for each
section.\8\ These funds are distributed to the State to
determine the distribution of their HAVA funds (e.g., to county
or other local elections officials) to ensure the grant
parameters are met. To ensure HAVA funds are being used in a
lawful manner, the EAC's Office of Inspector General ``conducts
periodic fiscal audits of State HAVA fund expenditures and
determines if any corrective actions are necessary to resolve
issues identified during audits.''\9\
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\4\See 52 U.S.C. Sec. 21141 defining ``State'' to include the
District of Columbia and the U.S. territories.
\5\Id. at U.S.C. Sec. 20901.
\6\Id. at Sec. 20902.
\7\Id. at Sec. 21001-21008, 21081-21085.
\8\For section 101 payments, see Id. at Sec. Sec. 20901(d), 20903.
For section 102 payments, see Id. at Sec. Sec. 20902(c), 20903. For
section 251 payments, see Id. at 21002.
\9\Audits & Resolutions, U.S. Election Assistance Commission (Aug.
7, 2023), https://www.eac.gov/grants/audits-resolutions.
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One of the core functions of the EAC is the distribution of
HAVA grant funds to States to help them administer federal,
State, and local elections. Congress appropriated a total of
more than $1.3 billion under HAVA's Section 101 general
improvements grant program for fiscal years 2018, 2020, 2022,
and 2023.\10\ Importantly, HAVA allows States to use funds
provided for Section 101's general improvement funding on
activities provided for under Section 251's requirements
payments.\11\
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\10\Karen Shanton, Election Administration: Federal Grant Funding
for States and Localities, Congressional Research Service (May 8,
2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46646.
\11\52 U.S.C. Sec. 20901(b)(1)(A).
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Election system audits are essential to maintaining the
integrity of elections. Audits ensure that voting systems
operate accurately and that election administrators comply with
election law and policies, and, in doing so, promote confidence
in election results.
In response to the issues encountered in the 2000
presidential election\12\ and 2004 congressional election,\13\
the Commission on Federal Election Reform, commonly referred to
as the ``Carter-Baker Commission,'' led by former President
Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III,
was created to make bipartisan recommendations for improving
the U.S. electoral process.\14\ One of their recommendations
was that election officials should publicly audit voting
machines before, during, and after election day to increase
confidence in election results.\15\
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\12\Ron Elving, The Florida Recount of 2000: a Nightmare that Goes
on Haunting, NPR (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/
666812854/the-florida-recount-of-2000-a-nightmare-that-goes-on-
haunting.
\13\Ted Barrett, CNN.Com--Democrats Challenge Ohio Electoral
Votes--Jan 6, 2005, CNN (Jan. 06, 2005), https://www.cnn.com/2005/
ALLPOLITICS/01/06/electoral.vote.1718/#:
:text==WASHINGTON%20%28CNN%29%20--
%20Alleging%20widespread%20%22irregularities
%22%20on%20Election,official%20certification%20of%20the%202004%20preside
ntial
%20election%20results.
\14\Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in
U.S. Elections (Sept. 2005), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/
eac_assets/1/6/Exhibit%20M.PDF.
\15\Id. at 28 (``State and local election authorities should
publicly test all types of voting machines before, during, and after
Election Day and allow public observation of zero machine counts at the
start of Election Day and the machine certification process.'')
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In 2013, President Barack Obama established the
Presidential Commission on Election Administration, a
bipartisan group tasked to ``identify best practices in
election administration and to make recommendations to improve
the voting experience.''\16\ Like the Carter-Baker Commission,
the Presidential Commission on Election Administration also
called upon jurisdictions to conduct election machinery
audits.\17\ However, the president's commission limited its
recommendation to post-election audits.\18\
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\16\Exec. Order. No. 13,639, 78 Fed. Reg. 19979 (Mar. 28, 2013).
\17\Nathaniel Persily et al., The American Voting Experience:
Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election
Administration, Presidential Commission on Election Administration
(Jan. 2014), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/
Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
\18\Id.
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Over time, many jurisdictions have come to see the wisdom
in election audits and voluntarily adopted audit requirements.
By 2018, 36 States required post-election audits by statute,
and seven States by administrative rule.\19\ By 2020, 44 States
required post-election audits of voting equipment, with other
States choosing to conduct them.\20\ In 2021, State lawmakers
introduced over 68 bills addressing post-election audits in 29
States.\21\
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\19\Election Administration and Voting Survey 2018 Comprehensive
Report, Election Assistance Commission (June 2019), https://
www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2018_
EAVS_Report.pdf.
\20\Election Administration and Voting Survey 2012 Comprehensive
Report, Election Assistance Commission (Aug. 2021), https://
www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/
2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf.
\21\Election Audits Across the United States, Election Assistance
Commission (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/
election-audits-across-united-states#::text=Election %20Audits
%20Across%20the
%20United%20States%20(Full%20PDF)&text=In%202021%2C%20state%20lawmakers
%20have,Types%20of%20audits.
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Since its inception in 2002, the EAC has allocated
discretionary grants exceeding $1.4 million to support county
and State organizations that research, develop, document, and
share various protocols with all the States to improve
management of pre-election audits, logic and accuracy testing,
and post-election audit procedures.\22\
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\22\ Id.
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Another way the EAC assists States is through the
development and implementation of audits pursuant to the
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, (``VVSG'')\23\ which also
includes overseeing a testing and certification program aimed
at evaluating voter-system interactions and the design and
development of voting systems.\24\ In 2021, the EAC adopted
VVSG 2.0, to enhance future election equipment's capacity to
facilitate efficient post-election tabulation audits and
introducing a new requirement for software independence.\25\
Software independence ensures that any unnoticed alteration or
error in the software cannot lead to an undetectable alteration
or error in the election results. The development and adoption
of VVSG 2.0 by the EAC has prompted the need to address
forthcoming challenges, replace outdated voting machines,
enhance the voter experience, and establish vital safeguards to
uphold the integrity of the voting process, particularly by
improving the auditability of voting systems. All newly
certified voting systems adhering to VVSG 2.0 will guarantee
that votes are cast, verified, and counted as intended, further
ensuring accurately results reflect voters' true intentions.
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\23\52 U.S.C. Sec. 20962.
\24\Id. at Sec. 20971.
\25\Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Election Assistance
Commission (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/
TestingCertification/Voluntary_Voting_System
_Guidelines_Version _2_0.pdf.
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Importantly, the implementation of VVSG 2.0 does not
decertify voting systems certified under VVSG 1.1 or 1.0.\26\
These systems remain secure. Rather, it means that beginning on
November 16, 2023, the EAC only certifies new voting systems
using VVSG 2.0.
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\26\Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) Migration, Election
Assistance Commission (Nov. 1, 2023), https://www.eac.gov/election-
officials/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines-vvsg-migration.
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To safeguard the integrity of the electoral process, novel
audit methods have been devised to identify discrepancies.
Regardless of the specific post-election audit method employed,
the overarching objective remains consistent across all
jurisdictions: ensuring the accuracy and integrity of elections
and reported results. While the EAC has made available better
pathways and opportunities for auditing election systems, each
State determines whether to implement audits. Expanding the use
of current federal funding for post-election audits provides
States with a useful tool.
In the 117th Congress, former Ranking Member on the
Committee on House Administration, Representative Rodney Davis
(IL-13), introduced H.R. 8528, the American Confidence in
Elections Act\27\ that permitted States to use HAVA
Requirements Payments for post-election audits of federal races
held within a State.
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\27\H.R. 8528--117th Congress (2021-2022): ACE Act, H.R. 8528,
117th Cong. (2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-
bill/8528.
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Similarly, in the 118th Congress, Representative Bryan
Steil (WI-01), introduced H.R. 4563,\28\ an updated version of
the American Confidence in Elections Act, which includes very
similar language to Rep. Murphy's H.R. 4555.
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\28\H.R. 4563--118th Congress (2023-2024): American Confidence in
Elections Act, H.R. 4563, 118th Cong. (2023), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4563.
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NEED FOR LEGISLATION
On July 11, 2023, Representative Greg Murphy (NC-03)
introduced H.R. 4555, Federal Election Audit Act. This bill
amends HAVA to allow States to use HAVA's requirements payments
to conduct audits of the accuracy and effectiveness of voting
systems, election procedures used to carry out elections for
federal office, the performance of the election officials who
facilitate such elections and reported results and outcomes. By
increasing the sources of election audit funding, States will
have more resources to conduct robust audits of election
systems, a necessary step in promoting public confidence in
election outcomes. To make clear, this legislation does not
require States HAVA funds to be used for post-election audits,
nor does it require that States begin conducting post-election
audits. Rather this legislation simply expands available HAVA
funds to conduct State level audits.
The timeframe in which these HAVA-funded audits are
conducted directly affects the capacity of the audit to not
only detect but also to correct any discrepancies or issues
that may have impacted the outcome of the election in question.
If an audit is conducted after the period for contesting
election results has passed, the opportunity to rectify any
identified issues that could change the outcome is lost. In
such a case, while the audit might provide valuable insights
for improving future electoral processes, it fails to address
any immediate concerns regarding the integrity of a just-
concluded election.
Voters expect audits to function as a means of verification
and, if necessary, a corrective mechanism to ensure that their
votes are counted as intended and that the election results are
trustworthy. By conducting audits within the contestable
period, election officials have a window in which they can
address and resolve any discovered discrepancies, thereby
upholding the integrity of the election and maintaining public
confidence in the democratic process. This timely intervention
is essential for reinforcing the electorate's belief that their
participation in the voting process is meaningful and that the
electoral system is both transparent and accountable.
Committee Action
INTRODUCTION AND REFERRAL
On July 11, 2023, Representative Gregory Murphy (NC-03)
introduced H.R. 4555, the Federal Election Audit Act. The bill
was referred to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
House Administration.
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
in the 118th Congress, the Committee on House Administration
held two full committee hearings and one subcommittee hearing
to develop H.R. 4555.
1. On April 27, 2023, the Committee held a full
committee hearing titled, ``American Confidence in
Elections: State Tools to Promote Voter Confidence.''
The hearing focused on Title I of H.R. 4563, the
American Confidence in Elections Act, what tools States
need to boost voter integrity and strengthen voter
confidence, and how the federal government can provide
States with access to the information needed to
accomplish these goals. Witnesses included: The
Honorable Ken Cuccinelli, Chairman, Election
Transparency Initiative, The Honorable Hans von
Spakovsky, Manager, Election Law Reform Initiative and
Senior Legal Fellow, on behalf of The Heritage
Foundation, The Honorable Mac Warner, West Virginia
Secretary of State, The Honorable Donald Palmer,
Commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, and
Mr. Joseph Paul Gloria, Chief Executive Officer for
Operations, Election Center.\29\
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\29\American Confidence in Elections: State Tools to Promote Voter
Confidence: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Admin., 118th Cong. (2023).
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2. On May 24, 2023, the Committee on House
Administration Subcommittee on Elections held a
subcommittee hearing titled, ``American Confidence in
Elections: Ensuring Every Eligible American has the
Opportunity to Vote--and for their Vote to Count
According to Law.'' The hearing highlighted the strong
election integrity reforms that have passed throughout
several States and how important it is for States to
learn from other States' successes in the election
arena. Witnesses included: Mr. Joseph Burns, Lawyer,
Law Office of Joseph T. Burns, PLLC, Ms. Lisa Dixon,
Executive Director, Lawyers Democracy Fund, Mr. Thor
Hearne, Founding Partner, True North Law, LLC, The
Honorable Scot Turner, Executive Director, Eternal
Vigilance Action Inc., and Mr. Deuel Ross, Deputy
Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.\30\
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\30\American Confidence in Elections: Ensuring Every Eligible
American has the Opportunity to Vote--and for their Vote to Count
According to Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Elections of the H.
Comm. On Admin., 118th Cong. (2023).
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3. On July 10, 2023, the Committee held a full
committee field hearing titled, ``American Confidence
in Elections: The Path to Election Integrity Across
America.'' The hearing outlined the newly introduced
H.R. 4563, the American Confidence in Elections Act,
and highlighted the successes of S.B. 202, 2021.
Witnesses included: The Honorable Hans von Spakovsky,
Manager, Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior
Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Dr. Kathleen
Ruth, Former Vice Chair, Fulton County Board of
Registration and Elections, Mrs. Vernetta Keith
Nuriddin, Elections Consultant, City of Milton, and Ms.
Cathy Woolard, Chair, Fulton County Board of
Registration and Elections.\31\
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\31\American Confidence in Elections: The Path to Election
Integrity Across America: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Admin., 118th
Cong. (2023).
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Committee Consideration
On November 30, 2023, the Committee on House Administration
met in open session with a quorum being present and ordered the
bill, H.R. 4555, the Federal Election Audit Act favorably
reported, as amended.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following vote occurred during the Committee's consideration of
H.R. 4555:
1. Vote on an amendment in the nature of a substitute
to H.R. 4555 offered by Mr. Steil, adopted by voice
vote.
2. Vote on an amendment to H.R. 4555, offered by Mr.
Morelle, failed by a vote of eight to four. Nays:
Steil, B., Loudermilk, B., Griffith, M., Murphy, G.,
Bice, S., Carey, M., D'Esposito, A., Lee, L. Ayes:
Morelle, J., Sewell, T., Kilmer, D., Torres, N.
3. Vote to report H.R. 4555 favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives, passed by a vote of eight
to four. Ayes: Steil, B., Loudermilk, B., Griffith, M.,
Murphy, G., Bice, S., Carey, M., D'Esposito, A., Lee,
L. Nays: Morelle, J., Sewell, T., Kilmer, D., Torres,
N.
Statement of Constitutional Authority
Congress has the power to enact this legislation pursuant
to the following:
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1--``The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof . . .''\32\ This clause,
consistent with contemporary thought and context,
informs Congress that the primary authority to set
election law and to administer federal elections rests
with the States and not with the Congress.
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\32\U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 4, cl. 1.
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Article I, Section 4, Clause 1--``To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; . . .''\33\
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\33\U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1.
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 18--``To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.''\34\
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\34\U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18. In U.S. v. Singh, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
foreign national spending prohibition was justified under Congress'
powers to provide for a uniform rule of naturalization, and was
necessary and proper to the exercise of its immigration and foreign
relations powers. See 924 F. 3d 1030, 1042-1043 (2019). Importantly,
the court did not rely on the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4
to justify the prohibition. Cf Report: The Elections Clause: States'
Primary Constitutional Authority Over Elections, Comm. on H. Admin.
(Republicans) (Aug. 12, 2021), https:// republicanscha.house.gov/sites/
republicans.cha.house.gov/files/documents/Report_The%20
Elections%20Clause_States%20Primary%20Constitutional%20Authority%20over%
20Elections %20%28Aug%2011%202021%29.pdf.
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Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Statement of Budget Authority and Related Items
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives and section 308(a)(I) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following opinion and estimate with respect to new budget
authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures. The
Committee believes that there will be no additional costs
attributable to H.R. 4555.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost
estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant
to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such an
estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record if it is
received by the Committee.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The performance goals and objectives of H.R. 4555 are to
allow States to use federal Help America Vote Act (``HAVA'')
Requirements Payments to conduct a post-election audit for
federal offices in a State. This legislation authorizes federal
dollars received from HAVA to be used by States to help conduct
their post-election audits. Such audits conducted by the State
using HAVA funds can be used to audit compliance with
established processes for voter registration, voter check-in,
voting, tabulation, canvassing, post-election proceedings, and
reporting of results. However, the audit must be done by
individuals who are independent from the office which
administered the election that is being audited.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 4555 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 4555
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such an estimate to be printed in
the Congressional Record if it is received by the Committee.
Advisory Committee Statement
H.R. 4555 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
This section provides a short title for H.R. 4555, the
Federal Election Audit Act.
Section 2. Use of requirements payments for post-election audits
Section (2)(a) allows HAVA funds to be used to conduct and
publish an audit of the effectiveness and accuracy of the
voting systems, nonvoting election technology, election
procedures, and outcomes used to carry out an election for
Federal office in the State and the performance of the State
and local election officials who carried out the election, but
only if the audit meets requirements set forth in (4)(A).
Section (2)(b) provides the requirements for the election
audits that will be funded with HAVA grants by adding (4)(A)
(below).
(4)(A) Requirements for audits conducted with requirements
payments:
(i) No one affiliated with the administration of
federal elections may be part of the audit.
(ii) The audit must examine compliance of established
processes for voter check-in, registration, tabulation,
canvassing, post-election proceedings, and reporting of
results.
(4)(B) Nonvoting Election Technology: Defines non-voting
election technology and lists such non-voting election
technologies in (i) through (viii).
Section (2)(c) provides a sense of Congress that the timing
of post-election audits should be completed before the State's
deadline to challenge the results of the election.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is
printed in italics and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--COMMISSION
* * * * * * *
Subtitle D--Election Assistance
PART 1--REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS
SEC. 251. REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS.
(a) In General.--The Commission shall make a requirements
payment each year in an amount determined under section 252 to
each State which meets the conditions described in section 253
for the year.
(b) Use of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3), a State receiving a requirements payment shall
use the payment only to meet the requirements of title
III, including to conduct and publish an audit of the
effectiveness and accuracy of the voting systems,
nonvoting election technology (as defined in paragraph
(4)(B)), election procedures, and outcomes used to
carry out an election for Federal office in the State
and the performance of the State and local election
officials who carried out the election, but only if the
audit meets the requirements of paragraph (4)(A).
(2) Other activities.--A State may use a requirements
payment to carry out other activities to improve the
administration of elections for Federal office if the
State certifies to the Commission that--
(A) the State has implemented the
requirements of title III; or
(B) the amount expended with respect to such
other activities does not exceed an amount
equal to the minimum payment amount applicable
to the State under section 252(c).
(3) Activities under uniformed and overseas citizens
absentee voting act.--A State shall use a requirements
payment made using funds appropriated pursuant to the
authorization under section 257(a)(4) only to meet the
requirements under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act imposed as a result of the
provisions of and amendments made by the Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act.
(4) Requirements for audits conducted with
requirements payments.--
(A) In general.--An audit described in
paragraph (1) meets the requirements of this
paragraph if--
(i) no individual who participates in
conducting the audit is an employee or
contractor of an office of the State or
local government which is responsible
for the administration of elections for
Federal office or of a subsidiary or
affiliate of such an office; and
(ii) the audit includes an
examination of compliance with
established processes for voter
registration, voter check-in, voting,
tabulation, canvassing, post-election
proceedings (such as recounts and
recanvasses), and reporting of results.
(B) Nonvoting election technology defined.--
In paragraph (1), the term ``nonvoting election
technology'' means technology used in the
administration of elections for Federal office
which is not used directly in the casting,
counting, tabulating, or collecting of ballots
or votes, including each of the following:
(i) Electronic pollbooks or other
systems used to check in voters at a
polling place or verify a voter's
identification.
(ii) Election result reporting
systems.
(iii) Electronic ballot delivery
systems.
(iv) Online voter registration
systems.
(v) Polling place location search
systems.
(vi) Sample ballot portals.
(vii) Signature systems.
(viii) Such other technology as may
be recommended for treatment as
nonvoting election technology as the
Standards Board may recommend.
(c) Retroactive Payments.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subtitle, including the maintenance of effort
requirements of section 254(a)(7), a State may use a
requirements payment as a reimbursement for costs
incurred in obtaining voting equipment which meets the
requirements of section 301 if the State obtains the
equipment after the regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office held in November 2000.
(2) Special rule regarding multiyear contracts.--A
State may use a requirements payment for any costs for
voting equipment which meets the requirements of
section 301 that, pursuant to a multiyear contract,
were incurred on or after January 1, 2001, except that
the amount that the State is otherwise required to
contribute under the maintenance of effort requirements
of section 254(a)(7) shall be increased by the amount
of the payment made with respect to such multiyear
contract.
(d) Adoption of Commission Guidelines and Guidance Not
Required To Receive Payment.--Nothing in this part may be
construed to require a State to implement any of the voluntary
voting system guidelines or any of the voluntary guidance
adopted by the Commission with respect to any matter as a
condition for receiving a requirements payment.
(e) Schedule of Payments.--As soon as practicable after the
initial appointment of all members of the Commission (but in no
event later than 6 months thereafter), and not less frequently
than once each calendar year thereafter, the Commission shall
make requirements payments to States under this part.
(f) Limitation.--A State may not use any portion of a
requirements payment--
(1) to pay costs associated with any litigation,
except to the extent that such costs otherwise
constitute permitted uses of a requirements payment
under this part; or
(2) for the payment of any judgment.
* * * * * * *
Dissenting Views
The Federal Election Audit Act purports to allow Help
America Vote Act Section 251 funds to be used for auditing the
effectiveness and accuracy of voting systems, election
procedures, and outcomes used to carry out an election for
Federal office, as well as the performance of the State and
local election officials who carried out the election. Post-
election audits are a necessary tool for ensuring accuracy and
transparency in our elections. Unfortunately, the bill put
forth by the Committee Republicans fails to provide any
guardrails or protect against any of the abuses we have seen by
third-party bad actors who have attempted to weaponize the
post-election audit process in furtherance of election-related
lies and disinformation, and election denialism.
In fact, the Committee Republicans took it a step further
with the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (``ANS'')
offered at mark-up. Rather than provide common sense
protections against abuse and misuse of taxpayer dollars, the
Republican ANS prohibits any individual who is an employee or
contractor of an office of the State or local government
responsible for administering the election (or a subsidiary or
affiliate of the office) from participating in conducting the
audit.
Prohibiting any individual who is an employee or contractor
of the State or local government office responsible for the
administration of the election from participating in conducting
the audit-removes critical individuals from the process. State
and local election administrators are the experts in how their
elections are run. Committee Republicans should not be barring
them from participating in an audit.
We have seen too many troubling examples of bad actors
conducting or attempting to conduct audits of the 2020 election
to allow federal funds to be used to facilitate such
undertakings without adequate safeguards in place. The false
claims about the 2020 election results led to fraudulent post-
election audits in a cynical attempt to undermine confidence in
the results.
Committee Democrats believe that post-election audits are a
necessary and critical part of the election administration
process, and that we should be providing States with the
resources they need to conduct them. While the Majority's bill
would allow states to use HAVA funds to conduct audits,
Rep:ublicans failed to provide any funding for elections in
their Financial Services and General Government appropriations
bill, all but ensuring that our State and local election
officials are under-resourced headed into a Presidential
election year.
Committee Democrats are opposed to H.R. 4555, and believe
that those who administer elections should not be barred from
participating in a post-election audit, and that there should
be proper, common sense guardrails on third parties--such as
those offered in the Morelle amendment--to ensure that any
post-election audit which utilizes Federal tax dollars meets
the highest standards of rigor and integrity, and that taxpayer
dollars are not used to further election denialism.
Joseph D. Morelle,
Ranking Member.
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