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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-573

PROTECTING STUDENT ATHLETES' ECONOMIC FREEDOM ACT OF 2024

2024-07-05

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 8534] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 8534) to prohibit a student athlete from being considered an employee of an institution, a conference, or an association based on participation in certain intercollegiate athletics, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Student Athletes' Economic Freedom Act of 2024''. SEC. 2. EMPLOYMENT STANDINGS. Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a student athlete (or former student athlete) may not be considered an employee of an institution, a conference, or an association under any Federal or State law or regulation based on participation of the student athlete (or former student athlete) in a varsity intercollegiate athletics program or a varsity intercollegiate athletics competition, or the existence of rules or requirements for being a member of any varsity sports team. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) Association.--The term ``association'' means an organization that-- (A) has multiple conferences and institutions as members; (B) arranges championships for varsity intercollegiate athletics programs; (C) sets rules for varsity intercollegiate athletics programs; (D) sets rules for varsity intercollegiate athletics competitions; and (E) is not a conference. (2) Conference.--The term ``conference'' means an organization that-- (A) has multiple institutions as members; (B) sets rules for varsity intercollegiate athletics competitions; (C) arranges championships for varsity intercollegiate athletics programs; and (D) is not an association. (3) Institution.--The term ``institution'' means an institution of higher education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)) that sponsors a varsity intercollegiate athletics program in the United States. (4) Student athlete.--The term ``student athlete'' means an individual who participates in a varsity intercollegiate athletics program. (5) Varsity intercollegiate athletics competition.--The term ``varsity intercollegiate athletics competition'' means a competition involving 2 or more varsity intercollegiate athletics programs sponsored by different institutions. (6) Varsity intercollegiate athletics program.--The term ``varsity intercollegiate athletics program'' means a team or other program unit of an institution participating in a sport-- (A) played at the intercollegiate level; (B) administered by an athletic department; and (C) for which eligibility requirements for participation by student athletes are established by an association. (7) Varsity sports team.--The term ``varsity sports team''-- (A) means a team of student athletes organized by a varsity intercollegiate athletics program to participate in a varsity intercollegiate athletics competition; and (B) does not include a team that is traditionally characterized as an intramural or club team. PURPOSE H.R. 8534, the Protecting Student Athletes' Economic Freedom Act, prevents the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) from misclassifying student-athletes as employees. The bill also clarifies that student-athletes are not considered employees of a collegiate institution, conference, or association under federal or state law or regulation based on participation in varsity intercollegiate athletic programs or competitions.

Committee Action

113TH CONGRESS Full Committee Hearing on Unionizing Student-Athletes On May 8, 2014, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing titled ``Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing Athletes.'' Witnesses were Patrick Eilers, Managing Director, Madison Dearborn Partners, Chicago, IL; Bradford Livingston, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL; Bernard Muir, Director of Athletics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA; Andy Schwarz, Partner, OSKR LLC, Emeryville, CA; and Ken Starr, President and Chancellor, Baylor University, Waco, TX. Witnesses discussed the NLRB's efforts to classify student-athletes as employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 114TH CONGRESS Full Committee Hearing on Expanding Opportunity in Schools and Workplaces On February 2, 2015, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing titled ``Expanding Opportunity in America's Schools and Workplaces.'' Witnesses were Mike Pence, Governor of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN; Michael Amiridis, Provost, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC; Drew Greenblatt, President and CEO, Marlin Steel, Baltimore, MD; and Lawrence Mishel, President, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. Witnesses discussed, among other things, attempts by the NLRB to misclassify student-athletes as employees under the NLRA. 118TH CONGRESS Joint Subcommittee Hearing on Student-Athletes On March 12, 2024, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions and the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Development held a joint hearing titled ``Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification.'' Witnesses were Jill Bodensteiner, Vice President and Director of Athletics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA; Tylere Sims, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, Tampa, FL; Matthew Mitten, Professor of Law and Executive Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, WI; and Mark Gaston Pearce, Executive Director, Workers' Rights Institute at Georgetown Law, Washington, D.C. Witnesses discussed the negative implications of the misclassification of student athletes as university employees subject to unionization. Legislative Action On May 23, 2024, Representative Bob Good (R-VA) introduced H.R. 8534, the Protecting Student Athletes' Economic Freedom Act, with Committee Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC) and Representatives Burgess Owens (R-UT), Eric Burlison (R-MO), Andrew Ogles (R-TN), Tim Walberg (R-MI), Rick Allen (R-GA), Mike Kelly (R-PA), Doug LaMalfa (R-CA), Mary E. Miller (R-IL), and Robert B. Aderhold (R-AL) as original cosponsors. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On June 13, 2024, the Committee considered H.R. 8534 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-16. Representative Good offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute making a technical change. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. COMMITTEE VIEWS Introduction President Biden promised to be the most pro-union President in U.S. history, and his actions have met that promise. The Biden administration has taken an all-of-government approach that is steadily chipping away at workers' rights and empowering unions to entrench themselves in workplaces in every sector, regardless of worker preference. At the epicenter of this coordinated approach by government agencies to impose unionization on workers is the NLRB. Under Chairman Lauren McFerran, the NLRB has issued decisions and rules that overturned commonsense policies and tilted the playing field in favor of labor unions at the expense of worker free choice and commonsense workplace standards. Part of this radical pro-union agenda is the NLRB's efforts to expand the agency's jurisdiction over individuals who have never before been considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including student-athletes. Background on NLRB Actions Concerning Student-Athletes In the face of declining union membership, labor unions have sought to organize individuals traditionally not considered employees under the NLRA. A recent target of this effort has been student-athletes. In March 2014, in the Northwestern University case, the NLRB Regional Director for Region 13 found that ``grant-in-aid scholarship players for [Northwestern University's] football team who have not exhausted their play eligibility are `employees' under the NLRA.''\1\ The bargaining unit excluded ``walk-on'' players who do not receive an athletic scholarship. The Regional Director ordered a representational election in April 2014 to determine whether a majority of the scholarship athletes supported the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) union. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Northwestern Univ., 13-RC-121359 (NLRB Mar. 6, 2014) (decision & direction of election). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Northwestern appealed the Regional Director's decision to the full Board. In August 2015, the Board unanimously declined to assert jurisdiction and dismissed the representation petition filed by CAPA concerning Northwestern University football players who receive grant-in-aid scholarships. The Board found that ``it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.''\2\ In large part, the Board reasoned that asserting jurisdiction ``would not serve to promote stability in labor relations'' because a majority of schools that compete in college football and the Big Ten Conference are public institutions not subject to the NLRA.\3\ The Board declined to rule on whether or not student- athletes are statutory employees. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167, at 1 (2015). \3\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Early in the Biden administration, NLRB General Counsel (GC) Jennifer Abruzzo signaled she would bring the issue of whether student-athletes are employees to the Board. In September 2021, GC Abruzzo issued a memorandum providing updated guidance to all NLRB field offices regarding her position that certain student-athletes are employees under the NLRA.\4\ The memo states that ``the law fully supports a finding that scholarship football players at Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) private colleges and universities, and other similarly situated Players at Academic Institutions, are employees under the NLRA.''\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-general- counsel-jennifer-abruzzo-issues-memo-on-employee-status-of. \5\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The memo relies on a common law definition of employee, which includes a person ``who perform[s] services for another and [is] subject to the other's control or right of control.'' The memo also argues that payment is ``strongly indicative of employee status.'' The memo further claims that student- athletes perform services for their respective academic institutions and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in return for compensation and are subject to their control. In support of this position, the memo cites the ``significant developments in the law, NCAA regulations, and the societal landscape.'' Specifically, the memo notes the NCAA's suspension of name, image, and likeness (NIL) rules for student-athletes and the collective action that is occurring at ``unprecedented levels'' by student-athletes.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since this memo was issued, two cases involving the status of student-athletes have reached NLRB regional offices. In May 2023, GC Abruzzo filed a complaint against the University of Southern California (USC), the Pac-12 Conference, and the NCAA, seeking that these entities ``cease and desist from misclassifying'' players as student-athletes and instead label them as employees.\7\ The complaint says misclassifying student-athletes as non-employees intentionally discourages student-athletes from exercising their rights to engage in protected concerted activity under the NLRA. The complaint also alleges that the three entities maintained illegal ``handbook rules,'' and it highlights USC's social media and interview policies that require student-athletes to ``be positive'' and not ``do anything to embarrass yourself, the team, your family, or the University.''\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\https://www.law360.com/articles/1679404/attachments/0. \8\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a remedy, GC Abruzzo is seeking an order from the NLRB directing USC, the Pac-12, and the NCAA to reclassify the ``student athletes'' as ``employees'' in their files, handbooks, and rules.\9\ In December 2023 and January 2024, NLRB Region 31 held hearings on the GC's unfair labor practice charges against USC, the Pac-12, and the NCAA.\10\ Region 31 has not yet issued a decision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\University of S. Cal., 31-CA-290326, at 5-6 (NLRB May 18, 2023) (complaint & notice of hearing) https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-290326. \10\ https://apnews.com/article/usc-ncaa-nlrb- b261dd0164b4bd17e00e4c7da5ca3f98. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On February 5, 2024, in the Dartmouth College case involving Dartmouth men's basketball players petitioning for a union, the NLRB Region 1 Director found that because ``Dartmouth has the right to control the work performed by the Dartmouth men's basketball team, and the players perform that work in exchange for compensation, I find that the petitioned- for basketball players are employees within the meaning of the [NLRA].''\11\ The bargaining unit consists of all basketball players on the men's varsity basketball team. The Regional Director issued a direction of election on union representation to allow the 15 members of the team to vote on whether a majority support the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local 560. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., 01-RC-325633, at 2 (NLRB Feb. 5, 2024) (decision & direction of election), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/01- RC-325633. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Regional Director determined that the NLRA defines ``employee'' broadly to include ``any employee'' subject to only a few enumerated exceptions that do include players at academic institutions or students. She also found that the basketball players at issue perform work that benefits Dartmouth; that Dartmouth exercises significant control over the players' work; that the players are required to provide their basketball services to Dartmouth only; and that the student-athlete handbook in many ways functions as an employee handbook, detailing the tasks athletes must complete and the regulations they may not break. Finally, the Regional Director found that the Dartmouth men's basketball team performs work in exchange for compensation. She noted the basketball players receive the benefits of ``early read'' for admission prior to graduating high school. The players also receive equipment and apparel-- including basketball shoes valued in excess of $1,000 per player per year--as well as tickets to games, lodging, meals, and the benefits of Dartmouth's ``Peak Performance'' program. On March 5, 2024, the Dartmouth men's basketball players voted to form the first labor union in college sports. The 15- player roster voted 13-2 in favor of joining SEIU Local 560. Hours after the vote, Dartmouth administrators filed a formal appeal to the full NLRB to challenge the vote.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., 01-RC-325633 (NLRB Mar. 5, 2024) (request for review of decision & direction of election), https:// www.nlrb.gov/case/01-RC-325633. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal Courts and State Legislatures Have Not Considered Student- Athletes To Be Employees Federal courts have consistently recognized the difference between professional and college athletes. Professional athletes are full-time employees paid cash compensation by for- profit leagues. Student-athletes are full-time students at nonprofit institutions of higher education with limits on how much time can be dedicated to athletic pursuits and with educational standards that must be met to remain eligible to compete in athletics. On March 12, 2024, Matthew Mitten, Professor and Executive Director of the National Sports Law Institute at Marquette University Law School, testified before joint subcommittees of the Committee about how federal courts and state legislatures have consistently held that student-athletes are not employees: Federal and state appellate courts have rejected assertions that college athletes are university employees under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016), or state worker's compensation laws. See, e.g., Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). For purposes of worker's compensation insurance coverage, no state legislatures have characterized college athletes as university employees. Some states expressly exclude intercollegiate athletes from coverage under their worker's compensation laws. See, e.g., Cal. Labor Code Sec. 3352(a)(7) (``employee'' excludes ``[a] person, other than a regular employee, participating in sports or athletics who does not receive compensation for the participation other than the use of athletic equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, meals, lodgings, or other expenses incidental thereto'').; N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law Sec. 2(4) (McKinney 2022) (```employee' shall not include persons who are members of a supervised amateur athletic activity operated on a non-profit basis''). Notably, without characterizing intercollegiate athletes as ``employees,'' Nebraska has legislatively mandated that the University of Nebraska ``establish an insurance program which provides coverage to student athletes for personal injuries or accidental death while participating in university-organized play or practice in an intercollegiate athletic event.'' Neb. Rev. St. Sec. 85-106.05 (West's 2024).\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Lab. & Pensions and the Subcomm. on Higher Educ. & Workforce Development of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 118th Cong. (2024) (statement of Matthew Mitten, Exec. Dir. of the Nat'l Sports Law Inst., Marquette Univ. Law Sch., at 5), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/mitten_testimony.pdf. Tyler Sims, a shareholder at Littler Mendelson, testified at the same hearing that states have enacted various laws limiting public employees' right to bargain collectively and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- classifying student-athletes to not be employees: Ohio and Michigan have laws stating that student- athletes at public universities are not employees. See Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 3345.56; Mich. Comp. Laws Sec. 423.201(1)(e)(iii). Wisconsin and several other states have laws limiting public sector union collective bargaining. See Wis. Stat. Sec. 111.91(3)(a) (wages only). And other states like North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia prohibit public sector collective bargaining all together. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sec. 95-98; Tex. Gov't Code Sec. 617.002(a); Ga. Code Ann. 20-2- 09989.10.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Id. (statement of Tyler Sims, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, at 8), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sims_testimony.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- College Athletes Are Not Employees Under the NLRA As stated in the Northwestern decision, Congress did not explicitly address ``whether the Board should exercise jurisdiction'' over student-athletes.\15\ Without any clear direction from Congress, it is important to note that the NLRA's overall statutory scheme's purpose and focus is to address economic relationships between employers and employees in an industrial setting, not an academic one. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167, at 1 (2015). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2014, Bradford Livingston, partner at Seyfarth Shaw, testified before the Committee about why student-athletes are not employees under the NLRA: Students who participate in intercollegiate athletics are not ``employees,'' regardless of whether the program generates revenue for the university. The term ``employee'' in Section 2(3) of the NLRA is not defined in any meaningful way, and as a result, its parameters must be examined based on the Act's purpose and focus, which is to address economic relationships between employer and employees. But ``principles developed for the industrial setting cannot be imposed blindly on the academic world.'' Yet claiming that college student- athletes are employees begets ``the problem of attempting to force the student-university relationship into the traditional employer-employee framework.'' An analysis of the relationship between the academic institution and its student-athletes can only lead to the conclusion that the NLRA's fundamental purpose does not cover such a relationship, nor should it.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & th

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 8534, the Protecting Student Athletes' Economic Freedom Act (Student Athletes Act), would exclude current or former ``student athletes'' from being determined under any federal or state law to be employees of their school or any collegiate athletics body on the basis of their participation in covered varsity sports or any control exerted over them as a condition of athletics participation. Putative employers who would be shielded from any employment-related liability under this bill are institutions of higher education that sponsor varsity intercollegiate athletics; varsity intercollegiate athletic conferences; and the NCAA and any other associations that serve as governing bodies for varsity sports. H.R. 8534 is opposed by the AFL-CIO, American Association for Justice, College Football Players Association, National College Players Association, and the Service Employees International Union. Additionally, individual college athletes have submitted letters in opposition to the bill.

Background

The Business of College Sports The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an association that regulates college athletics among nearly 1,100 member colleges and universities across 102 athletic conferences in North America.\1\ NCAA member institutions are divided into three divisions: Division I (DI), Division II (DII), and Division III (DIII).\2\ DI is the most competitive level of college athletics and is primarily populated by sizeable institutions with large athletic budgets, meanwhile DIII is not associated with the same intensity as DI and DII.\3\ Each division is governed by the member schools in the division through committees.\4\ In the 2021-2022 season, approximately 190,000 athletes participated in DI, 130,000 in DII, and over 200,000 in DIII.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Overview, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/16/ overview.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024); What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/about-resources-media-center- ncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024). \2\What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/ about-resources-media-center-ncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024). (Of the 1,098 members schools in the NCAA, 350 are in DI, 310 in DII, and 438 in DIII.) \3\The Differences Between NCAA Divisions, NCSA College Recruiting, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/college- divisions (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024). \4\Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2016/1/7/ about-resources-media-center-ncaa-101-our-three-divisions.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024). \5\NCAA Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report, NCAA (Oct. 27, 2022), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/sportpart/ 2022RES_SportsSponsorshipParticipationRates Report.pdf at 87 & 88. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The NCAA has long asserted that the draw of collegiate sports is amateurism.\6\ Meanwhile, college sports have become a multi-billion-dollar industry.\7\ In the 2022-2023 fiscal year, the NCAA brought in almost $1.3 billion in revenue, a $140 million increase from the prior fiscal year.\8\ The NCAA's Power Five conferences--the most prominent athletic conferences--collectively reported ``more than $3.3 billion in revenue during their 2022 fiscal years.''\9\ In 2019, NCAA member institutions across the three divisions generated more than $18.9 billion in revenue from athletics, with DI schools accounting for $15.8 billion.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on H, Employ., Lab., & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Wrkf., 118th Cong. (2024) (statement of Mark Gaston Pearce, Exec. Dir., Workers' Rights Inst. at Geo. L. Ctr.) (accessible at https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/ 31424pearcetestimony.pdf) [hereinafter Pearce Testimony]. \7\Andrew Zimbalist, Analysis: Who is Winning in the High-Revenue World of College Sports?, PBS (Mar. 18, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/ newshour/economy/analysis-who-is-winning-in-the-high-revenue-world-of- college-sports. \8\NCAA Generates Nearly $1.3 Billion in Revenue for 2022-23, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2024), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/ 39439274/ncaa-generates-nearly-13-billion-revenue-2022-23. \9\Steve Berkowitz, NCAA's Power Five Conferences Are Cash Cows. Here's How Much Schools Made in Fiscal 2022, USA Today (May 19, 2023), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2023/05/19/power-5- conferences-earnings-billions-2022/70235450007/. \10\15-Year Trends in Division I Athletics Finances, NCAA Research, https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/Finances/2020RES_D1- RevExp_Report.pdf (last viewed Mar. 5, 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Students who participate in varsity intercollegiate athletics report significant time demands, being subject to substantial control by colleges over their time and activities, and constraints on their ability to pursue their studies. One NCAA survey found that,``[o]n average, football, men's basketball, women's basketball, and baseball players in [DI] spend about 40 hours a week on athletic activities.''\11\ The issue persists in the offseason, with a majority of DI and DII college athletes engaging in athletic related activities for the same or greater number of hours as their regular season.\12\ Beyond the hours spent on the activity, college athletes have also spoken out about the control institutions have on their lives off the field. As noted in Mark Gaston Pearce's testimony before the Committee in March 2024: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\Jake New, What Off-Season?, Inside Higher Ed. (May 7, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/08/college-athletes-say- they-devote-too-much-time-sports-year-round. \12\Id. Former University of Southern California football players testified that USC officials retained rigid control over their lives almost year-round including fingerprint scanning players to mark their presence at daily meals and conducting hydration testing and weigh- ins multiple times a week. USC hired other students to check that the athletes went to class. One former football player testified that there was so much pressure to attend practices that he would rather study into the wee hours of the night than miss practice.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Pearce Testimony, supra note 6, at 10. Moreover, the demands of sports reportedly impinge on --------------------------------------------------------------------------- students' ability to pursue the academic path of their choice: Student athletes at NCAA [DI] schools must schedule classes around their required NCAA athletic activities and cannot reschedule their NCAA athletic activities around their academic programs. As a result, Villanova University only excuses a student athlete from participating in required athletic activities if there is a conflict between practice and a mandatory core class. For example, when [one student] played football at Villanova University he was required to participate in NCAA athletically related activities on weekdays between 5:45 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. and could not enroll in a non-core class during that time, including classes that were prerequisites for academic degree programs. . . . Because student athletes have to schedule their classes around their required athletic activities, many student athletes have reported that participation in NCAA [DI] sports have prevented them from taking classes that they wanted to take. Many student athletes have also reported that their participation in NCAA [DI] sports has prevented them from majoring in their preferred major.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Johnson v. NCAA, 556 F. Supp. 3d 491, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Workplace Laws Many laws afford protections or allot responsibilities based on an employment relationship.\15\ These laws differ in their definitions and the tests used to determine the existence of an employment relationship, but the relevant factors tend to include the nature of the enterprise, the distribution of capacity to control the nature of the work performed, and the economic relationship between the putative employer and putative employee. Two laws of particular relevance for this bill are the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)\16\ and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\See generally Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. 605 (2012); Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom of America's Labor Market 31 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds. 2008). \16\Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.). \17\Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FLSA is the core federal workplace standards law governing the minimum wage,\18\ overtime,\19\ oppressive child labor,\20\ discrimination in pay on the basis of sex,\21\ and the right of nursing mothers to take paid breaks at work for the purpose of expressing breast milk.\22\ FLSA is enforced by both the U.S. Department of Labor and private litigants.\23\ In FLSA, the term ``employ'' includes ``to suffer or permit to work.''\24\ When establishing this broad definition of employment, Congress consciously rejected the narrower common law standard of employment, which turns on the degree to which the employer has control over an employee. Congress instead sought to expand the employment relationship to hold accountable employers who would not be liable for violations under a control test.\25\ Courts test the applicability of this definition using the ``economic realities'' test, which looks underneath whatever terms the parties to a relationship use to describe it and focuses instead on the reality of the relationship based on the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the putative employee is economically dependent on the potential employer.\26\ Ultimately, the application of the economic realities factors is guided by the overarching principle that the FLSA should be ``construed liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.''\27\ The FLSA definition of employment is the ``broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.''\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Id. Sec. 6. \19\Id. Sec. 7. \20\Id. Sec. 12. \21\Id. Sec. 6(d). \22\Id. Sec. 18D. \23\Id. Sec. 16. \24\Id. Sec. 3(g). \25\Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 991 (1999). \26\Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (reiterating that the test of employment under the FLSA is economic reality); Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). \27\Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207 (1959). \28\United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (quoting 81 Cong. Rec. 7,657 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Hugo Black)). The FLSA's definition of ``employ'' is a standard of ``striking breadth'' that ``stretches the meaning of `employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.'' Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The NLRA is the foundational federal law governing labor relations. Administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the NLRA protects the rights of employees to organize and collectively bargain with their employers for improved working conditions and benefits, among other things. Under the NLRA, the question of whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is governed by a common law test of control.\29\ Among the factors courts and the NLRB apply when examining whether workers are employees within the meaning of the NLRA are ``the extent of control the employer has over the work; . . . whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation or business . . . ; whether the kind of occupation is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; [and] whether the employer is or is not in business.''\30\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2017). \30\Id. (internal citations omitted). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Workplace Law and College Sports Before 2021 Challenges around student athletes and labor and employment law date back decades. In fact, the term ``student-athlete'' was originally concocted by ``the NCAA's president and legal team in the 1950s as part of a legal strategy designed to avoid paying a worker's compensation claim.''\31\ Student athletes also attempted, generally unsuccessfully in the past, to bring wage theft claims under FLSA.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\Pearce Testimony, supra note 6, at 3. \32\See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that a student athlete was not an ``employee'' of either NCAA or conference under FLSA or under California Labor Code); Berger v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that former student athletes had not been employees of university). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- College athletes attempted in 2014 to unionize. The College Athletes Players Association filed an election petition seeking to represent football players at Northwestern University who received grant-in-aid scholarships.\33\ An NLRB Regional Director determined that players on Northwestern University's football team who received grant-in-aid scholarships were employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA\34\ and directed that a representation election be conducted. On review, the NLRB explicitly did not decide whether the scholarship football players were employees. Instead, the NLRB determined that, even if the players were statutory employees, asserting jurisdiction in the case would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Essentially, the NLRB was concerned that if Northwestern University players were determined to be statutory employees there would be a risk of unionized, non- unionized, and non-employee teams all in the same conference. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\Northwestern University, 362 NLRB 1350 (2015) (docket accessible at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359). \34\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151(2)(3). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Turning Point: NCAA v. Alston The distinctive nature of amateurism in college sports and the student athlete was questioned in a 2021 U.S. Supreme Court case applying antitrust law. In NCAA v. Alston, the Court considered claims by college athletes that the NCAA system's limits on education-related compensation amounted to an undue restraint of trade. A unanimous Court recognized that college sports are a profit-making enterprise and rejected the NCAA's antitrust defense based on the supposed distinctiveness of amateurism in college athletics.\35\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Alston Court did not explicitly address employment status of college athletes, but Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence suggested a direct line from that case to the applicability of workplace laws. ``[T]he NCAA['s argument] that colleges may decline to pay student athletes because the defining feature of college sports . . . is that the student athletes are not paid . . . is circular and unpersuasive,'' wrote Justice Kavanaugh. ``[I]t is highly questionable whether the NCAA and its member colleges can justify not paying student athletes a fair share of the revenues on the circular theory that the defining characteristic of college sports is that the colleges do not pay student athletes. . . . Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on a theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate.''\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\Id. at 2168-2169. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Workplace Law Challenges in the Wake of Alston A FLSA case brought by student athletes is now moving in the federal courts. Johnson v. NCAA, a post-Alston case raising FLSA and state wage and hour claims in addition to common law unjust enrichment claims, survived a motion to dismiss in 2021, with the federal district court extensively quoting Justice Kavanaugh's Alston concurrence.\37\ The court certified that decision for interlocutory appeal,\38\ which was recently argued before a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.\39\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\Johnson, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 501. \38\Johnson v. NCAA, No. 19-5230, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246324 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2021). \39\Maryclaire Dale, NCAA Asks US Appeals Court to Block Pay for Student-Athletes, Assoc. Press (Feb. 15, 2023), https://apnews.com/ article/sports-compensation-in-education-college- 6f6feb3a3973dee785ad2b778a490e0e. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Players on Dartmouth College's men's varsity basketball team voted March 2024 by a margin of 13 to 2 in favor of representation by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local 560--becoming the first ever bargaining unit comprised of college athletes.\40\ The union election came after a NLRB Regional Director concluded that the players were employees for the purposes of the NLRA.\41\ The school has filed a Request for Review of the Regional Director's decision, and the NLRB's decision is pending on the matter.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\Jimmy Golen, Dartmouth Men's Basketball Team Votes to Unionize, Though Steps Remain Before Forming Labor Union, AP News (Mar. 5, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/dartmouth-union-ncaa-basketball-players- 2fd912fade62ffd81218a6dc91461962; NLRB Certifies Union to Represent Dartmouth Basketball Players, AP News (Mar. 14, 2024), https:// apnews.com/article/dartmouth-basketball-union- b27e5702df9a92d0f2ec0ae791ca1916. \41\Decision and Direction of Elections, Trustees of Dartmouth College (No. 01-RC-325633 Feb. 5, 2024), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/ document.aspx/09031d4583c5ebe4. \42\Trustees of Dartmouth College, 01-RC-325633, https:// www.nlrb.gov/case/01-RC-325633. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Neither the Johnson litigation nor the Darthmouth College basketball unionization effort has

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/573