Committee Action
113TH CONGRESS
Full Committee Hearing on Unionizing Student-Athletes
On May 8, 2014, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing titled ``Big Labor on College
Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing Athletes.''
Witnesses were Patrick Eilers, Managing Director, Madison
Dearborn Partners, Chicago, IL; Bradford Livingston, Partner,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL; Bernard Muir, Director of
Athletics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA; Andy Schwarz,
Partner, OSKR LLC, Emeryville, CA; and Ken Starr, President and
Chancellor, Baylor University, Waco, TX. Witnesses discussed
the NLRB's efforts to classify student-athletes as employees
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
114TH CONGRESS
Full Committee Hearing on Expanding Opportunity in Schools and
Workplaces
On February 2, 2015, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing titled ``Expanding Opportunity in
America's Schools and Workplaces.'' Witnesses were Mike Pence,
Governor of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN; Michael Amiridis,
Provost, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC; Drew
Greenblatt, President and CEO, Marlin Steel, Baltimore, MD; and
Lawrence Mishel, President, Economic Policy Institute,
Washington, D.C. Witnesses discussed, among other things,
attempts by the NLRB to misclassify student-athletes as
employees under the NLRA.
118TH CONGRESS
Joint Subcommittee Hearing on Student-Athletes
On March 12, 2024, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor, and Pensions and the Subcommittee on Higher Education
and Workforce Development held a joint hearing titled
``Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification.''
Witnesses were Jill Bodensteiner, Vice President and Director
of Athletics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA;
Tylere Sims, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, Tampa, FL; Matthew
Mitten, Professor of Law and Executive Director, National
Sports Law Institute, Marquette University Law School,
Milwaukee, WI; and Mark Gaston Pearce, Executive Director,
Workers' Rights Institute at Georgetown Law, Washington, D.C.
Witnesses discussed the negative implications of the
misclassification of student athletes as university employees
subject to unionization.
Legislative Action
On May 23, 2024, Representative Bob Good (R-VA) introduced
H.R. 8534, the Protecting Student Athletes' Economic Freedom
Act, with Committee Chairwoman Virginia Foxx (R-NC) and
Representatives Burgess Owens (R-UT), Eric Burlison (R-MO),
Andrew Ogles (R-TN), Tim Walberg (R-MI), Rick Allen (R-GA),
Mike Kelly (R-PA), Doug LaMalfa (R-CA), Mary E. Miller (R-IL),
and Robert B. Aderhold (R-AL) as original cosponsors. The bill
was referred solely to the Committee on Education and the
Workforce.
On June 13, 2024, the Committee considered H.R. 8534 in
legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-16.
Representative Good offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute making a technical change. The amendment was adopted
by voice vote.
COMMITTEE VIEWS
Introduction
President Biden promised to be the most pro-union President
in U.S. history, and his actions have met that promise. The
Biden administration has taken an all-of-government approach
that is steadily chipping away at workers' rights and
empowering unions to entrench themselves in workplaces in every
sector, regardless of worker preference.
At the epicenter of this coordinated approach by government
agencies to impose unionization on workers is the NLRB. Under
Chairman Lauren McFerran, the NLRB has issued decisions and
rules that overturned commonsense policies and tilted the
playing field in favor of labor unions at the expense of worker
free choice and commonsense workplace standards. Part of this
radical pro-union agenda is the NLRB's efforts to expand the
agency's jurisdiction over individuals who have never before
been considered employees under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), including student-athletes.
Background on NLRB Actions Concerning Student-Athletes
In the face of declining union membership, labor unions
have sought to organize individuals traditionally not
considered employees under the NLRA. A recent target of this
effort has been student-athletes.
In March 2014, in the Northwestern University case, the
NLRB Regional Director for Region 13 found that ``grant-in-aid
scholarship players for [Northwestern University's] football
team who have not exhausted their play eligibility are
`employees' under the NLRA.''\1\ The bargaining unit excluded
``walk-on'' players who do not receive an athletic scholarship.
The Regional Director ordered a representational election in
April 2014 to determine whether a majority of the scholarship
athletes supported the College Athletes Players Association
(CAPA) union.
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\1\Northwestern Univ., 13-RC-121359 (NLRB Mar. 6, 2014) (decision &
direction of election).
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Northwestern appealed the Regional Director's decision to
the full Board. In August 2015, the Board unanimously declined
to assert jurisdiction and dismissed the representation
petition filed by CAPA concerning Northwestern University
football players who receive grant-in-aid scholarships. The
Board found that ``it would not effectuate the policies of the
Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.''\2\ In large part,
the Board reasoned that asserting jurisdiction ``would not
serve to promote stability in labor relations'' because a
majority of schools that compete in college football and the
Big Ten Conference are public institutions not subject to the
NLRA.\3\ The Board declined to rule on whether or not student-
athletes are statutory employees.
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\2\Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167, at 1 (2015).
\3\Id.
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Early in the Biden administration, NLRB General Counsel
(GC) Jennifer Abruzzo signaled she would bring the issue of
whether student-athletes are employees to the Board. In
September 2021, GC Abruzzo issued a memorandum providing
updated guidance to all NLRB field offices regarding her
position that certain student-athletes are employees under the
NLRA.\4\ The memo states that ``the law fully supports a
finding that scholarship football players at Division I
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) private colleges and
universities, and other similarly situated Players at Academic
Institutions, are employees under the NLRA.''\5\
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\4\https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-general-
counsel-jennifer-abruzzo-issues-memo-on-employee-status-of.
\5\Id.
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The memo relies on a common law definition of employee,
which includes a person ``who perform[s] services for another
and [is] subject to the other's control or right of control.''
The memo also argues that payment is ``strongly indicative of
employee status.'' The memo further claims that student-
athletes perform services for their respective academic
institutions and the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) in return for compensation and are subject to their
control. In support of this position, the memo cites the
``significant developments in the law, NCAA regulations, and
the societal landscape.'' Specifically, the memo notes the
NCAA's suspension of name, image, and likeness (NIL) rules for
student-athletes and the collective action that is occurring at
``unprecedented levels'' by student-athletes.\6\
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\6\Id.
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Since this memo was issued, two cases involving the status
of student-athletes have reached NLRB regional offices. In May
2023, GC Abruzzo filed a complaint against the University of
Southern California (USC), the Pac-12 Conference, and the NCAA,
seeking that these entities ``cease and desist from
misclassifying'' players as student-athletes and instead label
them as employees.\7\ The complaint says misclassifying
student-athletes as non-employees intentionally discourages
student-athletes from exercising their rights to engage in
protected concerted activity under the NLRA. The complaint also
alleges that the three entities maintained illegal ``handbook
rules,'' and it highlights USC's social media and interview
policies that require student-athletes to ``be positive'' and
not ``do anything to embarrass yourself, the team, your family,
or the University.''\8\
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\7\https://www.law360.com/articles/1679404/attachments/0.
\8\Id.
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As a remedy, GC Abruzzo is seeking an order from the NLRB
directing USC, the Pac-12, and the NCAA to reclassify the
``student athletes'' as ``employees'' in their files,
handbooks, and rules.\9\ In December 2023 and January 2024,
NLRB Region 31 held hearings on the GC's unfair labor practice
charges against USC, the Pac-12, and the NCAA.\10\ Region 31
has not yet issued a decision.
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\9\University of S. Cal., 31-CA-290326, at 5-6 (NLRB May 18, 2023)
(complaint & notice of hearing) https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-290326.
\10\ https://apnews.com/article/usc-ncaa-nlrb-
b261dd0164b4bd17e00e4c7da5ca3f98.
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On February 5, 2024, in the Dartmouth College case
involving Dartmouth men's basketball players petitioning for a
union, the NLRB Region 1 Director found that because
``Dartmouth has the right to control the work performed by the
Dartmouth men's basketball team, and the players perform that
work in exchange for compensation, I find that the petitioned-
for basketball players are employees within the meaning of the
[NLRA].''\11\ The bargaining unit consists of all basketball
players on the men's varsity basketball team. The Regional
Director issued a direction of election on union representation
to allow the 15 members of the team to vote on whether a
majority support the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU), Local 560.
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\11\Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., 01-RC-325633, at 2 (NLRB Feb. 5,
2024) (decision & direction of election), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/01-
RC-325633.
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The Regional Director determined that the NLRA defines
``employee'' broadly to include ``any employee'' subject to
only a few enumerated exceptions that do include players at
academic institutions or students. She also found that the
basketball players at issue perform work that benefits
Dartmouth; that Dartmouth exercises significant control over
the players' work; that the players are required to provide
their basketball services to Dartmouth only; and that the
student-athlete handbook in many ways functions as an employee
handbook, detailing the tasks athletes must complete and the
regulations they may not break.
Finally, the Regional Director found that the Dartmouth
men's basketball team performs work in exchange for
compensation. She noted the basketball players receive the
benefits of ``early read'' for admission prior to graduating
high school. The players also receive equipment and apparel--
including basketball shoes valued in excess of $1,000 per
player per year--as well as tickets to games, lodging, meals,
and the benefits of Dartmouth's ``Peak Performance'' program.
On March 5, 2024, the Dartmouth men's basketball players
voted to form the first labor union in college sports. The 15-
player roster voted 13-2 in favor of joining SEIU Local 560.
Hours after the vote, Dartmouth administrators filed a formal
appeal to the full NLRB to challenge the vote.\12\
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\12\Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., 01-RC-325633 (NLRB Mar. 5, 2024)
(request for review of decision & direction of election), https://
www.nlrb.gov/case/01-RC-325633.
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Federal Courts and State Legislatures Have Not Considered Student-
Athletes To Be Employees
Federal courts have consistently recognized the difference
between professional and college athletes. Professional
athletes are full-time employees paid cash compensation by for-
profit leagues. Student-athletes are full-time students at
nonprofit institutions of higher education with limits on how
much time can be dedicated to athletic pursuits and with
educational standards that must be met to remain eligible to
compete in athletics.
On March 12, 2024, Matthew Mitten, Professor and Executive
Director of the National Sports Law Institute at Marquette
University Law School, testified before joint subcommittees of
the Committee about how federal courts and state legislatures
have consistently held that student-athletes are not employees:
Federal and state appellate courts have rejected
assertions that college athletes are university
employees under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,
Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016), or
state worker's compensation laws. See, e.g., Rensing v.
Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170
(Ind. 1983); Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance
Ass'n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
For purposes of worker's compensation insurance
coverage, no state legislatures have characterized
college athletes as university employees. Some states
expressly exclude intercollegiate athletes from
coverage under their worker's compensation laws. See,
e.g., Cal. Labor Code Sec. 3352(a)(7) (``employee''
excludes ``[a] person, other than a regular employee,
participating in sports or athletics who does not
receive compensation for the participation other than
the use of athletic equipment, uniforms,
transportation, travel, meals, lodgings, or other
expenses incidental thereto'').; N.Y. Workers' Comp.
Law Sec. 2(4) (McKinney 2022) (```employee' shall not
include persons who are members of a supervised amateur
athletic activity operated on a non-profit basis'').
Notably, without characterizing intercollegiate
athletes as ``employees,'' Nebraska has legislatively
mandated that the University of Nebraska ``establish an
insurance program which provides coverage to student
athletes for personal injuries or accidental death
while participating in university-organized play or
practice in an intercollegiate athletic event.'' Neb.
Rev. St. Sec. 85-106.05 (West's 2024).\13\
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\13\Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Lab. & Pensions and the
Subcomm. on Higher Educ. & Workforce Development of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & the Workforce, 118th Cong. (2024) (statement of Matthew Mitten,
Exec. Dir. of the Nat'l Sports Law Inst., Marquette Univ. Law Sch., at
5), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/mitten_testimony.pdf.
Tyler Sims, a shareholder at Littler Mendelson, testified
at the same hearing that states have enacted various laws
limiting public employees' right to bargain collectively and
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classifying student-athletes to not be employees:
Ohio and Michigan have laws stating that student-
athletes at public universities are not employees. See
Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 3345.56; Mich. Comp. Laws Sec.
423.201(1)(e)(iii). Wisconsin and several other states
have laws limiting public sector union collective
bargaining. See Wis. Stat. Sec. 111.91(3)(a) (wages
only). And other states like North Carolina, Texas, and
Georgia prohibit public sector collective bargaining
all together. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sec. 95-98; Tex.
Gov't Code Sec. 617.002(a); Ga. Code Ann. 20-2-
09989.10.\14\
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\14\Id. (statement of Tyler Sims, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson,
at 8), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sims_testimony.pdf.
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College Athletes Are Not Employees Under the NLRA
As stated in the Northwestern decision, Congress did not
explicitly address ``whether the Board should exercise
jurisdiction'' over student-athletes.\15\ Without any clear
direction from Congress, it is important to note that the
NLRA's overall statutory scheme's purpose and focus is to
address economic relationships between employers and employees
in an industrial setting, not an academic one.
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\15\Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167, at 1 (2015).
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In 2014, Bradford Livingston, partner at Seyfarth Shaw,
testified before the Committee about why student-athletes are
not employees under the NLRA:
Students who participate in intercollegiate athletics
are not ``employees,'' regardless of whether the
program generates revenue for the university. The term
``employee'' in Section 2(3) of the NLRA is not defined
in any meaningful way, and as a result, its parameters
must be examined based on the Act's purpose and focus,
which is to address economic relationships between
employer and employees. But ``principles developed for
the industrial setting cannot be imposed blindly on the
academic world.'' Yet claiming that college student-
athletes are employees begets ``the problem of
attempting to force the student-university relationship
into the traditional employer-employee framework.'' An
analysis of the relationship between the academic
institution and its student-athletes can only lead to
the conclusion that the NLRA's fundamental purpose does
not cover such a relationship, nor should it.\16\
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\16\Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of
Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & th
Background
The Business of College Sports
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an
association that regulates college athletics among nearly 1,100
member colleges and universities across 102 athletic
conferences in North America.\1\ NCAA member institutions are
divided into three divisions: Division I (DI), Division II
(DII), and Division III (DIII).\2\ DI is the most competitive
level of college athletics and is primarily populated by
sizeable institutions with large athletic budgets, meanwhile
DIII is not associated with the same intensity as DI and
DII.\3\ Each division is governed by the member schools in the
division through committees.\4\ In the 2021-2022 season,
approximately 190,000 athletes participated in DI, 130,000 in
DII, and over 200,000 in DIII.\5\
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\1\Overview, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/16/
overview.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024); What is the NCAA?, NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/about-resources-media-center-
ncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024).
\2\What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/
about-resources-media-center-ncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last viewed Mar.
4, 2024). (Of the 1,098 members schools in the NCAA, 350 are in DI, 310
in DII, and 438 in DIII.)
\3\The Differences Between NCAA Divisions, NCSA College Recruiting,
https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/college-
divisions (last viewed Mar. 4, 2024).
\4\Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2016/1/7/
about-resources-media-center-ncaa-101-our-three-divisions.aspx (last
viewed Mar. 4, 2024).
\5\NCAA Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report, NCAA
(Oct. 27, 2022), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/sportpart/
2022RES_SportsSponsorshipParticipationRates
Report.pdf at 87 & 88.
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The NCAA has long asserted that the draw of collegiate
sports is amateurism.\6\ Meanwhile, college sports have become
a multi-billion-dollar industry.\7\ In the 2022-2023 fiscal
year, the NCAA brought in almost $1.3 billion in revenue, a
$140 million increase from the prior fiscal year.\8\ The NCAA's
Power Five conferences--the most prominent athletic
conferences--collectively reported ``more than $3.3 billion in
revenue during their 2022 fiscal years.''\9\ In 2019, NCAA
member institutions across the three divisions generated more
than $18.9 billion in revenue from athletics, with DI schools
accounting for $15.8 billion.\10\
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\6\Safeguarding Student-Athletes from NLRB Misclassification:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on H, Employ., Lab., & Pensions of the H.
Comm. on Educ. & the Wrkf., 118th Cong. (2024) (statement of Mark
Gaston Pearce, Exec. Dir., Workers' Rights Inst. at Geo. L. Ctr.)
(accessible at https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
31424pearcetestimony.pdf) [hereinafter Pearce Testimony].
\7\Andrew Zimbalist, Analysis: Who is Winning in the High-Revenue
World of College Sports?, PBS (Mar. 18, 2023), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/economy/analysis-who-is-winning-in-the-high-revenue-world-of-
college-sports.
\8\NCAA Generates Nearly $1.3 Billion in Revenue for 2022-23, ESPN
(Feb. 1, 2024), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
39439274/ncaa-generates-nearly-13-billion-revenue-2022-23.
\9\Steve Berkowitz, NCAA's Power Five Conferences Are Cash Cows.
Here's How Much Schools Made in Fiscal 2022, USA Today (May 19, 2023),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2023/05/19/power-5-
conferences-earnings-billions-2022/70235450007/.
\10\15-Year Trends in Division I Athletics Finances, NCAA Research,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/Finances/2020RES_D1-
RevExp_Report.pdf (last viewed Mar. 5, 2024).
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Students who participate in varsity intercollegiate
athletics report significant time demands, being subject to
substantial control by colleges over their time and activities,
and constraints on their ability to pursue their studies. One
NCAA survey found that,``[o]n average, football, men's
basketball, women's basketball, and baseball players in [DI]
spend about 40 hours a week on athletic activities.''\11\ The
issue persists in the offseason, with a majority of DI and DII
college athletes engaging in athletic related activities for
the same or greater number of hours as their regular
season.\12\ Beyond the hours spent on the activity, college
athletes have also spoken out about the control institutions
have on their lives off the field. As noted in Mark Gaston
Pearce's testimony before the Committee in March 2024:
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\11\Jake New, What Off-Season?, Inside Higher Ed. (May 7, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/08/college-athletes-say-
they-devote-too-much-time-sports-year-round.
\12\Id.
Former University of Southern California football
players testified that USC officials retained rigid
control over their lives almost year-round including
fingerprint scanning players to mark their presence at
daily meals and conducting hydration testing and weigh-
ins multiple times a week. USC hired other students to
check that the athletes went to class. One former
football player testified that there was so much
pressure to attend practices that he would rather study
into the wee hours of the night than miss practice.\13\
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\13\Pearce Testimony, supra note 6, at 10.
Moreover, the demands of sports reportedly impinge on
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students' ability to pursue the academic path of their choice:
Student athletes at NCAA [DI] schools must schedule
classes around their required NCAA athletic activities
and cannot reschedule their NCAA athletic activities
around their academic programs. As a result, Villanova
University only excuses a student athlete from
participating in required athletic activities if there
is a conflict between practice and a mandatory core
class. For example, when [one student] played football
at Villanova University he was required to participate
in NCAA athletically related activities on weekdays
between 5:45 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. and could not enroll
in a non-core class during that time, including classes
that were prerequisites for academic degree programs. .
. . Because student athletes have to schedule their
classes around their required athletic activities, many
student athletes have reported that participation in
NCAA [DI] sports have prevented them from taking
classes that they wanted to take. Many student athletes
have also reported that their participation in NCAA
[DI] sports has prevented them from majoring in their
preferred major.\14\
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\14\Johnson v. NCAA, 556 F. Supp. 3d 491, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 2021).
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Workplace Laws
Many laws afford protections or allot responsibilities
based on an employment relationship.\15\ These laws differ in
their definitions and the tests used to determine the existence
of an employment relationship, but the relevant factors tend to
include the nature of the enterprise, the distribution of
capacity to control the nature of the work performed, and the
economic relationship between the putative employer and
putative employee. Two laws of particular relevance for this
bill are the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)\16\ and
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).\17\
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\15\See generally Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and
Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in
the Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U.
Penn. J. Bus. L. 605 (2012); Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or
Grasp of Employment Law, in The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards
at the Bottom of America's Labor Market 31 (Annette Bernhardt et al.
eds. 2008).
\16\Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 201 et seq.).
\17\Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 151 et seq.).
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FLSA is the core federal workplace standards law governing
the minimum wage,\18\ overtime,\19\ oppressive child labor,\20\
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex,\21\ and the right of
nursing mothers to take paid breaks at work for the purpose of
expressing breast milk.\22\ FLSA is enforced by both the U.S.
Department of Labor and private litigants.\23\ In FLSA, the
term ``employ'' includes ``to suffer or permit to work.''\24\
When establishing this broad definition of employment, Congress
consciously rejected the narrower common law standard of
employment, which turns on the degree to which the employer has
control over an employee. Congress instead sought to expand the
employment relationship to hold accountable employers who would
not be liable for violations under a control test.\25\ Courts
test the applicability of this definition using the ``economic
realities'' test, which looks underneath whatever terms the
parties to a relationship use to describe it and focuses
instead on the reality of the relationship based on the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the putative
employee is economically dependent on the potential
employer.\26\ Ultimately, the application of the economic
realities factors is guided by the overarching principle that
the FLSA should be ``construed liberally to apply to the
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.''\27\
The FLSA definition of employment is the ``broadest definition
that has ever been included in any one act.''\28\
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\18\Id. Sec. 6.
\19\Id. Sec. 7.
\20\Id. Sec. 12.
\21\Id. Sec. 6(d).
\22\Id. Sec. 18D.
\23\Id. Sec. 16.
\24\Id. Sec. 3(g).
\25\Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the
Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of
Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 991 (1999).
\26\Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301
(1985) (reiterating that the test of employment under the FLSA is
economic reality); Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op, Inc., 366 U.S. 28,
33 (1961).
\27\Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
\28\United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (quoting
81 Cong. Rec. 7,657 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Hugo Black)). The FLSA's
definition of ``employ'' is a standard of ``striking breadth'' that
``stretches the meaning of `employee' to cover some parties who might
not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency
law principles.'' Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323
(1992).
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The NLRA is the foundational federal law governing labor
relations. Administered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the NLRA protects the rights of employees to organize
and collectively bargain with their employers for improved
working conditions and benefits, among other things. Under the
NLRA, the question of whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor is governed by a common law test of
control.\29\ Among the factors courts and the NLRB apply when
examining whether workers are employees within the meaning of
the NLRA are ``the extent of control the employer has over the
work; . . . whether the worker is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business . . . ; whether the kind of occupation
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision; [and] whether the employer is
or is not in business.''\30\
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\29\See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
\30\Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Workplace Law and College Sports Before 2021
Challenges around student athletes and labor and employment
law date back decades. In fact, the term ``student-athlete''
was originally concocted by ``the NCAA's president and legal
team in the 1950s as part of a legal strategy designed to avoid
paying a worker's compensation claim.''\31\ Student athletes
also attempted, generally unsuccessfully in the past, to bring
wage theft claims under FLSA.\32\
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\31\Pearce Testimony, supra note 6, at 3.
\32\See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 932 F.3d
905 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that a student athlete was not an
``employee'' of either NCAA or conference under FLSA or under
California Labor Code); Berger v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 843
F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that former student athletes had not
been employees of university).
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College athletes attempted in 2014 to unionize. The College
Athletes Players Association filed an election petition seeking
to represent football players at Northwestern University who
received grant-in-aid scholarships.\33\ An NLRB Regional
Director determined that players on Northwestern University's
football team who received grant-in-aid scholarships were
employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA\34\
and directed that a representation election be conducted. On
review, the NLRB explicitly did not decide whether the
scholarship football players were employees. Instead, the NLRB
determined that, even if the players were statutory employees,
asserting jurisdiction in the case would not effectuate the
policies of the NLRA. Essentially, the NLRB was concerned that
if Northwestern University players were determined to be
statutory employees there would be a risk of unionized, non-
unionized, and non-employee teams all in the same conference.
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\33\Northwestern University, 362 NLRB 1350 (2015) (docket
accessible at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359).
\34\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151(2)(3).
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The Turning Point: NCAA v. Alston
The distinctive nature of amateurism in college sports and
the student athlete was questioned in a 2021 U.S. Supreme Court
case applying antitrust law. In NCAA v. Alston, the Court
considered claims by college athletes that the NCAA system's
limits on education-related compensation amounted to an undue
restraint of trade. A unanimous Court recognized that college
sports are a profit-making enterprise and rejected the NCAA's
antitrust defense based on the supposed distinctiveness of
amateurism in college athletics.\35\
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\35\NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021).
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The Alston Court did not explicitly address employment
status of college athletes, but Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence
suggested a direct line from that case to the applicability of
workplace laws. ``[T]he NCAA['s argument] that colleges may
decline to pay student athletes because the defining feature of
college sports . . . is that the student athletes are not paid
. . . is circular and unpersuasive,'' wrote Justice Kavanaugh.
``[I]t is highly questionable whether the NCAA and its member
colleges can justify not paying student athletes a fair share
of the revenues on the circular theory that the defining
characteristic of college sports is that the colleges do not
pay student athletes. . . . Nowhere else in America can
businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a
fair market rate on a theory that their product is defined by
not paying their workers a fair market rate.''\36\
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\36\Id. at 2168-2169.
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Workplace Law Challenges in the Wake of Alston
A FLSA case brought by student athletes is now moving in
the federal courts. Johnson v. NCAA, a post-Alston case raising
FLSA and state wage and hour claims in addition to common law
unjust enrichment claims, survived a motion to dismiss in 2021,
with the federal district court extensively quoting Justice
Kavanaugh's Alston concurrence.\37\ The court certified that
decision for interlocutory appeal,\38\ which was recently
argued before a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.\39\
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\37\Johnson, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 501.
\38\Johnson v. NCAA, No. 19-5230, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 246324
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2021).
\39\Maryclaire Dale, NCAA Asks US Appeals Court to Block Pay for
Student-Athletes, Assoc. Press (Feb. 15, 2023), https://apnews.com/
article/sports-compensation-in-education-college-
6f6feb3a3973dee785ad2b778a490e0e.
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Players on Dartmouth College's men's varsity basketball
team voted March 2024 by a margin of 13 to 2 in favor of
representation by the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU), Local 560--becoming the first ever bargaining unit
comprised of college athletes.\40\ The union election came
after a NLRB Regional Director concluded that the players were
employees for the purposes of the NLRA.\41\ The school has
filed a Request for Review of the Regional Director's decision,
and the NLRB's decision is pending on the matter.\42\
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\40\Jimmy Golen, Dartmouth Men's Basketball Team Votes to Unionize,
Though Steps Remain Before Forming Labor Union, AP News (Mar. 5, 2024),
https://apnews.com/article/dartmouth-union-ncaa-basketball-players-
2fd912fade62ffd81218a6dc91461962; NLRB Certifies Union to Represent
Dartmouth Basketball Players, AP News (Mar. 14, 2024), https://
apnews.com/article/dartmouth-basketball-union-
b27e5702df9a92d0f2ec0ae791ca1916.
\41\Decision and Direction of Elections, Trustees of Dartmouth
College (No. 01-RC-325633 Feb. 5, 2024), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/
document.aspx/09031d4583c5ebe4.
\42\Trustees of Dartmouth College, 01-RC-325633, https://
www.nlrb.gov/case/01-RC-325633.
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Neither the Johnson litigation nor the Darthmouth College
basketball unionization effort has