Dissenting Views
[To accompany H.R. 1153]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 1153) to provide a clarification of non-
applicability for regulation and prohibition relating to
sensitive personal data under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, and for other purposes, having considered
the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and
recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Purpose.............................................. 2
Hearings......................................................... 4
Committee Consideration and Votes................................ 4
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 5
New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, and Federal Mandates..... 6
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 6
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 8
Federal Mandates................................................. 8
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs.............................. 8
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 8
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 8
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 8
Earmark Identification........................................... 8
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 9
Changes in Existing Law.......................................... 10
Dissenting Views................................................. 11
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
H.R. 1153, the Deterring America's Technological
Adversaries Act (or DATA Act), is essential to addressing the
significant threat posed by TikTok and other similar companies.
Specifically, the bill clarifies that 35-year-old, pre-Internet
amendments to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) do not apply to certain sensitive personal data. It
also prohibits U.S. persons from engaging with entities that
knowingly transfer sensitive personal data to the government of
the People's Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, the bill
mandates that the President sanction any foreign person that is
controlled, owned, influenced, or operating on behalf of the
government of the PRC and is reasonably believed to have
facilitated or may be facilitating or contributing to the PRC's
threatening activities, including military, intelligence,
espionage, or surveillance activities.
TikTok Threatens U.S. Security
TikTok's threat to individuals' personal data and U.S.
national security are well-documented. The web browser used
within the TikTok app can track every keystroke by its users.
This means TikTok can collect information on what people type
on their phones while visiting outside websites, which can
reveal credit card numbers and passwords. While using the app,
TikTok requests almost complete access to the contents of the
users' phone, including the entire hard drive, contact lists,
and other apps installed on the device. TikTok and ByteDance
also secretly hand-pick specific videos to supercharge their
distribution across its platform, raising serious concerns
about content moderation and influence operations in the United
States. Moreover, TikTok's owners are under investigation by
the Department of Justice after employees of the company used
the app to surveil American citizens, including several
journalists who cover the tech industry. These examples, which
represent a fraction of the publicly reported risks to using
TikTok, are evidence that this app is a threat.
National Security Officials Voice Concerns
In additional to public reporting, U.S. national security
officials have been and continue to articulate TikTok's threat
to national security. Several Biden Administration officials
have expressed their concern publicly.
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Christopher Wray, said: ``We . . . do have national security
concerns about the app [TikTok]. Its parent company is
controlled by the Chinese government. And it gives them the
potential to leverage the app in ways that I think should
concern us.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\December 2, 2022 remarks at the University of Michigan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines,
explained: ``It is extraordinary the degree to which China . .
. [is] developing just frameworks for collecting foreign data
and pulling it in and their capacity to then turn that around
and use it to target audiences for information campaigns or for
other things.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\December 3, 2022 remarks at the Reagan National Defense Forum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William
Burns, stated: ``I think it's a genuine concern . . . for the
U.S. government, in the sense that, because the parent company
of TikTok is a Chinese company, the Chinese government is able
to insist upon extracting the private data of a lot of TikTok
users in this country, and also to shape the content of what
goes on to TikTok as well to suit the interests of the Chinese
leadership . . . What I would underscore, though, is that it's
genuinely troubling to see what the Chinese government could do
to manipulate TikTok.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\December 16, 2022 interview on PBS News Hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Lisa Monaco,
said: ``I don't use TikTok and I would not advise anybody to do
so.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\February 16, 2023 remarks at Chatham House, London.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Governments Act against the TikTok Threat
An increasing number of governments are banning TikTok on
government devices due to the security risks. In 2022, the U.S.
Congress banned TikTok on federal government phones. To date,
more than half of all U.S. states have partially or fully
banned TikTok from government devices. Britain, Canada, the
executive arm of the European Union, and New Zealand's
parliament have all also recently banned the app from official
devices. The Government of India banned the use of TikTok and
other Chinese mobile applications throughout the country.
Except for India, these actions do nothing to protect non-
government devices from TikTok.
Legal Challenges Stymie Effective Response
Two consecutive administrations have taken action against
TikTok but were hamstrung by outdated laws that require urgent
modernization.
In 2019, the Trump Administration launched a national
security review of TikTok's owner Beijing ByteDance Technology
Company's (``ByteDance'') acquisition of U.S. social media app
Musical.ly. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) reviewed this acquisition as a ``non-notified
transaction''--meaning ByteDance did not seek clearance from
CFIUS when it acquired Musical.ly in 2017.
On August 6, 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order
13942, invoking authorities under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), to prohibit any transaction by any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with
ByteDance. On August 14, 2020, President Trump concluded the
CFIUS review and issued an order that prohibited the
acquisition by ByteDance of Musical.ly and demanded a
divestment.
On September 27, 2020, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction against the implementation of Executive Order 13942.
The court determined that ByteDance would likely succeed on the
merits of their claim that the prohibition contravened the
information material exception. On June 9, 2021, the Biden
Administration revoked EO 13492, effectively ending the
litigation.
For nearly two and half years, TikTok has continued to
operate in the United States. Finally, in mid-March 2023, the
Biden Administration reportedly demanded that ByteDance divest
from TikTok, which appears to restate then President Trump's
divestment order on August 14, 2020. It is unclear, however, if
the Biden Administration has sufficient legal authority to
enforce a divestiture and implement a potential ban.
For these reasons, H.R. 1153 is critical to addressing
contemporary threats to Americans and their sensitive personal
data by malign activities of the People's Republic of China.
Hearings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the rules
of the House of Representatives, the full Committee held the
following hearings:
The February 28, 2023 hearing on ``Combatting the
Generational Challenge of CCP Aggression'' was used to develop
and consider H.R. 1153. Witnesses included Mr. Daniel
Kritenbrink (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State), Mr. Michael
Schiffer (Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia, U.S.
Agency for International Development), Mr. Scott Nathan (Chief
Executive Officer, U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation), and Mr. Alan Estevez (Under Secretary of Commerce
for Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce).
The March 23, 2024 hearing on ``The State of
American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts, Budget
Challenges, and Great Power Competition'' with the Honorable
Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, also related to the issues
addressed by this bill.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND VOTES
The Committee considered H.R. 1153 pursuant to notice, in
open session, at a markup that commenced on February 28, 2023
and concluded on March 1, 2023.
The following amendments were considered by the Committee:
Meeks amendment #16 (in the nature of a
substitute) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 23 noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (23): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX),
Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill,
Davidson, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, McCormick, Moran, James,
Self.
Meeks amendment #11 (changing vital national
security waiver to national interest waiver) failed by a record
vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX),
Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill,
Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, McCormick, Moran,
James, Self.
Kamlager-Dove amendment #17 (revised) (video games
industry exemption) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 25
noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (25): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX),
Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill,
Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick,
Moran, James, Self.
Manning amendment #4 (exempting transactions by
U.S. entities with sanctionable minority shareholders) failed
by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim
(CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson,
Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran,
James, Self.
Jacobs amendment #11 (striking sanction for
knowingly assisting sanctionable person) failed by a record
vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim
(CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson,
Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran,
James, Self.
Phillips amendment #14 (striking section 101 of
the bill) failed by voice vote.
Allred amendment #8 (exempting European
entertainment software subsidiaries of sanctionable entities)
failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes.
Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J.
Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim
(CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson,
Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran,
James, Self.
H.R. 1153 was ordered favorably reported to the House by a
record vote of 24 ayes and 16 noes.
Ayes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa,
Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA),
Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz,
Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self.
Noes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating,
Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs,
Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL),
Kamlager-Dove, Crow.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In compliance with Clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under Clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
House of Representatives, are incorporated in the ``Summary and
Purpose'' section of this report, above.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND FEDERAL MANDATES
Clause 3(c)(2) of House rule XIII is inapplicable because
this bill does not provide new budget authority or increased
tax expenditures.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
H.R. 1153 would allow the Administration to impose
sanctions on any foreign person who works with or uses software
that is under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of
China and that contributes to Chinese military or intelligence
efforts. The bill also would newly authorize the President to
regulate the transfer of sensitive information, which includes
personally identifiable information. In addition, the bill
would require the Administration to periodically provide to the
Congress a list of foreign countries that are democracies or
emerging democracies and are partners of the United States.
Finally, 90 days after enactment, the President would be
required to determine whether entities that own or operate
certain connected software applications would be subject to
sanctions. The authority to impose sanctions would expire after
five years.
H.R. 1153 also would block transactions in certain assets
and property that are in the United States or that come under
the control of people in the United States. Those sanctions
would increase the number of people who are subject to civil or
criminal monetary penalties. Such penalties are recorded as
revenues, and a portion can be spent without further
appropriation.
Using data concerning similar actions, CBO estimates that
any additional sanctions would affect a small number of people;
thus, enacting H.R. 1153 would have insignificant effects on
revenues and direct spending, and would, on net, reduce
deficits by insignificant amounts over the 2023-2033 period.
On the basis of information about the costs of similar
requirements, CBO estimates that providing the reports required
under H.R. 1153 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2023-
2028 period; such spending would be subject to availability of
appropriated funds.
H.R. 1153 would impose private-sector mandates as defined
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot
determine whether the costs of those mandates would exceed the
annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector
mandates ($198 million in 2023, adjusted annually for
inflation). The bill contains no intergovernmental mandates as
defined in UMRA.
The bill would impose a private-sector mandate, as defined
in UMRA, on U.S. entities that are investors in or partial
owners of Chinese technology firms by regulating business
practices that are allowable under current law. The cost of the
mandate would be the share of costs borne by those U.S.
entities for complying with new data export requirements, which
could be significant, or the loss of income from technology
firms choosing to exit the U.S. Some U.S. companies may also be
required to administer some aspects of the regulations, such as
limiting user access to regulated products and services. Such a
requirement would impose additional administrative costs on
affected entities.
The scope of the regulations would be defined in a
directive issued by the Department of Treasury and could
encompass companies that routinely collect sensitive personal
information, including social media, gaming, and artificial
intelligence companies and virtual private network (VPN) hosts.
Regulations also could impose additional requirements on U.S.
companies that knowingly facilitate transfers of sensitive
personal information to China. Affected entities could include
companies that provide users with access to products and
services through app stores, including by requiring the removal
of applications prohibited by regulation.
CBO cannot determine the exact cost of the mandate because
much of the information on the scale of U.S. investment in
Chinese companies is confidential. In addition, the Department
of Treasury has not issued the regulations required by the
bill.
Any sanctions imposed as a result of the bill would have
the effect of prohibiting individuals or entities in the United
States from engaging in transactions involving assets and
property that have been frozen. Those transactions are
otherwise permitted under current law. The cost of the mandate
would be any income lost because of the prohibition. CBO
expects that because only a small number of people or entities
would be affected, the loss of income from any incremental
increase in restrictions imposed by the bill would be small as
well.
OTHER EFFECTS
The bill would indirectly affect individuals and companies
in the United States if technology firms subject to regulation
elect to remove their products and services from the U.S.
marketplace rather than comply with data export requirements.
Should this occur, some companies and users that have created
businesses and accumulated followers relying on products and
services, such as social media platforms, that have been
withdrawn would lose revenue. Such losses would not be the
direct result of complying with a federal mandate as defined in
UMRA.
CBO expects that some companies operating in the United
States would benefit by increasing their market share of
similar products and services if others exit the marketplace.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Madeleine Fox
(for federal costs) and Brandon Lever (for mandates). The
estimate was reviewed by Chad Chirico, Deputy Director of
Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
The Committee adopts as its own the Congressional Budget
Office cost estimate on this measure.
FEDERAL MANDATES
The Committee adopts as its own the identification,
description, and assessment of federal mandates contained in
the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate on this measure.
NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII is not applicable to this
measure, as it is not a bill or joint resolution that
establishes or reauthorizes a federal program.
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of H.R. 1153 is to modernize implementation of
portions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
that were written before the widespread use of the Internet, to
ensure that they address national security concerns arising
from the 21st century data-driven economy by creating a legally
durable authority to sanction entities that use Americans'
sensitive data in ways that undermine U.S. national security
interests. Toward that end, the bill requires a timebound
determination by the Executive Branch regarding whether TikTok
and ByteDance meet the criteria for the newly enhanced
sanctions authority.
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
H.R. 1153 does not apply to terms and conditions of
employment or to access to public services or accommodations
within the legislative branch.
NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES
H.R. 1153 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
EARMARK IDENTIFICATION
H.R. 1153 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses
9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House rule XXI.