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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-63

DETERRING AMERICA'S TECHNOLOGICAL ADVERSARIES ACT

2023-05-16

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Dissenting Views

[To accompany H.R. 1153] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 1153) to provide a clarification of non- applicability for regulation and prohibition relating to sensitive personal data under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass. CONTENTS Page Summary and Purpose.............................................. 2 Hearings......................................................... 4 Committee Consideration and Votes................................ 4 Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 5 New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, and Federal Mandates..... 6 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 6 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 8 Federal Mandates................................................. 8 Non-Duplication of Federal Programs.............................. 8 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 8 Congressional Accountability Act................................. 8 New Advisory Committees.......................................... 8 Earmark Identification........................................... 8 Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 9 Changes in Existing Law.......................................... 10 Dissenting Views................................................. 11 SUMMARY AND PURPOSE H.R. 1153, the Deterring America's Technological Adversaries Act (or DATA Act), is essential to addressing the significant threat posed by TikTok and other similar companies. Specifically, the bill clarifies that 35-year-old, pre-Internet amendments to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) do not apply to certain sensitive personal data. It also prohibits U.S. persons from engaging with entities that knowingly transfer sensitive personal data to the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, the bill mandates that the President sanction any foreign person that is controlled, owned, influenced, or operating on behalf of the government of the PRC and is reasonably believed to have facilitated or may be facilitating or contributing to the PRC's threatening activities, including military, intelligence, espionage, or surveillance activities. TikTok Threatens U.S. Security TikTok's threat to individuals' personal data and U.S. national security are well-documented. The web browser used within the TikTok app can track every keystroke by its users. This means TikTok can collect information on what people type on their phones while visiting outside websites, which can reveal credit card numbers and passwords. While using the app, TikTok requests almost complete access to the contents of the users' phone, including the entire hard drive, contact lists, and other apps installed on the device. TikTok and ByteDance also secretly hand-pick specific videos to supercharge their distribution across its platform, raising serious concerns about content moderation and influence operations in the United States. Moreover, TikTok's owners are under investigation by the Department of Justice after employees of the company used the app to surveil American citizens, including several journalists who cover the tech industry. These examples, which represent a fraction of the publicly reported risks to using TikTok, are evidence that this app is a threat. National Security Officials Voice Concerns In additional to public reporting, U.S. national security officials have been and continue to articulate TikTok's threat to national security. Several Biden Administration officials have expressed their concern publicly. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, said: ``We . . . do have national security concerns about the app [TikTok]. Its parent company is controlled by the Chinese government. And it gives them the potential to leverage the app in ways that I think should concern us.''\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\December 2, 2022 remarks at the University of Michigan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, explained: ``It is extraordinary the degree to which China . . . [is] developing just frameworks for collecting foreign data and pulling it in and their capacity to then turn that around and use it to target audiences for information campaigns or for other things.''\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\December 3, 2022 remarks at the Reagan National Defense Forum. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Burns, stated: ``I think it's a genuine concern . . . for the U.S. government, in the sense that, because the parent company of TikTok is a Chinese company, the Chinese government is able to insist upon extracting the private data of a lot of TikTok users in this country, and also to shape the content of what goes on to TikTok as well to suit the interests of the Chinese leadership . . . What I would underscore, though, is that it's genuinely troubling to see what the Chinese government could do to manipulate TikTok.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\December 16, 2022 interview on PBS News Hour. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Lisa Monaco, said: ``I don't use TikTok and I would not advise anybody to do so.''\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\February 16, 2023 remarks at Chatham House, London. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Governments Act against the TikTok Threat An increasing number of governments are banning TikTok on government devices due to the security risks. In 2022, the U.S. Congress banned TikTok on federal government phones. To date, more than half of all U.S. states have partially or fully banned TikTok from government devices. Britain, Canada, the executive arm of the European Union, and New Zealand's parliament have all also recently banned the app from official devices. The Government of India banned the use of TikTok and other Chinese mobile applications throughout the country. Except for India, these actions do nothing to protect non- government devices from TikTok. Legal Challenges Stymie Effective Response Two consecutive administrations have taken action against TikTok but were hamstrung by outdated laws that require urgent modernization. In 2019, the Trump Administration launched a national security review of TikTok's owner Beijing ByteDance Technology Company's (``ByteDance'') acquisition of U.S. social media app Musical.ly. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviewed this acquisition as a ``non-notified transaction''--meaning ByteDance did not seek clearance from CFIUS when it acquired Musical.ly in 2017. On August 6, 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13942, invoking authorities under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), to prohibit any transaction by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with ByteDance. On August 14, 2020, President Trump concluded the CFIUS review and issued an order that prohibited the acquisition by ByteDance of Musical.ly and demanded a divestment. On September 27, 2020, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against the implementation of Executive Order 13942. The court determined that ByteDance would likely succeed on the merits of their claim that the prohibition contravened the information material exception. On June 9, 2021, the Biden Administration revoked EO 13492, effectively ending the litigation. For nearly two and half years, TikTok has continued to operate in the United States. Finally, in mid-March 2023, the Biden Administration reportedly demanded that ByteDance divest from TikTok, which appears to restate then President Trump's divestment order on August 14, 2020. It is unclear, however, if the Biden Administration has sufficient legal authority to enforce a divestiture and implement a potential ban. For these reasons, H.R. 1153 is critical to addressing contemporary threats to Americans and their sensitive personal data by malign activities of the People's Republic of China.

Hearings

In compliance with clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives, the full Committee held the following hearings: The February 28, 2023 hearing on ``Combatting the Generational Challenge of CCP Aggression'' was used to develop and consider H.R. 1153. Witnesses included Mr. Daniel Kritenbrink (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State), Mr. Michael Schiffer (Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development), Mr. Scott Nathan (Chief Executive Officer, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), and Mr. Alan Estevez (Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce). The March 23, 2024 hearing on ``The State of American Diplomacy in 2023: Growing Conflicts, Budget Challenges, and Great Power Competition'' with the Honorable Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, also related to the issues addressed by this bill. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND VOTES The Committee considered H.R. 1153 pursuant to notice, in open session, at a markup that commenced on February 28, 2023 and concluded on March 1, 2023. The following amendments were considered by the Committee: Meeks amendment #16 (in the nature of a substitute) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 23 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (23): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Meeks amendment #11 (changing vital national security waiver to national interest waiver) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Kamlager-Dove amendment #17 (revised) (video games industry exemption) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 25 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (25): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Green, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Manning amendment #4 (exempting transactions by U.S. entities with sanctionable minority shareholders) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Jacobs amendment #11 (striking sanction for knowingly assisting sanctionable person) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Phillips amendment #14 (striking section 101 of the bill) failed by voice vote. Allred amendment #8 (exempting European entertainment software subsidiaries of sanctionable entities) failed by a record vote of 16 ayes and 24 noes. Ayes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. Noes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. H.R. 1153 was ordered favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 24 ayes and 16 noes. Ayes (24): McCaul, Smith, Wilson, Issa, Wagner, Mast, Burchett, Barr, R. Jackson (TX), Y. Kim (CA), Salazar, Huizenga, Radewagen, Hill, Davidson, Baird, Waltz, Kean, Lawler, Mills, McCormick, Moran, James, Self. Noes (16): Meeks, Connolly, Keating, Cicilline, Bera, Titus, Phillips, A. Kim (NJ), Jacobs, Cherfilus-McCormick, Stanton, Dean, Moskowitz, J. Jackson (IL), Kamlager-Dove, Crow. OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In compliance with Clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under Clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the ``Summary and Purpose'' section of this report, above. NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND FEDERAL MANDATES Clause 3(c)(2) of House rule XIII is inapplicable because this bill does not provide new budget authority or increased tax expenditures. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE H.R. 1153 would allow the Administration to impose sanctions on any foreign person who works with or uses software that is under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China and that contributes to Chinese military or intelligence efforts. The bill also would newly authorize the President to regulate the transfer of sensitive information, which includes personally identifiable information. In addition, the bill would require the Administration to periodically provide to the Congress a list of foreign countries that are democracies or emerging democracies and are partners of the United States. Finally, 90 days after enactment, the President would be required to determine whether entities that own or operate certain connected software applications would be subject to sanctions. The authority to impose sanctions would expire after five years. H.R. 1153 also would block transactions in certain assets and property that are in the United States or that come under the control of people in the United States. Those sanctions would increase the number of people who are subject to civil or criminal monetary penalties. Such penalties are recorded as revenues, and a portion can be spent without further appropriation. Using data concerning similar actions, CBO estimates that any additional sanctions would affect a small number of people; thus, enacting H.R. 1153 would have insignificant effects on revenues and direct spending, and would, on net, reduce deficits by insignificant amounts over the 2023-2033 period. On the basis of information about the costs of similar requirements, CBO estimates that providing the reports required under H.R. 1153 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2023- 2028 period; such spending would be subject to availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 1153 would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot determine whether the costs of those mandates would exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector mandates ($198 million in 2023, adjusted annually for inflation). The bill contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA. The bill would impose a private-sector mandate, as defined in UMRA, on U.S. entities that are investors in or partial owners of Chinese technology firms by regulating business practices that are allowable under current law. The cost of the mandate would be the share of costs borne by those U.S. entities for complying with new data export requirements, which could be significant, or the loss of income from technology firms choosing to exit the U.S. Some U.S. companies may also be required to administer some aspects of the regulations, such as limiting user access to regulated products and services. Such a requirement would impose additional administrative costs on affected entities. The scope of the regulations would be defined in a directive issued by the Department of Treasury and could encompass companies that routinely collect sensitive personal information, including social media, gaming, and artificial intelligence companies and virtual private network (VPN) hosts. Regulations also could impose additional requirements on U.S. companies that knowingly facilitate transfers of sensitive personal information to China. Affected entities could include companies that provide users with access to products and services through app stores, including by requiring the removal of applications prohibited by regulation. CBO cannot determine the exact cost of the mandate because much of the information on the scale of U.S. investment in Chinese companies is confidential. In addition, the Department of Treasury has not issued the regulations required by the bill. Any sanctions imposed as a result of the bill would have the effect of prohibiting individuals or entities in the United States from engaging in transactions involving assets and property that have been frozen. Those transactions are otherwise permitted under current law. The cost of the mandate would be any income lost because of the prohibition. CBO expects that because only a small number of people or entities would be affected, the loss of income from any incremental increase in restrictions imposed by the bill would be small as well. OTHER EFFECTS The bill would indirectly affect individuals and companies in the United States if technology firms subject to regulation elect to remove their products and services from the U.S. marketplace rather than comply with data export requirements. Should this occur, some companies and users that have created businesses and accumulated followers relying on products and services, such as social media platforms, that have been withdrawn would lose revenue. Such losses would not be the direct result of complying with a federal mandate as defined in UMRA. CBO expects that some companies operating in the United States would benefit by increasing their market share of similar products and services if others exit the marketplace. The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Madeleine Fox (for federal costs) and Brandon Lever (for mandates). The estimate was reviewed by Chad Chirico, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE The Committee adopts as its own the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate on this measure. FEDERAL MANDATES The Committee adopts as its own the identification, description, and assessment of federal mandates contained in the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate on this measure. NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS Clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII is not applicable to this measure, as it is not a bill or joint resolution that establishes or reauthorizes a federal program. PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES The goal of H.R. 1153 is to modernize implementation of portions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that were written before the widespread use of the Internet, to ensure that they address national security concerns arising from the 21st century data-driven economy by creating a legally durable authority to sanction entities that use Americans' sensitive data in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. Toward that end, the bill requires a timebound determination by the Executive Branch regarding whether TikTok and ByteDance meet the criteria for the newly enhanced sanctions authority. CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT H.R. 1153 does not apply to terms and conditions of employment or to access to public services or accommodations within the legislative branch. NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES H.R. 1153 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees. EARMARK IDENTIFICATION H.R. 1153 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House rule XXI.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents Sec. 2. Findings Makes findings that quote Biden Administration national security officials explaining the threat posed by TikTok. Sec. 3. Authorization of appropriations No additional amounts are authorized to be made available to carry out this act. Sec. 4. Severability This section explains that if any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. Sec. 5. Definitions This section includes several definitions that apply throughout the bill. TITLE I--CLARIFICATION OF NON-APPLICABILITY FOR REGULATION AND PROHIBITION RELATING TO SENSITIVE PERSONAL DATA UNDER INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT Sec. 101. Clarification This section explains that the importation or exportation of sensitive personal data shall not constitute the importation or exportation of information or informational materials for the purposes of paragraph (1) or (3) of section 203(b) of IEEPA, and clarifies that nothing in this section or in IEEPA may provide for the application of paragraph (1) or (3) of section 203(b) of IEEPA to the importation from or exportation to China, directly or indirectly, of sensitive personal data. Sec. 102. Directive This section prohibits U.S. persons from any transactions with a person that the Secretary of the Treasury determines knowingly provides or may transfer sensitive personal data of persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to any foreign person under the influence, jurisdiction, or direction of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). TITLE II--IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO CONNECTED SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS Sec. 201. Imposition of sanctions Directs the President to sanction any foreign person that operates, directs, or otherwise deals in a connected software application that is subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, operating on behalf of, owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of the government of the PRC and is reasonably believed to have facilitated or may be facilitating or contributing to dangerous aspects of the PRC, including its military, espionage, intelligence, or malicious cyber activities. Sec. 202. Sanction described Describes the types of sanctions, implementation, and penalties as well as the exceptions available, and it also provides a waiver to the President to not apply sanctions if it is vital to the national security interests. Sec. 203. Sunset Terminates the authorities in the bill five years after the date of its enactment. TITLE III--SPECIFIC DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS Sec. 301. Determination relating to Bytedance, Ltd., TikTok, and related entities Within 90 days after the date of enactment, and every 180 days thereafter for three years, requires the President to determine if ByteDance or TikTok meets the sanctionable criteria in section 102 or section 201. Sec. 302. Requests by appropriate congressional committees Allows the Chairperson and Ranking Member of an appropriate congressional committee to request that the President determine whether a foreign person meets the sanctionable criteria in section 102 or section 201. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW The bill, as reported, does not propose to repeal or amend a statute or part thereof.

Dissenting Views

There is broad bipartisan consensus in Congress and on the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the meteoric rise of Tiktok calls for legislative action that protects our privacy, boosts our economy, and safeguards our national security. The unjustifiable businesses practices of Tiktok, owned by the Chinese company Bytedance, are real: the company has spied on journalist and been deceptive about its institutional policies. Moreover, the national security threats arising from American data being stored in the People's Republic of China and accessible to Beijing-based staff are clear. To mitigate any potential risk to sensitive government data, the United States and allies around the globe have taken the prudent step of banning TikTok from government devices. But the cure cannot be worse than the disease. We must address concerns with PRC based tech companies thoughtfully, holistically, with an eye to our economy, two eyes on our national security, and without compromising the cherished values that have underpinned our nation for centuries. Unfortunately, the DATA Act misses the mark by a wide margin. The bill would damage our alliances across the globe, bring more countries into China's sphere, destroy jobs here in the United States and undermine American values of free speech and free enterprise. These ills are not just bad policy, they would actively undermine our national security. The legislation before us today is unvetted and dangerously overbroad. Framed as a ``TikTok'' bill, it is closer to a rewrite of the American-led global economic order. It applies mandatory sanctions to companies that have independent American subsidiaries without giving any consideration to the consequences. What would happen to these subsidiaries? The bill does not say. The bill would impose sanctions on companies with a combined market capitalization of over a trillion dollars while explicitly refusing to authorize one penny to the agencies that oversee sanctions enforcement. How will the government handle enormous new responsibilities with no additional resources? The bill does not say. The DATA Act would also result in sanctions on individuals and companies in allied and partner nations around the globe. Take semiconductors: there is widespread and bipartisan consensus that semiconductor manufacturing and supply chains are crucial to national security. But TSMC, Samsung, and SK Hynix all make significant revenue selling chips for Chinese companies that would be sanctioned by this bill. Under the secondary sanctions set forth in this legislation, by necessity each of these Taiwanese and Korean entities would be subject to mandatory sanctions. How does it make sense to sanction the very companies the Executive Branch and bipartisan Members of this Committee are actively courting to build fabs in the United States? The bill does not say. More careful deliberation would have yielded a better bill. The Committee could have held hearings before the markup, and carefully crafted bipartisan legislation together. Instead, the text of the legislation was drafted in a rushed manner to meet an arbitrary markup deadline. Many thoughtful and good faith amendments were proposed at markup but they were generally rejected in one sentence or two without careful consideration of how the amendments fixed significant issues with the legislation. While the DATA Act is flawed, no one should be giving a permission slip to Tiktok to carry on with business as usual. The company must take immediate action to ensure that all American data is stored in the United States, on American servers, run by an American company, and inaccessible to all PRC-based employees. If Beijing government officials come knocking on Bytedance's doors requesting American data under the omnipresent and omnipotent warrant that is the Chinese National Security Law, Bytedance must be able to truthfully answer that they are technically incapable of providing the requested information. If they are unable to do this in a reasonable time period, they should not be able to conduct business in the United States. A better bill would have taken such an approach. Legislation narrowly proscribing data storage rules and anti- censorship guarantees would garner broad bipartisan support. The threat of sanctions to enforce these rules would not only be reasonable, but remarkably prudent. A mandatory sanctions bill on friends and allies that do business with any PRC based entity, which is what the DATA Act amounts to, is unfortunately the very opposite: rash, shortsighted, and sure to backfire. The United States is at its strongest when we work with our allies and partners around the globe, animated by and in pursuit of our core values. We are at our weakest when we trudge forward alone, adopting our adversary's values as our own in pursuit of a short term advantage. This bill epitomizes the latter not the former, and as a result, Committee Democrats opposed it unequivocally and unanimously. Sincerely, Gregory W. Meeks, Chairman. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/63