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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-633

DECOUPLING FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL BATTERY DEPENDENCE ACT

2024-08-23

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Associated legislation

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependency Act, prohibits the use of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funds for purchasing battery technology produced by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP)-aligned Chinese companies as well as companies that violate the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act and those that have engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. H.R. 8631 furthers efforts to decouple the U.S. government's supply chain from its geopolitical foreign adversary, while proactively addressing national security risks to U.S. critical infrastructure and data security.

Background and Need for Legislation

H.R. 8631, aligns with Section 154 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, legislation signed into law, which prohibited the Department of Defense from procuring batteries from six companies that are closely aligned with the CCP and the CCP-led All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. These key companies are: Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Ltd. (CATL); BYD Company, Ltd; Envision Energy, Ltd; EVE Energy Company, Ltd; Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Ltd; and Gotion High-Tech Company, Ltd. Additionally, the bill would ban batteries produced by entities that appear on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list maintained by the Department of Commerce, any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'', and any entity included in further lists of companies involved in activities that go against U.S. national security or foreign policy interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Commerce. Last year, Duke Energy, a U.S. power company decommissioned CATL storage batteries from one of the largest U.S. Marine Corps bases in the country, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.\1\ According to the Department of Navy, the action was taken as a ```proactive approach' to procure American or allied-supplied batteries for its installations.''\2\ According to Duke Energy, ``In partnership with policymakers and the Department of the Navy, we [Duke Energy] have made the decision to decommission the CATL battery energy storage system at Camp Lejeune and replace it with a domestic or allied nation supplier.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Drew Lawrence, China-Made Batteries Eliminated from Navy, Marine Corps Infrastructure After Camp Lejeune Incident, Military (Apr. 11, 2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/04/11/navy-says-no-more- chinese-batteries-after-lawmakers-raise-concerns-about-camp-lejeune- power-system.html. \2\Id. \3\Michael Martina, Exclusive: Duke Energy to remove Chinese battery giant CATL from Marine Corps Base, Reuters (Feb. 9, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duke-energy-remove-chinese- battery-giant-catl-marine-corps-base-2024-02-09/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By expanding U.S. procurement prohibitions to DHS, this legislation would prevent the CCP from exploiting economic and security vulnerabilities that U.S. reliance on these Chinese- origin batteries causes. In particular, CATL and associated Chinese-companies could install malware on electric vehicles and use it to collect sensitive information or shut down charging networks or disable vehicles through hardware infiltration, presenting security vulnerabilities.\4\ Moreover, there are national security risks associated with malware on battery energy storage systems, a device that charges or collects energy from the grid or a power plant and then discharges that energy at a subsequent period to provide electricity for various services, as well as the building of battery production and other facilities in the United States.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Craig Singleton, Beijing's Power Play, Safeguarding U.S. National Security in the Electric Vehicle and Battery Industries, FDD (Oct. 23, 2023), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/23/ beijings-power-play/. \5\Id., see also, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Grid-Scale Battery Storage: Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/ fy19osti/74426.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, under the People's Republic of China's National Intelligence Law, as amended in 2018, all PRC firms, entities, organizations and citizens are required to support, assist, and cooperate with the PRC's intelligence work.\6\ Under Article 7 of this law, it states ``any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the [National Intelligence] Law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work from becoming known to the public.''\7\ This raises serious U.S. national security risks associated with Chinese companies that are controlled, operated, or aligned with the PRC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\PRC National Intelligence Law (as amended in 2018), China Law Translate, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence- law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/ (last visited June 22, 2024). \7\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, this legislation is also partly a result of the Committee's and Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party's oversight work of some of these companies' apparent ties to forced labor practices. In particular, publicly available corporate information reveals that CATL and Gotion High Tech, two of the six companies, are affiliated with Xinjiang Production and Construction (XPCC), a paramilitary and state-owned system and the only entity named in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFPLA) Entity List,\8\ due to its egregious forced labor practices.\9\ As the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce have jointly stated, ``[B]usinesses and individuals that do not exit supply chains, ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang could run a high risk of violating U.S. law.''\10\ These apparent affiliations are present in a tier-1 supplier relations, raising serious concerns. On June 5, 2024, Members of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, sent a 15-page letter to DHS illustrating that CATL and Gotion High Tech's supply chains are compromised by links to entities whose goods, wares, articles, or merchandise is mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang, China.\11\ As a result, Members requested they be added to the UFLPA Entity List and its shipments prohibited from entry to the United States.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\UFLPA Entity List, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https:// www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list (last updated May 14, 2024). \9\XPCC is connected to ``serious human rights abuse against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, which reportedly include mass arbitrary detention and severe physical abuse, among other serious abuses targeting Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim population indigenous to Xinjiang, and other ethnic minorities in the region.'' See, Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order (July 31, 2020), www.home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073. \10\Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 26, 2023), www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chainbusiness- advisory/. \11\Letter from Hon. Mark Green, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., Hon. John Moolenaar, Chairman, Select Comm. on the Chinese Communist Party., et al. to Rob Slivers, Under Sec'y of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., (June 5, 2024) (on file with Committee). \12\Pursuant to section 2(d)(2)(B) of the UFLPA, DHS on behalf of the FLETF is required to develop and maintain the UFLPA Entity List. CATL's supply chain connections to products mined, produced, or manufactured in the Xinjiang as well as its direct connections to XPCC ``subsidiaries'' and ``affiliates'' warrant its inclusion on the UFLPA Entity List per the requirements outlined in 2(d)(2)(B)(i); 2(d)(2)(B)(iv); and 2(d)(2)(B)(v). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hearings

The Committee held the following hearings in the 118th Congress that informed H.R. 8631: On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled, ``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the U.S. Homeland.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center; Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella Jr., Senior Fellow, at the Mitchell Institute; the Honorable Kari Bingen, former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, at the Department of Defense; and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International and Public Affairs, at Brown University. On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled, ``A Security Sprint: Assessing U.S. Homeland Vulnerabilities to Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Iranga Kahangama, Assistant Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, at DHS; Tyrone Durham, Acting Director, Nation State Threats Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, at DHS; and Jill M. Murphy, Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence, at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On October 19, 2023, the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled, ``Exploitation and Enforcement: Evaluating the Department of Homeland Security's Efforts to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Ms. Kimberly Glas, President and CEO, National Council of Textile Organizations; Mr. Peter Mattis, private citizen; Ms. Louisa Greve, Director of Global Advocacy, Uyghur Human Rights Project; and Mr. Michael Stumo, CEO, Coalition for a Prosperous America. On January 11, 2024, the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled, ``Exploitation and Enforcement Part II: Improving Enforcement in Countering Uyghur Forced Labor.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Ms. Christa Brzozowski, Acting Assistant Secretary for Trade and Economic Security Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor; and Mr. Eric Choy, Executive Director, Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate, Office of Trade, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Committee Consideration

The Committee met on June 12, 2024, a quorum being present, to consider H.R. 8631 and ordered the measure to be favorably reported to the House, as amended, by voice vote.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. No recorded votes were requested during consideration of H.R. 8631. COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Legislation summary: On June 12, 2024, the House Committee on Homeland Security ordered 13 bills to be reported. This document provides estimates for 12 of those bills. The legislation would: Require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct a public information campaign on the dangers of traveling to the United States through Mexico from Central and South America; Codify the Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) program within DHS; Authorize U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to conduct its own maintenance at ports of entry for projects that cost less than $300,000; Prohibit DHS from purchasing batteries or products that use batteries made by certain Chinese entities; Impose various reporting requirements on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Require DHS to conduct research and development on equipment used by law enforcement agencies to detect illicit drugs; and Expand the employee rotational program within DHS to include intelligence analyst positions. Estimated Federal cost: The estimated costs of the legislation fall within budget functions 400 (transportation) and 750 (administration of justice). Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the legislation will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2024. The estimated costs do not include any interaction effects among the pieces of legislation. If all 12 bills were combined and enacted as a single piece of legislation, the estimated costs could be different than the sum of the separate estimates, although CBO expects that any difference would be small. H.R. 4574, Cooperation on Combatting Human Smuggling and Trafficking Act: H.R. 4574 would require DHS to conduct public information campaigns about the dangers for migrants traveling across Mexico to the United States. H.R. 4574 also would require DHS to expand partnerships with law enforcement entities in Central and South America to combat human smuggling and trafficking. Using information from DHS about the costs of similar public awareness campaigns, such as ``If You See Something, Say Something'' and the Blue Campaign, CBO estimates that it would cost $5 million annually to implement the public information campaigns. Those costs would include hiring and training staff, engaging private contractors, and advertising. CBO estimates that it would cost DHS less than $500,000 to comply with the bill's other provisions because the agency already conducts those activities. In total, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4574 would cost $26 million over the 2024-2029 period, assuming appropriation of the estimated amounts. H.R. 6229, DHS Special Events Program and Support Act: H.R. 6229 would codify the Special Event Assessment Rating program that DHS currently administers. Under that program, state and local governments submit events to an inter-agency working group that assesses each event for potential security risks, such as terrorist attacks and other hazards. Depending on the level of risk determined by the group, DHS and other federal agencies may provide support to the state or local government in managing security operations for the event. H.R. 6229 also would require DHS to engage in research and development of emerging technologies that would enhance the department's efforts to support federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies with respect to mass gatherings. Lastly, the bill would require DHS to report to the Congress annually on the program's activities and once every five years on the program's effectiveness. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates implementing H.R. 6229 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period, primarily to comply with the bill's reporting requirements. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Under current law, DHS already can conduct research and development on emerging technologies. On that basis, CBO estimates that the cost of implementing that provision and codifying the existing SEAR program would be insignificant. H.R. 8150, REVAMP Act: H.R. 8150 would require U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish procedures to allow the agency to carry out maintenance and repair projects that cost less than $300,000 at federally owned ports of entry without the direct involvement of the General Services Administration (GSA). Under the bill, that amount would be adjusted annually for inflation. The bill also would require CBP to consult with GSA before creating those procedures and report annually to the Congress on the projects it completed and their costs. Using information from CBP, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8150 would cost $1 million in administrative and personnel costs over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8631, Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act: H.R. 8631 would, starting in fiscal year 2028, prohibit DHS from using appropriated funds to purchase a battery or a product that uses a battery made by certain Chinese entities. The bill would allow DHS to waive the prohibition under some circumstances, including if it determines that the battery would not pose a threat to national security. H.R. 8631 also would require DHS to report to the Congress within 180 days of enactment on the effect the prohibition would have on costs and operations. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8631 would cost less than $500,000. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8654, Streamlining Law Enforcement Information Sharing Act: H.R. 8654 would require the GAO to report to the Congress within one year of enactment on the Homeland Security Information Network. DHS uses that network to share information and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies, coordinate security for planned events, and respond to emergencies. Based on the costs of similar reports, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8654 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8655, Federal Air Marshal Enhancing Airport Security Act of 2024: H.R. 8655 would require TSA to develop a plan for the role of federal air marshals at certain airports and brief the Congress on that plan. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8658, Emerging Digital Identity Ecosystem Report Act of 2024: H.R. 8658 would require TSA to report to the Congress on digital identity systems that allow credentials and other information to be verified in a secure and efficient manner. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8662, TSA Commuting Fairness Act: H.R. 8662 would require TSA to report to the Congress on the feasibility of treating the time that its employees spend commuting from airport parking lots to their workstations as on-duty hours. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8663, DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024: H.R. 8663 would require DHS to engage in research and development of technologies and equipment that would help federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies detect and disrupt illicit drug trafficking. Under current law, DHS already conducts research on equipment and technologies to detect and intercept illegal drugs. On that basis, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8663 would cost less than $500,000. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8664, DHS Intelligence and Analysis Oversight and Transparency Act: H.R. 8664 would require DHS to annually audit its use of information systems and bulk data and report the results to the Congress. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8664 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8671, DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program and Law Enforcement Support Act: H.R. 8671 would allow intelligence analysts to participate in DHS's in-house employee rotation program, which allows personnel to work temporarily in different component units. CBO expects that DHS would need to update policies and procedures to expand the current rotation program. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8671 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 8675, Repair the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems Act of 2024: H.R. 8675 would require TSA to report to the Congress on how the agency collects digital data about law enforcement officers who are armed when they fly. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Pay-As-You-Go considerations: Enacting any of the 12 bills in this estimate would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. Increase in long-term net direct spending and deficits: CBO estimates that enacting any of the 12 bills in this estimate would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2035. Mandates: None of the bills contain intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Previous CBO estimate: On April 10, 2023, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S. 243, a bill to require the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to establish procedures for conducting maintenance projects at ports of entry at which the Office of Field Operations conducts certain enforcement and facilitation activities, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on March 29, 2023. S. 243 is similar to H.R. 8150, and CBO's estimate of the costs are the same for both bills. Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jeremy Crimm (Department of Homeland Security); Aaron Krupkin (Transportation Security Administration). Mandates: Rachel Austin, Brandon Lever. Estimate reviewed by: Justin Humphrey, Chief, Finance, Housing, and Education Cost Estimates Unit; Robert Reese, Chief, Natural and Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit; Kathleen FitzGerald, Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit; H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Estimate approved by: Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that H.R. 8631 does not contain any provision that establishes or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another Federal program. STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of H.R. 8631 is to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes. CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI. ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH The Committee finds that H.R. 8631 does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION Section 1. Short title This section provides the Act's short title, the ``Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependency Act of 2024''. Section 2. Prohibition on availability of funds for procurement of certain batteries Subsection 2(a) prohibits funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Homeland Security to procure a battery produced by certain specified foreign entities beginning on October 1, 2027. Subsection 2(b) outlines the specific entities, which are the following: (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also known as ``CATL''); (2) BYD Company, Limited; (3) Envision Energy, Limited; (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited; (5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited; (6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited; and (7) Any successor to an entity specified in paragraphs (1) through (6). Additionally, the bill would ban batteries produced by entities that appear on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list maintained by the Department of Commerce, any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'', and any entity included in further lists of companies involved in activities that go against U.S. national security or foreign policy interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Commerce. Subsection 2(c) details that a battery shall be treated as produced by an entity specific in subsection (b), if such entity (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses such battery; or (2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in such battery. Subsection 2(d) paragraph (1) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following: that the batteries to be procured do not pose a national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the U.S.; that there is no available alternative to procure batteries that are of similar or better cost and quality; and there is no available alternative produced by an entity not specified in subsection (b). Subsection 2(d) paragraph (2) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing or analysis. Subsection 2(d) paragraph (3) requires a Congressional notification that not later than 15 days after granting a waiver under this subsection, to the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subsection 2(e) requires a report by the Secretary of Homeland on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out the prohibition on Chinese batteries, particularly with respect to Department components. [all]

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