Purpose and Summary
H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery
Dependency Act, prohibits the use of Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) funds for purchasing battery technology produced
by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP)-aligned Chinese
companies as well as companies that violate the Uyghur Forced
Labor Protection Act and those that have engaged in activities
contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.
H.R. 8631 furthers efforts to decouple the U.S. government's
supply chain from its geopolitical foreign adversary, while
proactively addressing national security risks to U.S. critical
infrastructure and data security.
Background and Need for Legislation
H.R. 8631, aligns with Section 154 of the Fiscal Year 2024
National Defense Authorization Act, legislation signed into
law, which prohibited the Department of Defense from procuring
batteries from six companies that are closely aligned with the
CCP and the CCP-led All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce. These key companies are: Contemporary Amperex
Technology Company, Ltd. (CATL); BYD Company, Ltd; Envision
Energy, Ltd; EVE Energy Company, Ltd; Hithium Energy Storage
Technology company, Ltd; and Gotion High-Tech Company, Ltd.
Additionally, the bill would ban batteries produced by entities
that appear on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list
maintained by the Department of Commerce, any entity identified
by the Secretary of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'',
and any entity included in further lists of companies involved
in activities that go against U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland
Security, Defense, and Commerce.
Last year, Duke Energy, a U.S. power company decommissioned
CATL storage batteries from one of the largest U.S. Marine
Corps bases in the country, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.\1\
According to the Department of Navy, the action was taken as a
```proactive approach' to procure American or allied-supplied
batteries for its installations.''\2\ According to Duke Energy,
``In partnership with policymakers and the Department of the
Navy, we [Duke Energy] have made the decision to decommission
the CATL battery energy storage system at Camp Lejeune and
replace it with a domestic or allied nation supplier.''\3\
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\1\Drew Lawrence, China-Made Batteries Eliminated from Navy, Marine
Corps Infrastructure After Camp Lejeune Incident, Military (Apr. 11,
2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/04/11/navy-says-no-more-
chinese-batteries-after-lawmakers-raise-concerns-about-camp-lejeune-
power-system.html.
\2\Id.
\3\Michael Martina, Exclusive: Duke Energy to remove Chinese
battery giant CATL from Marine Corps Base, Reuters (Feb. 9, 2024),
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duke-energy-remove-chinese-
battery-giant-catl-marine-corps-base-2024-02-09/.
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By expanding U.S. procurement prohibitions to DHS, this
legislation would prevent the CCP from exploiting economic and
security vulnerabilities that U.S. reliance on these Chinese-
origin batteries causes. In particular, CATL and associated
Chinese-companies could install malware on electric vehicles
and use it to collect sensitive information or shut down
charging networks or disable vehicles through hardware
infiltration, presenting security vulnerabilities.\4\ Moreover,
there are national security risks associated with malware on
battery energy storage systems, a device that charges or
collects energy from the grid or a power plant and then
discharges that energy at a subsequent period to provide
electricity for various services, as well as the building of
battery production and other facilities in the United
States.\5\
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\4\Craig Singleton, Beijing's Power Play, Safeguarding U.S.
National Security in the Electric Vehicle and Battery Industries, FDD
(Oct. 23, 2023), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/23/
beijings-power-play/.
\5\Id., see also, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Grid-Scale
Battery Storage: Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy19osti/74426.pdf.
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Additionally, under the People's Republic of China's
National Intelligence Law, as amended in 2018, all PRC firms,
entities, organizations and citizens are required to support,
assist, and cooperate with the PRC's intelligence work.\6\
Under Article 7 of this law, it states ``any organization or
citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state
intelligence work in accordance with the [National
Intelligence] Law, and keep the secrets of the national
intelligence work from becoming known to the public.''\7\ This
raises serious U.S. national security risks associated with
Chinese companies that are controlled, operated, or aligned
with the PRC.
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\6\PRC National Intelligence Law (as amended in 2018), China Law
Translate, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-
law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/ (last visited June 22, 2024).
\7\Id.
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Finally, this legislation is also partly a result of the
Committee's and Select Committee on the Chinese Communist
Party's oversight work of some of these companies' apparent
ties to forced labor practices. In particular, publicly
available corporate information reveals that CATL and Gotion
High Tech, two of the six companies, are affiliated with
Xinjiang Production and Construction (XPCC), a paramilitary and
state-owned system and the only entity named in the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFPLA) Entity List,\8\ due to its
egregious forced labor practices.\9\ As the U.S. Departments of
State, Treasury, and Commerce have jointly stated,
``[B]usinesses and individuals that do not exit supply chains,
ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang could run a
high risk of violating U.S. law.''\10\ These apparent
affiliations are present in a tier-1 supplier relations,
raising serious concerns. On June 5, 2024, Members of the
Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on the
Chinese Communist Party, sent a 15-page letter to DHS
illustrating that CATL and Gotion High Tech's supply chains are
compromised by links to entities whose goods, wares, articles,
or merchandise is mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in
part in Xinjiang, China.\11\ As a result, Members requested
they be added to the UFLPA Entity List and its shipments
prohibited from entry to the United States.\12\
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\8\UFLPA Entity List, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list (last updated May 14, 2024).
\9\XPCC is connected to ``serious human rights abuse against ethnic
minorities in Xinjiang, which reportedly include mass arbitrary
detention and severe physical abuse, among other serious abuses
targeting Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim population indigenous to Xinjiang,
and other ethnic minorities in the region.'' See, Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials
Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order (July 31,
2020), www.home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073.
\10\Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(Sept. 26, 2023), www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chainbusiness-
advisory/.
\11\Letter from Hon. Mark Green, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., Hon. John Moolenaar, Chairman, Select Comm. on the Chinese
Communist Party., et al. to Rob Slivers, Under Sec'y of Strategy,
Policy, and Plans, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., (June 5, 2024) (on file
with Committee).
\12\Pursuant to section 2(d)(2)(B) of the UFLPA, DHS on behalf of
the FLETF is required to develop and maintain the UFLPA Entity List.
CATL's supply chain connections to products mined, produced, or
manufactured in the Xinjiang as well as its direct connections to XPCC
``subsidiaries'' and ``affiliates'' warrant its inclusion on the UFLPA
Entity List per the requirements outlined in 2(d)(2)(B)(i);
2(d)(2)(B)(iv); and 2(d)(2)(B)(v).
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Hearings
The Committee held the following hearings in the 118th
Congress that informed H.R. 8631:
On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled,
``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to
the U.S. Homeland.'' Members heard testimony from the following
witnesses: the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of
the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center;
Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella Jr., Senior Fellow, at
the Mitchell Institute; the Honorable Kari Bingen, former
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
at the Department of Defense; and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant
Professor of Political Science and International and Public
Affairs, at Brown University.
On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled, ``A
Security Sprint: Assessing U.S. Homeland Vulnerabilities to
Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' Members heard testimony
from the following witnesses: Iranga Kahangama, Assistant
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, at DHS; Tyrone Durham,
Acting Director, Nation State Threats Center, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, at DHS; and Jill M. Murphy, Deputy
Assistant Director of Counterintelligence, at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
On October 19, 2023, the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled,
``Exploitation and Enforcement: Evaluating the Department of
Homeland Security's Efforts to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor.''
Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Ms.
Kimberly Glas, President and CEO, National Council of Textile
Organizations; Mr. Peter Mattis, private citizen; Ms. Louisa
Greve, Director of Global Advocacy, Uyghur Human Rights
Project; and Mr. Michael Stumo, CEO, Coalition for a Prosperous
America.
On January 11, 2024, the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled,
``Exploitation and Enforcement Part II: Improving Enforcement
in Countering Uyghur Forced Labor.'' Members heard testimony
from the following witnesses: Ms. Christa Brzozowski, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Trade and Economic Security Policy,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Ms. Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for
International Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs,
U.S. Department of Labor; and Mr. Eric Choy, Executive
Director, Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate, Office of
Trade, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Committee Consideration
The Committee met on June 12, 2024, a quorum being present,
to consider H.R. 8631 and ordered the measure to be favorably
reported to the House, as amended, by voice vote.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and
amendments thereto.
No recorded votes were requested during consideration of
H.R. 8631.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY,
ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Legislation summary: On June 12, 2024, the House Committee
on Homeland Security ordered 13 bills to be reported. This
document provides estimates for 12 of those bills.
The legislation would:
Require the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to conduct a public information campaign on the
dangers of traveling to the United States through
Mexico from Central and South America;
Codify the Special Event Assessment Rating
(SEAR) program within DHS;
Authorize U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) to conduct its own maintenance at ports of entry
for projects that cost less than $300,000;
Prohibit DHS from purchasing batteries or
products that use batteries made by certain Chinese
entities;
Impose various reporting requirements on the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS, and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Require DHS to conduct research and
development on equipment used by law enforcement
agencies to detect illicit drugs; and
Expand the employee rotational program
within DHS to include intelligence analyst positions.
Estimated Federal cost: The estimated costs of the
legislation fall within budget functions 400 (transportation)
and 750 (administration of justice).
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the
legislation will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2024.
The estimated costs do not include any interaction effects
among the pieces of legislation. If all 12 bills were combined
and enacted as a single piece of legislation, the estimated
costs could be different than the sum of the separate
estimates, although CBO expects that any difference would be
small.
H.R. 4574, Cooperation on Combatting Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Act: H.R. 4574 would require DHS to conduct public
information campaigns about the dangers for migrants traveling
across Mexico to the United States. H.R. 4574 also would
require DHS to expand partnerships with law enforcement
entities in Central and South America to combat human smuggling
and trafficking.
Using information from DHS about the costs of similar
public awareness campaigns, such as ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' and the Blue Campaign, CBO estimates that it would
cost $5 million annually to implement the public information
campaigns. Those costs would include hiring and training staff,
engaging private contractors, and advertising. CBO estimates
that it would cost DHS less than $500,000 to comply with the
bill's other provisions because the agency already conducts
those activities. In total, CBO estimates that implementing
H.R. 4574 would cost $26 million over the 2024-2029 period,
assuming appropriation of the estimated amounts.
H.R. 6229, DHS Special Events Program and Support Act: H.R.
6229 would codify the Special Event Assessment Rating program
that DHS currently administers. Under that program, state and
local governments submit events to an inter-agency working
group that assesses each event for potential security risks,
such as terrorist attacks and other hazards. Depending on the
level of risk determined by the group, DHS and other federal
agencies may provide support to the state or local government
in managing security operations for the event.
H.R. 6229 also would require DHS to engage in research and
development of emerging technologies that would enhance the
department's efforts to support federal, state, local, tribal,
and territorial agencies with respect to mass gatherings.
Lastly, the bill would require DHS to report to the Congress
annually on the program's activities and once every five years
on the program's effectiveness.
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates
implementing H.R. 6229 would cost less than $500,000 over the
2024-2029 period, primarily to comply with the bill's reporting
requirements. Any related spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds. Under current law, DHS
already can conduct research and development on emerging
technologies. On that basis, CBO estimates that the cost of
implementing that provision and codifying the existing SEAR
program would be insignificant.
H.R. 8150, REVAMP Act: H.R. 8150 would require U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) to establish procedures to allow
the agency to carry out maintenance and repair projects that
cost less than $300,000 at federally owned ports of entry
without the direct involvement of the General Services
Administration (GSA). Under the bill, that amount would be
adjusted annually for inflation. The bill also would require
CBP to consult with GSA before creating those procedures and
report annually to the Congress on the projects it completed
and their costs.
Using information from CBP, CBO estimates that implementing
H.R. 8150 would cost $1 million in administrative and personnel
costs over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8631, Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery
Dependence Act: H.R. 8631 would, starting in fiscal year 2028,
prohibit DHS from using appropriated funds to purchase a
battery or a product that uses a battery made by certain
Chinese entities. The bill would allow DHS to waive the
prohibition under some circumstances, including if it
determines that the battery would not pose a threat to national
security. H.R. 8631 also would require DHS to report to the
Congress within 180 days of enactment on the effect the
prohibition would have on costs and operations.
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates
that implementing H.R. 8631 would cost less than $500,000. Any
related spending would be subject to the availability of
appropriated funds.
H.R. 8654, Streamlining Law Enforcement Information Sharing
Act: H.R. 8654 would require the GAO to report to the Congress
within one year of enactment on the Homeland Security
Information Network. DHS uses that network to share information
and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies,
coordinate security for planned events, and respond to
emergencies. Based on the costs of similar reports, CBO
estimates that implementing H.R. 8654 would cost less than
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8655, Federal Air Marshal Enhancing Airport Security
Act of 2024: H.R. 8655 would require TSA to develop a plan for
the role of federal air marshals at certain airports and brief
the Congress on that plan. Based on the costs of similar
activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated
funds.
H.R. 8658, Emerging Digital Identity Ecosystem Report Act
of 2024: H.R. 8658 would require TSA to report to the Congress
on digital identity systems that allow credentials and other
information to be verified in a secure and efficient manner.
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that
implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the
2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8662, TSA Commuting Fairness Act: H.R. 8662 would
require TSA to report to the Congress on the feasibility of
treating the time that its employees spend commuting from
airport parking lots to their workstations as on-duty hours.
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that
implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the
2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8663, DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024: H.R.
8663 would require DHS to engage in research and development of
technologies and equipment that would help federal, state,
local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies detect
and disrupt illicit drug trafficking. Under current law, DHS
already conducts research on equipment and technologies to
detect and intercept illegal drugs. On that basis, CBO
estimates that implementing H.R. 8663 would cost less than
$500,000. Any related spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8664, DHS Intelligence and Analysis Oversight and
Transparency Act: H.R. 8664 would require DHS to annually audit
its use of information systems and bulk data and report the
results to the Congress. Based on the costs of similar
activities, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8664 would
cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated
funds.
H.R. 8671, DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program
and Law Enforcement Support Act: H.R. 8671 would allow
intelligence analysts to participate in DHS's in-house employee
rotation program, which allows personnel to work temporarily in
different component units. CBO expects that DHS would need to
update policies and procedures to expand the current rotation
program. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO
estimates that implementing H.R. 8671 would cost less than
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
H.R. 8675, Repair the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications Systems Act of 2024: H.R. 8675 would require
TSA to report to the Congress on how the agency collects
digital data about law enforcement officers who are armed when
they fly. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO
estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: Enacting any of the 12 bills
in this estimate would not affect direct spending or revenues;
therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
Increase in long-term net direct spending and deficits: CBO
estimates that enacting any of the 12 bills in this estimate
would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in
any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2035.
Mandates: None of the bills contain intergovernmental or
private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act.
Previous CBO estimate: On April 10, 2023, CBO transmitted a
cost estimate for S. 243, a bill to require the Commissioner of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection to establish procedures for
conducting maintenance projects at ports of entry at which the
Office of Field Operations conducts certain enforcement and
facilitation activities, as ordered reported by the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on
March 29, 2023. S. 243 is similar to H.R. 8150, and CBO's
estimate of the costs are the same for both bills.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jeremy Crimm
(Department of Homeland Security); Aaron Krupkin
(Transportation Security Administration). Mandates: Rachel
Austin, Brandon Lever.
Estimate reviewed by: Justin Humphrey, Chief, Finance,
Housing, and Education Cost Estimates Unit; Robert Reese,
Chief, Natural and Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit;
Kathleen FitzGerald, Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit;
H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.
Estimate approved by: Phillip L. Swagel, Director,
Congressional Budget Office.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 8631 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 8631 is to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security
from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other
purposes.
CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED
TARIFF BENEFITS
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that H.R. 8631 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section provides the Act's short title, the
``Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependency Act of
2024''.
Section 2. Prohibition on availability of funds for procurement of
certain batteries
Subsection 2(a) prohibits funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of
Homeland Security to procure a battery produced by certain
specified foreign entities beginning on October 1, 2027.
Subsection 2(b) outlines the specific entities, which are
the following: (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company,
Limited (also known as ``CATL''); (2) BYD Company, Limited; (3)
Envision Energy, Limited; (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited; (5)
Gotion High tech Company, Limited; (6) Hithium Energy Storage
Technology company, Limited; and (7) Any successor to an entity
specified in paragraphs (1) through (6). Additionally, the bill
would ban batteries produced by entities that appear on the
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list maintained by the
Department of Commerce, any entity identified by the Secretary
of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'', and any entity
included in further lists of companies involved in activities
that go against U.S. national security or foreign policy
interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security,
Defense, and Commerce.
Subsection 2(c) details that a battery shall be treated as
produced by an entity specific in subsection (b), if such
entity (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that
uses such battery; or (2) creates or otherwise provides a
majority of the components used in such battery.
Subsection 2(d) paragraph (1) authorizes the Secretary of
Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a)
if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the
following: that the batteries to be procured do not pose a
national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the U.S.;
that there is no available alternative to procure batteries
that are of similar or better cost and quality; and there is no
available alternative produced by an entity not specified in
subsection (b).
Subsection 2(d) paragraph (2) authorizes the Secretary of
Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a)
if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured
are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training,
testing or analysis.
Subsection 2(d) paragraph (3) requires a Congressional
notification that not later than 15 days after granting a
waiver under this subsection, to the House Committee on
Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs.
Subsection 2(e) requires a report by the Secretary of
Homeland on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the
Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out
the prohibition on Chinese batteries, particularly with respect
to Department components.
[all]