Dissenting Views
[To accompany H.R. 1398]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 1398) to establish the CCP Initiative program, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 3
Hearings......................................................... 4
Committee Consideration.......................................... 5
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 7
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 7
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 8
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 8
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 8
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 8
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 8
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 8
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 9
Dissenting Views................................................. 9
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protect America's Innovation and
Economic Security from CCP Act of 2024''.
SEC. 2. CCP INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the National Security
Division of the Department of Justice the CCP Initiative to--
(1) counter nation-state threats to the United States;
(2) curb spying by the Chinese Communist Party on United
States intellectual property and academic institutions in the
United States;
(3) develop an enforcement strategy concerning nontraditional
collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and
the defense industrial base, that are being used to transfer
technology contrary to United States interests;
(4) implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (title XVII of division A of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132 Stat. 2173)) for the Department
of Justice, including by working with the Department of the
Treasury to develop regulations under that Act;
(5) identify cases under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (Public Law 95-213; 91 Stat. 1494) involving Chinese
companies that compete with United States businesses; and
(6) prioritize--
(A) identifying and prosecuting those engaged in
trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage;
and
(B) protecting the critical infrastructure in the
United States against external threats through foreign
direct investment and supply chain compromises.
(b) Consultation.--In executing the CCP Initiative's objectives as
set forth in subsection (a), the Attorney General, acting through the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, shall consult with
relevant components of the Department of Justice as necessary, and
coordinate activities with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any
other Federal agency as necessary.
(c) Requirement.--Under the CCP Initiative--
(1) the Initiative shall be separate from and not under the
authority or discretion of any other Department of Justice
initiative dedicated to countering nation-state threats; and
(2) all resources used for the CCP Initiative shall solely be
set aside for the CCP Initiative and shall not be combined to
support any other Department of Justice program, including
other programs and initiatives dedicated to countering nation-
state threats.
(d) Annual Report.--The Attorney General shall submit annually a
written report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the
Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives, on the progress and challenges of the CCP
Initiative over the preceding year, including--
(1) its progress in accomplishing the objectives set forth in
subsection (a);
(2) the amount and sufficiency of resources provided to, and
expended by, the CCP Initiative;
(3) the level and effectiveness of coordination with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal agencies;
(4) the status of efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to
engage in trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage;
and
(5) the impact of the CCP Initiative on those efforts of the
Chinese Communist Party.
(e) Sunset.--This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of
this Act and cease to be in effect on the date that is 6 years after
that date.
(f) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the
provisions of such to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected
thereby.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1398, the Protect America's Innovation and Economic
Security from CCP Act of 2024, introduced by Representative
Lance Gooden (R-TX), provides for the establishment of an
initiative within the National Security Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) to address espionage by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government on U.S.
intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions. The
initiative would focus on identifying and prosecuting
individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and
economic espionage, and protecting critical U.S. infrastructure
from being compromised based on foreign investment and supply
chains.
Background and Need for the Legislation
According to DOJ, approximately 80 percent of all economic
espionage cases prosecuted by DOJ involve theft of trade
secrets by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities or
agents, and approximately 60 percent of all trade secret
misappropriation cases brought in the United States have a
nexus to the People's Republic of China (PRC).\1\ The Chinese
government also makes extensive use of cyber-intrusions to
steal American IP.\2\ The annual cost of the theft of
intellectual property by the PRC from the United States has
been estimated at as much as $500 billion.\3\
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\1\David H. Laufman et al., The Department of Justice's National
Security Division Chief Addresses China's Campaign to Steal U.S.
Intellectual Property, NAT'L L.R., Aug. 24, 2020, https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/department-justice-s-national-security-
division-chief-addresses-china-s-campaign-to; Information About
Department of Justice's China Initiative and Compilation of China-
Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST., (Nov. 19, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-about-department-
justice-s-china-initiative-and-
compilation-china-related (``China Initiative Overview'').
\2\Off. Of U.S. Trade Rep., Findings Of The Investigation Into
China's Acts, Policies, And Practices Related To Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, And Innovation Under Section 301 Of The Trade
Act Of 1974, at 153-171 (2018) (``USTR 2018 Sec. 301 Report''), https:/
/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.
\3\Naveed Jamali and Tom O'Connor, U.S., China's Cold War Is Raging
in Cyberspace, Where Intellectual Property is a Costly Front, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 16, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/us-chinas-cold-war-raging-
cyberspace-where-intellectual-property-costly-front-1532133.
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In response to the theft of U.S. trade secrets orchestrated
by the Chinese government, DOJ established its China Initiative
in 2018.\4\ Dozens of cases were prosecuted under DOJ's China
Initiative, primarily under the Trump Administration.\5\ Over
160 individuals and entities were indicted under the China
Initiative, at least 45 of which have since been convicted or
pled guilty.\6\ Arguably, these cases brought under the China
Initiative were just the tip of the iceberg. Despite the track
record of PRC IP theft and the successes of the Initiative, the
Biden-Harris Administration chose to end the China Initiative
in February 2022, bowing to pressure from liberal commentators
and activists alleging that the program stoked anti-Asian bias
and dissuaded Chinese students and scholars from coming to the
U.S.\7\ The number of new economic espionage cases filed
following cancellation of the initiative declined
significantly--for example, zero new economic espionage cases
were opened in 2022.\8\
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\4\Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and
Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST.,
(Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-
and-compilation-china-related (``China Initiative Overview'').
\5\Id.
\6\Christopher Pelham & Brian A. Sun, US DOJ formally ends the
China Initiative, but leaves the underlying prosecution priorities
intact (Mar. 2022), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/enus/knowledge/
publications/0712bf2d/us-doj-formally-ends-the-china-initiative.
\7\Ronn Blitzer & Jake Gibson, Biden DOJ ending national security
initiative aimed at countering China amid complaints about bias, FOX
NEWS, Feb. 23, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-ending-china-
initiative-national-security-program-bias.
\8\Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing
Statistics Data Tool,
U.S. Dep't of Just., https://fccps.bjs.ojp.gov/
home.html?dashboard=FJSP-Prosecution&tab=
ProsecutionCourtsDefendantsChargedinCriminalCasesAdvanced (last visited
May 1, 2024).
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H.R. 1398 would reestablish an initiative at DOJ, the CCP
Initiative, dedicated to protecting the United States from the
threats previously addressed by the China Initiative,
statutorily requiring that this important work resumes. In
conducting the work of the CCP Initiative, H.R. 1398 would
mandate that DOJ coordinate efforts with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), other elements of DOJ, and other federal
agencies, as necessary. Further, to enable effective
Congressional oversight and to ensure that DOJ adequately
pursues the CCP Initiative's objectives, H.R. 1398 requires
robust annual reporting to key committees in the House and
Senate.
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 1398:
``Intellectual Property: Enforcement Activities by the
Executive Branch,'' a hearing held on May 7, 2024, before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet
of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard
testimony from the following witnesses:
Josh Goldfoot, Acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal
Division.
Michael Ball, Deputy Director, National
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center;
Deputy Assistant Director, Homeland Security
Investigations Global Trade Division.
Brandon Lord, Deputy Director, National
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center;
Executive Director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Trade Policy and Programs Directorate.
The hearing examined enforcement of IP in the United
States, with a focus on agencies and U.S. government entities
charged with IP enforcement-related tasks. The hearing
explored, among other topics, the lack of criminal IP
enforcement matters brought by the U.S. Department of Justice
following the Biden Administration's cancellation of the China
Initiative, as well as the lack of adequate information
regarding such prosecutions.
The Committee held another hearing titled, ``Intellectual
Property and Strategic Competition with China: Part 3--IP
Theft, Cybersecurity, and AI,'' a hearing held on October 19,
2023, before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary. The
Subcommittee heard testimony from the following witnesses:
John Brennan, Ph.D., General Manager, Public
Sector, Scale AI.
William Hannas, Ph.D., Lead Analyst, Center
for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown
University; former Senior Intelligence Service, Central
Intelligence Agency; former Assistant Professor of
Chinese, Georgetown University.
Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow,
International Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Professor
of Strategic Studies, Marine Corps University School of
Advanced Warfighting; former Senior Research Director,
U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
Robert Sheldon, Senior Director of Public
Policy and Strategy, CrowdStrike.
The hearing explored the current capabilities and risks in
the arms race between the United States and the PRC in the
development of artificial intelligence (AI) as it relates to
cybersecurity and IP theft. The hearing examined the
cybersecurity implications of AI and the potential impacts on
the protection of U.S. IP and technical resources, including
data.
The Committee held a further hearing titled, ``Intellectual
Property and Strategic Competition with China: Part I,'' a
hearing held on March 8, 2023, before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the
Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard testimony
from the following witnesses:
The Honorable William Evanina, Founder and
CEO, Evanina Goup, LLC.
Mr. Jamieson Greer, Partner of International
Trade, King & Spalding.
Mr. Mark Cohen, Distinguished Senior Fellow
and Director of Asia IP Project, Berkeley Center for
Law and Technology.
Mr. Charles Duan, Policy Fellow and Adjunct
Professor, Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property, American University Washington
College of Law, and Member, Patent Public Advisory
Committee, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
The hearing explored the role and importance of IP in the
strategic competition between the United States and the PRC.
The hearing examined the scope and extent of actions by the
Chinese government to obtain U.S. IP and technology, the goals
and plans of the Chinese government as it relates to U.S. IP
and technology, the methods and instrumentalities employed by
the Chinese government to accomplish those goals, steps taken
by the United States to counter IP theft by the Chinese
government or its instrumentalities or agents as well as areas
in which more action is needed, and the impact of Chinese
government actions in these areas on the United States.
Committee Consideration
On May 22, 2024, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 1398, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
15 to 8, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 1398:
1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 1398, as
amended--passed 15 ayes to 8 nays.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 has been timely submitted prior to filing of the report
and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included
in this report.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has
received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1398 from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office:
H.R. 1398 would require the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
establish a program to counter espionage, theft of intellectual
property and trade secrets, and threats to critical
infrastructure posed by the Chinese government. The bill also
would require DOJ to report to the Congress annually on the
program's activities. The bill's requirements would expire six
years after enactment.
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates
that implementing H.R. 1398 would cost less than $500,000 over
the 2024-2029 period, primarily to comply with the bill's
reporting requirements. Any related spending would be subject
to the availability of appropriated funds. Because DOJ already
addresses threats posed by the Chinese government, CBO
estimates that the cost of implementing those provisions would
be insignificant.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jeremy Crimm.
The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 1398 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 1398 would provide for the establishment
of an initiative within the National Security Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to address espionage by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government on
U.S. intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 1398
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
Pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, the Committee has determined that the bill does not
contain federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee
has determined that the bill does not impose a federal
intergovernmental mandate on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section. 1. Short title
The ``Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security
from CCP Act of 2024.''
Section. 2. CCP Initiative
Establishes the ``CCP Initiative'' within DOJ's National
Security Division to counter nation state threats to the United
States and curb spying by the CCP on U.S. IP and academic
institutions, including by non-traditional collectors being
used to transfer technology contrary to U.S. interests. The Act
directs the DOJ to leverage the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, and to prioritize identifying and prosecuting
individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and
economic espionage, as well as protecting the critical
infrastructure of the United States from foreign investment and
supply chain compromises. The Act requires consultation and
coordination with the FBI and other relevant elements of DOJ
and federal agencies as necessary, and mandates that DOJ
provide an annual report to Congress regarding the
effectiveness and progress of the CCP Initiative and related
information. The Act further requires the CCP Initiative be
separate from and not under the authority of any other DOJ
initiative designed to counter nation-state threats, and
requires DOJ to use resources for the CCP Initiative only for
activities of the CCP Initiative.
Dissenting Views
H.R. 1398 would reestablish the failed China Initiative at
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in everything but name. While
there are legitimate national security and economic espionage
concerns posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), this
program did nothing to counter those threats. Instead of
preventing intellectual property theft, the China Initiative
encouraged unrelated, unsupportable cases against Chinese
academics at the height of their careers and stoked tensions
with a community already experiencing unprecedented levels of
discrimination. For these reasons, elaborated below, I urge all
Members to oppose this legislation.
The China Initiative was born out of the understanding that
a strategic priority of the United States is countering
national security threats from China.\1\ But instead of
furthering the United States' national security and other
strategic priorities, the China Initiative became a vehicle to
target immigrants and foreigners. Using this program, the Trump
Administration invested significant resources into targeting
individuals of Chinese descent working in the United States,
diverting crucial funding and personnel that could have been
used to combat economic espionage and trade secret theft across
the board.
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\1\Web Page, Information About the Department of Justice's China
Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018,
Dep't of Justice Archives (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-
and-
compilation-china-related.
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Civil rights groups and national security experts have
criticized the China Initiative for targeting Chinese American
academics for minor infractions, such as administrative errors,
while failing to address any true threats to the United
States.\2\ These concerns are augmented by the data available.
Though the China Initiative's purported focus was countering
economic espionage, only 25% of cases included charges of
violating the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).\3\ Many cases also
had little-to-no nexus to national security, resulting in
racial profiling based on academics' race, ethnicity, and
ancestry. While at least 150 individuals were ultimately
charged, a significant number of these cases were dropped,
dismissed, or ended in mistrial.\4\ Critics have also
highlighted that the Department of Justice was inconsistent in
its reporting on these cases, for example, by deleting cases
from its website after they did not result in a conviction.\5\
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\2\Natasha Gilbert & Max Kozlov, The Controversial China Initiative
Is Ending, and Researchers Are Relieved, Sci. Am. (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-
controversial-china-initiative-is-ending-and-researchers-are-relieved/.
\3\Eileen Guo, Jess Aloe, & Karen Hao, The US crackdown on Chinese
economic espionage is a mess. We have the data to show it, MIT Tech.
Review (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/02/
1040656/china-initative-us-justice-department/.
\4\Id.
\5\Id.
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The China Initiative was ineffective. But it did not just
waste valuable resources. Rather than keeping America safe, the
China Initiative divided workplaces, ruined careers, and
contributed to Anti-Asian hate at the height of the pandemic,
when tensions were already high. Even after their cases were
dropped, many academics faced long-term personal and
professional damage and were unable to recover their former
jobs at American universities.\6\ An investigation by MIT
Technology Review found that some fired academics were even
forced to take up positions at the laboratories to which they
were previously accused of hiding their affiliations, without
other avenues for conducting their research.\7\
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\6\Id.
\7\Id.
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Scientists of Chinese descent also experienced a chilling
effect on their research as a result of DOJ's prosecutions. A
survey of nearly 2,000 scientists found that 51% of scientists
of Chinese descent reported feeling ``considerable fear,
anxiety, or both about being surveilled by the US government,''
while only 12% of non-Chinese scientists reported the same
sentiment.\8\ Respondents also commented that fear of added
scrutiny and discrimination caused them to pursue ``safer''
rather than ``cutting edge'' research.\9\ In another study of
scientists of Chinese descent, 72% reported feeling unsafe in
the US; 61% reported feeling pressure to move overseas; and 45%
reported an intent to avoid federal grant applications. The
scientists expressed disappointment with the government's
actions, with 89% of respondents affirming that they still wish
to contribute to US leadership in science and technology.\10\
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\8\Racial Profiling Among Scientists of Chinese Descent and
Consequences for the US Scientific Community, The University of
Arizona, https://www.committee100.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/C100-
Lee-Li-White-Paper-FINAL-FINAL-10.28.pdf.
\9\Id.
\10\Yu Xie, et al., Caught in the crossfire: Fears of Chinese-
American scientists, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(June 27, 2023), https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2216248120.
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These chilling effects have also extended to the US's
attractiveness to international scientists more broadly, and to
fields seeking to study US China relations. A 2021 survey of
over 3,200 physicists found that 43% of early-career
researchers believed the US to be ``unwelcoming for
international students and scholars.''\11\ In a September 2022
report by the Asian American Scholar's Forum, researchers found
that between December 2021 and March 2022, 42 percent of the
over 1,300 faculty members surveyed nationwide reported being
fearful of conducting research in the U.S. A further 61 percent
felt pressure to leave the U.S., and 45 percent intended to
avoid federal grant applications.
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\11\Research Security Policies & Their Impacts: Key Results of APS
Member Survey, American Physical Society (October 2021), https://
www.aps.org/policy/analysis/upload/APS-Research-
Security-Survey-Key-Findings-2021.pdf.
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Finally, innovation in the United States also suffered
because of China Initiative policies. During its four-year
tenure, the China Initiative stifled intellectual property
growth by discouraging foreign talent from moving to American
companies and prevented Chinese researchers from accepting
positions at our institutions of higher learning. We cannot
quantify those missed opportunities, there is no way to know
what inventions never came to be, but we can realize when we
made a mistake, and move on. This legislation would prevent us
from doing so.
For all of these reasons, I dissent, and I urge all of my
colleagues to oppose this legislation.
Jerrold Nadler,
Ranking Member.