Committee Consideration
The Committee marked up H.R. 8512 on June 11, 2024. In open
session, Chairman Turner offered an amendment in the nature of
a substitute, which the Committee adopted by voice vote.
Mr. Himes then moved, pursuant to House rule XI, clause
2(g)(2)(a) that the meeting be closed because testimony,
evidence, or other matters to be discussed would endanger
national security. The motion was agreed to by a recorded vote
of 20 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Turner, Wenstrup, Crawford, Stefanik, Kelly,
Fitzpatrick, Scott, Hill, Crenshaw, Waltz, Garcia, Perry,
Jackson, Himes, Castro, Krishnamoorthi, Plaskett, Gomez,
Houlahan, Spanberger.
Voting no: None.
Following closed discussion, the Committee considered one
amendment offered by Mr. Castro to the Classified Annex to H.R.
8512. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 5 ayes to 17
noes:
Voting aye: Himes, Carson, Castro, Krishnamoorthi, Crow.
Voting no: Turner, Wenstrup, Crawford, Stefanik, Kelly,
Fitzpatrick, Scott, Hill, Crenshaw, Waltz, Garcia, Perry,
Jackson, Plaskett, Gomez, Houlahan, Spanberger.
Finally, the Committee adopted by voice vote the amendment
in the nature of a substitute offered by Chairman Turner, and
the bill as amended was approved and ordered to be reported to
the House by voice vote.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Act and its accompanying
classified annex result from open and closed hearings,
briefings, and other oversight activities conducted by the
Committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the general goals and objectives
of H.R. 8512 are to authorize the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government
for Fiscal Year 2025. The Act and its accompanying classified
annex reflect in detail the Committee's specific performance
goals and objectives.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a
description of the application of this Act to the legislative
branch where the Act relates to terms and conditions of
employment or access to public services or accommodations. H.R.
8512 does not relate to terms and conditions of employment or
access to public services or accommodations.
Duplication of Federal Programs
In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, no provision of this Act
establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government
known to be duplicative of another federal program, a program
that was included in any report from the Government
Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of
Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program
identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings
This Act does not direct the completion of any specific
rule makings within the meaning of section 551 of title 5,
United States Code.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
The Act does not establish or authorize the establishment
of an advisory committee within the definition of section 5(b)
of the appendix to title 5, United States Code.
Earmark Identification
This bill does not include any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives.
Estimate of Costs
On June 14, 2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to
the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of
the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions,
including any federal mandates.
Committee Comments and Direction
TIMELY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
During or after Committee hearings or briefings with
elements of the Intelligence Community, Members may seek
clarification, request additional data, expand on topics
raised, or ask additional questions that were not covered due
to time constraints. These requests from the Committee, whether
written or verbal, are referred to as Questions for the Record,
and the Committee expects elements in receipt of Questions for
the Record to appropriately prioritize timely replies.
Therefore, the Committee directs that when an element is in
receipt of Questions for the Record, the reply from the element
is expected in a reasonable timeframe and, but for reasonable
extenuating circumstances agreed to by the Committee, should
not exceed 60 days.
JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS
It has been twenty years since enactment of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (Public Law
108-458), and it is the sense of the Committee that close
review of the integration of civilian and military officers as
part of a joint Intelligence Community workforce is warranted.
The Committee is aware that, the Director of National
Intelligence has recently conducted a Joint Duty Study. The
Committee is also aware that, pursuant to Intelligence
Community Directive 660, Intelligence Community civilian
personnel may not be promoted to a senior Intelligence
Community civilian rank, or equivalent, without having earned
joint duty credit, or without having been granted a waiver.
Further, it is the sense of the Committee that the
integration of a joint Intelligence Community workforce is
appropriately suited for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), and the Director of National Intelligence
should prioritize increasing participation in the Intelligence
Community Civilian Joint Duty Program from other elements of
the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the workforce of the
ODNI should be increasingly comprised of Intelligence Community
civilians from the other elements seeking attainment of a mid-
grade career promotion or a Senior National Intelligence
Service promotion, or equivalent, role. The Intelligence
Community should maintain its focus on cultivating a joint
workforce, especially for those seeking promotions into
leadership. This construct would improve talent retention,
offer career enhancing experiences, and foster collaboration
across the Intelligence Community.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on
the Joint Duty Study recommendations presented to the Director
and the Director's decision or plans to increase joint duty
assignment personnel at the ODNI.
GAO REPORT ON CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ENCOUNTERS AT U.S. BORDER
The Committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to conduct a study not later than December 31, 2024 to
examine U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) protocol and
operations regarding encounters at the U.S. borders with known
or suspected terrorists. This study shall assess the following:
1. What is the number and composition of encounters
with individuals who are known or suspected terrorists,
or associates and family members of known or suspected
terrorists (i.e., watchlist exceptions), at or between
U.S. ports of entry over the last two years?
2. What are the policies and procedures for
encounters with individuals that are known or suspected
terrorists and what are the procedures for watchlist
exceptions?
3. To what extent does CBP comply with existing laws,
policies, and procedures for encountering individuals
with a nexus to terrorism at U.S. borders?
4. With what degree of fidelity are persons
encountered at U.S. borders determined to, or not to
be, known or suspected terrorists or watchlist
exceptions, before being permitted entry into the U.S.?
5. What are the CBP procedures if such an individual
is permitted entry to the U.S.?
6. What are the procedures for CBP to transition
responsibility for these individuals to the
jurisdiction of other U.S. Government agencies, once
individuals have been approved for entry into the U.S.?
7. What are the CBP procedures if such an individual
is not permitted entry to the U.S.?
8. What are the procedures for CBP to make the
determination of what happens to these individuals once
they are turned away from entry into the U.S.?
9. To what extent does the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have awareness of known or
suspected terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, who
enter the U.S. after being encountered at U.S. borders?
10. To what extent does the FBI conduct surveillance
against known or suspected terrorists, or watchlist
exceptions, who enter the U.S. after being encountered
at U.S. borders?
11. What are the policies and procedures for how CBP
communicates to the FBI if known or suspected
terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, are encountered at
the border and permitted entry into the U.S.?
12. How is information on known or suspected
terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, who crossed the
U.S. border shared with and/or disseminated to relevant
Federal, State, Local, and Tribal partners?
REPORTS ON WATCHLIST ENCOUNTERS AT U.S.-MEXICO AND U.S.-CANADA BORDERS
The Committee directs the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with any
other appropriate federal agency or department, to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees not later than April
30, 2025 (1) a report that details the total number of
watchlist encounters at the United States-Mexico border in
calendar year 2024, disaggregated by Watchlisting Category
Code, country of origin of the encountered individual, and the
purported terrorist affiliation of the encountered individual;
and (2) a report that details the total number of watchlist
encounters at the United States-Canada border in calendar year
2024, disaggregated by Watchlisting Category Code, country of
origin of the encountered individual, and the purported
terrorist affiliation of the encountered individual. In
addition, to the degree feasible, the reports shall provide a
breakdown of the current status of watchlisted foreign
nationals who were encountered at the relevant border (e.g.,
whether they were detained, removed, or released into the
United States).
The reports shall present the required information in the
format of a chart or other graphic. Each report may be provided
in classified form, but shall be accompanied by an unclassified
version.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIVIDE
The Committee recognizes the Director of National
Intelligence's creation of a Senior Advisory Group Sub-Panel on
Managing Intelligence Issues that Span the Foreign and Domestic
Spheres, and endorses ongoing efforts by the Director to
examine how the Intelligence Community approaches an
increasingly complicated set of national security threats that
cross the foreign-domestic divide, to include the mitigation of
potential gaps in the ways that elements of the Intelligence
Community receive and share foreign intelligence with U.S.
federal, state, and local law enforcement.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence to provide the congressional intelligence
committees with any report and classified appendix produced by
the Senior Advisory Group Sub-Panel on Managing Intelligence
Issues that Span the Foreign and Domestic Spheres not later
than 30 days after the Sub-Panel provides the report to the
Director.
BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT HOSTAGE
RECOVERY EFFORTS
The Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with other appropriate
Intelligence Community elements, to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence committees not later than December
31, 2024, on the Intelligence Community's support to broader
U.S. government efforts to locate, obtain intelligence about,
and secure the release of U.S. nationals held hostage around
the world.
The briefing shall include the following: details of any
Intelligence Community support to U.S. hostage recovery efforts
presently and in the past five years; an overview of the
resources and surge capacity of the Intelligence Community to
support U.S. hostage recovery efforts; the level and nature of
support that the Intelligence Community provides to U.S.
special operations forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation-
led Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, and the State Department's
Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; and any
standing requirements the Intelligence Community has to support
hostage rescue operations.
ASSESSMENT OF UNDERSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CABLE CLUSTERING FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS
The Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other federal
departments and agencies as the Director deems appropriate, to
study and report to the congressional intelligence committees
not later than December 31, 2024, about the national security,
physical security, and counterintelligence risks posed by the
close clustering or collocation of undersea telecommunications
cables, particularly in the North Atlantic and North Pacific
oceans, that have landing sites on United States territory.
Furthermore, the report should assess whether the potential
placement of future undersea telecommunications cables across
more isolated spans portions of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans
would reduce such national security, physical security, or
counterintelligence risks. The report may be submitted in
classified form but shall include an unclassified executive
summary.
Finally, the Committee directs an appropriately classified,
releasable version of the report's findings to, at minimum, be
shared with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and
Information at the Department of Commerce.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DETECT AND
INTERDICT ILLICIT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION
The illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition into the
Caribbean contributes to violence and instability in the
region. Firearms used by drug trafficking organizations and
local gangs undermine citizen security and can contribute to
out-migration to the United States. U.S. government agencies,
in cooperation with Caribbean nations, have increased efforts
to detect and interdict illegal firearms trafficked into the
Caribbean region.
The Committee supports these efforts and directs the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
heads of other Intelligence Community elements as the Director
determines appropriate, to provide a briefing or report to the
congressional intelligence committees not later than December
31, 2024, on Intelligence Community support to U.S. government
efforts to detect and interdict illicit firearms trafficking in
the Caribbean region.
REPORT ON IRANIAN MALIGN INFLUENCE EFFORTS IN THE CYBER DOMAIN
The Committee directs the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in consultation with the heads of other
Intelligence Community elements as the Director determines
appropriate, to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on
Iranian malign influence efforts in the cyber domain, including
a description of Iran's strategies, operations, funding, and
key actors that conduct subversive, undeclared, coercive, or
criminal activities online to affect the attitudes,
perceptions, or behaviors in the United States, or in nations
that are allies or partners with the United States.
ENHANCEMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VETTING CAPABILITIES FOR DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The Committee directs the Director of the Department of
Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN)
to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence
committees not later than December 31, 2024 on the DOE-IN's
progress toward building a comprehensive counterintelligence
strategy, to include enhancements to the counterintelligence
capabilities and processes of overseeing and vetting foreign
nationals applying for entry into the National Labs, a plan and
progress for implementation, proposals for enhanced
counterintelligence and internal investigative authorities,
requisite counterintelligence training, and potential
technological and artificial intelligence vetting solutions,
and including internal controls and oversight for each
implemented and recommended enhancement. DOE-IN shall also
highlight and describe progress towards greater
standardization, coordination and communication across
counterintelligence assessments of foreign nationals attempting
to enter multiple National Labs.
STUDY ON THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Consistent with 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3003(4)(L), the Committee
directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Counternarcotics Executive and the Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, not later than March 1,
2025, a study assessing the feasibility and advisability of
including all or some of DEA's entities that conduct
intelligence-related activities--such as the Special Operations
Division and sections of the Intelligence Division other than
the Office of National Security Intelligence--in the
Intelligence Community, to be funded through the National
Intelligence Program.
The study shall discuss the potential benefits, risks, and
opportunities associated with any such addition, including the
potential benefits of enabling enhanced information sharing
between the DEA and the Intelligence Community to facilitate
DEA's intelligence-led disruptive activities, and any potential
benefits related to the Classified Information Procedures Act.
BRIEFING ON COMPLIANCE WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS
The Committee directs the Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Research at the Department of State to provide
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees
commencing not later than March 31, 2025, with subsequent
briefings every six months until March 31, 2026, on the
Department of State's compliance with Intelligence Community
information technology standards, including but not limited to
Intelligence Community Directive 500, Director of National
Intelligence, Chief Intelligence Officer, for all information
technology systems managed by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State. This briefing shall
include:
1. The Bureau's strategy for enforcing compliance
with Intelligence Community information technology
standards;
2. Future years cost estimates outlining the National
Intelligence Program resources required for the Bureau
to comply with Intell
Section-by-Section Analysis
The following is a section-by-section summary of H.R. 8512,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (the
Act).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 provides that the Act authorizes appropriations
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2025.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations, which shall be made available to
the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes $650,000,000 for the Intelligence
Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence for Fiscal Year 2025.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes $514,000,000 for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal
Year 2025.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations in the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 states that appropriations authorized in the
Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal
employees may be increased by such additional amounts as may be
necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
Section 303. Statute of limitation for espionage offenses
Section 303 modifies the statute of limitations for three
crimes commonly charged against state-directed foreign
intelligence assets spying on the United States. With this
modification, there will be no statute of limitations for
acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government,
delivering defense information to a foreign government, or
unlawfully procuring citizenship while working at the direction
of a foreign government. Because state directed espionage is
often discovered long after the applicable statute of
limitations has passed, this provision will ensure that state-
directed spies can be charged for espionage.
Section 304. Secure communication between Congress and Intelligence
Community
Section 304 amends Section 102A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024) to require the Director of
National Intelligence, upon the approval of specified
congressional leaders, to provide secure communications to
support the oversight functions of the congressional
intelligence committees, including through the procurement,
installation, configuration, and maintenance of all required
equipment to ensure that the committees can communicate with
the Intelligence Community through data, voice, and video
communications at all classification levels.
Section 305. Commission to examine the national security and defense
risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents
Section 305 creates a nine member commission to review
anomalous health incidents (AHI) affecting United States
government personnel and their dependents for the purpose of
comprehensively addressing the national security and defense
risks to the United States posed by AHI. The commission shall
submit a final report that addresses issues such as: whether
known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United
States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all
reported AHI; whether the United States government's provision
of support and medical care is sufficient to appropriately
address the impacts of AHI on affected personnel; how analytic
integrity and structured analytical techniques impacted the
United States government's response to AHI; and future policy
recommendations for AHI or other health incidents with a
potential counterintelligence nexus.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE
SUBTITLE A--MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES AND LIMITATIONS
Section 401. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct
regarding employees within the Intelligence Community
Section 401 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit annual reports to the congressional intelligence
committees, covering calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026,
regarding civilian employees in the Intelligence Community who
were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse
personnel actions, including information on the number of such
employees, their employing Intelligence Community element,
their pay grade, the paid or unpaid status of their
administrative leave, and instances in which leave exceeded 365
days. This section also requires the Director to notify the
congressional intelligence committees within 10 days of an
Intelligence Community element making a referral to the
Department of Justice regarding an allegation of misconduct
against a civilian employee of the Intelligence Community.
Section 402. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors
General of the Intelligence Community
Section 402 clarifies that standing to use the ``urgent
concern'' process includes not only individuals currently
affiliated with a covered Intelligence Community element but
also those who previously were affiliated with a covered
Intelligence Community element if their complaint or
information pertains to an alleged matter of ``urgent concern''
that arose during and was related to the time of their
affiliation with the covered Intelligence Community element.
This section also modifies the urgent concern statutory
provisions to require that ``urgent concern'' submissions be
submitted to appropriate Inspectors General in writing and
clarifies that the 14-calendar day period for Inspectors
General to determine the credibility of the urgent concern
submission begins when the appropriate Inspector General has
received from the submitter the information the submitter
intends to report to Congress.
Section 403. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures
to Inspectors General of elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 403 clarifies that in certain circumstances,
disclosures of classified information, made to Inspectors
General of the Intelligence Community by whistleblowers who are
``out of access'' due to a security clearance suspension,
revocation, or other action, would not violate applicable
nondisclosure agreements, are deemed to comply with Executive
Order 13526, and are not a violation subject to criminal
penalties relating to unauthorized disclosures. Specifically,
the out-of-access whistleblower's disclosure would not
constitute an unauthorized disclosure if it were made to
appropriately cleared Office of Inspector General personnel
with jurisdiction over the subject of the allegations and in
accordance with appropriate security guidance.
Section 404. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General
to receive protected disclosures
Section 404 makes technical corrections to 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3234 to clarify that the Inspectors General of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency
are authorized recipients of whistleblower protected
disclosures.
Section 405. Codification of the National Intelligence Management
Council
Section 405 codifies the National Intelligence Management
Council (NIMC) within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and sets forth its composition, authorities, and
responsibilities. This section also expresses the sense of
Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should
appoint a National Intelligence Manager (NIM) dedicated to the
People's Republic of China. This section further directs the
Director to provide a report to the congressional intelligence
committees within 180 days of the date of enactment on
strategic competition, including an examination of the
potential effects of establishing a new national intelligence
center designed to integrate collection and analysis in support
of strategic competition. Finally, this section expresses the
sense of Congress that the Director should appoint a NIM
dedicated to the counternarcotics mission.
Section 406. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed
investment into the United States
Section 406 amends Section 102A(z) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(z)) to clarify that the
Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees any analytic materials
prepared by the Director in support of investigations
undertaken by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign
Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services
Sector.
Section 407. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of
National Intelligence
Section 407 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to immediately notify the congressional intelligence committees
in writing if the President directs the Director to perform a
new intelligence-related function pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3024(f)(10).
Section 408. Enabling Intelligence Community integration
Section 408 amends Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3021 et seq.) to authorize an element of
the Intelligence Community, subject to such guidance or
regulations as may be developed by the Director of National
Intelligence, to provide goods or services to another element
of the Intelligence Community without reimbursement or transfer
of funds for such goods or services for the purposes of remote
work and hoteling initiatives for Intelligence Community
employees and affiliates. This section further provides that a
transfer of goods or services under this section may not occur
without the prior approval of the heads of both the providing
and receiving elements of the Intelligence Community.
Section 409. Protection of intelligence sources and methods
Section 409 amends Section 102A(i) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(i)) by adding a new subsection
which designates the Director of National Intelligence to be
responsible for the creation, modification, deconfliction, and
oversight for controlled access programs relating to
intelligence sources, methods, and intelligence activities.
This section also restricts the Director from approving the
establishment of a controlled access program unless a
vulnerability of or threat to specific information is
exceptional and when the normal criteria for determining
eligibility for access is deemed insufficient to protect
information from unauthorized disclosure. Finally, this section
provides that the Director may only delegate this
responsibility to the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
Section 410. Department of Homeland Security intelligence support for
State Governors
Section 410 requires the Undersecretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to ensure that, at least
once per year, an officer of the Field Intelligence Directorate
engages proactively with senior officials for each state, U.S.
territory, and the District of Columbia, such as the chief
executive or Homeland Security Advisor of such jurisdiction.
Section 411. Authorization relating to certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of Coast Guard
Section 411 authorizes Coast Guard to expend up to one
percent of the funding made available to it each fiscal year
under the National Intelligence Program for objects of a
confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which may be
accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and
with such certification deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified.
Section 412. Requirements with respect to access of foreign nationals
to Department of Energy National Laboratories
Section 412 requires the Secretary of Energy to designate
Senior Executive employees at the Department of Energy to have
final approval authority with respect to authorizing the access
of foreign nationals into Department of Energy National
Laboratories if an assessment of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence within the Department of Energy identifies
potential significant risks that are not agreed to by the
director of the relevant National Laboratory.
Section 413. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of
Energy personnel
Section 413 requires the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the Department of
Energy to develop and implement a standardized
counterintelligence training program for all Department of
Energy personnel, and a specialized training program for
officers at the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
who have counterintelligence responsibilities. This section
also requires the Director to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the implementation of this training
program within 90 days of the date of enactment.
Section 414. Federal Bureau of Investigation proactive cyber support
Section 414 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to develop and make available, within 90 days of the date
of enactment, an unclassified interface to facilitate
connection between owners and operators of U.S. critical
infrastructure and the FBI. This section further requires that
the interface be made available to congressional offices to
facilitate this connection. Finally, this section requires that
the interface include cyber hygiene best practices, tailored
threat information, recommendations for responding to cyber-
attacks, and information on the best ways to liaise with the
FBI.
Section 415. Requirements relating to confidential human source program
of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 415 places certain requirements, effective 180 days
after the date of enactment, on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's operation of its confidential human source
(CHS) program, namely requiring the Special Agent in Charge of
the relevant FBI Field Office to verify the identity of an
individual before the FBI may open the individual as a CHS;
prohibiting a headquarters-based FBI Special Agent from opening
an individual as a CHS; requiring additional vetting of current
or potential CHS who are counterintelligence concerns or under
criminal or counterintelligence investigation; requiring
handling agents to take certain steps if they believe a CHS has
engaged in an unauthorized illegal activity; prohibiting the
FBI Director from intervening in a civil action or
administrative hearing in which a CHS is a party; and
prohibiting FBI from opening Members of Congress or candidates
for Federal office as CHS. This section further requires
additional internal, as well as congressional, oversight of the
CHS program.
Section 416. Congressional notice of Federal Bureau of Investigation
counterintelligence investigations into individuals who hold or
are candidates for Federal elected office
Section 416 requires the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to notify congressional leadership no later than
five days after the commencement of a counterintelligence
investigation into an individual who holds an elected Federal
office or an individual who is a candidate in an election for
Federal office. The contents of such notification shall
include, to the extent consistent with the need to protect the
integrity of ongoing counterintelligence investigations or
other exceptionally sensitive national security or law
enforcement matters, a summary of the relevant facts associated
with the counterintelligence investigation and the identity of
the person subject to such investigation.
Section 417. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the
Department of Transportation
Section 417 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to seek to enter into an agreement with the Secretary of
Transportation to establish an Intelligence Community
Counterintelligence Office (ICCO) within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) for the purpose of providing timely and
relevant counterintelligence threat information to the
leadership of DOT. The Director of the ICCO shall be appointed
by the Director of National Intelligence, be an employee of the
Intelligence Community, and be responsible for, among other
things, advising the Secretary of Transportation on
intelligence and counterintelligence matters and ensuring that
counterintelligence information is provided to appropriate
personnel and disseminated in a timely manner.
Section 418. Ukraine lessons learned working group
Section 418 requires the Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense to jointly establish a working
group to identify lessons the Intelligence Community has
learned from the Ukraine conflict; to share such lessons with
the Department of Defense elements responsible for the
development of joint and service-specific doctrine,
acquisitions decisions, and capability development; and to
provide recommendations on intelligence collection priorities
to support those Department of Defense elements.
Section 419. Modification to waiver for post-service employment
restrictions
Section 419 delegates the waiver authority for post-service
employment restrictions applicable to former Intelligence
Community employees (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3073a) from the Director of
National Intelligence to the heads of the Intelligence
Community elements. This section also adjusts the approval
standard for post-service employment restrictions waivers to
require the applicable head of the Intelligence Community
element to determine that issuing such a waiver will not harm
the national security interests of the United States. Finally,
this section clarifies that the heads of the Intelligence
Community elements may provide advisory opinions to current and
former employees regarding whether a proposed employment,
representation, advice, or services would be prohibited under
the statute.
Section 420. Prohibition of funds for Intelligence Experts Group
Section 420 prohibits funds authorized or otherwise made
available by the Act to the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis from being obligated or
expended to support the Intelligence Experts Group or any
successor group.
Section 421. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain
activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source
Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security
Section 421 extends through Fiscal Year 2025 a prohibition
on certain activities by the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis that were prohibited by
section 7324 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024.
Section 422. Limitation on availability of funds for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence pending submission of