Skip to content

house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-662

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

2024-09-11

Committees

Associated legislation

Text

Committee Consideration

The Committee marked up H.R. 8512 on June 11, 2024. In open session, Chairman Turner offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which the Committee adopted by voice vote. Mr. Himes then moved, pursuant to House rule XI, clause 2(g)(2)(a) that the meeting be closed because testimony, evidence, or other matters to be discussed would endanger national security. The motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of 20 ayes to 0 noes: Voting aye: Turner, Wenstrup, Crawford, Stefanik, Kelly, Fitzpatrick, Scott, Hill, Crenshaw, Waltz, Garcia, Perry, Jackson, Himes, Castro, Krishnamoorthi, Plaskett, Gomez, Houlahan, Spanberger. Voting no: None. Following closed discussion, the Committee considered one amendment offered by Mr. Castro to the Classified Annex to H.R. 8512. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 5 ayes to 17 noes: Voting aye: Himes, Carson, Castro, Krishnamoorthi, Crow. Voting no: Turner, Wenstrup, Crawford, Stefanik, Kelly, Fitzpatrick, Scott, Hill, Crenshaw, Waltz, Garcia, Perry, Jackson, Plaskett, Gomez, Houlahan, Spanberger. Finally, the Committee adopted by voice vote the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Chairman Turner, and the bill as amended was approved and ordered to be reported to the House by voice vote. Oversight Findings With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Act and its accompanying classified annex result from open and closed hearings, briefings, and other oversight activities conducted by the Committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. General Performance Goals and Objectives With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the general goals and objectives of H.R. 8512 are to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2025. The Act and its accompanying classified annex reflect in detail the Committee's specific performance goals and objectives. Applicability to the Legislative Branch Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a description of the application of this Act to the legislative branch where the Act relates to terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations. H.R. 8512 does not relate to terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations. Duplication of Federal Programs In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, no provision of this Act establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings This Act does not direct the completion of any specific rule makings within the meaning of section 551 of title 5, United States Code. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement The Act does not establish or authorize the establishment of an advisory committee within the definition of section 5(b) of the appendix to title 5, United States Code. Earmark Identification This bill does not include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives. Estimate of Costs On June 14, 2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions, including any federal mandates. Committee Comments and Direction TIMELY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD During or after Committee hearings or briefings with elements of the Intelligence Community, Members may seek clarification, request additional data, expand on topics raised, or ask additional questions that were not covered due to time constraints. These requests from the Committee, whether written or verbal, are referred to as Questions for the Record, and the Committee expects elements in receipt of Questions for the Record to appropriately prioritize timely replies. Therefore, the Committee directs that when an element is in receipt of Questions for the Record, the reply from the element is expected in a reasonable timeframe and, but for reasonable extenuating circumstances agreed to by the Committee, should not exceed 60 days. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS It has been twenty years since enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (Public Law 108-458), and it is the sense of the Committee that close review of the integration of civilian and military officers as part of a joint Intelligence Community workforce is warranted. The Committee is aware that, the Director of National Intelligence has recently conducted a Joint Duty Study. The Committee is also aware that, pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 660, Intelligence Community civilian personnel may not be promoted to a senior Intelligence Community civilian rank, or equivalent, without having earned joint duty credit, or without having been granted a waiver. Further, it is the sense of the Committee that the integration of a joint Intelligence Community workforce is appropriately suited for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Director of National Intelligence should prioritize increasing participation in the Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program from other elements of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the workforce of the ODNI should be increasingly comprised of Intelligence Community civilians from the other elements seeking attainment of a mid- grade career promotion or a Senior National Intelligence Service promotion, or equivalent, role. The Intelligence Community should maintain its focus on cultivating a joint workforce, especially for those seeking promotions into leadership. This construct would improve talent retention, offer career enhancing experiences, and foster collaboration across the Intelligence Community. Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on the Joint Duty Study recommendations presented to the Director and the Director's decision or plans to increase joint duty assignment personnel at the ODNI. GAO REPORT ON CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ENCOUNTERS AT U.S. BORDER The Committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study not later than December 31, 2024 to examine U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) protocol and operations regarding encounters at the U.S. borders with known or suspected terrorists. This study shall assess the following: 1. What is the number and composition of encounters with individuals who are known or suspected terrorists, or associates and family members of known or suspected terrorists (i.e., watchlist exceptions), at or between U.S. ports of entry over the last two years? 2. What are the policies and procedures for encounters with individuals that are known or suspected terrorists and what are the procedures for watchlist exceptions? 3. To what extent does CBP comply with existing laws, policies, and procedures for encountering individuals with a nexus to terrorism at U.S. borders? 4. With what degree of fidelity are persons encountered at U.S. borders determined to, or not to be, known or suspected terrorists or watchlist exceptions, before being permitted entry into the U.S.? 5. What are the CBP procedures if such an individual is permitted entry to the U.S.? 6. What are the procedures for CBP to transition responsibility for these individuals to the jurisdiction of other U.S. Government agencies, once individuals have been approved for entry into the U.S.? 7. What are the CBP procedures if such an individual is not permitted entry to the U.S.? 8. What are the procedures for CBP to make the determination of what happens to these individuals once they are turned away from entry into the U.S.? 9. To what extent does the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have awareness of known or suspected terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, who enter the U.S. after being encountered at U.S. borders? 10. To what extent does the FBI conduct surveillance against known or suspected terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, who enter the U.S. after being encountered at U.S. borders? 11. What are the policies and procedures for how CBP communicates to the FBI if known or suspected terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, are encountered at the border and permitted entry into the U.S.? 12. How is information on known or suspected terrorists, or watchlist exceptions, who crossed the U.S. border shared with and/or disseminated to relevant Federal, State, Local, and Tribal partners? REPORTS ON WATCHLIST ENCOUNTERS AT U.S.-MEXICO AND U.S.-CANADA BORDERS The Committee directs the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with any other appropriate federal agency or department, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees not later than April 30, 2025 (1) a report that details the total number of watchlist encounters at the United States-Mexico border in calendar year 2024, disaggregated by Watchlisting Category Code, country of origin of the encountered individual, and the purported terrorist affiliation of the encountered individual; and (2) a report that details the total number of watchlist encounters at the United States-Canada border in calendar year 2024, disaggregated by Watchlisting Category Code, country of origin of the encountered individual, and the purported terrorist affiliation of the encountered individual. In addition, to the degree feasible, the reports shall provide a breakdown of the current status of watchlisted foreign nationals who were encountered at the relevant border (e.g., whether they were detained, removed, or released into the United States). The reports shall present the required information in the format of a chart or other graphic. Each report may be provided in classified form, but shall be accompanied by an unclassified version. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIVIDE The Committee recognizes the Director of National Intelligence's creation of a Senior Advisory Group Sub-Panel on Managing Intelligence Issues that Span the Foreign and Domestic Spheres, and endorses ongoing efforts by the Director to examine how the Intelligence Community approaches an increasingly complicated set of national security threats that cross the foreign-domestic divide, to include the mitigation of potential gaps in the ways that elements of the Intelligence Community receive and share foreign intelligence with U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement. Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide the congressional intelligence committees with any report and classified appendix produced by the Senior Advisory Group Sub-Panel on Managing Intelligence Issues that Span the Foreign and Domestic Spheres not later than 30 days after the Sub-Panel provides the report to the Director. BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT HOSTAGE RECOVERY EFFORTS The Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with other appropriate Intelligence Community elements, to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on the Intelligence Community's support to broader U.S. government efforts to locate, obtain intelligence about, and secure the release of U.S. nationals held hostage around the world. The briefing shall include the following: details of any Intelligence Community support to U.S. hostage recovery efforts presently and in the past five years; an overview of the resources and surge capacity of the Intelligence Community to support U.S. hostage recovery efforts; the level and nature of support that the Intelligence Community provides to U.S. special operations forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation- led Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, and the State Department's Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; and any standing requirements the Intelligence Community has to support hostage rescue operations. ASSESSMENT OF UNDERSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CABLE CLUSTERING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS The Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other federal departments and agencies as the Director deems appropriate, to study and report to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, about the national security, physical security, and counterintelligence risks posed by the close clustering or collocation of undersea telecommunications cables, particularly in the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans, that have landing sites on United States territory. Furthermore, the report should assess whether the potential placement of future undersea telecommunications cables across more isolated spans portions of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans would reduce such national security, physical security, or counterintelligence risks. The report may be submitted in classified form but shall include an unclassified executive summary. Finally, the Committee directs an appropriately classified, releasable version of the report's findings to, at minimum, be shared with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information at the Department of Commerce. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DETECT AND INTERDICT ILLICIT FIREARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION The illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition into the Caribbean contributes to violence and instability in the region. Firearms used by drug trafficking organizations and local gangs undermine citizen security and can contribute to out-migration to the United States. U.S. government agencies, in cooperation with Caribbean nations, have increased efforts to detect and interdict illegal firearms trafficked into the Caribbean region. The Committee supports these efforts and directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other Intelligence Community elements as the Director determines appropriate, to provide a briefing or report to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on Intelligence Community support to U.S. government efforts to detect and interdict illicit firearms trafficking in the Caribbean region. REPORT ON IRANIAN MALIGN INFLUENCE EFFORTS IN THE CYBER DOMAIN The Committee directs the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with the heads of other Intelligence Community elements as the Director determines appropriate, to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024, on Iranian malign influence efforts in the cyber domain, including a description of Iran's strategies, operations, funding, and key actors that conduct subversive, undeclared, coercive, or criminal activities online to affect the attitudes, perceptions, or behaviors in the United States, or in nations that are allies or partners with the United States. ENHANCEMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VETTING CAPABILITIES FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE The Committee directs the Director of the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN) to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees not later than December 31, 2024 on the DOE-IN's progress toward building a comprehensive counterintelligence strategy, to include enhancements to the counterintelligence capabilities and processes of overseeing and vetting foreign nationals applying for entry into the National Labs, a plan and progress for implementation, proposals for enhanced counterintelligence and internal investigative authorities, requisite counterintelligence training, and potential technological and artificial intelligence vetting solutions, and including internal controls and oversight for each implemented and recommended enhancement. DOE-IN shall also highlight and describe progress towards greater standardization, coordination and communication across counterintelligence assessments of foreign nationals attempting to enter multiple National Labs. STUDY ON THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM Consistent with 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3003(4)(L), the Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Counternarcotics Executive and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, not later than March 1, 2025, a study assessing the feasibility and advisability of including all or some of DEA's entities that conduct intelligence-related activities--such as the Special Operations Division and sections of the Intelligence Division other than the Office of National Security Intelligence--in the Intelligence Community, to be funded through the National Intelligence Program. The study shall discuss the potential benefits, risks, and opportunities associated with any such addition, including the potential benefits of enabling enhanced information sharing between the DEA and the Intelligence Community to facilitate DEA's intelligence-led disruptive activities, and any potential benefits related to the Classified Information Procedures Act. BRIEFING ON COMPLIANCE WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS The Committee directs the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research at the Department of State to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees commencing not later than March 31, 2025, with subsequent briefings every six months until March 31, 2026, on the Department of State's compliance with Intelligence Community information technology standards, including but not limited to Intelligence Community Directive 500, Director of National Intelligence, Chief Intelligence Officer, for all information technology systems managed by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. This briefing shall include: 1. The Bureau's strategy for enforcing compliance with Intelligence Community information technology standards; 2. Future years cost estimates outlining the National Intelligence Program resources required for the Bureau to comply with Intell

Section-by-Section Analysis

The following is a section-by-section summary of H.R. 8512, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (the Act). TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Section 101. Authorization of appropriations Section 101 provides that the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2025. Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account Section 103 authorizes $650,000,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for Fiscal Year 2025. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Section 201. Authorization of appropriations Section 201 authorizes $514,000,000 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025. TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities Section 301 provides that the authorization of appropriations in the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law Section 302 states that appropriations authorized in the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 303. Statute of limitation for espionage offenses Section 303 modifies the statute of limitations for three crimes commonly charged against state-directed foreign intelligence assets spying on the United States. With this modification, there will be no statute of limitations for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, delivering defense information to a foreign government, or unlawfully procuring citizenship while working at the direction of a foreign government. Because state directed espionage is often discovered long after the applicable statute of limitations has passed, this provision will ensure that state- directed spies can be charged for espionage. Section 304. Secure communication between Congress and Intelligence Community Section 304 amends Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024) to require the Director of National Intelligence, upon the approval of specified congressional leaders, to provide secure communications to support the oversight functions of the congressional intelligence committees, including through the procurement, installation, configuration, and maintenance of all required equipment to ensure that the committees can communicate with the Intelligence Community through data, voice, and video communications at all classification levels. Section 305. Commission to examine the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents Section 305 creates a nine member commission to review anomalous health incidents (AHI) affecting United States government personnel and their dependents for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by AHI. The commission shall submit a final report that addresses issues such as: whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported AHI; whether the United States government's provision of support and medical care is sufficient to appropriately address the impacts of AHI on affected personnel; how analytic integrity and structured analytical techniques impacted the United States government's response to AHI; and future policy recommendations for AHI or other health incidents with a potential counterintelligence nexus. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE SUBTITLE A--MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES AND LIMITATIONS Section 401. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct regarding employees within the Intelligence Community Section 401 requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit annual reports to the congressional intelligence committees, covering calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026, regarding civilian employees in the Intelligence Community who were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel actions, including information on the number of such employees, their employing Intelligence Community element, their pay grade, the paid or unpaid status of their administrative leave, and instances in which leave exceeded 365 days. This section also requires the Director to notify the congressional intelligence committees within 10 days of an Intelligence Community element making a referral to the Department of Justice regarding an allegation of misconduct against a civilian employee of the Intelligence Community. Section 402. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community Section 402 clarifies that standing to use the ``urgent concern'' process includes not only individuals currently affiliated with a covered Intelligence Community element but also those who previously were affiliated with a covered Intelligence Community element if their complaint or information pertains to an alleged matter of ``urgent concern'' that arose during and was related to the time of their affiliation with the covered Intelligence Community element. This section also modifies the urgent concern statutory provisions to require that ``urgent concern'' submissions be submitted to appropriate Inspectors General in writing and clarifies that the 14-calendar day period for Inspectors General to determine the credibility of the urgent concern submission begins when the appropriate Inspector General has received from the submitter the information the submitter intends to report to Congress. Section 403. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to Inspectors General of elements of the Intelligence Community Section 403 clarifies that in certain circumstances, disclosures of classified information, made to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community by whistleblowers who are ``out of access'' due to a security clearance suspension, revocation, or other action, would not violate applicable nondisclosure agreements, are deemed to comply with Executive Order 13526, and are not a violation subject to criminal penalties relating to unauthorized disclosures. Specifically, the out-of-access whistleblower's disclosure would not constitute an unauthorized disclosure if it were made to appropriately cleared Office of Inspector General personnel with jurisdiction over the subject of the allegations and in accordance with appropriate security guidance. Section 404. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to receive protected disclosures Section 404 makes technical corrections to 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3234 to clarify that the Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency are authorized recipients of whistleblower protected disclosures. Section 405. Codification of the National Intelligence Management Council Section 405 codifies the National Intelligence Management Council (NIMC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and sets forth its composition, authorities, and responsibilities. This section also expresses the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should appoint a National Intelligence Manager (NIM) dedicated to the People's Republic of China. This section further directs the Director to provide a report to the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the date of enactment on strategic competition, including an examination of the potential effects of establishing a new national intelligence center designed to integrate collection and analysis in support of strategic competition. Finally, this section expresses the sense of Congress that the Director should appoint a NIM dedicated to the counternarcotics mission. Section 406. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States Section 406 amends Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(z)) to clarify that the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees any analytic materials prepared by the Director in support of investigations undertaken by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector. Section 407. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence Section 407 requires the Director of National Intelligence to immediately notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing if the President directs the Director to perform a new intelligence-related function pursuant to 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(f)(10). Section 408. Enabling Intelligence Community integration Section 408 amends Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3021 et seq.) to authorize an element of the Intelligence Community, subject to such guidance or regulations as may be developed by the Director of National Intelligence, to provide goods or services to another element of the Intelligence Community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for such goods or services for the purposes of remote work and hoteling initiatives for Intelligence Community employees and affiliates. This section further provides that a transfer of goods or services under this section may not occur without the prior approval of the heads of both the providing and receiving elements of the Intelligence Community. Section 409. Protection of intelligence sources and methods Section 409 amends Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(i)) by adding a new subsection which designates the Director of National Intelligence to be responsible for the creation, modification, deconfliction, and oversight for controlled access programs relating to intelligence sources, methods, and intelligence activities. This section also restricts the Director from approving the establishment of a controlled access program unless a vulnerability of or threat to specific information is exceptional and when the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access is deemed insufficient to protect information from unauthorized disclosure. Finally, this section provides that the Director may only delegate this responsibility to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Section 410. Department of Homeland Security intelligence support for State Governors Section 410 requires the Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to ensure that, at least once per year, an officer of the Field Intelligence Directorate engages proactively with senior officials for each state, U.S. territory, and the District of Columbia, such as the chief executive or Homeland Security Advisor of such jurisdiction. Section 411. Authorization relating to certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of Coast Guard Section 411 authorizes Coast Guard to expend up to one percent of the funding made available to it each fiscal year under the National Intelligence Program for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and with such certification deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. Section 412. Requirements with respect to access of foreign nationals to Department of Energy National Laboratories Section 412 requires the Secretary of Energy to designate Senior Executive employees at the Department of Energy to have final approval authority with respect to authorizing the access of foreign nationals into Department of Energy National Laboratories if an assessment of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the Department of Energy identifies potential significant risks that are not agreed to by the director of the relevant National Laboratory. Section 413. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of Energy personnel Section 413 requires the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the Department of Energy to develop and implement a standardized counterintelligence training program for all Department of Energy personnel, and a specialized training program for officers at the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence who have counterintelligence responsibilities. This section also requires the Director to brief the congressional intelligence committees on the implementation of this training program within 90 days of the date of enactment. Section 414. Federal Bureau of Investigation proactive cyber support Section 414 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop and make available, within 90 days of the date of enactment, an unclassified interface to facilitate connection between owners and operators of U.S. critical infrastructure and the FBI. This section further requires that the interface be made available to congressional offices to facilitate this connection. Finally, this section requires that the interface include cyber hygiene best practices, tailored threat information, recommendations for responding to cyber- attacks, and information on the best ways to liaise with the FBI. Section 415. Requirements relating to confidential human source program of Federal Bureau of Investigation Section 415 places certain requirements, effective 180 days after the date of enactment, on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's operation of its confidential human source (CHS) program, namely requiring the Special Agent in Charge of the relevant FBI Field Office to verify the identity of an individual before the FBI may open the individual as a CHS; prohibiting a headquarters-based FBI Special Agent from opening an individual as a CHS; requiring additional vetting of current or potential CHS who are counterintelligence concerns or under criminal or counterintelligence investigation; requiring handling agents to take certain steps if they believe a CHS has engaged in an unauthorized illegal activity; prohibiting the FBI Director from intervening in a civil action or administrative hearing in which a CHS is a party; and prohibiting FBI from opening Members of Congress or candidates for Federal office as CHS. This section further requires additional internal, as well as congressional, oversight of the CHS program. Section 416. Congressional notice of Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence investigations into individuals who hold or are candidates for Federal elected office Section 416 requires the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to notify congressional leadership no later than five days after the commencement of a counterintelligence investigation into an individual who holds an elected Federal office or an individual who is a candidate in an election for Federal office. The contents of such notification shall include, to the extent consistent with the need to protect the integrity of ongoing counterintelligence investigations or other exceptionally sensitive national security or law enforcement matters, a summary of the relevant facts associated with the counterintelligence investigation and the identity of the person subject to such investigation. Section 417. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the Department of Transportation Section 417 requires the Director of National Intelligence to seek to enter into an agreement with the Secretary of Transportation to establish an Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office (ICCO) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) for the purpose of providing timely and relevant counterintelligence threat information to the leadership of DOT. The Director of the ICCO shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, be an employee of the Intelligence Community, and be responsible for, among other things, advising the Secretary of Transportation on intelligence and counterintelligence matters and ensuring that counterintelligence information is provided to appropriate personnel and disseminated in a timely manner. Section 418. Ukraine lessons learned working group Section 418 requires the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to jointly establish a working group to identify lessons the Intelligence Community has learned from the Ukraine conflict; to share such lessons with the Department of Defense elements responsible for the development of joint and service-specific doctrine, acquisitions decisions, and capability development; and to provide recommendations on intelligence collection priorities to support those Department of Defense elements. Section 419. Modification to waiver for post-service employment restrictions Section 419 delegates the waiver authority for post-service employment restrictions applicable to former Intelligence Community employees (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3073a) from the Director of National Intelligence to the heads of the Intelligence Community elements. This section also adjusts the approval standard for post-service employment restrictions waivers to require the applicable head of the Intelligence Community element to determine that issuing such a waiver will not harm the national security interests of the United States. Finally, this section clarifies that the heads of the Intelligence Community elements may provide advisory opinions to current and former employees regarding whether a proposed employment, representation, advice, or services would be prohibited under the statute. Section 420. Prohibition of funds for Intelligence Experts Group Section 420 prohibits funds authorized or otherwise made available by the Act to the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis from being obligated or expended to support the Intelligence Experts Group or any successor group. Section 421. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security Section 421 extends through Fiscal Year 2025 a prohibition on certain activities by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis that were prohibited by section 7324 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Section 422. Limitation on availability of funds for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pending submission of

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/662