Minority Views
[To accompany H.J. Res. 100]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 100) providing for
congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United
States Code, of the rule submitted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission relating to ``Cybersecurity Risk
Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure'',
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 2
Related Hearing.................................................. 3
Committee Consideration.......................................... 3
Committee Votes.................................................. 3
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 5
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 5
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 5
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 6
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 6
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 6
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 6
Earmark Identification........................................... 6
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 6
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 7
Minority Views................................................... 8
Purpose and Summary
Introduced on November 11, 2023, by Representative Andrew
Garbarino, H.J. Res. 100, a resolution providing for
congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United
States Code, of the rule submitted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission relating to the ``Cybersecurity Risk
Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure,''
would rescind the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
rule ``Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and
Incident Disclosure.''
Background and Need for Legislation
On July 26, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``SEC'') voted 3-2 to adopt the Cybersecurity Risk Management,
Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure Rule (``the Cyber
Rule'' or ``the Final Rule''). The Final Rule requires
expansive new disclosures by public companies regarding
cybersecurity matters, concerning both incident disclosure and
what is commonly referred to as cyber-hygiene. The incident
disclosure component of the Final Rule requires issuers to
publicly disclose a material cybersecurity incident on their
Form 8-K within four business days following the public
company's determination that the incident is material. The
cyber-hygiene disclosure obligations pertain to risk management
and governance, including disclosures relating to a company's
policies and procedures for identifying and managing
cybersecurity risks as well as the company's board of
director's oversight of cyber risk.
Committee Republicans generally appreciate the SEC's desire
to enhance transparency around material disclosures and
recognize the increasing risk to issuers from threat actors.
However, given that the Commission unanimously approved
Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures in 2018,
the Commission failed to persuasively articulate why a formal,
prescriptive Rule was necessary at this time.
The Rule also continues the SEC's recent trend away from
the materiality standard and towards expansive, one-size-fits-
all, prescriptive rulemaking covering even non-financial
matters. Additionally, the SEC did not sufficiently harmonize
the Rule with other state and federal agency rulemaking on this
matter. In fact, the SEC concedes that the Cyber Rule's
incident disclosure requirements may conflict with certain
disclosure requirements from other state and federal laws or
other federal agency rulemaking. In such cases, the SEC asserts
that either the Cyber Rule would preempt these conflicts or in
one specific scenario, the SEC would subsequently modify the
Rule to account for them.
Even the minority of commenters that were generally
supportive of a prescriptive Rule, such as the North American
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA), expressed
concerns with aspects of the Rule. For example, NASAA wrote
that ``[they] share the concern expressed by others that the
Proposal would not provide for any reporting delay based on an
ongoing external investigation related to a cybersecurity
incident.'' As NASAA noted, the SEC's determination that the
need for cybersecurity incident disclosure outweighs law
enforcement investigations is problematic. To address this
critique, the SEC crafted an overly narrow incident reporting
delay in the Final Rule that failed to adequately respond to
this serious concern.
Moreover, while Committee Republicans understand the
growing cyber risks posed to U.S. public companies and the
American economy at large, the SEC may not be the appropriate
agency to assess such risk. Additionally, the disclosures
required by the Rule fail to adequately mitigate or alleviate a
cyber threat and potentially give threat actors a ``road map''
to inflict greater harm on a given company or industry. This
rule could also significantly harm a company's stock price if
the information being disclosed is incomplete or inaccurate,
resulting in mispriced securities and uninformed market
speculation.
While the SEC concluded the Cyber Rule was necessary in
part because of concerns that material cybersecurity incidents
were underreported, there is at least one independent law firm
report indicating a subsequent overreporting of non-material
cyber incidents since the Cyber Rule was implemented. If such
claims of overreporting are accurate, the disclosures required
by the Rule would not provide decision-useful information for
investors. Instead, the Rule would merely increase compliance
and legal costs that could be better allocated to cybersecurity
prevention.
The Cyber Rule is a heavy handed and misplaced approach to
the increased threat of cybersecurity incidents. The SEC would
have been better served reaching out to industry experts and
investors engaging in a dialogue to determine the appropriate
course of action. Given that the SEC conceded it may have to
modify certain aspects of the Rule if it ``becomes appropriate
in light of future developments,'' the Rule should be revoked.
RELATED HEARING
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
hearing was used to develop H.J. Res. 100: The Committee on
Financial Services held a hearing on April 13, 2023, titled
``Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission.''
Committee Consideration
The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on
May 16, 2024, and ordered H.J. Res. 100 to be reported
favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 27 ayes to 22 nays
(Record vote no. FC-152), a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.J.
Res. 100 was ordered reported favorably to the House by a
recorded vote of 27 ayes to 22 nays (Record vote no. FC-152), a
quorum being present.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.J. Res. 100 is to
rescind the SEC's rule relating to ``Cybersecurity Risk
Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure.''
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate
provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.J. Res. 100 would disapprove a final rule published by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2023.\1\
By invoking a legislative process established in the
Congressional Review Act, the resolution would repeal the rule
and prohibit the agency from issuing the same or any similar
rule in the future.
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\1\Securities and Exchange Commission ``Cybersecurity Risk
Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosures,'' Final
Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 51896 (August 4, 2023), https://tinyurl.com/
mthdwt6x.
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The rule requires public companies that are subject to the
SEC's reporting requirements to disclose details about managing
and governing risks related to cybersecurity and material
incidents. The rule also requires companies to input the
information into a structured reporting system.
CBO estimates that repealing the rule would have an
insignificant effect on the SEC's costs. Because the SEC is
authorized to collect fees each year to offset its annual
appropriation, CBO expects that the net effect on discretionary
spending over the 2024-2029 period would be negligible,
assuming appropriation actions consistent with that authority.
CBO also expects that repealing the rule could reduce civil
monetary penalties that the SEC may seek against individuals
and companies that violate the disclosure requirements of the
rule. Civil monetary penalties are recorded as revenues in the
federal budget. CBO expects that companies would generally
comply with the new requirements in that rule and thus any
reduction in penalties under the bill would be insignificant
over the 2024-2034 period.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aurora Swanson.
The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY,
AND TAX EXPENDITURES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the
estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax
expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office
pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1973.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
Pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of the
Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
EARMARK IDENTIFICATION
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the
rule.
DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
This Joint Resolution disapproves the rule submitted by the
SEC relating to ``Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy,
Governance, and Incident Disclosure'' and asserts that such
rule shall have no force or effect.
Minority Views
This Congressional Review Act (``CRA'') resolution would
overturn an important SEC rule that provides much needed
transparency regarding corporate cybersecurity risks
(hereinafter ``cybersecurity rule'').\1\ Specifically, this
cybersecurity rule requires SEC-registered public companies to
disclose material cybersecurity incidents and information about
what they are doing to manage their cyber risks. At a time when
cybersecurity risks are increasingly a primary concern of
businesses across America, this bill would reduce investors'
ability to assess those risks and make more informed decisions
about their investment strategies. Moreover, by virtue of this
bill being a CRA resolution, it would not only overturn this
critical rule, but it would also prevent the SEC from ever
issuing a substantially similar rule in the future, which would
make it very difficult for the SEC to provide any future
guidance or regulation on cybersecurity risks.
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\1\SEC Final Rule on Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy,
Governance, and Incident Disclosure by Public Companies (Approved July
26, 2023), available https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-139
(17 CFR Parts 229, 232, 239, 240, and 249; Release Nos. 33-11216; 34-
97989; File No. S7-09-22).
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The SEC's cybersecurity rule mandates that each public
company registered with the SEC provide disclosures in their
periodic 8-K filing within four business days of discovering
any material cybersecurity breach, as well as to put forth in
their annual 10-K disclosures any risk management, strategy,
and governance processes they have put in place to mitigate
cyber risks. This rule is carefully drafted to balance the
needs of both investors and the companies themselves by
limiting the disclosures based on the well-known standard of
``materiality''--in other words, whether the company thinks
that the incident will be of use to its investors when deciding
whether or not to trade in the company's shares. This way,
investors are kept abreast of any cyber-attacks that might
impact a company's operations and market capitalization, while
companies are not overly burdened with compliance costs as they
do not need to spend time and resources disclosing every single
incident, all the way down to the smallest and most
insignificant.
The SEC's cyber disclosure rule was put in place in
response to a precipitous uptick in the number of cyber-attacks
on companies over the last several years, which CEOs and
economic experts alike have acknowledged are one of the top
threats to their operations and ability to create shareholder
value going forward.\2\ Recent examples of cybersecurity
breaches show just how devastating of an impact these types of
incidents can have on public companies, investors, and the U.S.
more broadly. For example, in 2021, the largest gas pipeline
operator and largest meat processing plant in the U.S. were
forced to halt operations due to a pair of cyberattacks that
cut off 45% of the oil to the East Coast and halted production
of a company that provides one-fifth of the U.S.'s meat
supply.\3\ Additionally, in 2017, the disclosure of a major
data breach at credit reporting agency Equifax caused the
company's share price to plummet 35%, and insider executives
who sold their shares prior to this news becoming public saved
themselves millions of dollars in losses while ordinary
investors were stuck with the bill.\4\ These attacks continue
to happen to this day: in November 2023, Russian hackers were
able to obtain emails and documents from accounts of
Microsoft's senior leadership, cybersecurity, and legal
teams;\5\ only two months later, hackers accessed the genetic
information of nearly 7 million 23andMe users.\6\
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\2\Better Markets, Letter Submitted to SEC Secretary Vanessa
Countryman re: Rule entitled ``Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy,
Governance, and Incident Disclosure'' (File No. S7-09-22, RIN 3235-
AM89) (Submitted May 9, 2022).
\3\Id. at 2-3.
\4\Bloomberg, Three Equifax Managers Sold Stock Before Cyber Hack
Revealed (Sep. 7, 2017).
\5\The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant
Cyber Incidents (accessed Jul. 24, 2024).
\6\The Guardian, Genetic testing firm 23andMe admits hackers
accessed DNA data of 7m users (Dec. 5, 2023).
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As the above incidents make apparent, data breaches and
cyber-attacks hurt ordinary investors and companies themselves.
While many companies already disclose information about their
material cybersecurity risks voluntarily, this information is
often disjointed, inconsistent, and not comparable.\7\ The
SEC's cybersecurity rule improves upon the status quo on all
fronts, and makes the disclosures much more decision-useful for
investors.\8\ H.J. Res. 100 harms investors by overturning this
critical cybersecurity rule, thereby making it harder for
investors to understand cybersecurity risks that have material
implications on their investments. Furthermore, as with all
CRAs, if H.J. Res. 100 is passed, it would not only overturn
the SEC's cybersecurity rule altogether, it would also prevent
the SEC from issuing any ``substantially similar'' rules in the
future. This means that the SEC will have very limited options
going forward to help investors better understand corporate
cybersecurity risks.
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\7\SEC, Fact Sheet: Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures; Final
Rules (Jul. 26, 2024) (``Although registrants' disclosures of material
cybersecurity incidents and cybersecurity risk management and
governance have improved since the 2011 and 2018 [staff] guidance,
disclosure practices are inconsistent, necessitating new rules.'').
\8\SEC, Fact Sheet: Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures; Final
Rules (Jul. 26, 2024).
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This bill is opposed by many prominent investor-centric
organizations, including Americans for Financial Reform, Public
Citizen, Better Markets, Council of Institutional Investors,
the North American Securities Administrators Association Inc.
(``NASAA''), and the California Public Employees' Retirement
System (``CalPERS'').
For these reasons, we oppose H.J. Res. 100.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
David Scott,
Al Green,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Oversight and
Investigations.
Jim Himes,
Joyce Beatty,
Sean Casten,
Brad Sherman,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Emanuel Cleaver II,
Bill Foster,
Juan Vargas,
Ayanna Pressley,
Rashida Tlaib,
Nikema Williams,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Members of Congress.
[all]