Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 3556]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3556) to amend the Federal financial laws to
increase financial regulatory accountability and transparency,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 12
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 13
Related Hearings................................................. 14
Committee Consideration.......................................... 14
Committee Votes.................................................. 15
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 22
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 22
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 22
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 22
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 22
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 22
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 22
Earmark Identification........................................... 22
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 23
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 23
Ramseyer......................................................... 31
Minority Views................................................... 120
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Increasing Financial
Regulatory Accountability and Transparency Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 101. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transparency.
TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 201. Federal Reserve transparency.
TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 301. FSOC transparency.
TITLE IV--ESTABLISHING FEDERAL RESERVE VICE CHAIR FOR SUPERVISION
EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT
Sec. 401. Establishment of requirements to be Vice Chairman for
Supervision.
TITLE V--BANKING REGULATOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 501. Reports and testimony to Congress on supervision.
TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY
SEC. 101. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION TRANSPARENCY.
Section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1823)
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting after ``taken'' the
following: ``after notification to the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and'';
(2) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in subparagraph (B)(i)(I), by striking ``a
present-value'' and inserting ``an expected present-
value''; and
(B) in subparagraph (G)--
(i) in clause (i)--
(I) by inserting ``after notification
to the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate and''
before ``upon the''; and
(II) in subclause (II), by striking
``would'' and inserting ``that can be
shown to'';
(ii) in clause (iii)(I), by inserting before
the semicolon the following: ``, including
documentation of factors, empirical analyses,
and data that gave rise to the determination'';
and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(vi) Additional reports to congress on
emergency determinations.--
``(I) In general.--With respect to
each determination under clause (i),
the Board of Directors, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the Secretary of the
Treasury shall each provide to the
Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate--
``(aa) not later than 3 days
after such determination, all
documentation related to such
determination, including staff
analyses and memoranda; and
``(bb) not later than 30 days
after such determination, any
analyses undertaken to justify
such determination, including
data, metrics used, and
quantitative analyses
undertaken.
``(II) Information requested by
committees.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall provide the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate with such additional
information related to a determination
under clause (i) as the committees may
request. The Secretary of the Treasury
may submit, with such information, a
written request and justification for
the committees to treat the information
confidentially.''; and
(3) in paragraph (8)(B), after ``in writing'' by inserting
``, shall include details of factors that led to the
determination and analyses of those factors and their
implications''.
TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY
SEC. 201. FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY.
(a) Federal Reserve Act.--The Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 221 et
seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 11--
(A) in the first subsection (s) (related to ``Federal
Reserve Transparency'')--
(i) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking
``eighth'' and inserting ``fourth'';
(ii) in paragraph (5), by striking ``24-
month'' and inserting ``12-month''; and
(iii) in paragraph (7)--
(I) by striking ``This subsection''
and inserting the following:
``(A) In general.--This subsection'';
(II) by inserting ``public'' before
``disclosure''; and
(III) by adding at the end the
following:
``(B) Congressional access to information.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall, upon
request, make the nonpublic personal
information described under subparagraph (A)
available to the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate.
``(ii) Confidentiality.--With respect to a
request described under clause (i), if the
Chairman of the Board determines that any part
of the requested information needs to remain
confidential and provides written notice of
such determination to the committee making such
request, the Board shall only make that part of
the requested information available to the
chair and ranking member of the committee.'';
and
(B) by redesignating the second subsection (s)
(relating to ``Assessments, Fees, and Other Charges'')
as subsection (t); and
(2) in section 13(3), by adding at the end the following:
``(F) Congressional access to information.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall make
available to the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate information requested by
such committees related to any credit facility
established by or on behalf of the Federal
Reserve System or a Federal reserve bank and
authorized by the Board under this paragraph.
``(ii) Confidentiality.--With respect to a
request described under clause (i), if the
Chairman of the Board determines that any part
of the requested information needs to remain
confidential and provides written notice of
such determination to the committee making such
request, the Board shall only make that part of
the requested information available to the
chair and ranking member of the committee.''.
(b) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.--Title
XI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is
amended--
(1) in section 1104 (12 U.S.C. 5611)--
(A) in subsection (a)(2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and''
at the end;
(ii) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as
subparagraph (C); and
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the
following:
``(B) be transmitted to the chair and ranking member
of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the chair and ranking member of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate; and'';
(B) in subsection (b), by inserting after ``consent
of the Secretary'' the following: ``and notification to
Congress'';
(C) in subsection (c)(2), in the heading, by striking
``GOA'' inserting ``Congressional review and gao''; and
(D) by striking subsection (d);
(2) in section 1105 (12 U.S.C. 5612)--
(A) in subsection (c)--
(i) in paragraph (1)--
(I) by inserting ``and upon
notification to Congress'' after ``with
the President'';
(II) by striking ``President may''
and inserting ``President shall''; and
(III) by striking ``amount and a
request'' and inserting ``amount, and
include in such report the expected
cost to taxpayers and a detailed
description of the assumptions made and
analytical tools used to calculate such
expected cost, and a request''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and
upon notification to Congress'' after ``with
the President''; and
(B) in subsection (g), by amending paragraph (3) to
read as follows:
``(3) Liquidity event.--The term `liquidity event' shall have
the definition given such term, jointly, by the Board of
Governors, the Corporation, and the Secretary, by rule pursuant
to notice and comment.''.
(c) Title 31.--Section 714(f)(3) of title 31, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``legislative or''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking ``, including to
Congress,''.
TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY
SEC. 301. FSOC TRANSPARENCY.
(a) Financial Stability Act of 2010.--The Financial Stability Act of
2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 111--
(A) in subsection (b)(1)--
(i) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``and''
at the end;
(ii) in subparagraph (J), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(K) an independent member appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and not of the same political party as the
President.'';
(B) in subsection (c)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking
``independent member'' and inserting
``independent members''; and
(ii) in paragraph (4)--
(I) in the heading, by striking
``independent member'' and inserting
``independent members''; and
(II) by striking ``subsection
(b)(1)(J)'' and inserting
``subparagraph (J) or (K) of subsection
(b)(1)'';
(C) by striking subsection (d);
(D) by redesignating subsections (e) through (j) as
subsections (d) through (i), respectively;
(E) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, by adding
at the end the following:
``(3) Notice to congress.--The Chairperson shall notify the
chair and ranking members of the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and the chair and
ranking members of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate of a meeting at the same time as the
meeting participants are notified.'';
(F) in subsection (f), as so redesignated, by
striking ``, or to any special advisory, technical, or
professional committee appointed by the Council, except
that, if an advisory, technical, or professional
committee has one or more members who are not employees
of or affiliated with the United States Government, the
Council shall publish a list of the names of the
members of such committee'';
(G) in subsection (g), as so redesignated, by
inserting before the period at the end the following:
``, but if such services, funds, facilities, staff, or
other support services are provided with respect to any
Council program or activity that has, or is planned to
have, duration of greater than 90 days, the Council
shall notify Congress of such provision''; and
(H) in subsection (i), as so redesignated, by adding
at the end the following: ``The Council shall report on
such detailed employees on a monthly basis to
Congress.'';
(2) in section 112--
(A) in subsection (a)(2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting after
``system'' the following: ``and only after
notifying Congress'';
(ii) by striking subparagraphs (D) and (I);
(iii) by redesignating subparagraphs (E),
(F), (G), (H), (J), (K), (L), (M), and (N) as
subparagraphs (D) through (L), respectively;
(iv) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated,
by striking ``agencies and'' and inserting
``agencies, Congress, and'';
(v) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated,
by inserting after ``to the member agencies''
the following: ``, the chair and ranking member
of the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives and the chair and
ranking member of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate'';
(vi) in subparagraph (G), as so redesignated,
by striking ``may'';
(vii) in subparagraph (H), as so
redesignated, by inserting before the semicolon
the following: ``, and notify the chair and
ranking member of the Committee on Financial
Services of the House of Representatives and
the chair and ranking member of the Committee
on Banking, Housing, an
Purpose and Summary
Introduced on May 22, 2023, by Representative Andy Barr,
H.R. 3556, the Increasing Financial Regulatory Accountability
and Transparency Act, enhances transparency and accountability
of banking regulators, provides for increased reporting
requirements on the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Financial Stability Oversight
Committee (FSOC), especially when emergency actions are taken
when threats to financial stability arise. The bill also
provides for the establishment of requirements for the position
of Vice Chairman for Supervision at the Federal Reserve.
Background and Need for Legislation
H.R. 3556 contains parts of the following pieces of
legislation:
H.R. 3555, the Banking Regulator
Accountability Act, introduced by Representative Monica
De La Cruz.
H.R. 3465, a bill to enhance FDIC
transparency, introduced by Representative Andy Barr.
H.R. 3467, a bill to enhance Federal Reserve
transparency, introduced by Representative Andy Barr.
H.R. 3466, a bill to enhance Financial
Stability Oversight Council transparency, introduced by
Representative Andy Barr.
H.R. 3558, the Vice Chair of Supervision
Banking Experience Requirement Act, introduced by
Representative Scott Fitzgerald.
Title I: Enhancing FDIC Transparency
Title I would enhance and expand reporting requirements for
the FDIC's receivership and resolution activities. The recent
bank failures have highlighted deficiencies in the Federal
banking agencies' authorities and duties surrounding emergency
activities. This title would ensure prompt notification and
reporting to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate
Banking Committee to increase transparency and accountability
and to facilitate proper Congressional oversight.
Title II: Enhancing Federal Reserve Transparency
Title II would enhance the transparency and accountability
around the Federal Reserve's emergency lending authorities when
used in ``unusual and exigent circumstances'' under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The bill does not affect
monetary policy independence. The recent bank failures have
highlighted the opacity of the Federal Reserve's emergency
lending authorities. This title would require prompt
notification and robust reporting to the House Financial
Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee to increase
transparency and accountability and facilitate proper
Congressional oversight.
Title III: Enhancing Financial Stability Oversight Council Transparency
Title III would enhance transparency surrounding activities
of FSOC. The recent bank failures have highlighted the closed
nature of the FSOC proceedings to Congress and the public. This
title would ensure prompt notification and reporting to the
House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee
to increase transparency and accountability and facilitate
proper Congressional oversight.
Title IV: Establishing Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision
Experience Requirement
Title IV would require that the Vice Chairman for
Supervision have experience working in or supervising banking
organizations. As with other experience and expertise
requirements for certain financial regulatory positions, the
Vice Chairman for Supervision at the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors should have relevant ``real world'' experience to
help successfully conduct the duties of the role. Currently,
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has only one member with
experience running or supervising a banking organization, which
is required by the Federal Reserve Act in relation to community
bank experience. The other members provide perspectives from
academia and non-supervision related government service.
Title V: Banking Regulatory Accountability
Title V would require the heads of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) (the ``Federal banking agencies'') to
testify semi-annually before the House Financial Services
Committee and Senate Banking Committee. Currently, only the
Vice Chairman of Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board is
required to provide semi-annual testimony. The title would also
expand the reporting requirements for each Federal banking
agency, including the Vice Chairman for Supervision of the
Federal Reserve Board, relating to supervisory activities,
including providing confidential reports to the Chair and
Ranking Member of the House Financial Services Committee and
Senate Banking Committee.
The Dodd-Frank Act created the position of Vice Chairman
for Supervision for the Federal Reserve Board and requires the
Vice Chairman for Supervision to testify before the House
Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee at
semi-annual hearings. The Federal Reserve Supervision and
Regulation Report summarizes banking conditions and the Federal
Reserve's supervision and regulation activities and is issued
in conjunction with the Vice Chairman's semiannual testimony
before Congress. The FDIC, the OCC, and the NCUA do not have
similar statutory testimony requirements. The expanded
reporting requirements will help Congress to further understand
the condition of the financial institutions the federal banking
agencies supervise on an aggregate basis.
Hearing
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following
hearings were used to develop H.R. 3556: The Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy of the Committee on
Financial Services held a hearing on May 10, 2023, titled
``Federal Responses to Recent Bank Failures.''
Committee Consideration
The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on
May 24, 2023, and ordered H.R. 3556 to be reported favorably to
the House as amended by a recorded vote of 26 ayes to 22 nays
(Record vote no. FC-65), a quorum being present. Before the
question was called to order the bill favorably reported, the
Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by Mr. Barr by voice vote.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.R.
3556 was ordered reported favorably to the House as amended by
a recorded vote of 26 ayes to 22 nays (Record vote no. FC-65),
a quorum being present.
An amendment offered by Mr. Lynch, no. 1, was not agreed to
by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote
no. FC-64).
An amendment offered by Mr. Sherman, no. 2, was not agreed
to by voice vote.
An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 3, was not agreed
to by a recorded vote of 21 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no.
FC-59).
An amendment offered by Mr. Sherman, no. 4, was not agreed
to by voice vote.
An amendment offered by Mr. Green, no. 5, was not agreed to
by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote
no. FC-64).
An amendment offered by Ms. Pettersen, no. 6, was not
agreed to by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays
(Record vote no. FC-64).
An amendment offered by Ms. Waters, no. 7, was not agreed
to by a recorded vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no.
FC-61).
An amendment offered by Ms. Tlaib, no. 8, was not agreed to
by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote
no. FC-64).
An amendment offered by Ms. Waters, no. 9, was not agreed
to by a recorded vote 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-
62).
An amendment offered by Mr. Green, no. 10, was not agreed
to by a recorded vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no.
FC-63).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 3556 is to ensure
the SEC has a better understanding of regulatory costs on small
entities and modernizes its criteria for defining ``small
entities.''
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
The Committee has requested but not received a cost
estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been
prepared.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
The Committee has requested but not received an estimate
from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However,
pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, once an estimate has been prepared by
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, as required by
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1973, the
Committee will adopt as its own the estimate of new budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the
Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act. The Committee will adopt the estimate once
it has been prepared by the Director.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Earmark Identification
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the
rule.
Duplication of Federal Programs
In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
This section cites H.R. 3556 as the Increasing Financial
Regulatory Accountability and Transparency Act.
TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 101. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transparency
This section would require the FDIC to notify the House
Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee
whenever the FDIC, pursuant to an FDIC systemic risk
determination, makes loans to, makes deposits in, purchases the
assets or securities of, assumes the liabilities of, or makes
contributions to insured depository institutions.
This section would require the FDIC, when determining the
best manner of securing a least cost resolution (least cost to
the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund) of a failed depository
institution, to use an expected present-value analysis.
This section would require notification of the two relevant
congressional committees of FDIC's proposed systemic risk
determination prior to or concurrent with the FDIC's request
for approval from two-thirds of the FDIC Board of Directors,
two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with
the President. Prompt information provision to Congress helps
facilitate necessary Congressional oversight of actions taken
by regulators and the Administration.
This section would require the Secretary of the Treasury to
document in greater detail the factors, empirical analyses, and
data that gave rise to a systemic risk determination, ensuring
that documentation of factors behind emergency actions taken is
necessary to facilitate proper Congressional oversight and can
help inform legislation, if legislation is needed, to improve
financial regulation following emergency regulatory actions.
This section would require the FDIC, the Federal Reserve,
and the Secretary of the Treasury to provide documentation to
the two relevant congressional committees of the immediate
discussions surrounding a systemic risk determination at the
time it was made, including staff analyses and memoranda,
within three days of the systemic risk determination, and would
require the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the
Treasury to provide more in-depth documentation of data,
metrics, and quantitative analyses used to justify the systemic
risk determination within 30 days of the systemic risk
determination.
This section would grant the relevant congressional
committees additional abilities to exercise Congressional
oversight and review requests for information from the
Secretary of the Treasury regarding a systemic risk
determination while safeguarding the confidentiality of the
information by allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to submit
a written request and justification for such confidentiality.
This section would require the FDIC to make public via the
Federal Register the factors that led to the systemic risk
determination and analyses of those factors and their
implications.
TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 201. Federal Reserve transparency
This section would require that the Federal Reserve provide
to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate
Banking Committee information relating to broad-based credit
facilities created pursuant to the Federal Reserve's 13(3)
unusual and exigent circumstances lending authorities while
safeguarding confidentiality of the information by allowing the
Federal Reserve to determine information that should remain
confidential other than disclosure to the chair and ranking
member of the committee requesting such information.
This section would shorten the timeline for public
reporting of transaction details and identifying information of
discount window borrowers, 13(3) credit facility borrowers, and
open market operations participants to four quarters from the
current eight quarters.
This section would shorten the automatic termination date
of 13(3) credit facilities to 12 months after the credit
facilities' last loan made instead of the current 24 months.
This section would require, upon request from the relevant
congressional committees, that the Federal Reserve disclose to
those committees the identifying information of non-borrower,
non-participating, or non-counterparty third parties named in
collateral or assets used in discount window lending, 13(3)
credit facilities, or open market operations while safeguarding
confidentiality of the information by allowing the Federal
Reserve to determine information that should remain
confidential other than disclosure to the chair and ranking
member of the relevant congressional committee making a request
for such information.
This section would require the Secretary of the Treasury to
notify the relevant congressional committees prior to or at the
same time that the Secretary, in conjunction with the two-
thirds votes of the FDIC Board of Directors and the two-thirds
vote of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, makes a
determination that a liquidity event exists that requires the
FDIC to create a widely available program to guarantee the
obligations of solvent insured depository institutions and
makes a conforming change by deleting a provision that required
a report to the relevant congressional committees within 30
days of a liquidity event determination allowing the FDIC to
guarantee such obligations.
This section would require that when the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the President, makes a liquidity
event determination, the Secretary must notify Congress prior
to or concurrent with the determination, and requires that the
President provide Congress a written report on the FDIC's plan
to exercise its authority to create a widely available program
to guarantee the obligations of solvent insured depository
institutions and requires a report containing an enumeration of
the amount of guarantees to be extended, the expected cost to
taxpayers, and a detailed description of the assumptions and
analyses used to calculate that expected cost.
This section would require that the FDIC, the Federal
Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury publish a rule for
notice and comment defining the term ``liquidity event'' to
provide a referential baseline for those agencies to compare
future circumstances to in order to provide clarity,
predictability, and accountability for future uses of the
FDIC's extraordinary authority to guarantee obligations of
solvent insured depository institutions. The existing
definition of a ``liquidity event'' provided in the Dodd-Frank
Act is confusing and allows too much discretion for suboptimal
decision making by the FDIC.
This section would require that when GAO conducts an audit
of Federal Reserve 13(3) credit facilities, that GAO only make
non-legislative recommendations regarding such facilities, and
that GAO make available to Congress, upon request, the
identifying details of 13(3) credit facility participants and
transaction details.
TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 301. FSOC transparency
This section would require that the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) have an independent voting member
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate who is a
not a member of the same political party as the President with
a term of six years. This would provide additional checks and
balances within the FSOC governance structure.
This section would eliminate FSOC's in-house advisory,
technical, and professional advisory committees that function
as an insular and duplicative set of bodies to those already
housed within the federal financial regulatory agencies
themselves.
This section would require the chair of FSOC--the Secretary
of the Treasury--to notify the House Financial Services
Committee and the Senate Banking Committee of FSOC meetings
while FSOC members are notified of such meetings.
This section would require that the Federal Advisory
Committee Act apply to FSOC special advisory committees as it
does other advisory committees of federal agencies, allowing
transparency and public involvement through open meetings and
publication of reports, transcripts, and other materials.
This section would require that FSOC notify Congress any
time it receives assistance from other federal agencies for
FSOC programs with a duration of 90 days or more and would
require monthly notification to Congress regarding employees
detailed from other federal agencies to FSOC.
This section would require notification to Congress
whenever FSOC directs the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to
collect information from bank holding companies and non-bank
financial companies.
This section would eliminate the purview of FSOC to monitor
and make recommendations to Congress regarding domestic and
international financial regulatory proposals and developments,
and to make recommendations to the Federal Reserve regarding
prudential financial regulations for bank holding companies and
non-bank financial companies regulated by the Federal Reserve.
This section will help preserve independence of Federal Reserve
policymaking.
This section would require that FSOC make the same
recommendations to the relevant congressional committees
regarding financial supervisory priorities and principles as it
currently does to the federal financial regulatory agencies.
This section would clarify that FSOC can only require that
the Federal Reserve supervise non-bank financial companies that
actually pose financial stability risks instead of the current
subjective discretion given to FSOC to require the Federal
Reserve to do so.
This section would require FSOC to notify the chair and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees when
it identifies systemically important financial market utilities
and payment, clearing, and settlement activities and of any
recommendations FSOC makes to federal financial regulatory
agencies regarding new or heightened standards and safeguards
that FSOC believes necessary to prevent systemic risk in U.S.
financial markets posed by these utilities or activities.
This section would require that FSOC notify Congress any
time it reviews and submits comments to the SEC, PCAOB, and
other standards-setting bodies regarding financial accounting
principles, standards, or procedures.
This section would require that the Chair of FSOC--the
Secretary of the Treasury--appear before the relevant
congressional committees in the Secretary's role as Chair of
the FSOC each year within 60 days of publication of FSOC's
Annual Report.
This section would require FSOC member agencies, the OFR,
and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to submit the same
information to Congress as they do to FSOC and would require
that the chairs and ranking members of the relevant
congressional committees be notified 30 days before FSOC
requires FSOC member agencies, the OFR, or the FIO to make
periodic submissions of reports and other information to FSOC.
This section would require FSOC to notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees before
requesting that the Federal Reserve conduct an examination of a
non-bank financial company that FSOC cannot itself determine
does or does not pose a threat to the financial stability of
the U.S.
This section would require FSOC, OFR, and FSOC member
agencies to make available to Congress, upon request,
confidential data, information, and reports.
This section would require that FSOC, when determining and
voting on whether or not to subject a U.S. or foreign non-bank
financial company to Federal Reserve supervision, must only
consider numerically quantifiable metrics for such a
determination instead of also allowing subjective
considerations of any other risk-related factors that FSOC
deems appropriate as is the case now.
This section would eliminate the ability of FSOC to deny or
modify the right to a hearing for a non-bank financial company
subject to a determination that they should be subject to
Federal Reserve supervision. This section would help fortify
due process for private-sector entities.
This section would require that when FSOC makes a
determination to subject a non-bank financial company to
Federal Reserve supervision that it immediately notify Congress
and that the determination may not have force or effect for 60
days beginning from the date that FSOC notifies Congress, and
allows Congress, within that 60 day period, to pass a joint
resolution through the House and Senate that disapproves FSOC's
determination and deprives it of any force or effect, and sets
out procedures for consideration of such joint resolution by
the House and the Senate.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any
recommendations it makes to the Federal Reserve regarding the
Federal Reserve's prudential standards and reporting
requirements for non-bank financial companies.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any
recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding
contingent convertible capital requirements for bank holding
companies and non-bank financial companies subject to Federal
Reserve supervision.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any
recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding
orderly resolution plan requirements for bank holding companies
subject to Federal Reserve supervision.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any
recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding
periodic reporting of counterparty credit exposures that
Federal Reserve-supervised bank holding companies and non-bank
financial companies have to other significant bank holding
companies and other significant non-bank financial companies.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any
recommendations that FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve
regarding Enhanced Prudential Standards that the Federal
Reserve applies to large bank holding companies and non-bank
financial companies it supervises.
This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and
ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of
recommendations it makes to the Fede
Minority Views
H.R. 3556 would make it much harder for financial
regulators to respond to future banking crises and otherwise
address risks to financial stability by creating layers of new
requirements to various emergency stabilization and financial
stability tools, including the ones that regulators recently
utilized to respond to recent bank failures.
Specifically, this bill would make it harder to promptly
invoke a systemic risk exception (SRE) to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) least cost resolution test by
requiring new and extensive analyses of an SRE in a fast-moving
crisis. This SRE was quickly utilized by federal regulators to
protect depositors of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank,
including many small businesses that could have otherwise been
unable to make payroll the Monday after both banks failed. The
bill also limits the effectiveness of the Fed's emergency
lending authorities, by requiring, for example, disclosures
revealing borrower information earlier than is currently
required that may create a chilling effect on the use of such
facilities. There already is a concern that borrowing from the
Fed's discount window on a two-year lag discourages banks from
accessing it, so requiring disclosures sooner could cause
enhance this chilling effect, rendering these emergency lending
authorities less helpful in a crisis.
Further, the bill engages in an unscrupulous political
attack on the current Fed's Vice Chair of Supervision by making
an individual with his experience and expertise ineligible to
serve in his current role. Republicans are focused on this
political attack in spite of the fact that the Fed's report,
Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of
Silicon Valley Bank,\1\ makes regulatory recommendations that
the Majority's own witnesses agree are sensible reforms.
Additionally, the bill would slash the funding of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial
Research (OFR), which are specifically charged with looking
across regulatory silos to prevent a future financial crisis.
The bill also eliminates FSOC's Climate-related Financial Risk
Advisory Committee (CFRAC), along with FSOC's ability to
establish any other expert committee to advise FSOC in the
furtherance of its mission to combat systemic risk and promote
financial stability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Federal Reserve, Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and
Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (Apr. 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, while verbalizing support for a number of
reform ideas offered as amendments by Committee Democrats,
Committee Republicans voted to reject every Democratic
amendment, all of which would have provided meaningful policy
changes to respond to the recent bank failures. These
amendments include:
Waters Amendment on Executive
Accountability: This amendment would enhance FDIC's
ability to clawback compensation from executives of
failed banks, fine them, and bar them from serving in
the industry going forward, similar to existing
authority FDIC has for other situations. The Biden
Administration has urged Congress to address clawback
authority in response to the bank failures, and this
amendment incorporated the feedback of the FDIC, NEC
and Treasury. Rep. Waters subsequently introduced this
amendment as H.R. 4208, the Failed Bank Executives
Accountability and Consequences Act. H.R. 4208 is
similar to S. 2190, the Recovering Executive
Compensation Obtained from Unaccountable Practices
(RECOUP) Act, sponsored by Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Sherrod Brown (D-OH), which the Senate Banking
Committee approved with broad bipartisan support by a
21-2 vote on June 21, 2023.
Waters Amendment to Close Enhanced
Prudential Standard Loophole: This amendment would
ensure that Dodd-Frank's enhanced prudential
standards--including enhanced capital and liquidity
requirements, stress testing, resolution planning, risk
management, etc.--apply to large banks, including those
banks that do not have a bank holding company. This
amendment closes a loophole that allowed Signature Bank
and First Republic Bank to escape Dodd-Frank's enhanced
prudential standards that apply to other large banks of
the same size. Rep. Waters subsequently introduced this
amendment as H.R. 4210, the Closing the Enhanced
Prudential Standards Loophole Act.
Green Amendment Systemic Risk Exception
Reporting: This amendment would require, whenever a
systemic risk exception (SRE) is authorized going
forward, that bank regulators produce the same kind of
self-assessment reports that the Federal Reserve and
FDIC recently did with SVB and Signature Bank,
disclosing relevant confidential supervisory
information as well. Moreover, GAO would also be
required to do a comprehensive study of related bank
failures, similar to what Chair McHenry and Ranking
Member Waters requested. Regulators and GAO would have
to produce an initial report within 60 days, and a more
comprehensive report after 6 months. Rep. Green
subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4116,
the Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act.
Green Amendment on Community Bank Exemption
from Special Assessments: This amendment would support
community bank calls to ensure that they are not
included in the special assessments charged to recoup
losses sustained by the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund
related to protecting uninsured depositors when the
systemic risk exception was invoked. Similar to FDIC's
proposal, the amendment would exempt banks with less
than $5 billion in assets (which the FDIC can raise to
a higher threshold) and require any assessment for
banks between $5 billion and $50 billion to be
relatively small compared to assessments charged to the
largest banks. Rep. Green subsequently introduced this
amendment as H.R. 4204, the Shielding Community Banks
from Systemic Risk Assessments Act.
Lynch Amendment to Promote Competition in
Purchasing Failing Banks: This amendment would ensure
more banks can purchase failed banks by directing the
FDIC to only consider the bids of a megabank with more
than 10% of total U.S. deposits if no other
institutions that bid on a failed bank meets FDIC's
least cost test. Rep. Lynch subsequently introduced
this amendment as H.R. 3914, the Failing Bank
Acquisition Fairness Act. H.R. 3914 is similar to an
amendment offered by Sen. J.D. Vance (R-OH) that was
included in S. 2190, the Recovering Executive
Compensation Obtained from Unaccountable Practices
(RECOUP) Act, which the Senate Banking Committee
approved with broad bipartisan support by a 21-2 vote
on June 21, 2023.
Casten Amendment on Chief Risk Officer
Requirements: The amendment would codify regulatory
requirements that large banks have a Chief Risk Officer
(CRO), along with a risk committee. The amendment would
further require that within 24 hours of a large bank's
CRO role becoming vacant, the bank must notify their
federal and, if applicable, state prudential regulator
of such vacancy. Within 7 days, they must submit a plan
to their regulator on how they would search for and
promptly hire a well-qualified CRO when there is a
vacancy. After 60 days, if the vacancy remains, the
bank shall notify the public that their CRO role is
vacant and automatically subject the bank to a cap on
their asset growth until such vacancy is cured. Rep.
Casten subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R.
4062, the Chief Risk Officer Enforcement and
Accountability Act.
Tlaib Amendment on Deferred Compensation:
This amendment would require large banks to have
portion of their executive compensation placed into a
deferred compensation pool that would get paid out
after 6 to 8 years. In the case of a bank failure and/
or executive misconduct, the fund would be used to
cover the costs of resolving the bank or pay any fines.
This idea was proposed by former New York Fed Bank
President Dudley, and it would supplement the
rulemaking pursuant to Section 956 of Dodd-Frank on
incentive-based compensation that the Fed, FDIC, OCC,
NCUA, SEC, and FHFA must jointly complete. Rep. Tlaib
subsequently introduced an expanded version of this
amendment as H.R. 4200, the Fostering Accountability in
Remuneration Fund Act (FAIR Fund Act) of 2023.
Pettersen Amendment on Bonus Freeze: This
amendment would automatically restrict discretionary
bonus payments to executives of large banks with more
than $50 billion in total assets whenever the bank
receives a Matter Requiring Immediate Attention (MRIA)
or other serious supervisory citations from bank
supervisors, until such time that the matter is
addressed by the bank to the regulators' satisfaction.
This provides an incentive to bank management to
promptly address problems flagged by supervisors before
they rise to an MRIA, similar to an executive bonus
restriction when large banks don't meet certain capital
requirements. Rep. Pettersen subsequently introduced
this amendment as H.R. 4207, the Stopping Bonuses for
Unsafe and Unsound Banking Act.
Sherman Amendment on Improving Stress
Testing: This amendment would require the bank
regulators to expand their stress testing requirements.
Specifically, rather than doing two stress test
scenarios, the bill would require five scenarios, and
ensure that the Federal Reserve does stress tests for
situations when interest rates are rising or falling.
Rep. Sherman subsequently introduced this amendment as
H.R. 3992, the Effective Bank Regulation Act.
Sherman Amendment on Capital Requirements
for Securities Portfolios with Unrealized Losses: This
amendment would prevent large banks from opting out of
the requirement to recognize Accumulated Other
Comprehensive Income (AOCI) in regulatory capital,
which primarily reflects the kind of unrealized losses
Silicon Valley Bank had with its securities portfolio.
This would address a problem with SVB's common equity
Tier 1 capital ratio artificially appearing 2% better
capitalized than it ended up being. Rep. Sherman
subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4206,
the Bank Safety Act.
Nothing in H.R. 3556 would address the root causes of the
recent bank failures. Instead, this bill meddles unnecessarily
with regulators' tools and flexibility to respond in an
emergency despite the fact that regulators have gone out of
their way to make confidential supervisory information
available and be forthright about what happened and what they
are doing in response. For these reasons, the Minority opposes
H.R. 3556.
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Brad Sherman,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Joyce Beatty,
Juan Vargas,
Sean Casten,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Nikema Williams,
Members of Congress.
[all]