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H. Rept. 118-793

INCREASING FINANCIAL REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ACT

2024-12-04

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 3556] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3556) to amend the Federal financial laws to increase financial regulatory accountability and transparency, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 12 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 13 Related Hearings................................................. 14 Committee Consideration.......................................... 14 Committee Votes.................................................. 15 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 22 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 22 Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 22 New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 22 Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 22 Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 22 Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 22 Earmark Identification........................................... 22 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 23 Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 23 Ramseyer......................................................... 31 Minority Views................................................... 120 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Increasing Financial Regulatory Accountability and Transparency Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY Sec. 101. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transparency. TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY Sec. 201. Federal Reserve transparency. TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY Sec. 301. FSOC transparency. TITLE IV--ESTABLISHING FEDERAL RESERVE VICE CHAIR FOR SUPERVISION EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT Sec. 401. Establishment of requirements to be Vice Chairman for Supervision. TITLE V--BANKING REGULATOR ACCOUNTABILITY Sec. 501. Reports and testimony to Congress on supervision. TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY SEC. 101. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION TRANSPARENCY. Section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1823) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting after ``taken'' the following: ``after notification to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and''; (2) in paragraph (4)-- (A) in subparagraph (B)(i)(I), by striking ``a present-value'' and inserting ``an expected present- value''; and (B) in subparagraph (G)-- (i) in clause (i)-- (I) by inserting ``after notification to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and'' before ``upon the''; and (II) in subclause (II), by striking ``would'' and inserting ``that can be shown to''; (ii) in clause (iii)(I), by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, including documentation of factors, empirical analyses, and data that gave rise to the determination''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(vi) Additional reports to congress on emergency determinations.-- ``(I) In general.--With respect to each determination under clause (i), the Board of Directors, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall each provide to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate-- ``(aa) not later than 3 days after such determination, all documentation related to such determination, including staff analyses and memoranda; and ``(bb) not later than 30 days after such determination, any analyses undertaken to justify such determination, including data, metrics used, and quantitative analyses undertaken. ``(II) Information requested by committees.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate with such additional information related to a determination under clause (i) as the committees may request. The Secretary of the Treasury may submit, with such information, a written request and justification for the committees to treat the information confidentially.''; and (3) in paragraph (8)(B), after ``in writing'' by inserting ``, shall include details of factors that led to the determination and analyses of those factors and their implications''. TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY SEC. 201. FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY. (a) Federal Reserve Act.--The Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 221 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 11-- (A) in the first subsection (s) (related to ``Federal Reserve Transparency'')-- (i) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``eighth'' and inserting ``fourth''; (ii) in paragraph (5), by striking ``24- month'' and inserting ``12-month''; and (iii) in paragraph (7)-- (I) by striking ``This subsection'' and inserting the following: ``(A) In general.--This subsection''; (II) by inserting ``public'' before ``disclosure''; and (III) by adding at the end the following: ``(B) Congressional access to information.-- ``(i) In general.--The Board shall, upon request, make the nonpublic personal information described under subparagraph (A) available to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. ``(ii) Confidentiality.--With respect to a request described under clause (i), if the Chairman of the Board determines that any part of the requested information needs to remain confidential and provides written notice of such determination to the committee making such request, the Board shall only make that part of the requested information available to the chair and ranking member of the committee.''; and (B) by redesignating the second subsection (s) (relating to ``Assessments, Fees, and Other Charges'') as subsection (t); and (2) in section 13(3), by adding at the end the following: ``(F) Congressional access to information.-- ``(i) In general.--The Board shall make available to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate information requested by such committees related to any credit facility established by or on behalf of the Federal Reserve System or a Federal reserve bank and authorized by the Board under this paragraph. ``(ii) Confidentiality.--With respect to a request described under clause (i), if the Chairman of the Board determines that any part of the requested information needs to remain confidential and provides written notice of such determination to the committee making such request, the Board shall only make that part of the requested information available to the chair and ranking member of the committee.''. (b) Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.--Title XI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is amended-- (1) in section 1104 (12 U.S.C. 5611)-- (A) in subsection (a)(2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end; (ii) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: ``(B) be transmitted to the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and''; (B) in subsection (b), by inserting after ``consent of the Secretary'' the following: ``and notification to Congress''; (C) in subsection (c)(2), in the heading, by striking ``GOA'' inserting ``Congressional review and gao''; and (D) by striking subsection (d); (2) in section 1105 (12 U.S.C. 5612)-- (A) in subsection (c)-- (i) in paragraph (1)-- (I) by inserting ``and upon notification to Congress'' after ``with the President''; (II) by striking ``President may'' and inserting ``President shall''; and (III) by striking ``amount and a request'' and inserting ``amount, and include in such report the expected cost to taxpayers and a detailed description of the assumptions made and analytical tools used to calculate such expected cost, and a request''; and (ii) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and upon notification to Congress'' after ``with the President''; and (B) in subsection (g), by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows: ``(3) Liquidity event.--The term `liquidity event' shall have the definition given such term, jointly, by the Board of Governors, the Corporation, and the Secretary, by rule pursuant to notice and comment.''. (c) Title 31.--Section 714(f)(3) of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``legislative or''; and (2) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking ``, including to Congress,''. TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY SEC. 301. FSOC TRANSPARENCY. (a) Financial Stability Act of 2010.--The Financial Stability Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 111-- (A) in subsection (b)(1)-- (i) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``and'' at the end; (ii) in subparagraph (J), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(K) an independent member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and not of the same political party as the President.''; (B) in subsection (c)-- (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``independent member'' and inserting ``independent members''; and (ii) in paragraph (4)-- (I) in the heading, by striking ``independent member'' and inserting ``independent members''; and (II) by striking ``subsection (b)(1)(J)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (J) or (K) of subsection (b)(1)''; (C) by striking subsection (d); (D) by redesignating subsections (e) through (j) as subsections (d) through (i), respectively; (E) in subsection (d), as so redesignated, by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Notice to congress.--The Chairperson shall notify the chair and ranking members of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the chair and ranking members of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate of a meeting at the same time as the meeting participants are notified.''; (F) in subsection (f), as so redesignated, by striking ``, or to any special advisory, technical, or professional committee appointed by the Council, except that, if an advisory, technical, or professional committee has one or more members who are not employees of or affiliated with the United States Government, the Council shall publish a list of the names of the members of such committee''; (G) in subsection (g), as so redesignated, by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, but if such services, funds, facilities, staff, or other support services are provided with respect to any Council program or activity that has, or is planned to have, duration of greater than 90 days, the Council shall notify Congress of such provision''; and (H) in subsection (i), as so redesignated, by adding at the end the following: ``The Council shall report on such detailed employees on a monthly basis to Congress.''; (2) in section 112-- (A) in subsection (a)(2)-- (i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting after ``system'' the following: ``and only after notifying Congress''; (ii) by striking subparagraphs (D) and (I); (iii) by redesignating subparagraphs (E), (F), (G), (H), (J), (K), (L), (M), and (N) as subparagraphs (D) through (L), respectively; (iv) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking ``agencies and'' and inserting ``agencies, Congress, and''; (v) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by inserting after ``to the member agencies'' the following: ``, the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate''; (vi) in subparagraph (G), as so redesignated, by striking ``may''; (vii) in subparagraph (H), as so redesignated, by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and notify the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, an

Purpose and Summary

Introduced on May 22, 2023, by Representative Andy Barr, H.R. 3556, the Increasing Financial Regulatory Accountability and Transparency Act, enhances transparency and accountability of banking regulators, provides for increased reporting requirements on the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), especially when emergency actions are taken when threats to financial stability arise. The bill also provides for the establishment of requirements for the position of Vice Chairman for Supervision at the Federal Reserve.

Background and Need for Legislation

H.R. 3556 contains parts of the following pieces of legislation: H.R. 3555, the Banking Regulator Accountability Act, introduced by Representative Monica De La Cruz. H.R. 3465, a bill to enhance FDIC transparency, introduced by Representative Andy Barr. H.R. 3467, a bill to enhance Federal Reserve transparency, introduced by Representative Andy Barr. H.R. 3466, a bill to enhance Financial Stability Oversight Council transparency, introduced by Representative Andy Barr. H.R. 3558, the Vice Chair of Supervision Banking Experience Requirement Act, introduced by Representative Scott Fitzgerald. Title I: Enhancing FDIC Transparency Title I would enhance and expand reporting requirements for the FDIC's receivership and resolution activities. The recent bank failures have highlighted deficiencies in the Federal banking agencies' authorities and duties surrounding emergency activities. This title would ensure prompt notification and reporting to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee to increase transparency and accountability and to facilitate proper Congressional oversight. Title II: Enhancing Federal Reserve Transparency Title II would enhance the transparency and accountability around the Federal Reserve's emergency lending authorities when used in ``unusual and exigent circumstances'' under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The bill does not affect monetary policy independence. The recent bank failures have highlighted the opacity of the Federal Reserve's emergency lending authorities. This title would require prompt notification and robust reporting to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee to increase transparency and accountability and facilitate proper Congressional oversight. Title III: Enhancing Financial Stability Oversight Council Transparency Title III would enhance transparency surrounding activities of FSOC. The recent bank failures have highlighted the closed nature of the FSOC proceedings to Congress and the public. This title would ensure prompt notification and reporting to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee to increase transparency and accountability and facilitate proper Congressional oversight. Title IV: Establishing Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Experience Requirement Title IV would require that the Vice Chairman for Supervision have experience working in or supervising banking organizations. As with other experience and expertise requirements for certain financial regulatory positions, the Vice Chairman for Supervision at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors should have relevant ``real world'' experience to help successfully conduct the duties of the role. Currently, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has only one member with experience running or supervising a banking organization, which is required by the Federal Reserve Act in relation to community bank experience. The other members provide perspectives from academia and non-supervision related government service. Title V: Banking Regulatory Accountability Title V would require the heads of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (the ``Federal banking agencies'') to testify semi-annually before the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee. Currently, only the Vice Chairman of Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board is required to provide semi-annual testimony. The title would also expand the reporting requirements for each Federal banking agency, including the Vice Chairman for Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board, relating to supervisory activities, including providing confidential reports to the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee. The Dodd-Frank Act created the position of Vice Chairman for Supervision for the Federal Reserve Board and requires the Vice Chairman for Supervision to testify before the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee at semi-annual hearings. The Federal Reserve Supervision and Regulation Report summarizes banking conditions and the Federal Reserve's supervision and regulation activities and is issued in conjunction with the Vice Chairman's semiannual testimony before Congress. The FDIC, the OCC, and the NCUA do not have similar statutory testimony requirements. The expanded reporting requirements will help Congress to further understand the condition of the financial institutions the federal banking agencies supervise on an aggregate basis. Hearing Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 3556: The Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on May 10, 2023, titled ``Federal Responses to Recent Bank Failures.''

Committee Consideration

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on May 24, 2023, and ordered H.R. 3556 to be reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 26 ayes to 22 nays (Record vote no. FC-65), a quorum being present. Before the question was called to order the bill favorably reported, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Barr by voice vote.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the order to report legislation and amendments thereto. H.R. 3556 was ordered reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded vote of 26 ayes to 22 nays (Record vote no. FC-65), a quorum being present. An amendment offered by Mr. Lynch, no. 1, was not agreed to by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-64). An amendment offered by Mr. Sherman, no. 2, was not agreed to by voice vote. An amendment offered by Mr. Casten, no. 3, was not agreed to by a recorded vote of 21 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-59). An amendment offered by Mr. Sherman, no. 4, was not agreed to by voice vote. An amendment offered by Mr. Green, no. 5, was not agreed to by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-64). An amendment offered by Ms. Pettersen, no. 6, was not agreed to by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-64). An amendment offered by Ms. Waters, no. 7, was not agreed to by a recorded vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-61). An amendment offered by Ms. Tlaib, no. 8, was not agreed to by a recorded en bloc vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-64). An amendment offered by Ms. Waters, no. 9, was not agreed to by a recorded vote 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC- 62). An amendment offered by Mr. Green, no. 10, was not agreed to by a recorded vote of 22 ayes to 26 nays (Record vote no. FC-63). [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 3556 is to ensure the SEC has a better understanding of regulatory costs on small entities and modernizes its criteria for defining ``small entities.'' Congressional Budget Office Estimates The Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been prepared. New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures The Committee has requested but not received an estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, once an estimate has been prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, as required by section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1973, the Committee will adopt as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The Committee will adopt the estimate once it has been prepared by the Director. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Earmark Identification With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. Duplication of Federal Programs In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title; table of contents This section cites H.R. 3556 as the Increasing Financial Regulatory Accountability and Transparency Act. TITLE I--ENHANCING FDIC TRANSPARENCY Sec. 101. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transparency This section would require the FDIC to notify the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee whenever the FDIC, pursuant to an FDIC systemic risk determination, makes loans to, makes deposits in, purchases the assets or securities of, assumes the liabilities of, or makes contributions to insured depository institutions. This section would require the FDIC, when determining the best manner of securing a least cost resolution (least cost to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund) of a failed depository institution, to use an expected present-value analysis. This section would require notification of the two relevant congressional committees of FDIC's proposed systemic risk determination prior to or concurrent with the FDIC's request for approval from two-thirds of the FDIC Board of Directors, two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President. Prompt information provision to Congress helps facilitate necessary Congressional oversight of actions taken by regulators and the Administration. This section would require the Secretary of the Treasury to document in greater detail the factors, empirical analyses, and data that gave rise to a systemic risk determination, ensuring that documentation of factors behind emergency actions taken is necessary to facilitate proper Congressional oversight and can help inform legislation, if legislation is needed, to improve financial regulation following emergency regulatory actions. This section would require the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury to provide documentation to the two relevant congressional committees of the immediate discussions surrounding a systemic risk determination at the time it was made, including staff analyses and memoranda, within three days of the systemic risk determination, and would require the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury to provide more in-depth documentation of data, metrics, and quantitative analyses used to justify the systemic risk determination within 30 days of the systemic risk determination. This section would grant the relevant congressional committees additional abilities to exercise Congressional oversight and review requests for information from the Secretary of the Treasury regarding a systemic risk determination while safeguarding the confidentiality of the information by allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a written request and justification for such confidentiality. This section would require the FDIC to make public via the Federal Register the factors that led to the systemic risk determination and analyses of those factors and their implications. TITLE II--ENHANCING FEDERAL RESERVE TRANSPARENCY Sec. 201. Federal Reserve transparency This section would require that the Federal Reserve provide to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee information relating to broad-based credit facilities created pursuant to the Federal Reserve's 13(3) unusual and exigent circumstances lending authorities while safeguarding confidentiality of the information by allowing the Federal Reserve to determine information that should remain confidential other than disclosure to the chair and ranking member of the committee requesting such information. This section would shorten the timeline for public reporting of transaction details and identifying information of discount window borrowers, 13(3) credit facility borrowers, and open market operations participants to four quarters from the current eight quarters. This section would shorten the automatic termination date of 13(3) credit facilities to 12 months after the credit facilities' last loan made instead of the current 24 months. This section would require, upon request from the relevant congressional committees, that the Federal Reserve disclose to those committees the identifying information of non-borrower, non-participating, or non-counterparty third parties named in collateral or assets used in discount window lending, 13(3) credit facilities, or open market operations while safeguarding confidentiality of the information by allowing the Federal Reserve to determine information that should remain confidential other than disclosure to the chair and ranking member of the relevant congressional committee making a request for such information. This section would require the Secretary of the Treasury to notify the relevant congressional committees prior to or at the same time that the Secretary, in conjunction with the two- thirds votes of the FDIC Board of Directors and the two-thirds vote of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, makes a determination that a liquidity event exists that requires the FDIC to create a widely available program to guarantee the obligations of solvent insured depository institutions and makes a conforming change by deleting a provision that required a report to the relevant congressional committees within 30 days of a liquidity event determination allowing the FDIC to guarantee such obligations. This section would require that when the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, makes a liquidity event determination, the Secretary must notify Congress prior to or concurrent with the determination, and requires that the President provide Congress a written report on the FDIC's plan to exercise its authority to create a widely available program to guarantee the obligations of solvent insured depository institutions and requires a report containing an enumeration of the amount of guarantees to be extended, the expected cost to taxpayers, and a detailed description of the assumptions and analyses used to calculate that expected cost. This section would require that the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury publish a rule for notice and comment defining the term ``liquidity event'' to provide a referential baseline for those agencies to compare future circumstances to in order to provide clarity, predictability, and accountability for future uses of the FDIC's extraordinary authority to guarantee obligations of solvent insured depository institutions. The existing definition of a ``liquidity event'' provided in the Dodd-Frank Act is confusing and allows too much discretion for suboptimal decision making by the FDIC. This section would require that when GAO conducts an audit of Federal Reserve 13(3) credit facilities, that GAO only make non-legislative recommendations regarding such facilities, and that GAO make available to Congress, upon request, the identifying details of 13(3) credit facility participants and transaction details. TITLE III--ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL TRANSPARENCY Sec. 301. FSOC transparency This section would require that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) have an independent voting member appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate who is a not a member of the same political party as the President with a term of six years. This would provide additional checks and balances within the FSOC governance structure. This section would eliminate FSOC's in-house advisory, technical, and professional advisory committees that function as an insular and duplicative set of bodies to those already housed within the federal financial regulatory agencies themselves. This section would require the chair of FSOC--the Secretary of the Treasury--to notify the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee of FSOC meetings while FSOC members are notified of such meetings. This section would require that the Federal Advisory Committee Act apply to FSOC special advisory committees as it does other advisory committees of federal agencies, allowing transparency and public involvement through open meetings and publication of reports, transcripts, and other materials. This section would require that FSOC notify Congress any time it receives assistance from other federal agencies for FSOC programs with a duration of 90 days or more and would require monthly notification to Congress regarding employees detailed from other federal agencies to FSOC. This section would require notification to Congress whenever FSOC directs the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to collect information from bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies. This section would eliminate the purview of FSOC to monitor and make recommendations to Congress regarding domestic and international financial regulatory proposals and developments, and to make recommendations to the Federal Reserve regarding prudential financial regulations for bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies regulated by the Federal Reserve. This section will help preserve independence of Federal Reserve policymaking. This section would require that FSOC make the same recommendations to the relevant congressional committees regarding financial supervisory priorities and principles as it currently does to the federal financial regulatory agencies. This section would clarify that FSOC can only require that the Federal Reserve supervise non-bank financial companies that actually pose financial stability risks instead of the current subjective discretion given to FSOC to require the Federal Reserve to do so. This section would require FSOC to notify the chair and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees when it identifies systemically important financial market utilities and payment, clearing, and settlement activities and of any recommendations FSOC makes to federal financial regulatory agencies regarding new or heightened standards and safeguards that FSOC believes necessary to prevent systemic risk in U.S. financial markets posed by these utilities or activities. This section would require that FSOC notify Congress any time it reviews and submits comments to the SEC, PCAOB, and other standards-setting bodies regarding financial accounting principles, standards, or procedures. This section would require that the Chair of FSOC--the Secretary of the Treasury--appear before the relevant congressional committees in the Secretary's role as Chair of the FSOC each year within 60 days of publication of FSOC's Annual Report. This section would require FSOC member agencies, the OFR, and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to submit the same information to Congress as they do to FSOC and would require that the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees be notified 30 days before FSOC requires FSOC member agencies, the OFR, or the FIO to make periodic submissions of reports and other information to FSOC. This section would require FSOC to notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees before requesting that the Federal Reserve conduct an examination of a non-bank financial company that FSOC cannot itself determine does or does not pose a threat to the financial stability of the U.S. This section would require FSOC, OFR, and FSOC member agencies to make available to Congress, upon request, confidential data, information, and reports. This section would require that FSOC, when determining and voting on whether or not to subject a U.S. or foreign non-bank financial company to Federal Reserve supervision, must only consider numerically quantifiable metrics for such a determination instead of also allowing subjective considerations of any other risk-related factors that FSOC deems appropriate as is the case now. This section would eliminate the ability of FSOC to deny or modify the right to a hearing for a non-bank financial company subject to a determination that they should be subject to Federal Reserve supervision. This section would help fortify due process for private-sector entities. This section would require that when FSOC makes a determination to subject a non-bank financial company to Federal Reserve supervision that it immediately notify Congress and that the determination may not have force or effect for 60 days beginning from the date that FSOC notifies Congress, and allows Congress, within that 60 day period, to pass a joint resolution through the House and Senate that disapproves FSOC's determination and deprives it of any force or effect, and sets out procedures for consideration of such joint resolution by the House and the Senate. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any recommendations it makes to the Federal Reserve regarding the Federal Reserve's prudential standards and reporting requirements for non-bank financial companies. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding contingent convertible capital requirements for bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies subject to Federal Reserve supervision. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding orderly resolution plan requirements for bank holding companies subject to Federal Reserve supervision. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any recommendations FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding periodic reporting of counterparty credit exposures that Federal Reserve-supervised bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies have to other significant bank holding companies and other significant non-bank financial companies. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of any recommendations that FSOC makes to the Federal Reserve regarding Enhanced Prudential Standards that the Federal Reserve applies to large bank holding companies and non-bank financial companies it supervises. This section would require that FSOC notify the chairs and ranking members of the relevant congressional committees of recommendations it makes to the Fede

Minority Views

H.R. 3556 would make it much harder for financial regulators to respond to future banking crises and otherwise address risks to financial stability by creating layers of new requirements to various emergency stabilization and financial stability tools, including the ones that regulators recently utilized to respond to recent bank failures. Specifically, this bill would make it harder to promptly invoke a systemic risk exception (SRE) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) least cost resolution test by requiring new and extensive analyses of an SRE in a fast-moving crisis. This SRE was quickly utilized by federal regulators to protect depositors of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, including many small businesses that could have otherwise been unable to make payroll the Monday after both banks failed. The bill also limits the effectiveness of the Fed's emergency lending authorities, by requiring, for example, disclosures revealing borrower information earlier than is currently required that may create a chilling effect on the use of such facilities. There already is a concern that borrowing from the Fed's discount window on a two-year lag discourages banks from accessing it, so requiring disclosures sooner could cause enhance this chilling effect, rendering these emergency lending authorities less helpful in a crisis. Further, the bill engages in an unscrupulous political attack on the current Fed's Vice Chair of Supervision by making an individual with his experience and expertise ineligible to serve in his current role. Republicans are focused on this political attack in spite of the fact that the Fed's report, Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank,\1\ makes regulatory recommendations that the Majority's own witnesses agree are sensible reforms. Additionally, the bill would slash the funding of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research (OFR), which are specifically charged with looking across regulatory silos to prevent a future financial crisis. The bill also eliminates FSOC's Climate-related Financial Risk Advisory Committee (CFRAC), along with FSOC's ability to establish any other expert committee to advise FSOC in the furtherance of its mission to combat systemic risk and promote financial stability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Federal Reserve, Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (Apr. 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unfortunately, while verbalizing support for a number of reform ideas offered as amendments by Committee Democrats, Committee Republicans voted to reject every Democratic amendment, all of which would have provided meaningful policy changes to respond to the recent bank failures. These amendments include: Waters Amendment on Executive Accountability: This amendment would enhance FDIC's ability to clawback compensation from executives of failed banks, fine them, and bar them from serving in the industry going forward, similar to existing authority FDIC has for other situations. The Biden Administration has urged Congress to address clawback authority in response to the bank failures, and this amendment incorporated the feedback of the FDIC, NEC and Treasury. Rep. Waters subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4208, the Failed Bank Executives Accountability and Consequences Act. H.R. 4208 is similar to S. 2190, the Recovering Executive Compensation Obtained from Unaccountable Practices (RECOUP) Act, sponsored by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Sherrod Brown (D-OH), which the Senate Banking Committee approved with broad bipartisan support by a 21-2 vote on June 21, 2023. Waters Amendment to Close Enhanced Prudential Standard Loophole: This amendment would ensure that Dodd-Frank's enhanced prudential standards--including enhanced capital and liquidity requirements, stress testing, resolution planning, risk management, etc.--apply to large banks, including those banks that do not have a bank holding company. This amendment closes a loophole that allowed Signature Bank and First Republic Bank to escape Dodd-Frank's enhanced prudential standards that apply to other large banks of the same size. Rep. Waters subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4210, the Closing the Enhanced Prudential Standards Loophole Act. Green Amendment Systemic Risk Exception Reporting: This amendment would require, whenever a systemic risk exception (SRE) is authorized going forward, that bank regulators produce the same kind of self-assessment reports that the Federal Reserve and FDIC recently did with SVB and Signature Bank, disclosing relevant confidential supervisory information as well. Moreover, GAO would also be required to do a comprehensive study of related bank failures, similar to what Chair McHenry and Ranking Member Waters requested. Regulators and GAO would have to produce an initial report within 60 days, and a more comprehensive report after 6 months. Rep. Green subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4116, the Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act. Green Amendment on Community Bank Exemption from Special Assessments: This amendment would support community bank calls to ensure that they are not included in the special assessments charged to recoup losses sustained by the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund related to protecting uninsured depositors when the systemic risk exception was invoked. Similar to FDIC's proposal, the amendment would exempt banks with less than $5 billion in assets (which the FDIC can raise to a higher threshold) and require any assessment for banks between $5 billion and $50 billion to be relatively small compared to assessments charged to the largest banks. Rep. Green subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4204, the Shielding Community Banks from Systemic Risk Assessments Act. Lynch Amendment to Promote Competition in Purchasing Failing Banks: This amendment would ensure more banks can purchase failed banks by directing the FDIC to only consider the bids of a megabank with more than 10% of total U.S. deposits if no other institutions that bid on a failed bank meets FDIC's least cost test. Rep. Lynch subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 3914, the Failing Bank Acquisition Fairness Act. H.R. 3914 is similar to an amendment offered by Sen. J.D. Vance (R-OH) that was included in S. 2190, the Recovering Executive Compensation Obtained from Unaccountable Practices (RECOUP) Act, which the Senate Banking Committee approved with broad bipartisan support by a 21-2 vote on June 21, 2023. Casten Amendment on Chief Risk Officer Requirements: The amendment would codify regulatory requirements that large banks have a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), along with a risk committee. The amendment would further require that within 24 hours of a large bank's CRO role becoming vacant, the bank must notify their federal and, if applicable, state prudential regulator of such vacancy. Within 7 days, they must submit a plan to their regulator on how they would search for and promptly hire a well-qualified CRO when there is a vacancy. After 60 days, if the vacancy remains, the bank shall notify the public that their CRO role is vacant and automatically subject the bank to a cap on their asset growth until such vacancy is cured. Rep. Casten subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4062, the Chief Risk Officer Enforcement and Accountability Act. Tlaib Amendment on Deferred Compensation: This amendment would require large banks to have portion of their executive compensation placed into a deferred compensation pool that would get paid out after 6 to 8 years. In the case of a bank failure and/ or executive misconduct, the fund would be used to cover the costs of resolving the bank or pay any fines. This idea was proposed by former New York Fed Bank President Dudley, and it would supplement the rulemaking pursuant to Section 956 of Dodd-Frank on incentive-based compensation that the Fed, FDIC, OCC, NCUA, SEC, and FHFA must jointly complete. Rep. Tlaib subsequently introduced an expanded version of this amendment as H.R. 4200, the Fostering Accountability in Remuneration Fund Act (FAIR Fund Act) of 2023. Pettersen Amendment on Bonus Freeze: This amendment would automatically restrict discretionary bonus payments to executives of large banks with more than $50 billion in total assets whenever the bank receives a Matter Requiring Immediate Attention (MRIA) or other serious supervisory citations from bank supervisors, until such time that the matter is addressed by the bank to the regulators' satisfaction. This provides an incentive to bank management to promptly address problems flagged by supervisors before they rise to an MRIA, similar to an executive bonus restriction when large banks don't meet certain capital requirements. Rep. Pettersen subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4207, the Stopping Bonuses for Unsafe and Unsound Banking Act. Sherman Amendment on Improving Stress Testing: This amendment would require the bank regulators to expand their stress testing requirements. Specifically, rather than doing two stress test scenarios, the bill would require five scenarios, and ensure that the Federal Reserve does stress tests for situations when interest rates are rising or falling. Rep. Sherman subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 3992, the Effective Bank Regulation Act. Sherman Amendment on Capital Requirements for Securities Portfolios with Unrealized Losses: This amendment would prevent large banks from opting out of the requirement to recognize Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) in regulatory capital, which primarily reflects the kind of unrealized losses Silicon Valley Bank had with its securities portfolio. This would address a problem with SVB's common equity Tier 1 capital ratio artificially appearing 2% better capitalized than it ended up being. Rep. Sherman subsequently introduced this amendment as H.R. 4206, the Bank Safety Act. Nothing in H.R. 3556 would address the root causes of the recent bank failures. Instead, this bill meddles unnecessarily with regulators' tools and flexibility to respond in an emergency despite the fact that regulators have gone out of their way to make confidential supervisory information available and be forthright about what happened and what they are doing in response. For these reasons, the Minority opposes H.R. 3556. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member. Nydia M. Velazquez, Brad Sherman, Stephen F. Lynch, Joyce Beatty, Juan Vargas, Sean Casten, Rashida Tlaib, Sylvia R. Garcia, Nikema Williams, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/793