Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 288]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 288) to amend title 5, United States Code, to
clarify the nature of judicial review of agency interpretations
of statutory and regulatory provisions, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 2
Hearings......................................................... 5
Committee Consideration.......................................... 5
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 9
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 9
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 9
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 9
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 9
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 9
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 10
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 10
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 10
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 10
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 10
Minority Views................................................... 11
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and
insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Separation of Powers Restoration Act
of 2023'' or ``SOPRA''.
SEC. 2. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY AND REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS.
Section 706 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``To the extent necessary'' and inserting
``(a) To the extent necessary'';
(2) by striking ``decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and'';
(3) by inserting after ``of the terms of an agency action''
the following ``and decide de novo all relevant questions of
law, including the interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this subsection
shall apply in any action for judicial review of agency action
authorized under any provision of law. No law may exempt any
such civil action from the application of this section except
by specific reference to this section''; and
(4) by striking ``The reviewing court shall--'' and inserting
the following:
``(b) The reviewing court shall--''.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 288, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2023
or ``SOPRA,'' introduced by Rep. Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI),
amends the Administrative Procedure Act to legislatively
override the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,\1\ Auer v. Robbins,\2\ Kisor v. Wilkie,\3\ and
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.\4\ judicial deference doctrines and
requires courts to decide de novo all questions of law,
including the interpretation of statutes, rules, and guidance.
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\1\467 U.S. 837 (1984).
\2\519 U.S. 452 (1997).
\3\588 U.S. ------, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
\4\323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Background and Need for the Legislation
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that courts
reviewing agency actions ``shall decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency . . . conclusions
found to be . . . not in accordance with law.''\5\ As provided
by the statute, this scheme is consistent with the bedrock
principle that ``[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.''\6\
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\5\5 U.S.C. Sec. 706.
\6\Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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However, a series of Supreme Court decisions have turned
the APA's statutory scheme--and the Constitution's separation
of powers--on its head. When applicable, these cases require
courts to enforce an agency's ``reasonable'' interpretation of
the law--regardless of ``whether the agency has the correct
interpretation''--instead of saying what the law actually
is.\7\ For example, the Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. requires courts to
``defer[] to administrative interpretations'' of ambiguous
statutes rather than to exercise their independent judgment as
to statutory meaning.\8\ Similarly, its decisions in Auer v.
Robbins\9\ and Kisor v. Wilkie require courts to ``[d]efer[] to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules'' instead
of determining what those rules actually provide.\10\ Further,
the Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. may require
courts to defer even to persuasive agency ``rulings,
interpretations and opinions''--i.e., guidance documents that
have neither been passed by Congress nor subjected to the APA's
notice-and-comment procedures.\11\
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\7\Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's
Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative
State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 118th Cong. 1 (2023) (statement of Allyson N. Ho, Partner,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP).
\8\467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
\9\519 U.S. 452 (1997).
\10\588 U.S.------, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019).
\11\323 U.S.134, 140 (1944).
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As Justice Neil Gorsuch explained on behalf of himself and
Justice Clarence Thomas in a concurring opinion in Kisor, the
effect of these judicial deference doctrines is ``systematic
judicial bias in favor of the federal government, the most
powerful of parties, and against everyone else.''\12\
Representative Hageman amplified this concern during the
Committee's consideration of this bill:
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\12\Kisor, 588 U.S.------, 139S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
Judicial deference is a harmful doctrine placing the
American people at a distinct disadvantage in court
when going up against what has become an all too
powerful administrative state. . . .
It also undermines the very purpose of judicial
review by creating systemic judicial bias in favor of
administrative agencies, which at this point in time
have become far too powerful and far too dictatorial in
their actions. . . .
[W]hat the deference doctrine actually does is it
places the thumb on the scale of the administrative
agency against the citizens of this country, the exact
opposite of what is the foundation of America and what
is the foundation of our form of government.\13\
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\13\Markup of H.R.288 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th
Cong. 376:8,694-395:9,139.
Further, deference to the administrative state reduces
incentives for legislative compromise and promotes
instability--and therefore illegitimacy--in the law.\14\ Former
United States Solicitor General Paul Clement remarked in May
2023:
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\14\See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (``To avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents. . . .'').
If you ask yourself, ``why is it that Congress passes
less and less major legislation each year?,'' I think
that a large share of the blame actually goes to the
administrative state and the Chevron doctrine. And the
reason, I think, is straightforward. I mean, the way
you used to get legislation passed is you'd get some
kind of legislative compromise between folks on the
right and folks on the left. . . . Well, with the
Chevron doctrine and the ability of agencies to
essentially take anything that looks like an ambiguity
and do rulemaking, the reason you don't get compromise,
in my view, is that at any given time, about half the
people in Congress can get their friends in the
executive branch to do what they want just through an
administrative rule. So why compromise? If you can get
the immediate objective through an administrative rule,
why compromise for a long-term solution that's in
legislation?
And then of course that creates the other dynamic,
which is the fundamental law and some of the most
important issues in our society changes every four
years, or at least every time there is a new
administration. Because instead of having a compromise
law that becomes the law of the land across
administrations, you have a rule that's over here in
one administration and then it flips all the way to the
other side in the next administration.\15\
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\15\ Paul D. Clement, Remarks at the Republican National Lawyers
Association 2023 National Policy Conference (May 12, 2023).
More fundamentally, the judicial deference doctrines
infringe upon the constitutional separation of powers and
reduce the accountability of government to the American people.
Deference gives federal agencies ``broad authority to
essentially write a regulation that has the force of law'' and
allows them to ``step[] into the role that Congress has--not
the executive.''\16\ Further, as Justice Antonin Scalia once
explained, it ``violate[s] a fundamental principle of
separation of powers'' for ``the power to write a law and the
power to interpret it [to] rest in the same hands''--as it does
when courts defer to agency interpretations of their own rules
and guidance.\17\ In addition, increasing the power of the
administrative state further removes and insulates policymakers
from electoral accountability because, unlike Congress and the
President, federal ``agencies are not directly accountable to
the people.''\18\
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\16\See Ho, supra note 7, at 2.
\17\Decker v. Nw. Env't Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
\18\Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS RESTORATION ACT
The Separation of Powers Restoration Act (SOPRA) is a good
step toward remedying the foregoing problems that have been
caused by the administrative state's ambition and encroachment.
The bill would amend the APA to expressly require courts to
``decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and
rules made by agencies.''\19\ This standard would restore the
courts' role as the branch that interprets the law under the
Constitution and the APA. The bill would ``level the playing
field'' for Americans in litigation against their
government.\20\ It will promote better legislative outcomes and
stability in the law. Most significantly, SOPRA would help to
restore the constitutional separation of powers between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches; enhance the
electrical accountability of policymakers; and reduce the power
of the administrative state.
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\19\SOPRA, H.R. 288, 118th Cong. Sec. 2 (2023).
\20\Markup of H.R. 288 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra
note 13, at 376:8,709.
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SOPRA would legislatively override the Chevron doctrine of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes. The bill expressly requires courts to review de
novo--i.e., without deference--agency interpretations of
statutes. Similarly, SOPRA would overrule the Auer-Kisor
doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous rules.
Moreover, SOPRA would repeal the Skidmore doctrine of
judicial deference to persuasive agency guidance. The bill
expressly applies de novo review to ``all relevant questions of
law,'' which include the interpretation of guidance.\21\
Further, the definition of rule under the APA includes both
``interpretative rules'' and ``general statements of policy''--
i.e., agency guidance documents.\22\ As Representative Hageman
explained the bill's intention: ``Because guidance is by
definition intended to guide something related to a statute or
regulation it must also be subject to de novo review under this
bill's language The judicial de novo review of all relevant
questions of law includes questions of law surrounding agency
guidance.''\23\
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\21\ SOPRA, H.R. 288, 118th Cong. Sec. 2 (2023).
\22\5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b)(3)(A); see Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.
31; Perezv. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (``Not all
`rules' must be issued through the notice-and-comment process,'' and
``the notice-and-comment requirement `does not apply' to
`interpretative rules [or] general statements of policy.''')
\23\Markup of H.R. 288 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra
note 13, at 376:8,713-378:8,745.
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Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 288: ``Reining
in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative
Power,'' a hearing held on March 10, 2023, before the
Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,
and Antitrust. The Committee heard testimony from the following
witnesses:
Allyson N. Ho, Partner and Co-Chair of
Appellate and Constitutional Law, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP;
Jonathan Wolfson, Chief Legal Officer and
Policy Director, Cicero Institute;
Ryan Cleckner, Co-Founder, Gun University
LLC and Owner, Law office of Ryan M. Cleckner; and
Emily Hammond, Professor, George Washington
University Law School.
The hearing addressed the growth of the administrative
state and the effect of judicial deference doctrines on the
separation of powers.
Committee Consideration
On May 10, 2023, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 288, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
15 to 5, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 288:
1. Vote on Amendment #1 to H.R. 288 ANS, offered by Mr.
Schiff, failed 5-15
2. Vote on Amendment #2 to H.R. 288 ANS, offered by Mr.
Nadler, failed 5-15
3. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 288, as amended, passed
15-5
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has
requested but not received from the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill
contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax
expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional
Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost
estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant
to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate
to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by
the Committee.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 288 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 288 would amend the Administrative
Procedure Act to legislatively override the Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Auer v. Robbins,
Kisor v. Wilkie, and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. judicial deference
doctrines and require courts to decide de novo all questions of
law, including the interpretation of statutes, rules, and
guidance.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 288
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House Rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short Title. This section sets forth the short
title of the bill as the ``Separation of Powers Restoration Act
of 2023.''
Section 2. Judicial Review of Statutory and Regulatory
Interpretations. This section amends the Administrative
Procedure Act to provide that courts shall decide de novo all
relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions and rules made by
agencies.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 7--JUDICIAL REVIEW
* * * * * * *
Sec. 706. Scope of review
[To the extent necessary] (a) To the extent necessary to
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall [decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and] determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action and decide de
novo all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and
rules made by agencies. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, this subsection shall apply in any action for judicial
review of agency action authorized under any provision of law.
No law may exempt any such civil action from the application of
this section except by specific reference to this section. [The
reviewing court shall--]
(b) The reviewing court shall--
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be--
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required
by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a
case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent
that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
Minority Views
I. INTRODUCTION
H.R. 288, the ``Separation of Powers Restoration Act'' or
``SOPRA,'' represents another effort by Republicans to
dismantle the administrative state by modifying the scope of
judicial review for agency actions by authorizing courts to
decide de novo (i.e., without giving deference to the agency's
interpretation) all relevant questions of law, including (1)
rules made by agencies, and (2) constitutional and statutory
provisions. Effectively, this bill eliminates the decades-old
precedent set by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.\1\ in which the courts use a legal test
to decide when the court should defer to the agency's answer or
interpretation of statutory authority. In short, the doctrine
of ``Chevron deference'' holds that judicial deference to an
agency's interpretation is appropriate as long as it is not
unreasonable, and Congress has spoken directly to the precise
issue at question. Although the courts have eroded the doctrine
of Chevron deference somewhat in recent years, it remains an
important tenet of administrative law.
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\1\468 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Among its many flaws, SOPRA would encourage judicial
activism by requiring judges to second-guess the carefully
crafted regulations from agencies. The bill would also make the
rulemaking process even more time-consuming and costly by
forcing agencies to adopt even more detailed factual records
and explanations to withstand judicial scrutiny, thus delaying
the finalization of critical, and possibly lifesaving,
regulations. By requiring this deeper report, the agency
rulemaking process would be skewed in favor of those with
significant resources as they have an edge against smaller
groups to overwhelm the process with possibly bogus reports,
paperwork, demands, and litigation.
Along with Democrats, who were united in opposition to
SOPRA, Rep. Matt Gatez (R-FL) spoke in opposition to the bill,
arguing that judicial deference to the executive has deep roots
in our country and that to undermine this precedent would mean
that we are opening the doors to judicial activism and policy
making from the bench.
During markup, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) offered an amendment
that would prohibit the law from taking effect until the
Judicial Conference certifies to Congress that each court of
the U.S. has a code of conduct in effect. This amendment was
defeated along party lines. Rep. Nadler (D-NY) offered an
amendment to exclude the FDA from the bill, which was also
defeated along party lines.
II. CONCERNS
Most administrative law scholars reject the need for a
legislative override of judicial deference because it would
make the rulemaking process more costly and time-consuming by
forcing agencies to adopt more detailed factual records and
explanations, effectively imposing more procedural requirements
on agency rulemaking.\2\ This cumulative burden would have the
effect of further ossifying the rulemaking process or
dissuading agencies from undertaking rulemakings altogether.\3\
Accordingly, the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards (CSS)--a
coalition of more than 160 consumer, labor, scientific,
research, faith, community, environmental, small business, good
government, public health and public interest groups--opposes
SORPA.\4\
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\2\ABA Sec. of Admin. L. & Reg. Prac., Comments on H.R. 3010, the
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 619, 667
(2012) (``Debate on these principles continues, but the prevailing
system works reasonably well, and no need for legislative intervention
to revise these principles is apparent.''); see Letter from Anna
Shavers, Chair, ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice, to Sens. Carper and Coburn on S. 1029, the Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2013, at 17, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/
s_1029_comments_dec_2014.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing reform of
judicial deference to interpretations of rules); see Letter from 84
administrative law academics to H. Judiciary Comm. Chair Bob Goodlatte
(R-VA) and H. Judiciary Comm. Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI),
2 (Jan. 12, 2015) (on file with the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Democratic staff).
\3\See id.
\4\The Separation of Powers Restoration Act, Coalition for Sensible
Safeguards, https://sensiblesafeguards.org/issues/separation-powers-
restoration-act/ (last visited May 31, 2023).
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Heightened judicial review would also increase the risk of
judicial activism by allowing generalist courts to supplant the
expertise of Federal agencies with their views. Finally, as a
general matter, administrative law experts believe that there
is no need to amend fundamentally the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), including its treatment of judicial review.\5\ They
argue that the APA's drafters were not unlike those of the
Constitution in that they had great foresight in making the APA
flexible and broad enough so that it is able to fit changing
times.\6\ The APA has served, and should continue to serve, as
``a kind of Constitution for administrative agencies and the
affected public--flexible enough to accommodate the variety of
agencies operating under it and the changes in modern
life.''\7\
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\5\See Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 Admin.
L.J. Am. U. 89, 89 (1996).
\6\See id.
\7\Letter from 84 administrative law academics to H. Judiciary
Comm. Chair Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and H. Judiciary Comm. Ranking Member
John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), 2 (Jan. 12, 2015) (on file with the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Democratic staff).
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Since the late 1980's, administrative law scholars have
complained that heightened scrutiny of agency rulemaking has
played a major role in regulatory ossification and avoidance
(i.e., dissuading agencies from pursuing regulations in the
first place).\8\ For example, Professor Richard Pierce of the
George Washington University Law School contends that ``the
judicial branch is responsible for most of the ossification of
the rulemaking process.''\9\ He further notes that enhanced
judicial review may have the effect of rewriting the statutory
requirements under the APA for informal rulemaking, and could
even invalidate roughly half of rules on appeal.\10\
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\8\Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law:
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L.J. 300, 309 (1988)
(``Courts also have diminished agency interest in systematic
policymaking by imposing requirements that agencies `find' unfindable
facts and support those findings with unattainable evidence.'').
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
Admin. L. Rev. 59, 61 (1995) (``Many agencies avoid rulemaking because
of the fear that after years of effort and expenditure of millions of
dollars, a rule will be struck down by the courts on judicial
review.''). For additional background on regulatory ossification, see
generally Brian J. Shearer, Outfoxing Alaska Hunters: How Arbitrary and
Capricious Review of Changing Regulatory Interpretations Can More
Efficiently Police Agency Discretion, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 167, 169-70
(2012) (``The [ossification] theory contends that rulemaking has become
increasingly burdensome for agencies due to congressionally-imposed and
judicially-fabricated procedures.'').
\9\Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 65 (1995).
\10\Id.
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The non-partisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) also
observes that enhanced judicial review may skew the agency fact
finding process in favor of those with the resources to shape
the agency record by making it more lengthy and costly.\11\ CRS
warns that enhanced judicial review ``will cause delay,
complexity, and uncertainty in the administrative process which
may be seen to have its most severe and direct impact on the
ability of public interest representatives to effectively
participate in the process.''\12\
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\11\Morton Rosenberg, The Future of Public Participation in
Informal Agency Rulemaking Under Pending Regulatory Reform Proposals,
Cong. Research Serv. Report for Congress 47-47 (1982).
\12\Id. at 44.
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In addition, enhanced judicial review could affect public
participation in the rulemaking process in other ways,
including how agency officials conduct proceedings in
anticipation of review, as well as the increased judicial
activism that the reform would spur, where individuals have
little role in private litigation.\13\ Furthermore, parties
that oppose a rule could create additional costs and delay in
the rulemaking process by increasing the number of appeals of
agency determinations.\14\
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\13\Id.
\14\Id.
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Eliminating judicial deference may also incentivize
judicial activism by allowing a reviewing court to substitute
its policy preferences for those of the agency.\15\ Rather than
deferring to agencies' substantive expertise, enhanced judicial
review would enable generalist courts to make policy by
applying their policy preferences to their review of an agency
rule, whether they do so consciously or not. Activist judges,
however, lack the political accountability and expertise of
agencies.\16\ As Professor Pierce notes, courts lacked explicit
authority to review most agency rulemaking until the late
Nineteenth century.\17\ Over the past century, however, the
Supreme Court has routinely held that it is the ``exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative
policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to
establish their relative priority for the Nation.''\18\ The
Court emphatically made this point in Chevron:
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\15\Id. at 48-51.
\16\Id; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1983) (``But whatever the logic of the Marbury
argument or the wisdom of strong judicial control of administrative
law-making, the Marshall court itself gave early sanction to deference
principles.''); Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 Geo. L.J. 1, 18 (1985) (``Marbury does not make
clear whether the exercise of independent judicial judgment to keep
agencies within statutory bounds is constitutionally indispensable.'').
\17\The Chevron Doctrine: Constitutional and Statutory Questions in
Judicial Deference to Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Prof. Richard Pierce)
(``Until late in the Nineteenth century, courts could not and did not
review the vast majority of agency actions. The Supreme Court held that
courts lacked the power to review exercises of executive branch
discretion. A court could review an action taken by the executive
branch (or a refusal to act) only in the rare case in which a statute
compelled an agency to act in a particular manner. In that situation,
the court was simply requiring the agency to take a non-discretionary
ministerial action.'') [hereinafter House Hearing].
\18\See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)
(``Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the
order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to
administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement
is sought.'').
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part
of either political branch of the Government. . . . In
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable
to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices--resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to
be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.\19\
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\19\Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984).
Lastly, H.R. 288 is a solution to a non-existent problem.
Notwithstanding the debate surrounding deference
principles,\20\ the American Bar Association (ABA)
Administrative Law Section has clarified that judicial review
remains ``relatively stable'' today, combining the features of
Chevron deference with the careful scrutiny of the hard-look
doctrine:
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\20\Hearing on H.R. 3438, the ``Require Evaluation before
Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2015;'' and, H.R.2631, the
``Regulatory Predictability for Business Growth Act of 2015'' Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of William
Funk, Lewis & Clark Distinguished Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law
School) (``The cases explaining when Chevron deference should apply are
confusing, and even experts and Supreme Court justices do not seem to
agree on what the test is.'').
Judicial review of agency decisionmaking today is
relatively stable, combining principles of restraint
with the careful scrutiny that goes by the nickname
``hard look review.'' Since the time of such landmark
decisions as Chevron and State Farm (and, of course,
for decades prior to their issuance), courts have
striven to work out principles that are intended to
calibrate the extent to which they will accept, or at
least give weight to, decisions by federal
administrative agencies. Debate on these principles
continues, but the prevailing system works reasonably
well, and no need for legislative intervention to
revise these principles is apparent.\21\
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\21\ABA Sec. of Admin. L. & Reg. Prac., Comments on H.R. 3010, the
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 619, 667
(2012).
Professor Levin similarly notes that agencies succeed on
appeal in roughly 70% of cases regardless of whether the court
applies Chevron or hard-look review, suggesting that many other
factors ultimately affect the outcome of a court's review.\22\
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\22\Examining the Proper Role of Judicial Review in the Federal
Regulatory Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs
and Fed. Management of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Government
Affairs, 114th Cong. 38 (2015) (statement of Prof. Ron Levin), at 41
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg94906/pdf/CHRG-
114shrg94906.pdf [hereinafter Senate hearing]; see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 515, 515
(2011).
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Judicial deference to agency rulemaking is also
constitutionally sound. As the Chevron Court observed, the
Constitution does not endow federal judges with policymaking
authority:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a
statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really
centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather
than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap
left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such
a case, federal judges--who have no constituency--have
a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest
are not judicial ones: ``Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches.''\23\
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\23\Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 866 (1984).
The body of precedent surrounding judicial deference
already allows for checks on executive abuses; ending this
tradition would raise countervailing separation of powers
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concerns, as Professor Levin explains:
The Court has developed a sophisticated, though
always evolving, body of precedents in order to
calibrate the complex relationship between courts and
agencies. These precedents do provide for a check on
executive abuses, but they also reflect a wise
recognition that judges do not have a monopoly on
wisdom, especially in regard to the specialized
problems that arise in the interpretation of
regulations. . . . elimination of all judicial
deference . . . may raise countervailing separation of
powers concerns of its own. It brings to mind the
reasoning of the Chevron opinion, in which Justice
Stevens cautioned the courts against being too quick to
substitute their judgments for those of politically
accountable administrators.\24\
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\24\Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 48 (statement of Prof. Ron
Levin).
Furthermore, Congress has historically yielded to the
expertise of the executive branch. Professor Sidney Shapiro, a
leading administrative law expert, explains that ``it is
difficult for legislators to resolve the policy and political
conflicts produced by most reform proposals,'' while delegation
enabled agencies to ``fine-tune procedures in different
institutional settings and to make incremental changes more
easily than if legislation was necessary.''\25\ Professor
Pierce has similarly cautioned against the legislative reform
of the Chevron doctrine:
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\25\Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory o