Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 277]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 277) to amend chapter 8 of title 5, United States
Code, to provide that major rules of the executive branch shall
have no force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval
is enacted into law, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 7
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 7
Hearings......................................................... 13
Committee Consideration.......................................... 13
Committee Votes.................................................. 14
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 18
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 18
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 18
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 18
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 18
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 18
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 19
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 19
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 19
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 19
Correspondence................................................... 20
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 24
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 25
Minority Views................................................... 40
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Regulations from the Executive in Need
of Scrutiny Act of 2023'' or the ``REINS Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to increase accountability for and
transparency in the Federal regulatory process. Section 1 of article I
of the United States Constitution grants all legislative powers to
Congress. Over time, Congress has excessively delegated its
constitutional charge while failing to conduct appropriate oversight
and retain accountability for the content of the laws it passes. By
requiring a vote in Congress, the REINS Act will result in more
carefully drafted and detailed legislation, an improved regulatory
process, and a legislative branch that is truly accountable to the
American people for the laws imposed upon them.
SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING.
Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
``CHAPTER 8--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
``Sec.
``801. Congressional review.
``802. Congressional approval procedure for major rules.
``803. Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules.
``804. Definitions.
``805. Judicial review.
``806. Exemption for monetary policy.
``807. Effective date of certain rules.
``Sec. 801. Congressional review
``(a)(1)(A) Before a rule may take effect, the Federal agency
promulgating such rule shall publish in the Federal Register a list of
information on which the rule is based, including data, scientific and
economic studies, and cost-benefit analyses, and identify how the
public can access such information online, and shall submit to each
House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report
containing--
``(i) a copy of the rule;
``(ii) a concise general statement relating to the rule;
``(iii) a classification of the rule as a major or nonmajor
rule, including an explanation of the classification
specifically addressing each criteria for a major rule
contained within subparagraphs (A) through (C) of section
804(2);
``(iv) a list of any other related regulatory actions
intended to implement the same statutory provision or
regulatory objective as well as the individual and aggregate
economic effects of those actions; and
``(v) the proposed effective date of the rule.
``(B) On the date of the submission of the report under subparagraph
(A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule shall submit to the
Comptroller General and make available to each House of Congress--
``(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the
rule, if any, including an analysis of any jobs added or lost,
differentiating between public and private sector jobs;
``(ii) the agency's actions pursuant to sections 603, 604,
605, 607, and 609 of this title;
``(iii) the agency's actions pursuant to sections 202, 203,
204, and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995; and
``(iv) any other relevant information or requirements under
any other Act and any relevant Executive orders.
``(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph (A), each
House shall provide copies of the report to the chairman and ranking
member of each standing committee with jurisdiction under the rules of
the House of Representatives or the Senate to report a bill to amend
the provision of law under which the rule is issued.
``(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on each major
rule to the committees of jurisdiction by the end of 15 calendar days
after the submission or publication date. The report of the Comptroller
General shall include an assessment of the agency's compliance with
procedural steps required by paragraph (1)(B) and an assessment of
whether the major rule imposes any new limits or mandates on private-
sector activity.
``(B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller General
by providing information relevant to the Comptroller General's report
under subparagraph (A).
``(3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall take effect upon enactment of a joint resolution of approval
described in section 802 or as provided for in the rule following
enactment of a joint resolution of approval described in section 802,
whichever is later.
``(4) A nonmajor rule shall take effect as provided by section 803
after submission to Congress under paragraph (1).
``(5) If a joint resolution of approval relating to a major rule is
not enacted within the period provided in subsection (b)(2), then a
joint resolution of approval relating to the same rule may not be
considered under this chapter in the same Congress by either the House
of Representatives or the Senate.
``(b)(1) A major rule shall not take effect unless the Congress
enacts a joint resolution of approval described under section 802.
``(2) If a joint resolution described in subsection (a) is not
enacted into law by the end of 70 session days or legislative days, as
applicable, beginning on the date on which the report referred to in
subsection (a)(1)(A) is received by Congress (excluding days either
House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of
Congress), then the rule described in that resolution shall be deemed
not to be approved and such rule shall not take effect.
``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (except
subject to paragraph (3)), a major rule may take effect for one 90-
calendar-day period if the President makes a determination under
paragraph (2) and submits written notice of such determination to the
Congress.
``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the President
by Executive order that the major rule should take effect because such
rule is--
``(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or
safety or other emergency;
``(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws;
``(C) necessary for national security; or
``(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an
international trade agreement.
``(3) An exercise by the President of the authority under this
subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under section 802.
``(d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise provided
under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which a report was
submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) during the period
beginning on the date occurring--
``(A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days; or
``(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60
legislative days,
before the date the Congress is scheduled to adjourn a session of
Congress through the date on which the same or succeeding Congress
first convenes its next session, sections 802 and 803 shall apply to
such rule in the succeeding session of Congress.
``(2)(A) In applying sections 802 and 803 for purposes of such
additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be
treated as though--
``(i) such rule were published in the Federal Register on--
``(I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th session
day; or
``(II) in the case of the House of Representatives,
the 15th legislative day,
after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes; and
``(ii) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress under
subsection (a)(1) on such date.
``(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect the
requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be submitted to
Congress before a rule can take effect.
``(3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect as
otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of this
section).
``Sec. 802. Congressional approval procedure for major rules
``(a)(1) For purposes of this section, the term `joint resolution'
means only a joint resolution addressing a report classifying a rule as
major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii) that--
``(A) bears no preamble;
``(B) bears the following title (with blanks filled as
appropriate): `Approving the rule submitted by ___ relating to
___.';
``(C) includes after its resolving clause only the following
(with blanks filled as appropriate): `That Congress approves
the rule submitted by ___ relating to ___.'; and
``(D) is introduced pursuant to paragraph (2).
``(2) After a House of Congress receives a report classifying a rule
as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii), the majority leader of
that House (or his or her respective designee) shall introduce (by
request, if appropriate) a joint resolution described in paragraph
(1)--
``(A) in the case of the House of Representatives, within 3
legislative days; and
``(B) in the case of the Senate, within 3 session days.
``(3) A joint resolution described in paragraph (1) shall not be
subject to amendment at any stage of proceeding.
``(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be
referred in each House of Congress to the committees having
jurisdiction over the provision of law under which the rule is issued.
``(c) In the Senate, if the committee or committees to which a joint
resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred have not
reported it at the end of 15 session days after its introduction, such
committee or committees shall be automatically discharged from further
consideration of the resolution and it shall be placed on the calendar.
A vote on final passage of the resolution shall be taken on or before
the close of the 15th session day after the resolution is reported by
the committee or committees to which it was referred, or after such
committee or committees have been discharged from further consideration
of the resolution.
``(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee or committees to which a
joint resolution is referred have reported, or when a committee or
committees are discharged (under subsection (c)) from further
consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is
at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the
same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the
consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against
the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint
resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a
motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of
other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is
agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed
to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint
resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until
disposed of.
``(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all
debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited
to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those
favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion to further
limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a
motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of
other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in
order.
``(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the
debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and a single
quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance
with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the joint
resolution shall occur.
``(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a
joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without
debate.
``(e) In the House of Representatives, if any committee to which a
joint resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred has not
reported it to the House at the end of 15 legislative days after its
introduction, such committee shall be discharged from further
consideration of the joint resolution, and it shall be placed on the
appropriate calendar. On the second and fourth Thursdays of each month
it shall be in order at any time for the Speaker to recognize a Member
who favors passage of a joint resolution that has appeared on the
calendar for at least 5 legislative days to call up that joint
resolution for immediate consideration in the House without
intervention of any point of order. When so called up a joint
resolution shall be considered as read and shall be debatable for 1
hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent,
and the previous question shall be considered as ordered to its passage
without intervening motion. It shall not be in order to reconsider the
vote on passage. If a vote on final passage of the joint resolution has
not been taken by the third Thursday on which the Speaker may recognize
a Member under this subsection, such vote shall be taken on that day.
``(f)(1) If, before passing a joint resolution described in
subsection (a), one House receives from the other a joint resolution
having the same text, then--
``(A) the joint resolution of the other House shall not be
referred to a committee; and
``(B) the procedure in the receiving House shall be the same
as if no joint resolution had been received from the other
House until the vote on passage, when the joint resolution
received from the other House shall supplant the joint
resolution of the receiving House.
``(2) This subsection shall not apply to the House of Representatives
if the joint resolution received from the Senate is a revenue measure.
``(g) If either House has not taken a vote on final passage of the
joint resolution by the last day of the period described in section
801(b)(2), then such vote shall be taken on that day.
``(h) This section and section 803 are enacted by Congress--
``(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are
deemed to be part of the rules of each House, respectively, but
applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in
that House in the case of a joint resolution described in
subsection (a) and superseding other rules only where
explicitly so; and
``(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to
the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
``Sec. 803. Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules
``(a) For purposes of this section, the term `joint resolution' means
only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the date
on which the report referred to in section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by
Congress and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of
Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of
Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: `That Congress disapproves the nonmajor rule submitted by the
___ relating to ___, and such rule shall have no force or effect.' (The
blank spaces being appropriately filled in).
``(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be
referred to the committees in each House of Congress with jurisdiction.
``(c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a joint
resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported such joint
resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the end of 15 session
days after the date of introduction of the joint resolution, such
committee may be discharged from further consideration of such joint
resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the
Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar.
``(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint
resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is discharged
(under subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint resolution
described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order
(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed
to) for a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint
resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and
against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion
is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion
to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to
shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of
the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain
the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of.
``(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all
debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited
to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those
favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion to further
limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a
motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of
other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in
order.
``(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the
deb
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 277, the Regulations from the Executivein Need of
Scrutiny Act of 2023, or the ``REINS'' Act, introduced by Rep.
Kat Cammack (R-FL), amends the Congressional Review Act to
require affirmative Congressional approval of ``major rules,''
including agency rules with an annual effect on the economy of
at least $100 million, before they take effect.
Background and Need for the Legislation
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GROWING PROBLEM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The Constitution separates the powers of the federal
government by vesting the legislative power in Congress, the
executive power in the President, and the judicial power in the
courts.\1\ The Framers established this structural separation
to provide ``security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department'' by ``giving to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others.''\2\ In other words--those of James Madison--this
separation of powers works such that ``[a]mbition [is] made to
counteract ambition.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 1, art. II Sec. 1, art. III Sec. 1; see
Saikrishna B. Prakash, A Note on the Separation of Powers, The Heritage
Guide to the Constitution (2d ed. 2014).
\2\The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
\3\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, federal legislation requires the approval of
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President.\4\
These elected officials are accountable to the American people,
who may lobby their representatives to support or oppose
legislation, and vote them out of office if they pass unpopular
or unwise laws.\5\ Under the Constitution, ``[n]o law or
resolution can . . . be passed without the concurrence, first,
of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the
States.''\6\ The Framers intended this process to provide an
``[i]mpediment . . . against improper acts of legislation.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 7.
\5\See U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 2, art. II Sec. 1, amends. 1 & 17.
\6\The Federalist No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
\7\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to this constitutional structure, the
administrative state has consolidated the powers of the federal
government in itself. Federal agencies exercise legislative
power by issuing rules with the force of law, executive power
by enforcing those rules, and judicial power by adjudicating
disputes under them.\8\ As one witness recently testified
before the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, in
``the modern administrative state . . . the executive branch
regularly runs the risk of encroaching on the authority of the
legislative branch.''\9\ Another hearing witness framed the
matter more starkly:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Michael Uhlmann, A Note on Administrative Agencies, The Heritage
Guide to the Constitution (2d ed. 2014).
\9\Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's
Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative
State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 118th Cong. 1 (2023) (statement of Allyson N. Ho, Partner,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If your knowledge of separation of powers is based on
reading the Constitution or watching Schoolhouse Rock
classics like ``I'm Just a Bill'' and ``Three-Ring
Government,'' you could be forgiven for believing that
Congress makes laws and the President executes those
laws by enforcement and education. . . . [T]he present
reality is entirely different. . . . [F]ederal agencies
regularly make new laws to fill gaps left by the
legislature, intentionally or unintentionally. And at
times, regulatory agencies even act to make new laws
despite a lack of any Congressional authority.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's
Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative
State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 118th Cong. 2 (2023) (statement of Jonathan A. Wolfson,
Chief Legal Officer and Policy Director, Cicero Institute).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the effects of the administrative state's
consolidation of power have been magnified by a series of
judicial decisions that require courts to enforce an agency's
``reasonable'' interpretation of the law instead of saying what
the law actually is--regardless of ``whether the agency has the
correct interpretation.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Ho, supra note 9, at 1; see, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring
judicial ``deference to administrative interpretations'' of ambiguous
statutes); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Kisor v. Wilkie, 588
U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (requiring judicial ``[d]eference
to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules''); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (requiring judicial deference to
persuasive agency ``rulings, interpretations and opinions'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike Congress and the President, federal ``agencies are
not directly accountable to the people.''\12\ At best, the
heads of most federal agencies might be said to have indirect
accountability because they are appointed by the President, who
in turn is elected.\13\ However, some agencies have allowed
career employees, rather than just presidentially appointed
senior officials, to issue and sign agency rules.\14\ For
example, 2,094 of the 2,952 rules (more than 70%) issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services from January 20, 2001,
to January 19, 2018, were issued by career employees or
inferior officials who were not confirmed by the Senate.\15\ At
the Food and Drug Administration, career employees issued 1,860
of its 1,891 rules (more than 98%) during this same period--and
a single career employee signed 385 of them (more than
20%).\16\ Civil servants are ``insulated from the
accountability that national elections bring,'' and their
issuance of agency rules ``undermines the power of the American
people to choose who governs them.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
\13\See Exec. Order No. 13,979, 86 Fed. Reg. 6,813 (Jan. 18, 2021).
\14\See id.
\15\Angela C. Erickson & Thomas Berry, Pacific Legal Foundation,
But Who Rules The Rulemakers?: A Study of Illegally Issued Regulations
at HHS 18, 35 (Apr. 29, 2019).
\16\Id. at 3, 25, 35.
\17\86 Fed. Reg. at 6,813.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, while rules made by agencies carry the ``force
and effect of law,''\18\ agency rulemaking procedures lack the
rigor and transparency of the Constitution's process for
considering and passing laws.\19\ Under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies may issue legislative
rules merely by publishing a ``notice of proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register,'' providing an opportunity for public
feedback (typically through the submission of written
comments), and publishing the final rule at least thirty days
before its effective date.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-303 (1979).
\19\See Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's
Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative
State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 118th Cong. 1 (2023) (statement of Ryan M. Cleckner, Owner,
Law Office of Ryan M. Cleckner).
\20\Administrative Conference of the United States & ABA Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Administrative Procedure
Act, Federal Administrative Procedure Sourcebook (May 25, 2022)
(cleaned up); see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, agencies issue so-called ``guidance documents''--
including interpretative rules (which explain how an agency
interprets the statutes and legislative rules it administers)
and general statements of policy (which prospectively advise
how an agency may choose to exercise its authority)--without
following even the limited procedural protections of notice and
comment provided by the APA.\21\ Used properly, guidance
documents can be valuable tools for agencies to help businesses
and individuals navigate the administrative enforcement of laws
enacted by Congress. However, as Representative Harriet Hageman
recently observed, ``we have seen a growing trend whereby
administrative agencies attempt to use guidance to make new law
while at the same time avoiding the APA process.''\22\ Through
guidance, as one federal appellate court observed, ``[l]aw is
made, without notice and comment, without public participation,
and without publication in the Federal Register.''\23\ ``[T]he
public frequently has insufficient notice of guidance
documents,'' which ``carry the implicit threat of enforcement
action if the regulated public does not comply.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b)(3)(A); Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31
(citing Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
30 n.3 (1947)).
\22\Markup of H.R. 288 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th
Cong. 377:8,731-8,733 (2023).
\23\Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
\24\Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 15, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By consolidating the separate constitutional powers of the
federal government, exploiting a rulemaking process that is
much less rigorous than what the Constitution requires for
legislation, and facing only minimal electoral accountability
for its actions, the administrative state has been able to
impose a quantity and quality of policies that never could have
received approval by the House, the Senate, and President.\25\
This reality is reflected in the empirical data. In 2021,
Congress passed just 143 laws while federal agencies issued
3,257 rules.\26\ In other words, the executive branch issued
mandates with the force of law over twenty-two times as often
as the legislative branch.\27\ Moreover, as of 2020, the most
recent year for which data is available, agencies had issued
more than 70,000 guidance documents.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 7.
\26\Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Competitive Enter. Inst., Ten Thousand
Commandments 7 (Oct. 26, 2022).
\27\Id.
\28\Id. at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency rules impose an estimated annual cost of $1.927
trillion, equivalent to $14,684 per U.S. household each year,
and rivaling the combined total of individual and federal
corporate income taxes.\29\ One observer commented, ``[i]f it
were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world's eighth-
largest economy (not counting the United States itself),
ranking behind France and ahead of Italy.''\30\ Agency guidance
costs Americans an untold additional amount.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Id. at 6.
\30\Id.
\31\See id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the policies imposed by the administrative state
are unpopular, radical, or do not reflect the will of the
American people. For example, already this year, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a final rule
that effectively bans pistol stabilizing braces across the
country,\32\ and the Federal Trade Commission issued a proposed
rule that would prohibit non-compete clauses in virtually every
employment contract nationwide.\33\ Agency guidance can have
equally pernicious effects. In 2019, the United States
Department of Agriculture posted a two-page factsheet on its
website that would have required all cattle and bison to be
tagged with radio frequency identification (RFID) ear tags.\34\
As Representative Hageman noted, ``the price tag of this
requirement to the cattle and bison industries would have been
$2 billion.''\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Factoring Criteria for Firearms With Attached ``Stabilizing
Braces,'' 88 Fed. Reg. 6478 (Jan. 31, 2023).
\33\Non-Compete Clause Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 3482, 3535 (Jan. 19,
2023) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 910).
\34\U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Advancing Animal Disease
Traceability: A Plan to Achieve Electronic Identification in Cattle and
Bison (Apr. 2019).
\35\Markup of H.R. 277 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th
Cong. 99:2,311-2,312 (2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
The REINS Act builds upon two existing laws governing the
administrative state: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
and the Congressional Review Act (CRA). These statutes are
discussed in turn.
Originally enacted in 1946, the APA provides standards for
agency rulemaking.\36\ Under ``formal'' rulemaking, an agency
may issue a ``rule after the kind of trial-type hearing
procedures normally reserved for adjudicatory orders.''\37\
Much more commonly, agencies issue rules through ``informal''
or notice-and-comment rulemaking. As discussed above, informal
rulemaking requires publication of a ``notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register,'' an opportunity for public
feedback (typically through the submission of written
comments), and publication of the final rule at least thirty
days before its effective date.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 551-559 (agency procedures), 701-
706 (judicial review).
\37\Administrative Conference of the United States & ABA Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, supra note 20 (cleaned up).
\38\Id.; see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (rulemaking).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifty years later, Congress passed the CRA in 1996 to help
``reclaim[] for Congress some of its policymaking authority''
and ``give[] the public the opportunity to call the attention
of politically accountable, elected officials to concerns about
new agency rules.''\39\ The CRA requires agencies to submit
rules to Congress and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) before they can take effect, and provides an expedited
process for Congress to disapprove a rule by passing a joint
resolution.\40\ In effect, the CRA gives Congress a legislative
veto mechanism over agency rulemaking that satisfies the
Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements.\41\
As then-President Bill Clinton explained in signing the CRA,
``th[e] legislation increases congressional accountability for
regulations'' and ``provid[es] expedited procedures for the
Congress to review those regulations.''\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\142 Cong. Rec. S3683-01, 683-84 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996)
(statement of Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens); see 5 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 801-808.
\40\See Maeve P. Carey & Christopher M. Davis, Congressional
Research Service, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked
Questions 1 (Nov. 12, 2021); Christopher M. Davis, Congressional
Research Service, The 118th Congress and the Congressional Review Act
``Lookback'' Mechanism 1 (Dec. 1, 2022).
\41\See Carey & Davis, supra note 40, at 23 n. 128.
\42\Statement on Signing the Contract With America Advancement Act
of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 525 (Mar.29, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly, the CRA also gives Congress the ability to
disapprove of agency guidance. The CRA generally adopts the
APA's definition of ``rule,''\43\ which includes both
``interpretative rules'' and ``general statements of policy''--
i.e., agency guidance documents.\44\ ``Congress intended the
CRA to reach a broad range of agency activities, including
agency policy statements, interpretive rules, and certain rules
of agency organization, despite the fact that those actions are
not subject to the APA's requirements for notice and
comment.''\45\ Specifically, ``[i]nterpretive rules, general
statements of policy, and analogous agency policy guidelines
are covered without qualification because they meet the
definition of a `rule' borrowed from'' the APA, and therefore
``these types of documents are covered under the congressional
review provisions of the'' CRA.\46\ In other words, ``some
agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still
be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned
using the CRA's procedures.''\47\ Indeed, Congress has used the
CRA to disapprove of and overturn a guidance bulletin issued by
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.\48\ Similarly, GAO
has determined that various guidance documents issued by the
Fish and Wildlife Service; the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services; and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were rules for
purposes of the CRA.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\5 U.S.C. Sec. 804(3).
\44\5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b)(3)(A); see Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31;
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (``Not all
`rules' must be issued through the notice-and-comment process,'' and
``the notice-and-comment requirement `does not apply' to
`interpretative rules [or] general statements of policy.''')
\45\Valerie C. Brannon & Maeve P. Carey, Congressional Research
Service, The Congressional Review Act: Determining Which ``Rules'' Must
Be Submitted To Congress 12 (Mar. 6, 2019).
\46\142 Cong. Rec. H2987-01, 3005 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996)
(st
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 277: ``Reining
in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative
Power,'' a hearing held on March 10, 2023, before the
Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,
and Antitrust. The Committee heard testimony from the following
witnesses:
Allyson N. Ho, Partner and Co-Chair of
Appellate and Constitutional Law, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP;
Jonathan Wolfson, Chief Legal Officer and
Policy Director, Cicero Institute;
Ryan Cleckner, Co-Founder, Gun University
LLC and Owner, Law office of Ryan M. Cleckner; and
Emily Hammond, Professor, George Washington
University Law School.
The hearing addressed the growth of the administrative
state and how it has aggrandized legislative power.
Committee Consideration
On May 24, 2023, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 277, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
13 to 5, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 277:
1. Vote on Amendment #2 to H.R. 277 ANS, offered by Mr.
Nadler, failed 9-17
2. Vote on Amendment #4 to H.R. 277 ANS, offered by Ms.
Scanlon, failed 5-15
3. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 277, as amended, passed
13-5
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has
requested but not received from the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill
contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax
expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional
Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost
estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant
to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate
to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by
the Committee.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 277 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 277 would amend the Congressional Review
Act to require affirmative Congressional approval of ``major
rules,'' including agency rules with an annual effect on the
economy of at least $100 million, before they take effect.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 277
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House Rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short Title. This section sets forth the short
title of the bill as the ``Regulations from the Executive in
Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023.''
Section 2. Purpose. This section sets forth the purpose of
the bill as increasing accountability and transparency in the
federal regulatory process.
Section 3. Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking. This
section amends and restates the CRA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 801 et seq.,
as follows:
Section 801. Congressional review:
Requires agencies promulgating rules to
provide information to Congress and the Comptroller
General, including whether the rule is a major rule.
Permits a major rule to take effect only if
Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval.
Allows presidential approval of a major rule
for a single ninety-day period on the basis of an
emergency or national security, or to enforce criminal
laws or implement a trade agreement.
Prevents a major rule that is not approved
from being considered again in the same Congress.
Section 802. Congressional approval procedure for major
rules:
Establishes an expedited process for
Congress to vote on joint resolutions of approval of
major rules.
Requires the Senate or House majority leader
to introduce a joint resolution within three session or
legislative days of receiving a report classifying an
agency rule as a major rule, and requires the
committees with jurisdiction to report within fifteen
session or legislative days of its introduction.
In the Senate, provides for a vote on a
joint resolution of approval within fifteen session
days after it is reported by the committee.
In the House, permits a vote on a joint
resolution of approval that has appeared on the
calendar for at least five legislative days on the
second and fourth Thursdays of each month, and requires
a vote by the third Thursday on which a vote may be
taken.
Section 803. Congressional disapproval procedure for
nonmajor rules:
Retains the CRA's disapproval mechanism for
non-major rules, allowing such rules to take effect
after sixty days if not affirmatively disapproved by
Congress.
Section 804. Definitions:
Retains the CRA's definitions of ``Federal
agency,'' ``major rule,'' and ``rule'' with minor
alteration.
Defines the term ``nonmajor rule'' as ``any
rule that is not a major rule.''
Adapts the definition of ``submission or
publication date'' for non-major rules from section 802
of the CRA, and defines the term for major rules as the
date on which Congress receives the information
required by the REINS Act.
Section 805. Judicial Review:
Permits courts to determine whether agencies
have completed the REINS Act's requirements for a rule
to take effect, and limits judicial use of a joint
resolution of approval to this purpose.
Provides that a joint resolution of approval
neither modifies an agency's statutory authority nor
affects claims alleging defects in a rule.
Section 806. Exemption for monetary policy:
Recodifies section 807 of the CRA.
Section 807. Effective date of certain rules:
Recodifies section 808 of the CRA.
Limits agencies' ability to determine the
effective date of rules for which notice and public
procedure is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest to non-major rules.
Section 4. Budgetary Effects of Rules Subject to Section
802 of Title 5, United States Code. This section amends the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, 2 U.S.C.
Sec. 907(b)(2), to provide that a major rule ``affecting budget
authority, outlays, or receipts shall be assumed to be
effective unless it is not approved.''
Section 5. Government Accountability Office Study of Rules.
This section requires the Comptroller General to report to
Congress within one year the number of rules in effect, the
number of major rules in effect, and their total estimated
economic cost.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
* * * * * * *
[CHAPTER 8--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
[Sec. 801. Congressional review
[(a)(1)(A) Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency
promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the
Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing--
[(i) a copy of the rule;
[(ii) a concise general statement relating to the
rule, including whether it is a major rule; and
[(iii) the proposed effective date of the rule.
[(B) On the date of the submission of the report under
subparagraph (A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule
shall submit to the Comptroller General and make available to
each House of Congress--
[(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of
the rule, if any;
[(ii) the agency's actions relevant to sections 603,
604, 605, 607, and 609;
[(iii) the agency's actions relevant to sections 202,
203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995; and
[(iv) any other relevant information or requirements
under any other Act and any relevant Executive orders.
[(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph
(A), each House shall provide copies of the report to the
chairman and ranking member of each standing committee with
jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or
the Senate to report a bill to amend the provision of law under
which the rule is issued.
[(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on
each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction in each House
of the Congress by the end of 15 calendar days after the
submission or publication date as provided in section
802(b)(2). The report of the Comptroller General shall include
an assessment of the agency's compliance with procedural steps
required by paragraph (1)(B).
[(B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller
General by providing information relevant to the Comptroller
General's report under subparagraph (A).
[(3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall take effect on the latest of--
[(A) the later of the date occurring 60 days after
the date on which--
[(i) the Congress receives the report
submitted under paragraph (1); or
[(ii) the rule is published in the Federal
Register, if so published;
[(B) if the Congress passes a joint resolution of
disapproval described in section 802 relating to the
rule, and the President signs a veto of such
resolution, the earlier date--
[(i) on which either House of Congress votes
and fails to override the veto of the
President; or
[(ii) occurring 30 session days after the
date on which the Congress received the veto
and objections of the President; or
[(C) the date the rule would have otherwise taken
effect, if not for this section (unless a joint
resolution of disapproval under section 802 is
enacted).
[(4) Except for a major rule, a rule shall take effect as
otherwise provided by law after submission to Congress under
paragraph (1).
[(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the effective date of a
rule shall not be delayed by operation of this chapter beyond
the date on which either House of Congress votes to reject a
joint resolution of disapproval under section 802.
[(b)(1) A rule shall not take effect (or continue), if the
Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, described
under section 802, of the rule.
[(2) A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue)
under paragraph (1) may not be reissued in substantially the
same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as
such a rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule
is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of
the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.
[(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section
(except subject to paragraph (3)), a rule that would not take
effect by reason of subsection (a)(3) may take effect, if the
President makes a determination under paragraph (2) and submits
written notice of such determination to the Congress.
[(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the
President by Executive order that the rule should take effect
because such rule is--
[(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to
health or safety or other emergency;
[(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws;
[(C) necessary for national security; or
[(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an
international trade agreement.
[(3) An exercise by the President of the authority under this
subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under section
802 or the effect of a joint resolution of disapproval under
this section.
[(d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise
provided under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which
a report was submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A)
during the period beginning on the date occurring--
[(A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days, or
[(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60
legislative days,
before the date the Congress adjourns a session of Congress
through the date on which the same or succeeding Congress first
convenes its next session, section 802 shall apply to such rule
in the succeeding session of Congress.
[(2)(A) In applying section 802 for purposes of such
additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall
be treated as though--
[(i) such rule were published in the Federal Register
(as a rule that shall take effect) on--
[(I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th
session day, or
[(II) in the case of the House of
Representatives, the 15th legislative day,
after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes; and
[(ii) a report on such rule were submitted to
Congress under subsection (a)(1) on such date.
[(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect
the requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be
submitted to Congress before a rule can take effect.
[(3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect
as otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of
this section).
[(e)(1) For purposes of this subsection, section 802 shall
also apply to any major rule promulgated between March 1, 1996,
and the date of the enactment of this chapter.
[(2) In applying section 802 for purposes of Congressional
review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be treated
as though--
[(A) such rule were published in the Federal Register
on the date of enactment of this chapter; and
[(B) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress
under subsection (a)(1) on such date.
[(3) The effectiveness of a rule described under paragraph
(1) shall be as otherwise provided by law, unless the rule is
made of no force or effect under section 802.
[(f) Any rule that takes effect and later is made of no force
or effect by enactment of a joint resolution under section 802
shall be treated as though such rule had never taken effect.
[(g) If the Congress does not enact a joint resolution of
disapproval under section 802 respecting a rule, no court or
agency may infer any intent of the Congress from any action or
inaction of the Congress with regard to such rule, related
statute, or joint resolution of disapproval.
[Sec. 802. Congressional disapproval procedure
[(a) For purposes of this section, the term ``joint
resolution'' means only a joint resolution introduced in the
period beginning on the date on which the report referred to in
section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress and ending 60 days
thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is
adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress),
the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
``That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the __
relating to __, and such rule shall have no force or effect.''
(The blank spaces being appropriately filled in).
[(b)(1) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall
be referred to the committees in each House of Congress with
jurisdiction.
[(2) For purposes of this section, the term ``submission or
publication date'' means the later of the date on which--
[(A) the Congress receives the report submitted under
section 801(a)(1); or
[(B) the rule is published in the Federal Register,
if so published.
[(c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a
joint resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported
such joint resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the
end of 20 calendar days after the submission or publication
date defined under subsection (b)(2), such committee may be
discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution
upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the
Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the
calendar.
[(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint
resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is
discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of
a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any
time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the
same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to
the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of
order against the joint resolution (and against consideration
of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject
to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to
proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to
the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the
joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the
Senate until disposed of.
[(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on
all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith,
shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the
joint resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order
and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or
a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or
a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.
[(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of
the debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a),
and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if
requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote
on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur.
[(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure
relating to a joint resolution described in subsection (a)
shall be decided without debate.
[(e) In the Senate the procedure specified in subsection (c)
or (d) shall not apply to the consideration of a joint
resolution respecting a rule--
[(1) after the expiration of the 60 session days
beginning with the applicable submission or publication
date, or
[(2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was
submitted during the period referred to in section
801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days
beginning on the 15th session day after the succeeding
session of Congress first convenes.
[(f) If, before the passage by one House of a joint
resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that
House receives from the other House a joint resolution
described in subsection (a), then the following procedures
shall apply:
[(1) The joint resolution of the other House shall
not be referred to a committee.
[(2) With respect to a joint resolution described in
subsection (a) of the House receiving the joint
resolution--
[(A) the procedure in that House shall be the
same as if no joint resolution had been
received from the other House; but
[(B) the vote on final passage shall be on
the joint resolution of the other House.
[(g) This section is enacted by Congress--
[(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and
as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House,
respectively, but applicable only with respect to the
procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a
joint resolution described in subsection (a), and it
supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is
inconsistent with such rules; and
[(2) with full recognition of the constitutional
right of either House to change the rules (so far as
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time,
in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of that House.
[Sec. 803. Special rule on statutory, regulatory, and judicial
deadlines
[(a) In the case of any deadline for, relating to, or
involving any rule which does not take effect (or the
effectiveness of which is terminated) because of enactment of a
joint resolution under section 802, that deadline is extended
until the date 1 year after the date of enactment of the joint
resolution. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
affect a deadline merely by reason of the postponement of a
rule's effective date under section 801(a).
[(b) The term ``deadline'' means any date certain for
fulfilling any obligation or exercising any authority
established by or under any Federal statute or regulation, or
by or under any court order implementing any Federal statute or
regulation.
[Sec. 804. Definitions
[For purposes of this chapter--
[(1) The term ``Federal agency'' means any agency as
that term is defined in section 551(1).
[(2) The term ``major rule'' means any rule that the
Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and
Budget finds has resulted in or is likely to result
Minority Views
I. INTRODUCTION
H.R. 277, the ``Regulations from the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny Act of 2023'' or the ``REINS Act,'' is an extreme,
unworkable bill that would prevent executive branch agencies
from executing the statutes passed by Congress, allow for more
corporate influence in rulemaking, and endanger the health and
safety of all U.S. residents. By requiring both houses of
Congress to pass, and the president to sign, a joint resolution
of approval for any ``major rules'' before they can take
effect, this bill would grind the gears of agency rulemaking to
a halt. Corporate interests that may oppose any major rule from
an agency could easily block the implementation of any rules by
convincing just a small number of Congressional members from
voting to approve any major rule. And the bill would also
endanger the health and safety of Americans, who rely on
administrative agencies to ensure that our air is safe to
breathe, our water is safe to drink, our food is safe to eat,
and the life-saving medicines we depend on are safe and
effective.
Furthermore, the bill claims to fix a problem that does not
exist. Congress already has numerous tools to shape agency
rulemaking and does not need the overly burdensome regime
contemplated by the bill. Finally, the bill may be
unconstitutional because its effect is nearly indistinguishable
from the one-House legislative veto that the U.S. Supreme Court
held to be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.
II. CONCERNS
H.R 277 is highly problematic because it would restrict
agency rulemaking, it would undermine public health and safety,
it is based on a false premise that regulations undermine
economic and employment growth, it ignores Congress' numerous
tools for affecting agency rulemaking, and it may be
unconstitutional. The Coalition for Sensible Safeguards (CSS)--
a coalition of more than 160 consumer, labor, scientific,
research, faith, community, environmental, small business, good
government, public health and public interest groups--opposes
the REINS Act.\1\ In addition to CSS, 67 other groups,
including the AFL-CIO, Consumer Reports, the Sierra Club, and
United Steelworkers, have voiced their opposition to the REINS
Act, arguing that the bill fundamentally threatens the
government's ability to protect the public from harm.\2\ The
National Resources Defense Council likewise opposes the REINS
Act on similar grounds.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\68 Groups Tell Congress: Reject the REINS Act, Coalition for
Sensible Safeguards (Feb. 27th, 2023), https://sensiblesafeguards.org/
press/68-groups-tell-congress-reject-the-reins-act/.
\2\Id.
\3\David Goldston, The REINS Act: Why Congress Should Hold Its
Horses, NRDC (Jan. 04, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david-
goldston/reins-act-why-congress-should-hold-its-horses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. The REINS Act Would Severely Restrict Federal Rulemaking
The REINS Act would effectively act as a chokehold on
Federal agency rulemaking by requiring congressional assent to
major rules before they can take effect. This approval process
would be in addition to an already heavily proceduralized
rulemaking process that often takes years to conclude. Under
the new approval process imposed by the legislation,
congressional gridlock or deliberate inaction would serve as a
veto of even critically needed rules that often took years to
develop.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\H.R. 367, the REINS Act of 2013: Promoting Jobs, Growth, and
American Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Ronald M. Levin, Distinguished
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis) [hereinafter
Levin Statement] (``The reality is that the Act would in substance
revive the legislative veto as a tool for controlling agency
rulemaking.''); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act
of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of David Goldston, Director of Government Affairs, Natural
Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter Goldston Statement] (``Agencies
often take several years to formulate a particular safeguard, reviewing
hundreds of scientific studies, drawing on their own experts in science
and economics, empaneling outside expert advisors, gathering thousands
of public comments, and going though many levels of executive branch
review'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, the REINS Act would consume vast amounts of
limited congressional time and resources, which would
necessarily have to be diverted from other critical
legislative, oversight, and constituent responsibilities. Even
under expedited procedures, Congress would likely be forced to
choose between passing judgment on complex regulations, on the
one hand, and other important duties, on the other.
By requiring Congress to pass judgment on major rules
without the time or expertise to make a well-informed decision,
the REINS Act would allow well-subsidized business interests to
further influence the rulemaking process. Major rules generally
involve highly technical and complex scientific data as well as
other types of evidence that require substantive expertise to
decipher. Simply put, Congress lacks the time, resources, or
technical knowledge to provide meaningful review of such
rules.\5\ In the face of this complexity and time constraints,
Members of Congress would be susceptible to readily available
``answers'' from well-funded industry lobbyists, who no doubt
would be on hand to supply Members with industry-friendly
talking points and other information regarding the merits of a
particular rule.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Levin Statement, supra note 4 at 2 (``The REINS Act would impose
great strain on congressional workloads. In many instances, this would
be a poor use of scarce legislative time, because the subject matter of
numerous major rules is arcane and most prudently left to specialized
administrators.'').
\6\Goldston Statement, supra note 4 at 3 (``Lobbyists would descend
on Congress with even greater fervor than is currently the case to
pressure Members to take their side on individual regulations.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adding to the concern about Congress's ability to provide
meaningful review of major rules is the fact that Congress
would have only 70 legislative days within which to act, and
committees of jurisdiction would have only 15 legislative days
to consider a proposed rule's merits. Moreover, under the
bill's expedited House procedures, floor consideration of joint
resolutions of approval would be limited to just the second and
fourth Thursdays of every month.
B. By Placing a Chokehold on Major Rules, the REINS Act Threatens
Public Safety
While the REINS Act is unnecessary and unworkable, its most
pernicious effect would be putting the health, welfare, and
safety of Americans at risk. In addition to their economic
benefits, regulations also promote improved air quality,
healthier children, reduced discrimination, protection of our
public health and safety, protection of human dignity, and
other non-quantifiable, but fundamental, values.
The costs of delaying these highly beneficial rules could
be devastating. As the Obama Administration noted in its
opposition to the REINS Act during the 113th Congress, the
REINS Act would ``delay and, in many cases, thwart
implementation of statutory mandates and execution of duly
enacted laws, increase business uncertainty, undermine much-
needed protections of the American public, and create
unnecessary confusion. There is no justification for such an
unprecedented requirement.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration
Policy on H.R. 367, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny
Act of 2013 (July 21, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During Markup, Representatives Nadler (D-NY) and Scanlon
(D-PA) introduced amendments to exempt rules from the EPA, FDA
and those affecting childhood illnesses from the bill. These
amendments were defeated on party lines.
C. The REINS Act Is Based on a False Premise that Regulations Harm
Economic and Employment Growth
Proponents of the REINS Act assert that Federal agency
regulations impose excessive costs on businesses, stifle job
creation, and hobble the Nation's economic growth. This
premise, however, is based on flawed data and completely
ignores the significant benefits of regulation. In support of
their arguments concerning the costs of regulation, proponents
of anti-regulatory measures, such as the REINS Act, regularly
cite a widely-debunked study by economists Nicole and Mark
Crain, which claims that Federal rulemaking imposes a
cumulative burden of $1.75 trillion a year.\8\ The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducted an extensive
examination of the Crain study and criticized much of its
methodology.\9\ CRS noted that the authors of the Crain study
themselves told CRS that their study was ``not meant to be a
decision-making tool for lawmakers or Federal regulatory
agencies to use in choosing the `right' level of regulation. In
no place in any of the reports do we imply that our reports
should be used for this purpose. (How could we recommend this
use when we make no attempt to estimate the benefits?)''\10\
CRS concluded that ``a valid, reasoned policy decision can only
be made after considering information on both costs and
benefits'' of regulation.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs
on Small Firms (Sept. 2010).
\9\Curtis W. Copeland, Analysis of an Estimate of the Total Costs
of Federal Regulations (Apr. 6, 2011).
\10\Id. at 26 (quoting an e-mail from Nicole and W. Mark Crain to
the author of the CRS report).
\11\Id. The Economic Policy Institute also issued a critique of the
Crain study outlining additional concerns with the study's methodology
and data. See Andrew Green, Flaws Call for Rejecting Crain and Crain
Model: Cited $1.75 Trillion Cost of Regulations Is Not Worth Repeating,
Econ. Pol'y Inst. (July 19, 2011), https://www.epi.org/publication/
flaws_call_for_rejecting_crain_and_crain_model/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the benefits of regulations routinely outweigh
their costs. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
annually estimated the costs of regulations. Significantly,
OMB's reports to Congress include data on the benefits of
regulations.
D. Congress Already Has Numerous Tools to Shape Agency Rulemaking
Congress already has various mechanisms at its disposal to
oversee and influence the Federal agency rulemaking process. In
its simplest and most straightforward form, Congress can
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies with greater
specificity or restriction, which would limit an agency's
rulemaking authority either from the outset or through later
amendment of an agency's organic statute. Congress also can
simply pass legislation to stay the effect of an existing rule,
as the House did in the 112th Congress with respect to the
Environmental Protection Agency's cement manufacturing
standards.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Cement Sector Regulatory Relief Act of 2011, H.R. 2681, 112th
Cong. (2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress may also impose restrictions on agency rulemaking
through the appropriations process. These restrictions can take
a variety of forms, including restrictions on the finalization
of particular proposed rules, restrictions on regulatory
activity within certain areas, restrictions on implementation
or enforcement of certain rules, and conditional restrictions
that prevent a rule from taking effect until an agency takes
certain steps.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\See Curtis W. Copeland, Congressional Influence on Rulemaking
and Regulation Through Appropriations Restrictions (Aug. 5, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. The REINS Act May Be Unconstitutional
The REINS Act raises Constitutional concerns because it may
provide for what arguably is an unconstitutional one-House
legislative veto. As Professor Ronald Levin of Washington
University Law School testified, one House of Congress can
effectively veto an agency's rule under the REINS Act's
congressional approval mechanism by simply not acting within
the 70-legislative-day time frame provided for in the bill.\14\
Such a mechanism would be, in effect, indistinguishable from
the one-House legislative veto that the Supreme Court held to
be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.\15\ The Court held in
that decision that a veto of a Federal agency's legislative act
was itself a legislative act that required passage by both
Houses of Congress and presentment to the President for his
signature.\16\ Under H.R. 277, one House could effectively veto
an agency rule (i.e., a legislative act) without meeting the
Constitutional requirements discussed in Chadha by simply not
acting to pass a resolution of approval. The REINS Act,
therefore, may violate the constitutional rule announced in
Chadha.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Levin Statement, supra note 4 at 7.
\15\Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (holding that a one-House legislative veto violated the
Constitution's bicameralism and presentment clauses).
\16\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Others--such as the Center for Progressive Reform (the
Center)--have called the REINS Act unconstitutional for a
different reason.\17\ The Center argues that because the REINS
Act requires major rules to be approved by Congress before they
become effective, it is ``deviating from the requirements of
the Constitution.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\William Funk, Why the REINS Act is Unconstitutional, Ctr. for
Progressive Reform (Feb. 14, 2017), https://progressivereform.org/cpr-
blog/why-the-reins-act-is-unconstitutional/.
\18\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ordinarily, ``when Congress effects change through
bicameralism and presentment, it creates a law--a
statute.''\19\ However, under the REINS Act, instead of
creating a new law, the effect of bicameralism and presentment
would be to approve a rule.\20\ While lawmakers are free to
ratify previous agency action, they must do so by passing a
statute, which by its nature can only be amended by Congress.
In contrast, any rule approved by Congress under the REINS Act
would be subject to change by the promulgating agency.\21\
Similarly, Congress can pass laws which explicitly allow
agencies to make subsequent regulatory changes (such as the
Attorney General's ability to reclassify substances under the
Controlled Substances Act). However, the REINS Act contains no
such language.\22\ As a result, the Center concludes that the
REINS Act falls outside the established boundaries of
Congressional practice and, by requiring both Houses to
approval of major rules, violates the constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Id.
\20\Id.
\21\Id.
\22\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During Markup, Representative Ivey (D-MD) probed the
unconstitutionality of the bill at length, making the case that
it clearly represents a legislative veto as contemplated in INS
v. Chadha.
III. CONCLUSION
H.R. 277 is a radical bill designed to undermine the
authority Congress delegated to agencies through statutes to
execute the law. This proposal, which originated in the Tea
Party movement of the 2010s, is an old and unworkable idea that
would prevent agencies' rulemaking, jeopardize the health and
safety of all US residents, and may be unconstitutional. The
bill is premised on the false notion that regulations harm
economic and employment growth and ignores the many other ways
that Congress can influence the rulemaking process. If
Republicans were actually concerned about our administrative
state, they would join with us to help ensure that the
rulemaking process cannot be gamed by corporate interests and
allow for additional ways for public feedback to influence the
process. H.R. 277 would prevent any major rule from coming to
effect and thus break down the execution of the laws Congress
passed.
For all of these reasons, I dissent and urge all of my
colleagues to oppose this legislation.
Jerrold Nadler,
Ranking Member.