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H. Rept. 118-84

REGULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN NEED OF SCRUTINY ACT OF 2023

2023-06-01

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 277] The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 277) to amend chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, to provide that major rules of the executive branch shall have no force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted into law, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 7 Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 7 Hearings......................................................... 13 Committee Consideration.......................................... 13 Committee Votes.................................................. 14 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 18 New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 18 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 18 Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 18 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 18 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 18 Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 19 Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 19 Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 19 Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 19 Correspondence................................................... 20 Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 24 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 25 Minority Views................................................... 40 The amendment is as follows: Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023'' or the ``REINS Act of 2023''. SEC. 2. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Act is to increase accountability for and transparency in the Federal regulatory process. Section 1 of article I of the United States Constitution grants all legislative powers to Congress. Over time, Congress has excessively delegated its constitutional charge while failing to conduct appropriate oversight and retain accountability for the content of the laws it passes. By requiring a vote in Congress, the REINS Act will result in more carefully drafted and detailed legislation, an improved regulatory process, and a legislative branch that is truly accountable to the American people for the laws imposed upon them. SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING. Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``CHAPTER 8--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING ``Sec. ``801. Congressional review. ``802. Congressional approval procedure for major rules. ``803. Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules. ``804. Definitions. ``805. Judicial review. ``806. Exemption for monetary policy. ``807. Effective date of certain rules. ``Sec. 801. Congressional review ``(a)(1)(A) Before a rule may take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such rule shall publish in the Federal Register a list of information on which the rule is based, including data, scientific and economic studies, and cost-benefit analyses, and identify how the public can access such information online, and shall submit to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing-- ``(i) a copy of the rule; ``(ii) a concise general statement relating to the rule; ``(iii) a classification of the rule as a major or nonmajor rule, including an explanation of the classification specifically addressing each criteria for a major rule contained within subparagraphs (A) through (C) of section 804(2); ``(iv) a list of any other related regulatory actions intended to implement the same statutory provision or regulatory objective as well as the individual and aggregate economic effects of those actions; and ``(v) the proposed effective date of the rule. ``(B) On the date of the submission of the report under subparagraph (A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule shall submit to the Comptroller General and make available to each House of Congress-- ``(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the rule, if any, including an analysis of any jobs added or lost, differentiating between public and private sector jobs; ``(ii) the agency's actions pursuant to sections 603, 604, 605, 607, and 609 of this title; ``(iii) the agency's actions pursuant to sections 202, 203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995; and ``(iv) any other relevant information or requirements under any other Act and any relevant Executive orders. ``(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph (A), each House shall provide copies of the report to the chairman and ranking member of each standing committee with jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or the Senate to report a bill to amend the provision of law under which the rule is issued. ``(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction by the end of 15 calendar days after the submission or publication date. The report of the Comptroller General shall include an assessment of the agency's compliance with procedural steps required by paragraph (1)(B) and an assessment of whether the major rule imposes any new limits or mandates on private- sector activity. ``(B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller General by providing information relevant to the Comptroller General's report under subparagraph (A). ``(3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under paragraph (1) shall take effect upon enactment of a joint resolution of approval described in section 802 or as provided for in the rule following enactment of a joint resolution of approval described in section 802, whichever is later. ``(4) A nonmajor rule shall take effect as provided by section 803 after submission to Congress under paragraph (1). ``(5) If a joint resolution of approval relating to a major rule is not enacted within the period provided in subsection (b)(2), then a joint resolution of approval relating to the same rule may not be considered under this chapter in the same Congress by either the House of Representatives or the Senate. ``(b)(1) A major rule shall not take effect unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval described under section 802. ``(2) If a joint resolution described in subsection (a) is not enacted into law by the end of 70 session days or legislative days, as applicable, beginning on the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a)(1)(A) is received by Congress (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), then the rule described in that resolution shall be deemed not to be approved and such rule shall not take effect. ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (except subject to paragraph (3)), a major rule may take effect for one 90- calendar-day period if the President makes a determination under paragraph (2) and submits written notice of such determination to the Congress. ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the President by Executive order that the major rule should take effect because such rule is-- ``(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or safety or other emergency; ``(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws; ``(C) necessary for national security; or ``(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an international trade agreement. ``(3) An exercise by the President of the authority under this subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under section 802. ``(d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise provided under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which a report was submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) during the period beginning on the date occurring-- ``(A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days; or ``(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60 legislative days, before the date the Congress is scheduled to adjourn a session of Congress through the date on which the same or succeeding Congress first convenes its next session, sections 802 and 803 shall apply to such rule in the succeeding session of Congress. ``(2)(A) In applying sections 802 and 803 for purposes of such additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be treated as though-- ``(i) such rule were published in the Federal Register on-- ``(I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th session day; or ``(II) in the case of the House of Representatives, the 15th legislative day, after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes; and ``(ii) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress under subsection (a)(1) on such date. ``(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect the requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be submitted to Congress before a rule can take effect. ``(3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect as otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of this section). ``Sec. 802. Congressional approval procedure for major rules ``(a)(1) For purposes of this section, the term `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution addressing a report classifying a rule as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii) that-- ``(A) bears no preamble; ``(B) bears the following title (with blanks filled as appropriate): `Approving the rule submitted by ___ relating to ___.'; ``(C) includes after its resolving clause only the following (with blanks filled as appropriate): `That Congress approves the rule submitted by ___ relating to ___.'; and ``(D) is introduced pursuant to paragraph (2). ``(2) After a House of Congress receives a report classifying a rule as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii), the majority leader of that House (or his or her respective designee) shall introduce (by request, if appropriate) a joint resolution described in paragraph (1)-- ``(A) in the case of the House of Representatives, within 3 legislative days; and ``(B) in the case of the Senate, within 3 session days. ``(3) A joint resolution described in paragraph (1) shall not be subject to amendment at any stage of proceeding. ``(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be referred in each House of Congress to the committees having jurisdiction over the provision of law under which the rule is issued. ``(c) In the Senate, if the committee or committees to which a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred have not reported it at the end of 15 session days after its introduction, such committee or committees shall be automatically discharged from further consideration of the resolution and it shall be placed on the calendar. A vote on final passage of the resolution shall be taken on or before the close of the 15th session day after the resolution is reported by the committee or committees to which it was referred, or after such committee or committees have been discharged from further consideration of the resolution. ``(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee or committees to which a joint resolution is referred have reported, or when a committee or committees are discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of. ``(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion to further limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order. ``(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur. ``(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. ``(e) In the House of Representatives, if any committee to which a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred has not reported it to the House at the end of 15 legislative days after its introduction, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, and it shall be placed on the appropriate calendar. On the second and fourth Thursdays of each month it shall be in order at any time for the Speaker to recognize a Member who favors passage of a joint resolution that has appeared on the calendar for at least 5 legislative days to call up that joint resolution for immediate consideration in the House without intervention of any point of order. When so called up a joint resolution shall be considered as read and shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered to its passage without intervening motion. It shall not be in order to reconsider the vote on passage. If a vote on final passage of the joint resolution has not been taken by the third Thursday on which the Speaker may recognize a Member under this subsection, such vote shall be taken on that day. ``(f)(1) If, before passing a joint resolution described in subsection (a), one House receives from the other a joint resolution having the same text, then-- ``(A) the joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee; and ``(B) the procedure in the receiving House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House until the vote on passage, when the joint resolution received from the other House shall supplant the joint resolution of the receiving House. ``(2) This subsection shall not apply to the House of Representatives if the joint resolution received from the Senate is a revenue measure. ``(g) If either House has not taken a vote on final passage of the joint resolution by the last day of the period described in section 801(b)(2), then such vote shall be taken on that day. ``(h) This section and section 803 are enacted by Congress-- ``(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are deemed to be part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution described in subsection (a) and superseding other rules only where explicitly so; and ``(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. ``Sec. 803. Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules ``(a) For purposes of this section, the term `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the date on which the report referred to in section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That Congress disapproves the nonmajor rule submitted by the ___ relating to ___, and such rule shall have no force or effect.' (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in). ``(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be referred to the committees in each House of Congress with jurisdiction. ``(c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported such joint resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the end of 15 session days after the date of introduction of the joint resolution, such committee may be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar. ``(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of. ``(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion to further limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order. ``(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the deb

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 277, the Regulations from the Executivein Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023, or the ``REINS'' Act, introduced by Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL), amends the Congressional Review Act to require affirmative Congressional approval of ``major rules,'' including agency rules with an annual effect on the economy of at least $100 million, before they take effect. Background and Need for the Legislation I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GROWING PROBLEM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE The Constitution separates the powers of the federal government by vesting the legislative power in Congress, the executive power in the President, and the judicial power in the courts.\1\ The Framers established this structural separation to provide ``security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department'' by ``giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.''\2\ In other words--those of James Madison--this separation of powers works such that ``[a]mbition [is] made to counteract ambition.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 1, art. II Sec. 1, art. III Sec. 1; see Saikrishna B. Prakash, A Note on the Separation of Powers, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2d ed. 2014). \2\The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). \3\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, federal legislation requires the approval of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President.\4\ These elected officials are accountable to the American people, who may lobby their representatives to support or oppose legislation, and vote them out of office if they pass unpopular or unwise laws.\5\ Under the Constitution, ``[n]o law or resolution can . . . be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States.''\6\ The Framers intended this process to provide an ``[i]mpediment . . . against improper acts of legislation.''\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 7. \5\See U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 2, art. II Sec. 1, amends. 1 & 17. \6\The Federalist No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). \7\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contrary to this constitutional structure, the administrative state has consolidated the powers of the federal government in itself. Federal agencies exercise legislative power by issuing rules with the force of law, executive power by enforcing those rules, and judicial power by adjudicating disputes under them.\8\ As one witness recently testified before the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, in ``the modern administrative state . . . the executive branch regularly runs the risk of encroaching on the authority of the legislative branch.''\9\ Another hearing witness framed the matter more starkly: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Michael Uhlmann, A Note on Administrative Agencies, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2d ed. 2014). \9\Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 1 (2023) (statement of Allyson N. Ho, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If your knowledge of separation of powers is based on reading the Constitution or watching Schoolhouse Rock classics like ``I'm Just a Bill'' and ``Three-Ring Government,'' you could be forgiven for believing that Congress makes laws and the President executes those laws by enforcement and education. . . . [T]he present reality is entirely different. . . . [F]ederal agencies regularly make new laws to fill gaps left by the legislature, intentionally or unintentionally. And at times, regulatory agencies even act to make new laws despite a lack of any Congressional authority.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 2 (2023) (statement of Jonathan A. Wolfson, Chief Legal Officer and Policy Director, Cicero Institute). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Further, the effects of the administrative state's consolidation of power have been magnified by a series of judicial decisions that require courts to enforce an agency's ``reasonable'' interpretation of the law instead of saying what the law actually is--regardless of ``whether the agency has the correct interpretation.''\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\Ho, supra note 9, at 1; see, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring judicial ``deference to administrative interpretations'' of ambiguous statutes); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (requiring judicial ``[d]eference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules''); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (requiring judicial deference to persuasive agency ``rulings, interpretations and opinions''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unlike Congress and the President, federal ``agencies are not directly accountable to the people.''\12\ At best, the heads of most federal agencies might be said to have indirect accountability because they are appointed by the President, who in turn is elected.\13\ However, some agencies have allowed career employees, rather than just presidentially appointed senior officials, to issue and sign agency rules.\14\ For example, 2,094 of the 2,952 rules (more than 70%) issued by the Department of Health and Human Services from January 20, 2001, to January 19, 2018, were issued by career employees or inferior officials who were not confirmed by the Senate.\15\ At the Food and Drug Administration, career employees issued 1,860 of its 1,891 rules (more than 98%) during this same period--and a single career employee signed 385 of them (more than 20%).\16\ Civil servants are ``insulated from the accountability that national elections bring,'' and their issuance of agency rules ``undermines the power of the American people to choose who governs them.''\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. \13\See Exec. Order No. 13,979, 86 Fed. Reg. 6,813 (Jan. 18, 2021). \14\See id. \15\Angela C. Erickson & Thomas Berry, Pacific Legal Foundation, But Who Rules The Rulemakers?: A Study of Illegally Issued Regulations at HHS 18, 35 (Apr. 29, 2019). \16\Id. at 3, 25, 35. \17\86 Fed. Reg. at 6,813. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, while rules made by agencies carry the ``force and effect of law,''\18\ agency rulemaking procedures lack the rigor and transparency of the Constitution's process for considering and passing laws.\19\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies may issue legislative rules merely by publishing a ``notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register,'' providing an opportunity for public feedback (typically through the submission of written comments), and publishing the final rule at least thirty days before its effective date.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-303 (1979). \19\See Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 1 (2023) (statement of Ryan M. Cleckner, Owner, Law Office of Ryan M. Cleckner). \20\Administrative Conference of the United States & ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Administrative Procedure Act, Federal Administrative Procedure Sourcebook (May 25, 2022) (cleaned up); see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moreover, agencies issue so-called ``guidance documents''-- including interpretative rules (which explain how an agency interprets the statutes and legislative rules it administers) and general statements of policy (which prospectively advise how an agency may choose to exercise its authority)--without following even the limited procedural protections of notice and comment provided by the APA.\21\ Used properly, guidance documents can be valuable tools for agencies to help businesses and individuals navigate the administrative enforcement of laws enacted by Congress. However, as Representative Harriet Hageman recently observed, ``we have seen a growing trend whereby administrative agencies attempt to use guidance to make new law while at the same time avoiding the APA process.''\22\ Through guidance, as one federal appellate court observed, ``[l]aw is made, without notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register.''\23\ ``[T]he public frequently has insufficient notice of guidance documents,'' which ``carry the implicit threat of enforcement action if the regulated public does not comply.''\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b)(3)(A); Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31 (citing Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947)). \22\Markup of H.R. 288 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 377:8,731-8,733 (2023). \23\Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000). \24\Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 15, 2019). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By consolidating the separate constitutional powers of the federal government, exploiting a rulemaking process that is much less rigorous than what the Constitution requires for legislation, and facing only minimal electoral accountability for its actions, the administrative state has been able to impose a quantity and quality of policies that never could have received approval by the House, the Senate, and President.\25\ This reality is reflected in the empirical data. In 2021, Congress passed just 143 laws while federal agencies issued 3,257 rules.\26\ In other words, the executive branch issued mandates with the force of law over twenty-two times as often as the legislative branch.\27\ Moreover, as of 2020, the most recent year for which data is available, agencies had issued more than 70,000 guidance documents.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 7. \26\Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Competitive Enter. Inst., Ten Thousand Commandments 7 (Oct. 26, 2022). \27\Id. \28\Id. at 53. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Agency rules impose an estimated annual cost of $1.927 trillion, equivalent to $14,684 per U.S. household each year, and rivaling the combined total of individual and federal corporate income taxes.\29\ One observer commented, ``[i]f it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world's eighth- largest economy (not counting the United States itself), ranking behind France and ahead of Italy.''\30\ Agency guidance costs Americans an untold additional amount.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\Id. at 6. \30\Id. \31\See id. at 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many of the policies imposed by the administrative state are unpopular, radical, or do not reflect the will of the American people. For example, already this year, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a final rule that effectively bans pistol stabilizing braces across the country,\32\ and the Federal Trade Commission issued a proposed rule that would prohibit non-compete clauses in virtually every employment contract nationwide.\33\ Agency guidance can have equally pernicious effects. In 2019, the United States Department of Agriculture posted a two-page factsheet on its website that would have required all cattle and bison to be tagged with radio frequency identification (RFID) ear tags.\34\ As Representative Hageman noted, ``the price tag of this requirement to the cattle and bison industries would have been $2 billion.''\35\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\Factoring Criteria for Firearms With Attached ``Stabilizing Braces,'' 88 Fed. Reg. 6478 (Jan. 31, 2023). \33\Non-Compete Clause Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 3482, 3535 (Jan. 19, 2023) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 910). \34\U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Advancing Animal Disease Traceability: A Plan to Achieve Electronic Identification in Cattle and Bison (Apr. 2019). \35\Markup of H.R. 277 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 118th Cong. 99:2,311-2,312 (2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT The REINS Act builds upon two existing laws governing the administrative state: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Congressional Review Act (CRA). These statutes are discussed in turn. Originally enacted in 1946, the APA provides standards for agency rulemaking.\36\ Under ``formal'' rulemaking, an agency may issue a ``rule after the kind of trial-type hearing procedures normally reserved for adjudicatory orders.''\37\ Much more commonly, agencies issue rules through ``informal'' or notice-and-comment rulemaking. As discussed above, informal rulemaking requires publication of a ``notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register,'' an opportunity for public feedback (typically through the submission of written comments), and publication of the final rule at least thirty days before its effective date.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 551-559 (agency procedures), 701- 706 (judicial review). \37\Administrative Conference of the United States & ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, supra note 20 (cleaned up). \38\Id.; see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (rulemaking). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fifty years later, Congress passed the CRA in 1996 to help ``reclaim[] for Congress some of its policymaking authority'' and ``give[] the public the opportunity to call the attention of politically accountable, elected officials to concerns about new agency rules.''\39\ The CRA requires agencies to submit rules to Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) before they can take effect, and provides an expedited process for Congress to disapprove a rule by passing a joint resolution.\40\ In effect, the CRA gives Congress a legislative veto mechanism over agency rulemaking that satisfies the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements.\41\ As then-President Bill Clinton explained in signing the CRA, ``th[e] legislation increases congressional accountability for regulations'' and ``provid[es] expedited procedures for the Congress to review those regulations.''\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\142 Cong. Rec. S3683-01, 683-84 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens); see 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 801-808. \40\See Maeve P. Carey & Christopher M. Davis, Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked Questions 1 (Nov. 12, 2021); Christopher M. Davis, Congressional Research Service, The 118th Congress and the Congressional Review Act ``Lookback'' Mechanism 1 (Dec. 1, 2022). \41\See Carey & Davis, supra note 40, at 23 n. 128. \42\Statement on Signing the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 525 (Mar.29, 1996). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Significantly, the CRA also gives Congress the ability to disapprove of agency guidance. The CRA generally adopts the APA's definition of ``rule,''\43\ which includes both ``interpretative rules'' and ``general statements of policy''-- i.e., agency guidance documents.\44\ ``Congress intended the CRA to reach a broad range of agency activities, including agency policy statements, interpretive rules, and certain rules of agency organization, despite the fact that those actions are not subject to the APA's requirements for notice and comment.''\45\ Specifically, ``[i]nterpretive rules, general statements of policy, and analogous agency policy guidelines are covered without qualification because they meet the definition of a `rule' borrowed from'' the APA, and therefore ``these types of documents are covered under the congressional review provisions of the'' CRA.\46\ In other words, ``some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures.''\47\ Indeed, Congress has used the CRA to disapprove of and overturn a guidance bulletin issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.\48\ Similarly, GAO has determined that various guidance documents issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service; the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were rules for purposes of the CRA.\49\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\5 U.S.C. Sec. 804(3). \44\5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b)(3)(A); see Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (``Not all `rules' must be issued through the notice-and-comment process,'' and ``the notice-and-comment requirement `does not apply' to `interpretative rules [or] general statements of policy.''') \45\Valerie C. Brannon & Maeve P. Carey, Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Review Act: Determining Which ``Rules'' Must Be Submitted To Congress 12 (Mar. 6, 2019). \46\142 Cong. Rec. H2987-01, 3005 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (st

Hearings

For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 277: ``Reining in the Administrative State: Reclaiming Congress's Legislative Power,'' a hearing held on March 10, 2023, before the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust. The Committee heard testimony from the following witnesses: Allyson N. Ho, Partner and Co-Chair of Appellate and Constitutional Law, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Jonathan Wolfson, Chief Legal Officer and Policy Director, Cicero Institute; Ryan Cleckner, Co-Founder, Gun University LLC and Owner, Law office of Ryan M. Cleckner; and Emily Hammond, Professor, George Washington University Law School. The hearing addressed the growth of the administrative state and how it has aggrandized legislative power.

Committee Consideration

On May 24, 2023, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 277, favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 13 to 5, a quorum being present.

Committee Votes

In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 277: 1. Vote on Amendment #2 to H.R. 277 ANS, offered by Mr. Nadler, failed 9-17 2. Vote on Amendment #4 to H.R. 277 ANS, offered by Ms. Scanlon, failed 5-15 3. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 277, as amended, passed 13-5 Committee Oversight Findings In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 277 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program. Performance Goals and Objectives The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of House rule XIII, H.R. 277 would amend the Congressional Review Act to require affirmative Congressional approval of ``major rules,'' including agency rules with an annual effect on the economy of at least $100 million, before they take effect. Advisory on Earmarks In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 277 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House Rule XXI. Federal Mandates Statement An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104- 1).

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short Title. This section sets forth the short title of the bill as the ``Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023.'' Section 2. Purpose. This section sets forth the purpose of the bill as increasing accountability and transparency in the federal regulatory process. Section 3. Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking. This section amends and restates the CRA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 801 et seq., as follows: Section 801. Congressional review: Requires agencies promulgating rules to provide information to Congress and the Comptroller General, including whether the rule is a major rule. Permits a major rule to take effect only if Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval. Allows presidential approval of a major rule for a single ninety-day period on the basis of an emergency or national security, or to enforce criminal laws or implement a trade agreement. Prevents a major rule that is not approved from being considered again in the same Congress. Section 802. Congressional approval procedure for major rules: Establishes an expedited process for Congress to vote on joint resolutions of approval of major rules. Requires the Senate or House majority leader to introduce a joint resolution within three session or legislative days of receiving a report classifying an agency rule as a major rule, and requires the committees with jurisdiction to report within fifteen session or legislative days of its introduction. In the Senate, provides for a vote on a joint resolution of approval within fifteen session days after it is reported by the committee. In the House, permits a vote on a joint resolution of approval that has appeared on the calendar for at least five legislative days on the second and fourth Thursdays of each month, and requires a vote by the third Thursday on which a vote may be taken. Section 803. Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules: Retains the CRA's disapproval mechanism for non-major rules, allowing such rules to take effect after sixty days if not affirmatively disapproved by Congress. Section 804. Definitions: Retains the CRA's definitions of ``Federal agency,'' ``major rule,'' and ``rule'' with minor alteration. Defines the term ``nonmajor rule'' as ``any rule that is not a major rule.'' Adapts the definition of ``submission or publication date'' for non-major rules from section 802 of the CRA, and defines the term for major rules as the date on which Congress receives the information required by the REINS Act. Section 805. Judicial Review: Permits courts to determine whether agencies have completed the REINS Act's requirements for a rule to take effect, and limits judicial use of a joint resolution of approval to this purpose. Provides that a joint resolution of approval neither modifies an agency's statutory authority nor affects claims alleging defects in a rule. Section 806. Exemption for monetary policy: Recodifies section 807 of the CRA. Section 807. Effective date of certain rules: Recodifies section 808 of the CRA. Limits agencies' ability to determine the effective date of rules for which notice and public procedure is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest to non-major rules. Section 4. Budgetary Effects of Rules Subject to Section 802 of Title 5, United States Code. This section amends the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, 2 U.S.C. Sec. 907(b)(2), to provide that a major rule ``affecting budget authority, outlays, or receipts shall be assumed to be effective unless it is not approved.'' Section 5. Government Accountability Office Study of Rules. This section requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress within one year the number of rules in effect, the number of major rules in effect, and their total estimated economic cost. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY * * * * * * * [CHAPTER 8--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING [Sec. 801. Congressional review [(a)(1)(A) Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing-- [(i) a copy of the rule; [(ii) a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and [(iii) the proposed effective date of the rule. [(B) On the date of the submission of the report under subparagraph (A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule shall submit to the Comptroller General and make available to each House of Congress-- [(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the rule, if any; [(ii) the agency's actions relevant to sections 603, 604, 605, 607, and 609; [(iii) the agency's actions relevant to sections 202, 203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995; and [(iv) any other relevant information or requirements under any other Act and any relevant Executive orders. [(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph (A), each House shall provide copies of the report to the chairman and ranking member of each standing committee with jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or the Senate to report a bill to amend the provision of law under which the rule is issued. [(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction in each House of the Congress by the end of 15 calendar days after the submission or publication date as provided in section 802(b)(2). The report of the Comptroller General shall include an assessment of the agency's compliance with procedural steps required by paragraph (1)(B). [(B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller General by providing information relevant to the Comptroller General's report under subparagraph (A). [(3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under paragraph (1) shall take effect on the latest of-- [(A) the later of the date occurring 60 days after the date on which-- [(i) the Congress receives the report submitted under paragraph (1); or [(ii) the rule is published in the Federal Register, if so published; [(B) if the Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval described in section 802 relating to the rule, and the President signs a veto of such resolution, the earlier date-- [(i) on which either House of Congress votes and fails to override the veto of the President; or [(ii) occurring 30 session days after the date on which the Congress received the veto and objections of the President; or [(C) the date the rule would have otherwise taken effect, if not for this section (unless a joint resolution of disapproval under section 802 is enacted). [(4) Except for a major rule, a rule shall take effect as otherwise provided by law after submission to Congress under paragraph (1). [(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the effective date of a rule shall not be delayed by operation of this chapter beyond the date on which either House of Congress votes to reject a joint resolution of disapproval under section 802. [(b)(1) A rule shall not take effect (or continue), if the Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, described under section 802, of the rule. [(2) A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue) under paragraph (1) may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule. [(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (except subject to paragraph (3)), a rule that would not take effect by reason of subsection (a)(3) may take effect, if the President makes a determination under paragraph (2) and submits written notice of such determination to the Congress. [(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the President by Executive order that the rule should take effect because such rule is-- [(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or safety or other emergency; [(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws; [(C) necessary for national security; or [(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an international trade agreement. [(3) An exercise by the President of the authority under this subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under section 802 or the effect of a joint resolution of disapproval under this section. [(d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise provided under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which a report was submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) during the period beginning on the date occurring-- [(A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days, or [(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60 legislative days, before the date the Congress adjourns a session of Congress through the date on which the same or succeeding Congress first convenes its next session, section 802 shall apply to such rule in the succeeding session of Congress. [(2)(A) In applying section 802 for purposes of such additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be treated as though-- [(i) such rule were published in the Federal Register (as a rule that shall take effect) on-- [(I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th session day, or [(II) in the case of the House of Representatives, the 15th legislative day, after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes; and [(ii) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress under subsection (a)(1) on such date. [(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect the requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be submitted to Congress before a rule can take effect. [(3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect as otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of this section). [(e)(1) For purposes of this subsection, section 802 shall also apply to any major rule promulgated between March 1, 1996, and the date of the enactment of this chapter. [(2) In applying section 802 for purposes of Congressional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be treated as though-- [(A) such rule were published in the Federal Register on the date of enactment of this chapter; and [(B) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress under subsection (a)(1) on such date. [(3) The effectiveness of a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be as otherwise provided by law, unless the rule is made of no force or effect under section 802. [(f) Any rule that takes effect and later is made of no force or effect by enactment of a joint resolution under section 802 shall be treated as though such rule had never taken effect. [(g) If the Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval under section 802 respecting a rule, no court or agency may infer any intent of the Congress from any action or inaction of the Congress with regard to such rule, related statute, or joint resolution of disapproval. [Sec. 802. Congressional disapproval procedure [(a) For purposes of this section, the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the date on which the report referred to in section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the __ relating to __, and such rule shall have no force or effect.'' (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in). [(b)(1) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be referred to the committees in each House of Congress with jurisdiction. [(2) For purposes of this section, the term ``submission or publication date'' means the later of the date on which-- [(A) the Congress receives the report submitted under section 801(a)(1); or [(B) the rule is published in the Federal Register, if so published. [(c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported such joint resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the end of 20 calendar days after the submission or publication date defined under subsection (b)(2), such committee may be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar. [(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of. [(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order. [(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur. [(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. [(e) In the Senate the procedure specified in subsection (c) or (d) shall not apply to the consideration of a joint resolution respecting a rule-- [(1) after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning with the applicable submission or publication date, or [(2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was submitted during the period referred to in section 801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning on the 15th session day after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes. [(f) If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a joint resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply: [(1) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee. [(2) With respect to a joint resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the joint resolution-- [(A) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but [(B) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House. [(g) This section is enacted by Congress-- [(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and [(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. [Sec. 803. Special rule on statutory, regulatory, and judicial deadlines [(a) In the case of any deadline for, relating to, or involving any rule which does not take effect (or the effectiveness of which is terminated) because of enactment of a joint resolution under section 802, that deadline is extended until the date 1 year after the date of enactment of the joint resolution. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect a deadline merely by reason of the postponement of a rule's effective date under section 801(a). [(b) The term ``deadline'' means any date certain for fulfilling any obligation or exercising any authority established by or under any Federal statute or regulation, or by or under any court order implementing any Federal statute or regulation. [Sec. 804. Definitions [For purposes of this chapter-- [(1) The term ``Federal agency'' means any agency as that term is defined in section 551(1). [(2) The term ``major rule'' means any rule that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget finds has resulted in or is likely to result

Minority Views

I. INTRODUCTION H.R. 277, the ``Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2023'' or the ``REINS Act,'' is an extreme, unworkable bill that would prevent executive branch agencies from executing the statutes passed by Congress, allow for more corporate influence in rulemaking, and endanger the health and safety of all U.S. residents. By requiring both houses of Congress to pass, and the president to sign, a joint resolution of approval for any ``major rules'' before they can take effect, this bill would grind the gears of agency rulemaking to a halt. Corporate interests that may oppose any major rule from an agency could easily block the implementation of any rules by convincing just a small number of Congressional members from voting to approve any major rule. And the bill would also endanger the health and safety of Americans, who rely on administrative agencies to ensure that our air is safe to breathe, our water is safe to drink, our food is safe to eat, and the life-saving medicines we depend on are safe and effective. Furthermore, the bill claims to fix a problem that does not exist. Congress already has numerous tools to shape agency rulemaking and does not need the overly burdensome regime contemplated by the bill. Finally, the bill may be unconstitutional because its effect is nearly indistinguishable from the one-House legislative veto that the U.S. Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha. II. CONCERNS H.R 277 is highly problematic because it would restrict agency rulemaking, it would undermine public health and safety, it is based on a false premise that regulations undermine economic and employment growth, it ignores Congress' numerous tools for affecting agency rulemaking, and it may be unconstitutional. The Coalition for Sensible Safeguards (CSS)-- a coalition of more than 160 consumer, labor, scientific, research, faith, community, environmental, small business, good government, public health and public interest groups--opposes the REINS Act.\1\ In addition to CSS, 67 other groups, including the AFL-CIO, Consumer Reports, the Sierra Club, and United Steelworkers, have voiced their opposition to the REINS Act, arguing that the bill fundamentally threatens the government's ability to protect the public from harm.\2\ The National Resources Defense Council likewise opposes the REINS Act on similar grounds.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\68 Groups Tell Congress: Reject the REINS Act, Coalition for Sensible Safeguards (Feb. 27th, 2023), https://sensiblesafeguards.org/ press/68-groups-tell-congress-reject-the-reins-act/. \2\Id. \3\David Goldston, The REINS Act: Why Congress Should Hold Its Horses, NRDC (Jan. 04, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david- goldston/reins-act-why-congress-should-hold-its-horses. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. The REINS Act Would Severely Restrict Federal Rulemaking The REINS Act would effectively act as a chokehold on Federal agency rulemaking by requiring congressional assent to major rules before they can take effect. This approval process would be in addition to an already heavily proceduralized rulemaking process that often takes years to conclude. Under the new approval process imposed by the legislation, congressional gridlock or deliberate inaction would serve as a veto of even critically needed rules that often took years to develop.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\H.R. 367, the REINS Act of 2013: Promoting Jobs, Growth, and American Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Ronald M. Levin, Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis) [hereinafter Levin Statement] (``The reality is that the Act would in substance revive the legislative veto as a tool for controlling agency rulemaking.''); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of David Goldston, Director of Government Affairs, Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter Goldston Statement] (``Agencies often take several years to formulate a particular safeguard, reviewing hundreds of scientific studies, drawing on their own experts in science and economics, empaneling outside expert advisors, gathering thousands of public comments, and going though many levels of executive branch review''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notably, the REINS Act would consume vast amounts of limited congressional time and resources, which would necessarily have to be diverted from other critical legislative, oversight, and constituent responsibilities. Even under expedited procedures, Congress would likely be forced to choose between passing judgment on complex regulations, on the one hand, and other important duties, on the other. By requiring Congress to pass judgment on major rules without the time or expertise to make a well-informed decision, the REINS Act would allow well-subsidized business interests to further influence the rulemaking process. Major rules generally involve highly technical and complex scientific data as well as other types of evidence that require substantive expertise to decipher. Simply put, Congress lacks the time, resources, or technical knowledge to provide meaningful review of such rules.\5\ In the face of this complexity and time constraints, Members of Congress would be susceptible to readily available ``answers'' from well-funded industry lobbyists, who no doubt would be on hand to supply Members with industry-friendly talking points and other information regarding the merits of a particular rule.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Levin Statement, supra note 4 at 2 (``The REINS Act would impose great strain on congressional workloads. In many instances, this would be a poor use of scarce legislative time, because the subject matter of numerous major rules is arcane and most prudently left to specialized administrators.''). \6\Goldston Statement, supra note 4 at 3 (``Lobbyists would descend on Congress with even greater fervor than is currently the case to pressure Members to take their side on individual regulations.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Adding to the concern about Congress's ability to provide meaningful review of major rules is the fact that Congress would have only 70 legislative days within which to act, and committees of jurisdiction would have only 15 legislative days to consider a proposed rule's merits. Moreover, under the bill's expedited House procedures, floor consideration of joint resolutions of approval would be limited to just the second and fourth Thursdays of every month. B. By Placing a Chokehold on Major Rules, the REINS Act Threatens Public Safety While the REINS Act is unnecessary and unworkable, its most pernicious effect would be putting the health, welfare, and safety of Americans at risk. In addition to their economic benefits, regulations also promote improved air quality, healthier children, reduced discrimination, protection of our public health and safety, protection of human dignity, and other non-quantifiable, but fundamental, values. The costs of delaying these highly beneficial rules could be devastating. As the Obama Administration noted in its opposition to the REINS Act during the 113th Congress, the REINS Act would ``delay and, in many cases, thwart implementation of statutory mandates and execution of duly enacted laws, increase business uncertainty, undermine much- needed protections of the American public, and create unnecessary confusion. There is no justification for such an unprecedented requirement.''\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 367, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2013 (July 21, 2013). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During Markup, Representatives Nadler (D-NY) and Scanlon (D-PA) introduced amendments to exempt rules from the EPA, FDA and those affecting childhood illnesses from the bill. These amendments were defeated on party lines. C. The REINS Act Is Based on a False Premise that Regulations Harm Economic and Employment Growth Proponents of the REINS Act assert that Federal agency regulations impose excessive costs on businesses, stifle job creation, and hobble the Nation's economic growth. This premise, however, is based on flawed data and completely ignores the significant benefits of regulation. In support of their arguments concerning the costs of regulation, proponents of anti-regulatory measures, such as the REINS Act, regularly cite a widely-debunked study by economists Nicole and Mark Crain, which claims that Federal rulemaking imposes a cumulative burden of $1.75 trillion a year.\8\ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducted an extensive examination of the Crain study and criticized much of its methodology.\9\ CRS noted that the authors of the Crain study themselves told CRS that their study was ``not meant to be a decision-making tool for lawmakers or Federal regulatory agencies to use in choosing the `right' level of regulation. In no place in any of the reports do we imply that our reports should be used for this purpose. (How could we recommend this use when we make no attempt to estimate the benefits?)''\10\ CRS concluded that ``a valid, reasoned policy decision can only be made after considering information on both costs and benefits'' of regulation.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms (Sept. 2010). \9\Curtis W. Copeland, Analysis of an Estimate of the Total Costs of Federal Regulations (Apr. 6, 2011). \10\Id. at 26 (quoting an e-mail from Nicole and W. Mark Crain to the author of the CRS report). \11\Id. The Economic Policy Institute also issued a critique of the Crain study outlining additional concerns with the study's methodology and data. See Andrew Green, Flaws Call for Rejecting Crain and Crain Model: Cited $1.75 Trillion Cost of Regulations Is Not Worth Repeating, Econ. Pol'y Inst. (July 19, 2011), https://www.epi.org/publication/ flaws_call_for_rejecting_crain_and_crain_model/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, the benefits of regulations routinely outweigh their costs. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has annually estimated the costs of regulations. Significantly, OMB's reports to Congress include data on the benefits of regulations. D. Congress Already Has Numerous Tools to Shape Agency Rulemaking Congress already has various mechanisms at its disposal to oversee and influence the Federal agency rulemaking process. In its simplest and most straightforward form, Congress can delegate rulemaking authority to agencies with greater specificity or restriction, which would limit an agency's rulemaking authority either from the outset or through later amendment of an agency's organic statute. Congress also can simply pass legislation to stay the effect of an existing rule, as the House did in the 112th Congress with respect to the Environmental Protection Agency's cement manufacturing standards.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Cement Sector Regulatory Relief Act of 2011, H.R. 2681, 112th Cong. (2011). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congress may also impose restrictions on agency rulemaking through the appropriations process. These restrictions can take a variety of forms, including restrictions on the finalization of particular proposed rules, restrictions on regulatory activity within certain areas, restrictions on implementation or enforcement of certain rules, and conditional restrictions that prevent a rule from taking effect until an agency takes certain steps.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\See Curtis W. Copeland, Congressional Influence on Rulemaking and Regulation Through Appropriations Restrictions (Aug. 5, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. The REINS Act May Be Unconstitutional The REINS Act raises Constitutional concerns because it may provide for what arguably is an unconstitutional one-House legislative veto. As Professor Ronald Levin of Washington University Law School testified, one House of Congress can effectively veto an agency's rule under the REINS Act's congressional approval mechanism by simply not acting within the 70-legislative-day time frame provided for in the bill.\14\ Such a mechanism would be, in effect, indistinguishable from the one-House legislative veto that the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.\15\ The Court held in that decision that a veto of a Federal agency's legislative act was itself a legislative act that required passage by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the President for his signature.\16\ Under H.R. 277, one House could effectively veto an agency rule (i.e., a legislative act) without meeting the Constitutional requirements discussed in Chadha by simply not acting to pass a resolution of approval. The REINS Act, therefore, may violate the constitutional rule announced in Chadha. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Levin Statement, supra note 4 at 7. \15\Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a one-House legislative veto violated the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment clauses). \16\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Others--such as the Center for Progressive Reform (the Center)--have called the REINS Act unconstitutional for a different reason.\17\ The Center argues that because the REINS Act requires major rules to be approved by Congress before they become effective, it is ``deviating from the requirements of the Constitution.''\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\William Funk, Why the REINS Act is Unconstitutional, Ctr. for Progressive Reform (Feb. 14, 2017), https://progressivereform.org/cpr- blog/why-the-reins-act-is-unconstitutional/. \18\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ordinarily, ``when Congress effects change through bicameralism and presentment, it creates a law--a statute.''\19\ However, under the REINS Act, instead of creating a new law, the effect of bicameralism and presentment would be to approve a rule.\20\ While lawmakers are free to ratify previous agency action, they must do so by passing a statute, which by its nature can only be amended by Congress. In contrast, any rule approved by Congress under the REINS Act would be subject to change by the promulgating agency.\21\ Similarly, Congress can pass laws which explicitly allow agencies to make subsequent regulatory changes (such as the Attorney General's ability to reclassify substances under the Controlled Substances Act). However, the REINS Act contains no such language.\22\ As a result, the Center concludes that the REINS Act falls outside the established boundaries of Congressional practice and, by requiring both Houses to approval of major rules, violates the constitution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Id. \20\Id. \21\Id. \22\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During Markup, Representative Ivey (D-MD) probed the unconstitutionality of the bill at length, making the case that it clearly represents a legislative veto as contemplated in INS v. Chadha. III. CONCLUSION H.R. 277 is a radical bill designed to undermine the authority Congress delegated to agencies through statutes to execute the law. This proposal, which originated in the Tea Party movement of the 2010s, is an old and unworkable idea that would prevent agencies' rulemaking, jeopardize the health and safety of all US residents, and may be unconstitutional. The bill is premised on the false notion that regulations harm economic and employment growth and ignores the many other ways that Congress can influence the rulemaking process. If Republicans were actually concerned about our administrative state, they would join with us to help ensure that the rulemaking process cannot be gamed by corporate interests and allow for additional ways for public feedback to influence the process. H.R. 277 would prevent any major rule from coming to effect and thus break down the execution of the laws Congress passed. For all of these reasons, I dissent and urge all of my colleagues to oppose this legislation. Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member.

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/84