Additional Views
[To accompany H.R. 3120]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3120) to ban anticompetitive terms in
facility and insurance contracts that limit access to higher
quality, lower cost care, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Healthy Competition for Better Care
Act''.
SEC. 2. BANNING ANTICOMPETITIVE TERMS IN FACILITY AND INSURANCE
CONTRACTS THAT LIMIT ACCESS TO HIGHER QUALITY, LOWER
COST CARE.
(a) In General.--
(1) PHSA.--Section 2799A-9 of the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. 300gg-119) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.--
``(1) In general.--A group health plan or a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage
shall not enter into an agreement with a provider, network or
association of providers, or other service provider offering
access to a network of service providers if such agreement,
directly or indirectly--
``(A) restricts the group health plan or health
insurance issuer from--
``(i) directing or steering enrollees to
other health care providers; or
``(ii) offering incentives to encourage
enrollees to utilize specific health care
providers;
``(B) requires the group health plan or health
insurance issuer to enter into any additional contract
with an affiliate of the provider as a condition of
entering into a contract with such provider;
``(C) requires the group health plan or health
insurance issuer to agree to payment rates or other
terms for any affiliate not party to the contract of
the provider involved; or
``(D) restricts other group health plans or health
insurance issuers not party to the contract, from
paying a lower rate for items or services than the
contracting plan or issuer pays for such items or
services.
``(2) Additional requirement for self-insured plans.--A self-
insured group health plan shall not enter into an agreement
with a provider, network or association of providers, third-
party administrator, or other service provider offering access
to a network of providers if such agreement directly or
indirectly requires the group health plan to certify, attest,
or otherwise confirm in writing that the group health plan is
bound by restrictive contracting terms between the service
provider and a third-party administrator that the group health
plan is not party to, without a disclosure that such terms
exist.
``(3) Exception for certain group model issuers.--Paragraph
(1)(A) shall not apply to a group health plan or health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage with respect to--
``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined
in section 2791(b)(3)), if such health maintenance
organization operates primarily through exclusive
contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to
any arrangement between such a health maintenance
organization and its affiliates; or
``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an
exclusive provider network, accountable care
organization or other alternative payment model, center
of excellence, a provider sponsored health insurance
issuer that operates primarily through aligned multi-
specialty physician group practices or integrated
health systems, or such other similar network
arrangements as determined by the Secretary through
rulemaking.
``(4) Attestation.--A group health plan or health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage
shall annually submit to, as applicable, the applicable
authority described in section 2723 or the Secretary of Labor,
an attestation that such plan or issuer is in compliance with
the requirements of this subsection.
``(c) Maintenance of Existing HIPAA, GINA, and ADA Protections.--
Nothing in this section shall modify, reduce, or eliminate the existing
privacy protections and standards provided by reason of State and
Federal law, including the requirements of parts 160 and 164 of title
45, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations).
``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary
of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury, not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this section, shall promulgate regulations to
carry out this section.
``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a
group health plan or health insurance issuer, including accountable
care organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that
tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers of
excellence, or other pay-for-performance programs.
``(f) Clarification With Respect to Antitrust Laws.--Compliance with
this section does not constitute compliance with the antitrust laws, as
defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 12(a)).''.
(2) Employee retirement income security act of 1974.--
(A) In general.--Section 724 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
1185m) is amended--
(i) in the header, by striking ``by
removing'' and all that follows through
``information'' and inserting ``; prohibition
on anticompetitive agreements'';
(ii) in subsection (a)(4), in the first
sentence, by striking ``section'' and inserting
``subsection''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.--
``(1) In general.--A group health plan or a health insurance
issuer offering group health insurance coverage may not enter
into an agreement with a covered entity (as defined in
paragraph (3)) if such agreement, directly or indirectly--
``(A) restricts (including by operation of any
agreement in effect between such covered entity and
another covered entity) the group health plan (whether
self-insured or fully-insured) or health insurance
issuer from--
``(i) directing or steering participants or
beneficiaries to other health care providers
who are not subject to such agreement; or
``(ii) offering incentives to encourage
participants or beneficiaries to utilize
specific health care providers;
``(B) requires the group health plan or health
insurance issuer to enter into any additional agreement
with an affiliate of the covered entity;
``(C) requires the group health plan or health
insurance issuer to agree to payment rates or other
terms for any affiliate of the covered entity not party
to the agreement; or
``(D) restricts other group health plans or health
insurance issuers not party to the agreement from
paying a lower rate for items or services than the plan
or issuer involved in the agreement pays for such items
or services.
``(2) Exceptions for certain provider group and value-based
network designs.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not apply to a group
health plan or health insurance issuer offering group health
insurance coverage with respect to--
``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined
in section 733(b)(3)), if such health maintenance
organization operates primarily through exclusive
contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to
any arrangement between such a health maintenance
organization and its affiliates; or
``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an
exclusive provider network, accountable care
organization, center of excellence, a provider
sponsored health insurance issuer that operates
primarily through aligned multi-specialty physician
group practices or integrated health systems, or such
other similar network arrangements as determined by the
Secretary through guidance or rulemaking.
``(3) Covered entity defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term `covered entity' means a health care
provider, network or association of providers, third-party
administrator, or other service provider offering access to a
network of providers.
``(4) State grandfathering option.--An applicable State
authority may make a determination that the prohibitions under
paragraph (1)(A) (relating to conditions that would direct or
steer enrollees to, or offer incentives to encourage enrollees
to use, other health care providers) will not apply in the
State with respect to any specified agreement executed on June
19, 2019, and any agreements related to such specified
agreement executed on or before December 31, 2020, for a
maximum length of nonapplicability of up to 10 years from the
date of execution of the contract if the applicable State
authority determines that the contract is unlikely to
significantly lessen competition. With respect to a specified
agreement for which an applicable State authority has made a
determination under the preceding sentence, an applicable State
authority may determine whether renewal of the contract, within
the applicable 10-year period, is allowed.
``(5) Rule of construction.--Except as provided in paragraph
(1), nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit
network design or cost or quality initiatives by a group health
plan or health insurance issuer, including accountable care
organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that
tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers
of excellence, or other pay-for-performance programs.''.
(B) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Labor, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
promulgate regulations to carry out the amendments made
by this paragraph.
(C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in
section 1 of such Act is amended, in the entry relating
to section 724, by amending such entry to read as
follows:
``Sec. 724. Increasing transparency; prohibition on anticompetitive
agreements.''.
(3) IRC.--Section 9824 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.--
``(1) In general.--A group health plan shall not enter into
an agreement with a provider, network or association of
providers, or other service provider offering access to a
network of service providers if such agreement, directly or
indirectly--
``(A) restricts the group health plan from--
``(i) directing or steering enrollees to
other health care providers; or
``(ii) offering incentives to encourage
enrollees to utilize specific health care
providers;
``(B) requires the group health plan to enter into
any additional contract with an affiliate of the
provider as a condition of entering into a contract
with such provider;
``(C) requires the group health plan to agree to
payment rates or other terms for any affiliate not
party to the contract of the provider involved; or
``(D) restricts other group health plans not party to
the contract, from paying a lower rate for items or
services than the contracting plan pays for such items
or services.
``(2) Additional requirement for self-insured plans.--A self-
insured group health plan shall not enter into an agreement
with a provider, network or association of providers, third-
party administrator, or other service provider offering access
to a network of providers if such agreement directly or
indirectly requires the group health plan to certify, attest,
or otherwise confirm in writing that the group health plan is
bound by restrictive contracting terms between the service
provider and a third-party administrator that the group health
plan is not party to, without a disclosure that such terms
exist.
``(3) Exception for certain group model issuers.--Paragraph
(1)(A) shall not apply to a group health plan with respect to--
``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined
in section 9832(b)(3)), if such health maintenance
organization operates primarily through exclusive
contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to
any arrangement between such a health maintenance
organization and its affiliates; or
``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an
exclusive provider network, accountable care
organization or other alternative payment model, center
of excellence, a provider sponsored health insurance
issuer that operates primarily through aligned multi-
specialty physician group practices or integrated
health systems, or such other similar network
arrangements as determined by the Secretary through
rulemaking.
``(4) Attestation.--A group health plan shall annually submit
to the Secretary of Labor an attestation that such plan is in
compliance with the requirements of this subsection.
``(c) Maintenance of Existing HIPAA, GINA, and ADA Protections.--
Nothing in this section shall modify, reduce, or eliminate the existing
privacy protections and standards provided by reason of State and
Federal law, including the requirements of parts 160 and 164 of title
45, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations).
``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Labor, not later than
1 year after the date of enactment of this section, shall promulgate
regulations to carry out this section.
``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a
group health plan, including accountable care organizations, exclusive
provider organizations, networks that tier providers by cost or quality
or steer enrollees to centers of excellence, or other pay-for-
performance programs.
``(f) Clarification With Respect to Antitrust Laws.--Compliance with
this section does not constitute compliance with the antitrust laws, as
defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 12(a)).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
apply with respect to any contract entered into, amended, or renewed on
or after the date that is 18 months after the date of enactment of this
Act.
Purpose
H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act,
amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) to ban anticompetitive terms in facility and
insurance contracts that limit access to higher quality, lower
cost health care. The bill gives employer-sponsored health
plans the protections they need to negotiate lower rates and
obtain higher quality in their networks, lowering premiums and
improving the health of their employees.
Committee Action
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On April 26, 2023, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing entitled ``Reducing
Health Care Costs for Working Americans and Their Families,''
which examined, among other topics, anticompetitive behavior
such as provider payer contracts that result in increased
health costs. Witnesses were Mr. Joel White, President, Council
for Affordable Health Coverage (CAHC), Washington, D.C.; Mrs.
Tracy Watts, Senior Partner, Mercer, Washington, D.C.; Ms.
Marcie Strouse, Partner, Capitol Benefits Group, Des Moines,
Iowa; and Ms. Sabrina Corlette, Senior Research Professor,
Center on Health Insurance Reforms, Georgetown University's
Health Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.
On June 21, 2023, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
entitled ``Competition and Transparency: The Pathway Forward
for a Stronger Health Care Market,'' which discussed, among
other topics, the prevalence of anticompetitive clauses found
in contracts employed by insurers and their impact on creating
higher costs. Witnesses were Dr. Gloria Sachdev, President and
CEO, Employers' Forum of Indiana, Carmel, Indiana; Ms. Sophia
Tripoli, Director of Health Care Innovation, Families USA,
Washington, D.C.; Mr. Greg Baker, CEO, Affirmed RX, Louisville,
Kentucky; Ms. Christine Monahan, Assistant Research Professor,
Georgetown University Center on Health Insurance Reforms,
Washington, D.C.; and Mr. JC Scott, President and CEO,
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Washington, D.C.
Second Session--Hearing
On April 16, 2024, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
entitled ``ERISA's 50th Anniversary: The Path to Higher
Quality, Lower Cost Healthcare,'' which discussed, among other
topics, the use of contracting terms by hospitals and payers to
inhibit competition in health care. Witnesses were Mr. Russell
Dubose, Vice President of Human Resources, Phifer Inc.,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama; Mr. Scott Behrens, Senior Vice President,
Director of Government Relations, Lockton Companies, Kansas
City, Missouri; Ms. Mairin Mancino, Senior Advisor, Policy,
Peterson Center on Healthcare, New York, New York; and Ms.
Karen L. Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington,
D.C.
On September 10, 2024, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
entitled ``ERISA's 50th Anniversary: The Value of Employer-
Sponsored Health Benefits,'' which discussed, among other
topics, anticompetitive terms in contracts between providers
and employer-sponsored health plans. Witnesses were Ms. Ilyse
Schuman, Senior Vice President, Health and Paid Leave Policy,
American Benefits Council, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Holly Wade,
Executive Director, National Federation of Independent Business
Research Center, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Paul Fronstin, Director,
Health Benefits Research, Employee Benefit Research Institute,
Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Anthony Wright, Executive Director,
Families USA, Washington, D.C.
Legislative Action
On May 5, 2023, Representative Michelle Steel (R-CA)
introduced H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care
Act, with Representative Don Davis (D-NC). The bill was
referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee
on Education and the Workforce, and the Committee on Ways and
Means.
On September 11, 2024, the Committee considered H.R. 3120
in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended,
to the House of Representatives by voice vote. The Committee
adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute (ANS)
offered by Representative Steel, which made substantive changes
to the bill's ERISA provisions. The ANS made the following
changes: (1) removed requirements for group health plans to
attest to DOL their compliance with the ERISA requirements in
the bill; (2) removed extraneous clarifications regarding
antitrust and health privacy law which do not impact the
legislation's requirements or enforceability; (3) added a
grandfather provision regarding the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center and Highmark contract, which has a unique
structure that the bill's requirements would negate in the
absence of a grandfather provision; and (4) incorporated
technical assistance from the Department of Labor (DOL)
regarding the rule of construction and the requirement that DOL
issue regulations to implement the bill.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
Unlike most industries in America, health care in this
country rarely operates as a true free market. The health care
system, especially among hospitals and providers, is
increasingly consolidated. This consolidation weakens
competition and undermines the free-market ideals that lead to
higher quality and lower costs. Consolidated hospital and
provider systems use their size and scale as leverage over the
purchasers of health care services, namely employer-sponsored
health plans. Legislation is needed to level the playing field
to prevent consolidated hospital and provider systems from
using anticompetitive terms in contracts to force employers
into bad deals with high costs and low quality. With increased
competition, employees and employers will benefit.
BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
The Committee on Education and the Workforce has
jurisdiction over employer-sponsored health coverage. Employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) covers over half of the non-elderly
population--an estimated 153 million employees and their
dependents.\1\ Employer-sponsored health benefits are governed
by several laws, including ERISA, which is the foundation of
employer-sponsored health care.
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\1\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits-
Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf.
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ERISA establishes federal guidelines governing the conduct
of employee benefit plans, including employer-sponsored group
health plans. Private employers that implement group health
plans may implement uniform benefit plans because ERISA
preempts state regulation of such plans. Approximately 99
million employees and family members have coverage from
employers that self-insure their own health plans, making them
subject to regulation only under ERISA and the IRC.\2\ The
remainder of private employers offering health benefits
purchase fully insured coverage from traditional insurance
companies, which is generally governed by ERISA, the IRC, the
PHSA, and state insurance laws.
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\2\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits-
Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf.
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ESI is the core of America's health care system. Employers
have historically been at the forefront of creating innovative,
market-driven approaches to providing health benefits. Ninety-
three percent of Americans covered by ESI are satisfied with
their employer-sponsored coverage.\3\ Fifty-three percent of
small firms (firms with 3-199 workers) and 98 percent of large
firms (firms with 200 or more workers) offered health benefits
to their workers in 2023.\4\ When employees can participate in
ESI, 75 percent enroll.\5\
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\3\https://www.techtarget.com/healthcarepayers/news/366603783/93-
of-Employees-Satisfied-with-Employer-Sponsored-Health-
Insurance#::text=93%25%20of%20
Employees%20Satisfied%20with%20Employer%20
Sponsored%20Health%20Insurance%20%7C%20T echTarget&text=Follow:.
\4\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits-
Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf.
\5\Id.
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PROVIDER CONSOLIDATION DRIVES UP PRICES
Competition drives innovation, improves quality, and lowers
prices. Unfortunately, the health care system has become
increasingly consolidated in recent decades. Three pharmacy
benefit manager (PBM) companies control nearly 90 percent of
the market,\6\ health plans are becoming vertically integrated,
primary and specialty care offices are being purchased,\7\ and
hospitals are consolidating at a rapid rate. From 1998 to 2021,
1,887 hospitals merged,\8\ and 90 percent of metropolitan
statistical areas are considered consolidated for hospital
services.\9\ The percentage of physicians' practices owned by
or affiliated with hospitals has also increased.\10\ One
hundred seventeen million Americans reside in a concentrated
hospital market,\11\ with highly concentrated markets found in
90 percent of metropolitan statistical areas.\12\ Commercial
insurers and private payers are thus not keeping pace with
consolidation in the hospital market.
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\6\https://content.naic.org/cipr-topics/pharmacy-benefit-managers.
\7\https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/
which-cvs-rivals-also-own-
primary-care-services-2023-02-08/.
\8\https://ldi.upenn.edu/our-work/research-updates/hospital-
consolidation-continues-to-boost-
costs-narrow-access-and-impact-care-quality/
::text=There%20were%201%2C887%20hospital%20
mergers,to%20around%20just%20over%206%2C000.%E2%80%9D.
\9\https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/policy-solutions-
for-hospital-consolidation/.
\10\https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57778.
\11\https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101508/
addressing_health_care_market_
consolidation_and_high_prices_1.pdf.
\12\https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/
hlthaff.2017.0556.
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Consolidation in health care has contributed to
significantly higher prices in the commercial market compared
to Medicare. A recent Congressional Budget Office report found
that commercial insurers' prices were 240 percent of Medicare
fee-for-service prices for outpatient services and 182 percent
for inpatient services.\13\ Researchers have found that
insurers paid through administrative services only (ASO)
contracts may have little incentive to obtain low health care
prices and may have a disincentive to lower prices when an ASO
contract is paid as a percentage of overall claims.\14\
Additionally, the prices that commercial insurers pay hospitals
are much higher than hospitals' costs.\15\ The National Bureau
of Economic Research reports that hospital mergers lessening
competition is correlated with higher hospital price
increases.\16\
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\13\Id.
\14\https://www.nber.org/papers/w25190.
\15\Id.
\16\https://www.nber.org/papers/w32613.
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CONSOLIDATED PROVIDERS DISADVANTAGE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH PLANS WITH ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONTRACTS
Employers are often at a disadvantage negotiating with
hospitals and providers when designing their networks, leading
to increased costs for plans and enrollees. Even large
employers often lack the resources, staffing, or expertise
needed to negotiate favorable terms with hospitals and
providers, especially highly resourced consolidated hospital
and provider systems.\17\ Due to this imbalance, employers are
often forced to agree to anticompetitive contracting terms in
their contracts with providers and hospitals, which reduces
their flexibility to design networks that best meet the needs
of their employees and keep costs down.\18\ Employers would
benefit from increased ability to steer patients towards higher
quality or lower cost provider options and not be subject to
mandated inflated reimbursement rates.
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\17\https://www.ajmc.com/view/large-self-insured-employers-lack-
power-to-effectively-negotiate-hospital-prices.
\18\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf.
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Large, self-insured companies such as Boeing, JPMorgan
Chase, and General Motors have begun to negotiate prices with
providers directly, using their large number of employees as
leverage in their negotiations. However, the success of these
efforts is typically a function of a given company's market
power, and the vast majority of employers do not have the
market power needed to negotiate lower prices or favorable
contract terms with providers.\19\
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\19\https://www.ajmc.com/view/large-self-insured-employers-lack-
power-to-effectively-negotiate-hospital-prices.
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During the HELP Subcommittee's April 16, 2024, hearing, Ms.
Mairin Mancino from the Peterson Center on Healthcare testified
about anti-competitive contracts:
Lawmakers can help promote greater competition within
the employer healthcare market, as well as individual
and commercial health insurance markets, by more
directly addressing anticompetitive practices that
arise in consolidated markets. Anti-tiering and anti-
steering clauses require that an insurer place
physicians, hospitals, and other facilities associated
with a particular system in the most favorable tier of
providers or at the lowest cost-sharing level
regardless of whether they meet cost and quality
requirements to be in that tier or if other providers
have better value. All-or-nothing clauses require
insurers to include all of a health system's providers
and facilities in their network, regardless of cost or
quality differences. Most favored nation clauses also
limit competition by guaranteeing that an insurer
receives terms from providers that are at least as
favorable as those provided to any other insurer, which
prevents other insurers from offering new products at a
lower rate. These clauses give dominant organizations
an unfair advantage over competitors, and the lack of
competition prevents employers from being able to
prudently fulfill their fiduciary obligations.\20\
During the HELP Subcommittee's September 10, 2024, hearing,
Ms. Ilyse Schuman from the American Benefits Council also
testified about anti-competitive contracts:
With growing market power, large hospital systems are
able to demand higher prices and impose anti-
competitive contracting terms on employer-sponsored
health plans and third-party administrators or insurers
negotiating on their behalf. These restrictive terms
that appear in contracts the hospital system negotiates
with insurers, third-party administrators or group
health plans further solidify the hospital system's
dominance in the region, reduce competition, and
ultimately increase costs. Large hospital systems in
highly concentrated markets use their leverage in
contract negotiations to include terms that limit
access to lower-cost, higher-quality health care. These
anti-competitive contracting terms come in several
forms: (1) ``anti-steering'' or ``anti-tiering''
provisions that prevent employers from utilizing value-
based designs to direct employees toward lower-cost,
higher-quality providers, (2) ``all-or-nothing''
clauses that require the health plan to contract with
all affiliated facilities and providers, including
lower-quality ones, or (3) ``most-favored nation''
clauses that restrict other health plans that are not
even a party to the contract from paying lower
rates.\21\
\20\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
Mancino_Testimony.pdf.
\21\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf.
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. . . .
With such contracting terms in place, the employer's
hands are tied in their efforts to promote higher-value
health care and employees are bound more tightly to
higher-cost and/or lower quality providers . . . The
Council urges the committee to pass the Healthy
Competition for Better Care Act (H.R. 3120) that would
increase competition and promote lower costs by
restricting such anti-competitive contract terms.\22\
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\22\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf.
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H.R. 3120, HEALTHY COMPETITION FOR BETTER CARE ACT
H.R. 3120 amends ERISA, the PHSA, and the IRC to ban
anticompetitive terms in facility and insurance contracts that
limit access to higher quality, lower cost care. Specifically,
the bill requires that a group health plan or a health
insurance issuer may not enter into an agreement with a health
care provider, network or association of providers, third-party
administrator, or other service provider offering access to a
network of providers if such an agreement includes restrictive
contracting terms. Restrictive contracting terms include terms
that, directly or indirectly, (1) restrict the group health
plan from directing or steering participants to other health
care providers, (2) restrict the group health plan from
offering incentives to encourage participants to use specific
health care providers, (3) require the group health plan to
enter into additional agreements with an affiliate of the
provider, (4) require the group health plan to agree to payment
rates for any affiliate of the provider not party to the
contract, or (5) restrict other group health plans from paying
a lower rate for services than the plan would pay under the
agreement. The bill also provides exceptions for health
maintenance organizations and value-based network arrangements;
it is not the Committee's intention to restrict employers'
ability to design innovative, patient-centered payment models.
SUPPORT FOR H.R. 3120
The following organizations have endorsed or support H.R.
3120: the American Benefits Council, the Bipartisan Policy
Center, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, the Colorado
Consumer Health Initiative, the Consumers for Quality Care, the
ERISA Industry Committee, Families USA, Health Access
California, Nomi Health, the Pennsylvania Health Access
Network, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
CONCLUSION
H.R. 3120 helps level the playing field between highly
consolidated providers and employer- sponsored health plans.
The bill protects employer-sponsored health plans from
anticompetitive contracting terms, giving them more control
over their own health plans' networks. As such, this improved
leverage will help employers fulfill their fiduciary duties to
their employees,
Additional Views
H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act,
introduced by Rep. Michelle Steel (R-CA), prohibits certain
terms in contracts entered into by group health plans and
insurers, including ``anti-tiering'' and ``anti-steering''
clauses, ``all-or-nothing'' clauses, ``most-favored-nation''
clauses, and other anticompetitive terms. Prohibiting these
contract terms in federal law could help counter the negative
impacts that consolidation can have on plans and consumers
alike, by preventing hospital monopolies from leveraging their
market power to force sponsors into contracts that financially
benefit the hospital and raise costs.\1\ H.R. 3120 was reported
favorably out of Committee on voice vote.
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\1\Brot-Goldberg et al., Who Pays for Rising Health Care Prices?
Evidence from Hospital Mergers, National Bureau of Economic Research
(June 2024), https://www.nber.org/papers/w32613.
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Consideration of the bill is timely, and the legislative
intent is meritorious--to address the anticompetitive practices
that disadvantage consumers of health care. Over the past three
decades, there has been a steady increase in hospital
consolidations\2\ and this trend is expected to continue.\3\
One study found that the hospital sector is highly concentrated
in as many as 90 percent of urban areas.\4\ Research shows that
consolidation reduces competition and leads to increased
prices\5\--as high as 65 percent according to one estimate.\6\
Consolidation also can lead to lower wages for many health
industry workers,\7\ lower quality of care for patients,\8\ and
higher costs for the federal government.\9\
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\2\Levinson et al., Ten Things to Know About Consolidation in
Health Care Provider Markets, KFF (Apr. 19, 2024), https://www.kff.org/
health-costs/issue-brief/ten-things-to-know-about-
consolidation-in-health-care-provider-markets/.
\3\Ron Southwick, Hospital merger activity is projected to increase
in 2024, Chief Healthcare Executive (Jan. 25, 2024), https://
www.chiefhealthcareexecutive.com/view/hospital-merger-
activity-is-projected-to-increase-in-2024.
\4\Brent D. Fulton, Health Care Market Concentration Trends In The
United States: Evidence And Policy Responses, Health Affairs (Sep.
2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/
hlthaff.2017.0556.
\5\Gaynor & Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation--Update, The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (June 2012), DOI: 10.13140/
RG.2.1.4294.0882; Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 2.
\6\Liu et al., Environmental Scan on Consolidation Trends and
Impacts in Health Care Markets, RAND (Sept. 30, 2022), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1820-1.html.
\7\Prager & Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence
from Hospitals, American Economic Review (2021), https://
pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20190690.
\8\Martin Gaynor, What to Do about Health-Care Markets? Policies to
Make Health-Care Markets Work, Brookings (Mar. 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Gaynor_PP_FINAL.pdf.
\9\Supra note 2.
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However, while well-intentioned, additional deliberation
and refinements are needed. The bill includes exemptions for
any contract that involves a health maintenance organization
(HMO), center of excellence, or a ``value-based network
arrangement.'' Notably, 13 percent of workers with employer-
sponsored health coverage were enrolled in an HMO in 2023.\10\
In addition, although undefined in this bill, the term
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are recognized as one
type of ``value-based network arrangement.''\11\ While ACOs
were originally established as a payment model for Medicare,
many private sector health plans across the country have
launched their own ACO networks, and today the top 20
commercial ACOs by patient population represent more than 13
million patients.\12\ While there may be policy merit in
ensuring that certain arrangements focused on value and quality
can continue, there should be ongoing dialogue on how to best
achieve that goal without leaving consumers vulnerable to the
behaviors the bill seeks to eliminate.\13\ Furthermore, in
addition to creating a loophole for certain existing contracts,
the bill's state grandfathering option allows states to
determine the applicability of federal law to employee health
benefits plans, upending a longstanding practice regarding
ERISA preemption and setting a dangerous precedent. Lastly, the
Secretary is granted broad authority to exempt any ``other
similar network arrangements,'' further weakening the bill and
leaving the door open for future loopholes or problematic
interpretations.
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\10\2023 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KFF (Oct. 18, 2023),
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2023-employer-health-benefits-
survey/.
\11\Value-Based Care, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
https://www.cms.gov/
priorities/innovation/key-concepts/value-based-care (last visited Sept.
19, 2024); Making the Most of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs):
What Advocates Need to Know, Families USA (Feb. 2012), https://
familiesusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ACO-Basics.pdf.
\12\Top 25 ACOs by patient population, Definitive Healthcare (June
12, 2024), https://www.definitivehc.com/resources/healthcare-insights/
top-acos-patient-population::text=
Which%20ACO%20has%20the%20largest,and%20two%20 are%20Medicaid%20ACOs;
How many accountable care organizations (ACOs) are in each state?
Definitive Healthcare (May 6, 2024), https://www.definitivehc.com/
resources/healthcare-insights/accountable-care-organizations-by-state.
\13\See, e.g., Letter from Consumers for Fair Hospital Pricing to
Chair Virginia Foxx and Ranking Member Bobby Scott (Sept. 11, 2024),
https://familiesusa.app.box.com/s/lt4fr3pxuekuqjdlvbjii1twt8334piz.
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It is necessary to close the loopholes and eliminate the
exceptions in the bill adopted by the Committee. Doing so would
bolster its strength and sufficiency to protect consumers from
high health care costs. With these improvements, this
legislation would be a stronger product and would warrant full
support.
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott,
Ranking Member.
[all]