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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 118-875

HEALTHY COMPETITION FOR BETTER CARE ACT

2024-12-16

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Additional Views

[To accompany H.R. 3120] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3120) to ban anticompetitive terms in facility and insurance contracts that limit access to higher quality, lower cost care, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Healthy Competition for Better Care Act''. SEC. 2. BANNING ANTICOMPETITIVE TERMS IN FACILITY AND INSURANCE CONTRACTS THAT LIMIT ACCESS TO HIGHER QUALITY, LOWER COST CARE. (a) In General.-- (1) PHSA.--Section 2799A-9 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg-119) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.-- ``(1) In general.--A group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall not enter into an agreement with a provider, network or association of providers, or other service provider offering access to a network of service providers if such agreement, directly or indirectly-- ``(A) restricts the group health plan or health insurance issuer from-- ``(i) directing or steering enrollees to other health care providers; or ``(ii) offering incentives to encourage enrollees to utilize specific health care providers; ``(B) requires the group health plan or health insurance issuer to enter into any additional contract with an affiliate of the provider as a condition of entering into a contract with such provider; ``(C) requires the group health plan or health insurance issuer to agree to payment rates or other terms for any affiliate not party to the contract of the provider involved; or ``(D) restricts other group health plans or health insurance issuers not party to the contract, from paying a lower rate for items or services than the contracting plan or issuer pays for such items or services. ``(2) Additional requirement for self-insured plans.--A self- insured group health plan shall not enter into an agreement with a provider, network or association of providers, third- party administrator, or other service provider offering access to a network of providers if such agreement directly or indirectly requires the group health plan to certify, attest, or otherwise confirm in writing that the group health plan is bound by restrictive contracting terms between the service provider and a third-party administrator that the group health plan is not party to, without a disclosure that such terms exist. ``(3) Exception for certain group model issuers.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not apply to a group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage with respect to-- ``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined in section 2791(b)(3)), if such health maintenance organization operates primarily through exclusive contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to any arrangement between such a health maintenance organization and its affiliates; or ``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an exclusive provider network, accountable care organization or other alternative payment model, center of excellence, a provider sponsored health insurance issuer that operates primarily through aligned multi- specialty physician group practices or integrated health systems, or such other similar network arrangements as determined by the Secretary through rulemaking. ``(4) Attestation.--A group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall annually submit to, as applicable, the applicable authority described in section 2723 or the Secretary of Labor, an attestation that such plan or issuer is in compliance with the requirements of this subsection. ``(c) Maintenance of Existing HIPAA, GINA, and ADA Protections.-- Nothing in this section shall modify, reduce, or eliminate the existing privacy protections and standards provided by reason of State and Federal law, including the requirements of parts 160 and 164 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations). ``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, shall promulgate regulations to carry out this section. ``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a group health plan or health insurance issuer, including accountable care organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers of excellence, or other pay-for-performance programs. ``(f) Clarification With Respect to Antitrust Laws.--Compliance with this section does not constitute compliance with the antitrust laws, as defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)).''. (2) Employee retirement income security act of 1974.-- (A) In general.--Section 724 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1185m) is amended-- (i) in the header, by striking ``by removing'' and all that follows through ``information'' and inserting ``; prohibition on anticompetitive agreements''; (ii) in subsection (a)(4), in the first sentence, by striking ``section'' and inserting ``subsection''; and (iii) by adding at the end the following: ``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.-- ``(1) In general.--A group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage may not enter into an agreement with a covered entity (as defined in paragraph (3)) if such agreement, directly or indirectly-- ``(A) restricts (including by operation of any agreement in effect between such covered entity and another covered entity) the group health plan (whether self-insured or fully-insured) or health insurance issuer from-- ``(i) directing or steering participants or beneficiaries to other health care providers who are not subject to such agreement; or ``(ii) offering incentives to encourage participants or beneficiaries to utilize specific health care providers; ``(B) requires the group health plan or health insurance issuer to enter into any additional agreement with an affiliate of the covered entity; ``(C) requires the group health plan or health insurance issuer to agree to payment rates or other terms for any affiliate of the covered entity not party to the agreement; or ``(D) restricts other group health plans or health insurance issuers not party to the agreement from paying a lower rate for items or services than the plan or issuer involved in the agreement pays for such items or services. ``(2) Exceptions for certain provider group and value-based network designs.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not apply to a group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage with respect to-- ``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined in section 733(b)(3)), if such health maintenance organization operates primarily through exclusive contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to any arrangement between such a health maintenance organization and its affiliates; or ``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an exclusive provider network, accountable care organization, center of excellence, a provider sponsored health insurance issuer that operates primarily through aligned multi-specialty physician group practices or integrated health systems, or such other similar network arrangements as determined by the Secretary through guidance or rulemaking. ``(3) Covered entity defined.--For purposes of this subsection, the term `covered entity' means a health care provider, network or association of providers, third-party administrator, or other service provider offering access to a network of providers. ``(4) State grandfathering option.--An applicable State authority may make a determination that the prohibitions under paragraph (1)(A) (relating to conditions that would direct or steer enrollees to, or offer incentives to encourage enrollees to use, other health care providers) will not apply in the State with respect to any specified agreement executed on June 19, 2019, and any agreements related to such specified agreement executed on or before December 31, 2020, for a maximum length of nonapplicability of up to 10 years from the date of execution of the contract if the applicable State authority determines that the contract is unlikely to significantly lessen competition. With respect to a specified agreement for which an applicable State authority has made a determination under the preceding sentence, an applicable State authority may determine whether renewal of the contract, within the applicable 10-year period, is allowed. ``(5) Rule of construction.--Except as provided in paragraph (1), nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a group health plan or health insurance issuer, including accountable care organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers of excellence, or other pay-for-performance programs.''. (B) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall promulgate regulations to carry out the amendments made by this paragraph. (C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 1 of such Act is amended, in the entry relating to section 724, by amending such entry to read as follows: ``Sec. 724. Increasing transparency; prohibition on anticompetitive agreements.''. (3) IRC.--Section 9824 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(b) Protecting Health Plans Network Design Flexibility.-- ``(1) In general.--A group health plan shall not enter into an agreement with a provider, network or association of providers, or other service provider offering access to a network of service providers if such agreement, directly or indirectly-- ``(A) restricts the group health plan from-- ``(i) directing or steering enrollees to other health care providers; or ``(ii) offering incentives to encourage enrollees to utilize specific health care providers; ``(B) requires the group health plan to enter into any additional contract with an affiliate of the provider as a condition of entering into a contract with such provider; ``(C) requires the group health plan to agree to payment rates or other terms for any affiliate not party to the contract of the provider involved; or ``(D) restricts other group health plans not party to the contract, from paying a lower rate for items or services than the contracting plan pays for such items or services. ``(2) Additional requirement for self-insured plans.--A self- insured group health plan shall not enter into an agreement with a provider, network or association of providers, third- party administrator, or other service provider offering access to a network of providers if such agreement directly or indirectly requires the group health plan to certify, attest, or otherwise confirm in writing that the group health plan is bound by restrictive contracting terms between the service provider and a third-party administrator that the group health plan is not party to, without a disclosure that such terms exist. ``(3) Exception for certain group model issuers.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not apply to a group health plan with respect to-- ``(A) a health maintenance organization (as defined in section 9832(b)(3)), if such health maintenance organization operates primarily through exclusive contracts with multi-specialty physician groups, nor to any arrangement between such a health maintenance organization and its affiliates; or ``(B) a value-based network arrangement, such as an exclusive provider network, accountable care organization or other alternative payment model, center of excellence, a provider sponsored health insurance issuer that operates primarily through aligned multi- specialty physician group practices or integrated health systems, or such other similar network arrangements as determined by the Secretary through rulemaking. ``(4) Attestation.--A group health plan shall annually submit to the Secretary of Labor an attestation that such plan is in compliance with the requirements of this subsection. ``(c) Maintenance of Existing HIPAA, GINA, and ADA Protections.-- Nothing in this section shall modify, reduce, or eliminate the existing privacy protections and standards provided by reason of State and Federal law, including the requirements of parts 160 and 164 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations). ``(d) Regulations.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Labor, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, shall promulgate regulations to carry out this section. ``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a group health plan, including accountable care organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers of excellence, or other pay-for- performance programs. ``(f) Clarification With Respect to Antitrust Laws.--Compliance with this section does not constitute compliance with the antitrust laws, as defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)).''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any contract entered into, amended, or renewed on or after the date that is 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act. Purpose H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to ban anticompetitive terms in facility and insurance contracts that limit access to higher quality, lower cost health care. The bill gives employer-sponsored health plans the protections they need to negotiate lower rates and obtain higher quality in their networks, lowering premiums and improving the health of their employees.

Committee Action

118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On April 26, 2023, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing entitled ``Reducing Health Care Costs for Working Americans and Their Families,'' which examined, among other topics, anticompetitive behavior such as provider payer contracts that result in increased health costs. Witnesses were Mr. Joel White, President, Council for Affordable Health Coverage (CAHC), Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Tracy Watts, Senior Partner, Mercer, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Marcie Strouse, Partner, Capitol Benefits Group, Des Moines, Iowa; and Ms. Sabrina Corlette, Senior Research Professor, Center on Health Insurance Reforms, Georgetown University's Health Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. On June 21, 2023, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``Competition and Transparency: The Pathway Forward for a Stronger Health Care Market,'' which discussed, among other topics, the prevalence of anticompetitive clauses found in contracts employed by insurers and their impact on creating higher costs. Witnesses were Dr. Gloria Sachdev, President and CEO, Employers' Forum of Indiana, Carmel, Indiana; Ms. Sophia Tripoli, Director of Health Care Innovation, Families USA, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Greg Baker, CEO, Affirmed RX, Louisville, Kentucky; Ms. Christine Monahan, Assistant Research Professor, Georgetown University Center on Health Insurance Reforms, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. JC Scott, President and CEO, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Washington, D.C. Second Session--Hearing On April 16, 2024, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``ERISA's 50th Anniversary: The Path to Higher Quality, Lower Cost Healthcare,'' which discussed, among other topics, the use of contracting terms by hospitals and payers to inhibit competition in health care. Witnesses were Mr. Russell Dubose, Vice President of Human Resources, Phifer Inc., Tuscaloosa, Alabama; Mr. Scott Behrens, Senior Vice President, Director of Government Relations, Lockton Companies, Kansas City, Missouri; Ms. Mairin Mancino, Senior Advisor, Policy, Peterson Center on Healthcare, New York, New York; and Ms. Karen L. Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C. On September 10, 2024, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``ERISA's 50th Anniversary: The Value of Employer- Sponsored Health Benefits,'' which discussed, among other topics, anticompetitive terms in contracts between providers and employer-sponsored health plans. Witnesses were Ms. Ilyse Schuman, Senior Vice President, Health and Paid Leave Policy, American Benefits Council, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Holly Wade, Executive Director, National Federation of Independent Business Research Center, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Paul Fronstin, Director, Health Benefits Research, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Anthony Wright, Executive Director, Families USA, Washington, D.C. Legislative Action On May 5, 2023, Representative Michelle Steel (R-CA) introduced H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act, with Representative Don Davis (D-NC). The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and the Committee on Ways and Means. On September 11, 2024, the Committee considered H.R. 3120 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by voice vote. The Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute (ANS) offered by Representative Steel, which made substantive changes to the bill's ERISA provisions. The ANS made the following changes: (1) removed requirements for group health plans to attest to DOL their compliance with the ERISA requirements in the bill; (2) removed extraneous clarifications regarding antitrust and health privacy law which do not impact the legislation's requirements or enforceability; (3) added a grandfather provision regarding the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and Highmark contract, which has a unique structure that the bill's requirements would negate in the absence of a grandfather provision; and (4) incorporated technical assistance from the Department of Labor (DOL) regarding the rule of construction and the requirement that DOL issue regulations to implement the bill. Committee Views INTRODUCTION Unlike most industries in America, health care in this country rarely operates as a true free market. The health care system, especially among hospitals and providers, is increasingly consolidated. This consolidation weakens competition and undermines the free-market ideals that lead to higher quality and lower costs. Consolidated hospital and provider systems use their size and scale as leverage over the purchasers of health care services, namely employer-sponsored health plans. Legislation is needed to level the playing field to prevent consolidated hospital and provider systems from using anticompetitive terms in contracts to force employers into bad deals with high costs and low quality. With increased competition, employees and employers will benefit. BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE The Committee on Education and the Workforce has jurisdiction over employer-sponsored health coverage. Employer- sponsored insurance (ESI) covers over half of the non-elderly population--an estimated 153 million employees and their dependents.\1\ Employer-sponsored health benefits are governed by several laws, including ERISA, which is the foundation of employer-sponsored health care. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits- Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ERISA establishes federal guidelines governing the conduct of employee benefit plans, including employer-sponsored group health plans. Private employers that implement group health plans may implement uniform benefit plans because ERISA preempts state regulation of such plans. Approximately 99 million employees and family members have coverage from employers that self-insure their own health plans, making them subject to regulation only under ERISA and the IRC.\2\ The remainder of private employers offering health benefits purchase fully insured coverage from traditional insurance companies, which is generally governed by ERISA, the IRC, the PHSA, and state insurance laws. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits- Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ESI is the core of America's health care system. Employers have historically been at the forefront of creating innovative, market-driven approaches to providing health benefits. Ninety- three percent of Americans covered by ESI are satisfied with their employer-sponsored coverage.\3\ Fifty-three percent of small firms (firms with 3-199 workers) and 98 percent of large firms (firms with 200 or more workers) offered health benefits to their workers in 2023.\4\ When employees can participate in ESI, 75 percent enroll.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\https://www.techtarget.com/healthcarepayers/news/366603783/93- of-Employees-Satisfied-with-Employer-Sponsored-Health- Insurance#::text=93%25%20of%20 Employees%20Satisfied%20with%20Employer%20 Sponsored%20Health%20Insurance%20%7C%20T echTarget&text=Follow:. \4\https://files.kff.org/attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits- Survey-2023-Annual-Survey.pdf. \5\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PROVIDER CONSOLIDATION DRIVES UP PRICES Competition drives innovation, improves quality, and lowers prices. Unfortunately, the health care system has become increasingly consolidated in recent decades. Three pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) companies control nearly 90 percent of the market,\6\ health plans are becoming vertically integrated, primary and specialty care offices are being purchased,\7\ and hospitals are consolidating at a rapid rate. From 1998 to 2021, 1,887 hospitals merged,\8\ and 90 percent of metropolitan statistical areas are considered consolidated for hospital services.\9\ The percentage of physicians' practices owned by or affiliated with hospitals has also increased.\10\ One hundred seventeen million Americans reside in a concentrated hospital market,\11\ with highly concentrated markets found in 90 percent of metropolitan statistical areas.\12\ Commercial insurers and private payers are thus not keeping pace with consolidation in the hospital market. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\https://content.naic.org/cipr-topics/pharmacy-benefit-managers. \7\https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/ which-cvs-rivals-also-own- primary-care-services-2023-02-08/. \8\https://ldi.upenn.edu/our-work/research-updates/hospital- consolidation-continues-to-boost- costs-narrow-access-and-impact-care-quality/ ::text=There%20were%201%2C887%20hospital%20 mergers,to%20around%20just%20over%206%2C000.%E2%80%9D. \9\https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/policy-solutions- for-hospital-consolidation/. \10\https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57778. \11\https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101508/ addressing_health_care_market_ consolidation_and_high_prices_1.pdf. \12\https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/ hlthaff.2017.0556. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Consolidation in health care has contributed to significantly higher prices in the commercial market compared to Medicare. A recent Congressional Budget Office report found that commercial insurers' prices were 240 percent of Medicare fee-for-service prices for outpatient services and 182 percent for inpatient services.\13\ Researchers have found that insurers paid through administrative services only (ASO) contracts may have little incentive to obtain low health care prices and may have a disincentive to lower prices when an ASO contract is paid as a percentage of overall claims.\14\ Additionally, the prices that commercial insurers pay hospitals are much higher than hospitals' costs.\15\ The National Bureau of Economic Research reports that hospital mergers lessening competition is correlated with higher hospital price increases.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Id. \14\https://www.nber.org/papers/w25190. \15\Id. \16\https://www.nber.org/papers/w32613. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONSOLIDATED PROVIDERS DISADVANTAGE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS WITH ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONTRACTS Employers are often at a disadvantage negotiating with hospitals and providers when designing their networks, leading to increased costs for plans and enrollees. Even large employers often lack the resources, staffing, or expertise needed to negotiate favorable terms with hospitals and providers, especially highly resourced consolidated hospital and provider systems.\17\ Due to this imbalance, employers are often forced to agree to anticompetitive contracting terms in their contracts with providers and hospitals, which reduces their flexibility to design networks that best meet the needs of their employees and keep costs down.\18\ Employers would benefit from increased ability to steer patients towards higher quality or lower cost provider options and not be subject to mandated inflated reimbursement rates. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\https://www.ajmc.com/view/large-self-insured-employers-lack- power-to-effectively-negotiate-hospital-prices. \18\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ 9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Large, self-insured companies such as Boeing, JPMorgan Chase, and General Motors have begun to negotiate prices with providers directly, using their large number of employees as leverage in their negotiations. However, the success of these efforts is typically a function of a given company's market power, and the vast majority of employers do not have the market power needed to negotiate lower prices or favorable contract terms with providers.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\https://www.ajmc.com/view/large-self-insured-employers-lack- power-to-effectively-negotiate-hospital-prices. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the HELP Subcommittee's April 16, 2024, hearing, Ms. Mairin Mancino from the Peterson Center on Healthcare testified about anti-competitive contracts: Lawmakers can help promote greater competition within the employer healthcare market, as well as individual and commercial health insurance markets, by more directly addressing anticompetitive practices that arise in consolidated markets. Anti-tiering and anti- steering clauses require that an insurer place physicians, hospitals, and other facilities associated with a particular system in the most favorable tier of providers or at the lowest cost-sharing level regardless of whether they meet cost and quality requirements to be in that tier or if other providers have better value. All-or-nothing clauses require insurers to include all of a health system's providers and facilities in their network, regardless of cost or quality differences. Most favored nation clauses also limit competition by guaranteeing that an insurer receives terms from providers that are at least as favorable as those provided to any other insurer, which prevents other insurers from offering new products at a lower rate. These clauses give dominant organizations an unfair advantage over competitors, and the lack of competition prevents employers from being able to prudently fulfill their fiduciary obligations.\20\ During the HELP Subcommittee's September 10, 2024, hearing, Ms. Ilyse Schuman from the American Benefits Council also testified about anti-competitive contracts: With growing market power, large hospital systems are able to demand higher prices and impose anti- competitive contracting terms on employer-sponsored health plans and third-party administrators or insurers negotiating on their behalf. These restrictive terms that appear in contracts the hospital system negotiates with insurers, third-party administrators or group health plans further solidify the hospital system's dominance in the region, reduce competition, and ultimately increase costs. Large hospital systems in highly concentrated markets use their leverage in contract negotiations to include terms that limit access to lower-cost, higher-quality health care. These anti-competitive contracting terms come in several forms: (1) ``anti-steering'' or ``anti-tiering'' provisions that prevent employers from utilizing value- based designs to direct employees toward lower-cost, higher-quality providers, (2) ``all-or-nothing'' clauses that require the health plan to contract with all affiliated facilities and providers, including lower-quality ones, or (3) ``most-favored nation'' clauses that restrict other health plans that are not even a party to the contract from paying lower rates.\21\ \20\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ Mancino_Testimony.pdf. \21\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ 9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- . . . . With such contracting terms in place, the employer's hands are tied in their efforts to promote higher-value health care and employees are bound more tightly to higher-cost and/or lower quality providers . . . The Council urges the committee to pass the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act (H.R. 3120) that would increase competition and promote lower costs by restricting such anti-competitive contract terms.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/UploadedFiles/ 9.10.24_HELP_Hearing_on_ERISA_Anniversary_Schuman_Testimony.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 3120, HEALTHY COMPETITION FOR BETTER CARE ACT H.R. 3120 amends ERISA, the PHSA, and the IRC to ban anticompetitive terms in facility and insurance contracts that limit access to higher quality, lower cost care. Specifically, the bill requires that a group health plan or a health insurance issuer may not enter into an agreement with a health care provider, network or association of providers, third-party administrator, or other service provider offering access to a network of providers if such an agreement includes restrictive contracting terms. Restrictive contracting terms include terms that, directly or indirectly, (1) restrict the group health plan from directing or steering participants to other health care providers, (2) restrict the group health plan from offering incentives to encourage participants to use specific health care providers, (3) require the group health plan to enter into additional agreements with an affiliate of the provider, (4) require the group health plan to agree to payment rates for any affiliate of the provider not party to the contract, or (5) restrict other group health plans from paying a lower rate for services than the plan would pay under the agreement. The bill also provides exceptions for health maintenance organizations and value-based network arrangements; it is not the Committee's intention to restrict employers' ability to design innovative, patient-centered payment models. SUPPORT FOR H.R. 3120 The following organizations have endorsed or support H.R. 3120: the American Benefits Council, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, the Colorado Consumer Health Initiative, the Consumers for Quality Care, the ERISA Industry Committee, Families USA, Health Access California, Nomi Health, the Pennsylvania Health Access Network, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group. CONCLUSION H.R. 3120 helps level the playing field between highly consolidated providers and employer- sponsored health plans. The bill protects employer-sponsored health plans from anticompetitive contracting terms, giving them more control over their own health plans' networks. As such, this improved leverage will help employers fulfill their fiduciary duties to their employees,

Additional Views

H.R. 3120, the Healthy Competition for Better Care Act, introduced by Rep. Michelle Steel (R-CA), prohibits certain terms in contracts entered into by group health plans and insurers, including ``anti-tiering'' and ``anti-steering'' clauses, ``all-or-nothing'' clauses, ``most-favored-nation'' clauses, and other anticompetitive terms. Prohibiting these contract terms in federal law could help counter the negative impacts that consolidation can have on plans and consumers alike, by preventing hospital monopolies from leveraging their market power to force sponsors into contracts that financially benefit the hospital and raise costs.\1\ H.R. 3120 was reported favorably out of Committee on voice vote. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Brot-Goldberg et al., Who Pays for Rising Health Care Prices? Evidence from Hospital Mergers, National Bureau of Economic Research (June 2024), https://www.nber.org/papers/w32613. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Consideration of the bill is timely, and the legislative intent is meritorious--to address the anticompetitive practices that disadvantage consumers of health care. Over the past three decades, there has been a steady increase in hospital consolidations\2\ and this trend is expected to continue.\3\ One study found that the hospital sector is highly concentrated in as many as 90 percent of urban areas.\4\ Research shows that consolidation reduces competition and leads to increased prices\5\--as high as 65 percent according to one estimate.\6\ Consolidation also can lead to lower wages for many health industry workers,\7\ lower quality of care for patients,\8\ and higher costs for the federal government.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\Levinson et al., Ten Things to Know About Consolidation in Health Care Provider Markets, KFF (Apr. 19, 2024), https://www.kff.org/ health-costs/issue-brief/ten-things-to-know-about- consolidation-in-health-care-provider-markets/. \3\Ron Southwick, Hospital merger activity is projected to increase in 2024, Chief Healthcare Executive (Jan. 25, 2024), https:// www.chiefhealthcareexecutive.com/view/hospital-merger- activity-is-projected-to-increase-in-2024. \4\Brent D. Fulton, Health Care Market Concentration Trends In The United States: Evidence And Policy Responses, Health Affairs (Sep. 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/ hlthaff.2017.0556. \5\Gaynor & Town, The Impact of Hospital Consolidation--Update, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (June 2012), DOI: 10.13140/ RG.2.1.4294.0882; Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 2. \6\Liu et al., Environmental Scan on Consolidation Trends and Impacts in Health Care Markets, RAND (Sept. 30, 2022), https:// www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1820-1.html. \7\Prager & Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals, American Economic Review (2021), https:// pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20190690. \8\Martin Gaynor, What to Do about Health-Care Markets? Policies to Make Health-Care Markets Work, Brookings (Mar. 2020), https:// www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Gaynor_PP_FINAL.pdf. \9\Supra note 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, while well-intentioned, additional deliberation and refinements are needed. The bill includes exemptions for any contract that involves a health maintenance organization (HMO), center of excellence, or a ``value-based network arrangement.'' Notably, 13 percent of workers with employer- sponsored health coverage were enrolled in an HMO in 2023.\10\ In addition, although undefined in this bill, the term Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are recognized as one type of ``value-based network arrangement.''\11\ While ACOs were originally established as a payment model for Medicare, many private sector health plans across the country have launched their own ACO networks, and today the top 20 commercial ACOs by patient population represent more than 13 million patients.\12\ While there may be policy merit in ensuring that certain arrangements focused on value and quality can continue, there should be ongoing dialogue on how to best achieve that goal without leaving consumers vulnerable to the behaviors the bill seeks to eliminate.\13\ Furthermore, in addition to creating a loophole for certain existing contracts, the bill's state grandfathering option allows states to determine the applicability of federal law to employee health benefits plans, upending a longstanding practice regarding ERISA preemption and setting a dangerous precedent. Lastly, the Secretary is granted broad authority to exempt any ``other similar network arrangements,'' further weakening the bill and leaving the door open for future loopholes or problematic interpretations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\2023 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KFF (Oct. 18, 2023), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2023-employer-health-benefits- survey/. \11\Value-Based Care, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, https://www.cms.gov/ priorities/innovation/key-concepts/value-based-care (last visited Sept. 19, 2024); Making the Most of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): What Advocates Need to Know, Families USA (Feb. 2012), https:// familiesusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ACO-Basics.pdf. \12\Top 25 ACOs by patient population, Definitive Healthcare (June 12, 2024), https://www.definitivehc.com/resources/healthcare-insights/ top-acos-patient-population::text= Which%20ACO%20has%20the%20largest,and%20two%20 are%20Medicaid%20ACOs; How many accountable care organizations (ACOs) are in each state? Definitive Healthcare (May 6, 2024), https://www.definitivehc.com/ resources/healthcare-insights/accountable-care-organizations-by-state. \13\See, e.g., Letter from Consumers for Fair Hospital Pricing to Chair Virginia Foxx and Ranking Member Bobby Scott (Sept. 11, 2024), https://familiesusa.app.box.com/s/lt4fr3pxuekuqjdlvbjii1twt8334piz. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is necessary to close the loopholes and eliminate the exceptions in the bill adopted by the Committee. Doing so would bolster its strength and sufficiency to protect consumers from high health care costs. With these improvements, this legislation would be a stronger product and would warrant full support. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Ranking Member. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/hrpt/875