Additional Views
[To accompany S. 4443]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 4443) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 12,
2024, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
for Fiscal Year 2025 was $73.4 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 and has the
legal status of public law. The classified annex is made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also
available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the
provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress
(1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year
2025.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2025.
Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the
Intelligence Innovation Board
Section 301 amends Section 7506 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which established the
Intelligence Innovation Board, in order to improve the process
for vetting potential conflicts of interest.
Section 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization
Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy
Section 302 amends Section 904 of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 to update the process for submittal to
Congress of the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment and the National Counterintelligence
Strategy.
Section 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of
Intelligence and Analysis personnel
Section 303 prohibits funds made available for Fiscal Year
2025 for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security from being obligated or
expended to increase the number of personnel assigned to the
Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or
predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.
Section 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence
Section 304 requires that the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a six-year term.
Section 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 305 amends the composition of the Advisory Board of
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) by permitting the
Director of the NRO to independently appoint up to eight
members to the Board. Section 305 also requires the Director to
establish a charter for the Board and extends the Board until
August 31, 2027.
Section 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants
Section 306 authorizes the National Intelligence University
to accept qualifying research grants.
Section 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft
Section 307 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by
unmanned aircraft.
Section 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled
access programs
Section 308 prohibits funds made available for fiscal year
2025 for the National Intelligence Program from being obligated
or expended for any controlled access program, until the head
of the element of the IC responsible for the program submits
the notification required by section 501A(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947.
Section 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs
Section 309 amends Section 501A(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 to prohibit the head of an element of the IC from
transferring a capability from a controlled access program,
until the head submits to the appropriate congressional
committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of
the head to make such transfer.
Section 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard
Section 310 authorizes the Commandant of the Coast Guard to
use up to 1% of the amounts made available for the National
Intelligence Program for each fiscal year for intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to
objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature,
which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the
Commandant.
Section 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property
Section 311 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized
access to IC property.
Section 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Section 312 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of
the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence
and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
Section 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information
Section 313 requires each element of the IC to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive
commercially available information by such element. Section 313
further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once
every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the
IC with respect to sensitive commercially available
information.
Section 314. Policy on collection of United States location information
Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Attorney General, to issue a policy on the collection of United
States location information by the IC.
Section 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United
States flag
Section 315 provides that any flag, seal, or emblem that is
not the United States flag that is displayed at an official
location of an element of the IC shall be smaller than the
official United States flag and may not be displayed above the
United States flag. Section 315 further provides that none of
the funds made available by the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program may
be obligated or expended to fly or display a flag over a
facility of an element of the IC other than the United States
flag or another authorized flag.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Section 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic
of China smartport technology
Section 401 requires the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to engage with
United States industry partners on the risks of smartport
technology--including shipping and logistics infrastructure and
software--of the People's Republic of China to United States
supply chains and commercial activity.
Section 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's
Republic of China
Section 402 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity
Center (NCBC), to assess the current status of the
biotechnology sector of the People's Republic of China. Within
30 days after the completion of the assessment, the DNI is
required to submit a report on the findings to the
congressional intelligence committees.
Section 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on
synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People's
Republic of China
Section 403 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head
of the Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, to develop a strategy
to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit
trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the
People's Republic of China and other source countries. The DNI
is further required to develop a mechanism for collaboration
between the IC and other Federal Government agencies.
Section 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to
evade United States transparency and national security
regulations
Section 404 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an unclassified report on the efforts
of the People's Republic of China to evade specified national
security restrictions and limitations.
Section 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers
Section 405 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a comprehensive plan to prioritize the
recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin
Chinese for each element of the IC.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
Section 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of
international terrorism
Section 411 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an assessment on the
extent to which the Russian Federation provides support for
international acts of terrorism and cooperates with the
antiterrorism efforts of the United States.
Section 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine
Section 412 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of
the CIA, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine
through December 31, 2025.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
Section 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS
officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist
activity
Section 421 amends Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to specify that any person who is a
spokesperson, or member of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any
successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses
terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned
groups, is considered to be engaged in terrorist activities.
Section 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to
the United States
Section 422 requires the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center to conduct an assessment of the threats
to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-
Khorasan.
Section 423. Terrorist financing prevention
Section 423 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
submit to the President a report identifying any foreign
financial institution or foreign digital asset transaction
facilitator that has knowingly facilitated a significant
financial transaction with a terrorist organization. Section
423 further requires the President to impose sanctions on such
foreign financial institutions and foreign digital asset
transaction facilitators.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
Section 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western
Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern
Section 431 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of
the impacts to national security caused by travel without a
visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by
nationals of countries of concern.
Section 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United
States agricultural land
Section 432 requires the DNI to conduct a study and provide
a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress on the
threats posed to the United States by foreign investment in
agricultural land in the United States.
Section 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment
programs
Section 433 requires the DNI and the Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury
to complete an assessment on the threat posed to the United
States by citizenship-by-investment programs. The DNI and the
Assistant Secretary are further directed to submit a report to
the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the
assessment and provide a briefing to such committees on the
report.
Section 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and
technology in hostile activities by foreign adversaries
Section 434 requires the DNI within 180 days of enactment
to develop and commence implementation of a Supply Chain Risk
Mitigation Strategy to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and
use of United States components in the conduct of activities
harmful to national security. The DNI is further required to
submit to Congress annually thereafter for three years a report
on the status and effect of the strategy.
Section 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of
visitors and assignees
Section 435 requires the Director of the Department of
Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to
establish procedures by which visitors and assignees are
assessed for counterintelligence risks to research or
activities undertaken at National Laboratories. It further
requires the Director to advise a National Laboratory on
visitors or assignees when the Director has reason to believe a
visitor or assignee is a non-traditional collector, or when the
Director has information indicating that the visitor or
assignee constitutes a counterintelligence risk to a lab.
Section 435 requires the Director to report quarterly to the
appropriate congressional committees metrics regarding
assignees and visitors admitted to the National Laboratories.
Section 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain
foreign nationals
Section 436 limits entry into Department of Energy National
Laboratories by foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba, with an exception for legal permanent
residents. Section 436 permits the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and certain
senior counterintelligence officials at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), to waive the prohibition for nationals
from these countries if the Secretary certifies that the
benefits to the United States of access outweigh the national
security and economic risks to the United States. Section 436
requires the Secretary to submit notifications to congressional
committees of each waiver issued.
Section 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered
at the United States border
Section 437 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the DNI, to publish a quarterly report
identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who
have been encountered at or near the United States border and
have been released, are under supervision, are being detained,
or have been removed from the United States.
Section 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence
community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war
Section 438 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress an assessment of the lessons learned
from the Israel-Hamas war.
Section 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on
Tren de Aragua
Section 439 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment on the
gang known as ``Tren de Aragua.''
Section 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security
relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign
terrorist organizations
Section 440 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an assessment of the economic and
security relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of
Venezuela with specified state sponsors of terrorism and
foreign terrorist organizations.
Section 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures
supporting foreign military and terrorist activities
Section 441 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the current
occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures by Iran on
military and terrorist activities outside the country.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Section 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize
biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national
security
Section 501 requires the DNI, acting through NCBC, to
develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees
a whole-of-government strategy to address concerns relating to
biotechnologies.
Section 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
Section 502 expands NCBC's authorities, to include
over
Committee Action
On May 22, 2024, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2025, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two
amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman
Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Cotton, to take
actions against foreign ransomware actors and designate state
sponsors of ransomware; (2) an amendment by Chairman Warner,
and cosponsored by Senator Rounds, to prevent foreign terrorist
financing regimes; (3) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions
to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding NCBC; (4)
an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill regarding genomic data and biosurveillance
capabilities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senator Casey, to
strengthen the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (6) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to impose limitations on
National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals;
(7) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio expressing the Sense of
Congress on government personnel support for Foreign Terrorist
Organizations; (8) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to
include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and
members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity; (9) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to require a report on the
threat of ISIS Khorasan to the United States; (10) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Rubio limiting the display of flags, seals,
and emblems other than the United States flag at IC facilities;
(11) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a report on
sensitive commercially available information; (12) an amendment
by Senator Wyden to require a policy on collection of United
States location information; (13) an amendment by Senator
Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Ossoff, regarding Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act directives relating to certain
electronic communication service providers; (14) an amendment
by Senator Cotton to require continued oversight of Iranian
expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist
activities; (15) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require a
plan for staffing the CIA's intelligence collection positions;
(16) an amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by
Chairman Warner and Senator Kelly, to make certain revisions to
the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding emerging
technologies; (17) an amendment by Senator Moran regarding the
Coast Guard's expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities; (18) an amendment by Senator
Lankford to require reporting on certain foreign nationals
encountered at the United States border; (19) an amendment by
Senator Gillibrand to extend certain funding limitations
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; (20) an amendment
by Senator Ossoff, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden and
Heinrich, to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's
and Vice Chairman's bill regarding Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board members' qualifications; (21) an amendment by
Senator Ossoff to make certain technical revisions to the
Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding an assessment of
the likely course of war in Ukraine; and (22) an amendment by
Senator Rounds, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and
Senators Risch, Moran, Cornyn, and Cotton, to prevent
unauthorized access to IC property.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator Warner to his own amendment
to protect technological measures designed to verify
authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media. By
voice vote, the Committee adopted Chairman Warner's amendment,
as amended.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own amendment
providing certain protections, imposing reporting requirements
on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting
the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee
except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted
to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the
Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S.
national security and provides an explanation for such
determination to the committees. By a vote of 10 ayes and 7
noes, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as
amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator
Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator
Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator
Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.
By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by
Senator Wyden to revise the definition of electronic
communication service provider, as amended by the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act, with Senator Wyden
recorded as an aye.
Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to strike the provision
in the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill to revise the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's amicus curiae
authorities, and withdrew it pending future consideration.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator Ossoff to establish pay parity for Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board staff with IC employees.
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator
King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice
Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no;
Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.
Votes to report the committee bill
On May 22, 2024, the Committee voted to report the bill, as
amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--
aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman
Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23,
2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO,
SENATOR RISCH, AND SENATOR ROUNDS
During the markup of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee adopted an amendment
that purported to provide Intelligence Community (IC) employees
with new employment protections, but in reality it will
increase risks to America's national security and hinder the
ability of Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed IC
officials to make personnel decisions to meet mission needs. We
believe this provision--if enacted--will thwart the IC's
effectiveness and upend decades of Congress's efforts to
recognize the unique mission of the IC. Notably, the IC and
Department of Defense (DOD) strongly oppose this amendment.
This amendment dictates to the heads of IC elements,
specifically the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the
Secretary of Defense, how to manage personnel decisions at
their own agencies. The amendment restricts the ability of
heads of IC elements from converting the employment status of
their own personnel and mandates that IC employees in converted
positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5
even if the employee's position falls under the excepted
service. The amendment further inhibits the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency from exercising termination
authorities under Title 50 by imposing burdensome requirements
to notify Congress about internal agency guidelines and
regulations--which Congress intentionally declined to codify
given the IC's unique national security mission and
responsibilities.
Rather than protecting IC and certain DOD employees from
adverse actions, the amendment micromanages the Senate-
confirmed Directors' and Secretary's fundamental authorities
and responsibilities to maintain their workforce in the
interest of national security. The amendment requires
congressional notifications upon conversion of competitive
service positions to excepted service positions, or when the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Secretary of
Defense make certain termination decisions, which becomes a
slippery slope toward unraveling the very specific and critical
IC employment protections that Congress has legislated over the
decades.
Congress recognized the Central Intelligence Agency's
unique employment requirements by specifically exempting the
Central Intelligence Agency from Title 5's requirements in 5
U.S.C. Sec. 7511(b)(7). Congress further gave the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency full discretion to manage
termination protocols, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3036, and followed
suit as to the Director of National Intelligence, see 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3024. It was a long-debated, thoughtful process
culminating in gradual codifications to ensure that America has
the most efficient, effective, and capable men and women
protecting us from terrorism, counterintelligence threats,
weapons of mass destruction, and many other national security
perils that go unseen by the public.
The IC and DOD leadership, entrusted by the President of
the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, must be
able to ensure the best and most capable personnel are in
operational positions. They must be able to determine the right
course of action when an employee's actions harm their
employing agency, the workforce, or our national security. As
to the DOD, the amendment would impose dual-track employment
requirements, ultimately meaning that two respective employees
serving in the same positions would be paid and treated
differently.
Given all of the above, this amendment appears to be an
attempt to impede future administrations' abilities to build a
workforce that meets current critical national security
challenges. There is no valid problem that this amendment is
attempting to solve.
Marco Rubio.
James E. Risch.
M. Michael Rounds.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
includes critical protections for Intelligence Community
personnel against political firings and whistleblower
reprisals.
My amendment to the bill ensures that personnel who are
involuntarily moved from one employment status to another can
retain their protections from firing. The amendment also
ensures that if an Intelligence Community employee is fired
without any due process, as is currently authorized, the agency
must explain its reasons to Congress. This oversight is
critical to protecting against politically motivated firings
and preserving the independence and professionalism of the
Intelligence Community.
The bill includes a number of provisions I submitted
protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. One provision
allows classified whistleblower complaints to be provided
directly to Congress if the Inspector General determines that
sending the complaint to the whistleblower's agency, as the
statute currently requires, could compromise the anonymity of
the whistleblower or result in the complaint being delivered to
the subject of that complaint. Other provisions ensure that
whistleblowers can't have their security clearances revoked on
a pretext; allow for former Intelligence Community employees to
submit whistleblower complaints; remove the cap on damages for
retaliatory revocation of whistleblowers' clearances; and
prohibit, as acts of reprisal, public disclosures of
whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake
psychological examinations.
The bill includes two of my amendments that increase
oversight of and public reporting on the Intelligence
Community's collection of Americans' private data. Since the
beginning of this administration, I have pressed the
Intelligence Community to be transparent about its purchases of
sensitive data on Americans. On May 8, 2024, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence released the Intelligence
Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available
Information. While I was disappointed that the Framework did
not prohibit the Intelligence Community from purchasing any
particular type of information, it did require IC elements to
report to the ODNI on its purchases of sensitive information on
Americans, while directing IC elements to employ privacy-
protecting safeguards. My amendment requires an annual report
to Congress on the Intelligence Community's access to and
collection, purchase and use of commercial datasets that
contain sensitive data on Americans, as well as its
implementation of the safeguards. The amendment also codifies
the Framework's requirement of a public report every two years.
In the years since the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case of
Carpenter v. United States, the Intelligence Community's
policies with regard to the warrantless collection of U.S.
location data have been both inconsistent and opaque. My
amendment to the bill brings clarity to this long-standing
problem by requiring the Intelligence Community to issue a
public policy on its collection of U.S. location information.
For years, I have worked to reform the country's broken
classification and declassification system. In particular, I
have joined with Senator Jerry Moran to ensure that there be an
Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to lead
a fully integrated, U.S. government-wide reform effort. My
provision directs the President to designate an Executive Agent
and provide a clear funding plan for governing the reform
process, including money for the perpetually under-resourced
Public Interest Declassification Board.
The bill modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) in several ways. In April 2024, as the Senate considered
the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), I
sought to strike from the bill a sweeping new definition of
electronic communications service provider that would authorize
the government to force almost any American with access to a
server, a wire, a cable box or wifi to participate in
warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. At the
time, the Department of Justice stated that it would only apply
the new authorities to the type of service provider at issue in
a 2023 FISA Court case. However, no such limitation was in the
statute.
The Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant
improvement, codifying that limitation and adding provisions
allowing for FISA Court review and congressional oversight of
the new authorities. However, the actual boundaries of what is
legal under the new authorities remain hidden from the public.
It is a fundamental democratic principle that an American
citizen should be able to read the law and have some inkling
about what the government is and is not permitted to do,
particularly when it comes to warrantless surveillance.
For this reason, I offered an amendment to replace the new
authorities with a clear articulation of which providers are
now subject to Section 702. This amendment would have allowed
the public to understand the intent and effect of the new
surveillance authorities, while permitting an informed, open
debate in Congress when these authorities sunset in 2026. The
defeat of my amendment unfortunately perpetuates secret law, a
problem that undermines trust in government and the Congress.
Voters have a need and a right to understand the limits of what
is and is not permitted under the law, so that they can ratify
or reject decisions that elected officials make on their
behalf.
The bill includes a provision strengthening the role of the
amicus curiae in the FISA Court. Many of these reforms
originated in the USA RIGHTS Act, which I introduced in 2017
with a bipartisan, bicameral coalition. In 2020, they passed
the Senate by a 77-19 vote thanks to the leadership of Senators
Lee and Leahy, although they were not passed into law at that
time. I commend Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio for
continuing to push for these important reforms and for
including them in this bill.
Finally, the bill includes a provision granting the
Attorney General new powers to police the labeling of AI-
generated media. This provision is modeled on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention provisions, which
are extremely controversial and have chilled legitimate
cybersecurity research. The use of this problematic legislative
framework to address the cutting-edge issue of AI-generated
media raises numerous First Amendment and other questions that
need to be considered and debated in public. I am also
concerned about a blanke