Skip to content

senate · Committee report

S. Rept. 118-181

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

2024-06-12

Committees

Associated legislation

Text

Additional Views

[To accompany S. 4443] The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an original bill (S. 4443) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal Year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass. Classified Annex to the Committee Report Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 12, 2024, that the request for the National Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2025 was $73.4 billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management Account, the classified nature of United States intelligence activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976). Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Section 101. Authorization of appropriations Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year 2025. Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2025. Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Section 201. Authorization of appropriations Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Section 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the Intelligence Innovation Board Section 301 amends Section 7506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which established the Intelligence Innovation Board, in order to improve the process for vetting potential conflicts of interest. Section 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy Section 302 amends Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 to update the process for submittal to Congress of the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and the National Counterintelligence Strategy. Section 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of Intelligence and Analysis personnel Section 303 prohibits funds made available for Fiscal Year 2025 for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from being obligated or expended to increase the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues. Section 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Section 304 requires that the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a six-year term. Section 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance Office Section 305 amends the composition of the Advisory Board of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) by permitting the Director of the NRO to independently appoint up to eight members to the Board. Section 305 also requires the Director to establish a charter for the Board and extends the Board until August 31, 2027. Section 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants Section 306 authorizes the National Intelligence University to accept qualifying research grants. Section 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft Section 307 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by unmanned aircraft. Section 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled access programs Section 308 prohibits funds made available for fiscal year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program from being obligated or expended for any controlled access program, until the head of the element of the IC responsible for the program submits the notification required by section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947. Section 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs Section 309 amends Section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit the head of an element of the IC from transferring a capability from a controlled access program, until the head submits to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of the head to make such transfer. Section 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard Section 310 authorizes the Commandant of the Coast Guard to use up to 1% of the amounts made available for the National Intelligence Program for each fiscal year for intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant. Section 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property Section 311 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized access to IC property. Section 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis Section 312 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Section 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information Section 313 requires each element of the IC to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive commercially available information by such element. Section 313 further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially available information. Section 314. Policy on collection of United States location information Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney General, to issue a policy on the collection of United States location information by the IC. Section 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United States flag Section 315 provides that any flag, seal, or emblem that is not the United States flag that is displayed at an official location of an element of the IC shall be smaller than the official United States flag and may not be displayed above the United States flag. Section 315 further provides that none of the funds made available by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program may be obligated or expended to fly or display a flag over a facility of an element of the IC other than the United States flag or another authorized flag. TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS Subtitle A--People's Republic of China Section 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic of China smartport technology Section 401 requires the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to engage with United States industry partners on the risks of smartport technology--including shipping and logistics infrastructure and software--of the People's Republic of China to United States supply chains and commercial activity. Section 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's Republic of China Section 402 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC), to assess the current status of the biotechnology sector of the People's Republic of China. Within 30 days after the completion of the assessment, the DNI is required to submit a report on the findings to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People's Republic of China Section 403 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head of the Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, to develop a strategy to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the People's Republic of China and other source countries. The DNI is further required to develop a mechanism for collaboration between the IC and other Federal Government agencies. Section 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade United States transparency and national security regulations Section 404 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an unclassified report on the efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade specified national security restrictions and limitations. Section 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers Section 405 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive plan to prioritize the recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin Chinese for each element of the IC. Subtitle B--The Russian Federation Section 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of international terrorism Section 411 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment on the extent to which the Russian Federation provides support for international acts of terrorism and cooperates with the antiterrorism efforts of the United States. Section 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine Section 412 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of the CIA, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine through December 31, 2025. Subtitle C--International Terrorism Section 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity Section 421 amends Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to specify that any person who is a spokesperson, or member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned groups, is considered to be engaged in terrorist activities. Section 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to the United States Section 422 requires the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to conduct an assessment of the threats to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS- Khorasan. Section 423. Terrorist financing prevention Section 423 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit to the President a report identifying any foreign financial institution or foreign digital asset transaction facilitator that has knowingly facilitated a significant financial transaction with a terrorist organization. Section 423 further requires the President to impose sanctions on such foreign financial institutions and foreign digital asset transaction facilitators. Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats Section 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern Section 431 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of the impacts to national security caused by travel without a visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern. Section 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United States agricultural land Section 432 requires the DNI to conduct a study and provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress on the threats posed to the United States by foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States. Section 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment programs Section 433 requires the DNI and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury to complete an assessment on the threat posed to the United States by citizenship-by-investment programs. The DNI and the Assistant Secretary are further directed to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the assessment and provide a briefing to such committees on the report. Section 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and technology in hostile activities by foreign adversaries Section 434 requires the DNI within 180 days of enactment to develop and commence implementation of a Supply Chain Risk Mitigation Strategy to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and use of United States components in the conduct of activities harmful to national security. The DNI is further required to submit to Congress annually thereafter for three years a report on the status and effect of the strategy. Section 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of visitors and assignees Section 435 requires the Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to establish procedures by which visitors and assignees are assessed for counterintelligence risks to research or activities undertaken at National Laboratories. It further requires the Director to advise a National Laboratory on visitors or assignees when the Director has reason to believe a visitor or assignee is a non-traditional collector, or when the Director has information indicating that the visitor or assignee constitutes a counterintelligence risk to a lab. Section 435 requires the Director to report quarterly to the appropriate congressional committees metrics regarding assignees and visitors admitted to the National Laboratories. Section 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain foreign nationals Section 436 limits entry into Department of Energy National Laboratories by foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, with an exception for legal permanent residents. Section 436 permits the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and certain senior counterintelligence officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to waive the prohibition for nationals from these countries if the Secretary certifies that the benefits to the United States of access outweigh the national security and economic risks to the United States. Section 436 requires the Secretary to submit notifications to congressional committees of each waiver issued. Section 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered at the United States border Section 437 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the DNI, to publish a quarterly report identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who have been encountered at or near the United States border and have been released, are under supervision, are being detained, or have been removed from the United States. Section 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war Section 438 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the lessons learned from the Israel-Hamas war. Section 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on Tren de Aragua Section 439 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment on the gang known as ``Tren de Aragua.'' Section 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations Section 440 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the economic and security relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela with specified state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations. Section 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities Section 441 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the current occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures by Iran on military and terrorist activities outside the country. TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES Section 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national security Section 501 requires the DNI, acting through NCBC, to develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a whole-of-government strategy to address concerns relating to biotechnologies. Section 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center Section 502 expands NCBC's authorities, to include over

Committee Action

On May 22, 2024, a quorum being present, the Committee met to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The Committee took the following actions: Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for Fiscal Year 2025, the base text for purposes of amendment. By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Cotton, to take actions against foreign ransomware actors and designate state sponsors of ransomware; (2) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator Rounds, to prevent foreign terrorist financing regimes; (3) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding NCBC; (4) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding genomic data and biosurveillance capabilities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senator Casey, to strengthen the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (6) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to impose limitations on National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals; (7) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio expressing the Sense of Congress on government personnel support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations; (8) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity; (9) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to require a report on the threat of ISIS Khorasan to the United States; (10) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio limiting the display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United States flag at IC facilities; (11) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a report on sensitive commercially available information; (12) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a policy on collection of United States location information; (13) an amendment by Senator Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Ossoff, regarding Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act directives relating to certain electronic communication service providers; (14) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require continued oversight of Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities; (15) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require a plan for staffing the CIA's intelligence collection positions; (16) an amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by Chairman Warner and Senator Kelly, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding emerging technologies; (17) an amendment by Senator Moran regarding the Coast Guard's expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities; (18) an amendment by Senator Lankford to require reporting on certain foreign nationals encountered at the United States border; (19) an amendment by Senator Gillibrand to extend certain funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; (20) an amendment by Senator Ossoff, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden and Heinrich, to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board members' qualifications; (21) an amendment by Senator Ossoff to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding an assessment of the likely course of war in Ukraine; and (22) an amendment by Senator Rounds, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senators Risch, Moran, Cornyn, and Cotton, to prevent unauthorized access to IC property. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a second-degree amendment by Senator Warner to his own amendment to protect technological measures designed to verify authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media. By voice vote, the Committee adopted Chairman Warner's amendment, as amended. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own amendment providing certain protections, imposing reporting requirements on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and provides an explanation for such determination to the committees. By a vote of 10 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich-- aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey-- aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no. By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to revise the definition of electronic communication service provider, as amended by the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, with Senator Wyden recorded as an aye. Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to strike the provision in the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill to revise the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's amicus curiae authorities, and withdrew it pending future consideration. By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an amendment by Senator Ossoff to establish pay parity for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board staff with IC employees. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no. Votes to report the committee bill On May 22, 2024, the Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand-- aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye. By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to make technical and conforming changes to the bill and classified annex. Compliance With Rule XLIV Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits. Estimate of Costs Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23, 2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of this legislation. Changes to Existing Law In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to expedite the business of the Senate. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO, SENATOR RISCH, AND SENATOR ROUNDS During the markup of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee adopted an amendment that purported to provide Intelligence Community (IC) employees with new employment protections, but in reality it will increase risks to America's national security and hinder the ability of Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed IC officials to make personnel decisions to meet mission needs. We believe this provision--if enacted--will thwart the IC's effectiveness and upend decades of Congress's efforts to recognize the unique mission of the IC. Notably, the IC and Department of Defense (DOD) strongly oppose this amendment. This amendment dictates to the heads of IC elements, specifically the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Secretary of Defense, how to manage personnel decisions at their own agencies. The amendment restricts the ability of heads of IC elements from converting the employment status of their own personnel and mandates that IC employees in converted positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5 even if the employee's position falls under the excepted service. The amendment further inhibits the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising termination authorities under Title 50 by imposing burdensome requirements to notify Congress about internal agency guidelines and regulations--which Congress intentionally declined to codify given the IC's unique national security mission and responsibilities. Rather than protecting IC and certain DOD employees from adverse actions, the amendment micromanages the Senate- confirmed Directors' and Secretary's fundamental authorities and responsibilities to maintain their workforce in the interest of national security. The amendment requires congressional notifications upon conversion of competitive service positions to excepted service positions, or when the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Secretary of Defense make certain termination decisions, which becomes a slippery slope toward unraveling the very specific and critical IC employment protections that Congress has legislated over the decades. Congress recognized the Central Intelligence Agency's unique employment requirements by specifically exempting the Central Intelligence Agency from Title 5's requirements in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7511(b)(7). Congress further gave the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency full discretion to manage termination protocols, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3036, and followed suit as to the Director of National Intelligence, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3024. It was a long-debated, thoughtful process culminating in gradual codifications to ensure that America has the most efficient, effective, and capable men and women protecting us from terrorism, counterintelligence threats, weapons of mass destruction, and many other national security perils that go unseen by the public. The IC and DOD leadership, entrusted by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, must be able to ensure the best and most capable personnel are in operational positions. They must be able to determine the right course of action when an employee's actions harm their employing agency, the workforce, or our national security. As to the DOD, the amendment would impose dual-track employment requirements, ultimately meaning that two respective employees serving in the same positions would be paid and treated differently. Given all of the above, this amendment appears to be an attempt to impede future administrations' abilities to build a workforce that meets current critical national security challenges. There is no valid problem that this amendment is attempting to solve. Marco Rubio. James E. Risch. M. Michael Rounds. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes critical protections for Intelligence Community personnel against political firings and whistleblower reprisals. My amendment to the bill ensures that personnel who are involuntarily moved from one employment status to another can retain their protections from firing. The amendment also ensures that if an Intelligence Community employee is fired without any due process, as is currently authorized, the agency must explain its reasons to Congress. This oversight is critical to protecting against politically motivated firings and preserving the independence and professionalism of the Intelligence Community. The bill includes a number of provisions I submitted protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. One provision allows classified whistleblower complaints to be provided directly to Congress if the Inspector General determines that sending the complaint to the whistleblower's agency, as the statute currently requires, could compromise the anonymity of the whistleblower or result in the complaint being delivered to the subject of that complaint. Other provisions ensure that whistleblowers can't have their security clearances revoked on a pretext; allow for former Intelligence Community employees to submit whistleblower complaints; remove the cap on damages for retaliatory revocation of whistleblowers' clearances; and prohibit, as acts of reprisal, public disclosures of whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake psychological examinations. The bill includes two of my amendments that increase oversight of and public reporting on the Intelligence Community's collection of Americans' private data. Since the beginning of this administration, I have pressed the Intelligence Community to be transparent about its purchases of sensitive data on Americans. On May 8, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the Intelligence Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information. While I was disappointed that the Framework did not prohibit the Intelligence Community from purchasing any particular type of information, it did require IC elements to report to the ODNI on its purchases of sensitive information on Americans, while directing IC elements to employ privacy- protecting safeguards. My amendment requires an annual report to Congress on the Intelligence Community's access to and collection, purchase and use of commercial datasets that contain sensitive data on Americans, as well as its implementation of the safeguards. The amendment also codifies the Framework's requirement of a public report every two years. In the years since the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States, the Intelligence Community's policies with regard to the warrantless collection of U.S. location data have been both inconsistent and opaque. My amendment to the bill brings clarity to this long-standing problem by requiring the Intelligence Community to issue a public policy on its collection of U.S. location information. For years, I have worked to reform the country's broken classification and declassification system. In particular, I have joined with Senator Jerry Moran to ensure that there be an Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to lead a fully integrated, U.S. government-wide reform effort. My provision directs the President to designate an Executive Agent and provide a clear funding plan for governing the reform process, including money for the perpetually under-resourced Public Interest Declassification Board. The bill modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in several ways. In April 2024, as the Senate considered the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), I sought to strike from the bill a sweeping new definition of electronic communications service provider that would authorize the government to force almost any American with access to a server, a wire, a cable box or wifi to participate in warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. At the time, the Department of Justice stated that it would only apply the new authorities to the type of service provider at issue in a 2023 FISA Court case. However, no such limitation was in the statute. The Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant improvement, codifying that limitation and adding provisions allowing for FISA Court review and congressional oversight of the new authorities. However, the actual boundaries of what is legal under the new authorities remain hidden from the public. It is a fundamental democratic principle that an American citizen should be able to read the law and have some inkling about what the government is and is not permitted to do, particularly when it comes to warrantless surveillance. For this reason, I offered an amendment to replace the new authorities with a clear articulation of which providers are now subject to Section 702. This amendment would have allowed the public to understand the intent and effect of the new surveillance authorities, while permitting an informed, open debate in Congress when these authorities sunset in 2026. The defeat of my amendment unfortunately perpetuates secret law, a problem that undermines trust in government and the Congress. Voters have a need and a right to understand the limits of what is and is not permitted under the law, so that they can ratify or reject decisions that elected officials make on their behalf. The bill includes a provision strengthening the role of the amicus curiae in the FISA Court. Many of these reforms originated in the USA RIGHTS Act, which I introduced in 2017 with a bipartisan, bicameral coalition. In 2020, they passed the Senate by a 77-19 vote thanks to the leadership of Senators Lee and Leahy, although they were not passed into law at that time. I commend Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio for continuing to push for these important reforms and for including them in this bill. Finally, the bill includes a provision granting the Attorney General new powers to police the labeling of AI- generated media. This provision is modeled on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention provisions, which are extremely controversial and have chilled legitimate cybersecurity research. The use of this problematic legislative framework to address the cutting-edge issue of AI-generated media raises numerous First Amendment and other questions that need to be considered and debated in public. I am also concerned about a blanke

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/118/srpt/181