Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title Provides the short title of the bill, the ``Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023.'' Section 2. U.S. Nuclear Fuel Security initiative Subsection (a) provides a sense of Congress that the Department of Energy should prioritize activities to increase domestic production of LEU and accelerate efforts to establish a domestic high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment capability. It further states that if a domestic HALEU enrichment capability will not be available in time to meet the needs of advanced nuclear reactor demonstration projects, the Department of Energy shall consider and implement, as necessary, all viable options to make HALEU available from inventories owned by the Department, until such time as commercial enrichment is available. Subsection (b) provides the objectives of this section, including: to increase domestic production of LEU for existing reactors and HALEU for advanced reactors; to ensure the availability of domestically produced uranium sufficient to address a supply disruption; to address gaps and deficiencies in the domestic uranium supply chain; to ensure a backup supply of uranium to support nonproliferation and civil nuclear objectives of the Department; to support uranium supply chain technology deployed in the U.S.; and to ensure the Department considers and implements all viable options necessary to ensure HALEU availability until such time as the needs and schedules of advanced nuclear reactor developers can be met with commercially produced HALEU. Subsection (c) provides the definitions used in this section. Subsection (d) directs the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security program to increase domestic production of LEU and HALEU. It directs the Secretary to expand the American Assured Fuel Supply program to ensure the availability of uranium in the event of a supply disruption. The subsection also directs the Secretary to establish a HALEU for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Demonstration Projects program to ensure HALEU availability, from inventories owned by the Department, until such time as the needs and schedules of advanced nuclear reactor developers can be met with commercially produced HALEU. Subsection (e) directs the Secretary to enter into 2 or more contracts each to begin acquiring not less than 100 metric tons per year of LEU by December 31, 2026 and not less than 20 metric tons per year of HALEU by December 31, 2027, utilizing domestic supply chains to the maximum extent practicable. The subsection limits the Secretary's ability to make commitments to acquire LEU or HALEU unless funds are available for those purposes. It further directs the Secretary to consider and implement options to ensure the quickest availability of commercially enriched HALEU and options to replenish Department stockpiles of uranium used as part of the HALEU for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Demonstration Projects program. The subsection directs the Secretary to avoid market disruptions or completion with U.S. nuclear energy companies in carrying out the Nuclear Fuel Security program. Subsection (f) directs the Secretary, in consultation with U.S. nuclear energy companies, to expand the American Assured Fuel Supply program by merging it with the operations of the Department's Uranium Reserve program and maintaining, replenishing, diversifying, and increasing the quantity of uranium made available by the program, utilizing domestically produced, converted, enriched, deconverted, and reduced uranium to the maximum extent practicable. It requires the Secretary to maintain a reserve in the event of a supply disruption. Subsection (g) directs the Secretary to accelerate, and as necessary initiate, activities to make available HALEU from inventories owned by the Department for use in advanced reactors that cannot operate on uranium with lower enrichment levels or alternate fuels. It gives priority to the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Projects, with additional HALEU to be made available to other advanced reactor developers as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. The subsection provides the quantities and dates for which the Secretary shall make HALEU available and lists the factors the Secretary shall consider in carrying out this program. The subsection prohibits uranium bartering as a method to pay for the Department's radioactive waste disposition and environmental cleanup activities. The subsection limits the Secretary's ability to make commitments to acquire LEU or HALEU unless funds are available for those purposes. The HALEU for Advanced Reactor Demonstrations Projects program sunsets when the needs of advanced reactor developers can be fully met by domestic commercial HALEU suppliers. Subsection (h) directs the Secretary to execute the programs authorized in this section in a manner that promotes domestic manufacturing and maximizes utilization of domestic resources. Subsection (i) directs the Secretary to ensure that any LEU or HALEU made available as a result of the programs authorized in this section are subject to reasonable compensation, taking into account fair market value and the purposes of this section. It also creates a revolving fund to minimize the need for additional appropriations. Subsection (j) directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to prioritize and expedite consideration of any action related to the programs authorized in this section. Subsection (k) provides that section 3112(d)(2) of the USEC Privatization Act does not apply to the programs authorized in this section. Subsection (1) prohibits the use of uranium deemed necessary for national security applications as part of the programs authorized by this section. Subsection (m) requires that this section be carried out in a manner consistent with the obligations of the U.S. under international agreements. Subsection (n) authorizes $3,500,000,000 for fiscal year 2023 to carry out this section, to remain available until September 30, 2032, of which the Secretary may use up to $1,000,000,000 by September 30, 2028, to carry out the HALEU for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Demonstration Projects program. Section 3. Report on civil nuclear credit program This section requires the Secretary of Energy to submit a report to Congress on anticipated funding requirements for the civil nuclear credit program described in section 40323 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (42 U.S.C. 18753). Section 4. Amendments to the USEC Privatization Act This section prohibits the importation of Russian uranium into the United States 90 days after enactment, prevents circumvention of the prohibition through uranium swaps, and allows waivers in the event of fuel unavailability or national security concerns. Section 5. Supply chain infrastructure and workforce capacity building Subsection (a) amends section 10781 of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 to expand the Department of Energy's authority to provide technical assistance to state, local communities and other eligible entities for advanced nuclear reactors to include associated nuclear supply chain infrastructure. Subsection (b) amends section 954(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to improve Department's nuclear traineeship program to enhance workforce capacity building and retraining and extends authorization of appropriations through 2027. Cost and Budgetary Considerations The Committee has requested, but has not yet received, the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of the cost of S. 452, as ordered reported. When the Congressional Budget Office completes its cost estimate, it will be posted on the Internet at www.cbo.gov. Regulatory Impact Evaluation In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee makes the following evaluation of the regulatory impact which would be incurred in carrying out S. 452. The bill is not a regulatory measure in the sense of imposing Government-established standards or significant economic responsibilities on private individuals and businesses. No personal information would be collected in administering the program. Therefore, there would be no impact on personal privacy. Little, if any, additional paperwork would result from the enactment of S. 452, as ordered reported. Congressionally Directed Spending S. 452, as ordered reported, does not contain any congressionally directed spending items, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Executive Communications The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the March 9, 2023, Committee hearing to examine the nuclear fuel cycle follows: Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy The Russian Federation's brutal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the grave threat to global energy security posed by dependence on Russian-supplied fuels. This is also the case in the nuclear area. Russia, the largest global enricher of uranium, currently supplies a significant portion of the nuclear fuel supply chain to the United States and our international allies and partners. In particular, conversion and enrichment services from trusted sources are insufficient to replace current U.S. imports from Russia. Without expansion of the domestic and international allies' and partners' fuel cycle capacity, the United States cannot reliably make sufficient low enriched uranium (LEU) or high-assay LEU (HALEU) available to support the needs of today's power reactor fleet, advanced reactors, research reactors, and medical isotope production facilities. This strategic vulnerability is unsustainable. In addition, Russia's military attacks on and subsequent seizure of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the associated heightened risks of a nuclear incident underscore the nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation concerns of doing business with Russia in the nuclear energy area. The Department is working to address these energy security challenges in the face of ongoing global events. As noted, the United States currently purchases a significant amount of enriched uranium from Russia. We cannot continue to infuse the Russian state with this source of income and must begin to reduce and ultimately eliminate U.S. reliance on Russia in the nuclear energy area, especially as it irresponsibly engages in strikes that disregard nuclear safety and security and a nuclear incident in Ukraine. I want to thank this Committee for its leadership in the development of proposed legislation aimed at tackling this critically important issue facing our nation and the world. As you know, there is no quick, easy path to reduce our dependence on Russian-supplied fuels. Expanding our domestic fuel capacity will require strategic investments coupled with import restrictions that protect those investments well into the future. We must act swiftly to support domestic enrichment capabilities and prepare our industry for this transition. The Department welcomes the opportunity to work with Congress to address this national security vulnerability. The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the July 28, 2022, Committee hearing on S. 3856 and S. 4066 follows: Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy s. 3856--a bill to prohibit the importation of uranium from the russian federation (barrasso et al.) S. 3856, a bill to prohibit the importation of uranium from the Russian Federation, bans the import of uranium from the Russian Federation. American dependence on Russian uranium threatens our energy security. Energy security is national security and untrustworthy state-sponsored programs have no place in our energy policy. However, any uranium ban from the Russian Federation must be accompanied by strategic investments that strengthen our domestic nuclear fuel supply chain. While a ban coupled with long-term assurances would provide long-term predictability that would de-risk investments in the domestic nuclear fuel supply chain, our nation's current nuclear power operators will need some time to wean themselves off this Russian supply. In the Presidential Proclamation that prohibits Russian-affiliated vessels from entering into U.S. ports, the Department was provided a method to exempt Russian- affiliated vessels transporting source, special nuclear, and by-product material, for such time, as the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, determines that no viable source of supply is available that would not require transport on Russian- affiliated vessels. A similar exception to a ban on uranium and fuel services from the Russian Federation would be needed while new capacity is developed to ensure our nuclear power plants continue to generate carbon-free electricity. s. 4066--fueling our nuclear future act of 2022 (barrasso haleu bill) S. 4066, the Fueling our Nuclear Future Act, would direct the Department of Energy to establish a program to accelerate the availability of commercially produced HALEU in the United States. It would also direct DOE to make HALEU available from our inventories for advanced reactors until U.S. commercial enrichment is available. DOE is supporting the development of two advanced reactor demonstrations that will require HALEU fuel. These Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program awardees have aggressive timelines for deployment. At DOE, we are working diligently to meet awardees' HALEU needs, which may be as early as 2025 for reactors that may go online as early as 2028. The Department shares the Committee's concern about HALEU availability, and it is a topic that DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is actively addressing, in coordination with the Environmental Management program and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), given the importance to our domestic industry and national security. Prior to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, the Department was already working to address HALEU needs for commercial deployment and uranium needs for its other missions. However, given global events, a new and more urgent path is needed. The Department recently issued a request for proposal for a competitively awarded cost share procurement to complete construction and operate the centrifuge cascade at Piketon, Ohio, with options to continue to operate the cascade subject to appropriations. The President's Fiscal Year 2023 budget request proposes to make available small quantities of HALEU from limited DOE inventories and support the private sector in establishing a limited U.S. commercial HALEU production and supply chain capability. The Department's highest priority for its enriched uranium inventories has been and will remain NNSA's national security missions. The Department will ensure that any material provided will not impinge on those missions. This includes the recovery and down-blending of material stored at Y-12 and Savannah River in a cost share program between NE and NNSA and producing HALEU material in the 2025- 2026 timeframe. It would also support completing construction of the enrichment demonstration facility in Piketon, Ohio, and continued operation of the centrifuge cascade at Piketon, Ohio, to produce 900kg HALEU per year, enriched to a nominal 19.75% U-235. The Department is concerned that the bill would eliminate consideration of potential harm to the natural or cultural resources of Tribal communities or sovereign Native Nations. I look forward to working together with you toward investments that secure our supplies of low enriched uranium (LEU), including HALEU, in a just and equitable manner. The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the March 1, 2022, Committee hearing on S. 3428 follows: Testimony of Dr. Geraldine Richmond, Under Secretary for Science and Innovation, U.S. Department of Energy s. 3428 Bill number S. 3428, to be referred to as the Fission for the Future Act of 2022, supports the deployment of next generation advanced nuclear energy technologies by establishing a program at DOE that would provide additional Federal assistance for such efforts. Specifically, the bill prioritizes helping communities with retired or retiring fossil fuel generation facilities transition to a clean energy future using nuclear energy technology. This future includes non-electric applications for nuclear energy such as heating, hydrogen production, industrial processes, desalination, and isotope production. Furthermore, the support for fossil communities, Tribes, and institutions of higher education and workforce development in this bill is consistent with the Department's equity and justice considerations. DOE currently supports efforts to deploy next generation advanced nuclear energy technology by leveraging retiring energy generation assets. For example, TerraPower recently announced siting of a Natrium reactor at a retiring coal plant in Wyoming. TerraPower has a cooperative agreement with DOE-- specifically in the Office of Nuclear Energy's (NE) Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program--to advance this project. The partnership includes private sector companies, universities, and National Laboratories. This project is a great example of what successful public-private partnerships can achieve in advancing energy solutions. Changes in Existing Law In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill S. 452, as ordered reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT Public Law 104-134 AN ACT Making appropriations for fiscal year 1996 to make a further downpayment toward a balanced budget, and for other purposes. * * * * * * * TITLE III--RESCISSIONS AND OFFSETS CHAPTER 1--ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT Subchapter A--United States Enrichment Corporation Privatization * * * * * * * SEC. 3112A. INCENTIVES FOR ADDITIONAL DOWNBLENDING OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. * * * * * * * (c) Promotion of Downblending of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium.-- * * * * * * * (2) Incentives to continue downblending russian highly enriched uranium after the completion of the russian heu agreement.-- (A) In general.--After the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement, the importation into the United States of low-enriched uranium, including low-enriched uranium obtained under contracts for separative work units, that is produced in the Russian Federation, whether or n