Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 1048]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 1048) to amend the Higher Education Act
of 1965 to strengthen disclosure requirements relating to
foreign gifts and contracts, to prohibit contracts between
institutions of higher education and certain foreign entities
and countries of concern, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Defending Education Transparency and
Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act'' or the
``DETERRENT Act''.
SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.
(a) In General.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1011f) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS.
``(a) Disclosure Reports.--
``(1) Aggregate gifts and contract disclosures.--An
institution shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with
subsection (b)(1), a disclosure report on July 31 of the
calendar year immediately following any calendar year in
which--
``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters
into a contract with, a foreign source (other than a
foreign country of concern or foreign entity of
concern)--
``(i) the value of which is $50,000 or more,
considered alone or in combination with all
other gifts from, or contracts with, that
foreign source within the calendar year; or
``(ii) the value of which is undetermined; or
``(B) the institution--
``(i) receives a gift from a foreign country
of concern or foreign entity of concern; or
``(ii) upon receiving a waiver under section
117A to enter into a contract with such a
country or entity, enters into such contract,
without regard to the value of such gift or
contract.
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.--
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of an institution
that is substantially controlled (as described in section
668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or
successor regulations)) by a foreign source, the institution
shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with subsection
(b)(2), a disclosure report on July 31 of each year.
``(3) Treatment of affiliated entities.--For purposes of this
section, any gift to, or contract with, an affiliated entity of
an institution shall be considered a gift to, or contract with,
respectively, such institution.
``(b) Contents of Report.--
``(1) Gifts and contracts.--Each report to the Secretary
required under subsection (a)(1) shall contain the following:
``(A) With respect to a gift received from, or a
contract entered into with, any foreign source--
``(i) the terms of such gift or contract,
including--
``(I) the name of the individual,
department, or other entity at the
institution receiving the gift or
carrying out the contract on behalf of
the institution;
``(II) the foreign source's intended
purpose of such gift or contract, or,
in the absence of such a purpose, the
manner in which the institution intends
to use such gift or contract; and
``(III) in the case of a restricted
or conditional gift or contract, a
description of the restrictions or
conditions of such gift or contract;
``(ii) with respect to a gift--
``(I) the total fair market dollar
amount or dollar value of the gift, as
of the date of submission of such
report; and
``(II) the date on which the
institution received such gift;
``(iii) with respect to a contract--
``(I) the total fair market dollar
amount or dollar value of the contract,
as of the date of submission of such
report;
``(II) the date on which the
institution enters into such contract;
``(III) the date on which such
contract first takes effect;
``(IV) if the contract has a
termination date, such termination
date; and
``(V) an assurance that the
institution will--
``(aa) maintain an unredacted
copy of the contract until the
latest of--
``(AA) the date that
is 5 years after the
date on which such
contract first takes
effect;
``(BB) the date on
which the contract
terminates; or
``(CC) the last day
of any period that
applicable State law
requires a copy of such
contract to be
maintained; and
``(bb) upon request of the
Secretary during an
investigation under section
117D(a)(1), produce such an
unredacted copy of the
contract; and
``(iv) an assurance that in a case in which
information is required to be disclosed under
this section with respect to a gift or contract
that is not in English, such information is
translated into English in accordance with
subsection (c).
``(B) With respect to a gift received from, or a
contract entered into with, a foreign source that is a
foreign government (other than the government of a
foreign country of concern)--
``(i) the name of such foreign government;
``(ii) the department, agency, office, or
division of such foreign government that
approved such gift or contract, as applicable;
and
``(iii) the physical mailing address of such
department, agency, office, or division.
``(C) With respect to a gift received from, or
contract entered into with, a foreign source (other
than a foreign government subject to the requirements
of subparagraph (B))--
``(i) the legal name of the foreign source,
or, if such name is not available, a statement
certified by a compliance officer in accordance
with section 117D(c) that the institution has
reasonably attempted to obtain such name;
``(ii) in the case of a foreign source that
is a natural person, the country of citizenship
of such person, or, if such country is not
known, the principal country of residence of
such person;
``(iii) in the case of a foreign source that
is a legal entity, the country in which such
entity is incorporated, or, if such information
is not available, the principal place of
business of such entity;
``(iv) the physical mailing address of such
foreign source, or, if such address is not
available, a statement certified by a
compliance officer in accordance with section
117D(c) that the institution has reasonably
attempted to obtain such address; and
``(v) any affiliation of the foreign source
to an organization that is designated as a
foreign terrorist organization pursuant to
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
``(D) With respect to a contract entered into with a
foreign source that is a foreign country of concern or
a foreign entity of concern--
``(i) a complete and unredacted text of the
original contract, and if such original
contract is not in English, a translated copy
in accordance with subsection (c);
``(ii) a copy of the waiver received under
section 117A for such contract; and
``(iii) the statement submitted by the
institution for purposes of receiving such a
waiver under section 117A(b)(2).
``(2) Foreign source ownership or control.--Each report to
the Secretary required under subsection (a)(2) shall contain--
``(A) the legal name and address of the foreign
source that owns or controls the institution;
``(B) the date on which the foreign source assumed
ownership or control; and
``(C) any changes in program or structure resulting
from the change in ownership or control.
``(c) Translation Requirements.--Any information required to be
disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is
not in English shall be translated, for purposes of such disclosure, by
a person that is not an affiliated entity or agent of the foreign
source involved with such gift or contract.
``(d) Public Inspection.--
``(1) Database requirement.--Beginning not later than May 31
of the calendar year following the date of enactment of the
DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall--
``(A) establish and maintain a searchable database on
a website of the Department, under which all reports
submitted under this section (including any report
submitted under this section before the date of
enactment of the DETERRENT Act)--
``(i) are made publicly available (in
electronic and downloadable format), including
any information provided in such reports (other
than the information prohibited from being
publicly disclosed pursuant to paragraph (2));
``(ii) can be individually identified and
compared; and
``(iii) are searchable and sortable--
``(I) by the institution that filed
such report;
``(II) by the date on which the
institution filed such report;
``(III) by the date on which the
institution received the gift which is
the subject of the report;
``(IV) by the date on which the
institution enters into the contract
which is the subject of the report;
``(V) by the date on which such
contract first takes effect;
``(VI) by the attributable country of
such gift or contract;
``(VII) by the name of the foreign
source (other than a foreign source
that is a natural person);
``(VIII) by the information described
in subparagraph (C)(i); and
``(IX) by the information described
in subparagraph (C)(ii);
``(B) not later than 30 days after receipt of a
disclosure report under this section, include such
report in such database;
``(C) indicate, as part of the public record of a
report included in such database, whether the report is
with respect to a gift received from, or a contract
entered into with--
``(i) a foreign source that is a foreign
government; or
``(ii) a foreign source that is not a foreign
government; and
``(D) with respect to a disclosure report that does
not include the name or address of a foreign source,
indicate, as part of the public record of such report
included in such database, that such report did not
include such information.
``(2) Name and address of foreign source.--The Secretary
shall not disclose the name or address of a foreign source that
is a natural person (other than the attributable country of
such foreign source) included in a disclosure report--
``(A) as part of the public record of such disclosure
report described in paragraph (1); or
``(B) in response to a request under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the
`Freedom of Information Act'), pursuant to subsection
(b)(3) of such section.
``(e) Interagency Information Sharing.--Not later than 30 days after
receiving a disclosure report from an institution in compliance with
this section, the Secretary shall transmit an unredacted copy of such
report (that includes the name and address of a foreign source
disclosed in such report) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Director
of the National Science Foundation, and the Director of the National
Institutes of Health.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Affiliated entity.--The term `affiliated entity', when
used with respect to an institution, means an entity or
organization that operates primarily for the benefit of, or
under the auspices of, such institution, including a foundation
of the institution or a related entity (such as any
educational, cultural, or language entity).
``(2) Attributable country.--The term `attributable country'
means--
``(A) the country of citizenship of a foreign source
who is a natural person, or, if such country is
unknown, the principal residence (as applicable) of
such foreign source; or
``(B) the country of incorporation of a foreign
source that is a legal entity, or, if such country is
unknown, the principal place of business (as
applicable) of such foreign source.
``(3) Contract.--The term `contract'--
``(A) means--
``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter of property or
services by the foreign source;
``(ii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar
transaction with a foreign source that involves
the use or exchange of an institution's name,
likeness, time, services, or resources; and
``(iii) any agreement for the acquisition by
purchase, lease, or barter, of property or
services from a foreign source (other than an
arms-length agreement for such acquisition from
a foreign source that is not a foreign country
of concern or a foreign entity of concern); and
``(B) does not include an agreement made between an
institution and a foreign source regarding any payment
of one or more elements of a student's cost of
attendance (as such term is defined in section 472),
unless such an agreement is made for more than 15
students or is made under a restricted or conditional
contract.
``(4) Foreign source.--The term `foreign source' means--
``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a
foreign government;
``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise,
created under the laws of a foreign state or states;
``(C) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise,
substantially controlled (as described in section
668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations)
(or successor regulations)) by a foreign source;
``(D) a natural person who is not a citizen or a
national of t
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On June 24, 2021, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was
to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department
of Education. During the hearing, then-Ranking Member Virginia
Foxx (R-NC) and Representatives Joe Wilson (R-SC), Elise
Stefanik (R-NY), Jim Banks (R-IN), and Burgess Owens (R-UT)
made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence
in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was
U.S. Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona,
Washington, D.C.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On May 16, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose
of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of
the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing,
Representatives Michelle Steel (R-CA), James Comer (R-KY), and
Eric Burlison (R-MO) made comments and asked questions
regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education.
Testifying before the Committee was U.S. Department of
Education Secretary Miguel Cardona, Washington, D.C.
On May 24, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Breaking the System Part II:
Examining the Implications of Biden's Student Loan Policies for
Students and Taxpayers.'' The purpose of the hearing was to
examine the Biden administration's policies surrounding student
loans and the Office of Federal Student Aid. During the
hearing, Representative Banks asked whether the Biden
administration has opened any new investigations into foreign
funding in postsecondary education. Testifying before the
Committee were the Honorable James Kvaal, Under Secretary of
Education, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., and
Mr. Richard Cordray, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Federal
Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.
On July 13, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Exposing the Dangers of the
Influence of Foreign Adversaries on College Campuses.'' The
purpose of the hearing was to examine the state of foreign
influence in the American postsecondary education system. The
hearing investigated how to prevent foreign adversaries from
abusing America's academic system to steal sensitive
intellectual property, limit free expression, control
curriculum, and indoctrinate students. Testifying before the
Committee were Mr. Paul Moore, J.D., Senior Counsel, Defense of
Freedom Institute, Washington, D.C.; Mr. John C. Yang,
President and Executive Director, Asian Americans Advancing
Justice, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Craig Singleton, China Program
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, Washington, D.C.
Legislative Action
On October 11, 2023, Representative Steel introduced the
Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes
Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act (H.R. 5933)
with Representatives Foxx, Owens, Wilson, Glenn Thompson (R-
PA), Glenn Grothman (R-WI), Stefanik, Lloyd Smucker (R-PA),
Lisa McClain (R-MI), Julia Letlow (R-LA), Brandon Williams (R-
NY), Erin Houchin (R-IA), Ron Estes (R-KS), and Tim Walberg (R-
MI).
The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education
and the Workforce. On November 8, 2023, the Committee
considered H.R. 5933 in legislative session and reported it
favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a
recorded vote of 27-11. The Committee considered the following
amendments to H.R. 5933:
1. Representative Steel offered an Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made changes to
better align the bill with other federal laws and
ensure more transparency around all types of donations
among other changes. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
2. Representative Thompson offered an amendment to
clarify the definition of batch reporting and define
the frequency, participants, and reports from the
standing user group. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
3. Representative Nathaniel Moran (R-TX) offered an
amendment to clarify the waiver process for existing
contracts between an institution of higher education
(IHE) and a country or foreign entity of concern and to
adjust the time deadlines for submission and approval
of waivers. The amendment was adopted by voice vote.
4. Representative Kathy Manning (D-NC) offered an
amendment to strike the requirement that gifts and
contracts to faculty be made publicly available. The
amendment failed by a recorded vote of 11-22.
5. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA)
offered an amendment to exclude receptions, widely-
attended events, charity events, and gifts of personal
hospitality from being classified as ``gifts'' for
purposes of reporting gifts and contracts to faculty
and staff. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of
14-24.
6. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to
increase the threshold for reporting by faculty and
staff to $25,000 (instead of $5,000) and to eliminate
the $0 reporting threshold for countries of concern.
The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24.
7. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute that provided a higher threshold
for reporting for all foreign gifts or contracts and
provided fewer public disclosures about the nature of
the gifts and contracts. The amendment failed by a
recorded vote of 14-24.
119TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On February 5, 2025, the Committee on Education and
Workforce held a hearing on ``The State of American
Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the
state of American education. During the hearing,
Representatives Walberg, Mark Harris (R-NC), and Mark Messmer
(R-IN) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign
influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the
Committee were Mrs. Nicole Neily, President, Parents Defending
Education, Arlington, VA; Dr. Preston Cooper, Senior Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Janai
Nelson, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Johnny C. Taylor, Jr.,
President and CEO, Society for Human Resource Management,
Alexandria, VA.
Legislative Action
On February 6, 2025, Representative Michael Baumgartner (R-
WA) introduced the Defending Education Transparency and Ending
Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT)
Act (H.R. 1048) with Representatives Messmer, Owens, Rick W.
Allen (R-GA), Kevin Kiley (R-CA), Walberg, Wilson, Michael A.
Rulli (R-OH), Foxx, and Grothman.
The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education
and Workforce. On February 12, 2025, the Committee considered
H.R. 1048 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as
amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of
20-14. The Committee considered the following amendments to
H.R. 1048:
1. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the
Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that would double the
reporting threshold for contracts to $100,000 and allow
gifts under $250,000 over a three-year span to be
unreported. The ANS would also prevent the disclosure
of the names of foreign sources and the names of gift
recipients at institutions and exempt all clinical
trials. Further, the ANS would reduce penalties for
violations to as low as $250. The ANS failed by a
recorded vote of 14-20.
2. Representative Alma S. Adams (D-NC) offered an
amendment to restrict access by any ``outside person''
to information submitted or maintained by the
Department of Education pursuant to section 117 unless
the sharing of the information is specifically
authorized or required by section 117 or required to be
made publicly available under section 117. The
amendment defines ``outside person'' as any person who
is not a direct employee of the Department of
Education, including any person who is a political
appointee, special government employee, or employee
detailed from any agency outside the Department of
Education. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of
14-20.
3. Representative Summer L. Lee (D-PA) offered an
amendment to require the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to initiate a study into whether the
provisions in the bill would result in a decline of
international research collaborations or an increase in
hostility on college campuses for international
students or faculty or students of color. The amendment
failed by a recorded vote of 14-20.
4. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to
exclude receptions, widely-attended events, charity
events, or gifts of personal hospitality from being
classified as ``gifts'' for reporting purposes. The
amendment was withdrawn.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
Foreign enemies like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are
infiltrating America's colleges and universities to subvert
United States' interests. Foreign adversaries recognize the
value of American education and research and continually seek
to exert their influence on students and faculty. To combat
these threats, section 117 of the Higher Education Act (HEA)
requires institutions that receive federal financial assistance
to disclose semiannually to the U.S. Department of Education
(ED or Department) any gifts received from and/or contracts
with a foreign source or foreign government that are valued at
$250,000 or more in a calendar year. The revisions made to
section 117 by H.R. 1048 are necessary due to section 117's
current loose legislative language, the Biden-Harris
administration's blatant crippling of enforcement efforts, and
institutions' refusal to adhere to the law, which together have
resulted in billions of dollars in foreign funds infiltrating
the country undetected. The DETERRENT Act brings much-needed
transparency, accountability, and clarity to foreign gift
reporting requirements for colleges and universities across the
nation.
Section 117 Background
Section 117 was enacted during the HEA reauthorization in
1986. The American Jewish Congress drafted and sponsored what
was then-called section 1207 in response to large gifts from
foreign governments, including gifts from Arab governments to
Georgetown University for the purpose of creating a Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies.\1\
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\1\https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/16/opinion/1-education-act-
would-curb-foreign-gifts-148386.html?searchResultPosition=1.
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Section 117 details the contents of required disclosures as
well as penalties. Each reported gift or contract from a
foreign source needs to contain the aggregate dollar amount as
well as the country of origin.\2\ The statute also requires
institutions owned or controlled by a foreign entity to report
additional information.\3\ If an institution fails to properly
disclose foreign gifts, the Attorney General may open a civil
action to compel compliance, and institutions can be found
liable to pay for the subsequent investigation and enforcement
costs.
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\2\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-765/pdf/COMPS-765.pdf,
page 27.
\3\https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-117-
foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting.
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Section 117 Limitations
Although the disclosure requirements of section 117 have
been in place for over 30 years, the loose language in statute,
poor federal enforcement, and lack of congressional oversight
have collectively resulted in very few and vague disclosures
from institutions.
Most institutions fail to disclose the majority of foreign
gifts they have received. A 2019 Senate report found that up to
70 percent of all institutions failed to comply with section
117 and that those that do comply often underreport.\4\
Investigations by the first Trump administration discovered
$6.5 billion in previously undisclosed gifts and contributions
provided to elite colleges from countries that pose serious
national security threats.\5\
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\4\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
PSI%20Report%20China's
%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf.
\5\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-
compliance-section-117.pdf.
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Even when data is submitted, the accuracy of the reported
amounts of funding and the breadth of relationships are
unclear. All data submitted is self-reported by institutions
and there is no requirement that the numbers be audited for
accuracy by an independent body such as the Department's
Inspector General or the GAO.\6\ In 2022, research from the
Lincoln Policy Network found that nearly 30 percent of reported
payments had no receipt date, making it hard to discern when
payments began or to notice any changes over time.\7\ The
statute also allows institutions to report gift sources as
``anonymous.'' In 2020, the Department estimated that schools
had anonymized $8.4 billion in foreign money over the past
decade.\8\ Finally, several colleges and universities have
affiliated nonprofit foundations or other entities that receive
gifts for the university, and section 117 does not explicitly
extend its requirements to such entities.\9\
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\6\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the-
foreign-payroll.
\7\https://lincolnpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Foreign-
Influence-in-American-Higher-Education.pdf.
\8\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/stanford-and-fordham-
swept-up-in-education-
department-investigation-into-chinese-influence.
\9\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
2019-02-28%20Zais%20
Testimony%20%20PSI.pdf.
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Section 117 also has no requirements for individual faculty
or staff to report foreign gifts and contracts they receive.
However, other federal agencies, in accordance with National
Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33),\10\ have
different disclosure requirements for individuals to disclose
information that could reveal conflicts of interest and foreign
entanglements.\11\ The following are a few examples of
problematic faculty relationships that were investigated by the
Department of Justice:
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\10\NSPM-33 requires government agencies to coordinate on
strengthening research protections through screening potential foreign
threats to research, creating standard policies to mitigate research
risks, and explaining those policies and actions to recipients of
federal research dollars. NSPM-33 also requires federally funded
researchers to disclose potential conflicts of interest for research
such as outside research funding. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-government-
supported-research-development-national-security-policy/, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/010422-NSPM-33-
Implementation-Guidance.pdf.
\11\https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/29/2003251160/-1/-1/1/
COUNTERING-UNWANTED-
INFLUENCE-IN-DEPARTMENT-FUNDED-RESEARCH-AT-INSTITUTIONS-OF-HIGHER-
EDUCATION.PDF, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/07/
2023-16765/agency-
information-collection-activities-request-for-public-comment-on-common-
disclosure-forms-for.
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In April 2023 the former Chair of Harvard
University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department
was sentenced to prison for lying about his affiliation
with and income from the Wuhan University of Technology
in Wuhan, China.\12\
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\12\https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-harvard-university-
professor-sentenced-lying-about-his-affiliation-wuhan.
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In October 2023, in a settlement agreement
with the Department of Justice, Stanford University
agreed to pay $1.9 million over allegations that
faculty members failed to disclose foreign research
support they were receiving.\13\
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\13\https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/stanford-university-agrees-pay-
19-million-resolve-allegations-it-failed-disclose-foreign.
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In July 2024, in a settlement with the
Department of Justice, the University of Maryland,
College Park agreed to pay $500,000 for failing to
disclose foreign funding from the Chinese companies of
three researchers who simultaneously received federal
grants.\14\
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\14\https://www.baltimoresun.com/2024/07/16/umd-pays-settlement-
chinese-companies/.
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In September 2024, in a settlement agreement
with the Department of Justice, the Research Foundation
of the State University of New York agreed to pay
$313,574 after a scientist failed to disclose Chinese
support.\15\
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\15\https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/research-foundation-pays-
313574-resolve-claims-
university-research-scientist-failed.
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In December 2024, in a settlement with the
Department of Justice, the University of Delaware
agreed to pay $700,000 for not disclosing that a
faculty member receiving a NASA grant taught at a
Chinese university.\16\
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\16\https://www.campusreform.org/article/doj-holds-university-
delaware-accountable-failing-
disclose-professors-affiliation-chinese-government-nasa-grant/27165.
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These investigations and enforcement are encouraging, but
Minority Views
Introduction
H.R. 1048, the Defending Education Transparency and Ending
Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT)
Act would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to
impose increased reporting requirements for foreign gifts and
contracts. If enacted, H.R. 1048 would force institutions of
higher education to comply with overly burdensome and
duplicative reporting requirements with no discernable increase
in security or oversight. Further, H.R. 1048 would jeopardize
the essential global partnerships among institutions that play
a critical role in the United States' social, economic, and
technological progress.
Research and Development in Higher Education
Institutions of higher education (institutions) have long
been incubators of research and development that advances the
scientific knowledge of the United States. Institutions conduct
innovative, collaborative, multidisciplinary research with the
goal to improve the economy, international competitiveness, and
quality of life for individuals.\1\ Federal investment has
played a key role in this collaborative process for over 80
years. The National Science Foundation was established in 1950
growing out of federal government sponsorship of university
research to aid the Allied effort in World War II; the first
federal student loans were authorized to increase technical and
scientific knowledge of U.S. scientists to help prevail in the
Cold War.\2\ By underwriting scientific work at universities,
the United States has received a wealth of research knowledge
applicable in multiple industries, and the benefits of a
national infrastructure of research laboratories it did not
have to build itself. In return, institutions have received
steady streams of funding to conduct research in the public
interest.
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\1\See generally e.g., Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Public
Impact Research: APLU Impact, Our Work: Fostering Research & Innovation
To Meet Societal Needs, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/2-fostering-
research-innovation/public-impact-research/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2025); Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univ., University Innovation and
Entrepreneurship Showcase: APLU Impact, Our Work: Econ. Dev. & Cmte.
Engagement, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/5-archived-projects/economic-
development-and-community-engagement/university-innovation-and-
entrepreneurship-showcase/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2025).
\2\National Science Foundation, History, https://new.nsf.gov/about/
history; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title II, Pub. L. 85-
864; 72 Stat. 1580, Sept. 2, 1958.
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However, the system has evolved to a point where
institutions rely heavily on federal investments to advance
their research and development priorities. The federal
government, via grants from a multitude of federal agencies,
provides over $30 billion annually to institutions to support
research and development efforts, and this federal funding
accounts for roughly 60 percent of institutions' research and
development budgets.\3\ Institutions also collaborate with a
range of international entities on federal grants through
partnerships with foreign universities and faculty. The
research community and Committee Democrats agree: to advance
complex research, it is essential to have a ``diversity of
research capabilities, perspectives, and access to
resources.''\4\
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\3\See Am. Ass'n for the Advantage of Sci., R&D at Colleges and
Universities, Programs: R D Budget And Pol'y (Oc. 2022) https://
www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/rd-colleges-and-
universities.
\4\Id.
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Addressing Undue Foreign Influence in Research
Due to the inherent international nature of research,
protecting against undue foreign influence is important for
institutions and the federal government.\5\ Institutions
recognize they have a responsibility to safeguard research and
protect against intellectual property theft, but unwarranted or
overinflated concerns of foreign influence can inhibit the
ability of institutions and individual scholars to develop a
global perspective in their research and teaching.
Unfortunately, these unjustifiable concerns may also often lead
to the fueling of xenophobic rhetoric and behaviors,
particularly towards Asians, Asian Americans, and Middle
Eastern Americans conducting research in the United States or
in collaboration with American partners. This rhetoric is
extremely harmful, and it contributes to the diminishing of the
United States' ``superpower of attracting global scientific
talent.''\6\
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\5\See generally e.g., Candice N. Wright, Agency Actions Needed to
Address Foreign Influence, U.S. Gov. Acct. Off.: Fed. Rsch. 1,
Testimony before the Subcmte. on Investigation & Oversight, and the
Subcmte.on Rsch .& Technology of the H. Comm. on Sci, Space & Tech.
(Oct. 5, 2021) https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105434.pdf; Off. of
the Chief of Rsch Section Strategy & Pol'y, Research Security at the
National Science Foundation, Nat'l Sci. Found.: Rsch Section https://
new.nsf.gov/research-security (last visited Feb. 18, 2025).
\6\Dr. Eric Lander, Guidance for U.S. Scientific Research Security
That Preserves International Collaboration, The White House: OSTP Ostp
Blog (Jan. 4, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news-
updates/2022/01/04/guidance-for-u-s-scientific-research-security-that-
preserves-international-collaboration/.
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Committee Republicans argue that institutions refuse ``to
adhere to the law'' with respect to foreign influence,\7\ but
this could not be further from reality. The country's leading
research universities have proven they are committed to
securing federally funded research and are demonstrating that
commitment by constantly working to ensure compliance with
foreign influence laws and regulations. In 2020, the
Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association
of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) conducted a survey
that found institutions are consistently working to improve
their disclosure policies, enhancing training around foreign
security risks, and developing robust risk mitigation
strategies and assessments.\8\ Further, a recent letter signed
by six of the leading higher education organizations emphasized
that institutions have increasingly strengthened relationships
with federal research agencies and security agencies to ensure
compliance and strengthen research security within foreign
partnerships.\9\
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\7\See H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Fact Sheet, DETERRENT Act,
https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2.6.25_deterrent_act_one_pager.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2025).
\8\See generally Ass'n of Am. Univ., University Actions to Address
Concerns About Security Threats and Undue Foreign Government Influence
on Campus, Actions Taken By Univ. To Address Sci. And Sec. Concerns 1-2
(May 19, 2020) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-
Issues/Science-Security/2020-Effective-Science-Security-Practices-
Summary.pdf.
\9\Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to
Chair Walberg & Ranking Member Bobby Scott, U.S. H. Comm. on Educ. &
the Workforce 1-2 (Feb. 11, 2025) (on file with H Comm. on Educ. &
Workforce, Minority Staff).
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Federal Policies on Foreign Influence
Institutions have expressed that to better address research
security at institutions, intentional federal interagency
coordination is essential.\10\ As described in detail below,
the federal government has acted on this concern and
established robust coordinated policies to ensure institutions
can address undue foreign influence in a manner that is not
overly duplicative or burdensome. While Committee Republicans
argue the Department of Education (ED) should be leading the
fight against foreign influence, this argument fails to
recognize that the overwhelming majority of research funding
flowing to our institutions are coming from agencies and
departments other than ED. This push to centralize operations
at the ED ignores the multitude of policies and initiatives
within the federal government that already exist to address
research security and protect institutions from undue foreign
influence. Through these policies and initiatives, most of
which are outside the jurisdiction of this Committee, the Biden
Administration was committed to establishing one cohesive
compliance process across federal agencies. The adoption of
H.R. 1048 would needlessly complicate the progress the Biden
Administration made.
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\10\See generally Letter from Ass'n of Am. Univ., to Dr. Eric
Lander, Assistant to the President & Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y
1-2 (Sept. 30, 2021) https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-OSTP-
Presidential-Memo-NSPM-33-093021.pdf
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OFFICE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND NSPM-33 FEDERAL GUIDANCE
The White House Office for Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) advises the President on matters related to Science and
Technology.\11\ OSTP coordinates with federal agencies,
Congress, and external partners, including institutions, to
support research, regulation, and innovation.\12\ In January
2021, President Trump issued the Presidential Memorandum on
United States Government-Supported Research and Development
National Security Policy (NSPM-33) to direct ``action to
strengthen protections of United States Government-supported
Research and Development against foreign government
interference and exploitation.''\13\ This guidance, implemented
by President Biden establishes the priorities of OSTP and other
agencies involved in enforcing disclosures of funds, foreign
influence, and other research security risks.\14\ NSPM-33
outlines the central priorities of enforcement on foreign
influence for all institutions including: sharing awareness of
risks and disclosure requirements, limiting access and vetting
foreign students, and providing research to ``protect federally
funded R&D from foreign government interference.''\15\ NSPM-33
plays an integral role ``in advancing American competitiveness
and keeping America at the forefront of innovation and
technological development.'' Through engaging with the U.S.
research community, this guidance establishes robust
requirements to safeguard against undue foreign influence.\16\
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\11\See generally Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off.
Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/
(2022) (explaining that how the OSTP was established by the National
Science and Technology Policy, Organizations and Priorities Act of
1976).
\12\Id. Six teams that steer the recommendations through the OSTP:
Climate and Environment, Energy, Health Outcomes, National Security and
Science and Society, Technology. For further specifics see Off. of Sci.
& Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://
bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/ (2022).
\13\Exec. Off. of the President, Presidential Memorandum on United
States Government: Supported Research and Development National Security
Policy, Nat'l Section Presidential Memorandum 33 https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-united-states-government-supported-research-development-
national-security-policy/ (Jan. 14, 2021) (calling on various Executive
Officials to work on increasing roles, responsibilities and priorities
to combat the significant influence from foreign entities on U.S.
Research and Development).
\14\See id. (elaborating on how the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy on the National Science and Technology
Council to work as representative of their fields to develop
coordinated activities for protection and outreach).
\15\See generally Morgan Dwyer, Christina Ciocca Eller, & Ryan
Donohue, An Update on Research Security: Streamlining Disclosure
Standards to Enhance Clarity, Transparency, and Equity, The White
House: OSTP Blog https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news-
updates/2022/08/31/an-update-on-research-securitystreamlining-
disclosure-standards-to-enhance-clarity-transparency-and-equity/ (Aug.
31, 2022) (elaborating the other priorities include, information
sharing amongst agencies, reviewing funding agencies, identifying risks
and conduct analysis and promoting international research and
development cooperation).
\16\See id.
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CHIPS AND SCIENCE ACT
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 designated the National
Science Foundation (NSF) as the primary agency charged with
coordinating research security initiatives, since it provides
the relevant prohibitions, guidance, and disclosure
requirements ``around foreign talent recruitment programs and
potential conflicts of interest.''\17\ NSF is required to
create policies, protocols, and resources to identify and
address any potential security risks to research integrity for
institutions.\18\ Furthermore, the Act requires NSF to create a
Research Security and Policy Office to coordinate all security
policies and conduct due diligence regarding compliance with
any security standards set forth.\19\ Similarly, CHIPS and
Science Act requires that all institutions must annually report
to NSF in any financial information associated with a foreign
country of concern and directs NSF to create guardrails around
foreign talent programs.\20\
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\17\CHIPS and Science Act, Sec. 10631, Pub. L. 117-167, 72 Stat.
1580, Aug. 9, 2022 (``Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, in coordination with the interagency working group
established under . . .[23 U.S.C. 6601] . . . shall publish and widely
distribute a uniform set of guidelines for federal research agencies
regarding foreign talent recruitment programs.''). The CHIPS and
Science Act also requires that the N.S.F. establishes an independent
risk assessment center to help institutions and researchers understand
and mitigate security risks. See Nat'l Sci. Found., CHIPS and Science,
Nat'l Sci. Found. https://new.nsf.gov/chips (last visited Feb. 18,
2025).
\18\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10331(1).
\19\Id.; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant
Univs., Research Security Provisions, The CHIPS And Sci. Act Of 2022 1
(H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/
default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/
CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf (quoting H.R. 4346,
117th Cong. Sec. 10331 (2022)).
\20\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10339B, 10631; See Ass'n of Am.
Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security
Provisions, The CHIPS And Sci. Act Of 2022 022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last
updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-
Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/
CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf.
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FEDERAL INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED SINCE CONSIDERATION OF THE DETERRENT
ACT IN 2023
While Republicans claim that the Biden Administration was
``crippling'' enforcement of foreign influence laws,\21\ it is
evident that the Biden Administration was committed to
implementing a cohesive interagency plan to combat undue
foreign influence by signing robust provisions doing so into
law and building upon those laws to enhance the
responsibilities of federal agencies.
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\21\See Press Release, Congresswoman Michelle Steel Press Off.,
Steel, Foxx Bill Will Deter Foreign Adversaries' Influences in
Postsecondary Education, (Oct. 11, 2023) https://steel.house.gov/media/
press-releases/steel-foxx-bill-will-deter-foreign-adversaries-
influence-postsecondary.
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Since the Committee last considered the DETERRENT Act in
the 118th Congress, federal research agencies have taken
significant steps to address foreign influence risks.\22\
Specifically:
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\22\Ass'n of Am. Univ., Actions Taken to Address Foreign Security
Threats, Undue Foreign Interference, and Protect Research Integrity at
U.S. Universities, 4 (Feb. 2025), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/
files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/Actions-Taken-Research-
Security.pdf.
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In February 2024, OSTP released a memo to
federal agencies requiring the use of the common
disclosure form for federal research, which requires
additional details on foreign affiliations,
relationships, and financial interests.\23\
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\23\Arati Prabhakar, Director, Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, Memo for
the Heads of Federal Res. Agencies, Policy Regarding Use of Common
Disclosure Forms for the ``Biographical Sketch'' and the ``Current and
Pending (Other) Support'' Sections of Applications by Federal Research
Funding Agencies (Feb. 14, 2024), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2024/02/OSTP-Common-Disclosure-Form-Policy.pdf.
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In June 2024, the NSF announced a new risk
mitigation framework for assessing grant proposals for
potential national security risks.\24\ The Trusted
Research Using Safeguards and Transparency (TRUST)
framework created a process to evaluate and mitigate
risks for both U.S. scholars and international
collaborators prior to awarding federal grants.
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\24\Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., NSF enhances research
security with new TRUST proposal assessment process (Jun. 5, 2025),
https://new.nsf.gov/news/nsf-enhances-research-security-new-trust-
proposal.
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In July 2024, the NSF also announced a $67
million investment to establish the Safeguarding the
Entire Community of the U.S. Research Ecosystem
(SECURE) Center.\25\ The center is designed to
communicate information to institutions on research
security risks, provide training of insti