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H. Rept. 119-16

DEFENDING EDUCATION TRANSPARENCY AND ENDING ROGUE REGIMES ENGAGING IN NEFARIOUS TRANS- ACTIONS ACT

2025-03-14

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 1048] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 1048) to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to strengthen disclosure requirements relating to foreign gifts and contracts, to prohibit contracts between institutions of higher education and certain foreign entities and countries of concern, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions Act'' or the ``DETERRENT Act''. SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS. (a) In General.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 117. DISCLOSURES OF FOREIGN GIFTS. ``(a) Disclosure Reports.-- ``(1) Aggregate gifts and contract disclosures.--An institution shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with subsection (b)(1), a disclosure report on July 31 of the calendar year immediately following any calendar year in which-- ``(A) the institution receives a gift from, or enters into a contract with, a foreign source (other than a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern)-- ``(i) the value of which is $50,000 or more, considered alone or in combination with all other gifts from, or contracts with, that foreign source within the calendar year; or ``(ii) the value of which is undetermined; or ``(B) the institution-- ``(i) receives a gift from a foreign country of concern or foreign entity of concern; or ``(ii) upon receiving a waiver under section 117A to enter into a contract with such a country or entity, enters into such contract, without regard to the value of such gift or contract. ``(2) Foreign source ownership or control disclosures.-- Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of an institution that is substantially controlled (as described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or successor regulations)) by a foreign source, the institution shall file with the Secretary, in accordance with subsection (b)(2), a disclosure report on July 31 of each year. ``(3) Treatment of affiliated entities.--For purposes of this section, any gift to, or contract with, an affiliated entity of an institution shall be considered a gift to, or contract with, respectively, such institution. ``(b) Contents of Report.-- ``(1) Gifts and contracts.--Each report to the Secretary required under subsection (a)(1) shall contain the following: ``(A) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with, any foreign source-- ``(i) the terms of such gift or contract, including-- ``(I) the name of the individual, department, or other entity at the institution receiving the gift or carrying out the contract on behalf of the institution; ``(II) the foreign source's intended purpose of such gift or contract, or, in the absence of such a purpose, the manner in which the institution intends to use such gift or contract; and ``(III) in the case of a restricted or conditional gift or contract, a description of the restrictions or conditions of such gift or contract; ``(ii) with respect to a gift-- ``(I) the total fair market dollar amount or dollar value of the gift, as of the date of submission of such report; and ``(II) the date on which the institution received such gift; ``(iii) with respect to a contract-- ``(I) the total fair market dollar amount or dollar value of the contract, as of the date of submission of such report; ``(II) the date on which the institution enters into such contract; ``(III) the date on which such contract first takes effect; ``(IV) if the contract has a termination date, such termination date; and ``(V) an assurance that the institution will-- ``(aa) maintain an unredacted copy of the contract until the latest of-- ``(AA) the date that is 5 years after the date on which such contract first takes effect; ``(BB) the date on which the contract terminates; or ``(CC) the last day of any period that applicable State law requires a copy of such contract to be maintained; and ``(bb) upon request of the Secretary during an investigation under section 117D(a)(1), produce such an unredacted copy of the contract; and ``(iv) an assurance that in a case in which information is required to be disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is not in English, such information is translated into English in accordance with subsection (c). ``(B) With respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with, a foreign source that is a foreign government (other than the government of a foreign country of concern)-- ``(i) the name of such foreign government; ``(ii) the department, agency, office, or division of such foreign government that approved such gift or contract, as applicable; and ``(iii) the physical mailing address of such department, agency, office, or division. ``(C) With respect to a gift received from, or contract entered into with, a foreign source (other than a foreign government subject to the requirements of subparagraph (B))-- ``(i) the legal name of the foreign source, or, if such name is not available, a statement certified by a compliance officer in accordance with section 117D(c) that the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such name; ``(ii) in the case of a foreign source that is a natural person, the country of citizenship of such person, or, if such country is not known, the principal country of residence of such person; ``(iii) in the case of a foreign source that is a legal entity, the country in which such entity is incorporated, or, if such information is not available, the principal place of business of such entity; ``(iv) the physical mailing address of such foreign source, or, if such address is not available, a statement certified by a compliance officer in accordance with section 117D(c) that the institution has reasonably attempted to obtain such address; and ``(v) any affiliation of the foreign source to an organization that is designated as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189). ``(D) With respect to a contract entered into with a foreign source that is a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of concern-- ``(i) a complete and unredacted text of the original contract, and if such original contract is not in English, a translated copy in accordance with subsection (c); ``(ii) a copy of the waiver received under section 117A for such contract; and ``(iii) the statement submitted by the institution for purposes of receiving such a waiver under section 117A(b)(2). ``(2) Foreign source ownership or control.--Each report to the Secretary required under subsection (a)(2) shall contain-- ``(A) the legal name and address of the foreign source that owns or controls the institution; ``(B) the date on which the foreign source assumed ownership or control; and ``(C) any changes in program or structure resulting from the change in ownership or control. ``(c) Translation Requirements.--Any information required to be disclosed under this section with respect to a gift or contract that is not in English shall be translated, for purposes of such disclosure, by a person that is not an affiliated entity or agent of the foreign source involved with such gift or contract. ``(d) Public Inspection.-- ``(1) Database requirement.--Beginning not later than May 31 of the calendar year following the date of enactment of the DETERRENT Act, the Secretary shall-- ``(A) establish and maintain a searchable database on a website of the Department, under which all reports submitted under this section (including any report submitted under this section before the date of enactment of the DETERRENT Act)-- ``(i) are made publicly available (in electronic and downloadable format), including any information provided in such reports (other than the information prohibited from being publicly disclosed pursuant to paragraph (2)); ``(ii) can be individually identified and compared; and ``(iii) are searchable and sortable-- ``(I) by the institution that filed such report; ``(II) by the date on which the institution filed such report; ``(III) by the date on which the institution received the gift which is the subject of the report; ``(IV) by the date on which the institution enters into the contract which is the subject of the report; ``(V) by the date on which such contract first takes effect; ``(VI) by the attributable country of such gift or contract; ``(VII) by the name of the foreign source (other than a foreign source that is a natural person); ``(VIII) by the information described in subparagraph (C)(i); and ``(IX) by the information described in subparagraph (C)(ii); ``(B) not later than 30 days after receipt of a disclosure report under this section, include such report in such database; ``(C) indicate, as part of the public record of a report included in such database, whether the report is with respect to a gift received from, or a contract entered into with-- ``(i) a foreign source that is a foreign government; or ``(ii) a foreign source that is not a foreign government; and ``(D) with respect to a disclosure report that does not include the name or address of a foreign source, indicate, as part of the public record of such report included in such database, that such report did not include such information. ``(2) Name and address of foreign source.--The Secretary shall not disclose the name or address of a foreign source that is a natural person (other than the attributable country of such foreign source) included in a disclosure report-- ``(A) as part of the public record of such disclosure report described in paragraph (1); or ``(B) in response to a request under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information Act'), pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of such section. ``(e) Interagency Information Sharing.--Not later than 30 days after receiving a disclosure report from an institution in compliance with this section, the Secretary shall transmit an unredacted copy of such report (that includes the name and address of a foreign source disclosed in such report) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Director of the National Institutes of Health. ``(f) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Affiliated entity.--The term `affiliated entity', when used with respect to an institution, means an entity or organization that operates primarily for the benefit of, or under the auspices of, such institution, including a foundation of the institution or a related entity (such as any educational, cultural, or language entity). ``(2) Attributable country.--The term `attributable country' means-- ``(A) the country of citizenship of a foreign source who is a natural person, or, if such country is unknown, the principal residence (as applicable) of such foreign source; or ``(B) the country of incorporation of a foreign source that is a legal entity, or, if such country is unknown, the principal place of business (as applicable) of such foreign source. ``(3) Contract.--The term `contract'-- ``(A) means-- ``(i) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services by the foreign source; ``(ii) any affiliation, agreement, or similar transaction with a foreign source that involves the use or exchange of an institution's name, likeness, time, services, or resources; and ``(iii) any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter, of property or services from a foreign source (other than an arms-length agreement for such acquisition from a foreign source that is not a foreign country of concern or a foreign entity of concern); and ``(B) does not include an agreement made between an institution and a foreign source regarding any payment of one or more elements of a student's cost of attendance (as such term is defined in section 472), unless such an agreement is made for more than 15 students or is made under a restricted or conditional contract. ``(4) Foreign source.--The term `foreign source' means-- ``(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a foreign government; ``(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, created under the laws of a foreign state or states; ``(C) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, substantially controlled (as described in section 668.174(c)(3) of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations) (or successor regulations)) by a foreign source; ``(D) a natural person who is not a citizen or a national of t

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On June 24, 2021, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing, then-Ranking Member Virginia Foxx (R-NC) and Representatives Joe Wilson (R-SC), Elise Stefanik (R-NY), Jim Banks (R-IN), and Burgess Owens (R-UT) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was U.S. Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona, Washington, D.C. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On May 16, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the policies and priorities of the U.S. Department of Education. During the hearing, Representatives Michelle Steel (R-CA), James Comer (R-KY), and Eric Burlison (R-MO) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee was U.S. Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona, Washington, D.C. On May 24, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Breaking the System Part II: Examining the Implications of Biden's Student Loan Policies for Students and Taxpayers.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the Biden administration's policies surrounding student loans and the Office of Federal Student Aid. During the hearing, Representative Banks asked whether the Biden administration has opened any new investigations into foreign funding in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee were the Honorable James Kvaal, Under Secretary of Education, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., and Mr. Richard Cordray, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C. On July 13, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Exposing the Dangers of the Influence of Foreign Adversaries on College Campuses.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the state of foreign influence in the American postsecondary education system. The hearing investigated how to prevent foreign adversaries from abusing America's academic system to steal sensitive intellectual property, limit free expression, control curriculum, and indoctrinate students. Testifying before the Committee were Mr. Paul Moore, J.D., Senior Counsel, Defense of Freedom Institute, Washington, D.C.; Mr. John C. Yang, President and Executive Director, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Craig Singleton, China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C. Legislative Action On October 11, 2023, Representative Steel introduced the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act (H.R. 5933) with Representatives Foxx, Owens, Wilson, Glenn Thompson (R- PA), Glenn Grothman (R-WI), Stefanik, Lloyd Smucker (R-PA), Lisa McClain (R-MI), Julia Letlow (R-LA), Brandon Williams (R- NY), Erin Houchin (R-IA), Ron Estes (R-KS), and Tim Walberg (R- MI). The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On November 8, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5933 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 27-11. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 5933: 1. Representative Steel offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made changes to better align the bill with other federal laws and ensure more transparency around all types of donations among other changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 2. Representative Thompson offered an amendment to clarify the definition of batch reporting and define the frequency, participants, and reports from the standing user group. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 3. Representative Nathaniel Moran (R-TX) offered an amendment to clarify the waiver process for existing contracts between an institution of higher education (IHE) and a country or foreign entity of concern and to adjust the time deadlines for submission and approval of waivers. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 4. Representative Kathy Manning (D-NC) offered an amendment to strike the requirement that gifts and contracts to faculty be made publicly available. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 11-22. 5. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA) offered an amendment to exclude receptions, widely- attended events, charity events, and gifts of personal hospitality from being classified as ``gifts'' for purposes of reporting gifts and contracts to faculty and staff. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. 6. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to increase the threshold for reporting by faculty and staff to $25,000 (instead of $5,000) and to eliminate the $0 reporting threshold for countries of concern. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. 7. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute that provided a higher threshold for reporting for all foreign gifts or contracts and provided fewer public disclosures about the nature of the gifts and contracts. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-24. 119TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On February 5, 2025, the Committee on Education and Workforce held a hearing on ``The State of American Education.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine the state of American education. During the hearing, Representatives Walberg, Mark Harris (R-NC), and Mark Messmer (R-IN) made comments and asked questions regarding foreign influence in postsecondary education. Testifying before the Committee were Mrs. Nicole Neily, President, Parents Defending Education, Arlington, VA; Dr. Preston Cooper, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Janai Nelson, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Johnny C. Taylor, Jr., President and CEO, Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, VA. Legislative Action On February 6, 2025, Representative Michael Baumgartner (R- WA) introduced the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act (H.R. 1048) with Representatives Messmer, Owens, Rick W. Allen (R-GA), Kevin Kiley (R-CA), Walberg, Wilson, Michael A. Rulli (R-OH), Foxx, and Grothman. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education and Workforce. On February 12, 2025, the Committee considered H.R. 1048 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 20-14. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 1048: 1. Ranking Member Scott offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that would double the reporting threshold for contracts to $100,000 and allow gifts under $250,000 over a three-year span to be unreported. The ANS would also prevent the disclosure of the names of foreign sources and the names of gift recipients at institutions and exempt all clinical trials. Further, the ANS would reduce penalties for violations to as low as $250. The ANS failed by a recorded vote of 14-20. 2. Representative Alma S. Adams (D-NC) offered an amendment to restrict access by any ``outside person'' to information submitted or maintained by the Department of Education pursuant to section 117 unless the sharing of the information is specifically authorized or required by section 117 or required to be made publicly available under section 117. The amendment defines ``outside person'' as any person who is not a direct employee of the Department of Education, including any person who is a political appointee, special government employee, or employee detailed from any agency outside the Department of Education. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-20. 3. Representative Summer L. Lee (D-PA) offered an amendment to require the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to initiate a study into whether the provisions in the bill would result in a decline of international research collaborations or an increase in hostility on college campuses for international students or faculty or students of color. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 14-20. 4. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to exclude receptions, widely-attended events, charity events, or gifts of personal hospitality from being classified as ``gifts'' for reporting purposes. The amendment was withdrawn. Committee Views INTRODUCTION Foreign enemies like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are infiltrating America's colleges and universities to subvert United States' interests. Foreign adversaries recognize the value of American education and research and continually seek to exert their influence on students and faculty. To combat these threats, section 117 of the Higher Education Act (HEA) requires institutions that receive federal financial assistance to disclose semiannually to the U.S. Department of Education (ED or Department) any gifts received from and/or contracts with a foreign source or foreign government that are valued at $250,000 or more in a calendar year. The revisions made to section 117 by H.R. 1048 are necessary due to section 117's current loose legislative language, the Biden-Harris administration's blatant crippling of enforcement efforts, and institutions' refusal to adhere to the law, which together have resulted in billions of dollars in foreign funds infiltrating the country undetected. The DETERRENT Act brings much-needed transparency, accountability, and clarity to foreign gift reporting requirements for colleges and universities across the nation. Section 117 Background Section 117 was enacted during the HEA reauthorization in 1986. The American Jewish Congress drafted and sponsored what was then-called section 1207 in response to large gifts from foreign governments, including gifts from Arab governments to Georgetown University for the purpose of creating a Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/16/opinion/1-education-act- would-curb-foreign-gifts-148386.html?searchResultPosition=1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 details the contents of required disclosures as well as penalties. Each reported gift or contract from a foreign source needs to contain the aggregate dollar amount as well as the country of origin.\2\ The statute also requires institutions owned or controlled by a foreign entity to report additional information.\3\ If an institution fails to properly disclose foreign gifts, the Attorney General may open a civil action to compel compliance, and institutions can be found liable to pay for the subsequent investigation and enforcement costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-765/pdf/COMPS-765.pdf, page 27. \3\https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-117- foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 Limitations Although the disclosure requirements of section 117 have been in place for over 30 years, the loose language in statute, poor federal enforcement, and lack of congressional oversight have collectively resulted in very few and vague disclosures from institutions. Most institutions fail to disclose the majority of foreign gifts they have received. A 2019 Senate report found that up to 70 percent of all institutions failed to comply with section 117 and that those that do comply often underreport.\4\ Investigations by the first Trump administration discovered $6.5 billion in previously undisclosed gifts and contributions provided to elite colleges from countries that pose serious national security threats.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/ PSI%20Report%20China's %20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf. \5\https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional- compliance-section-117.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even when data is submitted, the accuracy of the reported amounts of funding and the breadth of relationships are unclear. All data submitted is self-reported by institutions and there is no requirement that the numbers be audited for accuracy by an independent body such as the Department's Inspector General or the GAO.\6\ In 2022, research from the Lincoln Policy Network found that nearly 30 percent of reported payments had no receipt date, making it hard to discern when payments began or to notice any changes over time.\7\ The statute also allows institutions to report gift sources as ``anonymous.'' In 2020, the Department estimated that schools had anonymized $8.4 billion in foreign money over the past decade.\8\ Finally, several colleges and universities have affiliated nonprofit foundations or other entities that receive gifts for the university, and section 117 does not explicitly extend its requirements to such entities.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/02/universities-on-the- foreign-payroll. \7\https://lincolnpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Foreign- Influence-in-American-Higher-Education.pdf. \8\https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/stanford-and-fordham- swept-up-in-education- department-investigation-into-chinese-influence. \9\https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/ 2019-02-28%20Zais%20 Testimony%20%20PSI.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 117 also has no requirements for individual faculty or staff to report foreign gifts and contracts they receive. However, other federal agencies, in accordance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33),\10\ have different disclosure requirements for individuals to disclose information that could reveal conflicts of interest and foreign entanglements.\11\ The following are a few examples of problematic faculty relationships that were investigated by the Department of Justice: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\NSPM-33 requires government agencies to coordinate on strengthening research protections through screening potential foreign threats to research, creating standard policies to mitigate research risks, and explaining those policies and actions to recipients of federal research dollars. NSPM-33 also requires federally funded researchers to disclose potential conflicts of interest for research such as outside research funding. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-government- supported-research-development-national-security-policy/, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/010422-NSPM-33- Implementation-Guidance.pdf. \11\https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/29/2003251160/-1/-1/1/ COUNTERING-UNWANTED- INFLUENCE-IN-DEPARTMENT-FUNDED-RESEARCH-AT-INSTITUTIONS-OF-HIGHER- EDUCATION.PDF, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/07/ 2023-16765/agency- information-collection-activities-request-for-public-comment-on-common- disclosure-forms-for. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In April 2023 the former Chair of Harvard University's Chemistry and Chemical Biology Department was sentenced to prison for lying about his affiliation with and income from the Wuhan University of Technology in Wuhan, China.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-harvard-university- professor-sentenced-lying-about-his-affiliation-wuhan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In October 2023, in a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice, Stanford University agreed to pay $1.9 million over allegations that faculty members failed to disclose foreign research support they were receiving.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/stanford-university-agrees-pay- 19-million-resolve-allegations-it-failed-disclose-foreign. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In July 2024, in a settlement with the Department of Justice, the University of Maryland, College Park agreed to pay $500,000 for failing to disclose foreign funding from the Chinese companies of three researchers who simultaneously received federal grants.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\https://www.baltimoresun.com/2024/07/16/umd-pays-settlement- chinese-companies/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In September 2024, in a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice, the Research Foundation of the State University of New York agreed to pay $313,574 after a scientist failed to disclose Chinese support.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/research-foundation-pays- 313574-resolve-claims- university-research-scientist-failed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In December 2024, in a settlement with the Department of Justice, the University of Delaware agreed to pay $700,000 for not disclosing that a faculty member receiving a NASA grant taught at a Chinese university.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\https://www.campusreform.org/article/doj-holds-university- delaware-accountable-failing- disclose-professors-affiliation-chinese-government-nasa-grant/27165. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These investigations and enforcement are encouraging, but

Minority Views

Introduction H.R. 1048, the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act would amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) to impose increased reporting requirements for foreign gifts and contracts. If enacted, H.R. 1048 would force institutions of higher education to comply with overly burdensome and duplicative reporting requirements with no discernable increase in security or oversight. Further, H.R. 1048 would jeopardize the essential global partnerships among institutions that play a critical role in the United States' social, economic, and technological progress. Research and Development in Higher Education Institutions of higher education (institutions) have long been incubators of research and development that advances the scientific knowledge of the United States. Institutions conduct innovative, collaborative, multidisciplinary research with the goal to improve the economy, international competitiveness, and quality of life for individuals.\1\ Federal investment has played a key role in this collaborative process for over 80 years. The National Science Foundation was established in 1950 growing out of federal government sponsorship of university research to aid the Allied effort in World War II; the first federal student loans were authorized to increase technical and scientific knowledge of U.S. scientists to help prevail in the Cold War.\2\ By underwriting scientific work at universities, the United States has received a wealth of research knowledge applicable in multiple industries, and the benefits of a national infrastructure of research laboratories it did not have to build itself. In return, institutions have received steady streams of funding to conduct research in the public interest. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\See generally e.g., Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Public Impact Research: APLU Impact, Our Work: Fostering Research & Innovation To Meet Societal Needs, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/2-fostering- research-innovation/public-impact-research/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2025); Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univ., University Innovation and Entrepreneurship Showcase: APLU Impact, Our Work: Econ. Dev. & Cmte. Engagement, https://www.aplu.org/our-work/5-archived-projects/economic- development-and-community-engagement/university-innovation-and- entrepreneurship-showcase/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2025). \2\National Science Foundation, History, https://new.nsf.gov/about/ history; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Title II, Pub. L. 85- 864; 72 Stat. 1580, Sept. 2, 1958. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, the system has evolved to a point where institutions rely heavily on federal investments to advance their research and development priorities. The federal government, via grants from a multitude of federal agencies, provides over $30 billion annually to institutions to support research and development efforts, and this federal funding accounts for roughly 60 percent of institutions' research and development budgets.\3\ Institutions also collaborate with a range of international entities on federal grants through partnerships with foreign universities and faculty. The research community and Committee Democrats agree: to advance complex research, it is essential to have a ``diversity of research capabilities, perspectives, and access to resources.''\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\See Am. Ass'n for the Advantage of Sci., R&D at Colleges and Universities, Programs: R D Budget And Pol'y (Oc. 2022) https:// www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/rd-colleges-and- universities. \4\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Addressing Undue Foreign Influence in Research Due to the inherent international nature of research, protecting against undue foreign influence is important for institutions and the federal government.\5\ Institutions recognize they have a responsibility to safeguard research and protect against intellectual property theft, but unwarranted or overinflated concerns of foreign influence can inhibit the ability of institutions and individual scholars to develop a global perspective in their research and teaching. Unfortunately, these unjustifiable concerns may also often lead to the fueling of xenophobic rhetoric and behaviors, particularly towards Asians, Asian Americans, and Middle Eastern Americans conducting research in the United States or in collaboration with American partners. This rhetoric is extremely harmful, and it contributes to the diminishing of the United States' ``superpower of attracting global scientific talent.''\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\See generally e.g., Candice N. Wright, Agency Actions Needed to Address Foreign Influence, U.S. Gov. Acct. Off.: Fed. Rsch. 1, Testimony before the Subcmte. on Investigation & Oversight, and the Subcmte.on Rsch .& Technology of the H. Comm. on Sci, Space & Tech. (Oct. 5, 2021) https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105434.pdf; Off. of the Chief of Rsch Section Strategy & Pol'y, Research Security at the National Science Foundation, Nat'l Sci. Found.: Rsch Section https:// new.nsf.gov/research-security (last visited Feb. 18, 2025). \6\Dr. Eric Lander, Guidance for U.S. Scientific Research Security That Preserves International Collaboration, The White House: OSTP Ostp Blog (Jan. 4, 2022), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news- updates/2022/01/04/guidance-for-u-s-scientific-research-security-that- preserves-international-collaboration/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Republicans argue that institutions refuse ``to adhere to the law'' with respect to foreign influence,\7\ but this could not be further from reality. The country's leading research universities have proven they are committed to securing federally funded research and are demonstrating that commitment by constantly working to ensure compliance with foreign influence laws and regulations. In 2020, the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) conducted a survey that found institutions are consistently working to improve their disclosure policies, enhancing training around foreign security risks, and developing robust risk mitigation strategies and assessments.\8\ Further, a recent letter signed by six of the leading higher education organizations emphasized that institutions have increasingly strengthened relationships with federal research agencies and security agencies to ensure compliance and strengthen research security within foreign partnerships.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\See H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Fact Sheet, DETERRENT Act, https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 2.6.25_deterrent_act_one_pager.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2025). \8\See generally Ass'n of Am. Univ., University Actions to Address Concerns About Security Threats and Undue Foreign Government Influence on Campus, Actions Taken By Univ. To Address Sci. And Sec. Concerns 1-2 (May 19, 2020) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key- Issues/Science-Security/2020-Effective-Science-Security-Practices- Summary.pdf. \9\Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to Chair Walberg & Ranking Member Bobby Scott, U.S. H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce 1-2 (Feb. 11, 2025) (on file with H Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Minority Staff). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Federal Policies on Foreign Influence Institutions have expressed that to better address research security at institutions, intentional federal interagency coordination is essential.\10\ As described in detail below, the federal government has acted on this concern and established robust coordinated policies to ensure institutions can address undue foreign influence in a manner that is not overly duplicative or burdensome. While Committee Republicans argue the Department of Education (ED) should be leading the fight against foreign influence, this argument fails to recognize that the overwhelming majority of research funding flowing to our institutions are coming from agencies and departments other than ED. This push to centralize operations at the ED ignores the multitude of policies and initiatives within the federal government that already exist to address research security and protect institutions from undue foreign influence. Through these policies and initiatives, most of which are outside the jurisdiction of this Committee, the Biden Administration was committed to establishing one cohesive compliance process across federal agencies. The adoption of H.R. 1048 would needlessly complicate the progress the Biden Administration made. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\See generally Letter from Ass'n of Am. Univ., to Dr. Eric Lander, Assistant to the President & Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2021) https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-OSTP- Presidential-Memo-NSPM-33-093021.pdf --------------------------------------------------------------------------- OFFICE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND NSPM-33 FEDERAL GUIDANCE The White House Office for Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) advises the President on matters related to Science and Technology.\11\ OSTP coordinates with federal agencies, Congress, and external partners, including institutions, to support research, regulation, and innovation.\12\ In January 2021, President Trump issued the Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy (NSPM-33) to direct ``action to strengthen protections of United States Government-supported Research and Development against foreign government interference and exploitation.''\13\ This guidance, implemented by President Biden establishes the priorities of OSTP and other agencies involved in enforcing disclosures of funds, foreign influence, and other research security risks.\14\ NSPM-33 outlines the central priorities of enforcement on foreign influence for all institutions including: sharing awareness of risks and disclosure requirements, limiting access and vetting foreign students, and providing research to ``protect federally funded R&D from foreign government interference.''\15\ NSPM-33 plays an integral role ``in advancing American competitiveness and keeping America at the forefront of innovation and technological development.'' Through engaging with the U.S. research community, this guidance establishes robust requirements to safeguard against undue foreign influence.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\See generally Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/ (2022) (explaining that how the OSTP was established by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organizations and Priorities Act of 1976). \12\Id. Six teams that steer the recommendations through the OSTP: Climate and Environment, Energy, Health Outcomes, National Security and Science and Society, Technology. For further specifics see Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, The White House: Off. Of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, https:// bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/ (2022). \13\Exec. Off. of the President, Presidential Memorandum on United States Government: Supported Research and Development National Security Policy, Nat'l Section Presidential Memorandum 33 https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential- memorandum-united-states-government-supported-research-development- national-security-policy/ (Jan. 14, 2021) (calling on various Executive Officials to work on increasing roles, responsibilities and priorities to combat the significant influence from foreign entities on U.S. Research and Development). \14\See id. (elaborating on how the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy on the National Science and Technology Council to work as representative of their fields to develop coordinated activities for protection and outreach). \15\See generally Morgan Dwyer, Christina Ciocca Eller, & Ryan Donohue, An Update on Research Security: Streamlining Disclosure Standards to Enhance Clarity, Transparency, and Equity, The White House: OSTP Blog https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news- updates/2022/08/31/an-update-on-research-securitystreamlining- disclosure-standards-to-enhance-clarity-transparency-and-equity/ (Aug. 31, 2022) (elaborating the other priorities include, information sharing amongst agencies, reviewing funding agencies, identifying risks and conduct analysis and promoting international research and development cooperation). \16\See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHIPS AND SCIENCE ACT The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the primary agency charged with coordinating research security initiatives, since it provides the relevant prohibitions, guidance, and disclosure requirements ``around foreign talent recruitment programs and potential conflicts of interest.''\17\ NSF is required to create policies, protocols, and resources to identify and address any potential security risks to research integrity for institutions.\18\ Furthermore, the Act requires NSF to create a Research Security and Policy Office to coordinate all security policies and conduct due diligence regarding compliance with any security standards set forth.\19\ Similarly, CHIPS and Science Act requires that all institutions must annually report to NSF in any financial information associated with a foreign country of concern and directs NSF to create guardrails around foreign talent programs.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\CHIPS and Science Act, Sec. 10631, Pub. L. 117-167, 72 Stat. 1580, Aug. 9, 2022 (``Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination with the interagency working group established under . . .[23 U.S.C. 6601] . . . shall publish and widely distribute a uniform set of guidelines for federal research agencies regarding foreign talent recruitment programs.''). The CHIPS and Science Act also requires that the N.S.F. establishes an independent risk assessment center to help institutions and researchers understand and mitigate security risks. See Nat'l Sci. Found., CHIPS and Science, Nat'l Sci. Found. https://new.nsf.gov/chips (last visited Feb. 18, 2025). \18\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10331(1). \19\Id.; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security Provisions, The CHIPS And Sci. Act Of 2022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/ default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/ CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf (quoting H.R. 4346, 117th Cong. Sec. 10331 (2022)). \20\CHIPS and Science Act Sec. 10339B, 10631; See Ass'n of Am. Univs. & Ass'n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Research Security Provisions, The CHIPS And Sci. Act Of 2022 022 1 (H.R. 4346) (last updated Aug. 8, 2022) https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU- Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/ CHIPSandScienceFinalResearchSecurityProvisions.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED SINCE CONSIDERATION OF THE DETERRENT ACT IN 2023 While Republicans claim that the Biden Administration was ``crippling'' enforcement of foreign influence laws,\21\ it is evident that the Biden Administration was committed to implementing a cohesive interagency plan to combat undue foreign influence by signing robust provisions doing so into law and building upon those laws to enhance the responsibilities of federal agencies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\See Press Release, Congresswoman Michelle Steel Press Off., Steel, Foxx Bill Will Deter Foreign Adversaries' Influences in Postsecondary Education, (Oct. 11, 2023) https://steel.house.gov/media/ press-releases/steel-foxx-bill-will-deter-foreign-adversaries- influence-postsecondary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since the Committee last considered the DETERRENT Act in the 118th Congress, federal research agencies have taken significant steps to address foreign influence risks.\22\ Specifically: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\Ass'n of Am. Univ., Actions Taken to Address Foreign Security Threats, Undue Foreign Interference, and Protect Research Integrity at U.S. Universities, 4 (Feb. 2025), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/ files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/Actions-Taken-Research- Security.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In February 2024, OSTP released a memo to federal agencies requiring the use of the common disclosure form for federal research, which requires additional details on foreign affiliations, relationships, and financial interests.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\Arati Prabhakar, Director, Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, Memo for the Heads of Federal Res. Agencies, Policy Regarding Use of Common Disclosure Forms for the ``Biographical Sketch'' and the ``Current and Pending (Other) Support'' Sections of Applications by Federal Research Funding Agencies (Feb. 14, 2024), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2024/02/OSTP-Common-Disclosure-Form-Policy.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In June 2024, the NSF announced a new risk mitigation framework for assessing grant proposals for potential national security risks.\24\ The Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency (TRUST) framework created a process to evaluate and mitigate risks for both U.S. scholars and international collaborators prior to awarding federal grants. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., NSF enhances research security with new TRUST proposal assessment process (Jun. 5, 2025), https://new.nsf.gov/news/nsf-enhances-research-security-new-trust- proposal. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In July 2024, the NSF also announced a $67 million investment to establish the Safeguarding the Entire Community of the U.S. Research Ecosystem (SECURE) Center.\25\ The center is designed to communicate information to institutions on research security risks, provide training of insti

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/16