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H. Rept. 119-170

HALTING UNCERTAIN METHODS AND PRACTICES IN SUPERVISION ACT OF 2025

2025-06-25

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 3379] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3379) to amend the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Act of 1978 to require the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies to update the CAMELS Rating System, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3 Committee Consideration.......................................... 3 Related Hearings................................................. 3 Committee Votes.................................................. 4 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7 New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 7 Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 7 Earmark Statement................................................ 7 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 7 Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 8 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8 Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 8 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 9 Minority Views................................................... 19 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision Act of 2025'' or the ``HUMPS Act of 2025''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds that-- (1) CAMELS ratings (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk) are a critical tool for evaluating the safety and soundness of financial institutions, and the basis for determining significant regulatory matters such as the evaluation for mergers and acquisitions and a bank's deposit insurance premiums; (2) the CAMELS rating system relies heavily on examiner judgment, which can lead to subjective and inconsistent ratings across similar institutions; (3) establishing clear, objective measures for each CAMELS component and their relative weighting in determining composite ratings will promote fairness, consistency, and accountability in supervisory assessments; and (4) examination and supervision, as well as the CAMELS rating system, should focus on a financial institution's core financial condition or solvency. SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO THE CAMELS RATING SYSTEM. (a) In General.--The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 1012. AMENDMENTS TO THE CAMELS RATING SYSTEM. ``(a) In General.--The Council shall make recommendations to amend the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, and the CAMELS components thereunder, to-- ``(1) establish clear and objective criteria for assessing each CAMELS component; ``(2) revise the factors affecting each CAMELS component to derive a composite rating that more accurately reflects the financial condition and risk profile of the financial institutions being rated; ``(3) either-- ``(A) eliminate the management component of the CAMELS rating system; or ``(B) revise the management component of the CAMELS rating system to limit the assessment under such component to objective measures of the governance and controls used to manage an institution's risk profile; ``(4) ensure that composite ratings consider the financial institution's compliance with-- ``(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b); ``(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); ``(C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code; and ``(D) any other applicable requirements and implementing regulations relating to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing; and ``(5) ensure that composite ratings are determined based on a transparent methodology that is limited to the objective criteria established for each CAMELS component. ``(b) Rulemaking.--Not later than 12 months after the Council makes the recommendations required under subsection (a), the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies shall, jointly, issue rules to carry out the recommendations described under subsection (a). ``(c) Public Comment Period.--In issuing the rules required under subsection (b), the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies shall-- ``(1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with respect to such rules; and ``(2) provide for a public comment period of not less than 90 days. ``(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed to limit the authority of the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies to take supervisory or enforcement actions to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions.''. (b) Well Managed Definition.--Section 2(o)(9)(A) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(o)(9)(A)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``achievement of'' and all that follows through ``a CAMEL'' and inserting ``achievement of a CAMEL''; (2) by striking ``; and'' and inserting a period; and (3) by striking clause (ii).

Purpose and Summary

Introduced on May 14, 2025, by Representative Scott Fitzgerald (WI-05), H.R. 3379, the Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision (HUMPS) Act of 2025, requires the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to develop formal recommendations to revise the CAMELS rating system. Federal banking regulators would then be required to implement the recommendations through joint rulemakings.

Background and Need for Legislation

The CAMELS rating system--comprising Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk--was established by the FFIEC in 1979 as a tool for evaluating the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Despite its longstanding use, the system has been criticized for its heavy reliance on examiner judgment and subjective metrics, which can lead to inconsistent ratings across institutions of similar risk profiles. In particular, the Management component often acts as a vague ``catch-all'' that allows for supervisory downgrades based on non-material or intangible concerns. These ratings have far-reaching implications, affecting matters such as merger approvals, deposit insurance premiums, and enforcement decisions. Subjectivity in the CAMELS framework undermines transparency, accountability, and consistency in the supervisory process. The HUMPS Act seeks to address these concerns by directing regulators to adopt clear, objective standards that better reflect a financial institution's solvency and risk profile. By modernizing the rating framework, the legislation aims to improve the fairness of bank evaluations while preserving regulatory tools necessary to ensure safety and soundness.

Committee Consideration

119TH CONGRESS On May 14, 2025, Representative Fitzgerald introduced H.R. 3379, the Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision (HUMPS) Act of 2025. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. The bill was attached to the April 29, 2025, hearing titled, ``Regulatory Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity.'' On May 21, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 3379. The Committee favorably reported H.R. 3379, as amended to the House of Representatives. Related Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 3379: The Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Financial Services Committee held a hearing on April 29, 2025, entitled ``Regulatory Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity.'' A discussion draft version of the bill was considered in this hearing. The following witnesses testified: Ms. Sarah Christine Flowers, Senior Vice President, Senior Associate General Counsel, Bank Policy Institute; Mr. J. Michael Radcliffe, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Community Financial Services Bank (Benton, KY); Ms. Margaret E. Tahyar, Partner, Head of Financial Institutions Group, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP; The Honorable Graham Steele, Academic Fellow, Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Stanford Law School.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee Report to include for each record vote on a motion to report the measure or matter and on any amendments offered to the measure or matter the total number of votes for and against and the names of the Members voting for and against. On May 21, 2025, the Committee ordered H.R. 3379, as amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 29 yeas and 23 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-126). The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 3379: Representative Fitzgerald offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which clarified language related to supervisory rating factors, explicitly requiring that composite ratings consider compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing laws. The amendment also extended the deadline for issuing final reports from 60 days to 90 days. This amendment was adopted by a voice vote. Ranking Member Maxine Waters (D-CA) offered an amendment (No. 6), designated AMEND_HR3379_15. This amendment would prohibit any changes to the CAMELS rating system recommended by the FFIEC from being applied to insured depository institutions with over $1 trillion in assets or to institutions that have violated federal law or regulations in a manner that, in the aggregate, harmed one million or more consumers. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 23 yeas and 29 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC- 125). Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 3379 is to establish objective, quantifiable criteria for each CAMELS component, revise the weighting methodology to better reflect actual risk, and either eliminate or narrow the scope of the Management component. Committee Cost Estimate Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 3379. The Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been prepared. New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, a cost estimate was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Unfunded Mandates Statement The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The Committee will adopt the estimate once it has been prepared by the Director. Earmark Statement With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the resolution and states that the provisions of the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to the Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title This section designates the short title as the ``Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision Act of 2025'' or the ``HUMPS Act of 2025''. Section 2. Findings This section provides congressional findings, including: The CAMELS ratings system (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk) is a critical tool used to assess the safety and soundness of financial institutions and to inform significant regulatory decisions such as mergers, acquisitions deposit insurance premiums; CAMELS ratings depend heavily on examiner discretion, which can result in subjective and inconsistent ratings across similar institutions; Establishing clear, objective measures for each CAMELS component and their relative weighting in determining composite ratings will promote fairness, consistency, and accountability in supervisory assessments; and Examination and supervision, as well as the CAMELS rating system, should focus on a financial institution's core financial condition or solvency. Section 3. Amendments to the Camels Rating System This section amends the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Act of 1978 to require the Council to recommend updates to the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System and the CAMELS components. These updates must: Establish clear and objective criteria for assessing each CAMELS component; Revise the factors used to assess each component to more accurately reflect an institution's financial condition and risk profile; Either eliminate the management component or revise it to focus solely on objective measures of governance and risk controls; Ensure the composite ratings account for compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) laws, including section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508, subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, U.S. Code; and Ensure that the overall rating methodology is transparent and based exclusively on objective criteria. This section also requires that the federal financial regulators jointly issue implementing rules within 12 months of the Council's recommendations and provide for a public comment period of at least 90 days. This section clarifies that nothing in the Act limits regulators' authority to take supervisory or enforcement actions to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL ACT OF 1978 * * * * * * * SEC. 1012. AMENDMENTS TO THE CAMELS RATING SYSTEM. (a) In General.--The Council shall make recommendations to amend the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, and the CAMELS components thereunder, to-- (1) establish clear and objective criteria for assessing each CAMELS component; (2) revise the factors affecting each CAMELS component to derive a composite rating that more accurately reflects the financial condition and risk profile of the financial institutions being rated; (3) either-- (A) eliminate the management component of the CAMELS rating system; or (B) revise the management component of the CAMELS rating system to limit the assessment under such component to objective measures of the governance and controls used to manage an institution's risk profile; (4) ensure that composite ratings consider the financial institution's compliance with-- (A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b); (B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); (C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code; and (D) any other applicable requirements and implementing regulations relating to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing; and (5) ensure that composite ratings are determined based on a transparent methodology that is limited to the objective criteria established for each CAMELS component. (b) Rulemaking.--Not later than 12 months after the Council makes the recommendations required under subsection (a), the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies shall, jointly, issue rules to carry out the recommendations described under subsection (a). (c) Public Comment Period.--In issuing the rules required under subsection (b), the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies shall-- (1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with respect to such rules; and (2) provide for a public comment period of not less than 90 days. (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed to limit the authority of the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies to take supervisory or enforcement actions to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions. ---------- BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956 * * * * * * * definitions Sec. 2. (a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection, ``bank holding company'' means any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Act. (2) Any company has control over a bank or over any company if-- (A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company; (B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or (C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company. (3) For the purposes of any proceeding under paragraph (2)(C) of this subsection, there is a presumption that any company which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote less than 5 per centum of any class of voting securities of a given bank or company does not have control over that bank or company. (4) In any administrative or judicial proceeding under this Act, other than a proceeding under paragraph (2)(C) of this subsection, a company may not be held to have had control over any given bank or company at any given time unless that company, at the time in question, directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or had power to vote 5 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company, or had already been found to have control in a proceeding under paragraph (2)(C). (5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection-- (A) No bank and no company owning or controlling voting shares of a bank is a bank holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of shares in a fiduciary capacity, except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (g) of this section. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, bank shares shall not be deemed to have been acquired in a fiduciary capacity if the acquiring bank or company has sole discretionary authority to exercise voting rights with respect thereto; except that this limitation is applicable in the case of a bank or company acquiring such shares prior to the date of enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 only if the bank or company has the right consistent with its obligations under the instrument, agreement, or other arrangement establishing the fiduciary relationship to divest itself of such voting rights and fails to exercise that right to divest within a reasonable period not to exceed one year after the date of enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970. (B) No company is a bank holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of shares acquired by it in connection with its underwriting of securities if such shares are held only for such period of time as will permit the sale thereof on a reasonable basis. (C) No company formed for the sole purpose of participating in a proxy solicitation is a bank holding company by virtue of its control of voting rights of shares acquired in the course of such solicitation. (D) No company is a bank holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of shares acquired in securing or collecting a debt previously contracted in good faith, until two years after the date of acquisition. The Board is authorized upon application by a company to extend, from time to time for not more than one year at a time, the two-year period referred to herein for disposing of any shares acquired by a company in the regular course of securing or collecting a debt previously contracted in good faith, if, in the Board's judgment, such an extension would not be detrimental to the public interest, but no such extension shall in the aggregate exceed three years. (E) No company is a bank holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of any State-chartered bank or trust company which-- (i) is wholly owned by 1 or more thrift institutions or savings banks; and (ii) is restricted to accepting-- (I) deposits from thrift institutions or savings banks; (II) deposits arising out of the corporate business of the thrift institutions or savings banks that own the bank or trust company; or (III) deposits of public moneys. (F) No trust company or mutual savings bank which is an insured bank under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act is a bank holding company by virtue of its direct or indirect ownership or control of one bank located in the same State, if (i) such ownership or control existed on the date of enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and is specifically authorized by applicable State law, and (ii) the trust company or mutual savings bank does not after that date acquire an interest in any company that, together with any other interest it holds in that company, will exceed 5 per centum of any class of the voting shares of that company, except that this limitation shall not be applicable to investments of the trust company or mutual savings bank, direct and indirect, which are otherwise in accordance with the limitations applicable to national banks under section 5136 of the Revised Statutes. (12 U.S.C. 24) (6) For the purposes of this Act, any successor to a bank holding company shall be deemed to be a bank holding company from the date on which the predecessor company became a bank holding company. (b) ``Company'' means any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or similar organization, or any other trust unless by its terms it must terminate within twenty-five years or not later than twenty-one years and ten months after the death of individuals living on the effective date of the trust, but shall not include any corporation the majority of the shares of which are owned by the United States or by any State, and shall not include a qualified family partnership. ``Company covered in 1970'' means a company which becomes a bank holding company as a result of the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and which would have been a bank holding company on June 30, 1968, if those amendments had been enacted on that date. (c) Bank Defined.--For purposes of this Act-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the term ``bank'' means any of the following: (A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. (B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands which both-- (i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and (ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans. (2) Exceptions.--The term ``bank'' does not include any of the following:

Minority Views

This bill, previously referred to as CAMELS Rating Modernization Act, would require the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to develop recommendations and modify their implementation of the CAMELS ratings framework, where depository institutions are given composite and component exam ratings for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk (CAMELS).\1\ In doing so, regulators would either have to eliminate the management component or limit its use. The bill also eliminates the consideration of management with respect to certain provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, including with respect to acquiring other banks and expanding the bank's financial activities. This will significantly diminish the ability to hold bank management accountable for their actions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The ABCs of CAMELS (Jul. 23, 2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While large banks argue the management component is too subjective, being able to fully assess the adequacy of a bank's management capabilities, especially of a large, complex entity that enjoys several Federal benefits (deposit insurance, access to Fed discount window, access to Fed payment systems, etc.) has always been key to the safe and sound operation of a bank. Moreover, it is difficult for Congress or the public to assess whether bank examiners are being fair and consistent with the ratings they give for management or any aspect of the CAMELS ratings since these are confidential supervisory information. To improve accountability, some have proposed publicly releasing CAMELS ratings, including on a delay.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\See Aaron Klein, Why bank regulators should make their secret ratings public, Brookings (Feb. 27, 2020); Karen Petrou, Make Camels Ratings Public Already, American Banker (May 17, 2016); FSC, In Advance of Wells Fargo Hearings, Waters and Green Release Investigative Report Exposing Failures of Megabank's Management, Board, and Regulators (Mar. 4, 2020). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the aftermath of Silicon Valley Bank's failure in 2023 that required regulators to invoke the systemic risk exception to prevent contagion from spreading into a larger financial crisis, the GAO conducted a review of the regulator's supervision of the bank at the request of former Chairman McHenry and Ranking Member Waters.\3\ GAO found that Fed examiners gave SVB many ``2'' ratings between 2018-2022, but by 2022, examiners gave the bank a ``3'' rating for mismanagement.\4\ GAO and others found that these problems should have been escalated faster to ensure the bank promptly addressed its management failures.\5\ If this bill were in place before then, examiners may have downplayed management problems if they focused exclusively on quantifiable data. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\GAO, Bank Regulation: Preliminary Review of Agency Actions Related to March 2023 Bank Failures (Apr. 28, 2023). \4\Id. \5\GAO, Bank Supervision: More Timely Escalation of Supervisory Action Needed (Mar. 6, 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Consumer groups like Americans for Financial Reform (AFR) and Public Citizen are opposed to the bill. Moreover, a former Treasury official expressed strong concerns in recent testimony, saying ``A bank's managerial character and capacity has long been a foundational basis for evaluating whether a bank is worthy of receiving a charter or federal deposit insurance. . . . These factors may not be precisely quantifiable in the way a bank's capital ratio can be calculated, but we have seen time and again that public perception and confidence and sound management affect the stability of banks and the entire banking system . . .''\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Testimony of The Honorable Graham Steele, former Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions before FSC hearing entitled, ``Regulatory Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity'' (Apr. 29, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the debate, Ranking Member Waters offered an amendment to exempt megabanks over $1 trillion that a Federal regulator found in the past 10 years that the bank violated a federal law or regulation, and that they found the bank harmed more than 1 million consumers. This would ensure large banks like Wells Fargo, for example, that have been found to have repeatedly mismanaged their operations and repeatedly violated the law, resulting in extensive consumer harm, would continue to have their management scrutinized by bank regulators. This amendment was rejected by Republicans. For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 3379. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member. Nydia M. Velazquez, Stephen F. Lynch, Al Green, Emanuel Cleaver, II, Bill Foster, Joyce Beatty, Juan Vargas, Rashida Tlaib, Sylvia R. Garcia, Nikema Williams, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/170