Purpose and Summary
H.R. 2659, the ``Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against
State-Sponsored Threats Act,'' directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in
consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the heads of
appropriate Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs), to
establish an interagency task force to facilitate coordination
to respond to the cybersecurity threat posed by state-sponsored
cyber actors of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Additionally, over a six-year period, the task force will be
required to submit an annual report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the targeting of United States
critical infrastructure by PRC state-sponsored cyber actors.
Background and Need for Legislation
In recent years, the PRC has significantly escalated its
malicious cyber operations targeting the United States. Whether
it is compromising power grids or water systems, infiltrating
telecommunications infrastructure, or probing vulnerabilities
in financial networks, the PRC's state-sponsored cyber
operations continue to pose a direct threat to U.S. national
security.\1\ The PRC's state-sponsored cyber actors, including
Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, have not only refined their
techniques but have also broadened their objectives,
encompassing intelligence gathering, economic espionage, and
the capability to conduct damaging cyberattacks in times of
geopolitical tension.\2\
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\1\Max Colchester and Daniel Michaels, ``Scale of Chinese Spying
Overwhelms Western Governments,'' WSJ, (Oct. 14, 2024), https://
www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/scale-of-chinese-
spying-overwhelms-western-governments-
6ae644d2?mod=china_more_article_pos1.
\2\Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
CCP Cyber Threat to the American Homeland and National Security.
Testimony before the House Select Committee on China, (Jan. 24, 2024).
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Despite widespread recognition of the threat posed by PRC
state-sponsored cyber actors, the U.S. government's response
has been fragmented and ultimately insufficient. Federal
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
CISA, and the FBI have all made efforts to detect and mitigate
the impacts of these cyber operations, but they continue to
operate in silos. These agencies have often lacked the
resources and coordination necessary to fully understand the
scope of the threat, share intelligence in real-time, and
deploy effective countermeasures. The disjointed nature of
these efforts has enabled PRC-sponsored cyber actors to go
undetected for extended periods or, when detected, has
exploited bureaucratic inefficiencies to evade meaningful
consequences.
For instance, the PRC state-sponsored cyber actor known as
Volt Typhoon has specialized in stealthy, long-term espionage
operations that target key critical infrastructure sectors such
as energy, telecommunications, transportation, and water
systems. Volt Typhoon uses ``living off the land'' techniques,
which has enabled the threat actor to go undetected within U.S.
critical infrastructure systems for multiple years.\3\
Additionally, Volt Typhoon has pre-positioned itself to move
laterally--and easily--between information technology (IT) and
operational technology (OT) networks to cause disruption in the
event of a conflict with the United States.\4\
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\3\CISA. PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain
Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Cybersecurity
Advisory (Feb. 07, 2024), https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/
cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a.
\4\Id.
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Volt Typhoon's success to date is due in part to the vast
and interconnected nature of U.S. networks, and vulnerabilities
inherent in often outdated infrastructure. Today, most U.S.
critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the private
sector, meaning strong public-private partnerships are
imperative for ensuring its resiliency.\5\ This creates
challenges for coordinating an effective U.S. government
response. Given the number of government stakeholders that are
involved--including CISA, the FBI, the intelligence community,
and SRMAs--the U.S. government must streamline its own
information sharing to work effectively with private sector
owners and operators.
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\5\Tina Won Sherman, Director, Homeland Security and Justice.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Actions Urgently Needed to
Better Protect the Nation's Critical Infrastructure. Testimony before
the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Innovation, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,
(Apr. 06, 2022).
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Whether dealing with Volt Typhoon or other PRC state-
sponsored cyber actors, the U.S. response has been largely
reactive, which is insufficient for confronting persistent and
well-resourced PRC state-sponsored cyber operations. Given the
magnitude of the PRC cyber threat, there is an urgent need for
legislation that establishes an interagency task force
dedicated solely to addressing the activities of PRC state-
sponsored cyber actors. Such a task force would provide the
structure and authority necessary to coordinate a comprehensive
U.S. response. By bringing together representatives from CISA,
the FBI, and other relevant entities, the task force would
ensure that intelligence is shared effectively, vulnerabilities
are identified and mitigated, and proactive strategies are
developed to protect U.S. interests.
To ensure accountability and transparency, the task force
would be required to submit an annual, comprehensive report to
the appropriate congressional committees. This report will
provide detailed information on the targeting of U.S. critical
infrastructure by PRC cyber actors, including data on the
number of incidents, the sectors affected, and the nature of
the attacks. Additionally, the report will outline the steps
taken by the task force to mitigate these threats, as well as
any challenges or obstacles encountered. By mandating this
annual report, Congress will ensure that the task force remains
focused on its mission, while also providing lawmakers with the
information necessary to adapt and refine U.S. cybersecurity
policy in response to the evolving threat landscape.
The annual report would also serve as a critical tool for
enhancing public awareness of the threat posed by PRC cyber
actors. While much of the task force's work would remain
classified, the report will include unclassified sections that
inform the American public and private sector stakeholders
about the risks to U.S. critical infrastructure and the steps
taken to address them. This would promote greater collaboration
between the government and the private sector.
Hearings
The Committee held the following hearing in the 119th
Congress that informed H.R. 2659:
On January 22, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security
held a hearing entitled, ``Unconstrained Actors: Assessing
Global Cyber Threats to the Homeland.'' Members heard testimony
from the following witnesses: Mr. Adam Meyers, Senior Vice
President of Counter Adversary Operations, CrowdStrike; Rear
Admiral Mark Montgomery, USN, (ret.), Senior Director of the
Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies; Mr. Brandon Wales, Vice President of
Cybersecurity Strategy, SentinelOne; and Ms. Kemba Walden,
President, Paladin Global Institute, who testified as a private
citizen.
Committee Consideration
The Committee met on Wednesday, April 9, 2025, a quorum
being present, to consider H.R. 2659 and ordered the measure to
be favorably reported to the House.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and
amendments thereto.
No recorded votes were requested during consideration of
H.R. 2659.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY,
ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 2659 would establish an interagency task force to
detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity threats from
state-sponsored actors. Under the bill, the task force would
publish a list of federal resources available to help safeguard
information technology systems at critical infrastructure
facilities. The bill also would require the task force to
report annually to the Congress on its findings and actions.
The task force would consist of representatives from
federal agencies, including the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Using information about the cost of similar
efforts, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2659 would cost
$5 million over the 2025-2030 period for staff salaries,
travel, and other administrative expenses to operate the task
force; satisfying the reporting requirements would cost less
than $500,000. Such spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
The costs of the legislation, detailed in Table 1, fall
within budget function 050 (national defense).
TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 2659
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By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
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2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2025-2030
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Estimated Authorization........................ * 1 1 1 1 1 5
Estimated Outlays.............................. * 1 1 1 1 1 5
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* = between zero and $500,000.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi.
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 2659 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 2659 is to ensure the security and integrity of United
States critical infrastructure by establishing an interagency
task force and requiring a comprehensive report on the
targeting of United States critical infrastructure by People's
Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for other
purposes.
CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED
TARIFF BENEFITS
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that H.R. 2659 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section states that the Act may be cited as the
``Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored
Threats Act.''
Section 2. Interagency task force and report on the targeting of
United States Critical Infrastructure by People's Republic of
China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security,
acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the
Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the heads of
appropriate SRMAs, to establish an interagency task force to
facilitate collaboration and coordination among the SRMA's to
detect, analyze, and respond to the cybersecurity threat posed
by state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Typhoon, of the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
Furthermore, this section designates the Director of CISA
as the chair of the task force and the FBI Director as the
vice-chair. The task force will be composed of representatives
from relevant federal departments and agencies. Representatives
must possess subject matter expertise in areas such as
cybersecurity, digital forensics, threat intelligence analysis,
and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) commonly
used by PRC state-sponsored actors like Volt Typhoon and Salt
Typhoon.
To prevent redundancy, this section provides flexibility
for the task force to coordinate with existing groups or
efforts that have already examined or responded to similar
cybersecurity threats. This ensures that resources are
efficiently allocated, and that duplication of efforts is
minimized.
Under this section, the task force is also required to
report its findings to Congress. The initial report must be
submitted within 540 days of the task force's establishment,
with annual reports to follow for the next five years. These
reports will assess sector-specific risks, identify trends in
cyber incidents, and provide insights into the TTPs used by
state-sponsored actors. The reports will also address the
potential impact on U.S. critical infrastructure and provide
recommendations for improving defenses against these threats.
Some portions of the reports, especially those related to
sensitive intelligence, will be classified. However, each
report will include an unclassified executive summary that will
be publicly available on the Department of Homeland Security's
website.
In addition to regular reports, the task force is required
to deliver classified briefings to Congress within 30 days of
each report submission. These briefings will allow for deeper
discussion on the task force's findings and recommendations.
This section clarifies that the task force will exist only
as long as necessary to fulfill its purpose. It will terminate
60 days after delivering its final classified briefing to
Congress. This ensures that the task force remains focused and
does not become a permanent entity. Importantly, the task force
is exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and
the Paperwork Reduction Act, allowing it to operate with
greater flexibility and without procedural delays.
Finally, this section provides clear definitions of key
terms, such as ``critical infrastructure,'' and ``cybersecurity
threat,'' among others. These definitions are intended to align
with existing legal frameworks and provide clarity for how the
task force should operate.
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