Committee Consideration
119TH CONGRESS
On May 19, 2025, Representative Barr introduced H.R. 3484,
the Business Owners Protection Act of 2025, with
Representatives Tom Emmer (R-MN), Bruce Westerman (R-AR), and
Ashley Hinson (R-IA) as original cosponsors. Representatives
Richard Hudson (R-NC), Michael Baumgartner (R-WA), Roger
Williams (R-TX), and Pete Sessions (R-TX) were added
subsequently as cosponsors. The bill was referred solely to the
Committee on Financial Services. In addition, Senator Pete
Ricketts (R-NE) introduced S. 1806, a companion bill to H.R.
3484, on May 19, 2025, with Senator John Curtis (R-UT) as an
original cosponsor. Senators Jim Banks (R-IN) and Tom Cotton
(R-AR) were subsequently added as cosponsors. This bill was
referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
H.R. 3484 was attached to the July 15, 2025, hearing titled
``Dodd-Frank Turns 15: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead.''
On September 16, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services
met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 3484. The
Committee ordered H.R. 3484, as amended, to be favorably
reported to the House of Representatives.
Related Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to
develop H.R. 3484:
The Committee on Financial Services held a July 15, 2025,
hearing titled ``Dodd-Frank Turns 15: Lessons Learned and the
Road Ahead.'' H.R. 3484 was noticed for legislative
consideration in the hearing. The Committee heard testimony
from the following witnesses: The Honorable Ken Bentsen,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association; Mrs. Lindsey Johnson, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Bankers Association; Mr.
Tom Quaadman, Chief of Government Affairs and Public Policy,
Investment Company Institute; Dr. Paul Kupiec, Senior Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute; and Mr. Dennis Kelleher, Co-
Founder, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Better
Markets.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto.
On September 16, 2025, the Committee ordered H.R. 3484, as
amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded
vote of 26 yeas and 24 nays, a quorum being present. (Record
Vote No. FC-196).
Before the question to report was called, Representative
Barr offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute,
designated BARR_081, which repeals certain unused authority to
restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, removes certain
authority to perpetually consider more rules and obligations on
financial professionals, and repeals certain unused authority
to impose a uniform fiduciary standard on broker dealers and
investment advisers. The amendment was adopted by voice vote.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 3484 is to reduce
regulatory burden by eliminating discretionary powers that have
not been actively used, thereby providing more regulatory
clarity and flexibility for businesses.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 3484. The
Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However,
pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own
the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office once it has been prepared.
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as
its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director
of the Congressional Budget Office. However, a cost estimate
was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing
of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its
receipt by the Committee.
Unfunded Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the
Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause
such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon
its receipt by the Committee.
Earmark Statement
In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides the short title is the ``Business Owners
Protection Act of 2025.''
Section 2. Repeal of certain unused authority to restrict mandatory
predispute arbitration
Section 2 amends the Exchange Act to repeal Section 15(o),
which granted the SEC authority to limit or ban mandatory
predispute arbitration clauses in broker-dealer agreements and
strikes a related provision from Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank
Act.
Section 3. Removal of certain authority related to fiduciary duties
Section 3 eliminates SEC authority under Section 15(l) of
the Exchange Act and Section 211(h) of the Advisers Act to
consider imposing additional obligations on broker-dealers and
investment advisers.
Section 4. Repeal of certain unused authority related to standards of
conduct
Section 4 repeals the second subsection (k) of Section 15
of the Exchange Act, which was added by the Dodd-Frank Act,
authorizing the SEC to impose a uniform fiduciary standard of
conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when
providing personalized investment advice.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES
* * * * * * *
registration and regulation of brokers and dealers
Sec. 15. (a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer
which is either a person other than a natural person or a
natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is
a person other than a natural person (other than such a broker
or dealer whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does
not make use of any facility of a national securities exchange)
to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce
or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security
(other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances, or commercial bills) unless such broker or dealer
is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section.
(2) The Commission, by rule or order, as it deems consistent
with the public interest and the protection of investors, may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt from paragraph (1) of
this subsection any broker or dealer or class of brokers or
dealers specified in such rule or order.
(b)(1) A broker or dealer may be registered by filing with
the Commission an application for registration in such form and
containing such information and documents concerning such
broker or dealer and any persons associated with such broker or
dealer as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. Within forty-five days of the date of the filing of
such application (or within such longer period as to which the
applicant consents), the Commission shall--
(A) by order grant registration, or
(B) institute proceedings to determine whether
registration should be denied. Such proceedings shall
include notice of the grounds for denial under
consideration and opportunity for hearing and shall be
concluded within one hundred twenty days of the date of
the filing of the application for registration. At the
conclusion of such proceedings, the Commission, by
order, shall grant or deny such registration. The
Commission may extend the time for conclusion of such
proceedings for up to ninety days if it finds good
cause for such extension and publishes its reasons for
so finding or for such longer period as to which the
applicant consents.
The Commission shall grant such registration if the Commission
finds that the requirements of this section are satisfied. The
order granting registration shall not be effective until such
broker or dealer has become a member of a registered securities
association, or until such broker or dealer has become a member
of a national securities exchange, if such broker or dealer
effects transactions solely on that exchange, unless the
Commission has exempted such broker or dealer, by rule or
order, from such membership. The Commission shall deny such
registration if it does not make such a finding or if it finds
that if the applicant were so registered, its registration
would be subject to suspension or revocation under paragraph
(4) of this subsection.
(2)(A) An application for registration of a broker or dealer
to be formed or organized may be made by a broker or dealer to
which the broker or dealer to be formed or organized is to be
the successor. Such application, in such form as the
Commission, by rule, may prescribe, shall contain such
information and documents concerning the applicant, the
successor, and any persons associated with the applicant or the
successor, as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. The grant or denial of registration to
such an applicant shall be in accordance with the procedures
set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection. If the
Commission grants such registration, the registration shall
terminate on the forty-fifth day after the effective date
thereof, unless prior thereto the successor shall, in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe, adopt the application for registration as its
own.
(B) Any person who is a broker or dealer solely by reason of
acting as a municipal securities dealer or municipal securities
broker, who so acts through a separately identifiable
department or division, and who so acted in such a manner on
the date of enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, may, in accordance with such terms and conditions as the
Commission, by rule, prescribes as necessary and appropriate in
the public interest and for the protection of investors,
register such separately identifiable department or division in
accordance with this subsection. If any such department or
division is so registered, the department or division and not
such person himself shall be the broker or dealer for purposes
of this title.
(C) Within six months of the date of the granting of
registration to a broker or dealer, the Commission, or upon the
authorization and direction of the Commission, a registered
securities association or national securities exchange of which
such broker or dealer is a member, shall conduct an inspection
of the broker or dealer to determine whether it is operating in
conformity with the provisions of this title and the rules and
regulations thereunder: Provided, however, That the Commission
may delay such inspection of any class of brokers or dealers
for a period not to exceed six months.
(3) Any provision of this title (other than section 5 and
subsection (a) of this section) which prohibits any act,
practice, or course of business if the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce is used in connection
therewith shall also prohibit any such act, practice, or course
of business by any registered broker or dealer or any person
acting on behalf of such a broker or dealer, irrespective of
any use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce in connection therewith.
(4) The Commission, by order, shall censure, place
limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of,
suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the
registration of any broker or dealer if it finds, on the record
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such censure,
placing of limitations, suspension, or revocation is in the
public interest and that such broker or dealer, whether prior
or subsequent to becoming such, or any person associated with
such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming
so associated--
(A) has willfully made or caused to be made in any
application for registration or report required to be
filed with the Commission or with any other appropriate
regulatory agency under this title, or in any
proceeding before the Commission with respect to
registration, any statement which was at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or has omitted to state in any such application
or report any material fact which is required to be
stated therein.
(B) has been convicted within ten years preceding the
filing of any application for registration or at any
time thereafter of any felony or misdemeanor or of a
substantially equivalent crime by a foreign court of
competent jurisdiction which the Commission finds--
(i) involves the purchase or sale of any
security, the taking of a false oath, the
making of a false report, bribery, perjury,
burglary, any substantially equivalent activity
however denominated by the laws of the relevant
foreign government, or conspiracy to commit any
such offense;
(ii) arises out of the conduct of the
business of a broker, dealer, municipal
securities dealer municipal advisor,,
government securities broker, government
securities dealer, investment adviser, bank,
insurance company, fiduciary, transfer agent,
nationally recognized statistical rating
organization, foreign person performing a
function substantially equivalent to any of the
above, or entity or person required to be
registered under the Commodity Exchange Act (7
U.S.C. 1 et seq.) or any substantially
equivalent foreign statute or regulation;
(iii) involves the larceny, theft, robbery,
extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraudulent
concealment, embezzlement, fraudulent
conversion, or misappropriation of funds, or
securities, or substantially equivalent
activity however denominated by the laws of the
relevant foreign government; or
(iv) involves the violation of section 152,
1341, 1342, or 1343 or chapter 25 or 47 of
title 18, United States Code, or a violation of
a substantially equivalent foreign statute.
(C) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order,
judgment, or decree of any court of competent
jurisdiction from acting as an investment adviser,
underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer municipal advisor,, government securities
broker, government securities dealer, security-based
swap dealer, major security-based swap participant,
transfer agent, nationally recognized statistical
rating organization, foreign person performing a
function substantially equivalent to any of the above,
or entity or person required to be registered under the
Commodity Exchange Act or any substantially equivalent
foreign statute or regulation, or as an affiliated
person or employee of any investment company, bank,
insurance company, foreign entity substantially
equivalent to any of the above, or entity or person
required to be registered under the Commodity Exchange
Act or any substantially equivalent foreign statute or
regulation, or from engaging in or continuing any
conduct or practice in connection with any such
activity, or in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
(D) has willfully violated any provision of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Commodity
Exchange Act, this title, the rules or regulations
under any of such statutes, or the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or is unable to
comply with any such provision.
(E) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any
other person of any provision of the Securities Act of
1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, the Commodity Exchange
Act, this title, the rules or regulations under any of
such statutes, or the rules of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the
provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations,
another person who commits such a violation, if such
other person is subject to his supervision. For the
purposes of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be
deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other
person, if--
(i) there have been established procedures,
and a system for applying such procedures,
which would reasonably be expected to prevent
and detect, insofar as practicable, any such
violation by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged
the duties and obligations incumbent upon him
by reason of such procedures and system without
reasonable cause to believe that such
procedures and system were not being complied
with.
(F) is subject to any order of the Commission barring
or suspending the right of the person to be associated
with a broker, dealer, security-based swap dealer, or a
major security-based swap participant;
(G) has been found by a foreign financial regulatory
authority to have--
(i) made or caused to be made in any
application for registration or report required
to be filed with a foreign financial regulatory
authority, or in any proceeding before a
foreign financial regulatory authority with
respect to registration, any statement that was
at the time and in the li
Minority Views
H.R. 3484 would repeal two key investor protection
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: (1) the SEC's authority to
hold broker-dealers to the same fiduciary standard as
investment advisers (Section 913(g)); and (2) rescind the SEC's
authority to prohibit forced arbitration clauses that prevent
clients of broker-dealers or investment advisers from accessing
the courts (Section 921).
A documented weakness\1\ in the regulatory framework that
regulates the provision of personalized investment advice in
the U.S. is the inconsistent legal standard of care between
investment advisers and broker-dealers:
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\1\SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan.
2011).
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Investment Advisers are bound by a fiduciary duty
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This
standard legally requires investment advisers to act
with undivided loyalty and in the client's best
interest at all times.
Broker-Dealers are held to a lower ``suitability''
standard, requiring only that a recommended investment
be suitable for a client's financial situation, but not
necessarily that it is the best possible option.
This disparity creates significant, quantifiable harm. As
the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) has long argued, most
retail investors do not understand this nuanced legal
distinction and reasonably assume that any professional
providing financial advice must act in their best interest.\2\
This confusion is exploited when brokers recommend products
that are merely suitable for their clients but carry higher
fees or commissions, which directly benefit the broker at the
investor's expense.\3\ This conflict of interest results in a
multi-billion-dollar annual wealth transfer from American
households to financial intermediaries, severely eroding
retirement savings over time. The CFA Institute, an
organization of investment professionals, has also advocated
for a universal fiduciary standard to bolster professionalism
and trust in the industry.
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\2\CFA, Survey: Vast Majority of U.S. Investors Support Clear
``Fiduciary Standard'' for Financial Professionals, Widespread
Confusion Seen Linked to Current SEC Rules (Sept. 15, 2010).
\3\Executive Office of the President of the United States, The
Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings (Sept.
15, 2015).
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The broker dealer industry has suggested that Regulation
Best Interest (Reg BI) solved this.\4\ However, Better Markets,
a consumer and investor watchdog organization, and others, have
argued that Reg BI largely re-labels suitability and overly
relies on disclosure rather than imposing a clear, enforceable
best-interest obligation that subordinates the seller's
incentives to the investor's needs--contrary to Dodd-Frank's
Sec. 913 spirit.\5\ The law's namesakes, Senator Dodd and
Representative Frank, warned that Reg BI fell short of Sec.
913(g)'s directive for a uniform fiduciary standard.\6\ Section
913 of the Dodd-Frank Act was the specific remedy for this
problem. It granted the SEC the clear authority to harmonize
these confusing standards and create a single, high-level
fiduciary duty for all personalized retail investment advice.
Section 3 of the ``Business Owners Protection Act of 2025''
would repeal this authority, thereby cementing the harmful two-
tiered system and removing the SEC's most effective tool for
addressing conflicted advice.
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\4\See, SIFMA Testimony Before House Financial Services Committee,
July 15, 2025, available at https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/
2025/07/Bentsen-HFSC-written-testimony-final-July-2025.pdf.
\5\Better Markets Comment Letter, Proposed Rule, Regulation Best
Interest, File Number S7-07-18 (Aug. 7, 2018).
\6\WealthManagement.com, Dodd, Frank Take a Stand Against the SEC's
Reg Bi (Jan. 7, 2020).
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The second major harm caused by this bill is the repeal of
SEC's authority to address the pervasive use of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in investor account agreements.
These clauses force investors to waive their constitutional
right to a trial by jury as a condition of opening an account.
As organizations like the Public Investors Advocate Bar
Association (PIABA) and the American Association for Justice
(AAJ), and other investor advocates have documented
extensively, the FINRA-run arbitration forum has structural
deficiencies that can disadvantage investors, and called on the
SEC to implement Sec. 921.\7\ Brokerage firms possess a
``repeat player'' advantage, as they are frequently involved in
arbitration and are familiar with the arbitrators and
procedures, unlike an individual investor who is likely a one-
time participant. Furthermore, discovery is limited compared to
a court of law, making it harder for an investor to prove
wrongdoing. The grounds for appealing an arbitrator's decision
are nearly non-existent, rendering flawed decisions final. This
private, opaque system also prevents public accountability. As
Better Markets often notes, court proceedings create a public
record that can expose patterns of fraud and deter future
misconduct.\8\ Arbitration keeps these disputes out of the
public eye, allowing systemic problems at financial firms to
fester without regulatory or public scrutiny.\9\
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\7\American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), Americans for Financial Reform, Better Markets, Center for
Justice & Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumers for Auto Reliability
and Safety, Consumer Watchdog, Earthjustice, Essential Information,
Impact Fund, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National
Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low income clients), National
Employment Law Project, People's Parity Project, Public Citizen, Public
Justice, Revolving Door Project, Critical Need for Rulemaking to
Prohibit Forced Arbitration (Jan. 31, 2024).
\8\See Better Markets, The Dirty Dozen--Why Mandatory Arbitration
is Unfair (Oct. 11, 2017); Better Markets, Forced Arbitration: Taking
Away Your Rights and Your Money (June 11, 2019).
\9\Id.
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Section 921 of the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the SEC to
address this by granting it the authority to prohibit or place
conditions on the use of forced arbitration clauses if it
deemed such action to be in the public interest. While the SEC
has not yet fully implemented this authority, it remains a
critical tool. Section 2 of the proposed bill would repeal this
authority entirely, ensuring that investors remain trapped in a
binding dispute resolution system that is widely seen as unfair
and biased in favor of the financial industry. This removes the
possibility of future reform at a time when the SEC has
announced its plans to move investor lawsuits from the courts
to the more secretive, pro-issuer venue of arbitration at the
expense of investors.\10\
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\10\SEC, Open Meeting Agenda, (Sept. 10, 2025) (announcing an open
meeting to address ``Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration
Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions'').
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The bill's flaw lies in its arbitrary assumption that
unused authority equals unnecessary authority. These
authorities serve critical functions even when dormant: their
very existence creates voluntary compliance and industry self-
improvement. Congress intentionally granted this flexible
toolkit so the SEC could respond to emerging threats. By
removing critical regulatory authorities as securities markets
become increasingly complex and dynamic, the legislation
handcuffs the primary agency responsible for protecting
American investors and maintaining market integrity.
The following groups have called on the SEC to implement
Sec. 921, and will likely strongly oppose efforts to repeal the
authority: American Association for Justice (AAJ), Americans
for Financial Reform, Better Markets, Center for Justice &
Democracy, Consumer Action, Consumers for Auto Reliability and
Safety, Consumer Watchdog, Earthjustice, Essential Information,
Impact Fund, National Association of Consumer Advocates,
National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low income
clients), National Employment Law Project, People's Parity
Project, PIABA, Public Citizen, Public Justice, and the
Revolving Door Project.
At a Financial Services Committee markup held September
16th, 2026, Committee Democrats voted unanimously against H.R.
3484.\11\
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\11\U.S. House Committee Repository, Markup of Various Measures
(Sep. 16, 2025).
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For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 3484.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Al Green,
Joyce Beatty,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Members of Congress.
[all]