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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-377

PROTECTING INFORMATION BY LOCAL LEADERS FOR AGENCY RESILIENCE ACT

2025-11-12

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 5078, the ``Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience Act'' or ``PILLAR Act,'' reauthorizes and updates the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The SLCGP focuses on strengthening the cybersecurity and resilience of state, local, and territorial (SLT) governments' information systems and operational technology systems, including those that use artificial intelligence. The SLCGP enables DHS to support targeted cybersecurity investments to improve the capabilities of SLT government agencies that are oftentimes at the frontlines of U.S. cyber defense.

Background and Need for Legislation

Like Federal agencies, state and local governments are rich targets for cyber adversaries given the volume of sensitive personal data they house and the high cost that service disruptions and system failures would impose. However, state and local agencies often have far fewer resources and cybersecurity personnel than their Federal counterparts or similarly sized private sector entities. In the 2024 Deloitte and the National Association of Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) biennial cybersecurity report, ``86% of state chief information security officers (CISOs) say their responsibilities are growing, yet more than one-third do not have a dedicated cybersecurity budget. Four of the 51 state CISOs surveyed said their state IT budgets allocate less than 1% for cybersecurity,''\1\ which is far lower the Federal government or private industries, such as the financial services sector. Investing in cybersecurity before a cyberattack saves money, protects important data housed on state and local networks, and ensures state and local governments can continue to provide the important services Americans rely on. According to the ``State of Ransomware in State and Local Government 2024,'' 98% of ransomware incidents in 2024 resulted in data encryption--an increase from 76% in 2023--and the average cost to recover from a ransomware attack was $2.83 million in 2024--an increase from $1.21 million in 2023.\2\ To address this urgent national security issue, the Federal government sought to create a Federally-funded cybersecurity grant to redouble efforts with state and local governments to build robust cybersecurity defenses. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\2024 Deloitte-NASCIO Survey Finds States Face Growing Cybersecurity Threats, Tight Budgets, National Association of State Chief Information Officers (September 30, 2024), https:// www.nascio.org/press-releases/2024-deloitte-nascio-survey-finds-states- face-growing- cybersecurity-threats-tight-budgets/. \2\The State of Ransomware in State and Local Government 2024, Sophos (August 2024), https://www.sophos.com/en-us/whitepaper/state-of- ransomware-in-government. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), commonly referred to as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), was signed into law in November 2021, which included a provision that would require DHS to establish the State SLCGP. The SLCGP is ``a program to award grants to eligible entities to address cybersecurity risks and cybersecurity threats to information systems owned or operated by, or on behalf of, State, Local, or Tribal governments.''\3\ The program authorized one billion dollars over four years and expires on September 30, 2025. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\6 U.S.C. 665g et seq. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a statutorily required analysis of the impact of the SLCGP. They found that DHS provided nearly $172 million USD in grant allocations to 33 states and territories, funding almost 840 projects that align with the principles defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). These projects included developing cybersecurity policies, hiring various cybersecurity contractors, implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA), and updating existing equipment.\4\ GAO solicited feedback from various participants and found that officials positively regarded the grant program.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\DHS Implemented a Grant Program to Enable State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments to Improve Security, Government Accountability Office (April 2025), https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO- 25-107313/index.html#_Toc196309939. \5\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On March 19, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued an Executive Order titled ``Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness.'' The Executive Order outlines that ``[c]ommon sense approaches and investments by State and local governments across American infrastructure will enhance national security and create a more resilient Nation.''\6\ The Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience (PILLAR) Act, or H.R. 5078, fulfills this mandate to invest wisely in SLTT infrastructure by extending a successful program with updates based on extensive stakeholder feedback. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness, The White House (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential- actions/2025/03/achieving-efficiency-through-state-and-local- preparedness/. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hearings

The Committee held the following hearings in the 119th Congress that informed H.R. 5078: On April 1, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection held a hearing entitled, ``Cybersecurity is Local, Too: Assessing the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Robert Huber, Chief Security Officer, Tenable, Inc.; Mr. Alan Fuller, Chief Information Officer, State of Utah; The Honorable Kevin Kramer, First Vice President, National League of Cities; Councilman, Louisville, KY; and Mr. Mark Raymond, Chief Information Officer, State of Connecticut. On June 12, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection held a hearing entitled, ``Security to Model: Securing Artificial Intelligence to Strengthen Cybersecurity.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Kiran Chinnagangannagari, Co-Founder and Chief Product and Technology Officer, Securin Inc.; Mr. Steve Faehl, U.S. Government Security Leader, Microsoft; Mr. Gareth Maclachlan, Chief Product Officer, Trellix; and Mr. Jonathan Dambrot, CEO, Cranium AI, Inc. On July 22, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection held a hearing entitled, ``Fully Operational: Stuxnet 15 Years Later and the Evolution of Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure.'' Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Ms. Kim Zetter, Journalist and Author of ``Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon''; Mr. Robert M. Lee, CEO and Co-Founder, Dragos Inc.; Ms. Tatyana Bolton, Executive Director, Operational Technology Cyber Coalition (OTCC); and Dr. Nathaniel Gleason, Program Leader, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Committee Consideration

The Committee met on September 3, 2025, a quorum being present, to consider H.R. 5078 and ordered the measure to be favorably reported to the House by a recorded vote of 21 yeas to 1 nay.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Congressional Budget Office Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 5078 would extend until 2035 the requirements for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to make cybersecurity grants to state and local entities, assess grant applications, review state and local cybersecurity plans, and monitor the performance of grant recipients. H.R. 5078 also would expand the scope of the grant program to include state and local government investments in artificial intelligence systems. Finally, the bill would require the Comptroller General of the United States to periodically review the program. The requirement to make cybersecurity grants currently expires on September 30, 2025. The costs of the legislation, detailed in Table 1, fall within budget function 450 (Community and Regional Development). For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 5078 will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2026 and that outlays will follow historical spending patterns for the affected programs. Implementing H.R. 5078 would cost $869 million over the 2025-2030 period, CBO estimates; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 5078 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By fiscal year, millions of dollars-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2025-2030 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cybersecurity Grants: Estimated Authorization.................... 0 250 250 250 250 250 1,250 Estimated Outlays.......................... 0 50 103 160 210 243 766 Management and Oversight Costs: Estimated Authorization.................... 0 20 20 21 21 21 103 Estimated Outlays.......................... 0 20 20 21 21 21 103 Total Changes: Estimated Authorization................ 0 270 270 271 271 271 1,353 Estimated Outlays...................... 0 70 123 181 231 264 869 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the 2022-2025 period, lawmakers provided an average of $250 million per year for the DHS State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. CBO estimates that continuing to award grants at that level would cost $766 million over the 2025-2030 period. On the basis of the costs to administer a similar grant program, CBO estimates that reviewing grant applications and cybersecurity plans, disbursing grants, communicating with state and local governments, and completing other oversight and administrative functions required by the bill would cost $103 million over the 2025-2030 period. On the basis of the costs of similar reviews, CBO estimates that the cost of the periodic review by the Comptroller General would be less than $500,000 over the 2025-2030 period. The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi. The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Mark P. Hadley (For Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office). Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Duplicative Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that H.R. 5078 does not contain any provision that establishes or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another Federal program. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of H.R. 5078 is to reauthorize and update the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, and for other purposes. Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to the Legislative Branch The Committee finds that H.R. 5078 does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience Act'' or the ``PILLAR Act.'' Section 2. Reauthorization of CISA State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program This section amends Section 2220A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Reauthorization of CISA State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, Subsections (a), (b), (d), (e), (g), (i), (j), (l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), (r), (s), and (t). H.R. 5078 reauthorizes and updates the SLCGP, which is managed by CISA and FEMA of DHS. This legislation authorizes the SLCGP for ten years, subject to the availability of appropriations. The longer authorization timeline encourages long-term cybersecurity resource planning by SLTT entities and updates the bill language to capture operational technology (OT) and artificial intelligence (AI). H.R. 5078 also stabilizes the cost share over the course of the grant and incentivizes implementation of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across critical infrastructure by increasing the Federal cost share. As nation-state adversaries and cybercriminals continue to target state and local entities, H.R. 5078 provides necessary resources to bolster SLTT cyber defense capabilities. In subsection (e), there are sixteen provisions listed to drive cybersecurity risk assessment and mitigation at the SLTT level. During the April 1, 2025 hearing entitled, ``Cybersecurity is Local, Too: Assessing the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program,'' witnesses testified that the cybersecurity plan requirements were helpful for recipients to target the vulnerabilities found in critical networks and services and that the statute requirements should not change. The Committee updated cybersecurity planning language to ensure that plans capture OT systems and AI, in addition to information systems. Additionally, while the grant program made strides in information sharing and identifying cyber risk, the Committee wants to encourage information sharing between Federal and state partners, including with DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Centers, as applicable. As we have seen time and again, State Administrative Agencies (SAA) need timely intelligence from Federal partners to make meaningful, high- value decisions about where to invest limited resources or to respond to time-sensitive incidents. In addition to Federal partners, the Committee encourages consultation with information sharing and analysis organizations; small communities, regardless of whether they are rural; and academic and nonprofit entities, including cybersecurity clinics and other nonprofit technical assistance programs, as applicable. These partnerships ensure that targeted resources go to the communities who need cybersecurity assistance most. Importantly, the bill requires an SAA to address in its Cybersecurity Plans how it will assume the cost or partial cost of cybersecurity investments made due to implementation of its plan. The Committee recognizes the challenges associated with having SLTT governments pick up the full costs of their cybersecurity needs, especially against well-funded nation- state adversaries. However, to be good stewards of Federal funding, SLTT governments need to plan on how they would assume the costs of cybersecurity if the grant were to expire. SLTT governments could pursue public-private partnerships, additional state funding, or other creative mechanisms to continue to achieve cybersecurity planning goals. The Committee is also aware that AI is creating significant efficiencies for state and local governments, including by identifying waste, fraud, and abuse; more efficiently delivering of government services; and supporting law enforcement activities. The Committee supports these efforts to infuse innovative new technologies into legacy processes. However, like any new and rapidly evolving technology, AI requires additional focus from cybersecurity professionals as it is integrated into our digital infrastructure. This escalation of rapid AI use, novel AI code, and increasing complexity of our information systems and OT systems pose very real risks for cybersecurity systems and processes. Therefore, states and localities are encouraged to leverage these grants to manage their AI security posture, mitigate AI risk, and enhance AI system resilience against attacks. This includes continuously inventorying and evaluating AI components within broader information systems and OT systems for potential vulnerabilities. To encourage more multi-entity grant applications found in subsection (f), the Committee urges SAAs to consider multi- entity approaches within the jurisdiction of an SAA during the Cybersecurity Planning process. For example, multiple counties may want to offer the same service or capability to their citizens. To avoid duplication and ensure resources are spent effectively, they should coordinate to pursue a multi-entity grant through their SAA. The Committee anticipates that CISA, the subject-matter expert agency, will provide additional guidance on what qualifies as a multi-entity grant within an SAA. In subsection (g), ``low or otherwise limited operating budgets''' are at the discretion of CISA to provide a framework for identifying rural, suburban, and high-population jurisdictions with significant resource limitations within an eligible entity. This language ensures that State Planning Committees understand and consider the needs of entities with the lowest capacity into their planning and investments. The Federal government has an obligation to the American taxpayer that any technology or services purchased using taxpayer dollars follow the highest security standards available. In subsection (j)(1)(F) and (j)(1)(G), the new subparagraphs ensure state governments align with these standards as well. The Committee encourages SAAs to purchase technology or services that adhere to Secure by Design principles or other relevant and/or forthcoming guidance from CISA. Additionally, SAAs must ensure they are not buying from foreign entities of concern, as defined by those found in 42 U.S.C. 19237. After receiving input from stakeholders, the language in subsection (m)(1) was amended to ``activities'' to encourage an overall match for each grant to a state/territory, instead of a project-by-project match, which is a challenge for small, local governments. The bill also stabilizes the cost share at 60% for single entities and 70% for multi-entity groups, which is the current authorization level for Fiscal Year 2025, to make it easier for entities to plan out their investments. Recognizing that not all Multi-Factor Authentication is created equal, the Committee expects that CISA will determine which standard of MFA-enabled or implemented on critical infrastructure that is within the entity or multi-entities' jurisdiction will qualify for the increased Federal cost share incentive laid out in subparagraph (B). The Committee recommends phishing-resistant at a minimum but included broader language to encourage the most current MFA that relies on the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) standard. The Committee defers to SLTT governments to determine their critical infrastructure, and to CISA to determine if SLTT governments have fulfilled the requirement for the increased cost share. However, the Committee's interpretation of critical infrastructure under state and local jurisdiction includes vital community services like local transportation networks, water and wastewater systems, local emergency services, and community facilities that support public safety, health, and the economy. These are distinct from Federal systems and are essential for the daily functioning of a city or town, encompassing the physical and virtual systems necessary for a region to thrive, with specific examples including municipal dams, transit systems, and local power distribution. In subsection (n)(2)(A), the updated language alleviates the administrative burden on SAAs that were previously required to request yearly consent from all of their SLTT government partners for a given project. Under this bill, a project only requires consent once to qualify for the shared services passthrough. Additionally, ``shared services''' language in clauses (ii) and (iii) found in subparagraphs (A) and (B) is codified for SAAs to qualify for the grant passthrough requirements. A ``whole-of-state'' approach, whereby states provide shared services to local governments using Federal grant funding, is an encouraged approach to ensure that states provide essential cybersecurity services, such as security awareness training, endpoint detection, and exercises that would otherwise be out of reach for smaller communities. The Committee encourages SAAs to consider services that benefit the communities who need cybersecurity services the most. If a certain percentage, as determined by CISA, of localities within a state do not opt into the shared services provided, the localities should receive direct funding from SAAs in the following fiscal year. In paragraph (5), the Committee clarified that if direct funding is not distributed to a local government within 60 days of the anticipated grant disbursement date, the local government may petition the Secretary to receive funds directly. This provision provides more accountability for SAAs to distribute direct funding within a specified timeframe and enables local governments to apply directly for funding if the SAA is not in compliance with the terms of the grant--something that came up during the Committee's April 1, 2025 hearing entitled, ``Cybersecurity is Local, Too: Assessing the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program.'' The Committee added language in subsection (o) to include representatives from local governments with small populations to ensure they are consulted during the Cybersecurity Plan development process. This would fulfill a primary goal of this bill, which is to help the communities that need to improve their cyber posture most. The new subsection (p) also encourages DHS outreach to local governments with small populations to inform them about no-cost cybersecurity service offerings available from CISA. Subsection (r) directs GAO to provide a review of the grant program every four years to ensure that the program is following the intent of Congress. GAO will also review the grant program to evaluate the adoption of AI by SAAs in their Cybersecurity Plans. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 * * * * * * * TITLE XXII--CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY * * * * * * * Subtitle A--Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security * * * * * * * SEC. 2220A. STATE AND LOCAL CYBERSECURITY GRANT PROGRAM. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in section 5002(3) of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (enacted as division E of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 9401(3))). (2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial intelligence system'' means any data system, software, hardware, application tool, or utility that operates in whole or in part using artificial intelligence. [(1)] (3) Cybersecurity plan.--The term ``Cybersecurity Plan'' means a plan submitted by an eligible entity under subsection (e)(1). [(2)] (4) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible entity'' means a-- (A) State; or (B) Tribal government. (5) Foreign entity of concern.--The term ``foreign entity of concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 10634 of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19237; Public Law 117-167; popularly referred to as the ``CHIPS and Science Act''). [(3)] (6) Multi-entity group.--The term ``multi- entity group'' means a group of 2 or more eligible entities desiring a grant under this section. (7) Multi-factor authentication.--The term ``multi factor authentication'' means an authentication system that requires more than one distinct type of

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