Background and Need for Legislation
Like Federal agencies, state and local governments are rich
targets for cyber adversaries given the volume of sensitive
personal data they house and the high cost that service
disruptions and system failures would impose. However, state
and local agencies often have far fewer resources and
cybersecurity personnel than their Federal counterparts or
similarly sized private sector entities. In the 2024 Deloitte
and the National Association of Chief Information Officers
(NASCIO) biennial cybersecurity report, ``86% of state chief
information security officers (CISOs) say their
responsibilities are growing, yet more than one-third do not
have a dedicated cybersecurity budget. Four of the 51 state
CISOs surveyed said their state IT budgets allocate less than
1% for cybersecurity,''\1\ which is far lower the Federal
government or private industries, such as the financial
services sector. Investing in cybersecurity before a
cyberattack saves money, protects important data housed on
state and local networks, and ensures state and local
governments can continue to provide the important services
Americans rely on. According to the ``State of Ransomware in
State and Local Government 2024,'' 98% of ransomware incidents
in 2024 resulted in data encryption--an increase from 76% in
2023--and the average cost to recover from a ransomware attack
was $2.83 million in 2024--an increase from $1.21 million in
2023.\2\ To address this urgent national security issue, the
Federal government sought to create a Federally-funded
cybersecurity grant to redouble efforts with state and local
governments to build robust cybersecurity defenses.
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\1\2024 Deloitte-NASCIO Survey Finds States Face Growing
Cybersecurity Threats, Tight Budgets, National Association of State
Chief Information Officers (September 30, 2024), https://
www.nascio.org/press-releases/2024-deloitte-nascio-survey-finds-states-
face-growing-
cybersecurity-threats-tight-budgets/.
\2\The State of Ransomware in State and Local Government 2024,
Sophos (August 2024), https://www.sophos.com/en-us/whitepaper/state-of-
ransomware-in-government.
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The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), commonly referred
to as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), was
signed into law in November 2021, which included a provision
that would require DHS to establish the State SLCGP. The SLCGP
is ``a program to award grants to eligible entities to address
cybersecurity risks and cybersecurity threats to information
systems owned or operated by, or on behalf of, State, Local, or
Tribal governments.''\3\ The program authorized one billion
dollars over four years and expires on September 30, 2025.
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\3\6 U.S.C. 665g et seq.
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a
statutorily required analysis of the impact of the SLCGP. They
found that DHS provided nearly $172 million USD in grant
allocations to 33 states and territories, funding almost 840
projects that align with the principles defined by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). These projects
included developing cybersecurity policies, hiring various
cybersecurity contractors, implementing multi-factor
authentication (MFA), and updating existing equipment.\4\ GAO
solicited feedback from various participants and found that
officials positively regarded the grant program.\5\
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\4\DHS Implemented a Grant Program to Enable State, Local, Tribal,
and Territorial Governments to Improve Security, Government
Accountability Office (April 2025), https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-
25-107313/index.html#_Toc196309939.
\5\Id.
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On March 19, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued an
Executive Order titled ``Achieving Efficiency Through State and
Local Preparedness.'' The Executive Order outlines that
``[c]ommon sense approaches and investments by State and local
governments across American infrastructure will enhance
national security and create a more resilient Nation.''\6\ The
Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience
(PILLAR) Act, or H.R. 5078, fulfills this mandate to invest
wisely in SLTT infrastructure by extending a successful program
with updates based on extensive stakeholder feedback.
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\6\Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness, The
White House (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/2025/03/achieving-efficiency-through-state-and-local-
preparedness/.
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Hearings
The Committee held the following hearings in the 119th
Congress that informed H.R. 5078:
On April 1, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
held a hearing entitled, ``Cybersecurity is Local, Too:
Assessing the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program.''
Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr.
Robert Huber, Chief Security Officer, Tenable, Inc.; Mr. Alan
Fuller, Chief Information Officer, State of Utah; The Honorable
Kevin Kramer, First Vice President, National League of Cities;
Councilman, Louisville, KY; and Mr. Mark Raymond, Chief
Information Officer, State of Connecticut.
On June 12, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
held a hearing entitled, ``Security to Model: Securing
Artificial Intelligence to Strengthen Cybersecurity.'' Members
heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Kiran
Chinnagangannagari, Co-Founder and Chief Product and Technology
Officer, Securin Inc.; Mr. Steve Faehl, U.S. Government
Security Leader, Microsoft; Mr. Gareth Maclachlan, Chief
Product Officer, Trellix; and Mr. Jonathan Dambrot, CEO,
Cranium AI, Inc.
On July 22, 2025, the Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
held a hearing entitled, ``Fully Operational: Stuxnet 15 Years
Later and the Evolution of Cyber Threats to Critical
Infrastructure.'' Members heard testimony from the following
witnesses: Ms. Kim Zetter, Journalist and Author of ``Countdown
to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First
Digital Weapon''; Mr. Robert M. Lee, CEO and Co-Founder, Dragos
Inc.; Ms. Tatyana Bolton, Executive Director, Operational
Technology Cyber Coalition (OTCC); and Dr. Nathaniel Gleason,
Program Leader, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and
amendments thereto.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate, New Budget
Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 5078 would extend until 2035 the requirements for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to make cybersecurity
grants to state and local entities, assess grant applications,
review state and local cybersecurity plans, and monitor the
performance of grant recipients. H.R. 5078 also would expand
the scope of the grant program to include state and local
government investments in artificial intelligence systems.
Finally, the bill would require the Comptroller General of the
United States to periodically review the program. The
requirement to make cybersecurity grants currently expires on
September 30, 2025.
The costs of the legislation, detailed in Table 1, fall
within budget function 450 (Community and Regional
Development). For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 5078
will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2026 and that
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for the
affected programs. Implementing H.R. 5078 would cost $869
million over the 2025-2030 period, CBO estimates; such spending
would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 5078
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By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
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2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2025-2030
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Cybersecurity Grants:
Estimated Authorization.................... 0 250 250 250 250 250 1,250
Estimated Outlays.......................... 0 50 103 160 210 243 766
Management and Oversight Costs:
Estimated Authorization.................... 0 20 20 21 21 21 103
Estimated Outlays.......................... 0 20 20 21 21 21 103
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization................ 0 270 270 271 271 271 1,353
Estimated Outlays...................... 0 70 123 181 231 264 869
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Over the 2022-2025 period, lawmakers provided an average of
$250 million per year for the DHS State and Local Cybersecurity
Grant Program. CBO estimates that continuing to award grants at
that level would cost $766 million over the 2025-2030 period.
On the basis of the costs to administer a similar grant
program, CBO estimates that reviewing grant applications and
cybersecurity plans, disbursing grants, communicating with
state and local governments, and completing other oversight and
administrative functions required by the bill would cost $103
million over the 2025-2030 period.
On the basis of the costs of similar reviews, CBO estimates
that the cost of the periodic review by the Comptroller General
would be less than $500,000 over the 2025-2030 period.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi.
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Mark P. Hadley
(For Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
Duplicative Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 5078 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 5078 is to reauthorize and update the State and Local
Cybersecurity Grant Program, and for other purposes.
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited
Tariff Benefits
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that H.R. 5078 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section states that the Act may be cited as the
``Protecting Information by Local Leaders for Agency Resilience
Act'' or the ``PILLAR Act.''
Section 2. Reauthorization of CISA State and Local Cybersecurity
Grant Program
This section amends Section 2220A of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Reauthorization of CISA State and Local
Cybersecurity Grant Program, Subsections (a), (b), (d), (e),
(g), (i), (j), (l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), (r), (s), and (t).
H.R. 5078 reauthorizes and updates the SLCGP, which is managed
by CISA and FEMA of DHS. This legislation authorizes the SLCGP
for ten years, subject to the availability of appropriations.
The longer authorization timeline encourages long-term
cybersecurity resource planning by SLTT entities and updates
the bill language to capture operational technology (OT) and
artificial intelligence (AI). H.R. 5078 also stabilizes the
cost share over the course of the grant and incentivizes
implementation of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across
critical infrastructure by increasing the Federal cost share.
As nation-state adversaries and cybercriminals continue to
target state and local entities, H.R. 5078 provides necessary
resources to bolster SLTT cyber defense capabilities.
In subsection (e), there are sixteen provisions listed to
drive cybersecurity risk assessment and mitigation at the SLTT
level. During the April 1, 2025 hearing entitled,
``Cybersecurity is Local, Too: Assessing the State and Local
Cybersecurity Grant Program,'' witnesses testified that the
cybersecurity plan requirements were helpful for recipients to
target the vulnerabilities found in critical networks and
services and that the statute requirements should not change.
The Committee updated cybersecurity planning language to ensure
that plans capture OT systems and AI, in addition to
information systems. Additionally, while the grant program made
strides in information sharing and identifying cyber risk, the
Committee wants to encourage information sharing between
Federal and state partners, including with DHS State, Local,
and Regional Fusion Centers, as applicable. As we have seen
time and again, State Administrative Agencies (SAA) need timely
intelligence from Federal partners to make meaningful, high-
value decisions about where to invest limited resources or to
respond to time-sensitive incidents. In addition to Federal
partners, the Committee encourages consultation with
information sharing and analysis organizations; small
communities, regardless of whether they are rural; and academic
and nonprofit entities, including cybersecurity clinics and
other nonprofit technical assistance programs, as applicable.
These partnerships ensure that targeted resources go to the
communities who need cybersecurity assistance most.
Importantly, the bill requires an SAA to address in its
Cybersecurity Plans how it will assume the cost or partial cost
of cybersecurity investments made due to implementation of its
plan. The Committee recognizes the challenges associated with
having SLTT governments pick up the full costs of their
cybersecurity needs, especially against well-funded nation-
state adversaries. However, to be good stewards of Federal
funding, SLTT governments need to plan on how they would assume
the costs of cybersecurity if the grant were to expire. SLTT
governments could pursue public-private partnerships,
additional state funding, or other creative mechanisms to
continue to achieve cybersecurity planning goals.
The Committee is also aware that AI is creating significant
efficiencies for state and local governments, including by
identifying waste, fraud, and abuse; more efficiently
delivering of government services; and supporting law
enforcement activities. The Committee supports these efforts to
infuse innovative new technologies into legacy processes.
However, like any new and rapidly evolving technology, AI
requires additional focus from cybersecurity professionals as
it is integrated into our digital infrastructure. This
escalation of rapid AI use, novel AI code, and increasing
complexity of our information systems and OT systems pose very
real risks for cybersecurity systems and processes. Therefore,
states and localities are encouraged to leverage these grants
to manage their AI security posture, mitigate AI risk, and
enhance AI system resilience against attacks. This includes
continuously inventorying and evaluating AI components within
broader information systems and OT systems for potential
vulnerabilities.
To encourage more multi-entity grant applications found in
subsection (f), the Committee urges SAAs to consider multi-
entity approaches within the jurisdiction of an SAA during the
Cybersecurity Planning process. For example, multiple counties
may want to offer the same service or capability to their
citizens. To avoid duplication and ensure resources are spent
effectively, they should coordinate to pursue a multi-entity
grant through their SAA. The Committee anticipates that CISA,
the subject-matter expert agency, will provide additional
guidance on what qualifies as a multi-entity grant within an
SAA.
In subsection (g), ``low or otherwise limited operating
budgets''' are at the discretion of CISA to provide a framework
for identifying rural, suburban, and high-population
jurisdictions with significant resource limitations within an
eligible entity. This language ensures that State Planning
Committees understand and consider the needs of entities with
the lowest capacity into their planning and investments.
The Federal government has an obligation to the American
taxpayer that any technology or services purchased using
taxpayer dollars follow the highest security standards
available. In subsection (j)(1)(F) and (j)(1)(G), the new
subparagraphs ensure state governments align with these
standards as well. The Committee encourages SAAs to purchase
technology or services that adhere to Secure by Design
principles or other relevant and/or forthcoming guidance from
CISA. Additionally, SAAs must ensure they are not buying from
foreign entities of concern, as defined by those found in 42
U.S.C. 19237.
After receiving input from stakeholders, the language in
subsection (m)(1) was amended to ``activities'' to encourage an
overall match for each grant to a state/territory, instead of a
project-by-project match, which is a challenge for small, local
governments. The bill also stabilizes the cost share at 60% for
single entities and 70% for multi-entity groups, which is the
current authorization level for Fiscal Year 2025, to make it
easier for entities to plan out their investments.
Recognizing that not all Multi-Factor Authentication is
created equal, the Committee expects that CISA will determine
which standard of MFA-enabled or implemented on critical
infrastructure that is within the entity or multi-entities'
jurisdiction will qualify for the increased Federal cost share
incentive laid out in subparagraph (B). The Committee
recommends phishing-resistant at a minimum but included broader
language to encourage the most current MFA that relies on the
Fast Identity Online (FIDO) standard. The Committee defers to
SLTT governments to determine their critical infrastructure,
and to CISA to determine if SLTT governments have fulfilled the
requirement for the increased cost share. However, the
Committee's interpretation of critical infrastructure under
state and local jurisdiction includes vital community services
like local transportation networks, water and wastewater
systems, local emergency services, and community facilities
that support public safety, health, and the economy. These are
distinct from Federal systems and are essential for the daily
functioning of a city or town, encompassing the physical and
virtual systems necessary for a region to thrive, with specific
examples including municipal dams, transit systems, and local
power distribution.
In subsection (n)(2)(A), the updated language alleviates
the administrative burden on SAAs that were previously required
to request yearly consent from all of their SLTT government
partners for a given project. Under this bill, a project only
requires consent once to qualify for the shared services
passthrough.
Additionally, ``shared services''' language in clauses (ii)
and (iii) found in subparagraphs (A) and (B) is codified for
SAAs to qualify for the grant passthrough requirements. A
``whole-of-state'' approach, whereby states provide shared
services to local governments using Federal grant funding, is
an encouraged approach to ensure that states provide essential
cybersecurity services, such as security awareness training,
endpoint detection, and exercises that would otherwise be out
of reach for smaller communities. The Committee encourages SAAs
to consider services that benefit the communities who need
cybersecurity services the most. If a certain percentage, as
determined by CISA, of localities within a state do not opt
into the shared services provided, the localities should
receive direct funding from SAAs in the following fiscal year.
In paragraph (5), the Committee clarified that if direct
funding is not distributed to a local government within 60 days
of the anticipated grant disbursement date, the local
government may petition the Secretary to receive funds
directly. This provision provides more accountability for SAAs
to distribute direct funding within a specified timeframe and
enables local governments to apply directly for funding if the
SAA is not in compliance with the terms of the grant--something
that came up during the Committee's April 1, 2025 hearing
entitled, ``Cybersecurity is Local, Too: Assessing the State
and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program.''
The Committee added language in subsection (o) to include
representatives from local governments with small populations
to ensure they are consulted during the Cybersecurity Plan
development process. This would fulfill a primary goal of this
bill, which is to help the communities that need to improve
their cyber posture most. The new subsection (p) also
encourages DHS outreach to local governments with small
populations to inform them about no-cost cybersecurity service
offerings available from CISA.
Subsection (r) directs GAO to provide a review of the grant
program every four years to ensure that the program is
following the intent of Congress. GAO will also review the
grant program to evaluate the adoption of AI by SAAs in their
Cybersecurity Plans.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE XXII--CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2220A. STATE AND LOCAL CYBERSECURITY GRANT PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given such term in
section 5002(3) of the National Artificial Intelligence
Initiative Act of 2020 (enacted as division E of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C.
9401(3))).
(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term
``artificial intelligence system'' means any data
system, software, hardware, application tool, or
utility that operates in whole or in part using
artificial intelligence.
[(1)] (3) Cybersecurity plan.--The term
``Cybersecurity Plan'' means a plan submitted by an
eligible entity under subsection (e)(1).
[(2)] (4) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible
entity'' means a--
(A) State; or
(B) Tribal government.
(5) Foreign entity of concern.--The term ``foreign
entity of concern'' has the meaning given such term in
section 10634 of the Research and Development,
Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19237;
Public Law 117-167; popularly referred to as the
``CHIPS and Science Act'').
[(3)] (6) Multi-entity group.--The term ``multi-
entity group'' means a group of 2 or more eligible
entities desiring a grant under this section.
(7) Multi-factor authentication.--The term ``multi
factor authentication'' means an authentication system
that requires more than one distinct type of