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H. Rept. 119-421

PROTECTING PRUDENT INVESTMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACT

2025-12-30

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 2988] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2988) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS Sec. 1001. Short title. Sec. 1002. Limitation on consideration of non-pecuniary factors by fiduciaries. DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS Sec. 2001. Short title. Sec. 2002. Service provider selection. DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION Sec. 3001. Short title. Sec. 3002. Exercise of shareholder rights. DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS Sec. 4001. Short title. Sec. 4002. Brokerage window disclosures. DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE. This division may be cited as the ``Increase Retirement Earnings Act''. SEC. 1002. LIMITATION ON CONSIDERATION OF NON-PECUNIARY FACTORS BY FIDUCIARIES. (a) In General.--Section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(3) Interest Based on Pecuniary Factors.-- ``(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a fiduciary shall be considered to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan with respect to an investment or investment course of action only if the fiduciary's action with respect to such investment or investment course of action is based solely on pecuniary factors (except as provided in subparagraph (B)). The fiduciary may not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to other objectives and may not sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk to promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals. The weight given to any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall reflect a prudent assessment of the impact of such factor on risk and return. ``(B) Use of non-pecuniary factors for investment alternatives.--Notwithstanding paragraph (A), if a fiduciary is unable to distinguish between or among investment alternatives or investment courses of action on the basis of pecuniary factors alone, the fiduciary may use non-pecuniary factors as the deciding factor if the fiduciary documents-- ``(i) why pecuniary factors were not sufficient to select a plan investment or investment course of action; ``(ii) how the selected investment compares to the alternative investments with regard to the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification, the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan, and the projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan; and ``(iii) how the selected non-pecuniary factor or factors are consistent with the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan. ``(C) Investment alternatives for participant-directed individual account plans.--In selecting or retaining investment options for a pension plan described in subsection (c)(1)(A), a fiduciary is not prohibited from considering, selecting, or retaining an investment option on the basis that such investment option promotes, seeks, or supports one or more non- pecuniary benefits or goals, if-- ``(i) the fiduciary satisfies the requirements of paragraph (1) and subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph in selecting or retaining any such investment option; and ``(ii) such investment option is not added or retained as, or included as a component of, a default investment under subsection (c)(5) (or any other default investment alternative) if its investment objectives or goals or its principal investment strategies include, consider, or indicate the use of one or more non-pecuniary factors. ``(D) Definitions.--For the purposes of this paragraph: ``(i) The term `pecuniary factor' means a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's investment objectives and the funding policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1). ``(ii) The term `investment course of action' means any series or program of investments or actions related to a fiduciary's performance of the fiduciary's investment duties, and includes the selection of an investment fund as a plan investment, or in the case of an individual account plan, a designated investment alternative under the plan.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken by a fiduciary on or after the date that is 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act. DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE. This division may be cited as the ``No Discrimination in My Benefits Act''. SEC. 2002. SERVICE PROVIDER SELECTION. Section 404(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) by selecting, monitoring, and retaining any fiduciary, counsel, employee, or service provider of the plan-- ``(i) in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B); and ``(ii) without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.''. DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE. This division may be cited as the ``Retirement Proxy Protection Act''. SEC. 3002. EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS. (a) In General.--Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(f) Exercise of Shareholder Rights.-- ``(1) Authority to exercise shareholder rights.-- ``(A) In general.--The fiduciary duty to manage plan assets that are shares of stock includes the management of shareholder rights appurtenant to those shares, including the right to vote proxies. When deciding whether to exercise a shareholder right and in exercising such right, including the voting of proxies, a fiduciary must act prudently and solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable expenses of administering the plan. The fiduciary duty to manage shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise of every shareholder right. ``(B) Exception.--This subsection shall not apply to voting, tender, and similar rights with respect to qualifying employer securities or securities held in an investment arrangement that is not a designated investment alternative in the event such rights are passed through pursuant to the terms of an individual account plan to participants and beneficiaries with accounts holding such securities. ``(2) Requirements for exercise of shareholder rights.--A fiduciary, when deciding whether to exercise a shareholder right and when exercising a shareholder right-- ``(A) shall-- ``(i) act solely in accordance with the economic interest of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries; ``(ii) consider any costs involved; ``(iii) evaluate material facts that form the basis for any particular proxy vote or exercise of shareholder rights; and ``(iv) maintain a record of any proxy vote, proxy voting activity, or other exercise of a shareholder right, including any attempt to influence management; and ``(B) shall not subordinate the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to any non- pecuniary objective, or promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals unrelated to those financial interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. ``(3) Monitoring.--A fiduciary shall exercise prudence and diligence in the selection and monitoring of a person, if any, selected to advise or otherwise assist with the exercise of shareholder rights, including by providing research and analysis, recommendations on exercise of proxy voting or other shareholder rights, administrative services with respect to voting proxies, and recordkeeping and reporting services. ``(4) Investment managers and proxy advisory firms.--Where the authority to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder rights has been delegated to an investment manager pursuant to section 403(a), or a proxy voting advisory firm or other person who performs advisory services as to the voting of proxies or the exercise of other shareholder rights, a responsible plan fiduciary shall prudently monitor the proxy voting activities of such investment manager or advisory firm and determine whether such activities are in compliance with paragraphs (1) and (2). ``(5) Voting policies.-- ``(A) In general.--In deciding whether to vote a proxy pursuant to this subsection, the plan fiduciary may adopt a proxy voting policy, including a safe harbor proxy voting policy described in subparagraph (B), providing that the authority to vote a proxy shall be exercised pursuant to specific parameters designed to serve the economic interest of the plan. ``(B) Safe harbor voting policy.--With respect to a decision not to vote a proxy, a fiduciary shall satisfy the fiduciary responsibilities under this subsection if such fiduciary adopts and follows a safe harbor proxy voting policy that-- ``(i) limits voting resources to particular types of proposals that the fiduciary has prudently determined are substantially related to the business activities of the issuer or are expected to have a material effect on the value of the plan investment; or ``(ii) establishes that the fiduciary will refrain from voting on proposals or particular types of proposals when the assets of a plan invested in the issuer relative to the total assets of such plan are below 5 percent (or, in the event such assets are under management, when the assets under management invested in the issuer are below 5 percent of the total assets under management). ``(C) Exception.--No proxy voting policy adopted pursuant to this paragraph shall preclude a fiduciary from submitting a proxy vote when the fiduciary determines that the matter being voted on is expected to have a material economic effect on the investment performance of a plan's portfolio (or the investment performance of assets under management in the case of an investment manager); provided, however, that in all cases compliance with a safe harbor voting policy shall be presumed to satisfy fiduciary responsibilities with respect to decisions not to vote. ``(6) Review.--A fiduciary shall periodically review any policy adopted under this subsection.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to an exercise of shareholder rights occurring on or after January 1, 2026. DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS SEC. 4001. SHORT TITLE. This division may be cited as the ``Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act''. SEC. 4002. BROKERAGE WINDOW DISCLOSURES. (a) In General.--Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(7) Notice requirements for brokerage windows.-- ``(A) In general.--In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and which provides a participant or beneficiary the opportunity to choose from designated investment alternatives, a participant or beneficiary shall not be treated as exercising control over assets in the account of the participant or beneficiary unless, with respect to any investment arrangement that is not a designated investment alternative, each time before such a participant or beneficiary directs an investment into, out of, or within such investment arrangement, such participant is notified of, and acknowledges, each element of the notice described under paragraph (B). ``(B) Notice.--The notice described under this paragraph is a four part information that is substantially similar to the following information: ``1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment alternatives prudently selected and monitored by fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio. In selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) compared with reasonably available investment alternatives. 2. The investments available through this investment arrangement are not designated investment alternatives, and have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a plan fiduciary. 3. Depending on the investments you select through this investment arrangement, you may experience diminished returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from the plan's designated investment alternatives. 4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent on your account balance projected to age 67. ``(C) Illustration.--The notice described under paragraph (B) shall also include a graph displaying the projected retirement balances of such participant or beneficiary at age 67 if the account of such individual were to achieve an annual return equal to each of the following: ``(i) 4 percent. ``(ii) 6 percent. ``(iii) 8 percent.''. (b) Designated Investment Alternative Defined.--Section 3 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 1002) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(46) Designated investment alternative.-- ``(A) In general.--The term `designated investment alternative' means any investment alternative designated by a responsible fiduciary of an individual account plan described in subsection 404(c) into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts. ``(B) Exception.--The term `designated investment alternative' does not include brokerage windows, self- directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries to select investments beyond those designated by a responsible plan fiduciary.''. (c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on January 1, 2027. Purpose The purpose of H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act, is to make clear that the financial interests of employee benefit plan participants and beneficiaries in their benefits come first.

Committee Action

117TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden- Harris administration's attempt to put its radical environmental and social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by prioritizing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security and Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and Public Policy, Morningstar Investment Management, Washington, D.C. On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The hearing included a discussion of concerns regarding the DOL's proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty toward Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) employee benefit plans and the administration's view on incorporating ESG into the implementation of ERISA plans. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J. Walsh, Secretary of Labor, Washington, D.C. 118TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of DOL. The hearing discussed DOL's December 1, 2022, final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including concerns regarding the Biden- Harris administration's efforts to undermine an investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the administration's support for incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA plans. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Julie A. Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C. First Session--Legislative Action On February 7, 2023, Representative Andy Barr (R-KY) introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30) under the Congressional Review Act to nullify the Biden-Harris administration DOL's final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights.'' The resolution was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. The resolution rescinds the Biden- Harris administration's rule and would have the effect of reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule titled ``Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments.'' On February 28, 2023, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210, with Senate passage on March 1 by a vote of 50-46. On March 20, the President vetoed the measure. On March 23, 2023, the House of Representatives failed to override the veto by a vote of 219-200. On September 5, 2023, Representative Erin Houchin (R-IN) introduced H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5337 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 5337: 1. Representative Virginia Foxx (R-NC) offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 2. Representative Mark DeSaulnier (R-CA) offered a substitute amendment codifying the Biden-Harris administration's ESG and proxy voting rule. The amendment was defeated by a recorded vote of 19-23. On September 5, 2023, Representative Bob Good (R-VA) introduced H.R. 5338, the No Discrimination in My Benefits Act (H.R. 5338). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5338 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee considered an ANS offered by Representative Good that made minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. On September 5, 2023, Representative Rick W. Allen (R-GA) introduced H.R. 5339, the Roll Back ESG to Increase Retirement Earnings Act (RETIRE Act). The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5339 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 5339: 1. Representative Allen offered an ANS that made minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. 2. Representative Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA) offered a substitute amendment to codify the Biden- Harris administration's ESG investing rule. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 19-23. On September 5, 2023, Representative Jim Banks (R-IN) introduced H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to Retirement Investors Act. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5340 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee considered an ANS offered by Representative Banks that made minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. On September 18, 2024, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5339, which now also included the texts of H.R. 5337, H.R. 5338, and H.R. 5340, by a vote of 217-206. 119TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On April 30, 2025, the Committee on Education and Workforce, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Investing for the Future: Honoring ERISA's Promise to Participants.'' The hearing discussed the Biden-Harris administration's attempts to put its environmental and social agendas above the financial interests of retirees by prioritizing ESG factors when investing retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Mr. Ike Brannon, President, Capitol Policy Analytics, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Charles Crain, Managing Vice President for Policy, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Brandon Rees, Deputy Director, Corporations and Capital Markets, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Max M. Schanzenbach, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, Chicago, Illinois. First Session--Legislative Action On April 24, 2025, Representative Allen introduced H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. On June 25, 2025, the Committee considered H.R. 2988 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 21-15. The Committee considered an ANS offered by Chairman Allen that made minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. Committee Views INTRODUCTION H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act, clarifies what ERISA and the U.S. Supreme Court already require: that fiduciaries manage plan assets, including the shareholder management rights appurtenant to those assets, for the exclusive purpose of a participant's or beneficiary's financial interest in his or her benefits under the plan. This legislation is needed because the Biden-Harris administration ignored ERISA's foundational principles in order to allow activists to invest and use shareholder management rights, such as proxy votes appurtenant to ERISA plan assets, to advance ESG goals at the expense of the financial interests of ERISA employee benefit plans. H.R. 2988 also reiterates a fundamental principle already existing under ERISA: selecting a service provider for an ERISA plan is a fiduciary act subject to ERISA's fiduciary obligation of prudence and loyalty. H.R. 2988 further amends ERISA to codify a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin when selecting a service provider. Additionally, H.R. 2988 requires participant-directed ERISA individual account plans to give critically important information to participants before investing through a brokerage window. In short, H.R. 2988 protects the retirement savings of the U.S. workforce. THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\ Courts have held that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries''\2\ and make decisions ``with an eye single to the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c), 1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the ``exclusive purpose rule.'' \2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). \3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character.''\4\ Thus, fiduciaries are held to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the appropriateness of investments continually.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B). \5\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015) (confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust investments). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non- pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's fiduciary standards.\6\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even if that goal is set out in the plan document.\7\ The Court stated: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock ownership). \7\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan.''). Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term `benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust's beneficiaries . . . The term does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer stock.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Id. at 421. The Supreme Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary benefits. Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing collateral goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in which there are two economically equal investments. At a Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) hearing on April 30, 2025, Professor Max Schanzenbach, an economist and legal expert in fiduciary law, stated: ERISA's fiduciary guardrails have been tested by the advent of so-called ESG investing . . . Providing collateral social benefits to third parties is not consistent with the duty of loyalty under ERISA, and avoiding financially sound investments is not consistent with the duty of prudence. For these reasons, socially responsible investing was widely regarded as forbidden under ERISA.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\Investing for the Future: Honoring ERISA's Promise to Investors: Hearing on H.R. 2988 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Lab. & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Max Schanzenbach, Seigle Family Prof. of Law, Northwestern Univ., at 2), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ schanzenbach_testimony.pdf. However, for the last 30 years, there have been attempts to erode ERISA's principles of prudence and loyalty in order to promote benefits other than the financial interest of participants and beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits''). Professor Schanzenbach testified he believes that H.R. 2988 ``improves ERISA regulations . . . while adopting modest reforms that strengthen ERISA's fiduciary guardrails.''\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\Id. at 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIVISION A OF H.R. 2988: INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS History of the Tiebreaker Rule When Investing ERISA Plan Assets In 1994, DOL first articulated a ``tiebreaker rule'' in broadly applicable guidance allowing an ERISA fiduciary to consider ESG benefits (``collateral benefits'') when choosing between two economically equal investments.\11\ From the beginning, the tiebreaker rule was inherently inconsistent with ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\12\ Over the next two decades, DOL addressed the tiebreaker rule through sub-regulatory guidance, with Democrat administrations promoting the tiebreaker rule to use ERISA plan assets for collateral benefits and Republican administrations attempting to limit collateral benefit investing by reinforcing ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. Sec. 2509.94-1) (Interpretive Bulletin (IB) 94-1)). The term used in IB 94-1 is ``economically targeted investments.'' Prior to issuing IB 94 1, DOL issued letters concerning a fiduciary's ability to consider the non-pecuniary effects of an investment and granted a variety of prohibited transaction exemptions to both individual plans and pooled investment vehicles involving investments that produce non-pecuniary benefits. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,856, 72,856 n.6 (Nov. 13, 2020). \12\See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stanford L. Rev. 381, 390, 408 (2020) (stating that DOL's tiebreaker rule is ``dubious as a matter or textbook financial economics and . . . contrary to the controlling statute and U.S. Supreme Court precedent); see also Edward Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 Berkeley J. Emp. Lab. L. 333 (1995) (criticizing DOL's first sub-regulatory guidance on investing for collateral benefits using the tiebreaker rule as ``unsound as a matter of logic and policy and . . . incompatible with the statutory standards governing the investment decisions of pension fiduciaries.''). \13\Edward Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-01 and Economically Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript 11, 12 (2009) (criticizing subsequent Republican subregulatory guidance as only an attempt to limit collateral investing rather than repudiating it as incoherent and incompatible with ERISA's duty of loyalty). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Two distinguished professors wrote in the Stanford Law Review in 2020 on ERISA's fiduciary duty and ESG investing that ``with respect to law, the tiebreaker is irreconcilable with the strict `sole interest' or `exclusive benefit' rule [of ERISA].''\14\ The article is skeptical that true economic ties exist in the investment world, but if they do, then the appropriate solution is to invest in both instruments for purposes of diversification. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 408 (2020). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Trump Administration ESG Rule In November 2020, DOL issued a final rule on ESG investing based on skepticism that a true tie can exist between two investments. Under this rule, a fiduciary can consider collateral benefits only if choosing between or among ``investment alternatives that the plan fiduciary is unable to distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.''\15\ The Trump administration rule requires a plan fiduciary to document (and, in essence, prove) that two investments are indistinguishable based on pecuniary factors before invoking the tiebreaker rule. If a fiduciary invokes the tiebreaker rule, then the fiduciary is required to document how any tiebreaking factor is consistent with the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their financial benefits under the plan. This provision is intended to prevent abuse of the tiebreaker. The rule also prohibits fiduciaries from choosing default investments that have objectives or principal strategies that are non-pecuniary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,884 (Nov. 13, 2020). ------------------------

Minority Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to codify two regulations from the first Trump Administration regarding environmental, social, governance (ESG) factors in the selection of retirement investments\2\ and proxy voting.\3\ Additionally, H.R. 2988 prohibits retirement plan fiduciaries from selecting, monitoring, and retaining any fiduciary, counsel, employee, or service provider of the plan based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. H.R. 2988 also requires that retirement plan participants receive notice when they make certain investments. In sum, H.R. 2988 reflects a mistaken view about ESG factors in retirement investing and undermines retirement plan fiduciaries' ability to make prudent decisions in retirement plan participants' bests interests. H.R. 2988 is opposed by dozens of organizations,\4\ including the AFL CIO, American Association of People with Disabilities, American Federation of Teachers, Americans for Financial Reform, CERES, Communications Workers of America, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers, Oxfam America, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and the U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104. \2\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final ESG Rule], https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-13/pdf/2020-24515.pdf. \3\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Federal Register 81658 (Dec. 16, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final Proxy Voting Rule], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-16/pdf/ 2020-27465.pdf. \4\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform, et al to Chair Tim Walberg and Ranking Member Bobby Scott, H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Full Committee Markup (June 25, 2025) [hereinafter Americans for Financial Reform letter], https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2025/06/ letters-to-congress-letter-in-opposition-to-h-r-2988-protecting- prudent-investment-of-retirement- savings-act/; Letter from CERES to Comm. on Educ. & Workforce Chair Walberg and Comm. Members, H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Full Committee Markup (June 25, 2025), https://house.app.box.com/s/ eikni8ns1vv5t71krbb8abzoc3ydlvzk/file/1904803386220; Statement from U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum, (June 23, 2025), (on file with Committee staff). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE REPUBLICANS ARE WRONG ABOUT ESG FACTORS Committee Republicans characterized H.R. 2988 as a bill that ``seeks to ensure financial institutions are focused on maximizing returns in retirement plans rather than on woke ESG factors.''\5\ This is a false construct. ESG factors enable investors, including retirement plans, to be informed about potential risks and opportunities when evaluating an investment portfolio. Additionally, ESG investing can be viewed as a risk mitigation strategy enabling retirement plans to consider investments that account for companies' negative externalities, such as high liability risks, fossil fuel dependent business practices, and poor treatment of workers. These are among the factors that would cause stocks to suffer over decades, which is precisely the time horizon of retirement investing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Press Release, H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, @EdWorkforceCmte Passes Bills on Education Freedom, Accreditation, and Workers' Benefits (June 25, 2025), https://edworkforce.house.gov/news/ documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=412598. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Maximizing returns is tied to careful consideration of ESG factors, and retirement plan fiduciaries and major corporations understand this. BlackRock, which is the world's largest asset manager, has stated that its ``investment conviction is that incorporating sustainability-related factors--which are often characterized and grouped into ESG categories--into investment decisions can provide better risk-adjusted returns to investors over the long-term.''\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Comment No. EBSA-2021-0013-0734 at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/ dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public- comments/1210-AC03/00729.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In July 2023, the New York University (NYU) Stern Center for Sustainable Business and Rockefeller Asset Management, collaborated to examine the relationship between ESG and financial performance in more than 1,000 research papers from 2015-2020. They found that ``empirical studies and meta- analyses consistently demonstrate a positive relationship between ESG integration and financial performance.''\7\ They also concluded that ``some ESG strategies seem to generate market rate or excess returns when compared to conventional investment strategies, especially for long-term investors, and provide downside protection during economic or social crisis. Notably, very few studies found definitive negative correlations between ESG and financial performance.''\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\Tensie Whelan et al., ESG And Financial Performance: Uncovering the Relationship by Aggregating Evidence from 1,000 Plus Studies Published between 2015-2020 at 2, New York University Stern School of Business (Feb. 2021), https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ assets/documents/NYU-RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20Rev_0.pdf. \8\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Democrats are not arguing that ESG investments always perform better or have lower fees than traditional non- ESG investments, but we understand ESG's relevance to and impact on workers' retirement security. As such, Committee Democrats believe that retirement plan fiduciaries should be permitted to consider ESG factors when making investment decisions for plan participants. H.R. 2988 CODIFIES A FLAWED ESG RULE FROM THE FIRST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION In 2020, the first Trump Administration finalized an ESG rule\9\ requiring plan fiduciaries to make investment decisions solely based on ``pecuniary'' factors, defined as ``a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk and/or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan's investment objectives and the funding policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1) of ERISA.''\10\ The Trump-era ESG rule permitted consideration of ``non-pecuniary'' factors when a fiduciary is unable to distinguish reasonably available alternatives on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.\11\ However, in such instances, the Trump-era ESG rule imposed a first-of-its-kind paperwork requirement on plan fiduciaries to ``document the basis'' for concluding that a distinguishing factor could not be found and why the selected investment was chosen based on the purposes of the plan.\12\ The Trump-era ESG rule also prohibited non-pecuniary investments, such as ESG- themed funds, from being a qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) such as a target date fund (TDF).\13\ H.R. 2988 codifies the Trump-era ESG rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\2020 Final ESG Rule, supra note 2. \10\Id at 72884. \11\Id. at 72851. \12\Id. at 72874. \13\Id. at 72863. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There was significant opposition to the Trump-era ESG rule. According to an analysis of the more than 8,700 public comments conducted by the U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum and other organizations, 96% of the comments or petition signatures from individuals expressed opposition.\14\ One of the key findings of the analysis was that ``[o]pposition was especially high among investment-related groups, with asset managers, financial advisors, financial service providers, asset owners, pension plans, and investment organizations either unanimous or all but unanimous opposing the proposal.''\15\ Specifically, BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street Global Advisors, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard submitted opposing comments to the Department of Labor (DOL).\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Press Release, Ceres, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms' Analysis of Public Comments on Department of Labor's ESG Proposal Shows Landslide of Opposition (Aug. 20, 2020), https:// www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/investor-organizations-and- financial-industry-firms-analysis-public. \15\Id. \16\Rachel Koning Beals, Trump Labor Department's Rule Discouraging ESG Investing in Retirement Plans is Finalized Over Swell of Objections, MarketWatch (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/ story/trumps-labor-rule-discouraging-esg-investing-in-retirement-plans- is-finalized-over-swell-of-objections-11604089492. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At an April 2025 hearing of the Committee on Education and Workforce's Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, one witness noted that the distinction between ``pecuniary'' and ``non-pecuniary'' is ``unworkable because all investments inherently include pecuniary and non-pecuniary features . . . There is no universally accepted definition of what is a pecuniary vs. a non-pecuniary consideration. This vague language is nowhere to be found in the text of ERISA.''\17\ Echoing this point during the Committee's markup of H.R. 2988, Ranking Member Scott said: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\Investing for the Future: Honoring ERISA's Promise to Participants: Hearing before the H. Comm on Educ and Workforce, 119th Cong. (2025)(statement of Brandon Rees, Deputy Director of Corporations and Capital Markets, AFL-CIO), https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/ house/118155/witnesses/HHRG-119-ED02-Wstate-ReesB-20250430.pdf. [L]et's say there's a real estate fund that appears to have short-term `pecuniary' value for participants; but the properties are near the shoreline and subject to rising sea levels over the long term that would be considered `non-pecuniary' in nature. The Trump-era E- S-G rule puts needless constraints on plan fiduciaries' ability to weigh the full scope of this kind of investment--and that's not in the best interests of retirement savers.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Markup of Bills on Education Freedom, Accreditation, and Workers' Benefits: Markup before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 119th Cong. (2025)(statement of Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott on H.R. 2988), https://www.youtube.com/live/4ym5hhWETnQ. In 2022, the Biden Administration finalized a rule that reversed the Trump-era ESG rule and retained the long-standing duty of a fiduciary to focus on relevant risk-return factors in selecting investments.\19\ Specifically, the Biden-era final ESG rule permits fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, but only when consistent with the requirement that all investments must serve investors' economic interests. It does not require consideration of ESG factors, and moreover it is explicit that ESG considerations alone cannot justify sacrificing investment returns or taking on additional risks when inconsistent with those economic interests. Committee Democrats strongly support the Biden-era ESG rule, which has been upheld twice in federal district court by a judge who was appointed by President Trump.\20\ Regrettably, the Trump Administration recently signaled it would pursue changing and/or rescinding the existing Biden-era rule through regulation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 87 Federal Register 73822-73886 (Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-01/pdf/2022- 25783.pdf. \20\Memorandum Opinion and Order, State of Utah et al. v. Vince Micone (Feb. 14, 2025), Case No. 2:23-cv-00016-Z at 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 2988 CODIFIES A MISGUIDED PROXY VOTING RULE FROM THE FIRST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION Retirement savings plans covered by ERISA likely have stocks as part of their investment portfolios.\21\ Stock ownership provides an investor with certain shareholder rights, including the right to vote on matters such as electing the board of directors, executive compensation, and shareholder proposals on ESG-related issues. Such voting often occurs by proxy. The voting of proxies is not an arbitrary exercise, but rather an important mechanism for shareholders to monitor and hold management accountable and enhance long-term value of plan assets. For example, in the years since the scandal at Worldcom, a telecommunications corporation whose executives engaged in massive accounting fraud, it has become a common understanding that prudent corporate governance practices can mitigate risks. Proxy voting plays a pivotal role in enhancing investment returns by improving corporate accountability and potentially reducing the risk of wrongdoing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\See U.S. Congressional Research Service, Department of Labor Guidance and Regulations on the Exercise of Shareholder Rights by Private-Sector Pension Plans (IF12362, Mar. 27, 2023), https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF12362.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the years, DOL periodically issued guidance on proxy voting issues yet consistently affirmed that ERISA's fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence apply to proxy voting by pension and employee benefit plans.\22\ This is because the exercise of shareholder rights is key to ensuring management's accountability to the shareholders that own the company. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\See Letter from U.S. Department of Labor to Mr. Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 198 WL 897696 (``In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.''). The Department of Labor subsequently restated this view in 1994 (Interpretive Bulletin 94-2), 2008 (Interpretive Bulletin 2008-02), 2016 (Interpretative Bulletin 2016-01), and 2018 (Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-01). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2020, the first Trump Administration proposed a rule on proxy voting that was based on a flawed premise that: [S]ome fiduciaries . . . may be acting in ways that unwittingly allow plan assets to be used to support or pursue proxy proposals for environmental, social, or public policy agendas that have no connection to increasing the value of investments used for the payment of benefits or plan administrative expenses, and in fact may have unnecessarily increased plan expenses.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Federal Register 55219 (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2020-09 04/pdf/2020-19472.pdf. During the public comment period, numerous stakeholders, including those in the financial services industry, questioned or strongly objected to the Trump Administration's premise. For instance, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), which, according to its comment letter on the Trump-era proposed rule, serves more than five million retirement plan participants, said ``ESG factors are often in direct alignment with a company's pecuniary considerations--and thus it is often the case that voting proxies on ESG-related issues is in the economic interests of investors.''\24\ Many other stakeholders agreed. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which is a broad coalition of institutional investors collectively representing over $500 billion in invested capital, ``[n]o evidence appears . . . supporting the notion that fiduciaries are confused about their obligations with respect to proxy voting.''\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0284, at 8, https://www.dol.gov/ sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/ public-comments/1210-AB91/00266.pdf. \25\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0301, at 2, https:// www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0301. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nevertheless, in December 2020, the Trump Administration finalized its proxy voting rule that reflected its strong skepticism about proxy voting and ESG. It imposed first-of-its- kind restrictions on plan fiduciaries when it came to exercising their shareholder rights. The Trump-era proxy voting rule specified that fiduciaries do not have an obligation to vote on all proxies and included two safe harbors that permitted fiduciaries to limit or refrain from proxy voting in certain situations.\26\ The rule also imposed new onerous recordkeeping requirements and monitoring obligations regarding the exercise of shareholder rights. Many retirement stakeholders believed the Trump-era proxy voting rule would effectively disenfranchise ERISA fiduciaries from utilizing proxy voting and thus hurt retirement plan participants. H.R. 2988 codifies this Trump-era proxy voting rule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\Id at 81663. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 2988 ENDS WORTHWHILE EFFORTS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE ASSET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY Women and people of color are significantly underrepresented in the asset management industry. Specifically, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), about 1.4 percent of the $82 trillion in financial assets under management are managed by women or minority-owned firms.\27\ There have been efforts to increase diversity among asset managers in the private sector and the federal government, including the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) Smaller Asset Management Program. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\U.S. Gen Accountability Office, GAO-25-106766, Investment Management: Federal Entities' Efforts to Increase Opportunities

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/421