Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 2988]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2988) to amend the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 to specify requirements concerning
the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Prudent
Investment of Retirement Savings Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS
Sec. 1001. Short title.
Sec. 1002. Limitation on consideration of non-pecuniary factors by
fiduciaries.
DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS
Sec. 2001. Short title.
Sec. 2002. Service provider selection.
DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION
Sec. 3001. Short title.
Sec. 3002. Exercise of shareholder rights.
DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS
Sec. 4001. Short title.
Sec. 4002. Brokerage window disclosures.
DIVISION A--INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Increase Retirement Earnings
Act''.
SEC. 1002. LIMITATION ON CONSIDERATION OF NON-PECUNIARY FACTORS BY
FIDUCIARIES.
(a) In General.--Section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(3) Interest Based on Pecuniary Factors.--
``(A) In general.--For purposes of paragraph (1), a fiduciary
shall be considered to act solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries of the plan with respect to an
investment or investment course of action only if the
fiduciary's action with respect to such investment or
investment course of action is based solely on pecuniary
factors (except as provided in subparagraph (B)). The fiduciary
may not subordinate the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries in their retirement income or financial benefits
under the plan to other objectives and may not sacrifice
investment return or take on additional investment risk to
promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals. The weight given to
any pecuniary factor by a fiduciary shall reflect a prudent
assessment of the impact of such factor on risk and return.
``(B) Use of non-pecuniary factors for investment
alternatives.--Notwithstanding paragraph (A), if a fiduciary is
unable to distinguish between or among investment alternatives
or investment courses of action on the basis of pecuniary
factors alone, the fiduciary may use non-pecuniary factors as
the deciding factor if the fiduciary documents--
``(i) why pecuniary factors were not sufficient to
select a plan investment or investment course of
action;
``(ii) how the selected investment compares to the
alternative investments with regard to the composition
of the portfolio with regard to diversification, the
liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative
to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan,
and the projected return of the portfolio relative to
the funding objectives of the plan; and
``(iii) how the selected non-pecuniary factor or
factors are consistent with the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement
income or financial benefits under the plan.
``(C) Investment alternatives for participant-directed
individual account plans.--In selecting or retaining investment
options for a pension plan described in subsection (c)(1)(A), a
fiduciary is not prohibited from considering, selecting, or
retaining an investment option on the basis that such
investment option promotes, seeks, or supports one or more non-
pecuniary benefits or goals, if--
``(i) the fiduciary satisfies the requirements of
paragraph (1) and subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this
paragraph in selecting or retaining any such investment
option; and
``(ii) such investment option is not added or
retained as, or included as a component of, a default
investment under subsection (c)(5) (or any other
default investment alternative) if its investment
objectives or goals or its principal investment
strategies include, consider, or indicate the use of
one or more non-pecuniary factors.
``(D) Definitions.--For the purposes of this paragraph:
``(i) The term `pecuniary factor' means a factor that
a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a
material effect on the risk or return of an investment
based on appropriate investment horizons consistent
with the plan's investment objectives and the funding
policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1).
``(ii) The term `investment course of action' means
any series or program of investments or actions related
to a fiduciary's performance of the fiduciary's
investment duties, and includes the selection of an
investment fund as a plan investment, or in the case of
an individual account plan, a designated investment
alternative under the plan.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
to actions taken by a fiduciary on or after the date that is 12 months
after the date of enactment of this Act.
DIVISION B--NO DISCRIMINATION IN MY BENEFITS
SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``No Discrimination in My Benefits
Act''.
SEC. 2002. SERVICE PROVIDER SELECTION.
Section 404(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'';
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) by selecting, monitoring, and retaining any fiduciary,
counsel, employee, or service provider of the plan--
``(i) in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B);
and
``(ii) without regard to race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.''.
DIVISION C--RETIREMENT PROXY PROTECTION
SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Retirement Proxy Protection
Act''.
SEC. 3002. EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS.
(a) In General.--Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(f) Exercise of Shareholder Rights.--
``(1) Authority to exercise shareholder rights.--
``(A) In general.--The fiduciary duty to manage plan
assets that are shares of stock includes the management
of shareholder rights appurtenant to those shares,
including the right to vote proxies. When deciding
whether to exercise a shareholder right and in
exercising such right, including the voting of proxies,
a fiduciary must act prudently and solely in the
interests of participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants
and beneficiaries and defraying the reasonable expenses
of administering the plan. The fiduciary duty to manage
shareholder rights appurtenant to shares of stock does
not require the voting of every proxy or the exercise
of every shareholder right.
``(B) Exception.--This subsection shall not apply to
voting, tender, and similar rights with respect to
qualifying employer securities or securities held in an
investment arrangement that is not a designated
investment alternative in the event such rights are
passed through pursuant to the terms of an individual
account plan to participants and beneficiaries with
accounts holding such securities.
``(2) Requirements for exercise of shareholder rights.--A
fiduciary, when deciding whether to exercise a shareholder
right and when exercising a shareholder right--
``(A) shall--
``(i) act solely in accordance with the
economic interest of the plan and its
participants and beneficiaries;
``(ii) consider any costs involved;
``(iii) evaluate material facts that form the
basis for any particular proxy vote or exercise
of shareholder rights; and
``(iv) maintain a record of any proxy vote,
proxy voting activity, or other exercise of a
shareholder right, including any attempt to
influence management; and
``(B) shall not subordinate the interests of
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement
income or financial benefits under the plan to any non-
pecuniary objective, or promote non-pecuniary benefits
or goals unrelated to those financial interests of the
plan's participants and beneficiaries.
``(3) Monitoring.--A fiduciary shall exercise prudence and
diligence in the selection and monitoring of a person, if any,
selected to advise or otherwise assist with the exercise of
shareholder rights, including by providing research and
analysis, recommendations on exercise of proxy voting or other
shareholder rights, administrative services with respect to
voting proxies, and recordkeeping and reporting services.
``(4) Investment managers and proxy advisory firms.--Where
the authority to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder
rights has been delegated to an investment manager pursuant to
section 403(a), or a proxy voting advisory firm or other person
who performs advisory services as to the voting of proxies or
the exercise of other shareholder rights, a responsible plan
fiduciary shall prudently monitor the proxy voting activities
of such investment manager or advisory firm and determine
whether such activities are in compliance with paragraphs (1)
and (2).
``(5) Voting policies.--
``(A) In general.--In deciding whether to vote a
proxy pursuant to this subsection, the plan fiduciary
may adopt a proxy voting policy, including a safe
harbor proxy voting policy described in subparagraph
(B), providing that the authority to vote a proxy shall
be exercised pursuant to specific parameters designed
to serve the economic interest of the plan.
``(B) Safe harbor voting policy.--With respect to a
decision not to vote a proxy, a fiduciary shall satisfy
the fiduciary responsibilities under this subsection if
such fiduciary adopts and follows a safe harbor proxy
voting policy that--
``(i) limits voting resources to particular
types of proposals that the fiduciary has
prudently determined are substantially related
to the business activities of the issuer or are
expected to have a material effect on the value
of the plan investment; or
``(ii) establishes that the fiduciary will
refrain from voting on proposals or particular
types of proposals when the assets of a plan
invested in the issuer relative to the total
assets of such plan are below 5 percent (or, in
the event such assets are under management,
when the assets under management invested in
the issuer are below 5 percent of the total
assets under management).
``(C) Exception.--No proxy voting policy adopted
pursuant to this paragraph shall preclude a fiduciary
from submitting a proxy vote when the fiduciary
determines that the matter being voted on is expected
to have a material economic effect on the investment
performance of a plan's portfolio (or the investment
performance of assets under management in the case of
an investment manager); provided, however, that in all
cases compliance with a safe harbor voting policy shall
be presumed to satisfy fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to decisions not to vote.
``(6) Review.--A fiduciary shall periodically review any
policy adopted under this subsection.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
apply to an exercise of shareholder rights occurring on or after
January 1, 2026.
DIVISION D--PROVIDING COMPLETE INFORMATION TO RETIREMENT INVESTORS
SEC. 4001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Providing Complete Information to
Retirement Investors Act''.
SEC. 4002. BROKERAGE WINDOW DISCLOSURES.
(a) In General.--Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(7) Notice requirements for brokerage windows.--
``(A) In general.--In the case of a pension plan
which provides for individual accounts and which
provides a participant or beneficiary the opportunity
to choose from designated investment alternatives, a
participant or beneficiary shall not be treated as
exercising control over assets in the account of the
participant or beneficiary unless, with respect to any
investment arrangement that is not a designated
investment alternative, each time before such a
participant or beneficiary directs an investment into,
out of, or within such investment arrangement, such
participant is notified of, and acknowledges, each
element of the notice described under paragraph (B).
``(B) Notice.--The notice described under this
paragraph is a four part information that is
substantially similar to the following information:
``1. Your retirement plan offers designated investment alternatives prudently selected and monitored by
fiduciaries for the purpose of enabling you to construct an appropriate retirement savings portfolio. In
selecting and monitoring designated investment alternatives, your plan's fiduciary considers the risk of loss
and the opportunity for gain (or other return) compared with reasonably available investment alternatives.
2. The investments available through this investment arrangement are not designated investment alternatives, and
have not been prudently selected and are not monitored by a plan fiduciary.
3. Depending on the investments you select through this investment arrangement, you may experience diminished
returns, higher fees, and higher risk than if you select from the plan's designated investment alternatives.
4. The following is a hypothetical illustration of the impact of return at 4 percent, 6 percent, and 8 percent
on your account balance projected to age 67.
``(C) Illustration.--The notice described under
paragraph (B) shall also include a graph displaying the
projected retirement balances of such participant or
beneficiary at age 67 if the account of such individual
were to achieve an annual return equal to each of the
following:
``(i) 4 percent.
``(ii) 6 percent.
``(iii) 8 percent.''.
(b) Designated Investment Alternative Defined.--Section 3 of such Act
(29 U.S.C. 1002) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(46) Designated investment alternative.--
``(A) In general.--The term `designated investment
alternative' means any investment alternative
designated by a responsible fiduciary of an individual
account plan described in subsection 404(c) into which
participants and beneficiaries may direct the
investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their
individual accounts.
``(B) Exception.--The term `designated investment
alternative' does not include brokerage windows, self-
directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan
arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries
to select investments beyond those designated by a
responsible plan fiduciary.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on January 1, 2027.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment
of Retirement Savings Act, is to make clear that the financial
interests of employee benefit plan participants and
beneficiaries in their benefits come first.
Committee Action
117TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearings
On February 26, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor,
Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, held a
hearing titled ``Improving Retirement Security and Access to
Mental Health Benefits.'' The hearing discussed the Biden-
Harris administration's attempt to put its radical
environmental and social agendas above the financial interests
of retirees by prioritizing environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) factors when investing retirement plan assets.
Testifying before the Subcommittee were Dr. Andrew Biggs,
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
D.C.; Ms. Karen Handorf, Senior Counsel, Berger Montague,
Washington, D.C.; Ms. Amy Matsui, Director of Income Security
and Senior Counsel, National Women's Law Center, Washington,
D.C.; and Mr. Aron Szapiro, Head of Retirement Studies and
Public Policy, Morningstar Investment Management, Washington,
D.C.
On June 14, 2022, the Committee on Education and Labor held
a hearing titled ``Examining the Policies and Priorities of the
U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the Fiscal Year 2023
budget priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The
hearing included a discussion of concerns regarding the DOL's
proposed rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan
Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,'' including the
Biden-Harris administration's efforts to undermine an
investment fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty toward
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
employee benefit plans and the administration's view on
incorporating ESG into the implementation of ERISA plans.
Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Martin J.
Walsh, Secretary of Labor, Washington, D.C.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On June 7, 2023, the Committee on Education and the
Workforce held a hearing on ``Examining the Policies and
Priorities of the U.S. Department of Labor'' to review the
Fiscal Year 2023 budget priorities of DOL. The hearing
discussed DOL's December 1, 2022, final rule titled ``Prudence
and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights,'' including concerns regarding the Biden-
Harris administration's efforts to undermine an investment
fiduciary's duties of prudence and loyalty when selecting and
monitoring investments for ERISA plans and the administration's
support for incorporating ESG into the administration of ERISA
plans. Testifying before the Committee was the Honorable Julie
A. Su, Acting Secretary, DOL, Washington, D.C.
First Session--Legislative Action
On February 7, 2023, Representative Andy Barr (R-KY)
introduced a joint resolution of disapproval (H.J. Res. 30)
under the Congressional Review Act to nullify the Biden-Harris
administration DOL's final rule titled ``Prudence and Loyalty
in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights.'' The resolution was referred to the Committee on
Education and the Workforce. The resolution rescinds the Biden-
Harris administration's rule and would have the effect of
reinstating the Trump administration's November 13, 2020, rule
titled ``Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments.'' On
February 28, 2023, the House of Representatives passed H.J.
Res. 30 by a vote of 219-210, with Senate passage on March 1 by
a vote of 50-46. On March 20, the President vetoed the measure.
On March 23, 2023, the House of Representatives failed to
override the veto by a vote of 219-200.
On September 5, 2023, Representative Erin Houchin (R-IN)
introduced H.R. 5337, the Retirement Proxy Protection Act. The
bill was referred to the Committee on Education and the
Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the Committee considered H.R.
5337 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as
amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of
23-19. The Committee considered the following amendments to
H.R. 5337:
1. Representative Virginia Foxx (R-NC) offered an
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made
minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by
voice vote.
2. Representative Mark DeSaulnier (R-CA) offered a
substitute amendment codifying the Biden-Harris
administration's ESG and proxy voting rule. The
amendment was defeated by a recorded vote of 19-23.
On September 5, 2023, Representative Bob Good (R-VA)
introduced H.R. 5338, the No Discrimination in My Benefits Act
(H.R. 5338). The bill was referred to the Committee on
Education and the Workforce. On September 14, 2023, the
Committee considered H.R. 5338 in legislative session and
reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee
considered an ANS offered by Representative Good that made
minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
On September 5, 2023, Representative Rick W. Allen (R-GA)
introduced H.R. 5339, the Roll Back ESG to Increase Retirement
Earnings Act (RETIRE Act). The bill was referred to the
Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14,
2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5339 in legislative session
and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee
considered the following amendments to H.R. 5339:
1. Representative Allen offered an ANS that made
minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by
voice vote.
2. Representative Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA)
offered a substitute amendment to codify the Biden-
Harris administration's ESG investing rule. The
amendment was defeated by a vote of 19-23.
On September 5, 2023, Representative Jim Banks (R-IN)
introduced H.R. 5340, the Providing Complete Information to
Retirement Investors Act. The bill was referred to the
Committee on Education and the Workforce. On September 14,
2023, the Committee considered H.R. 5340 in legislative session
and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-19. The Committee
considered an ANS offered by Representative Banks that made
minor technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
On September 18, 2024, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 5339, which now also included the texts of H.R. 5337, H.R.
5338, and H.R. 5340, by a vote of 217-206.
119TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On April 30, 2025, the Committee on Education and
Workforce, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions, held a hearing titled ``Investing for the Future:
Honoring ERISA's Promise to Participants.'' The hearing
discussed the Biden-Harris administration's attempts to put its
environmental and social agendas above the financial interests
of retirees by prioritizing ESG factors when investing
retirement plan assets. Testifying before the Subcommittee were
Mr. Ike Brannon, President, Capitol Policy Analytics,
Washington, D.C.; Mr. Charles Crain, Managing Vice President
for Policy, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington,
D.C.; Mr. Brandon Rees, Deputy Director, Corporations and
Capital Markets, American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. Max M.
Schanzenbach, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law,
Chicago, Illinois.
First Session--Legislative Action
On April 24, 2025, Representative Allen introduced H.R.
2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement Savings
Act. The bill was referred to the Committee on Education and
the Workforce. On June 25, 2025, the Committee considered H.R.
2988 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as
amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of
21-15. The Committee considered an ANS offered by Chairman
Allen that made minor technical changes. The amendment was
adopted by voice vote.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement
Savings Act, clarifies what ERISA and the U.S. Supreme Court
already require: that fiduciaries manage plan assets, including
the shareholder management rights appurtenant to those assets,
for the exclusive purpose of a participant's or beneficiary's
financial interest in his or her benefits under the plan. This
legislation is needed because the Biden-Harris administration
ignored ERISA's foundational principles in order to allow
activists to invest and use shareholder management rights, such
as proxy votes appurtenant to ERISA plan assets, to advance ESG
goals at the expense of the financial interests of ERISA
employee benefit plans. H.R. 2988 also reiterates a fundamental
principle already existing under ERISA: selecting a service
provider for an ERISA plan is a fiduciary act subject to
ERISA's fiduciary obligation of prudence and loyalty. H.R. 2988
further amends ERISA to codify a prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin when selecting a service provider.
Additionally, H.R. 2988 requires participant-directed ERISA
individual account plans to give critically important
information to participants before investing through a
brokerage window. In short, H.R. 2988 protects the retirement
savings of the U.S. workforce.
THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND LOYALTY UNDER EXISTING LAW
Under ERISA, an investment fiduciary must act solely in the
interest of participants and beneficiates and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan (the ``exclusive purpose rule'').\1\
Courts have held that ERISA's exclusive purpose rule requires
fiduciaries to act with ``complete and undivided loyalty to the
beneficiaries''\2\ and make decisions ``with an eye single to
the interests of participants and beneficiaries.''\3\
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\1\ERISA Sec. Sec. 403(c), 404(a); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1103(c),
1104(a). Hereinafter, this fiduciary duty is referred to as the
``exclusive purpose rule.''
\2\Donavan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted).
\3\Donavan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ERISA also requires a fiduciary to act ``with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of like character.''\4\ Thus, fiduciaries are held
to an expert prudence standard. Courts have held that the duty
of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to monitor the
appropriateness of investments continually.\5\
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\4\ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B).
\5\Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828-29 (2015)
(confirming ERISA fiduciary duty to monitor and remove imprudent trust
investments).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected non-
pecuniary public policy goals as a basis for relaxing ERISA's
fiduciary standards.\6\ The Court held that ERISA's duty of
prudence does not vary depending on a non-pecuniary goal, even
if that goal is set out in the plan document.\7\ The Court
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014)
(rejecting a ``presumption of prudence'' for acquisition and holding of
employer stock based on the non-pecuniary benefit of employee stock
ownership).
\7\Id. at 420 (``We cannot accept the claim . . . that the content
of ERISA's duty of prudence varies depending on the specific
nonpecuniary goal set out in an ERISA plan.'').
Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term
`benefits' . . . must be understood to refer to the
sort of financial benefits (such as retirement income)
that trustees who manage investments typically seek to
secure for the trust's beneficiaries . . . The term
does not cover nonpecuniary benefits like those
supposed to arise from employee ownership of employer
stock.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Id. at 421.
The Supreme Court's holding applies to all non-pecuniary
benefits. Thus, under ERISA, there is no room for advancing
collateral goals such as ESG, even in a tiebreaker situation in
which there are two economically equal investments.
At a Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions (HELP) hearing on April 30, 2025, Professor Max
Schanzenbach, an economist and legal expert in fiduciary law,
stated:
ERISA's fiduciary guardrails have been tested by the
advent of so-called ESG investing . . . Providing
collateral social benefits to third parties is not
consistent with the duty of loyalty under ERISA, and
avoiding financially sound investments is not
consistent with the duty of prudence. For these
reasons, socially responsible investing was widely
regarded as forbidden under ERISA.\9\
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\9\Investing for the Future: Honoring ERISA's Promise to Investors:
Hearing on H.R. 2988 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Lab. &
Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, 119th Cong. (2025)
(statement of Max Schanzenbach, Seigle Family Prof. of Law,
Northwestern Univ., at 2), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
schanzenbach_testimony.pdf.
However, for the last 30 years, there have been attempts to
erode ERISA's principles of prudence and loyalty in order to
promote benefits other than the financial interest of
participants and beneficiaries (i.e., ``collateral benefits'').
Professor Schanzenbach testified he believes that H.R. 2988
``improves ERISA regulations . . . while adopting modest
reforms that strengthen ERISA's fiduciary guardrails.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Id. at 4.
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DIVISION A OF H.R. 2988: INCREASE RETIREMENT EARNINGS
History of the Tiebreaker Rule When Investing ERISA Plan Assets
In 1994, DOL first articulated a ``tiebreaker rule'' in
broadly applicable guidance allowing an ERISA fiduciary to
consider ESG benefits (``collateral benefits'') when choosing
between two economically equal investments.\11\ From the
beginning, the tiebreaker rule was inherently inconsistent with
ERISA's exclusive purpose rule.\12\ Over the next two decades,
DOL addressed the tiebreaker rule through sub-regulatory
guidance, with Democrat administrations promoting the
tiebreaker rule to use ERISA plan assets for collateral
benefits and Republican administrations attempting to limit
collateral benefit investing by reinforcing ERISA's exclusive
purpose rule.\13\
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\11\59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
Sec. 2509.94-1) (Interpretive Bulletin (IB) 94-1)). The term used in IB
94-1 is ``economically targeted investments.'' Prior to issuing IB 94
1, DOL issued letters concerning a fiduciary's ability to consider the
non-pecuniary effects of an investment and granted a variety of
prohibited transaction exemptions to both individual plans and pooled
investment vehicles involving investments that produce non-pecuniary
benefits. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed.
Reg. 72,856, 72,856 n.6 (Nov. 13, 2020).
\12\See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling
Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG
Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stanford L. Rev. 381, 390, 408 (2020)
(stating that DOL's tiebreaker rule is ``dubious as a matter or
textbook financial economics and . . . contrary to the controlling
statute and U.S. Supreme Court precedent); see also Edward Zelinsky,
ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Investments,
IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 Berkeley J. Emp.
Lab. L. 333 (1995) (criticizing DOL's first sub-regulatory guidance on
investing for collateral benefits using the tiebreaker rule as
``unsound as a matter of logic and policy and . . . incompatible with
the statutory standards governing the investment decisions of pension
fiduciaries.'').
\13\Edward Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-01 and Economically
Targeted Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. Postscript
11, 12 (2009) (criticizing subsequent Republican subregulatory guidance
as only an attempt to limit collateral investing rather than
repudiating it as incoherent and incompatible with ERISA's duty of
loyalty).
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Two distinguished professors wrote in the Stanford Law
Review in 2020 on ERISA's fiduciary duty and ESG investing that
``with respect to law, the tiebreaker is irreconcilable with
the strict `sole interest' or `exclusive benefit' rule [of
ERISA].''\14\ The article is skeptical that true economic ties
exist in the investment world, but if they do, then the
appropriate solution is to invest in both instruments for
purposes of diversification.
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\14\Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a
Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 408 (2020).
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Trump Administration ESG Rule
In November 2020, DOL issued a final rule on ESG investing
based on skepticism that a true tie can exist between two
investments. Under this rule, a fiduciary can consider
collateral benefits only if choosing between or among
``investment alternatives that the plan fiduciary is unable to
distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.''\15\ The
Trump administration rule requires a plan fiduciary to document
(and, in essence, prove) that two investments are
indistinguishable based on pecuniary factors before invoking
the tiebreaker rule. If a fiduciary invokes the tiebreaker
rule, then the fiduciary is required to document how any
tiebreaking factor is consistent with the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries in their financial benefits
under the plan. This provision is intended to prevent abuse of
the tiebreaker. The rule also prohibits fiduciaries from
choosing default investments that have objectives or principal
strategies that are non-pecuniary.
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\15\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
72,846, 72,884 (Nov. 13, 2020).
------------------------
Minority Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 2988, the Protecting Prudent Investment of Retirement
Savings Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)\1\ to codify two regulations from the first
Trump Administration regarding environmental, social,
governance (ESG) factors in the selection of retirement
investments\2\ and proxy voting.\3\ Additionally, H.R. 2988
prohibits retirement plan fiduciaries from selecting,
monitoring, and retaining any fiduciary, counsel, employee, or
service provider of the plan based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. H.R. 2988 also requires that
retirement plan participants receive notice when they make
certain investments. In sum, H.R. 2988 reflects a mistaken view
about ESG factors in retirement investing and undermines
retirement plan fiduciaries' ability to make prudent decisions
in retirement plan participants' bests interests. H.R. 2988 is
opposed by dozens of organizations,\4\ including the AFL CIO,
American Association of People with Disabilities, American
Federation of Teachers, Americans for Financial Reform, CERES,
Communications Workers of America, Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility, International Union of Bricklayers
and Allied Craftworkers, Oxfam America, Public Citizen, Sierra
Club, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
and the U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum.
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\1\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104.
\2\Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg.
72846 (Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final ESG Rule], https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-13/pdf/2020-24515.pdf.
\3\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights,
85 Federal Register 81658 (Dec. 16, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Final Proxy
Voting Rule], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-16/pdf/
2020-27465.pdf.
\4\See Letter from Americans for Financial Reform, et al to Chair
Tim Walberg and Ranking Member Bobby Scott, H. Comm. on Educ. &
Workforce, Full Committee Markup (June 25, 2025) [hereinafter Americans
for Financial Reform letter], https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2025/06/
letters-to-congress-letter-in-opposition-to-h-r-2988-protecting-
prudent-investment-of-retirement-
savings-act/; Letter from CERES to Comm. on Educ. & Workforce Chair
Walberg and Comm. Members, H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, Full
Committee Markup (June 25, 2025), https://house.app.box.com/s/
eikni8ns1vv5t71krbb8abzoc3ydlvzk/file/1904803386220; Statement from
U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum, (June 23, 2025), (on file with
Committee staff).
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COMMITTEE REPUBLICANS ARE WRONG ABOUT ESG FACTORS
Committee Republicans characterized H.R. 2988 as a bill
that ``seeks to ensure financial institutions are focused on
maximizing returns in retirement plans rather than on woke ESG
factors.''\5\ This is a false construct. ESG factors enable
investors, including retirement plans, to be informed about
potential risks and opportunities when evaluating an investment
portfolio. Additionally, ESG investing can be viewed as a risk
mitigation strategy enabling retirement plans to consider
investments that account for companies' negative externalities,
such as high liability risks, fossil fuel dependent business
practices, and poor treatment of workers. These are among the
factors that would cause stocks to suffer over decades, which
is precisely the time horizon of retirement investing.
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\5\Press Release, H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce,
@EdWorkforceCmte Passes Bills on Education Freedom, Accreditation, and
Workers' Benefits (June 25, 2025), https://edworkforce.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=412598.
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Maximizing returns is tied to careful consideration of ESG
factors, and retirement plan fiduciaries and major corporations
understand this. BlackRock, which is the world's largest asset
manager, has stated that its ``investment conviction is that
incorporating sustainability-related factors--which are often
characterized and grouped into ESG categories--into investment
decisions can provide better risk-adjusted returns to investors
over the long-term.''\6\
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\6\Comment No. EBSA-2021-0013-0734 at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-
comments/1210-AC03/00729.pdf.
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In July 2023, the New York University (NYU) Stern Center
for Sustainable Business and Rockefeller Asset Management,
collaborated to examine the relationship between ESG and
financial performance in more than 1,000 research papers from
2015-2020. They found that ``empirical studies and meta-
analyses consistently demonstrate a positive relationship
between ESG integration and financial performance.''\7\ They
also concluded that ``some ESG strategies seem to generate
market rate or excess returns when compared to conventional
investment strategies, especially for long-term investors, and
provide downside protection during economic or social crisis.
Notably, very few studies found definitive negative
correlations between ESG and financial performance.''\8\
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\7\Tensie Whelan et al., ESG And Financial Performance: Uncovering
the Relationship by Aggregating Evidence from 1,000 Plus Studies
Published between 2015-2020 at 2, New York University Stern School of
Business (Feb. 2021), https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/NYU-RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20Rev_0.pdf.
\8\Id.
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Committee Democrats are not arguing that ESG investments
always perform better or have lower fees than traditional non-
ESG investments, but we understand ESG's relevance to and
impact on workers' retirement security. As such, Committee
Democrats believe that retirement plan fiduciaries should be
permitted to consider ESG factors when making investment
decisions for plan participants.
H.R. 2988 CODIFIES A FLAWED ESG RULE FROM THE FIRST TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION
In 2020, the first Trump Administration finalized an ESG
rule\9\ requiring plan fiduciaries to make investment decisions
solely based on ``pecuniary'' factors, defined as ``a factor
that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a
material effect on the risk and/or return of an investment
based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the
plan's investment objectives and the funding policy established
pursuant to section 402(b)(1) of ERISA.''\10\ The Trump-era ESG
rule permitted consideration of ``non-pecuniary'' factors when
a fiduciary is unable to distinguish reasonably available
alternatives on the basis of pecuniary factors alone.\11\
However, in such instances, the Trump-era ESG rule imposed a
first-of-its-kind paperwork requirement on plan fiduciaries to
``document the basis'' for concluding that a distinguishing
factor could not be found and why the selected investment was
chosen based on the purposes of the plan.\12\ The Trump-era ESG
rule also prohibited non-pecuniary investments, such as ESG-
themed funds, from being a qualified default investment
alternative (QDIA) such as a target date fund (TDF).\13\ H.R.
2988 codifies the Trump-era ESG rule.
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\9\2020 Final ESG Rule, supra note 2.
\10\Id at 72884.
\11\Id. at 72851.
\12\Id. at 72874.
\13\Id. at 72863.
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There was significant opposition to the Trump-era ESG rule.
According to an analysis of the more than 8,700 public comments
conducted by the U.S. Sustainable Investment Forum and other
organizations, 96% of the comments or petition signatures from
individuals expressed opposition.\14\ One of the key findings
of the analysis was that ``[o]pposition was especially high
among investment-related groups, with asset managers, financial
advisors, financial service providers, asset owners, pension
plans, and investment organizations either unanimous or all but
unanimous opposing the proposal.''\15\ Specifically, BlackRock,
Fidelity, State Street Global Advisors, T. Rowe Price, and
Vanguard submitted opposing comments to the Department of Labor
(DOL).\16\
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\14\Press Release, Ceres, Investor Organizations and Financial
Industry Firms' Analysis of Public Comments on Department of Labor's
ESG Proposal Shows Landslide of Opposition (Aug. 20, 2020), https://
www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/investor-organizations-and-
financial-industry-firms-analysis-public.
\15\Id.
\16\Rachel Koning Beals, Trump Labor Department's Rule Discouraging
ESG Investing in Retirement Plans is Finalized Over Swell of
Objections, MarketWatch (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/trumps-labor-rule-discouraging-esg-investing-in-retirement-plans-
is-finalized-over-swell-of-objections-11604089492.
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At an April 2025 hearing of the Committee on Education and
Workforce's Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and
Pensions, one witness noted that the distinction between
``pecuniary'' and ``non-pecuniary'' is ``unworkable because all
investments inherently include pecuniary and non-pecuniary
features . . . There is no universally accepted definition of
what is a pecuniary vs. a non-pecuniary consideration. This
vague language is nowhere to be found in the text of
ERISA.''\17\ Echoing this point during the Committee's markup
of H.R. 2988, Ranking Member Scott said:
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\17\Investing for the Future: Honoring ERISA's Promise to
Participants: Hearing before the H. Comm on Educ and Workforce, 119th
Cong. (2025)(statement of Brandon Rees, Deputy Director of Corporations
and Capital Markets, AFL-CIO), https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/
house/118155/witnesses/HHRG-119-ED02-Wstate-ReesB-20250430.pdf.
[L]et's say there's a real estate fund that appears
to have short-term `pecuniary' value for participants;
but the properties are near the shoreline and subject
to rising sea levels over the long term that would be
considered `non-pecuniary' in nature. The Trump-era E-
S-G rule puts needless constraints on plan fiduciaries'
ability to weigh the full scope of this kind of
investment--and that's not in the best interests of
retirement savers.\18\
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\18\Markup of Bills on Education Freedom, Accreditation, and
Workers' Benefits: Markup before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce,
119th Cong. (2025)(statement of Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby''
Scott on H.R. 2988), https://www.youtube.com/live/4ym5hhWETnQ.
In 2022, the Biden Administration finalized a rule that
reversed the Trump-era ESG rule and retained the long-standing
duty of a fiduciary to focus on relevant risk-return factors in
selecting investments.\19\ Specifically, the Biden-era final
ESG rule permits fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, but only
when consistent with the requirement that all investments must
serve investors' economic interests. It does not require
consideration of ESG factors, and moreover it is explicit that
ESG considerations alone cannot justify sacrificing investment
returns or taking on additional risks when inconsistent with
those economic interests. Committee Democrats strongly support
the Biden-era ESG rule, which has been upheld twice in federal
district court by a judge who was appointed by President
Trump.\20\ Regrettably, the Trump Administration recently
signaled it would pursue changing and/or rescinding the
existing Biden-era rule through regulation.
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\19\Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights, 87 Federal Register 73822-73886 (Dec. 1,
2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-12-01/pdf/2022-
25783.pdf.
\20\Memorandum Opinion and Order, State of Utah et al. v. Vince
Micone (Feb. 14, 2025), Case No. 2:23-cv-00016-Z at 12.
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H.R. 2988 CODIFIES A MISGUIDED PROXY VOTING RULE FROM THE FIRST TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION
Retirement savings plans covered by ERISA likely have
stocks as part of their investment portfolios.\21\ Stock
ownership provides an investor with certain shareholder rights,
including the right to vote on matters such as electing the
board of directors, executive compensation, and shareholder
proposals on ESG-related issues. Such voting often occurs by
proxy. The voting of proxies is not an arbitrary exercise, but
rather an important mechanism for shareholders to monitor and
hold management accountable and enhance long-term value of plan
assets. For example, in the years since the scandal at
Worldcom, a telecommunications corporation whose executives
engaged in massive accounting fraud, it has become a common
understanding that prudent corporate governance practices can
mitigate risks. Proxy voting plays a pivotal role in enhancing
investment returns by improving corporate accountability and
potentially reducing the risk of wrongdoing.
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\21\See U.S. Congressional Research Service, Department of Labor
Guidance and Regulations on the Exercise of Shareholder Rights by
Private-Sector Pension Plans (IF12362, Mar. 27, 2023), https://
sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF12362.pdf.
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Over the years, DOL periodically issued guidance on proxy
voting issues yet consistently affirmed that ERISA's fiduciary
duties of loyalty and prudence apply to proxy voting by pension
and employee benefit plans.\22\ This is because the exercise of
shareholder rights is key to ensuring management's
accountability to the shareholders that own the company.
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\22\See Letter from U.S. Department of Labor to Mr. Helmuth Fandl,
Chairman of the Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23,
1988), 198 WL 897696 (``In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan
assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of
proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.''). The Department of
Labor subsequently restated this view in 1994 (Interpretive Bulletin
94-2), 2008 (Interpretive Bulletin 2008-02), 2016 (Interpretative
Bulletin 2016-01), and 2018 (Field Assistance Bulletin 2018-01).
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In 2020, the first Trump Administration proposed a rule on
proxy voting that was based on a flawed premise that:
[S]ome fiduciaries . . . may be acting in ways that
unwittingly allow plan assets to be used to support or
pursue proxy proposals for environmental, social, or
public policy agendas that have no connection to
increasing the value of investments used for the
payment of benefits or plan administrative expenses,
and in fact may have unnecessarily increased plan
expenses.\23\
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\23\Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights,
85 Federal Register 55219 (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-09 04/pdf/2020-19472.pdf.
During the public comment period, numerous stakeholders,
including those in the financial services industry, questioned
or strongly objected to the Trump Administration's premise. For
instance, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America
(TIAA), which, according to its comment letter on the Trump-era
proposed rule, serves more than five million retirement plan
participants, said ``ESG factors are often in direct alignment
with a company's pecuniary considerations--and thus it is often
the case that voting proxies on ESG-related issues is in the
economic interests of investors.''\24\ Many other stakeholders
agreed. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility, which is a broad coalition of institutional
investors collectively representing over $500 billion in
invested capital, ``[n]o evidence appears . . . supporting the
notion that fiduciaries are confused about their obligations
with respect to proxy voting.''\25\
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\24\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0284, at 8, https://www.dol.gov/
sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/
public-comments/1210-AB91/00266.pdf.
\25\Comment No. EBSA-2020-0008-0301, at 2, https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/EBSA-2020-0008-0301.
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Nevertheless, in December 2020, the Trump Administration
finalized its proxy voting rule that reflected its strong
skepticism about proxy voting and ESG. It imposed first-of-its-
kind restrictions on plan fiduciaries when it came to
exercising their shareholder rights. The Trump-era proxy voting
rule specified that fiduciaries do not have an obligation to
vote on all proxies and included two safe harbors that
permitted fiduciaries to limit or refrain from proxy voting in
certain situations.\26\ The rule also imposed new onerous
recordkeeping requirements and monitoring obligations regarding
the exercise of shareholder rights. Many retirement
stakeholders believed the Trump-era proxy voting rule would
effectively disenfranchise ERISA fiduciaries from utilizing
proxy voting and thus hurt retirement plan participants. H.R.
2988 codifies this Trump-era proxy voting rule.
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\26\Id at 81663.
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H.R. 2988 ENDS WORTHWHILE EFFORTS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE ASSET
MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY
Women and people of color are significantly
underrepresented in the asset management industry.
Specifically, according to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), about 1.4 percent of the $82 trillion in financial
assets under management are managed by women or minority-owned
firms.\27\ There have been efforts to increase diversity among
asset managers in the private sector and the federal
government, including the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation's (PBGC) Smaller Asset Management Program.
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\27\U.S. Gen Accountability Office, GAO-25-106766, Investment
Management: Federal Entities' Efforts to Increase Opportunities