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H. Rept. 119-532

TAILORING AND INDEXING ENHANCED REGULATIONS ACT OF 2025

2026-02-25

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 6553] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6553) to index statutory thresholds, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 4 Committee Consideration.......................................... 4 Related Hearings................................................. 4 Committee Votes.................................................. 5 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7 New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 7 Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 7 Earmark Statement................................................ 7 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 8 Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 8 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8 Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 8 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 10 Documents Included by Unanimous Consent.......................... 63 Minority Views................................................... 70 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations Act of 2025'' or the ``TIER Act of 2025''. SEC. 2. THRESHOLD ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOUNT FOR HISTORICAL INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. (a) Federal Reserve Act.--The second subsection (s) (relating to assessments) of section 11 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 248(s)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``$100,000,000,000'' each place that term appears and inserting ``$150,000,000,000''; and (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``between $100,000,000,000 and $250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``between $150,000,000,000 and $370,000,000,000''. (b) Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.--Section 4(k)(6)(B)(ii) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(6)(B)(ii)) is amended, by striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$15,000,000,000''. (c) Financial Stability Act of 2010.--The Financial Stability Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.) is amended-- (1) in section 116(a) (12 U.S.C. 5326(a)), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; (2) in section 121(a) (12 U.S.C. 5331(a)), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; (3) in section 163(b) (12 U.S.C. 5363(b))-- (A) by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' each place that term appears and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and (B) by striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$15,000,000,000''; (4) in section 164 (12 U.S.C. 5364), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and (5) in section 165 (12 U.S.C. 5365)-- (A) in subsection (a)-- (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and (ii) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking ``$100,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$150,000,000,000''; (B) in subsection (h)(2), by striking ``$50,000,000,000'' each place that term appears and inserting ``$75,000,000,000''; (C) in subsection (i)(2)(A), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and (D) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''. (d) Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.--Section 401(f) of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5365 note) is amended by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''. SEC. 3. PERIODIC ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS TO ACCOUNT FOR FUTURE INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. (a) In General.--The Financial Stability Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 177. PERIODIC ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS TO ACCOUNT FOR INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. ``(a) In General.--By April 1, 2031, and the 1st day of each subsequent 5-year period, the Board of Governors shall increase the thresholds described in subsection (b) by the ratio, if greater than 1, of the annual value of current-dollar United States gross domestic product, published by the Department of Commerce, for the calendar year preceding the year in which the adjustment is calculated under this section, to the published annual value of such index for the calendar year preceding April 1, 2026. ``(b) Covered Thresholds.--The thresholds described in this subsection are the following: ``(1) Each bank holding company or savings and loan holding company total consolidated asset amount in the second subsection (s) (relating to assessments) of section 11 of the Federal Reserve Act. ``(2) Each bank holding company total consolidated asset amount in-- ``(A) sections 116(a), 121(a), 163(b), 164, 165(a)(1), 165(h)(2), 165(j)(1) of this Act; and ``(B) section 401(f) of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. ``(3) Each financial company total consolidated asset amount in section 165(i)(2)(A) of this Act. ``(c) Currency of Information.--The values used in the calculation under subsection (a) shall be, as of the date of the calculation, the values most recently published by the Department of Commerce. ``(d) Rounding.-- ``(1) If any amount equal to or greater than $100,000,000,000 determined under subsection (a) for any period is not a multiple of $50,000,000,000, the amount shall be rounded up to the nearest $50,000,000,000. ``(2) If any amount less than $100,000,000,000 determined under subsection (a) for any period is not a multiple of $5,000,000,000, the amount shall be rounded up to the nearest $5,000,000,000. ``(e) Publication.--Not later than April 5 of any calendar year in which an adjustment is required to be calculated under subsection (a), the Board of Governors shall publish in the Federal Register the amounts as so calculated. ``(f) Implementation Period.--Any increase in amounts determined under subsection (a) shall take effect on January 1 of the year immediately succeeding the calendar year in which the increase is required to be calculated under subsection (a). ``SEC. 178. ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS ESTABLISHED BY RULE TO ACCOUNT FOR INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. ``(a) Agency Review.--Not later than June 30, 2026, and the 1st day of each subsequent 5-year period, the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall, to the extent applicable, review-- ``(1) any regulation-- ``(A) implementing section 165 of this Act; or ``(B) making specific cross-reference to any regulation of the Board of Governors implementing section 165 of this Act; and ``(2) any asset threshold or other quantitative threshold in such regulations implementing section 165 of this Act, or in such regulations making specific cross-reference to any regulation of the Board of Governors implementing section 165 of this Act, the amount of which is not prescribed by statute. ``(b) Modifications Required.--The Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall modify any such thresholds identified by each review conducted under subsection (a) by the ratio, if greater than 1, of the annual value of current-dollar United States gross domestic product, published by the Department of Commerce, for the calendar year preceding the year in which the modification is calculated under this section, to the published annual value of such index for the calendar year preceding the effective date of such threshold, as each respective agency shall determine as appropriate for such regulations. In making such determination, the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall-- ``(1) use the values for current-dollar United States gross domestic product most recently published by the Department of Commerce as of the date of commencement of the review; ``(2) seek to establish, to the extent feasible, uniform thresholds for use by each such agency, taking into account the entities regulated by each such agency and the purposes for which such threshold was established; and ``(3) seek to adjust such thresholds, to the extent feasible, with rounding consistent with section 177(d) of this Act. ``(c) Report.--Upon conclusion of each review required under subsection (a), each of the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall transmit a report to Congress containing a description of any modification of any regulation such agency made pursuant to subsection (b).''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 176 the following: ``Sec. 177. Periodic adjustments to thresholds to account for increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic product. ``Sec. 178. Adjustments to thresholds established by rule to account for increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic product.''.

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 6553, the Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations (TIER) Act, was introduced on December 10, 2025, by Republican Representative Andy Barr (KY-06). This bill indexes various asset-based thresholds for bank regulations to nominal GDP largely for banks categorized as Category II, III, and IV. These regulations include enhanced prudential standards, periodic and supervisory stress tests, among others.

Background and Need for Legislation

Banking regulation relies upon the use of asset-size thresholds above which various regulatory requirements come into effect. This is intended to both focus the most stringent of regulations on banks with the greatest risks and conserve the resources of regulators for the supervision of those banks with the greatest risks. These asset-size thresholds are largely static, expressed as dollar figures that do not change absent adjustment through periodic rulemakings. Though such thresholds do provide predictability given that they clearly demarcate when certain regulatory requirements will be applicable to a given bank, they also create unintended consequences given their fixed levels. This is because as the economy grows and inflation rises, the volume of banks' real inflation-adjusted assets grows with the economy and the nominal value of banks' assets rises with inflation, meaning banks' respective asset-sizes can increase in nominal terms on paper despite still being the same size relative to the wider economy in real inflation-adjusted terms. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in times of high inflation. H.R. 6553 adjusts thresholds for Category II, III, and IV banks to account for the effects of economic growth and inflation that has occurred since the threshold was initially set. Additionally, this bill codifies automatic adjustments on a permanent basis by indexing the new thresholds to nominal GDP.

Committee Consideration

119TH CONGRESS On December 10, 2025, Representative Barr introduced H.R. 6553, the Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations (TIER) Act. Representatives Dan Meuser (R-PA), Roger Williams (R-TX), Tim Moore (R-NC), Maria Salazar (R-FL), Frank Lucas (R-OK), Pete Sessions (R-TX), and Zach Nunn (R-IA) were added subsequently as cosponsors. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. A discussion draft version of H.R. 6553 was attached to the December 2, 2025, hearing titled ``Oversight of Prudential Regulators.'' On December 16, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 6553. The Committee ordered H.R. 6553, as amended, to be reported with a favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives. Related Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 6553: On December 2, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing titled, ``Oversight of Prudential Regulators.'' The Committee heard testimony from: the Honorable Michelle Bowman, Vice Chair for Supervision, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Honorable Jonathan Gould, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Honorable Kyle Hauptman, Chairman, National Credit Union Administration; and the Honorable Travis Hill, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. On December 16, 2025, the Committee ordered H.R. 6553, as amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 33 yeas and 19 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-216). Before the question to report was called, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Representative Barr, designated BARR_124, which made minor edits and technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice vote. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 6553 is to index various statutory thresholds to keep pace with changing economic conditions over time. Committee Cost Estimate Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 6553. The Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office once it has been prepared. New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However, a cost estimate was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Unfunded Mandates Statement The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Earmark Statement In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to the Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title Section 1 provides the short title is the ``Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations Act of 2025'' or the ``TIER Act of 2025''. Section 2. Threshold adjustments to account for historical increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic product Section 2(a) amends the Federal Reserve Act to increase the threshold at which bank holding companies are subjected to assessments, fees, or other charges collected from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from $100 billion to $150 billion. Section 2(b) amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to increase the threshold above which a financial holding company must obtain prior approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before acquiring a nonbank company under section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 in a transaction involving an acquisition of assets exceeding the threshold from $10 billion to $15 billion. Section 2(c)(1) amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase the threshold above which the Financial Stability Oversight Council, acting through the Office of Financial Research, may require a bank holding company to submit certain certified reports from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(c)(2) also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase the threshold above which the Board of Governors may take certain mitigating actions in respect of bank holding companies with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(c)(3) also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase (i) the threshold above which a bank holding company with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold must provide notice to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before acquiring direct or indirect ownership or control of voting shares of certain nonbank companies from $250 billion to $370 billion, and (ii) the threshold defining such nonbank companies from $10 billion to $15 billion. Section 2(c)(4) also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase the threshold above which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System generally may not act to permit service by a management official at a bank holding company with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold while at the same time serving as a management official at a nonbank financial company designated for supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by the Financial Stability Oversight Council from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(c)(5) also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 (i) to increase the threshold above which bank holding companies become subject to enhanced prudential standards under section 165(a)(1) of the Financial Stability Act of 2010 from $250 billion to $370 billion, (ii) to increase the threshold above which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may apply a enhanced prudential standard to a bank holding company with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold from under section 165(a)(2) of the Financial Stability Act of 2010 from $100 billion to $150 billion, (iii) to increase the threshold above which publicly traded bank holding companies are required to establish a risk committee from $50 billion to $75 billion, (iv) to increase the threshold above which financial companies regulated by a primary Federal financial regulatory agency with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold are required to conduce periodic stress tests from $250 billion to $370 billion, and (v) to increase the threshold above which bank holding companies with total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold and in respect of which the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel makes certain determinations become subject to a debt to equity ratio from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(d) amends the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act to increase the total consolidated asset level a bank holding company is treated as having for purposes of certain provisions of the Financial Stability Act of 2010 and of the Federal Reserve Act if the bank holding company is identified as a global systemically important BHC under certain rules adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 3. Periodic adjustments to thresholds to account for future increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic product Section 3 adds section 177 to the Financial Stability Act of 2010, which would require the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by April 1, 2031, and the 1st day of each subsequent 5-year period, to adjust certain asset thresholds in the Federal Reserve Act, the Financial Stability Act of 2010, and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act to account for increases in current- dollar U.S. gross domestic product. Section 3 also adds section 178 to the Financial Stability Act of 2010, which would require the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, by June 30, 2026, and the 1st day of each subsequent 5-year period, to adjust certain asset thresholds in certain rules adopted by these agencies to account for increases in current-dollar U.S. gross domestic product. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): SECTION 11 OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT Sec. 11. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall be authorized and empowered: (a)(1) To examine at its discretion the accounts, books and affairs of each Federal reserve bank and of each member bank and to require such statements and reports as it may deem necessary. The said board shall publish once each week a statement showing the condition of each Federal reserve bank and a consolidated statement for all Federal reserve banks. Such statements shall show in detail the assets and liabilities of the Federal reserve banks, single and combined, and shall furnish full information regarding the character of the money held as reserve and the amount, nature and maturities of the paper and other investments owned or held by Federal reserve banks. (2) To require any depository institution specified in this paragraph to make, at such intervals as the Board may prescribe, such reports of its liabilities and assets as the Board may determine to be necessary or desirable to enable the Board to discharge its responsibility to monitor and control monetary and credit aggregates. Such reports shall be made (A) directly to the Board in the case of member banks and in the case of other depository institutions whose reserve requirements under section 19 of this Act exceed zero, and (B) for all other reports to the Board through the (i) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of insured State savings associations that are insured depository institutions (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), State nonmember banks, savings banks, and mutual savings banks, (ii) National Credit Union Administration Board in the case of insured credit unions, (iii) the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of any Federal savings association which is an insured depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) or which is a member as defined in section 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, and (iv) such State officer or agency as the Board may designate in the case of any other type of bank, savings association, or credit union. The Board shall endeavor to avoid the imposition of unnecessary burdens on reporting institutions and the duplication of other reporting requirements. Except as otherwise required by law, any data provided to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States pursuant to other reporting requirements shall be made available to the Board. The Board may classify depository institutions for the purposes of this paragraph and may impose different requirements on each such class. (b) To permit, or, on the affirmative vote of at least five members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to require Federal reserve banks to rediscount the discounted paper of other Federal reserve banks at rates of interest to be fixed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (c) To suspend for a period not exceeding thirty days, and from time to time to renew such suspension for periods not exceeding fifteen days, any reserve requirements specified in this Act. (d) To supervise and regulate through the Secretary of the Treasury the issue and retirement of Federal reserve notes, except for the cancellation and destruction, and accounting with respect to such cancellation and destruction, of notes unfit for circulation, and to prescribe rules and regulations under which such notes may be delivered by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Federal reserve agents applying therefor. (e) To add to the number of cities classified as Reserve cities under existing law in which national banking associations are subject to the Reserve requirements set forth in section twenty of this Act; or to reclassify existing Reserve cities or to terminate their designation as such. (f) To suspend or remove any officer or director of any Federal reserve bank, the cause of such removal to be forthwith communicated in writing by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the removed officer or director and to said bank. (g) To require the writing off of doubtful or worthless assets upon the books and balance sheets of Federal reserve banks. (h) To suspend, for the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the operations of any Federal reserve bank, to take possession thereof, administer the same during the period of suspension, and, when deemed advisable, to liquidate or reorganize such bank. (i) To require bonds of Federal reserve agents, to make regulations for the safeguarding of all collateral, bonds, Federal reserve notes, money or property of any kind deposited in the hands of such agents, and said board shall perform the duties, functions, or services specified in this Act, and make all rules and regulations necessary to enable said board effectively to perform the same. (j) To exercise general supervision over said Federal reserve banks. (k) To delegate, by published order or rule and subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, any of its functions, other than those relating to rulemaking or pertaining principally to monetary and credit policies, to one or more administrative law judges, members or employees of the Board, or Federal Reserve banks. The assignment of responsibility for the performance of any function that the Board determines to delegate shall be a function of the Chairman. The Board shall, upon the vote of one member, review action taken at a delegated level within such time and in such manner as the Board shall by rule prescribe. The Board of Governors may not delegate to a Federal reserve bank its functions for the establishment of policies for the supervision and regulation of depository institution holding companies and other financial firms supervised by the Board of Governors. (l) To employ such attorneys, experts, assistants, clerks, or other employees as may be deemed necessary to conduct the business of the board. All salaries and fees shall be fixed in advance by said board and shall be paid in the same manner as the salaries of the members of said board. All such attorneys, experts, assistants, clerks, and other employees shall be appointed without regard to the provisions of the Act of January sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-three (volume twenty-two, United States Statutes at Large, page four hundred and three), and amendments thereto, or any rule or regulation made in pursuance thereof: Provided, That nothing herein shall prevent the President from placing said employees in the classified service. (n) To examine, at the Board's discretion, any depository institution, and any affiliate of such depository institution, in connection with any advance to, any discount of any instrument for, or any request for any such advance or discount by, such depository institution under this Act. (o) Authority To Appoint Conservator or Receiver.--The Board may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as conservator or receiver for a State member bank under section 11(c)(9) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. (p) Authority.--The Board may act in its own name and through its own attorneys in enforcing any provision of this title, regulations promulgated hereunder, or any other law or regulation, or in any action, suit, or proceeding to which the Board is a party and which involves the Board's regulation or supervision of any bank, bank holding company (as defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956), or other entity, or the administration of its operations. (q) Uniform Protection Authority for Federal Reserve Facilities.-- (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to authorize personnel to act as law enforcement officers to protect and safeguard the premises, grounds, property, personnel, including members of the Board, of the Board, or any Federal reserve bank, and operations conducted by or on behalf of the Board or a reserve bank. (2) The Board may, subject to the regulations prescribed under paragraph (5), delegate authority to a Federal reserve bank to authorize personnel to act as law enforcement officers to protect and safeguard the bank's premises, grounds, property, personnel, and operations conducted by or on behalf of the bank. (3) Law enforcement officers designated or authorized by the Board or a reserve bank under paragraph (1) or (2) are authorized while on duty to carry firearms and make arrests without warrants for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States committed or being committed within the buildings and grounds of the Board or a reserve bank if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony. Such officers shall have access to law enforcement information that may be necessary for the protection of the property or personnel of the Board or a reserve bank. (4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``law enforcement officers'' means personnel who have successfully completed law enforcement training and are authorized to carry fire

Minority Views

H.R. 6553 would reduce the safeguards for some of the largest banks, including guardrails that could have prevented three of the largest bank failures in U.S. history in 2023 when Silicon Valley Bank and other regional banks failed. Specifically, the bill increases the minimum threshold when mandatory so-called ``enhanced prudential standards'' (EPS) apply to a large bank, going from $250 billion to $370 billion in total assets. It also increases the minimum threshold for when regulators are able to apply any EPS to large banks, going from $100 billion to $150 billion in total assets. The bill also indexes these thresholds, and related regulatory thresholds,\1\ to rapidly grow based on an untested nominal Gross Domestic Product (``GDP'') metric that Trump's FDIC recently rejected, instead of using a more common inflation- based metric. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Fed has established four categories of banks subject to EPS as follows, with more stringent requirements increasingly applied to the highest categories. Category I: U.S. G-SIBs, Category II: BHCs with more than $700 billion in total assets or $75 billion in cross- jurisdictional activity; Category III: all BHCs with more than $250 billion and other BHCs between $100 billion and $250 billion that pose greater risks compared to others; and Category IV: all other BHCs between $100 billion and $250 billion. For more information, see Fed, Federal Reserve Board finalizes rules that tailor its regulations for domestic and foreign banks to more closely match their risk profiles (Oct. 10, 2019). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the 2008 global financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank'') into law. One of the key reforms in the Dodd- Frank Act was a requirement that bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in total assets be subject to EPS.\2\ This meant they were subject to more stringent capital, liquidity, leverage, stress testing, resolution planning, and other requirements to ensure they were safe and sound as a means of promoting financial stability. In 2015, Congress considered a measure to relax this requirement for banks with less than $250 billion in total assets. Greg Becker, CEO of SVB, submitted a statement for the record urging support for this effort, arguing that his bank had a ``low risk profile'' and a ``traditional banking business model.''\3\ In 2018, Congress ultimately enacted reforms into law,\4\ when SVB had $53 billion in total assets before rapidly growing to have more than $200 billion in total assets. In 2019, Trump's regulators issued rules implementing the 2018 law and further relaxed requirements for or otherwise exempted bank holding companies with less than $250 billion from enhanced prudential standards.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ See CRS, Enhanced Prudential Regulation of Large Banks (May 6, 2019). \3\ See Senate Banking Committee hearings, ``Examining the Regulatory Regime for Regional Banks,'' March 19 and March 24, 2015. \4\ P.L. 115-174, S. 2155 (115th Congress), the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA). \5\ See Fed, Federal Reserve Board finalizes rules that tailor its regulations for domestic and foreign banks to more closely match their risk profiles (Oct. 10, 2019). Also see Davis Polk, The Final Tailoring Rules for U.S. Banking Organizations (Nov. 21, 2019), and Todd Phillips, How 2018 Regulatory Rollbacks Set the Stage for the Silicon Valley Bank Collapse, and How to Change Course, Roosevelt Institute (Mar. 15, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These deregulatory actions in Trump's first term likely contributed to the 2023 regional bank failures.\6\ For example, instead of being subject to robust semiannual, company-run stress tests and annual supervisory stress tests, SVB was scheduled to be subject to a supervisory stress test every two years. But given the timing of its rapid growth, the bank was not scheduled to receive its first supervisory stress test until 2024. Additionally, SVB was exempt from the liquidity coverage ratio (``LCR'') and only had to do quarterly internal liquidity stress tests. SVB was also exempt from Dodd-Frank's resolution planning requirements (referred to as ``living wills'') while only having to do a more narrow resolution plan separately required by the FDIC for insured depository institutions.\7\ Moreover, regulators allowed banks of SVB size to opt-out of capital requirements relating to accumulated other comprehensive income (``AOCI''), which allowed SVB to seem better capitalized than it was with a large amount of unrealized losses in their securities portfolio.\8\ The Fed estimated this AOCI opt out inflated SVB's capital ratio by nearly 2%. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ For a comparison of what prudential requirements applied to Silicon Valley Bank before and after the deregulatory measures were implemented, see Table 12 of Fed, Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (Apr. 28, 2023). \7\ SVB submitted their first and only IDI resolution plan in December 2022. See SVB, 2022 Covered Insured Depository Institution Resolution Plan: Public Section (Dec. 2022). \8\ See Seeking Alpha, SVB Financial: Incompetence Allowed By Flawed Regulations (Mar. 12, 2023). For more info on enhanced prudential standards that applied to SVB, see pp 11-12 from their Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, concerns have been raised with how Trump's regulators rolled back the Volcker Rule, which generally prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading or investing in or sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds, may have contributed to SVB's failure.\9\ For example, one change finalized in 2019 allowed banks to realize short term profits from sales in their available for sale (``AFS'') securities portfolio, whereas this was previously prohibited by the Volcker Rule. In 2022, SVB reduced more than $15 billion in hedges on its AFS portfolio to only $563 million by the end of the year, leaving it more vulnerable to failure as the Fed continued to raise interest rates. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Better Markets, Federal Reserve Deregulation Caused the Failure of Silicon Valley Bank and the 2023 Banking Crisis (Mar. 27, 2023). Also see Better Markets, Ten Actions Necessary to Prevent Large Bank Failures, Strengthen the Financial System, and Protect Main Street Families (May 9, 2023); Better Markets, Banking Crisis Exemplifies the Fed's Enforcement Failures: Here's What to Do About It (May 15, 2023); and Better Markets Silicon Valley Bank Failure: Accountability and Path Forward (accessed May 15, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With respect to Signature Bank, it had $44 billion in total assets in 2018 before quickly growing to have more than $110 billion in total assets.\10\ First Republic Bank had $99 billion in total assets in 2018 before rapidly expanding to have more than $212 billion in total assets at the end of 2022. While rare among large banks, both of these banks did not have a bank holding company. While that meant that some of Dodd- Frank's original enhanced prudential standards would not have automatically applied,\11\ certain stress testing requirements would have applied prior to the 2018 law,\12\ and regulators used other authorities to apply other enhanced measures, such as resolution planning.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ See Fed, Large Commercial Banks--Statistical Release (Mar. 30, 2018). \11\ Given how nonbank financial company is defined in the law, FSOC has authority to designate and subject any bank that does not have a bank holding company to enhanced prudential standards, though they have not done so to date. \12\ Under the original Dodd-Frank provisions, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank would have been required to conduct annual company- run stress tests, and the bank could have been subject to annual supervisory stress tests at the Fed's discretion. \13\ Signature Bank was required to submit a resolution plan for insured depository institutions (IDI) to the FDIC once every three years, though given the timing of when the crossed the $100 billion threshold, they had not done so before they failed. For more on IDI resolution plans, see FDIC, FDIC and Financial Regulatory Reform--Title I and IDI Resolution Plans (Jan. 3, 2023). For more info on enhanced prudential standards that applied to Signature Bank, see pp 22-37 from their Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to these regulatory rollbacks and gaps, the Fed's supervisory practices eased during Trump's first term with a shift in culture and expectations from Fed leadership. In investigating what contributed to SVB's failure, the Fed found that, ``In the interviews for this report, [Fed] staff repeatedly mentioned changes in expectations and pressure to reduce burden on firms, meet a higher burden of proof for a supervisory conclusion, and demonstrate due process when considering supervisory actions . . . . As a result, staff approached supervisory messages, particularly supervisory findings and enforcement actions, with a need to accumulate more evidence than in the past, which contributed to delays and in some cases led staff not to take action.''\14\ In a press conference, Fed Chair Powell said, ``I fully recognize that we made mistakes,'' agreeing that the Fed's supervisory and regulatory shortcomings contributed to SVB's failure.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Fed, Federal Reserve Board announces the results from the review of the supervision and regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, led by Vice Chair for Supervision Barr (Apr. 28, 2023). \15\ American Banker, Powell: Fed made `mistakes' in regulation and supervision on his watch (May 3, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even though regulators were forced to use systemic risk tools to resolve SVB ($212 billion) and Signature Bank ($110 billion), H.R. 6553 would severely limit if not eliminate the application of EPS to similarly-sized banks. However, there does not appear to be much study with data and analysis to justify such changes proposed by the bill, and the bill provides no flexibility for regulators to make refinements that promote safety and soundness. Arguably, this bill is the opposite of what is a tiered and tailored approach to regulating regional banks: it uses arbitrary thresholds to either exempt or severely limit the application of risk-based prudential safeguards. At a minimum, it would be prudent to proceed with greater caution with respect to safeguards relating to the largest banks given the risk to financial stability even a $100 billion or $200 billion bank poses, as the 2023 regional bank failures demonstrated. Furthermore, proponents of indexing thresholds with nominal GDP argue that using nominal GDP will capture both inflation and economic growth, and ensure these thresholds evolve over time to make the application of various regulatory criteria more dynamic.\16\ That said, nominal GDP does not capture industry growth (which may differ from economic growth), institution complexity, consumer impacts, or other factors that may be relevant in setting a threshold to include or exclude different entities from the application of certain obligations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ See Bank Policy Institute (BPI), Adjusting Regulatory Thresholds for Economic Growth (Sep. 9, 2024); BPI, The Economy Evolves Over Time--So Should Bank Regulations (Sep. 26, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moreover, using nominal GDP will lead to more rapid increases to thresholds compared to inflation, exempting institutions that Congress may not have intended to exempt when it first enacted the law. Over the last ten years, nominal GDP grew by nearly 70% compared to a modest 37% increase based on CPI-W.\17\ Over the past three decades, nominal GDP increased by 299% compared to a 111% increase in CPI W.\18\ While lobbyists for large banks have advocated for the use of a nominal GDP growth,\19\ other stakeholders have suggested Congress consider inflation- based metrics or even more nuanced thresholds that are not based solely on asset size.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ FRED, Nominal Gross Domestic Product for United States (accessed Jan. 19, 2026); and FRED, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: All Items in U.S. City Average (accessed Jan. 19, 2026). \18\ Federal Register, FDIC Final Rule: Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds (Dec. 4, 2025). \19\ See Bank Policy Institute (BPI), Adjusting Regulatory Thresholds for Economic Growth (Sep. 9, 2024); BPI, The Economy Evolves Over Time--So Should Bank Regulations (Sep. 26, 2025). \20\ Better Markets, Letter to the House Financial Services Committee re Making Community Banking Great Again Principles (Feb. 20, 2025). For example, the FDIC developed a nuanced definition of community banking organizations that take into account a bank's business lines, foreign assets, deposit base, and geographic footprint, among other criteria that could provide a more tailored regulatory application than a blunt asset-size threshold. See FDIC, Community Banking Study (Dec. 2012), page 1-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, the use of nominal GDP as an indexing metric appears to be novel and untested in banking law; to the extent thresholds utilize an index, they often utilize inflation-based metrics. For example, the dollar threshold for exempting certain large-dollar consumer credit transactions from TILA is adjusted annually based on Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Regulation CC, implementing the Expedited Funds Availability Act (``EFAA'') modifies thresholds relating to check hold periods utilizing CPI-W every 5 years. Indeed, the approach in this bill is more aggressive than what Trump's banking regulators have recently adopted for other regulatory thresholds. The FDIC recently adopted a final rule that changed numerous regulatory thresholds relating to bank filing procedures, audits, reporting requirements, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and more, however they based the changes on inflation instead of nominal GDP.\21\ In the final rule, the FDIC rejected industry arguments that nominal GDP should be used and explained: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Federal Register, FDIC Final Rule: Adjusting and Indexing Certain Regulatory Thresholds (Dec. 4, 2025). ``[T]here are several downsides to using GDP for threshold adjustments. GDP is subject to business cycle fluctuations that may not always correspond with price level changes, such as in a ``stagflationary'' environment where stagnant economic growth occurs simultaneously with inflation. Relatedly, GDP in certain cases may grow fast for a period of years, followed by a downturn marked by slow or negative growth. Additionally, GDP is a lagging indicator that is frequently revised, which may limit the accuracy and durability of threshold adjustments. Finally, the intent behind many rules that use asset- based thresholds is to target banks of a certain size, rather than a size relative to the broader economy; thus, if the banking industry is growing quickly in real terms alongside a rapidly growing economy, banks are still --------------------------------------------------------------------------- growing for purposes of the relevant regulations.'' Americans for Financial Reform is opposed to H.R. 6553. Instead of focusing on helping community banks, this bill lets their bigger competitors off the hook from sensible safeguards that would ensure the larger risks that they pose to financial stability are fully accounted for. For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 6553. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member. Al Green, Joyce Beatty, Rashida Tlaib, Sylvia R. Garcia, Nikema Williams, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/532