Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 6553]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 6553) to index statutory thresholds, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 4
Committee Consideration.......................................... 4
Related Hearings................................................. 4
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 7
Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 7
Earmark Statement................................................ 7
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 8
Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 8
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 8
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 10
Documents Included by Unanimous Consent.......................... 63
Minority Views................................................... 70
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced
Regulations Act of 2025'' or the ``TIER Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. THRESHOLD ADJUSTMENTS TO ACCOUNT FOR HISTORICAL INCREASES IN
CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT.
(a) Federal Reserve Act.--The second subsection (s) (relating to
assessments) of section 11 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.
248(s)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``$100,000,000,000'' each
place that term appears and inserting ``$150,000,000,000''; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``between $100,000,000,000
and $250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``between $150,000,000,000
and $370,000,000,000''.
(b) Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.--Section 4(k)(6)(B)(ii) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(6)(B)(ii)) is
amended, by striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$15,000,000,000''.
(c) Financial Stability Act of 2010.--The Financial Stability Act of
2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 116(a) (12 U.S.C. 5326(a)), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000'';
(2) in section 121(a) (12 U.S.C. 5331(a)), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000'';
(3) in section 163(b) (12 U.S.C. 5363(b))--
(A) by striking ``$250,000,000,000'' each place that
term appears and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and
(B) by striking ``$10,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$15,000,000,000'';
(4) in section 164 (12 U.S.C. 5364), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''; and
(5) in section 165 (12 U.S.C. 5365)--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$370,000,000,000''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking
``$100,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$150,000,000,000'';
(B) in subsection (h)(2), by striking
``$50,000,000,000'' each place that term appears and
inserting ``$75,000,000,000'';
(C) in subsection (i)(2)(A), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$370,000,000,000''; and
(D) in subsection (j)(1), by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$370,000,000,000''.
(d) Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection
Act.--Section 401(f) of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5365 note) is amended by striking
``$250,000,000,000'' and inserting ``$370,000,000,000''.
SEC. 3. PERIODIC ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS TO ACCOUNT FOR FUTURE
INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT.
(a) In General.--The Financial Stability Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5311
et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 177. PERIODIC ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS TO ACCOUNT FOR INCREASES
IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT.
``(a) In General.--By April 1, 2031, and the 1st day of each
subsequent 5-year period, the Board of Governors shall increase the
thresholds described in subsection (b) by the ratio, if greater than 1,
of the annual value of current-dollar United States gross domestic
product, published by the Department of Commerce, for the calendar year
preceding the year in which the adjustment is calculated under this
section, to the published annual value of such index for the calendar
year preceding April 1, 2026.
``(b) Covered Thresholds.--The thresholds described in this
subsection are the following:
``(1) Each bank holding company or savings and loan holding
company total consolidated asset amount in the second
subsection (s) (relating to assessments) of section 11 of the
Federal Reserve Act.
``(2) Each bank holding company total consolidated asset
amount in--
``(A) sections 116(a), 121(a), 163(b), 164,
165(a)(1), 165(h)(2), 165(j)(1) of this Act; and
``(B) section 401(f) of the Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.
``(3) Each financial company total consolidated asset amount
in section 165(i)(2)(A) of this Act.
``(c) Currency of Information.--The values used in the calculation
under subsection (a) shall be, as of the date of the calculation, the
values most recently published by the Department of Commerce.
``(d) Rounding.--
``(1) If any amount equal to or greater than $100,000,000,000
determined under subsection (a) for any period is not a
multiple of $50,000,000,000, the amount shall be rounded up to
the nearest $50,000,000,000.
``(2) If any amount less than $100,000,000,000 determined
under subsection (a) for any period is not a multiple of
$5,000,000,000, the amount shall be rounded up to the nearest
$5,000,000,000.
``(e) Publication.--Not later than April 5 of any calendar year in
which an adjustment is required to be calculated under subsection (a),
the Board of Governors shall publish in the Federal Register the
amounts as so calculated.
``(f) Implementation Period.--Any increase in amounts determined
under subsection (a) shall take effect on January 1 of the year
immediately succeeding the calendar year in which the increase is
required to be calculated under subsection (a).
``SEC. 178. ADJUSTMENTS TO THRESHOLDS ESTABLISHED BY RULE TO ACCOUNT
FOR INCREASES IN CURRENT-DOLLAR UNITED STATES GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT.
``(a) Agency Review.--Not later than June 30, 2026, and the 1st day
of each subsequent 5-year period, the Board of Governors, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall, to the extent
applicable, review--
``(1) any regulation--
``(A) implementing section 165 of this Act; or
``(B) making specific cross-reference to any
regulation of the Board of Governors implementing
section 165 of this Act; and
``(2) any asset threshold or other quantitative threshold in
such regulations implementing section 165 of this Act, or in
such regulations making specific cross-reference to any
regulation of the Board of Governors implementing section 165
of this Act, the amount of which is not prescribed by statute.
``(b) Modifications Required.--The Board of Governors, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Corporation shall modify any such
thresholds identified by each review conducted under subsection (a) by
the ratio, if greater than 1, of the annual value of current-dollar
United States gross domestic product, published by the Department of
Commerce, for the calendar year preceding the year in which the
modification is calculated under this section, to the published annual
value of such index for the calendar year preceding the effective date
of such threshold, as each respective agency shall determine as
appropriate for such regulations. In making such determination, the
Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
Corporation shall--
``(1) use the values for current-dollar United States gross
domestic product most recently published by the Department of
Commerce as of the date of commencement of the review;
``(2) seek to establish, to the extent feasible, uniform
thresholds for use by each such agency, taking into account the
entities regulated by each such agency and the purposes for
which such threshold was established; and
``(3) seek to adjust such thresholds, to the extent feasible,
with rounding consistent with section 177(d) of this Act.
``(c) Report.--Upon conclusion of each review required under
subsection (a), each of the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Corporation shall transmit a report to Congress
containing a description of any modification of any regulation such
agency made pursuant to subsection (b).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 176 the following:
``Sec. 177. Periodic adjustments to thresholds to account for increases
in current-dollar United States gross domestic product.
``Sec. 178. Adjustments to thresholds established by rule to account
for increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic
product.''.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 6553, the Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations
(TIER) Act, was introduced on December 10, 2025, by Republican
Representative Andy Barr (KY-06). This bill indexes various
asset-based thresholds for bank regulations to nominal GDP
largely for banks categorized as Category II, III, and IV.
These regulations include enhanced prudential standards,
periodic and supervisory stress tests, among others.
Background and Need for Legislation
Banking regulation relies upon the use of asset-size
thresholds above which various regulatory requirements come
into effect. This is intended to both focus the most stringent
of regulations on banks with the greatest risks and conserve
the resources of regulators for the supervision of those banks
with the greatest risks. These asset-size thresholds are
largely static, expressed as dollar figures that do not change
absent adjustment through periodic rulemakings.
Though such thresholds do provide predictability given that
they clearly demarcate when certain regulatory requirements
will be applicable to a given bank, they also create unintended
consequences given their fixed levels. This is because as the
economy grows and inflation rises, the volume of banks' real
inflation-adjusted assets grows with the economy and the
nominal value of banks' assets rises with inflation, meaning
banks' respective asset-sizes can increase in nominal terms on
paper despite still being the same size relative to the wider
economy in real inflation-adjusted terms. This phenomenon is
particularly pronounced in times of high inflation.
H.R. 6553 adjusts thresholds for Category II, III, and IV
banks to account for the effects of economic growth and
inflation that has occurred since the threshold was initially
set. Additionally, this bill codifies automatic adjustments on
a permanent basis by indexing the new thresholds to nominal
GDP.
Committee Consideration
119TH CONGRESS
On December 10, 2025, Representative Barr introduced H.R.
6553, the Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations (TIER)
Act. Representatives Dan Meuser (R-PA), Roger Williams (R-TX),
Tim Moore (R-NC), Maria Salazar (R-FL), Frank Lucas (R-OK),
Pete Sessions (R-TX), and Zach Nunn (R-IA) were added
subsequently as cosponsors.
The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial
Services. A discussion draft version of H.R. 6553 was attached
to the December 2, 2025, hearing titled ``Oversight of
Prudential Regulators.''
On December 16, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services
met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 6553. The
Committee ordered H.R. 6553, as amended, to be reported with a
favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives.
Related Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to
develop H.R. 6553:
On December 2, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services
held a hearing titled, ``Oversight of Prudential Regulators.''
The Committee heard testimony from: the Honorable Michelle
Bowman, Vice Chair for Supervision, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System; the Honorable Jonathan Gould,
Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Honorable Kyle Hauptman, Chairman, National Credit Union
Administration; and the Honorable Travis Hill, Acting Chairman,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto.
On December 16, 2025, the Committee ordered H.R. 6553, as
amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded
vote of 33 yeas and 19 nays, a quorum being present. (Record
Vote No. FC-216).
Before the question to report was called, the Committee
adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by
Representative Barr, designated BARR_124, which made minor
edits and technical changes. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 6553 is to index
various statutory thresholds to keep pace with changing
economic conditions over time.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 6553. The
Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However,
pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own
the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office once it has been prepared.
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as
its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director
of the Congressional Budget Office. However, a cost estimate
was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing
of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its
receipt by the Committee.
Unfunded Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the
Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause
such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon
its receipt by the Committee.
Earmark Statement
In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides the short title is the ``Tailoring and
Indexing Enhanced Regulations Act of 2025'' or the ``TIER Act
of 2025''.
Section 2. Threshold adjustments to account for historical increases in
current-dollar United States gross domestic product
Section 2(a) amends the Federal Reserve Act to increase the
threshold at which bank holding companies are subjected to
assessments, fees, or other charges collected from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System from $100 billion to
$150 billion.
Section 2(b) amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to
increase the threshold above which a financial holding company
must obtain prior approval of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System before acquiring a nonbank company under
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 in a
transaction involving an acquisition of assets exceeding the
threshold from $10 billion to $15 billion.
Section 2(c)(1) amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010
to increase the threshold above which the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, acting through the Office of Financial
Research, may require a bank holding company to submit certain
certified reports from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section
2(c)(2) also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to
increase the threshold above which the Board of Governors may
take certain mitigating actions in respect of bank holding
companies with total consolidated assets exceeding the
threshold from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(c)(3)
also amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase (i)
the threshold above which a bank holding company with total
consolidated assets exceeding the threshold must provide notice
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before
acquiring direct or indirect ownership or control of voting
shares of certain nonbank companies from $250 billion to $370
billion, and (ii) the threshold defining such nonbank companies
from $10 billion to $15 billion. Section 2(c)(4) also amends
the Financial Stability Act of 2010 to increase the threshold
above which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System generally may not act to permit service by a management
official at a bank holding company with total consolidated
assets exceeding the threshold while at the same time serving
as a management official at a nonbank financial company
designated for supervision by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council from $250 billion to $370 billion. Section 2(c)(5) also
amends the Financial Stability Act of 2010 (i) to increase the
threshold above which bank holding companies become subject to
enhanced prudential standards under section 165(a)(1) of the
Financial Stability Act of 2010 from $250 billion to $370
billion, (ii) to increase the threshold above which the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may apply a enhanced
prudential standard to a bank holding company with total
consolidated assets exceeding the threshold from under section
165(a)(2) of the Financial Stability Act of 2010 from $100
billion to $150 billion, (iii) to increase the threshold above
which publicly traded bank holding companies are required to
establish a risk committee from $50 billion to $75 billion,
(iv) to increase the threshold above which financial companies
regulated by a primary Federal financial regulatory agency with
total consolidated assets exceeding the threshold are required
to conduce periodic stress tests from $250 billion to $370
billion, and (v) to increase the threshold above which bank
holding companies with total consolidated assets exceeding the
threshold and in respect of which the Financial Stability
Oversight Counsel makes certain determinations become subject
to a debt to equity ratio from $250 billion to $370 billion.
Section 2(d) amends the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief,
and Consumer Protection Act to increase the total consolidated
asset level a bank holding company is treated as having for
purposes of certain provisions of the Financial Stability Act
of 2010 and of the Federal Reserve Act if the bank holding
company is identified as a global systemically important BHC
under certain rules adopted by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System from $250 billion to $370 billion.
Section 3. Periodic adjustments to thresholds to account for future
increases in current-dollar United States gross domestic
product
Section 3 adds section 177 to the Financial Stability Act
of 2010, which would require the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, by April 1, 2031, and the 1st day of
each subsequent 5-year period, to adjust certain asset
thresholds in the Federal Reserve Act, the Financial Stability
Act of 2010, and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act to account for increases in current-
dollar U.S. gross domestic product. Section 3 also adds section
178 to the Financial Stability Act of 2010, which would require
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, by June 30, 2026, and the 1st day of each
subsequent 5-year period, to adjust certain asset thresholds in
certain rules adopted by these agencies to account for
increases in current-dollar U.S. gross domestic product.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECTION 11 OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
Sec. 11. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall be authorized and empowered:
(a)(1) To examine at its discretion the accounts, books and
affairs of each Federal reserve bank and of each member bank
and to require such statements and reports as it may deem
necessary. The said board shall publish once each week a
statement showing the condition of each Federal reserve bank
and a consolidated statement for all Federal reserve banks.
Such statements shall show in detail the assets and liabilities
of the Federal reserve banks, single and combined, and shall
furnish full information regarding the character of the money
held as reserve and the amount, nature and maturities of the
paper and other investments owned or held by Federal reserve
banks.
(2) To require any depository institution specified in this
paragraph to make, at such intervals as the Board may
prescribe, such reports of its liabilities and assets as the
Board may determine to be necessary or desirable to enable the
Board to discharge its responsibility to monitor and control
monetary and credit aggregates. Such reports shall be made (A)
directly to the Board in the case of member banks and in the
case of other depository institutions whose reserve
requirements under section 19 of this Act exceed zero, and (B)
for all other reports to the Board through the (i) Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of insured State
savings associations that are insured depository institutions
(as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act),
State nonmember banks, savings banks, and mutual savings banks,
(ii) National Credit Union Administration Board in the case of
insured credit unions, (iii) the Comptroller of the Currency in
the case of any Federal savings association which is an insured
depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act) or which is a member as defined in
section 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, and (iv) such
State officer or agency as the Board may designate in the case
of any other type of bank, savings association, or credit
union. The Board shall endeavor to avoid the imposition of
unnecessary burdens on reporting institutions and the
duplication of other reporting requirements. Except as
otherwise required by law, any data provided to any department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States pursuant to
other reporting requirements shall be made available to the
Board. The Board may classify depository institutions for the
purposes of this paragraph and may impose different
requirements on each such class.
(b) To permit, or, on the affirmative vote of at least five
members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
to require Federal reserve banks to rediscount the discounted
paper of other Federal reserve banks at rates of interest to be
fixed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
(c) To suspend for a period not exceeding thirty days, and
from time to time to renew such suspension for periods not
exceeding fifteen days, any reserve requirements specified in
this Act.
(d) To supervise and regulate through the Secretary of the
Treasury the issue and retirement of Federal reserve notes,
except for the cancellation and destruction, and accounting
with respect to such cancellation and destruction, of notes
unfit for circulation, and to prescribe rules and regulations
under which such notes may be delivered by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the Federal reserve agents applying therefor.
(e) To add to the number of cities classified as Reserve
cities under existing law in which national banking
associations are subject to the Reserve requirements set forth
in section twenty of this Act; or to reclassify existing
Reserve cities or to terminate their designation as such.
(f) To suspend or remove any officer or director of any
Federal reserve bank, the cause of such removal to be forthwith
communicated in writing by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to the removed officer or director and
to said bank.
(g) To require the writing off of doubtful or worthless
assets upon the books and balance sheets of Federal reserve
banks.
(h) To suspend, for the violation of any of the provisions of
this Act, the operations of any Federal reserve bank, to take
possession thereof, administer the same during the period of
suspension, and, when deemed advisable, to liquidate or
reorganize such bank.
(i) To require bonds of Federal reserve agents, to make
regulations for the safeguarding of all collateral, bonds,
Federal reserve notes, money or property of any kind deposited
in the hands of such agents, and said board shall perform the
duties, functions, or services specified in this Act, and make
all rules and regulations necessary to enable said board
effectively to perform the same.
(j) To exercise general supervision over said Federal reserve
banks.
(k) To delegate, by published order or rule and subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act, any of its functions, other
than those relating to rulemaking or pertaining principally to
monetary and credit policies, to one or more administrative law
judges, members or employees of the Board, or Federal Reserve
banks. The assignment of responsibility for the performance of
any function that the Board determines to delegate shall be a
function of the Chairman. The Board shall, upon the vote of one
member, review action taken at a delegated level within such
time and in such manner as the Board shall by rule prescribe.
The Board of Governors may not delegate to a Federal reserve
bank its functions for the establishment of policies for the
supervision and regulation of depository institution holding
companies and other financial firms supervised by the Board of
Governors.
(l) To employ such attorneys, experts, assistants, clerks, or
other employees as may be deemed necessary to conduct the
business of the board. All salaries and fees shall be fixed in
advance by said board and shall be paid in the same manner as
the salaries of the members of said board. All such attorneys,
experts, assistants, clerks, and other employees shall be
appointed without regard to the provisions of the Act of
January sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-three (volume
twenty-two, United States Statutes at Large, page four hundred
and three), and amendments thereto, or any rule or regulation
made in pursuance thereof: Provided, That nothing herein shall
prevent the President from placing said employees in the
classified service.
(n) To examine, at the Board's discretion, any depository
institution, and any affiliate of such depository institution,
in connection with any advance to, any discount of any
instrument for, or any request for any such advance or discount
by, such depository institution under this Act.
(o) Authority To Appoint Conservator or Receiver.--The Board
may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as
conservator or receiver for a State member bank under section
11(c)(9) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
(p) Authority.--The Board may act in its own name and through
its own attorneys in enforcing any provision of this title,
regulations promulgated hereunder, or any other law or
regulation, or in any action, suit, or proceeding to which the
Board is a party and which involves the Board's regulation or
supervision of any bank, bank holding company (as defined in
section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956), or other
entity, or the administration of its operations.
(q) Uniform Protection Authority for Federal Reserve
Facilities.--
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to
authorize personnel to act as law enforcement officers
to protect and safeguard the premises, grounds,
property, personnel, including members of the Board, of
the Board, or any Federal reserve bank, and operations
conducted by or on behalf of the Board or a reserve
bank.
(2) The Board may, subject to the regulations
prescribed under paragraph (5), delegate authority to a
Federal reserve bank to authorize personnel to act as
law enforcement officers to protect and safeguard the
bank's premises, grounds, property, personnel, and
operations conducted by or on behalf of the bank.
(3) Law enforcement officers designated or authorized
by the Board or a reserve bank under paragraph (1) or
(2) are authorized while on duty to carry firearms and
make arrests without warrants for any offense against
the United States committed in their presence, or for
any felony cognizable under the laws of the United
States committed or being committed within the
buildings and grounds of the Board or a reserve bank if
they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is committing such a
felony. Such officers shall have access to law
enforcement information that may be necessary for the
protection of the property or personnel of the Board or
a reserve bank.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``law
enforcement officers'' means personnel who have
successfully completed law enforcement training and are
authorized to carry fire
Minority Views
H.R. 6553 would reduce the safeguards for some of the
largest banks, including guardrails that could have prevented
three of the largest bank failures in U.S. history in 2023 when
Silicon Valley Bank and other regional banks failed.
Specifically, the bill increases the minimum threshold when
mandatory so-called ``enhanced prudential standards'' (EPS)
apply to a large bank, going from $250 billion to $370 billion
in total assets. It also increases the minimum threshold for
when regulators are able to apply any EPS to large banks, going
from $100 billion to $150 billion in total assets. The bill
also indexes these thresholds, and related regulatory
thresholds,\1\ to rapidly grow based on an untested nominal
Gross Domestic Product (``GDP'') metric that Trump's FDIC
recently rejected, instead of using a more common inflation-
based metric.
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\1\ The Fed has established four categories of banks subject to EPS
as follows, with more stringent requirements increasingly applied to
the highest categories. Category I: U.S. G-SIBs, Category II: BHCs with
more than $700 billion in total assets or $75 billion in cross-
jurisdictional activity; Category III: all BHCs with more than $250
billion and other BHCs between $100 billion and $250 billion that pose
greater risks compared to others; and Category IV: all other BHCs
between $100 billion and $250 billion. For more information, see Fed,
Federal Reserve Board finalizes rules that tailor its regulations for
domestic and foreign banks to more closely match their risk profiles
(Oct. 10, 2019).
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After the 2008 global financial crisis, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(``Dodd-Frank'') into law. One of the key reforms in the Dodd-
Frank Act was a requirement that bank holding companies with
more than $50 billion in total assets be subject to EPS.\2\
This meant they were subject to more stringent capital,
liquidity, leverage, stress testing, resolution planning, and
other requirements to ensure they were safe and sound as a
means of promoting financial stability. In 2015, Congress
considered a measure to relax this requirement for banks with
less than $250 billion in total assets. Greg Becker, CEO of
SVB, submitted a statement for the record urging support for
this effort, arguing that his bank had a ``low risk profile''
and a ``traditional banking business model.''\3\ In 2018,
Congress ultimately enacted reforms into law,\4\ when SVB had
$53 billion in total assets before rapidly growing to have more
than $200 billion in total assets. In 2019, Trump's regulators
issued rules implementing the 2018 law and further relaxed
requirements for or otherwise exempted bank holding companies
with less than $250 billion from enhanced prudential
standards.\5\
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\2\ See CRS, Enhanced Prudential Regulation of Large Banks (May 6,
2019).
\3\ See Senate Banking Committee hearings, ``Examining the
Regulatory Regime for Regional Banks,'' March 19 and March 24, 2015.
\4\ P.L. 115-174, S. 2155 (115th Congress), the Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA).
\5\ See Fed, Federal Reserve Board finalizes rules that tailor its
regulations for domestic and foreign banks to more closely match their
risk profiles (Oct. 10, 2019). Also see Davis Polk, The Final Tailoring
Rules for U.S. Banking Organizations (Nov. 21, 2019), and Todd
Phillips, How 2018 Regulatory Rollbacks Set the Stage for the Silicon
Valley Bank Collapse, and How to Change Course, Roosevelt Institute
(Mar. 15, 2023).
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These deregulatory actions in Trump's first term likely
contributed to the 2023 regional bank failures.\6\ For example,
instead of being subject to robust semiannual, company-run
stress tests and annual supervisory stress tests, SVB was
scheduled to be subject to a supervisory stress test every two
years. But given the timing of its rapid growth, the bank was
not scheduled to receive its first supervisory stress test
until 2024. Additionally, SVB was exempt from the liquidity
coverage ratio (``LCR'') and only had to do quarterly internal
liquidity stress tests. SVB was also exempt from Dodd-Frank's
resolution planning requirements (referred to as ``living
wills'') while only having to do a more narrow resolution plan
separately required by the FDIC for insured depository
institutions.\7\ Moreover, regulators allowed banks of SVB size
to opt-out of capital requirements relating to accumulated
other comprehensive income (``AOCI''), which allowed SVB to
seem better capitalized than it was with a large amount of
unrealized losses in their securities portfolio.\8\ The Fed
estimated this AOCI opt out inflated SVB's capital ratio by
nearly 2%.
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\6\ For a comparison of what prudential requirements applied to
Silicon Valley Bank before and after the deregulatory measures were
implemented, see Table 12 of Fed, Review of the Federal Reserve's
Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (Apr. 28, 2023).
\7\ SVB submitted their first and only IDI resolution plan in
December 2022. See SVB, 2022 Covered Insured Depository Institution
Resolution Plan: Public Section (Dec. 2022).
\8\ See Seeking Alpha, SVB Financial: Incompetence Allowed By
Flawed Regulations (Mar. 12, 2023). For more info on enhanced
prudential standards that applied to SVB, see pp 11-12 from their Form
10-K for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2022.
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Additionally, concerns have been raised with how Trump's
regulators rolled back the Volcker Rule, which generally
prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading
or investing in or sponsoring hedge funds or private equity
funds, may have contributed to SVB's failure.\9\ For example,
one change finalized in 2019 allowed banks to realize short
term profits from sales in their available for sale (``AFS'')
securities portfolio, whereas this was previously prohibited by
the Volcker Rule. In 2022, SVB reduced more than $15 billion in
hedges on its AFS portfolio to only $563 million by the end of
the year, leaving it more vulnerable to failure as the Fed
continued to raise interest rates.
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\9\ Better Markets, Federal Reserve Deregulation Caused the Failure
of Silicon Valley Bank and the 2023 Banking Crisis (Mar. 27, 2023).
Also see Better Markets, Ten Actions Necessary to Prevent Large Bank
Failures, Strengthen the Financial System, and Protect Main Street
Families (May 9, 2023); Better Markets, Banking Crisis Exemplifies the
Fed's Enforcement Failures: Here's What to Do About It (May 15, 2023);
and Better Markets Silicon Valley Bank Failure: Accountability and Path
Forward (accessed May 15, 2023).
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With respect to Signature Bank, it had $44 billion in total
assets in 2018 before quickly growing to have more than $110
billion in total assets.\10\ First Republic Bank had $99
billion in total assets in 2018 before rapidly expanding to
have more than $212 billion in total assets at the end of 2022.
While rare among large banks, both of these banks did not have
a bank holding company. While that meant that some of Dodd-
Frank's original enhanced prudential standards would not have
automatically applied,\11\ certain stress testing requirements
would have applied prior to the 2018 law,\12\ and regulators
used other authorities to apply other enhanced measures, such
as resolution planning.\13\
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\10\ See Fed, Large Commercial Banks--Statistical Release (Mar. 30,
2018).
\11\ Given how nonbank financial company is defined in the law,
FSOC has authority to designate and subject any bank that does not have
a bank holding company to enhanced prudential standards, though they
have not done so to date.
\12\ Under the original Dodd-Frank provisions, Signature Bank and
First Republic Bank would have been required to conduct annual company-
run stress tests, and the bank could have been subject to annual
supervisory stress tests at the Fed's discretion.
\13\ Signature Bank was required to submit a resolution plan for
insured depository institutions (IDI) to the FDIC once every three
years, though given the timing of when the crossed the $100 billion
threshold, they had not done so before they failed. For more on IDI
resolution plans, see FDIC, FDIC and Financial Regulatory Reform--Title
I and IDI Resolution Plans (Jan. 3, 2023). For more info on enhanced
prudential standards that applied to Signature Bank, see pp 22-37 from
their Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 2022.
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In addition to these regulatory rollbacks and gaps, the
Fed's supervisory practices eased during Trump's first term
with a shift in culture and expectations from Fed leadership.
In investigating what contributed to SVB's failure, the Fed
found that, ``In the interviews for this report, [Fed] staff
repeatedly mentioned changes in expectations and pressure to
reduce burden on firms, meet a higher burden of proof for a
supervisory conclusion, and demonstrate due process when
considering supervisory actions . . . . As a result, staff
approached supervisory messages, particularly supervisory
findings and enforcement actions, with a need to accumulate
more evidence than in the past, which contributed to delays and
in some cases led staff not to take action.''\14\ In a press
conference, Fed Chair Powell said, ``I fully recognize that we
made mistakes,'' agreeing that the Fed's supervisory and
regulatory shortcomings contributed to SVB's failure.\15\
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\14\ Fed, Federal Reserve Board announces the results from the
review of the supervision and regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, led by
Vice Chair for Supervision Barr (Apr. 28, 2023).
\15\ American Banker, Powell: Fed made `mistakes' in regulation and
supervision on his watch (May 3, 2023).
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Even though regulators were forced to use systemic risk
tools to resolve SVB ($212 billion) and Signature Bank ($110
billion), H.R. 6553 would severely limit if not eliminate the
application of EPS to similarly-sized banks. However, there
does not appear to be much study with data and analysis to
justify such changes proposed by the bill, and the bill
provides no flexibility for regulators to make refinements that
promote safety and soundness. Arguably, this bill is the
opposite of what is a tiered and tailored approach to
regulating regional banks: it uses arbitrary thresholds to
either exempt or severely limit the application of risk-based
prudential safeguards. At a minimum, it would be prudent to
proceed with greater caution with respect to safeguards
relating to the largest banks given the risk to financial
stability even a $100 billion or $200 billion bank poses, as
the 2023 regional bank failures demonstrated.
Furthermore, proponents of indexing thresholds with nominal
GDP argue that using nominal GDP will capture both inflation
and economic growth, and ensure these thresholds evolve over
time to make the application of various regulatory criteria
more dynamic.\16\ That said, nominal GDP does not capture
industry growth (which may differ from economic growth),
institution complexity, consumer impacts, or other factors that
may be relevant in setting a threshold to include or exclude
different entities from the application of certain obligations.
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\16\ See Bank Policy Institute (BPI), Adjusting Regulatory
Thresholds for Economic Growth (Sep. 9, 2024); BPI, The Economy Evolves
Over Time--So Should Bank Regulations (Sep. 26, 2025).
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Moreover, using nominal GDP will lead to more rapid
increases to thresholds compared to inflation, exempting
institutions that Congress may not have intended to exempt when
it first enacted the law. Over the last ten years, nominal GDP
grew by nearly 70% compared to a modest 37% increase based on
CPI-W.\17\ Over the past three decades, nominal GDP increased
by 299% compared to a 111% increase in CPI W.\18\ While
lobbyists for large banks have advocated for the use of a
nominal GDP growth,\19\ other stakeholders have suggested
Congress consider inflation- based metrics or even more nuanced
thresholds that are not based solely on asset size.\20\
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\17\ FRED, Nominal Gross Domestic Product for United States
(accessed Jan. 19, 2026); and FRED, Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: All Items in U.S. City Average
(accessed Jan. 19, 2026).
\18\ Federal Register, FDIC Final Rule: Adjusting and Indexing
Certain Regulatory Thresholds (Dec. 4, 2025).
\19\ See Bank Policy Institute (BPI), Adjusting Regulatory
Thresholds for Economic Growth (Sep. 9, 2024); BPI, The Economy Evolves
Over Time--So Should Bank Regulations (Sep. 26, 2025).
\20\ Better Markets, Letter to the House Financial Services
Committee re Making Community Banking Great Again Principles (Feb. 20,
2025). For example, the FDIC developed a nuanced definition of
community banking organizations that take into account a bank's
business lines, foreign assets, deposit base, and geographic footprint,
among other criteria that could provide a more tailored regulatory
application than a blunt asset-size threshold. See FDIC, Community
Banking Study (Dec. 2012), page 1-2.
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Additionally, the use of nominal GDP as an indexing metric
appears to be novel and untested in banking law; to the extent
thresholds utilize an index, they often utilize inflation-based
metrics. For example, the dollar threshold for exempting
certain large-dollar consumer credit transactions from TILA is
adjusted annually based on Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage
Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Regulation CC,
implementing the Expedited Funds Availability Act (``EFAA'')
modifies thresholds relating to check hold periods utilizing
CPI-W every 5 years. Indeed, the approach in this bill is more
aggressive than what Trump's banking regulators have recently
adopted for other regulatory thresholds. The FDIC recently
adopted a final rule that changed numerous regulatory
thresholds relating to bank filing procedures, audits,
reporting requirements, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and
more, however they based the changes on inflation instead of
nominal GDP.\21\ In the final rule, the FDIC rejected industry
arguments that nominal GDP should be used and explained:
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\21\ Federal Register, FDIC Final Rule: Adjusting and Indexing
Certain Regulatory Thresholds (Dec. 4, 2025).
``[T]here are several downsides to using GDP for
threshold adjustments. GDP is subject to business cycle
fluctuations that may not always correspond with price
level changes, such as in a ``stagflationary''
environment where stagnant economic growth occurs
simultaneously with inflation. Relatedly, GDP in
certain cases may grow fast for a period of years,
followed by a downturn marked by slow or negative
growth. Additionally, GDP is a lagging indicator that
is frequently revised, which may limit the accuracy and
durability of threshold adjustments. Finally, the
intent behind many rules that use asset- based
thresholds is to target banks of a certain size, rather
than a size relative to the broader economy; thus, if
the banking industry is growing quickly in real terms
alongside a rapidly growing economy, banks are still
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growing for purposes of the relevant regulations.''
Americans for Financial Reform is opposed to H.R. 6553.
Instead of focusing on helping community banks, this bill lets
their bigger competitors off the hook from sensible safeguards
that would ensure the larger risks that they pose to financial
stability are fully accounted for.
For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 6553.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Al Green,
Joyce Beatty,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Nikema Williams,
Members of Congress.
[all]