Committee Action
112TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearing
On June 28, 2012, the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
held a hearing titled ``Promoting Safe Workplaces through
Voluntary Protection Programs.'' The hearing examined the
effectiveness of OSHA's VPP. Testifying were Mr. Jordan Barab,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Washington, DC;
Mr. Rob Henson, Process Technician, Lyondell Basell,
Channelview, TX; Mr. David I. Levine, Trefethen Professor of
Business Administration, Haas School of Business, University of
California, Berkeley, CA; Mr. Mike Lee, Vice President, Nucor
Corporation, Trinity, AL; and Mr. R. Davis Layne, Executive
Director, Voluntary Protection Programs Participants'
Association (VPPPA), Falls Church, VA.
114TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On October 7, 2015, the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections held a hearing titled ``Protecting America's
Workers: An Enforcement Update from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.'' The hearing examined OSHA's
enforcement and compliance assistance and safety education
efforts, including the VPP. Testifying before the Subcommittee
was the Honorable David Michaels, Assistant Secretary,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, DOL, Washington,
DC.
119TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On July 16, 2025, the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
held a hearing titled ``Safe Workplaces, Stronger Partnerships:
The Future of OSHA Compliance Assistance.'' The hearing
examined the effectiveness of existing compliance assistance
programs under OSHA, including the VPP, and considered
legislative solutions increasing the effectiveness of OSHA's
employer outreach and cooperative workplace safety efforts.
Testifying were Mr. Chris Williams, Executive Director,
Voluntary Protection Program Participants' Association, Falls
Church, VA; Mr. Myron Harper, National Health and Safety
Director, Cintas Corporation, Indianapolis, IN; Ms. Rebecca L.
Reindel, Director of Occupational Safety and Health, AFL-CIO,
Washington, DC; and Mr. Kevin Sell, Senior Manager, Corporate
Development, Kwest Group, Alexandria, KY, testifying on behalf
of the Associated Builders and Contractors.
Legislative Action
On April 10, 2025, Representative Diana Harshbarger (R-TN)
introduced H.R. 2844, the Michael Enzi Voluntary Protection
Program Act, with Representative Mike Thompson (D-CA) as an
original cosponsor. The bill was referred solely to the
Committee on Education and Workforce. On September 17, 2025,
the Committee considered H.R. 2844 in legislative session and
reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 19-16. Representative
Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA) offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute making a technical change to the bill. The amendment
was adopted by voice vote.
COMMITTEE VIEWS
INTRODUCTION
OSHA and its state partners cover roughly 130 million
workers employed at more than 8 million worksites.\1\ In fiscal
year 2024, OSHA conducted 34,625 inspections with 17,455
unprogrammed and 17,170 programmed inspections.\2\ Unprogrammed
inspections are initiated by employee complaints, injuries/
fatalities, or referrals. Programmed inspections target high-
hazard industries or individual workplaces with high rates of
injuries and illnesses. The regional and national emphasis
programs on industries and operations where known hazards exist
(e.g., heat, respirable silica, combustible dust, chemical
processing, ship-breaking, and falls in construction) also
initiate programmed inspections. To expand its safety network
without abusing taxpayer funds, OSHA offers several outreach
activities and programs, including the VPP, to encourage
businesses and organizations to work cooperatively with the
agency to reduce and prevent injuries and illnesses.
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\1\https://www.osha.gov/data/commonstats.
\2\https://www.osha.gov/enforcement/current-enforcement-summary.
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THE VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS
Initiated in 1982, the VPP recognizes employers and workers
in private industry and federal agencies who have implemented
effective safety and health management systems.\3\
Specifically, VPP participants must maintain injury and illness
rates below Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) national averages
for their respective industries. As an incentive, program
participants are exempt from OSHA-programmed inspections while
they maintain their VPP status. To participate in the VPP,
employers must undergo an onsite evaluation by a team of safety
and health professionals. In addition, union support is
required for applicants that are unionized. OSHA re-evaluates
VPP participants every three to five years to assess their
eligibility to remain in the programs.
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\3\https://www.osha.gov/vpp.
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Current participants in the VPP span more than 50
industries, including mining, agriculture, manufacturing,
construction, transportation, health care, and national
security. More than 1,800 unique worksites participate in the
VPP, and VPP sites are located in all 50 states and Puerto
Rico.\4\
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\4\https://www.osha.gov/vpp/bylocation.
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OSHA has found significantly lower injury and illness rates
among VPP participants. In 2021, rates for site-based non-
construction VPP participants were 53 percent below the BLS
Total Case Incident Rate and 57 percent below the BLS Days Away
from Work, Restricted Work Activity, or Job Transfer rate for
their respective industries. Additionally, 542 non-construction
VPP participant sites experienced zero recordable injuries and
illnesses, and 14 construction and mobile workforce participant
sites experienced zero recordable injuries and illnesses.\5\
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\5\https://www.osha.gov/vpp/evaluation2021.
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Playing a significant role in the VPP, OSHA's Special
Government Employee (SGE) Program was established to allow
industry employees to work alongside OSHA as part of the
program's on-site evaluations. Qualified volunteers from VPP
sites are eligible to participate in the SGE Program and must
undergo training and approval by OSHA to participate.\6\ In his
testimony to the Workforce Protections Subcommittee on July 16,
2025, Mr. Kevin Sell, Senior Manager, Corporate Development,
Kwest Group, emphasized the importance of the SGE Program and
the VPP, noting their efficacy in achieving OSHA's goal of
improving workplace safety while using agency resources more
efficiently:
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\6\https://www.osha.gov/sge.
As an OSHA special government employee, I have
proudly contributed my time and expertise to advancing
workplace safety and health for businesses of all
sizes. . . . This role has allowed me to help employers
and employees across a broad spectrum of industries to
enhance their workplace environments, achieve VPP
recognition and build a culture of continuous
improvement. As an SGE, I am honored to be part of a
program that not only extends OSHA's resources but also
empowers companies of all sizes to prioritize the
wellbeing of their workers and achieve excellence in
occupational safety and health.\7\
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\7\Safe Workplaces, Stronger Partnerships: The Future of OSHA
Compliance Assistance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce
Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, 119th Cong.
(statement of Kevin Sell, Senior Manager, Corp. Dev., Kwest Group, at
3), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sell_testimony.pdf.
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Mr. Chris Williams, Executive Director of the VPPPA, stated
at the same hearing that the VPP has broad support from
participating organizations:
Democrats and Republicans alike stand behind VPP.
It's a program built on labor--nearly 500 local unions
are signatories to VPP agreements. For example, more
than 170 IBEW and 45 United Steelworkers locals support
VPP as signatories. CEOs from the nation's biggest
employers believe in the positive impact of VPP and
commit substantial financial and personnel resources to
participate in the program. VPP is the gold standard of
safety and health management systems, and the only
system available free to every workplace willing to
commit to--and abide by--its stringent ongoing
requirements.\8\
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\8\Id. (statement of Chris Williams, Exec. Dir., VPPPA, at 2),
https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/williams_testimony.pdf.
Mr. Jordan Barab, Deputy Assistant Secretary of OSHA, spoke
on behalf of the agency during a June 28, 2012, Workforce
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Protections Subcommittee hearing in support of the VPP:
VPP is an integral part of the toolbox which the
Congress has provided to OSHA to accomplish our mission
. . . Since its inception, VPP has demonstrated its
value in advancing this primary goal. We are extremely
proud of this program and are working every day to
strengthen it. VPP will continue to have the Department
of Labor's full support.\9\
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\9\Promoting Safe Workplaces through Voluntary Protection Programs:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & the Workforce, 112th Cong. 15 (statement of Jordan Barab,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, OSHA) [hereinafter Barab statement].
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MODERNIZING AND IMPROVING THE VPP
In May 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) published its report titled ``OSHA'S Voluntary Protection
Programs: Improved Oversight and Controls Would Better Ensure
Program Quality.'' GAO recommended that the Secretary of Labor
direct OSHA to (1) develop a documentation policy for
information on actions taken in OSHA's regions in response to
fatalities and serious injuries at VPP sites; (2) establish
internal controls that ensure consistent compliance by its
regions with VPP policies; and (3) develop goals and
performance measures for the VPP.\10\ Mr. Barab testified at
the June 28, 2012, Workforce Protection Subcommittee hearing
that OSHA took immediate action to address GAO's
recommendations:
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\10\See GAO, OSHA'S Voluntary Protection Programs: Improved
Oversight and Controls Would Better Ensure Program Quality (May 20,
2009), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-09-395.
In response to these recommendations, OSHA issued
five Policy Memoranda designed to strengthen the
management and internal control of VPP. In August 2009,
for example, we specified the actions National and
Regional offices must take to improve administration of
VPP, including verification of the quality of VPP self-
evaluations that are required each year, as well as the
quality of regional review of VPP sites . . . As part
of OSHA's comprehensive response to GAO, as well as the
ongoing VPP improvement process, we are refining
internal controls and doing a better job measuring
program effectiveness.\11\
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\11\Barab statement, supra note 9, at 13.
Similarly, the DOL Office of Inspector General (OIG)
conducted an audit of the VPP and issued a report outlining
several recommendations to further improve the program.\12\ In
response to the OIG report, OSHA stated that the agency is
committed to implementing enhanced processes and technology
improvements to better enable the agency to identify and track
enforcement activities at VPP sites.\13\
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\12\See DOL OIG, OSHA's Voluntary Protection Programs Require
Better Information to Identify Participants With Contract-Worker
Fatalities and Catastrophes (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.oig.dol.gov/
public/reports/oa/2017/02-17-202-10-105.pdf.
\13\Id. at 12-13.
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In 2023, OSHA also invited public feedback on how the
agency can modernize and enhance the VPP, as well as continue
to promote the use of workplace safety and health management
systems.\14\ Most recently, in July 2025, OSHA announced the
expansion of the VPP as part of a larger ``self-audit''
initiative designed to enhance worker protections while
reducing the likelihood of formal investigation or litigation.
The expansion will allow employers to undergo regular self-
evaluations.\15\
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\14\https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/02162023.
\15\https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/osha-national-news-
release/20250724.
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CONCLUSION
For more than 40 years, the VPP has been a proven tool to
advance jobsite safety. Most importantly, it offers a
collaborative approach to creating and strengthening a culture
of safety within participating and prospective workplaces,
through programs like the SGE Program. H.R. 2844, the Michael
Enzi Voluntary Protection Program Act, recognizes the
importance of consistent funding to ensure the VPP can continue
to expand, innovate, and deliver lasting improvements in
workplace safety.
H.R. 2844 SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY
Section 1 identifies the bill's short title, the Michael
Enzi Voluntary Protection Program Act.
Section 2 establishes the continued operation of the VPP
within OSHA and outlines requirements to participate in the
program. This section also states that funding for the program
will not be through payment from employers to qualify for or
participate in the VPP but from at least five percent of funds
appropriated for OSHA for a fiscal year.
EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENTS
The amendment in the nature of a substitute is explained in
the body of this report.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1.
UNFUNDED MANDATE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344 (as amended
by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4), the Committee traditionally adopts as
its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) pursuant to section 402 of
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
The Committee reports that because this cost estimate was not
timely submitted to the Committee before the filing of this
report, the Committee is not in a position to make a cost
estimate for H.R. 2844.
EARMARK STATEMENT
H.R. 2844 does not contain any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9 of House rule XXI.
ROLL CALL VOTES
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include for
each record vote on a motion to report the measure or matter
and on any amendments offered to the measure or matter the
total number of votes for and against and the names of the
Members voting for and against.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
In accordance with clause (3)(c) of House of
Representatives rule XIII, the goal of H.R. 2844, the Michael
Enzi Voluntary Protection Program Act, is to codify the VPP,
making it a lasting program in OSHA.
DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
No provision of H.R. 2844 establishes or reauthorizes a
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
STATEMENT OF OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMMITTEE
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are
reflected in the body of this report.
REQUIRED COMMITTEE HEARING
In compliance with clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives the following hearing held
during the 119th Congress was used to develop or consider H.R.
2844: On July 16, 2025, the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections held a hearing on ``Safe Workplaces, Stronger
Partnerships: The Future of OSHA Compliance Assistance.''
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND CBO COST ESTIMATE
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, a cost estimate was not made
available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate
to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by
the Committee.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 2844.
However, clause 3(d)(2)(B) of that Rule provides that this
requirement does not apply when, as with the present report,
the Committee has requested a cost estimate for the bill from
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
H.R. 2844, as reported by the Committee, makes no changes
to existing law.
Minority Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 2844, the Michael Enzi Voluntary Protection Program
Act, would expand a controversial Reagan Administration program
to recognize supposedly model employers at the expense of
investments in workplace health and safety standards and
employee training to prevent illness and injury on the job.
Specifically, this bill would exclude eligible employers from
strategically planned inspections focused on high-priority
hazards and would shield them from any enforcement penalty if
compliance auditors detect health and safety violations, even
hazards that can cause serious injury, severe illness, and
death.
This bill is opposed by the AFL-CIO and the United
Steelworkers.
ABOUT THE VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAM
The model for this bill is an existing program created and
administered by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), called the Voluntary Protection Program
(VPP). OSHA has broad authority under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970\1\ (OSH Act) to ``assure . . . safe and
healthful working conditions . . . by encouraging employers . .
. in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational safety
and health hazards at their places of employment, and to
stimulate employers . . . to institute new and to perfect
existing programs for providing safe and healthful working
conditions.''\2\ Using this broad authority, the Reagan
Administration launched OSHA's VPP in 1982\3\ as a recognition
program run by OSHA's compliance assistance branch.\4\
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\1\Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
\2\Id. Sec. 2(b)(1).
\3\Promoting Safe Workplaces Through Voluntary Protection Programs:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Wrkf. Prots. of the H. Comm. on Educ. &
the Wrkf., 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Jordan Barab, Dep. Asst.
Sec., Occup. Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Lab.) [hereinafter
2012 VPP Hearing].
\4\Compliance Assistance Specialists, Occup. Safety & Health
Admin., https://www.osha.gov/complianceassistance/cas (last visited
Sept. 14, 2025).
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How VPP Works
To gain VPP recognition, employers must put in place
comprehensive safety management systems and undergo an OSHA
audit of their injury and illness history.\5\ Where
establishments are unionized, the unions must also consent to
the employer's participation in VPP.\6\
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\5\2012 VPP Hearing, supra note 3, at 9.
\6\Id.
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VPP benefits include inspection exemptions. Although VPP
establishments remain subject to inspections for employee
complaints, catastrophes, or fatalities, they are exempted from
``programmed'' inspections\7\--that is, a series of inspections
planned by OSHA as part of an emphasis program targeting
industries or hazards of particular concern.\8\
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\7\Id. at 10.
\8\Current Enforcement Summary, Occup. Safety & Health Admin.,
https://www.osha.gov/enforcement/current-enforcement-summary (last
visited Sept. 11, 2025).
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VPP consists of two main levels of achievement--``Star''
and ``Merit,'' plus a newer third grouping that is more
experimental:\9\
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\9\Voluntary Protection Programs, Occup. Safety & Health Admin.
(Aug. 2009), https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
factsheet-vpp.pdf.
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Star, with 1,086 sites,\10\ applies the most
stringent standards to recognize employers who operate
management systems focused on safety and health and
have low injury rates.\11\
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\10\Current Federal and State-Plan Sites, Occup. Safety & Health
Admin., https://www.osha.gov/vpp/bylocation (last visited Sept. 11,
2025) [hereinafter Current Data].
\11\All About VPP, Occ. Safety & Health Admin., https://
www.osha.gov/vpp/all-about-vpp (last visited Sept. 18, 2025)
[hereinafter VPP Info].
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Merit, with only five sites,\12\ is limited
recognition for employers who have implemented good
safety and health management systems but still need
improvement to bring their injury rates below the
national average.
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\12\Current Data, supra note 11.
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Demonstration, which is intended to allow
employers in the Star tier to ``test alternatives to
current Star eligibility and performance
requirements.''\13\
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\13\See Voluntary Protection Programs, supra note 9, at 2.
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Employers qualify for VPP membership on the basis of injury
and illness rates, enforcement history, and certain practices.
For example, to qualify for VPP ``Star'' Status, sites must
meet the following criteria:
Injury and illness rates at or below the
national average for their industry.\14\
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\14\U.S. Gov't Account. Off., GAO-09-395, OSHA'S Voluntary
Protection Programs: Improved Oversight and Controls Would Better
Ensure Program Quality 4 & 5 (May 2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-09-395.pdf [hereinafter 2009 GAO Report].
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An active safety and health management
system, in place for at least one year, that takes a
``systems approach'' to preventing and controlling
workplace hazards.\15\
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\15\Id.
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No ongoing enforcement actions, such as
inspections, at the worksite or willful violations
cited by OSHA within the 3-year period prior to the
site's initial application.\16\
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\16\Id.
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Completion of an onsite evaluation. This on-
site review usually lasts about 4 days and involves
approximately 3 to 5 OSHA staff. OSHA also uses
volunteers from other VPP sites--Special Government
Employees who have been trained by OSHA--to conduct
some portions of these reviews.\17\
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\17\Id.
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Once approved, employers must maintain low injury and
illness rates and report annually to OSHA on the status of
their safety and health systems. VPP participants are
reevaluated every 3 to 5 years in order to continue as program
members. If a VPP site's average injury rate rises above the
average rates for its industry, OSHA must place the site on a
rate-reduction plan. Failure to meet benchmarks can lead to
termination of VPP status.\18\
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\18\Id. at 6-7.
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VPP participation does not shield employers from
consequences for failing to comply with OSHA standards. If
violations are detected during onsite evaluation meetings, VPP
participating employers are given a window of time to correct
the hazard, and any violations that persist past that window
can be pursued through the enforcement process:
If an onsite evaluation reveals a hazard that
endangers the health and safety of employees, the
onsite evaluation team must add the hazard to a written
list of uncontrolled identified hazards. If the VPP
participant cannot correct the identified hazard before
the conclusion of the onsite evaluation, then the
hazard will be assigned as a 90-day item. If a VPP
participant refuses to correct the noted hazard, the
worksite in violation is referred to OSHA enforcement
for an inspection and appropriate remedial measures,
including sanctions, fines, and termination from the
program.\19\
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\19\2012 VPP Hearing, supra note 3, at 10.
Currently there are 1,857 worksites certified under VPP--
1,096 certified by federal OSHA and 761 through OSHA state-
plans.\20\ Industries most represented by number of sites are
chemical manufacturing (249), utilities (149), personal and
laundry services (97), transportation equipment manufacturing
(92), professional services (89), warehousing and storage (83),
waste management (70), and specialty trade contractors
(73).\21\
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\20\See Current Federal and State-Plan Sites, supra note 10.
\21\Industries in VPP Federal and State Plans, Occup. Safety &
Health Admin., https://www.osha.gov/vpp/bynaics#812 (last visited Sept.
11, 2025).
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VPP Shortcomings Identified
Auditors and journalists have identified shortcomings over
the years since VPP was launched. A 2004 GAO report concluded
that OSHA lacked adequate data to assess the effectiveness of
any of its voluntary compliance initiatives, including VPP.\22\
In response, OSHA contracted with the Gallup Organization to
conduct a study of the program's effectiveness.\23\ However,
flaws in the design of the study and low response rates made it
unreliable as a measure of effectiveness.\24\ OSHA officials
acknowledged the study's limitations.\25\ By contrast, there is
peer-reviewed evidence that OSHA inspections are associated
with reduced injury claims, reduced workers' compensation
costs, and an estimated $20 billion in savings to employers
nationwide.\26\
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\22\U.S. Gen. Account. Off., GAO-04-378, Workplace Safety and
Health: OSHA's Voluntary Compliance Strategies Show Promising Results,
but Should Be Fully Evaluated before They Are Expanded (Mar. 2004),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-04 378.pdf.
\23\See 2009 GAO Report, supra note 14, at 17.
\24\Id.
\25\Id.
\26\See 2012 VPP Hearing, supra note 3, at 21.
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A 2009 GAO report found that OSHA was not adequately
monitoring VPP members to ensure they remained eligible to
participate.\27\ Among other things, GAO reviewed OSHA's files
for the 30 VPP sites that had fatalities from January 2003 to
August 2008 and found there was no documentation of actions
taken by OSHA to review the safety programs at these sites.\28\
OSHA also lacked adequate internal controls, such as reviews by
the national office, to ensure that regions consistently
monitor sites' injury and illness rates and conduct onsite
reviews.\29\
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\27\See generally 2009 GAO Report, supra note 23.
\28\Id.
\29\Id.
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The nonprofit journalism group Center for Public Integrity
ran an investigative series from 2011-2013 about VPP,\30\
reporting the following:
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\30\Model Workplaces, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, https://
publicintegrity.org/topics/inequality-poverty-opportunity/workers-
rights/worker-health-and-safety/model-workplaces/ (last visited Sept.
11, 2025).
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At least 80 workers died at VPP
establishments from 2000 to 2011.\31\
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\31\Chris Hamby, `Model Workplaces' Not Always So Safe, Ctr. for
Pub. Integrity (July 7, 2011), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-
poverty-opportunity/workers-rights/worker-health-and-safety/model-
workplaces/model-workplaces-not-always-so-safe/.
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At least 65 percent of the establishments
with fatalities were still in VPP status since the
launch of the series.\32\
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\32\Chris Hamby, `Model' Workplaces Avoid Special Government
Scrutiny Targeting Hazardous Industries, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (July
11, 2011), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-opportunity/
workers-rights/worker-health-and-safety/model-workplaces/model-
workplaces-avoid-special-government-scrutiny-targeting-hazardous-
industries/.
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Seven of those deaths occurred in oil
refineries and 18 in chemical plants. OSHA had
enforcement emphasis programs for those industries, but
VPP designation kept those establishments out of
programmed inspections.\33\
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\33\Id.; Chris Hamby, New Scrutiny of Worker Safety Excludes Some
Chemical Plants, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Dec. 1, 2011), https://
publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-opportunity/workers-rights/
worker-health-and-safety/model-workplaces/new-scrutiny-of-worker-
safety-excludes-some-chemical-plants/.
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The U.S. Postal Service had more locations
in VPP than any other employer, even as OSHA was
pursuing citations for willful violations for agency-
wide failure to correct electrical safety hazards.\34\
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\34\Chris Hamby, Lost Letter: How Government Fails to Deliver on
Worker Safety, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Oct. 13, 2011), https://
publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-opportunity/workers-rights/
worker-health-and-safety/model-workplaces/lost-letter-how-government-
fails-to-deliver-on-worker-safety/.
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VPP membership tripled in size in that
decade, even as OSHA cut staff monitoring VPP and
relaxed the standards for entry.\35\
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\35\See Hamby, supra note 31.
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A 2013 DOL IG audit\36\ concluded that OSHA lacked
sufficient controls to ensure that VPP sites truly were model
employers:
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\36\Off. of Inspect. Gen., Off. of Aud., U.S. Dep't of Lab., Rep.
No. 02 14 201 10 105, Voluntary Protection Program: Controls Are Not
Sufficient to Ensure Only Worksites With Exemplary Safety and Health
Systems Remain in the Program (Dec. 2013), https://www.oig.dol.gov/
public/reports/oa/2014/02-14-201-10-105.pdf.
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Even though 13 percent of participants had
injury and illness rates above industry averages or
were cited with violations of safety and health
standards, most of these participants were allowed to
remain in the program.\37\
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\37\Id. at 2.
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OSHA's policies to set improvement plans for
VPP employers extended the time that they remained in
the program after violations or deviations from program
norms. OSHA policy allowed participants with injury and
illness rates above industry averages to potentially
remain in the program for up to 6 years.\38\
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\38\Id.
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Despite policies for timely onsite
evaluations, OSHA did not provide timely evaluations
for 11 percent of participants to ensure
compliance.\39\
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\39\Id.
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OSHA could not identify the universe of
participants or applicants because it tracked VPP data
in at least 11 different databases that were not
reconciled.\40\
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\40\Id.
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OSHA used unreliable injury and illness data
reported by the participants themselves to evaluate
participants and in reported program statistics.\41\
For a judgmental sample, 60 percent of reported injury
rates differed significantly (by more than half) from
more reliable agency source documents.\42\
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\41\Id. at 15.
\42\Id. at 16.
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For the same reason, OSHA's claim that the
average VPP participant has injury rates 52 percent
below their respective industry rate was
unreliable.\43\
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\43\Id. at 15.
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VPP Reforms
Responding to some of the issues identified above, the
Obama Administration OSHA made several VPP program changes.\44\
Among other things, OSHA issued a directive disqualifying any
VPP participant that uses negative safety incentive programs
(such as pizza parties or Bingo nights offered for periods
without reported injuries or illnesses) because such programs
disincentivize workers from reporting hazards and harms.\45\
OSHA also adjusted the program's administrative processes,
including requiring regional offices to recalculate
participants' self-reported injury rate data.\46\
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\44\See 2012 VPP Hearing, supra note 3, at 13.
\45\Id. at 14.
\46\Id. at 13.
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SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LEGISLATION
This bill would replace the current VPP with the new
Michael Enzi Voluntary Protection Program (ME-VPP).\47\ It is
named for the late senator who, among other things, led the
first