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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-629

RURAL AND MUNICIPAL UTILITY CYBERSECURITY ACT

2026-04-30

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 7266, the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Act, was introduced by Representative Miller-Meeks (R-IA) on January 27, 2026, and referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce on January 27, 2026. H.R. 7266 reauthorizes the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity (RMUC) Grant and Technical Assistance Program at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

Background and Need for Legislation

The U.S. energy sector, made up of the bulk power system and associated energy infrastructure, is a vital component to all other critical infrastructure sectors in the country. The bulk power system makes up the backbone of the U.S. energy sector, providing reliable generation and transmission of energy to local distribution networks, powering everything from rural communities to metropolitan cities. Without the around the clock, uninterrupted operation of our bulk power system, hospitals, military installations, and almost all other sectors of the U.S. economy cease to function properly. While there are several entities involved within the scope of energy sector cyber security, the DOE plays a lead role as the designated Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) for cybersecurity in the energy sector, authorized by the FAST Act in 2015.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Pub. L. 114-94. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The crucial function of the bulk power system makes it a prime target for both cyber and physical threats from both state and nonstate actors. Recently, the United States has faced an evolving cyber threat landscape to its bulk power system, with countries such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran investing in their cyber-attack capabilities aimed at U.S. energy infrastructure.\2\ Specifically, China's cyber-attack strategy has involved prepositioning within the U.S. critical infrastructure, including in the energy sector, for future strategic attacks during times of crisis or conflict.\3\ These threats, along with those by nonstate actors, could incapacitate or destroy certain assets or systems within the bulk power system and could cause substantial, potentially widespread, harm to national security, economic security, public health and safety. The interconnected and interdependent nature of our complex energy systems creates vulnerabilities in parts of the electric system that do not have adequate cyber and physical security protections. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\Office of Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Mar. 2025), https:// www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified- Report.pdf. \3\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mitigation, emergency response, and prevention strategies to counter cyber threats on our bulk power system rely on collaboration, partnerships, and information sharing between utility companies, including investor owned utilities (IOUs), publicly owned utilities (POUs) and Cooperatives (co-ops), and Federal agencies, including the DOE office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER),\4\ as well as other entities such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. Together, under DOE's leadership, these entities collaborate to establish and enforce standards and regulations aimed at ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system and countering cyber threats. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\See, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, http://en ergy.gov/ceser/office- cybersecurity-energy-security-and-emergency-response. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to a strong partnership between government entities and utilities, mitigating cyber threats and enhancing utilities' security posture require significant investments to harden the bulk power system against threats. These investments can include new and innovative technology, enhanced operational capabilities, and software or hardware services that protect against cyber threats. While utilities try to prioritize these investments to harden their systems, the unique characteristics and rate structures between IOUs, POUs, and co-ops can make the financial capital necessary for investment difficult for some utilities to obtain. While IOUs are owned by shareholders and are for profit businesses, POUs are owned by Federal, State, or municipal governments and co-ops are member-owned, both of which are not- for-profit entities. In 2017, IOUs served 72% of U.S. electricity customers while only making up 6% of utility companies in the United States.\5\ In reality, most IOUs are far larger and far more financially endowed than most POUs and co-ops. The interconnected and interdependent nature of our complex energy systems exposes vulnerabilities in parts of the electric system that do not have adequate cyber and physical security protections, which can have cascading effects on the bulk power system writ large. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\U.S. Energy Information Admin., Investor-Owned Utilities Served 72% of U.S. Electricity Customers in 2017, (Aug. 15. 2019), https:// www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40913. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On average, POUs serve about 12,000 electricity customers and co-ops serve roughly 24,000; meanwhile, the average customer base for an IOU is over 650,000 customers.\6\ On top of the smaller customer base, many co-ops also serve lower income, rural communities, with one in four co-op households having an annual income of below $35,000.\7\ This combination of a limited customer base, not-for-profit structure, and ownership characteristics of co-ops and POUs makes it difficult for those entities to access and raise the capital necessary to properly harden their systems against cyber threats as compared to large IOUs, creating a significant resource gap. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Id. \7\See testimony of Dr. Nathaniel J. Melby, Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Energy of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 119th Cong. (Jan. 13, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The RMUC Program, first authorized in section 40124 of the Infrastructure Investments and Jobs Act (IIJA),\8\ provides grants and technical assistance intended to deploy advanced cybersecurity technologies and increase participation of eligible entities in cybersecurity threat information sharing programs. Given the significant resource gap of smaller utilities can vary, the Secretary of Energy is directed to prioritize utilities that have limited cybersecurity resources, own assets critical to the reliability of the bulk power system or own infrastructure critical to the defense sector. Through the first 5 years of authorization, the RMUC program has assisted more than 500 eligible utilities, providing targeted investments in cybersecurity technologies.\9\ For example, DOE has used RMUC funds to host multiple training sessions with more than 200 individuals from 123 co-ops on securing industrial control systems and separational technology. Through the RMUC program, DOE also launched Project Guardian which helps co-ops develop self-assessment tools, tabletop exercises, and increase access to experienced cyber personnel for better planning and prevention of cyber attacks.\10\ H.R. 7266, the Rural and Municipal Cybersecurity Act, reauthorizes this program and streamlines financial assistance award processes to ensure finite taxpayer resources can reach the smallest and most vulnerable communities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\42 U.S.C. Sec. 18723. \9\See testimony of Alex Fitzsimmons, Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Energy of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 119th Cong. (Jan. 13, 2026). \10\See testimony of Tim Lindahl, Securing America's Energy Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber and Physical Threats to the Grid: Before the Subcomm. On Energy of the H. Comm on Energy and Commerce, 119th Cong. (Dec. 2, 2025). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee Action

On December 2, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7266. The title of the hearing was ``Securing America's Energy Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber and Physical Threats to the Grid.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Michael Ball, CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and Senior Vice President, North American Electric Reliability Corporation; Sharla Artz, Security and Resilience Policy Area Vice President at Xcel Energy, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute; Tim Lindahl, President & CEO of Kenergy, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; Zach Tudor, Associate Laboratory Director, National & Homeland Security, Idaho National Laboratory; and Harry Krejsa, Director of Studies for the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology. On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7266. The title of the hearing was ``Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Alex Fitzsimmons, Acting Undersecretary of Energy and Director of the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Energy; Scott I. Aaronson, Senior Vice President, Energy Security and Industry Operations, Edison Electric Institute; Adrienne Lotto, Senior Vice President of Grid Security, Technical and Operations Services, American Public Power Association; Nathaniel J. Melby, Ph.D., Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Dairyland Power, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA); and Rebecca O'Neil, Research Principal, Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. On February 4, 2026, the Subcommittee on energy met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 7266, as amended, to the full Committee by a voice vote. On March 5, 2026, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 7266, without amendment, favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 49 yeas and 0 nays.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during the Committee consideration: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Oversight Findings and Recommendations Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report. New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that H.R. 7266, would result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues.

Congressional Budget Office Estimate

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, the following is the cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 7266 would reauthorize the Department of Energy's Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance (RMUC) Program through 2031. The program, which is currently authorized through 2026, provides technical assistance, grants, and other support to electric utilities to protect against cybersecurity threats. The bill would authorize the appropriation of $250 million for the 2027-2031 period. The estimated budgetary effects of the legislation are shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within budget function 270 (energy). For this estimate, CBO assumes that $50 million will be provided in each year over the 2027-2031 period; that is consistent with how the RMUC program was funded under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). Based on historical spending patterns for this and similar programs, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 7266 would cost $114 million over the 2026-2031 period and $136 million after 2031, assuming the appropriation of $50 million in each year over the 2027-2031 period. TABLE 1--ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 7266 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars ---------------------------------------------------------- 2026- 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2031 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION Authorization........................................ 0 50 50 50 50 50 250 Estimated Outlays.................................... 0 1 9 23 36 45 114 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The bill would authorize the appropriation of $250 million over the 2027-2031 period but does not specify amounts for specific years. For this estimate, CBO has assumed that $50 million will be provided in each year over that period. CBO also estimates that enacting H.R. 7266 would increase direct spending by less than $500,000 over the 2026- 2036 period. In addition, enacting H.R. 7266 would increase direct spending because we expect that amounts previously appropriated for the RMUC program that are not otherwise expected to be spent under current law could be used for the reauthorized program. Those amounts would derive from budget authority originally designated as an emergency requirement under IIJA. CBO estimates that any increase in direct spending would total less than $500,000 over the 2026-2036 period. H.R. 7266 would extend an existing preemption of state, local, and tribal laws on public disclosure of government information. Although that preemption would limit the application of such laws, CBO estimates that H.R. 7266 would impose no duty on state, local, or tribal governments that would result in additional spending or a loss of revenues. Consequently, the cost of the mandate would not exceed the threshold established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) for intergovernmental mandates ($107 million in 2026, adjusted annually for inflation). H.R. 7266 contains no private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Aaron Krupkin (for federal costs) and Lucy Marret (for mandates). The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general performance goal or objective of this legislation is to reauthorize the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program and streamline financial assistance award processes to ensure finite resources reach the smallest and most vulnerable communities. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 7266, is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following related hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 7266: On December 2, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7266. The title of the hearing was ``Securing America's Energy Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber and Physical Threats to the Grid.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Michael Ball, CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and Senior Vice President, North American Electric Reliability Corporation; Sharla Artz, Security and Resilience Policy Area Vice President at Xcel Energy, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute; Tim Lindahl, President & CEO of Kenergy, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; Zach Tudor, Associate Laboratory Director, National & Homeland Security, Idaho National Laboratory; and Harry Krejsa, Director of Studies for the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology. On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7266. The title of the hearing was ``Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Alex Fitzsimmons, Acting Undersecretary of Energy and Director of the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Energy; Scott I. Aaronson, Senior Vice President, Energy Security and Industry Operations, Edison Electric Institute; Adrienne Lotto, Senior Vice President of Grid Security, Technical and Operations Services, American Public Power Association; Nathaniel J. Melby, Ph.D., Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Dairyland Power, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA); and Rebecca O'Neil, Research Principal, Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Committee Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the Committee finds that H.R. 7266 contains no earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Act.'' Section 2. Rural and Municipal Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program This section reauthorizes the RMUC program through 2031 for $250,000,000 and streamlines financial assistance award processes to ensure finite resources reach the smallest and most vulnerable communities. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND JOBS ACT * * * * * * * DIVISION D--ENERGY * * * * * * * TITLE I--GRID INFRASTRUCTURE AND RESILIENCY * * * * * * * Subtitle B--Cybersecurity * * * * * * * [SEC. 40124. RURAL AND MUNICIPAL UTILITY ADVANCED CYBERSECURITY GRANT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. [(a) Definitions.--In this section: [(1) Advanced cybersecurity technology.--The term ``advanced cybersecurity technology'' means any technology, operational capability, or service, including computer hardware, software, or a related asset, that enhances the security posture of electric utilities through improvements in the ability to protect against, detect, respond to, or recover from a cybersecurity threat (as defined in section2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002)). [(2) Bulk-power system.--The term ``bulk-power system'' has the meaning given the term in section 215(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(a)). [(3) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible entity'' means-- [(A) a rural electric cooperative; [(B) a utility owned by a political subdivision of a State, such as a municipally owned electric utility; [(C) a utility owned by any agency, authority, corporation, or instrumentality of 1 or more political subdivisions of a State; [(D) a not-for-profit entity that is in a partnership with not fewer than 6 entities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); and [(E) an investor-owned electric utility that sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year. [(4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program established under subsection (b). [(b) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, and the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, shall establish a program, to be known as the ``Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program'', to provide grants and technical assistance to, and enter into cooperative agreements with, eligible entities to protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats. [(c) Objectives.--The objectives of the Program shall be-- [(1) to deploy advanced cybersecurity technologies for electric utility systems; and [(2) to increase the participation of eligible entities in cybersecurity threat information sharing programs. [(d) Awards.-- [(1) In general.--The Secretary-- [(A) shall award grants and provide technical assistance under the Program to eligible entities on a competitive basis; [(B) shall develop criteria and a formula for awarding grants and providing technical assistance under the Program; [(C) may enter into cooperative agreements with eligible entities that can facilitate the objectives described in subsection (c); and [(D) shall establish a process to ensure that all eligible entities are informed about and can become aware of opportunities to receive grants or technical assistance under the Program. [(2) Priority for grants and technical assistance.-- In awarding grants and providing technical assistance under the Program, the Secretary shall give priority to an eligible entity that, as determined by the Secretary-- [(A) has limited cybersecurity resources; [(B) owns assets critical to the reliability of the bulk-power system; or [(C) owns defense critical electric infrastructure (as defined in section 215A(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o- 1(a))). [(e) Protection of Information.--Information provided to, or collected by, the Federal Government pursuant to this section the disclosure of which the Secretary reasonably foresees could be detrimental to the physical security or cybersecurity of any electric utility or the bulk-power system-- [(1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; and [(2) shall not be made available by any Federal agency, State, political subdivision of a State, or Tribal authority pursuant to any Federal, State, political subdivision of a State, or Tribal law, respectively, requiring public disclosure of information or records. [(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this section $250,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.] SEC. 40124. RURAL AND MUNICIPAL UTILITY ADVANCED CYBERSECURITY GRANT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Advanced cybersecurity technology.--The term ``advanced cybersecurity technology'' means any technology, operational capability, or service, including computer hardware, software, or a related asset, that enhances the security posture of electric utilities through improvements in the ability to protect against, detect, respond to, or recover from a cybersecurity threat. (2) Bulk-power system.--The term ``bulk-power system'' has the meaning given the term in section 215(a) of the Federal Power Act. (3) Cybersecurity threat.--The term ``cybersecurity threat'' has the meaning given the term in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. (4) Defense critical electric infrastructure.--The term ``defense critical electric infrastructure'' has the meaning given the term in section 215A(a) of the Federal Power Act. (5) Eligible entity.--The term ``eligible entity'' means-- (A) a rural electric cooperative; (B) an electric utility owned by a political subdivision of a State, such as a municipally owned electric utility; (C) an electric utility owned by any agency, authority, corporation, or instrumentality of 1 or more political subdivisions of a State; (D) a not-for-profit entity that is in a partnership with not fewer than 6 entities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); and (E) an investor-owned electric utility that sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year. (6) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program established under subsection (b). (b) Establishment.--The Secretary shall maintain a program, to be known as the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and Technical Assistance Program, to provide technical assistance and award funding, including grants, cooperative agreements, and prizes, to eligible entities to protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats. (c) Objectives.--The objectives of the Program shall be-- (1) to deploy advanced cybersecurity technologies for electric utility systems; and (2) to increase the participation of eligible entities in cybersecurity threat information sharing programs. (d) Awards.-- (1) In general.--In carrying out the Program, the Secretary-- (A) shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, provide technical assistance, and award funding, including grants, cooperative agreements, and prizes, to eligible entities on a competitive or noncompetitive basis; (B) shall develop criteria for providing such technical assistance and awarding such funding; (C) may enter into agreements that can facilitate the objectives described in subsection (c) with eligible entities to provide technical assistance or award funding, including grants, cooperative agreements, and prizes; and (D) shall establish a process to ensure, to the extent practicable, that all eligible entities are informed about opportunities to receive technical assistance or funding, including grants, cooperative agreements, and prizes. (2) Priority for funding and technical assistance.-- In providing technical assistance and awarding funding, including grants, cooperative agreements, and

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/629