Dissenting Views
[To accompany H.R. 8365]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 8365) to provide for conditions on the appointment
of monitors by courts, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 3
Hearings......................................................... 5
Committee Consideration.......................................... 6
Committee Votes.................................................. 6
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 8
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 8
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 8
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 8
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 8
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 9
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 9
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 9
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 9
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 9
Dissenting Views................................................. 9
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all that follows after the enacting clause, and
insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Monitor Accountability Act''.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF MONITORS BY COURTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the effective date of
this section, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts shall by rule establish conditions on the appointment by
a district court of the United States of any person charged, pursuant
to a court order, with monitoring the conduct of a State or unit of
local government. Such conditions shall include the following:
(1) Fees.--Such person--
(A) may not assess a fee in excess of such maximum
rates as the Administrator may establish; and
(B) shall be authorized to employ the use of pro bono
time or reduced rates.
(2) Exclusivity and term.--Such person may not be--
(A) appointed to more than one such monitorship at a
time;
(B) appointed for a term greater than 5 years; or
(C) reappointed after the expiration of such term
pursuant to the same court order.
(3) Subsequent monitors.--A monitor who is appointed to a
monitorship after the expiration of the term of a monitor who
served pursuant to the same court order may not be employed by
the same employer as the previous monitor.
(4) Public comment.--Prior to the appointment of a monitor,
the court shall provide notice of the person to be appointed
and afford the public an opportunity for comment thereon.
(5) Termination.--
(A) Revision.--In the case that a court, a party, or
a monitor seeks to revise a monitorship imposed by a
court order, the court shall conduct a hearing.
(B) Scope of monitorship.--The court may only revise
a requirement of a monitorship with respect to which
the subject of the monitorship has not attained
substantial and sustained compliance.
(b) Transfer.--On the date that is 6 years after the court order
imposing a monitorship, if such monitorship is in effect on such date,
the case shall be transferred to another judge in the district in which
the case is pending.
(c) Accounting.--
(1) In general.--On an annual basis, a monitor shall submit
to the court imposing the monitorship an accounting, which
shall include--
(A) information on the services provided and the fee
charged for such services; and
(B) whether any such services were provided pro bono
or at a reduced rate.
(2) Publication.--The court shall make available to the
public any accounting submitted to the court under paragraph
(1).
(d) Retroactivity.--In the case of a monitorship that is in effect on
the date of enactment of this Act and has been in effect for 6 years--
(1) a new monitor shall be appointed not later than 180 days
after such date of enactment in accordance with the limitations
under this section; and
(2) the case shall be transferred not later than 1 year after
such date of enactment in accordance with this section.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that monitoring
is a public service and monitorships should be structured to encourage
the use of pro bono time or reduced rates.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 8365, the Monitor Accountability Act, introduced by
Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ), requires the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts to establish conditions on the
appointment by a district court of a monitor of a state or unit
of local government. These conditions include a cap on fees, a
term limit on the monitors and judges overseeing monitor cases,
allowing for public comment on the selection of the monitor,
and providing a public accounting of the activities of the
monitor.
Background and Need for the Legislation
Court monitors are independent oversight officials
appointed through agreements between a government agency and a
public or private entity, often in response to concerns
involving civil rights violations, fraud allegations,
misconduct, or regulatory violations.\1\ These agreements often
function as alternatives to more severe enforcement actions
such as civil penalties, debarment, or criminal prosecution, by
requiring the organization to implement corrective reforms
under external supervision.\2\ Section 21601 of title 34 of the
U.S. Code authorizes the Attorney General to sue local law
enforcement agencies that ``engage in a pattern or practice of
conduct'' that ``deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.''\3\ In cases where such a pattern or
practice is established, a monitor is often instituted to
ensure the agency implements corrective action.
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\1\U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Civil Settlement Agreements and Consent
Decrees Involving State and Local Governmental Entities, 1-20.010 (last
accessed Apr. 29, 2026).
\2\Id.
\3\34 U.S.C. Sec. 12601.
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Once appointed, a monitor has broad access to an
organization's internal systems, policies, and data.\4\ The
monitor may carry out a range of duties, including evaluating
compliance programs, auditing adherence to legal and
contractual requirements, and recommending reforms to
strengthen efficiency, accountability, and internal
controls.\5\ In some cases, a monitor's role extends to
assessing broader cultural and institutional reforms within the
monitored entity.\6\
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\4\U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Civil Settlement Agreements and Consent
Decrees Involving State and Local Governmental Entities, 1-20.010 (last
accessed Apr. 29, 2026).
\5\Id.
\6\Press Release, See Antitrust, Compliance Monitoring and State
Attorney General Investigations: Issues in Appointment and Operation,
National Association of Attorneys General (last accessed Apr. 29,
2026).
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Although court monitors are intended to operate
independently from both the government and the monitored
entity, this independence has raised concerns in practice,
particularly regarding cost, duration, and accountability in
long-running consent decree regimes.\7\ There are various court
monitors across the United States that are responsible to
report findings to the court or relevant authorities, ensuring
transparency and accountability throughout the monitoring
process.\8\ In several cases, monitorships have remained in
place for a decade or longer, prompting debate over whether
oversight remains narrowly focused on ensuring compliance or
expands into sustained managerial control of agency
operations.\9\
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\7\Womble Bond Dickinson, A Shift Away from Corporate Monitors
Signals DOJ's More Active Role in Compliance Oversight, JD SUPRA (Sep.
23, 2025), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-shift-away-from-
corporate-monitors-2036141/
\8\Robin Barclay & Nico Leslie, Monitorships, Global Investigations
Review (Oct. 31, 2025), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/
the-practitioners-guide-global-investigations/2026/article/monitorships
\9\U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Civil Settlement Agreements and Consent
Decrees Involving State and Local Governmental Entities, 1-20.010 (last
accessed Apr. 29, 2026).
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In April 2021, then-Attorney General Merrick Garland asked
then-Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta to conduct a four-
month review of how the Justice Department appoints and
oversees federal monitors in settlement agreements and consent
decrees with state and local governments.\10\ On August 13,
2021, Associate Attorney General Gupta issued memorandum to
Attorney General Garland, which made 19 recommendations
stemming from five core principles.\11\ These core principles
included minimizing costs and conflicts of interest in
monitorships, ensuring monitors' accountability, conducting
compliance assessment within the organization, community
engagement on monitorship, and efficient reform, which
determines whether an organization makes corrective changes
quickly to achieve compliance.\12\
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\10\Memorandum from The Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Just., For
Heads of Civil Litigating Components United States Attorneys, Office of
the Attorney General (Sep. 13, 2021). https://www.justice.gov/archives/
ag/file/1166091-0/dl?inline=.
\11\Id.
\12\Id.
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A notable reform proposed in the memorandum was imposing
term limits for federal monitors.\13\ The memorandum
recommended that consent decrees set a specified term for a
monitor--two to three years--after which the monitor's
performance would be reviewed, and he or she could be
reappointed.\14\ Moreover, the memorandum called for a hearing
no later than five years after the decree begins to assess
whether the court should terminate the monitorship.\15\
Attorney General Garland accepted these recommendations,
publicly announcing them on September 13, 2021.\16\ The
significance of these recommendations set clear expectations
for time-limited oversight, ensuring that federal monitorships
are not indefinite.\17\
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\13\Id.
\14\Id.
\15\Id.
\16\Id.
\17\Id.
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There are various court monitors across the United States
whose actions have raised concerns regarding cost, duration,
and accountability in certain long-running consent decree
regimes.\18\ There is no precise nationwide count of court
monitors, but the Department of Justice states that
monitorships are appointed on a case-by-case basis under
individual consent decrees and enforcement agreements,
resulting in a limited and variable number of active monitors
at any given time.\19\ In several cases, monitorships have
remained in place for a decade or longer, prompting debate over
whether oversight remains narrowly focused on ensuring
compliance or expands into sustained managerial control of
agency operations.\20\
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\18\Womble Bond Dickinson, A Shift Away from Corporate Monitors
Signals DOJ's More Active Role in Compliance Oversight, JD Supra (Sep.
23, 2025), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-shift-away-from-
corporate-monitors-2036141/
\19\U.S. Dep't of Just., Civil Settlement Agreements and Consent
Decrees Involving State and Local Governmental Entities, 1-20.010 (last
accessed Apr. 16, 2026).
\20\Id.
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In February 2026, the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal
Government Surveillance conducted a hearing in Phoenix,
Arizona, to examine the federal court monitor overseeing the
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO). Since 2013, the MCSO
has been subject to federal judicial oversight stemming from
the Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio case, a lawsuit accusing the
MCSO of targeting Latino drivers and passengers during traffic
stops, arrests, and investigations.\21\ In January 2014, a
federal court appointed Robert Warshaw as the monitor to
oversee MCSO.\22\ MCSO's policy development, training, and
procedural changes have improved since 2014.\23\ In January
2026, the DOJ informed the court that it supported the County's
motion to end the monitorship, noting that MCSO has corrected
its unconstitutional practices and demonstrated sustained,
systemic compliance when it comes to training, procedural, and
policy changes.\24\ Despite MCSO's ongoing compliance since
2013, the county remains subject to oversight, costing Arizona
taxpayers roughly $350 million as of September 2025.\25\ As of
April 2026, the court-appointed monitor overseeing the Maricopa
County Sheriff's Office in the Melendres litigation remains in
place.\26\
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\21\Thomas Galvin, A monitor keeps moving goalposts for MCSO
officers, putting our safety at risk, AZCENTRAL (Sep. 3, 2025); First
Amended Complaint, Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV 07-025 13-PHX-MHM
(D. Ariz. Jul. 16, 2008).
\22\Order Appointing Monitor, Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV
07-025 13-PHX-MHM (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2014)
\23\Id.
\24\Report's Transcript of Proceedings, In-Court Hearing, Ortega
Melendres v. Sheridan, 2:07-cv-02513-GMS (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2026).
\25\Thomas Galvin, A monitor keeps moving goalposts for MCSO
officers, putting our safety at risk, AZCENTRAL (Sep. 3, 2025).
\26\Press Release, Maricopa County Leaders Cite $350M Cost In Push
To End Federal Oversight Of Sheriff's Office, AZ FREE NEWS (Mar. 25,
2026), https://azfreenews.com/2026/03/federal-governments-racial-
profiling-oversight-continues-to-cost-maricopa-county/
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This is a reoccurring pattern across the country. For
example, the Justice Department consent decree involving the
Los Angeles Police Department, initiated in 2001, remained
active for more than a decade before officially ending in 2013,
and required substantial expenditures on monitoring, compliance
reporting, and related administrative functions.\27\ When court
monitors expand their role beyond targeted compliance
oversight, some states may face prolonged financial
obligations, increased administrative demands, and reduced
flexibility.\28\ These effects can persist beyond the
underlying remedial objectives, underscoring the importance of
clearly defined mandates and periodic reassessment to ensure
monitoring remains proportionate, time-limited, and directly
tied to measurable compliance outcomes.\29\
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\27\Solomon Moore, Judge Ends Monitor of the Los Angeles Police,
The New York Times (Jul. 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/
us/18lapd.html
\28\Thomas Stevenson, Andy Biggs asks DOJ to lift Obama-era
monitoring of Maricopa County Sheriff's Office over racial profiling
allegations, Post Millennial (Oct. 7, 2025).
\29\Id.
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The Monitor Accountability Act
The Monitor Accountability Act codifies much of Associate
Attorney General Gupta's memorandum to Attorney General Garland
regarding monitors. It requires the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts to establish conditions on the
appointment by a district court of a monitor of a state or unit
of local government. These conditions include a cap on fees, a
term limit on the monitors and judges overseeing monitor cases,
allowing for public comment on the selection of the monitor,
and providing a public accounting of the activities.
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 8365: ``The
Monitoring Racket: The Grift that Keeps on Giving,'' a hearing
held on February 13, 2026, before the Subcommittee on the Crime
and Federal Government Surveillance of the Committee on the
Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard testimony from the following
witnesses:
The Honorable Debbie Lesko, Vice Chair,
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors;
Felix Garcia, Community Advisory Board for
the Monitor of Maricopa County Sheriff's Office; and
Jon Riches, Vice President for Litigation
and General Counsel at the Goldwater Institute's
Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation.
The hearing examined the federal court monitor overseeing
the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) and how
improvements to the monitor regime could be implemented.
Committee Consideration
On April 22, 2026, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 8365, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
13-11, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R 8365:
1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 8365, as
amended--passed 13 ayes to 11 nays.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has
requested but not received from the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill
contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax
expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate and statement to be printed in the Congressional
Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost
estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant
to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this
report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate
to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by
the Committee.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 8365 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 8365 would require the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts to establish conditions on
the appointment by a district court of a monitor of a state or
unit of local government.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 8365
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
An estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1: Short Title
The ``Monitor Accountability Act.''
Section 2. Conditions on the Appointment of Monitors by Courts.
This section requires the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to establish conditions on the appointment
by a district court of a monitor of a State or unit of local
government. These conditions include a cap on fees, a term
limit on the monitors and judges overseeing monitor cases,
allowing for public comment on the selection of the monitor,
and providing a public accounting of the activities of the
monitor.
Dissenting Views
I oppose this legislation to undermine federal
monitorships, which are an important tool for federal judges to
ensure compliance with court orders, settlement agreements, or
consent decrees and remedy entrenched violations of federal
law, especially in matters of civil rights, policing,
detention, disability rights, the environment, education, and
antitrust.
The sponsors of this bill appear to be offering it in
response to the ongoing federal monitorship of the Maricopa
County, Arizona, Sheriff's Office. In May 2013, a federal court
found that the Sheriff's Office, under the infamous leadership
of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, had a practice of racially profiling and
illegally detaining Latino motorists, in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Arizona State
Constitution.\1\ One expert called it, ``the worst pattern of
racial profiling by a law enforcement agency in U.S.
history.''\2\ Following this ruling, the federal district judge
placed the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office under supervision
by a court-appointed monitor to ensure it was taking the
necessary steps to correct systematic violations of the law.
For years after the initial court order, Sheriff Arpaio
gleefully violated a succession of court orders, refusing to
end his office's practice of unlawful racial profiling, which
eventually led to courts finding him in civil contempt and
guilty of criminal contempt, for which he was later pardoned by
President Trump.\3\ As a result, the court has had to issue
subsequent orders, each time trying to more clearly articulate
the steps the Sheriff's Office must take to come into
compliance with the order and the law.
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\1\Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Federal Court
Rules Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Violated United States Constitution
(May 24, 2013), https://www.acluaz.org/press-
releases/federal-court-rules-arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-violated-
united-states-constitution/.
\2\Ray Stern, Sheriff Joe Arpaio's Office Commits Worst Racial
Profiling in U.S. History, Concludes DOJ Investigation, Phoenix News
Times (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/sheriff-
joe-arpaios-office-commits-worst-racial-profiling-in-us-history-
concludes-doj-investigation-6655328/.
\3\Steve Almasy & Artemis Moshtaghlan, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Three
Others Found in Civil Contempt, CNN (May 15, 2016), https://
www.cnn.com/2016/05/13/us/sheriff-joe-arpaio-
contempt-charges; Colin Dwyer, Ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio Convicted of
Criminal Contempt, NPR (July 31, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/07/31/540629884/ex-sheriff-joe-arpaio-convicted-of-
criminal-contempt; Press Release, White House, President Trump Pardons
Sheriff Joe Arpaio (Aug. 25, 2017), available at https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-trump-
pardons-sheriff-joe-arpaio/.
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Recently, my Republican colleagues held a field hearing in
Phoenix, Arizona, where they apparently took issue with the
fact that the Sheriff's Office is still under federal
monitorship more than ten years later. It's not a ``grift'', as
they allege, that a monitor is still in place for the Maricopa
County Sheriff's Office. The monitor is still in place because
the Sheriff's Office has still not cleaned up its act by
remedying its egregious violations of the law, pursuant to
multiple court orders. In fact, more than a decade later and
even under a new sheriff, data reveals that racial disparities
in the Sheriff's Office arrest rates persist.\4\
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\4\Rafael Carranza, This Sheriff Says His Department Eliminated
Racial Bias. Data Shows Otherwise., Propublica (Mar. 26, 2026), https:/
/www.propublica.org/article/sheriff-jerry-
sheridan-maricopa-county-court-oversight.
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The real grift is contained in this legislation. While I am
certainly open to having a serious policy discussion about ways
to strengthen or improve the federal monitorship process, this
bill is flawed in multiple ways.
We were told that the Monitor Accountability Act is simply
a codification of recommendations made by Attorney General (AG)
Merrick Garland and Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta in
a 2021 Department of Justice memo on the use of monitors in
settlement agreements and consent decrees.\5\ But that's not
close to the full story.
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\5\Memorandum from Att'y Gen. to Heads of Civil Litigating
Components U.S. Att'y, Review of the Use of Monitors in Civil
Settlement Agreements and Consent Decrees with State and Local Gov't
Entities (Sept. 13, 2021).
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The Monitor Accountability Act is a cherry-picked, chopped
up and distorted GOP creation that would make inevitable the
demise of the Maricopa County monitor and make all other
federal monitorships less effective and less efficient. It
would exacerbate existing problems in accomplishing the goals
of consent decrees and settlement agreements, which is to
provide legal and equitable relief to remedy serious violations
of federal law, particularly for entities that engage in a
pattern or practice of misconduct. The bill would also have
sweeping consequences for the enforcement of federal law around
the country through consent decrees and settlements that have
been entered into with other federal government agencies
outside our Committee's jurisdiction. The effect would be to
undermine one of the most important tools we have to address
persistent violations of federal law in matters of civil
rights, policing, detention, disability rights, the
environment, education, and antitrust.
While this bill certainly encompasses some of the Garland
memo's recommendations, many other key recommendations
contained in the Garland memo are not included, such as
requiring a hearing after five years to assess the progress
made under the agreement and evaluate whether a monitorship
should be terminated.
Many of the provisions of this bill are far more
proscriptive than the recommendations made in the Garland memo,
and, in other cases, the legislative language in the bill
expressly contradicts the Garland memo's recommendations. For
example, this bill would impose mandatory five-year term limits
on federal monitorships. While the Garland memo supports term
limits for monitors, it does not prescribe a specific time
limit, and counsels against automatic termination, as would be
the case under this bill. Instead, the Garland memo recommends
judicial evaluation of monitorships at the end of their term
and allows for the possibility of reappointment.\6\ The Garland
memo also recommends that consent decrees and settlement
agreements explicitly include a mutually agreed upon process
for assessing the monitor before a reappointment can occur.\7\
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\6\Id. at 8-9.
\7\Id. at 5-6.
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This bill also imposes a new mandate that requires
appointment of a new judge after six years--which means that,
oddly, it fails to align the term limits for monitors and
judges. Where's the efficiency in that? Far from making this a
more efficient and effective process, these requirements will
delay, prolong, and confuse monitorships as a new monitor and a
new judge will have to get up to speed on the complicated
history of the case and the progress completed by the party
prior to their appointment. They will have to review years'
worth of briefs, reports, motions, replies, orders, and
pleadings, among other case documents. Together, these
provisions could certainly incentivize a reluctant party to
simply ``run out the clock'' until a more favorable monitor
and/or judge is appointed to their case.
The retroactive application of this bill is also curious.
The Garland memo explicitly warns against retroactivity, noting
that, ``because existing consent decrees and monitorships are
the product of extensive negotiations between the parties, with
approval by the federal court, the specific recommendations [in
the memorandum] should apply only to consent decrees and
monitorships used in future cases.''\8\ Inexplicably, the
Monitor Accountability Act would effectuate the exact opposite
of this advice. The bill would apply retroactively, meaning
that both the monitor and judge in the Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office case would be terminated shortly after this
bill becomes law. And that, I have a hunch, may be the deep-
down ulterior motive for why this bill is being offered here in
the first place.
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\8\Id. at 3.
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I will also note that this bill suffered from other
technical deficiencies at the outset. Some of the deficiencies
were brought to the attention of the Majority, including its
timeline for implementation and who would be responsible for
implementation. For example, the bill instructed the
``Administrator'' of the Administrative Office of the Courts
(AO)--a position that does not currently exist--to establish
the new conditions, including a new fee schedule, for monitors
within 90 days of enactment. Given that the Judicial Conference
only meets twice a year, it would have been impossible for the
AO to establish a new fee schedule within 90 days of enactment
of the Monitor Accountability Act. These issues were addressed
by an amendment introduced by the bill's sponsor, changing the
timeframe for implementation to 180 days and making the
``Director'' of the AO responsible for implementation, but they
do not come close to solving the underlying flaws in this
legislation.
While I appreciate that my colleagues took steps to make
corrections, the fact that these last-minute changes were
necessary to make the bill remotely sensible demonstrates that
we have not done any kind of thorough vetting and analysis of
the recommendations contained therein. If the Majority is
serious about improving the appointment and use of federal
monitors and making AG Garland's 2021 recommendations law, then
they would have worked with us and the AO to craft this bill
rather than rushing through this last-minute, makeshift
legislation that was introduced for the first time two days
before the markup.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this makeshift, ramshackle
bill designed apparently to interfere in a single case.
Jamie Raskin,
Ranking Member.
[all]