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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-644

SECURING COMMUNITY UPGRADES FOR A RESILIENT GRID ACT

2026-05-11

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Purpose and Summary

H.R. 7257 the ``Securing Community Upgrades for a Resilient Grid Act'' or the ``SECURE Grid Act'' was introduced by Rep. Bob Latta (R-OH) and Rep. Doris Matsui (D-CA) on February 4th, 2026. H.R. 7257 would make updates to existing authorities under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to enhance States' ability to holistically consider elements of energy infrastructure cyber and physical security protections and foster collaboration between federal, state, and private sector partners to develop comprehensive State Energy Security Plans.

Background and Need for Legislation

The United States' energy infrastructure is comprised of a vast network of energy and electricity delivery systems. This includes hundreds of thousands of high voltage transmission lines and millions of miles of low voltage distribution lines, along with millions of miles of energy pipelines that transport a variety of fuels to end users. These intricate and highly interdependent systems enable almost every aspect of our daily lives. The nation's economy, security, and the health and safety of its citizens depend upon the reliable and uninterrupted delivery of fuels and electricity. States and territories play a critical role in protecting the security and resiliency of energy infrastructure systems within their borders. Originally authorized under part D of title III of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA), the State Energy Program at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provides federal financial and technical assistance to help states with energy planning efforts.\1\ Since the inception of the DOE's State Energy Program in 1975, the manner in which energy and power is generated, transmitted, and delivered continues to evolve rapidly. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6321-6326. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since the enactment of EPCA, several subsequent statutes have reauthorized the State Energy Program, including the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976, the State Energy Efficiency Programs Improvement Act of 1990, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The State Energy Efficiency Programs Improvement Act of 1990 amended EPCA by including energy emergency planning requirements as a supplement to State energy conservation plans.\2\ Under this provision, federal financial assistance for the entire State Energy Program was contingent upon a State designing an energy emergency planning program for an energy supply disruption. The energy emergency plan must include an implementation strategy that includes regional coordination. The submission of these plans has been for informational purposes and has not required approval of the Secretary of Energy. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act updated energy emergency planning requirements under EPCA with provisions that strengthened the ability of the United States to secure energy infrastructure of the United States against physical and cybersecurity threats and to mitigate against energy supply disruptions.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\State Energy Efficiency Programs Improvement Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6323(e). \3\Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6321. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On June 14th, 2023, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a field hearing in Moore County, North Carolina, to examine physical threats to electric infrastructure.\4\ This hearing took place following several attacks on electric infrastructure, including in Tacoma, Washington, Baltimore, Maryland, and Moore County, North Carolina that left thousands of customers without power for extend periods of time. Recent cyber-related events have continued raising concerns about the security and resiliency of the nation's energy and electricity systems. States and Congress recognize the need to prioritize energy security, emergency planning, and energy infrastructure protection. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Oversight of FERC: Adhering To A Mission Of Affordable and Reliable Energy for America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Energy of the H. Comm on Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong. (2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Throughout the 119th Congress, the Committee on Energy and Commerce has received testimony detailing the importance of State Energy Security Plans, as well as the collaborative partnership between States and the DOE to develop and implement emergency planning measures that can appropriately consider potential hazards and risks facing complex energy systems.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape: Hearing on H.R. 7257, H.R. 7258, H.R. 7266, H.R. 7272, and H.R. 7305 Before the Subcomm. On Energy of the H. Comm on Energy and Commerce, 119th Cong. (2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, the Committee has held several hearings examining historic projections in electricity demand from next generation industries and general economywide electrification. Our nation's increasing reliance on the electric grid necessitates holistic and comprehensive State Energy Security Plans that can protect critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats.

Committee Action

On December 2, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7257. The title of the hearing was ``Securing America's Energy Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber and Physical Threats to the Grid.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Michael Ball, CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and Senior Vice President, North American Electric Reliability Corporation; Sharla Artz, Security and Resilience Policy Area Vice President at Xcel Energy, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute; Tim Lindahl, President & CEO of Kenergy, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; Zach Tudor, Associate Laboratory Director, National & Homeland Security, Idaho National Laboratory; and Harry Krejsa, Director of Studies for the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology. On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7257. The title of the hearing was ``Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Alex Fitzsimmons, Acting Undersecretary of Energy and Director of the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Energy; Scott I. Aaronson, Senior Vice President, Energy Security and Industry Operations, Edison Electric Institute; Adrienne Lotto, Senior Vice President of Grid Security, Technical and Operations Services, American Public Power Association; Nathaniel J. Melby, Ph.D., Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Dairyland Power, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA); and Rebecca O'Neil, Research Principal, Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. On February 4, 2026, the Subcommittee on Energy met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 7257, without amendment, to the full Committee by voice vote. On March 5, 2026, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 7257, as amended, favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 47 yeas and 0 nays.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during the Committee consideration: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Oversight Findings and Recommendations Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report. New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee finds that H.R. 7257 would result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues.

Congressional Budget Office Estimate

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general performance goal or objective of this legislation is to enhance existing authorities under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to develop comprehensive State Energy Security Plans. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 7257 is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following related hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 7257: On December 2, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7257. The title of the hearing was ``Securing America's Energy Infrastructure: Addressing Cyber and Physical Threats to the Grid.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Michael Ball, CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and Senior Vice President, North American Electric Reliability Corporation; Sharla Artz, Security and Resilience Policy Area Vice President at Xcel Energy, on behalf of Edison Electric Institute; Tim Lindahl, President & CEO of Kenergy, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; Zach Tudor, Associate Laboratory Director, National & Homeland Security, Idaho National Laboratory; and Harry Krejsa, Director of Studies for the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology. On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on H.R. 7257. The title of the hearing was ``Protecting America's Energy Infrastructure in Today's Cyber and Physical Threat Landscape.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from: Alex Fitzsimmons, Acting Undersecretary of Energy and Director of the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Energy; Scott I. Aaronson, Senior Vice President, Energy Security and Industry Operations, Edison Electric Institute; Adrienne Lotto, Senior Vice President of Grid Security, Technical and Operations Services, American Public Power Association; Nathaniel J. Melby, Ph.D., Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Dairyland Power, on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA); and Rebecca O'Neil, Research Principal, Infrastructure, Energy and Environment Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Committee Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was filed, the estimate was not available. Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the Committee finds that H.R. 7257 contains no earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title This section provides the short title of ``Securing Community Upgrades for a Resilient Grid'' or the ``SECURE Grid Act.'' Section 2. Consideration of the security of local distribution systems in State Energy Security Plans This section amends existing requirements under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to require States include considerations for local distribution lines, supply chain risks, and extreme weather impacts in the development of State Energy Security Plans. This section also clarifies that the Secretary of Energy is not required to approve submitted plans and requires the Department of Energy to provide technical assistance to States upon request. Section 3. GAO report This section requires the Government Accountability Office submit a report to Congress on the effectiveness of State Energy Security Plan provisions in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and recommendations for improvements prior to the expiration of authority in 2031. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT * * * * * * * TITLE III--IMPROVING ENERGY EFFICIENCY * * * * * * * Part D--State Energy Conservation Plans * * * * * * * SEC. 366. STATE ENERGY SECURITY PLANS. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Bulk-power system.--The term ``bulk-power system'' has the meaning given the term in section 215(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o(a)). (2) State energy security plan.--The term ``State energy security plan'' means a State energy security plan described in subsection (b). (3) Local distribution system.--The term ``local distribution system'' means any energy infrastructure owned and operated by an electric utility at a voltage of 100 kilovolts or less. (b) Financial Assistance for State Energy Security Plans.-- Federal financial assistance made available to a State under this part may be used for the development, implementation, review, and revision of a State energy security plan that-- (1) assesses the existing circumstances in the State; and (2) proposes methods to strengthen the ability of the State, in consultation with owners and operators of, and suppliers of equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to, energy infrastructure in the State-- (A) to secure the energy infrastructure of the State against all physical and cybersecurity threats; (B)(i) to mitigate the risk of energy supply disruptions to the State; and (ii) to enhance the response to, and recovery from, energy disruptions; and (C) to ensure that the State has reliable, secure, and resilient energy infrastructure. (c) Contents of Plan.--A State energy security plan shall-- (1) address all energy sources and regulated and unregulated energy providers; (2) provide a State energy profile, including an assessment of energy production, transmission, distribution, and end-use; [(3) address potential hazards to each energy sector or system, including-- [(A) physical threats and vulnerabilities; and [(B) cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities;] (3) address potential hazards to each energy sector or system, including-- (A) physical threats and vulnerabilities, including-- (i) weather-related threats and vulnerabilities; (ii) physical attacks on local distribution systems and the bulk-power system; and (iii) supply chain risks for equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity; and (B) cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, including threats to, and vulnerabilities of, local distribution systems that may impact the bulk-power system; (4) provide a risk assessment of energy infrastructure and cross-sector interdependencies; [(5) provide a risk mitigation approach to enhance reliability and end-use resilience; and] (5) provide a risk mitigation approach to enhance reliability and end-use resilience, including methods of responding to, mitigating, and recovering from potential hazards described in paragraph (3); and (6)(A) address-- (i) multi-State and regional coordination, planning, and response; and (ii) coordination with Indian Tribes with respect to planning and response; and (B) to the extent practicable, encourage mutual assistance in cyber and physical response plans. (d) Coordination.--In developing or revising a State energy security plan, the State energy office of the State shall coordinate, to the extent practicable, with-- (1) the public utility or service commission of the State; (2) energy providers from the private and public sectors; and (3) other entities responsible for-- (A) maintaining fuel or electric reliability; [and] (B) supplying equipment for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity; and [(B)] (C) securing energy infrastructure. (e) Financial Assistance.--[A State is not eligible] (1) Submission required._A State is not eligible to receive Federal financial assistance under this part for any purpose for a fiscal year unless the Governor of the State submits to the Secretary, with respect to that fiscal year-- [(1)] (A) a State energy security plan that meets the requirements of subsection (c); or [(2)] (B) after an annual review, carried out by the Governor, of a State energy security plan-- [(A)] (i) any necessary revisions to the State energy security plan; or [(B)] (ii) a certification that no revisions to the State energy security plan are necessary. (2) State determination.--A submission under paragraph (1) is not required to be approved by the Secretary. (f) Technical Assistance.--On request of the Governor of a State, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, [may] shall provide information, technical assistance, and other assistance in the development, implementation, or revision of a State energy security plan. (g) Requirement.--Each State receiving Federal financial assistance under this part shall provide reasonable assurance to the Secretary that the State has established policies and procedures designed to assure that the financial assistance will be used-- (1) to supplement, and not to supplant, State and local funds; and (2) to the maximum extent practicable, to increase the amount of State and local funds that otherwise would be available, in the absence of the Federal financial assistance, for the implementation of a State energy security plan. (h) Protection of Information.--Information provided to, or collected by, the Federal Government pursuant to this section the disclosure of which the Secretary reasonably foresees could be detrimental to the physical security or cybersecurity of any electric utility, local distribution system, or the bulk-power system-- (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; and (2) shall not be made available by any Federal agency, State, political subdivision of a State, or Tribal authority pursuant to any Federal, State, political subdivision of a State, or Tribal law, respectively, requiring public disclosure of information or records. [(i) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall expire on October 31, 2025.] (i) Sunset.--This section shall expire on September 30, 2031. * * * * * * * [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/644