Committee Action
118TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearings On April 10, 2024, the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Development held a hearing on ``FAFSA Fail: Examining the Impact on Students, Families, and Schools.'' The purpose of the hearing was to assess the causes and impacts of the previous year's failed FAFSA rollout, including the effects of delays and data inaccuracies on students and postsecondary institutions. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Mr. Mark Kantrowitz, President, Cerebly, Inc., Skokie, Illinois; Mr. Justin Draeger, President & CEO, National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Kim Cook, CEO, National College Attainment Network, Washington, D.C.; and Ms. Rachelle Feldman, Vice Provost, Enrollment, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. On September 24, 2024, the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Development held a hearing titled ``GAO Uncovers Biden-Harris FAFSA Failures.'' The purpose of the hearing was to review data and findings from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on ED's implementation of the new FAFSA, with a focus on timelines, technical challenges, and transparency and communication with students, institutions, and taxpayers. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Ms. Melissa Emrey- Arras, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, GAO, Washington, D.C.; and Mrs. Marisol Cruz Cain, Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity Team, GAO, Washington, D.C. 119TH CONGRESS First Session--Hearing On September 16, 2025, the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Development held a hearing on ``No More Surprises: Reforming College Pricing for Students and Families.'' The purpose of the hearing was to examine ways to make college financial aid more transparent. Testifying before the Subcommittee were Mr. Justin Draeger, Senior Vice President, Affordability, Strada Education Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Lee Wishing III, Vice President for Student Recruitment and Chief Marketing Officer, Grove City College, Grove City, Pennsylvania; Ms. Amy Laitinen, Senior Director of Higher Education, New America, Washington, D.C.; and Dr. Andrew Gillen, Research Fellow, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Legislative Action On March 12, 2026, Representative Glenn ``GT'' Thompson (R- PA) introduced Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026 (H.R. 7891). The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Education and Workforce. On March 17, 2026, the Committee considered H.R. 7891 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 33-0. The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 7891: 1. Representative Thompson offered an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) that made technical changes. The amendment passed by voice vote. 2. Representative Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA) offered and withdrew an amendment that would have limited flags to institutions demonstrating a pattern of fraud and required a review process with the institution before the Secretary could consider such findings in a program review, audit, or similar proceeding. 3. Representative Scott offered and withdrew an amendment to clarify that a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud must be based on the V4 and V5 verification groups under current regulations. Committee Views INTRODUCTION The federal student aid system plays a vital role in helping students and families afford postsecondary education by providing grants, loans, and work-study assistance through the FAFSA process. In Fiscal Year 2024, the Office of Federal Student Aid delivered approximately $120.8 billion in aid to more than 9.9 million students.\1\ Given both the scale and importance of these programs, durable and effective safeguards are necessary to protect taxpayer funds and ensure aid is awarded only to real, eligible students. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\fy2024-fsa-annual-report.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ghost Student Fraud ``Ghost student'' fraud commonly refers to schemes in which bad actors use stolen or counterfeit identities to submit college admission and federal student aid applications, enroll in courses, and extract federal or state aid by capturing the refund portion of the aid after institutional charges are covered. Once the funds are disbursed, the ``student'' vanishes. This has become a significant issue, costing taxpayers millions of dollars and even crowding real students out of classes.\2\ The problem has only grown in recent years, with California community colleges seeing the share of applicants identified as ``likely fake'' increase from 20 percent in 2021 to 34 percent in 2024.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\`Ghost' students are hijacking millions from colleges--and locking real human students out of classes Fortune. \3\Financial aid fraud keeps climbing in CA community colleges-- CalMatters. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ghost student fraud schemes often exploit the structure of remote admissions, online enrollment, and federal student aid disbursement. In a typical scheme, fraudsters obtain or fabricate personally identifiable information and use that information to create accounts and submit admissions applications to institutions that offer online programs or otherwise permit students to complete enrollment processes remotely. After securing admission, the fraudster submits a FAFSA in the name of the fraudulent student. Once the application is processed and the student is enrolled, the institution receives the applicable student aid funds and applies a portion of those funds toward tuition and fees. Any remaining balance is then refunded to the student. Ghost student fraud schemes exploit that refund process by directing the excess aid to accounts controlled by the fraudster. Recent criminal cases demonstrate how these schemes operate in practice. In one such case, the alleged fraudsters used the identities of prison inmates to enroll at a California community college, submit FAFSAs, and divert approximately $980,000 in federal student aid funds to accounts under their control.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Central District of California Three Women Indicted for Alleged Scheme that Used Prison Inmates' Identities to Fraudulently Obtain Federal Student Loans United States Department of Justice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fraudsters are increasingly adopting new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) to increase the scale and sophistication of ghost student fraud.\5\ At a larger scale, ghost student fraud schemes require the creation of plausible identities, the submission of large volumes of admissions and financial aid applications, and the maintenance of activity that appears consistent with legitimate student participation long enough to trigger aid disbursement. AI tools can streamline these steps by generating convincing written materials, automating repetitive application processes, and producing online activity that mimics realistic student behavior. This evolving threat underscores the need for strong, durable safeguards to protect the integrity of federal student aid programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\How scammers are using AI to steal college financial aid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recent Executive Actions Last year, ED launched a series of measures to combat ghost student fraud. In guidance issued for the summer 2025 semester, ED required institutions to verify the identity of first-time FAFSA applicants and introduced new identity-validation requirements designed to make it more difficult for fraudsters to use stolen or fabricated identities.\6\ For certain flagged applicants, that verification included presenting an unexpired, valid, government-issued photo ID either in person or through a live video conference with an institutionally authorized official.\7\ By December 2025, ED estimated it had blocked more than $1 billion in attempted financial aid theft.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\U.S. Department of Education to Implement New Identity Validation Processes to Combat Student Aid Fraud U.S. Department of Education. \7\U.S. Department of Education to Implement New Identity Validation Processes to Combat Student Aid Fraud U.S. Department of Education. \8\U.S. Department of Education Prevents More Than $1 Billion in Federal Student Aid Fraud This Year, Additional Crackdowns Expected in 2026 U.S. Department of Education. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Most recently, on April 26, 2026, ED implemented a real- time fraud detection system within FAFSA that screens applicants as they complete the form.\9\ The system allows most legitimate applicants to proceed normally, while applicants flagged as high risk must complete an additional online identity confirmation process within the FAFSA workflow. For the highest-risk applicants, as well as high-risk applicants whose identities cannot be confirmed through the online process, Institutional Student Information Records (ISIRs) continue to be generated but are placed in rejected status with fraud-related codes. Institutions can then assist legitimate applicants in resolving the rejected status through in-person identity verification and by reporting the result through the FAFSA Partner Portal. By giving high-risk applicants an opportunity to resolve identity concerns online within the FAFSA workflow before institutional review is needed, ED expects to reduce the number of applications that institutions must verify in person, easing the verification burden on institutions while protecting federal student aid dollars from fraud. On May 13, 2026, ED estimated the new real-time fraud detection system had blocked $60 million in fraudulent student loan applications since launching on April 26.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\FAFSA Real-Time Fraud Detection Knowledge Center. \10\https://dailycaller.com/2026/05/13/donald-trump-education- department-student-loans-60- million-applications-fraud/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Need for Legislation ED's authority to address fraud in the federal student aid programs, including ghost student fraud, is rooted in HEA provisions governing student eligibility, institutional participation, fraud involving Title IV funds, and the oversight of participating institutions through program reviews. These provisions establish baseline eligibility requirements for student aid; require institutions participating in Title IV programs to administer those funds in accordance with applicable requirements; authorize the Secretary to conduct program reviews on a systematic basis and to prioritize institutions for review based on specified risk indicators; and provide for civil, administrative, and criminal consequences when Title IV funds are obtained or used improperly. This legislation builds on that existing framework by establishing an additional statutory program review priority category for institutions that disburse Title IV aid to applicants whose FAFSA information presented a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud, unless that suspicion was resolved through prescribed verification measures before disbursement. By incorporating identity fraud risk into the statutory program review framework, the bill would strengthen ED's oversight tools and help inform program reviews, audits, investigations, and other authorized oversight activities, thereby better protecting students and taxpayers from evolving fraud threats. Conclusion Federal student aid should support real students pursuing postsecondary education, not ghost student fraud schemes. By strengthening ED's oversight of institutions that disburse Title IV aid to applicants whose FAFSA presents a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud, H.R. 7891 will help protect the integrity of the federal student aid programs and better ensure that taxpayer resources support legitimate students. Summary H.R. 7891 SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY Section 1--Short title Names the bill Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026. Section 2--Program review priority category Amends section 498A(a) of the HEA to add a new program review priority category for institutions identified under a new paragraph (4). Adds a new paragraph (4) to require the Secretary to identify any institution that, on or after October 1, 2026, disbursed federal student aid to a student whose application presented a reasonable suspicion of identity fraud, as determined by the Secretary's identity fraud detection system. Provides an exception so that an institution is not identified if it demonstrates to the Secretary that, for each such student and before disbursing aid, the institution verified the student's identity either in person or through a live video call. Clarifies that identification of an institution: may be used to inform program reviews, audits, investigations, and other oversight activities authorized under title IV; and may not, by itself, be treated as a determination that the institution failed to meet title IV requirements. Explanation of Amendments The amendment in the nature of a substitute is explained in the body of this report. Application of Law to the Legislative Branch Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a description of the application of this bill to the legislative branch. H.R. 7891 amends the HEA to strengthen federal oversight of institutions of higher education that disburse federal student aid to applicants whose FAFSA information is flagged for suspected identity fraud. H.R. 7891 applies only to ED, FAFSA applicants, and institutions of higher education, and therefore does not apply to the Legislative Branch. Unfunded Mandate Statement Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344 (as amended by section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4), the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Earmark Statement H.R. 7891 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of House rule XXI. Roll Call Votes Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee Report to include for each record vote on a motion to report the measure or matter and on any amendments offered to the measure or matter the total number of votes for and against and the names of the Members voting for and against. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives In accordance with clause (3)(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 7891 is to combat federal student aid fraud by requiring ED to strengthen federal oversight of institutions of higher education that disburse federal student aid to applicants whose FAFSA information is flagged for suspected identity fraud. Duplication of Federal Programs No provision of H.R. 7891 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the body of this report. Required Committee Hearing In compliance with clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII the following hearing held during the 119th Congress was used to develop or consider H.R. 7891: On September 16, 2025, the Committee's Higher Education and Workforce Development Subcommittee held a hearing on ``No More Surprises: Reforming College Pricing for Students and Families.'' New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 7891 would require the Department of Education to prioritize the review of institutions of higher education that disburse federal student aid to applicants without providing proof that they verified an applicant's identity, if such applicant has been flagged by the department's fraud detection system for potential identity theft. Under current law, the Department of Education conducts systematic reviews of institutions of higher education that participate in the federal student aid programs. On that basis and based on the cost of similar activities, CBO estimates that the cost to implement H.R. 7891 would be less than $500,000. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Leah Koestner. The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. Committee Cost Estimate Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 7891. However, clause 3(d)(2)(B) of that Rule provides that this requirement does not apply when, as with the pres