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H. Rept. 119-683

FRAUD PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

2026-06-03

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 8312] The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 8312) to establish fraud prevention and program integrity functions and data sharing authorities within the Department of Treasury and a permanent governmentwide Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Summary and Purpose of Legislation............................... 10 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 10 Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 14 Legislative History.............................................. 18 Committee Consideration.......................................... 18 Roll Call Votes.................................................. 18 Explanation of Amendments........................................ 20 List of Related Committee Hearings............................... 20 Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee...................................................... 21 Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 21 Application of Law to the Legislative Branch..................... 21 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 21 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 22 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement........................... 22 Earmark Identification........................................... 22 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 22 New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate....................................................... 22 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 22 Minority Views................................................... 58 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act''. SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF FRAUD PREVENTION AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY. (a) In General.--Section 306 of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 306. Fiscal Service ``(a) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is a service in the Department of the Treasury. ``(b) The head of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service is the Fiscal Assistant Secretary appointed under section 301(d). ``(c) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service, having as its head a Commissioner, shall maintain the following functions related to financial integrity, spending transparency, and preventing improper payments resulting in financial loss to the government, and does not include any investigative or law enforcement function, which, in addition to any other duty the Secretary of the Treasury assigns-- ``(1) shall administer and operate the Do Not Pay system required under section 3354 in a manner that ensures that any data provided to the Secretary is used only for the purposes set forth under section 3354 in accordance with applicable law; and ``(2) shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, establish and maintain a voluntary governmentwide data analysis program in accordance with applicable law and using the authorities under section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note)-- ``(A) to provide data sharing and analysis services to Federal agencies and any State (meaning a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United States, or a federally recognized Indian Tribe) and local government responsible for the administration of a federally funded program or the disbursement of Federal funds, to detect fraud and prevent improper payments resulting in a financial loss to the government, but for no other purpose including any policy analysis and enforcement action purpose, and, including by facilitating the following services upon request and on a voluntary basis in accordance with all applicable privacy and security laws: ``(i) Federal agency or State and local government data sharing of known fraudulent entities and transactions resulting from final adverse action determinations, payment denials, referrals for criminal investigation, or equivalent findings with the Department of the Treasury. ``(ii) Screening awardees and payees against the centralized fraud database prior to award or payment issuance, as feasible and in accordance with individual program requirements. ``(iii) Screening relevant cyber activity against the centralized fraud database to review recipient or payee changes to virtual identity or payment information. ``(iv) Establishing governmentwide standards for the collection, labeling, and sharing of data related to improper payments, to include fraudulent payments, with the Department of the Treasury. ``(v) Partnering with financial institutions and industry to share best practices and, as appropriate, information on known fraud patterns and results of investigations into fraudulent activity. ``(vi) Providing identity, eligibility, account, and vital event verification and validation tools and analytical services to agencies, as necessary and appropriate; and ``(B) that is capable of receiving (including in bulk data formats and through systems that facilitate real- time data access) any data asset, information, or record related to the administration of Federal programs (including federally funded State-administered programs) and disbursement of Federal funds under such programs, provided to the Secretary for secure and confidential use by the center or the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability and Recovery (in accordance with any terms included in a written data sharing agreement between the Secretary and the Inspector General) to recognize and address patterns of fraudulent actors, information, and claims across such programs; and ``(3) shall provide the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, access to such information technology, data assets, information, and records to support the functions and services of the Office of the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery established under section 317 in accordance with applicable law. ``(d) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall not later than 2 years after the establishment of this section, and on an annual basis thereafter, submit, to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a report, which may be included as part of another report submitted to Congress by the Secretary, on the implementation of the Program, including participation rates and an assessment of the Program's effectiveness in reducing fraud and preventing improper payments resulting in a financial loss to the government. ``(e) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is absent or unable to serve or when the office of Fiscal Assistant Secretary is vacant.''. (b) Coordination in Designating Do Not Pay Databases.--Section 3354(b)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury'' before ``in consultation''. (c) Amendment to Data Act of 2014 Data Analysis Center Authorization.--Section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended by striking ``may'' and inserting ``shall''. SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR FRAUD, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND RECOVERY. (a) Establishment of Inspector for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery.--Subchapter I of chapter 3 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within the Department of the Treasury ``(a) Office of Inspector General.--There is established within the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery. ``(b) Appointment of Inspector General; Removal.-- ``(1) In general.--The head of the Office shall be the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. ``(2) Nomination.--The nomination of the Inspector General shall be made without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations. ``(3) Removal.--The Inspector General shall be removable from office in accordance with the provisions of section 403(b) of title 5. ``(4) Political activity.--For purposes of section 7324 of title 5, the Inspector General shall not be considered an employee who determines policies to be pursued by the United States in the nationwide administration of Federal law. ``(5) Basic pay.--The annual rate of basic pay of the Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General under section 403(e) of title 5. ``(6) Legal counsel.--The Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery shall, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service, obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery or another inspector general within the executive branch. ``(c) Duties and Responsibilities.-- ``(1) In general.--It shall be the duty of the Inspector General, in accordance with section 404(b)(1) of title 5, to conduct, supervise, or coordinate oversight activities, including audits and investigations of the use of and the provision or award of covered funds, and the management by agency heads of any program established by the use of covered funds, with such related activities of the Inspector General to be considered civil or criminal law enforcement activities, including by-- ``(A) providing support to agency Inspectors General, if requested by the agency Inspector General, in the oversight of covered funds in order to-- ``(i) detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement; ``(ii) identify major risks that cut across programs and agency boundaries; and ``(iii) identify and promote best practices and tools to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud across covered funds; and ``(B) coordinating with relevant agency Inspectors General, the Department of Justice, and, as appropriate, the Fiscal Service to-- ``(i) provide support in conducting investigations, audits, and reviews relating to covered funds, including through-- ``(I) the establishment or use of an independent data analytics platform, which shall incorporate to the extent practicable and feasible the data analytic platform maintained by the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee prior to the enactment of this section; ``(II) the sharing of data, tools, and services; ``(III) the development and enhancement of data practices, analysis, and visualization; and ``(IV) any other appropriate means as determined by the Inspector General in coordination with relevant Inspectors General from any agency that expends or obligates covered funds; ``(ii) provide analytical products to agencies to promote program integrity, prevent improper payments, facilitate verification efforts to ensure proper expenditure and utilization of covered funds, and assist with civil and criminal investigations or litigation relating to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement of covered funds; ``(iii) review the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and the detection of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in, programs and operations using covered funds; ``(iv) as appropriate and practicable, identify data assets and information records collected, produced, and maintained by the Office that can be securely provided through data sharing agreements, including in bulk data formats and through systems that facilitate real-time data access, with the Secretary of the Treasury to support the functions and activities of the Fiscal Service and civil and criminal investigations or litigation relating to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of covered funds; and ``(v) expeditiously report to the Attorney General any instance in which the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law; ``(C) establish an advisory committee composed of other Inspectors General, with at least three representing an agency specified under section 901(b) of title 31, United States Code, and three from another agency, in accordance with the following: ``(i) General functions.--The advisory committee may identify and prioritize cross- agency fraud risks and activities to prevent, detect, and otherwise mitigate such risks, including by reviewing-- ``(I) the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and the detection of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in, programs and operations using covered funds; and ``(II) whether there are appropriate mechanisms for interagency collaboration relating to the oversight of covered funds, including coordinating and collaborating to the extent practicable with State and local government entities. ``(ii) Recommendations.--The advisory committee may, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, make recommendations to agencies on measures to prevent or address fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, and to mitigate major risks that cut across programs and agency boundaries, relating to covered funds. ``(iii) Preventing duplication in oversight functions.--With a view to preventing duplication in government functions and provide for ongoing coordination of resources to prevent fraud and improper payments in Federal programs and spending the advisory committee may-- ``(I) provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Treasury to assist the Secretary in making recommendations under section 321(a)(11) of title 31; and ``(II) provide any such additional recommendations in a timely manner to the appropriate congressional committees as the advisory committee determines necessary and to ensure that the definition of `covered funds' established under section 317(l) of title 31 is legislativel

Background and Need for Legislation

Every year, billions of Americans' tax dollars are lost by the federal government due to fraudulent and improper payments. In April 2026, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the federal government cumulatively improperly paid about $3 trillion dollars since 2003, with $186 billion in fiscal year 2025 alone.\1\ The improper payment rate has been trending up, with GAO recently reporting an increase of about $24 billion from fiscal year 2024.\2\ Separately, GAO estimates that between $233 billion and $521 billion is lost annually due to fraud across all Federal programs and operations.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-26-108694, Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billing in Fiscal Year 2025 (Apr. 2026). \2\Id. \3\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-105833, Fraud Risk Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, Based on Various Risk Environments (Apr. 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While improper payments, which include payments obtained through fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for Congress, pandemic-era spending programs exposed the vulnerability of federal agencies to criminals, especially fraud due to identity theft. Between March 2020 and March 2021, Congress enacted a series of six laws providing over $4.6 trillion in Federal funds to mitigate the economic and public health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.\4\ In the first four months alone, Congress appropriated over $2.7 trillion for these purposes.\5\ Congress expanded eligibility for certain programs, such as unemployment insurance (UI),\6\ and created new programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program to help individuals and businesses.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-21-387, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year (2021). \5\Id. \6\Peter Ganong, Recession Remedies, Lessons Learned from Expanded Unemployment Insurance during COVID-19, Brookings Institution (last visited Apr. 21, 2026), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2022/04/RR-OP-Chapter-2-final.pdf. \7\Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, Sec. 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (2020) (amending 15 U.S.C. 636(a)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From the beginning of the COVID-19 response, there were concerns that the trillions in relief were vulnerable to fraud and improper payments.\8\ Despite prior congressional focus and action to address these problems, Federal agencies had not implemented adequate fraud prevention, financial management and risk management capabilities. The massive amounts of funding, coupled with the demand for fast action, allowed for underlying weaknesses to be exploited and paved the way for massive amounts of fraud and improper payments. At the State level, unprecedented public demand quickly overwhelmed existing systems in place to determine eligibility and distribute assistance, most notably for unemployment insurance.\9\ As these systems crashed, State governments implemented work- around strategies that prioritized getting money out the door quickly, which also paved the way for large amounts of improper payments and fraud.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Pandemic Response and Accountability: Reducing Fraud and Expanding Access to Covid-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S. Hrg. 117-564, at 7 (Mar. 17, 2022) (testimony of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, Gov't Accountability Office). \9\Pandemic Response and Accountability: Reducing Fraud and Expanding Access to Covid-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S. Hrg. 117-564, at 5 (Mar. 17, 2022) (testimony of Jason S. Miller, Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget). \10\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The scale of the fraud across these pandemic relief packages is astounding. The U.S. Secret Service--the agency leading criminal investigations into pandemic relief fraud-- found that more than $100 billion was illegally obtained from the Small Business Administration's pandemic relief programs.\11\ Furthermore GAO has documented numerous problems of fraud in the pandemic relief programs, including in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (COVID-19 EIDL) program, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs.\12\ In September 2024, the Oversight Committee released a staff report documenting the widespread failures and fraud in pandemic unemployment relief programs specifically.\13\ The report found that the states investigated chose to follow a `pay and chase' model by sacrificing program integrity to get benefit payments out quickly and that organized crime played a major role in the proliferation of fraud by targeting preexisting system vulnerabilities and outdated information systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\Eamon Javers & Scott Zamost, Criminals have stolen nearly $100 billion in COVID relief funds, Secret Service said, CNBC, (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/21/criminals-have-stolen-nearly- 100-billion-in-covid-relief-funds-secret-service.html. \12\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106556, Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Address Fraud and Improper Payments (Feb. 2023). \13\See Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10, 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congress will likely never know the exact amount of fraud that occurred during the pandemic, but GAO observes that ``hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent payments were disbursed''.\14\ The pandemic may have been a failed stress test, but the problem of improper payments under any condition is likely to grow, with criminal organizations and fraudsters increasingly using more sophisticated means to engage in efforts to defraud taxpayer-funded programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) was established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-136, Sec. 15010) to conduct oversight over COVID-19 pandemic stimulus funds and to provide free tools to Inspectors General to help detect and prevent fraud. The PRAC developed the Pandemic Analytics Center for Excellence (PACE) which was able to identify anomalies indicating fraud schemes. This type of government-wide anti- fraud analytics function had not existed since 2015, when the Recovery Accountability Transparency Board (RATB), which oversaw the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's $787 billion in funding, permanently expired. In 2022, GAO found that the delayed establishment of PACE--more than a year after agencies started distributing COVID-19 relief funds--resulted in valuable time lost for programs to address fraud.\15\ Recently, the Working Families Tax Cut Act (WFTCA) (P.L. 119- 21) (i.e., the One Big Beautiful Bill Act) enhanced the PRAC's oversight authorities to enable the use of its anti-fraud data analytic tools and investigative resources to prevent fraud in funding related to the Act. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-22-105715, Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability For COVID-19 and Beyond, at 26 (Mar. 17, 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- According to the PRAC, in its most recent semiannual report to Congress, it has promoted transparency in the spending of over $5 trillion across 500 pandemic relief programs and safeguarded taxpayer dollars by identifying and mitigating risks, pursuing waste, fraud, abuse, and holding wrongdoers accountable.\16\ As of September 2025, the PRAC reported that it supports more than 50 law enforcement and agency IG partners across 1,200 pandemic-related investigations into over 24,000 fraudsters, representing a potential fraud loss to the government of $2.5 billion.\17\ And the PRAC's data analytics hub--the PACE--has over 68 major public, non-public, and commercial data sources in a secure platform with over 1.6 billion data points that enable fraud detection and investigations.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\About the PRAC, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/media/file/prac-primer (last visited May 29, 2026). \17\PRAC Releases Semiannual Report to Congress Highlighting Accomplishment from October 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (last visited May 29, 2026), https:// pandemicoversight.gov/news/articles/prac-releases-semiannual-report- congress-highlighting-accomplishments-october-1-2024-march-31-2025. \18\Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2025-September 30, 2025 (Dec. 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the PRAC received funding under the WFTCA to continue operating through 2034, there is no plan to permanently maintain the PRAC's data analysis tools or make its valuable anti-fraud resources available to all federal programs, for which there clearly is a need. An end to such operations would mean that the data and analytical capabilities would be permanently lost. Congress must ensure the permanent, continued operation of the PRAC's government-wide, anti-fraud investigative resources and support Treasury's further efforts to support agency program integrity. In recent subcommittee hearings, the Committee has heard that aligning PRAC's anti-fraud analytics capabilities with the U.S. Treasury and its Do Not Pay system, as well as making them permanent, is critical to efficiently and effectively preventing fraud across the government.\19\ It is estimated that if the PRAC and PACE were established prior to the pandemic, $79 billion dollars in fraud could have been prevented.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs: Hearing Before H. Comm on Oversight and Gov't Reform Subcomm. On Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. 2, (Jan. 13, 2026); See also Fraud Prevention: Understanding Fraud in Federally Funded Programs Run by the States: H. Comm on Oversight and Gov't Reform Subcomm. On Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2026). \20\PRAC: Data Analytics Could Have Prevented $79B COVID Fraud, MeriTalk (last visited Apr. 22, 2026), available at https:// www.meritalk.com/articles/prac-data-analytics-could-have-prevented-79b- covid-fraud/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During an emergency the government has historically forgone establishing necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure that funds go to the right person for the right purpose. Payment integrity stakeholders have long recommended enhancing government-wide anti-fraud efforts and this bill does just that.\21\ GAO specifically recommended establishing a permanent, government-wide analytics center to aid the oversight community in identifying improper payments and fraud.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\Steve Goodrich and Bob Westbrooks, IBM Center for the Business of Government, A Prepared Federal Government: Preventing Fraud and Improper Payments in Emergency Funding (Aug. 2024); see also Linda Miller, What's Missing Is Not Another Task Force (Mar. 23, 2026), available at https://govintegrity.substack.com/p/whats-missing-is-not- another-task. \22\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-22-105715, Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability For COVID-19 And Beyond, at 41 (Mar. 17, 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Fraud Prevention Accountability Act ensures that there is a permanent, governmentwide anti-fraud IG analytics function to assist agency IGs with their fraud work by providing cross- agency fraud detection and data analysis tools. It establishes a permanent IG for Fraud, Accountability and Recovery--which assumes the resources (i.e., personnel, funding, information technology) and functions of the PRAC through a legal transfer of assets by December 2028. This eliminates the need to start from scratch in the event of Congress passing a future emergency supplemental spending relief package. The bill also strengthens the U.S. Treasury's Fiscal Service program integrity services by explicitly codifying Treasury's role over maintaining the Do Not Pay system. It also encourages the development of government-wide data analytic support functions to support federal agencies in their pre- award anti-fraud work. Lastly, the bill avoids duplication of anti-fraud resources and functions by requiring Treasury to negotiate data sharing agreements to benefit both the Fiscal Service's program integrity functions and the new Inspector General's investigative work. The Treasury Secretary would also be required to develop legislative recommendations to leverage and reinforce existing government-wide anti-fraud resources whenever Congress drafts a future emergency supplemental spending relief package over $100 billion in total funding or establish a new program that spends more than $100 million in a single year. Congress must ensure the permanent and continued operation of the PRAC's government-wide anti-fraud services if it truly intends for the massive fraud experienced during the pandemic to never happen again. This bill is the culmination of years of the Committee's work to understand how agencies can improve their operations to protect hard-earned, taxpayer money from fraudsters.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title The short title is the ``Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act''. Section 2. Establishment of fraud prevention and financial integrity functions with the Department of the Treasury Subsection (a) strikes and replaces 31 U.S.C. 306 (Fiscal Service) to rename to the Bureau of Fiscal Service (BFS), leaving in place the Fiscal Assistant Secretary as its head, and making the following changes: New subsection (c) establishes a Commissioner of the BFS to maintain the functions related to financial integrity, spending transparency, and preventing improper payments resulting in loss to the government which includes administration and operation of the Do Not Pay System, establishment of a voluntary governmentwide data analysis program to provide services to Federal agencies and any State or local government that administers Federal funds, and providing the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR) in the U.S. Treasury (as established in subsection (c) of this Act) access to such information technology, data assets, information, and records the support the function and services of the IGFAR. New subsection (d) requires the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the Director of OMB, to submit a report within 2 years and annually thereafter to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on the Program's effectiveness in reducing fraud and preventing improper payments resulting in financial loss to the government. New subsection (e) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to designate another officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary when the office is vacant in accordance with the current law. Subsection (b) amends subsection (b)(1)(B) of section 3354 (Do Not Pay Initiative) of title 31 to require the Director of OMB to coordinate with the Treasury Secretary on the Initiative. Subsection (c) amends section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (Public Law 109- 282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) by striking ``may'' and inserting ``shall'' to ensure the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board Data Analysis Center remains at the Treasury Department. Section 3. Establishment of Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery Subsection (c) amends subchapter I of chapter 3 of title 31 by adding the following section, ``Sec. 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within the Department of the Treasury.'' New subsection (a) establishes the Office of the IGFAR. New subsection (b) specifies that the IGFAR shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and without regard to political affiliation. The subsection also details procedures for removal from office, the non-policymaking role of the IGFAR, aligns basic pay with other Inspectors General (IGs), and authorizes the IGFAR to obtain legal advice from a counsel reporting to an IG within the executive branch. New subsection (c) defines the duties of the IGFAR to conduct, supervise, or coordinate oversight activities, including audits and investigations, and the management by agency heads of any program established by the use of covered funds. Specifically, such duties include: In paragraph (1)(A), providing support to agency IGs, if requested, in order to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, identify major risks that cut across programs and agency boundaries, and promote best practices and tools to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud; in paragraph (1)(B), coordinating with relevant IGs, the Department of Justice, and, as appropriate, the Fiscal Service to provide support in conducting investigations, audits, and reviews; provide analytical products to promote program integrity and prevent improper payments; identify data assets and information records that can be securely provided through data sharing agreements; and report to the Attorney General if the IGFAR has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law; in paragraph (1)(C), establishing an advisory committee composed of other IGs, with at least three representing an agency, to identify and prioritize cross-agency fraud risks and activities to prevent, detect, and otherwise mitigate such risks. The advisory committee may make recommendations to agencies on measures to prevent or address fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, and to mitigate major risks that cut across programs and agency boundaries. The advisory committee may also make recommendations to the Treasury Secretary and to the appropriate congressional committees as to preventing duplication in government functions and provide for coordination of resources to prevent fraud and improper payments; in paragraph (1), providing investigative support to prosecutive and enforcement authorities to protect program integrity and coordinating the oversight and investigative activities with the Comptroller General, State and local government IGs, and State and local auditors, as appropriate; in paragraph (2), establishing, maintaining, and overseeing such systems and procedures as the IGFAR considers appropriate; in paragraph (3), providing technical assistance to support independent oversight activities provided that appropriate data privacy and security protection provisions are provided. Such technical assistance may include sharing data, data analytics services, and data analysis best practices; in addition, paragraph (4) clarifies that the duties and responsibilities of IGs under subsection (b) through (e) of section 404 of title 5, apply to the IGFAR but extend beyond the Treasury Department. New subsection (d) provides the IGFAR with the authorities provided under section 406 of title 5, without limited such authorities to the Treasury Department. The subsection also clarifies the treatment of the Office of the IGFAR and the records of the IGFAR, specifying that the Office is considered to be conducting civil or criminal law enforcement activity which is a component of its principal function for the purposes of sections 552 and 552a of title 5. New subsection (e) allows the Office of the IGFAR to operate as if it were a temporary organization (as defined in section 3161 of title 5), allowing the IGFAR to rapidly appoint officers and employees as such. The IGFAR is also given the authority to detail personnel on a non-reimbursable basis to another IG, employ annuitants, and enter into contracts with public agencies and private persons to carry out the duties of the Office. New subsection (f) requires departments and agencies of the Federal Government to furnish information requested by the IGFAR to the extent practicable and requires the IGFAR to immediately report an unreasonable refusal to the appropriate congressional committees. New subsection (g) requires the IGFAR to provide annual report to the appropriate committees of Congress that summarizes the activities of the IGFAR and includes estimates of fraudulent payments the Office helped prevent and assisted in recovering, policy and legislative recommendations to improve governmentwide fraud and improper payment prevention, and may include a classified annex. The IGFAR must also submit period reports to the President and Congress as necessary, provide periodic updates on the work of the Office, and publish the reports publicly with appropriate redactions so as not to disclose certain information. New subsection (h) authorizes $10,000,000 to the Office annually, in line with existing funding at the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) whose assets and obligations will be transferred to the Office of the IGFAR on or before December 31, 2028. New subsection (i) makes the IGFAR a member of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). New subsection (j) requires agency heads to address deficiencies identified by the IGFAR or to certify to the appropriate congressional committees that they do not concur with the recommendation. New subsection (k) requires the Office to establish and maintain a user-friendly, public-facing website to foster accountability and transparency in the use of covered funds that will be a centralized, governmentwide portal to key information relating to the oversight of covered funds which provides information and findings from the Office, agency IGs, or State auditors and financial managers. New subsection (l) defines key terms such as ``appropriate congressional committees'' and ``covered funds''. The term ``covered funds'' means: any funds, including loans or tax credits, that are made available to any non-Federal entity or individual under Division A or B of the CARES Act (Public Law 116-136), the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116-123), the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Public Law 116-127), the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (Public Law 116-139), Division M or N of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2), the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), and other enumerated laws; a Federal award over $50,000; any intramural payment made governmentwide for research activity; any emergency spending related to disaster relief or economic recovery. New subsection (m) contains a rule of construction stating that this section does not affect the independent authority of an IG or require any IG to provide funding to support the activities of the Office. Subsection (b) requires the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Treasury Secretary and the IGFAR, to issue a directive to the head of each agency that disburses or awards federal funds that requires such agency to identify and report opportunities to use the information system and data analytics products of the Fiscal Service to detect and prevent fraud and improper payments on or before March 1, 2029. Subsection (c) requires the Chairperson of the PRAC (or the Executive Director of the PRAC in the case the Chairperson position is vacant) to temporarily perform the duties of the IGFAR until the IGFAR is appointed under the process established in the new section 317(b) above. Subsection (d) requires that each employee of the PRAC that is transferred to the Office of the IGFAR be appointed to positions in the Office under terms and conditions of employment that are substantively the same as their current terms and conditions. Subsection (e) updates the table of sections for subchapter I of chapter 3 of title 31, to include the new section 317. Subsection (f) sets the effective date of this section as December 31, 2028. Section 4. Data Sharing for fraud prevention and program integrity Subsection (a) amends subsection (a) of section 321 (General authority of the Secretary) of title 31 by adding a new paragraph (10) thereby providing the Treasury Secretary with the authority to enter into memoranda of understanding with the heads of other Federal agencies and agreements with private entities to secure access to appropriate and allowable data assets as may appropriate for the Fiscal Service to use to prevent fraud and improper payments, support Do Not Pay, and, beginning on December 31, 2028, the IGFAR. Subsection (a) also adds a new paragraph (10) requiring the Treasury Secretary to provide legislative recommendations to Congress on any supplemental emergency disaster, pandemic, economic relief, or other supplemental appropriations totaling more than $100,000,000,000 or establishing a new program with more than $100,000,000 in anticipated additional spending in a single fiscal year to ensure that existing fraud prevention and oversight functions and entities are not supplanted or duplicated and are resourced appropriately. Section 5. Termination and transfer of assets of Pandemic Response Accountability Committee Subsection (a) amends section 15010(k) of the CARES Act (Public Law 116-136; 15 U.S.C. 9053) to terminate the PRAC on December 31, 2028, instead of September 30, 2034. Subsection (b) requires the transfer of assets and obligations held by the PRAC to be transferred to the Office of the IGFAR on December 31, 2028. Subsection (c) repeals section 15010 of the CARES Act on December 31, 2028. Subsection (d) defines ``assets'' to include contracts, agreements, facilities, property, data, records, unobligated or unexpended balances of appropriations, appropriate personnel, and other funds or resources. Legislative History H.R. 8312, the Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act, was introduced on April 15, 2026, by Representative Pete Sessions (R-TX). The following Representative is a cosponsor of the bill: William Timmons (R-SC). The bill was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The Committee considered H.R. 8312 at a business meeting on April 29, 2026, and ordered the bill as amended favorably reported by a recorded vote.

Committee Consideration

On April 29, 2026, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 8312, favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 23-17, a quorum being present. Roll Call Votes In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following roll call vote occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 8312: The roll call vote was on favorably reporting H.R. 8312. The bill was agreed to in a recorded vote of 23-17. Explanation of Amendments During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative James Comer (R-KY), Chairman of the Committee, offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute that made substantive changes to the bill. The amendment in the nature of a substitute clarified that the U.S. Treasury may only provide data sharing and analysis services under Sec. 2 of the bill to State and local governments (in addition to Federal agencies which is the current law) responsible for the administration of federal funds on a voluntary basis in accordance with all applicable privacy and security laws and made certain additional technicals edits throughout the bill text. The amendment in the nature of a substitute passed by voice vote. List of Related Committee Hearings In accordance with House rule XIII, clause 3(c)(6), (1) the following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 8312: On January 13, 2026, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a legislative hearing titled ``Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs'' with Ken Dieffenbach, the Executive Director for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; Renata Miskell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Accounting Policy & Financial Transparency at the U.S. Department of Treasury's Bureau of Fiscal Service, and Sterling Thomas, Chief Scientist at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2) The following related hearings were held: On February 12,2025, the Subcommittee on Delivering on Government Efficiency held a legislative hearing titled ``The War on Waste: Stamping Out the Scourge of Improper Payments and Fraud'' with Stewart Whitson, Former FBI Special Agent and Senior Director of Federal Affairs for the Foundation for Government Accountability; Haywood Talcove, Chief Executive Officer for LexisNexis Risk Solution; Dawn Royal, Director for United Council on Welfare Fraud; and Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette, Director of Government Affairs for Project On Government Oversight (Minority Witness). On March 11, 2025, the Subcommittee on Government Operations held a legislative hearing titled, ``Shifting Gears: Moving from Recovery to Prevention of Improper Payments and Fraud'' with Kristen Kociolek, Managing Director of Financial Management Assurance for the Government Accountability Office, Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; and Jennifer Wagner, Director of Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Minority Witness). On January 7, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds in Minnesota: Part I'' with Kristin Robbins, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; Walter Hudson, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; Marion Rarick, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; and Brendan Ballou, Former Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice (Minority Witness). On March 4, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds in Minnesota: Part II'' with the Honorable Tim Walz, Governor for the State of Minnesota; Honorable Keith Ellison, Attorney General for the State of Minnesota; and Reverend Mariah Tollgaard (Minority Witness). On April 15, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government Operations held a legislative hearing titled ``Fraud Prevention: Understanding Fraud in Federally Funded Programs Run by the States'' with Dr. O.J. Oleka, Chief Executive Officer for the State Financial Officers Foundation; Allison Ball, Auditor of Public Accounts for the Commonwealth of Kentucky; Seto Bagdoyan, Director of Forensic Audits and Investigative Services for the U.S. Government Accountability Office; and Robert A. Westbrooks (Minority Witness), former Federal Inspector General. Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause (2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the Background and Need for Legislation section above. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance goals or objectives of this bill are to ensure federal agencies have access to fraud preventions tools and techniques through a permanent data analytics center developed at the U.S. Treasury and to ensure that agency Inspectors General can effectively detect and prevent fraud when any future emergency spending relief package goes into effect by having reliable access to current resources developed by the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee by transitioning such resources into an expanded and permanent Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery. Application of Law to the Legislative Branch Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a description of the application of this bill to the legislative branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services and accommodations. This bill does not relate to employment or access to public services and accommodations in the legislative branch. Duplication of Federal Programs In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII no provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement Pursuant to section 5(b) of Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C. 1004(b)), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Committee finds that this Committee Print does not direct the establishment of an advisory committee. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 the Committee has included a letter received from the Congressional Budget Office below. Earmark Identification This bill does not include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives. Committee Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE * * * * * * * SUBTITLE I--GENERAL * * * * * * * CHAPTER 3--DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY SUBCHAPTER I--ORGANIZATION Sec. * * * * * * * 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within the Department of the Treasury. * * * * * * * SUBCHAPTER I--ORGANIZATION * * * * * * * [Sec. 306. Fiscal Service [(a) The Fiscal Service is a service in the Department of the Treasury. [(b) The head of the Fiscal Service is the Fiscal Assistant Secretary appointed under section 301(d) of this title. [(c) The Fiscal Service has a-- [(1) Bureau of Government Financial Operations, having as its head a Commissioner of Government Financial Operations; and [(2) Bureau of the Public Debt, having as its head a Commissioner of the Public Debt. [(d) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is absent or unable to serve or when the office of Fiscal Assistant Secretary is vacant.] Sec. 306. Fiscal Service (a) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is a service in the Department of the Treasury. (b) The head of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service is the Fiscal Assistant Secretary appointed under section 301(d). (c) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service, having as its head a Commissioner, shall maintain the following functions related to financial integrity, spending transparency, and preventing improper payments resulting in financial loss to the government, and does not include any investigative or law enforcement function, which, in addition to any other duty the Secretary of the Treasury assigns-- (1) shall administer and operate the Do Not Pay system required under section 3354 in a manner that ensures that any data provided to the Secretary is used only for the purposes set forth under section 3354 in accordance with applicable law; and (2) shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, establish and maintain a voluntary governmentwide data analysis program in accordance with applicable law and using the authorities under section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note)-- (A) to provide data sharing and analysis services to Federal agencies and any State (meaning a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United States, or a federally recognized Indian Tribe) and local government responsible for the administration of a federally funded program or the disbursement of Federal funds, to detect fraud and prevent improper payments resulting in a financial loss to the government, but for no other purpose including any policy analysis and enforcement action purpose, and, including by facilitating the following services upon request and on a voluntary basis in accordance with all applicable privacy and security laws: (i) Federal agency or State and local government data sharing of known fraudulent entities and transactions resulting from final adverse action determinations, payment denials, referrals for criminal investigation, or equivalent findings with the Department of the Treasury. (ii) Screening awardees and payees against the centralized fraud database prior to award or payment issuance, as feasible and in accordance with individual program requirements. (iii) Screening relevant cyber activity against the centralized fraud database to review recipient or payee changes to virtual identity or payment information. (iv) Establishing governmentwide standards for the collection, labeling, and sharing of data related to improper payments, to include fraudulent payments, with the Department of the Treasury. (v) Partnering with financial institutions and industry to share best practices and, as appropriate, information on known fraud patterns and results of investigations into fraudulent activity. (vi) Providing identity, eligibility, account, and vital event verification and validation tools and analytical services to agencies, as necessary and appropriate; and (B) that is capable of receiving (including in bulk data formats and through systems that facilitate real-time data access) any data asset, information, or record related to the administration of Federal programs (including federally funded State-administered programs) and disbursement of Federal funds under such programs, provided to the Secretary for secure and confidential use by the center or the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability and Recovery (in accordance with any terms included in a written data sharing agreement between the Secretary and the Inspector General) to recognize and address patterns of fraudulent actors, information, and claims across such programs; and (3) shall provide the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, access to such information technology, data assets, information, and records to support the functions and services of the Office of the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery established under section 317 in accordance with applicable law. (d) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall not later than 2 years after the establishment of this section, and on an annual basis thereafter, submit, to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a report, which may be included as part of another report submitted to Congress by the Secretary, on the implementation of the Program, including participation rates and an assessment of the Program's effectiveness in reducing fraud and preventing improper payments resulting in a financial loss to the government. (e) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is absent or unable to serve or when the office of Fiscal Assistant Secretary is vacant. * * * * * * * Sec. 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within the Department of the Treasury (a) Office of Inspector General.--There is established within the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery. (b) Appointment of Inspector General; Removal.-- (1) In general.--The head of the Office shall be the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Nomination.--The nomination of the Inspector General shall be made without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations. (3) Removal.--The Inspector General shall be removable from office in accordance with the provisions of section 403(b) of title 5. (4) Political activity.--For purposes of section 7324 of title 5, the Inspector General shall not be considered an employee who determines policies to be pursued by the United States in the nationwide administration of Federal law. (5) Basic pay.--The annual rate of basic pay of the Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General under section 403(e) of title 5. (6) Legal counsel.--The Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery shall, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service, obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery or another inspector general within the executive branch. (c) Duties and Responsibilities.-- (1) In general.--It shall be the duty of the Inspector General, in accordance with section 404(b)(1) of title 5, to conduct, supervise, or coordinate oversight activities, including audits and investigations of the use of and the provision or award of covered funds, and the management by agency heads of any program established by the use of covered funds, with such related activities of the Inspector General to be considered civil or criminal law enforcement activities, including by-- (A) providing support to agency Inspectors General, if requested by the agency Inspector General, in the oversight of covered funds in order to-- (i) detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement; (ii) identify major risks that cut across

Minority Views

Since the beginning of his second term, President Trump and his allies in Congress have sustained an unrelenting attack on the Inspector General community. The assault began with the illegal mass firing of Inspectors General during President Trump's first month in office in 2025. Since that time, President Trump has left many Inspector General positions vacant and installed overtly partisan appointees in others. The government-wide overhaul in Offices of Inspectors General has generated a culture of fear. Independent oversight has been blocked in order to deliberately facilitate illegal activity and corruption by or within federal agencies. This Administration's assault on the Inspector General community continues with the Office of Management and Budget's practice to apportion Congressionally appropriated funds to the Council on Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) quarterly rather than annually. CIGIE, an entity created in statute, provides crucial services to the Inspector General community, including training and back-end services for websites and IT. CIGIE, however, has drawn the ire of Trump and his allies in Congress over its peer investigative function, the Integrity Committee. The apportionment process is controlled by the Office of Management and Budget, which must apportion funds to agencies before they can use it. CIGIE is an indispensable enabler for the work of Inspectors General across agencies. It facilitates information sharing and encourages Offices of Inspector General to communicate and share best practices. The inter-office function of CIGIE is also what made it a natural home for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC). The PRAC has garnered wide bipartisan support for its work examining pandemic-era programs. The PRAC's analytics ability, bolstered by robust data-sharing agreements between agencies, gives it a unique edge in both identifying fraud schemes and clawing back money claimed by fraudsters. The PRAC stands as an exemplar of what smart oversight can accomplish with strong bipartisan support. Last year, the PRAC's authorization was extended to September 30, 2034, and its remit was expanded with the support of Oversight Democrats. H.R. 8312 would move the PRAC from CIGIE to the Department of Treasury. This would effectively clear the way for the Trump Administration to further undermine or even completely defund CIGIE by removing a key bipartisan initiative from its purview. At the Department of the Treasury, PRAC would become the third Office of Inspector General in that department. H.R. 8312 would create unnecessary issues with jurisdiction for this new Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, without any offsetting benefits. Committee Democrats support creating a permanent home for the PRAC and giving it more power to coordinate and assist Offices of Inspector General in performing their functions, but we cannot support a bill that would give the Trump Administration the ability to pull the rug out from under the rest of the Inspector General community. Should the Administration decide to completely withhold apportionment for CIGIE, as it did in October 2025, it would be a disaster for Offices of Inspector General and Congress alike: many oversight websites would cease to function, preventing us from accessing thousands of reports on how to improve government programs; law enforcement officers in small Offices of Inspector General would have no way to get their required law enforcement training; and auditors and investigators across the oversight community would be left without a way to get the training necessary to perform their duties. H.R. 8312 purports to further the effort to prevent fraud--a worthy and essential effort--but it does so at too great a cost. Committee Democrats strongly oppose this legislation, which uses the facade of fraud prevention to undermine an entire ecosystem intended to hold the executive branch accountable. Robert Garcia, Ranking Member. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/683