Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 8312]
The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to whom
was referred the bill (H.R. 8312) to establish fraud prevention
and program integrity functions and data sharing authorities
within the Department of Treasury and a permanent
governmentwide Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and
Recovery, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that
the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Purpose of Legislation............................... 10
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 10
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 14
Legislative History.............................................. 18
Committee Consideration.......................................... 18
Roll Call Votes.................................................. 18
Explanation of Amendments........................................ 20
List of Related Committee Hearings............................... 20
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the
Committee...................................................... 21
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 21
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch..................... 21
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 21
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 22
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement........................... 22
Earmark Identification........................................... 22
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 22
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost
Estimate....................................................... 22
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 22
Minority Views................................................... 58
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Fraud Prevention and Accountability
Act''.
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF FRAUD PREVENTION AND FINANCIAL INTEGRITY
FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
(a) In General.--Section 306 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 306. Fiscal Service
``(a) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is a service in the Department
of the Treasury.
``(b) The head of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service is the Fiscal
Assistant Secretary appointed under section 301(d).
``(c) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service, having as its head a
Commissioner, shall maintain the following functions related to
financial integrity, spending transparency, and preventing improper
payments resulting in financial loss to the government, and does not
include any investigative or law enforcement function, which, in
addition to any other duty the Secretary of the Treasury assigns--
``(1) shall administer and operate the Do Not Pay system
required under section 3354 in a manner that ensures that any
data provided to the Secretary is used only for the purposes
set forth under section 3354 in accordance with applicable law;
and
``(2) shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, establish and maintain a voluntary
governmentwide data analysis program in accordance with
applicable law and using the authorities under section 6(c)(1)
of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act
(Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note)--
``(A) to provide data sharing and analysis services
to Federal agencies and any State (meaning a State of
the United States, the District of Columbia, a
territory or possession of the United States, or a
federally recognized Indian Tribe) and local government
responsible for the administration of a federally
funded program or the disbursement of Federal funds, to
detect fraud and prevent improper payments resulting in
a financial loss to the government, but for no other
purpose including any policy analysis and enforcement
action purpose, and, including by facilitating the
following services upon request and on a voluntary
basis in accordance with all applicable privacy and
security laws:
``(i) Federal agency or State and local
government data sharing of known fraudulent
entities and transactions resulting from final
adverse action determinations, payment denials,
referrals for criminal investigation, or
equivalent findings with the Department of the
Treasury.
``(ii) Screening awardees and payees against
the centralized fraud database prior to award
or payment issuance, as feasible and in
accordance with individual program
requirements.
``(iii) Screening relevant cyber activity
against the centralized fraud database to
review recipient or payee changes to virtual
identity or payment information.
``(iv) Establishing governmentwide standards
for the collection, labeling, and sharing of
data related to improper payments, to include
fraudulent payments, with the Department of the
Treasury.
``(v) Partnering with financial institutions
and industry to share best practices and, as
appropriate, information on known fraud
patterns and results of investigations into
fraudulent activity.
``(vi) Providing identity, eligibility,
account, and vital event verification and
validation tools and analytical services to
agencies, as necessary and appropriate; and
``(B) that is capable of receiving (including in bulk
data formats and through systems that facilitate real-
time data access) any data asset, information, or
record related to the administration of Federal
programs (including federally funded State-administered
programs) and disbursement of Federal funds under such
programs, provided to the Secretary for secure and
confidential use by the center or the Inspector General
for Fraud, Accountability and Recovery (in accordance
with any terms included in a written data sharing
agreement between the Secretary and the Inspector
General) to recognize and address patterns of
fraudulent actors, information, and claims across such
programs; and
``(3) shall provide the Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery, access to such information
technology, data assets, information, and records to support
the functions and services of the Office of the Inspector
General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery established
under section 317 in accordance with applicable law.
``(d) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall not later than 2
years after the establishment of this section, and on an annual basis
thereafter, submit, to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a report, which may be included
as part of another report submitted to Congress by the Secretary, on
the implementation of the Program, including participation rates and an
assessment of the Program's effectiveness in reducing fraud and
preventing improper payments resulting in a financial loss to the
government.
``(e) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another officer or
employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary
when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is absent or unable to serve or
when the office of Fiscal Assistant Secretary is vacant.''.
(b) Coordination in Designating Do Not Pay Databases.--Section
3354(b)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting
``in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury'' before ``in
consultation''.
(c) Amendment to Data Act of 2014 Data Analysis Center
Authorization.--Section 6(c)(1) of the Federal Funding Accountability
and Transparency Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note)
is amended by striking ``may'' and inserting ``shall''.
SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR FRAUD, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND RECOVERY.
(a) Establishment of Inspector for Fraud, Accountability, and
Recovery.--Subchapter I of chapter 3 of title 31, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery
within the Department of the Treasury
``(a) Office of Inspector General.--There is established within the
Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Inspector General for
Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery.
``(b) Appointment of Inspector General; Removal.--
``(1) In general.--The head of the Office shall be the
Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(2) Nomination.--The nomination of the Inspector General
shall be made without regard to political affiliation and
solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
``(3) Removal.--The Inspector General shall be removable from
office in accordance with the provisions of section 403(b) of
title 5.
``(4) Political activity.--For purposes of section 7324 of
title 5, the Inspector General shall not be considered an
employee who determines policies to be pursued by the United
States in the nationwide administration of Federal law.
``(5) Basic pay.--The annual rate of basic pay of the
Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay for an
Inspector General under section 403(e) of title 5.
``(6) Legal counsel.--The Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service,
obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to
the Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery
or another inspector general within the executive branch.
``(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be the duty of the Inspector
General, in accordance with section 404(b)(1) of title 5, to
conduct, supervise, or coordinate oversight activities,
including audits and investigations of the use of and the
provision or award of covered funds, and the management by
agency heads of any program established by the use of covered
funds, with such related activities of the Inspector General to
be considered civil or criminal law enforcement activities,
including by--
``(A) providing support to agency Inspectors General,
if requested by the agency Inspector General, in the
oversight of covered funds in order to--
``(i) detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse,
and mismanagement;
``(ii) identify major risks that cut across
programs and agency boundaries; and
``(iii) identify and promote best practices
and tools to prevent, detect, and respond to
fraud across covered funds; and
``(B) coordinating with relevant agency Inspectors
General, the Department of Justice, and, as
appropriate, the Fiscal Service to--
``(i) provide support in conducting
investigations, audits, and reviews relating to
covered funds, including through--
``(I) the establishment or use of an
independent data analytics platform,
which shall incorporate to the extent
practicable and feasible the data
analytic platform maintained by the
Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee prior to the enactment of
this section;
``(II) the sharing of data, tools,
and services;
``(III) the development and
enhancement of data practices,
analysis, and visualization; and
``(IV) any other appropriate means as
determined by the Inspector General in
coordination with relevant Inspectors
General from any agency that expends or
obligates covered funds;
``(ii) provide analytical products to
agencies to promote program integrity, prevent
improper payments, facilitate verification
efforts to ensure proper expenditure and
utilization of covered funds, and assist with
civil and criminal investigations or litigation
relating to fraud, waste, abuse and
mismanagement of covered funds;
``(iii) review the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of, and the
detection of fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement in, programs and operations using
covered funds;
``(iv) as appropriate and practicable,
identify data assets and information records
collected, produced, and maintained by the
Office that can be securely provided through
data sharing agreements, including in bulk data
formats and through systems that facilitate
real-time data access, with the Secretary of
the Treasury to support the functions and
activities of the Fiscal Service and civil and
criminal investigations or litigation relating
to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of
covered funds; and
``(v) expeditiously report to the Attorney
General any instance in which the Inspector
General has reasonable grounds to believe there
has been a violation of Federal criminal law;
``(C) establish an advisory committee composed of
other Inspectors General, with at least three
representing an agency specified under section 901(b)
of title 31, United States Code, and three from another
agency, in accordance with the following:
``(i) General functions.--The advisory
committee may identify and prioritize cross-
agency fraud risks and activities to prevent,
detect, and otherwise mitigate such risks,
including by reviewing--
``(I) the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of,
and the detection of fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement in, programs
and operations using covered funds; and
``(II) whether there are appropriate
mechanisms for interagency
collaboration relating to the oversight
of covered funds, including
coordinating and collaborating to the
extent practicable with State and local
government entities.
``(ii) Recommendations.--The advisory
committee may, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, make
recommendations to agencies on measures to
prevent or address fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, and to mitigate major risks that
cut across programs and agency boundaries,
relating to covered funds.
``(iii) Preventing duplication in oversight
functions.--With a view to preventing
duplication in government functions and provide
for ongoing coordination of resources to
prevent fraud and improper payments in Federal
programs and spending the advisory committee
may--
``(I) provide recommendations to the
Secretary of the Treasury to assist the
Secretary in making recommendations
under section 321(a)(11) of title 31;
and
``(II) provide any such additional
recommendations in a timely manner to
the appropriate congressional
committees as the advisory committee
determines necessary and to ensure that
the definition of `covered funds'
established under section 317(l) of
title 31 is legislativel
Background and Need for Legislation
Every year, billions of Americans' tax dollars are lost by
the federal government due to fraudulent and improper payments.
In April 2026, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
estimated that the federal government cumulatively improperly
paid about $3 trillion dollars since 2003, with $186 billion in
fiscal year 2025 alone.\1\ The improper payment rate has been
trending up, with GAO recently reporting an increase of about
$24 billion from fiscal year 2024.\2\ Separately, GAO estimates
that between $233 billion and $521 billion is lost annually due
to fraud across all Federal programs and operations.\3\
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\1\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-26-108694, Payment
Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186
Billing in Fiscal Year 2025 (Apr. 2026).
\2\Id.
\3\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-105833, Fraud Risk
Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated
$233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, Based on Various Risk
Environments (Apr. 2024).
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While improper payments, which include payments obtained
through fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for
Congress, pandemic-era spending programs exposed the
vulnerability of federal agencies to criminals, especially
fraud due to identity theft. Between March 2020 and March 2021,
Congress enacted a series of six laws providing over $4.6
trillion in Federal funds to mitigate the economic and public
health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.\4\ In the first four
months alone, Congress appropriated over $2.7 trillion for
these purposes.\5\ Congress expanded eligibility for certain
programs, such as unemployment insurance (UI),\6\ and created
new programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program to help
individuals and businesses.\7\
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\4\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-21-387, COVID-19: Sustained
Federal Action is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year (2021).
\5\Id.
\6\Peter Ganong, Recession Remedies, Lessons Learned from Expanded
Unemployment Insurance during COVID-19, Brookings Institution (last
visited Apr. 21, 2026), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/RR-OP-Chapter-2-final.pdf.
\7\Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, Sec. 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (2020) (amending 15 U.S.C.
636(a)).
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From the beginning of the COVID-19 response, there were
concerns that the trillions in relief were vulnerable to fraud
and improper payments.\8\ Despite prior congressional focus and
action to address these problems, Federal agencies had not
implemented adequate fraud prevention, financial management and
risk management capabilities. The massive amounts of funding,
coupled with the demand for fast action, allowed for underlying
weaknesses to be exploited and paved the way for massive
amounts of fraud and improper payments. At the State level,
unprecedented public demand quickly overwhelmed existing
systems in place to determine eligibility and distribute
assistance, most notably for unemployment insurance.\9\ As
these systems crashed, State governments implemented work-
around strategies that prioritized getting money out the door
quickly, which also paved the way for large amounts of improper
payments and fraud.\10\
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\8\Pandemic Response and Accountability: Reducing Fraud and
Expanding Access to Covid-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
S. Hrg. 117-564, at 7 (Mar. 17, 2022) (testimony of Gene L. Dodaro,
Comptroller General of the United States, Gov't Accountability Office).
\9\Pandemic Response and Accountability: Reducing Fraud and
Expanding Access to Covid-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
S. Hrg. 117-564, at 5 (Mar. 17, 2022) (testimony of Jason S. Miller,
Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget).
\10\ Id.
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The scale of the fraud across these pandemic relief
packages is astounding. The U.S. Secret Service--the agency
leading criminal investigations into pandemic relief fraud--
found that more than $100 billion was illegally obtained from
the Small Business Administration's pandemic relief
programs.\11\ Furthermore GAO has documented numerous problems
of fraud in the pandemic relief programs, including in the
Small Business Administration's (SBA) Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) and COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan
(COVID-19 EIDL) program, the Department of Labor's (DOL)
Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs.\12\ In September 2024,
the Oversight Committee released a staff report documenting the
widespread failures and fraud in pandemic unemployment relief
programs specifically.\13\ The report found that the states
investigated chose to follow a `pay and chase' model by
sacrificing program integrity to get benefit payments out
quickly and that organized crime played a major role in the
proliferation of fraud by targeting preexisting system
vulnerabilities and outdated information systems.
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\11\Eamon Javers & Scott Zamost, Criminals have stolen nearly $100
billion in COVID relief funds, Secret Service said, CNBC, (Dec. 21,
2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/21/criminals-have-stolen-nearly-
100-billion-in-covid-relief-funds-secret-service.html.
\12\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106556, Emergency Relief
Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Address Fraud and
Improper Payments (Feb. 2023).
\13\See Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability,
Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10,
2024).
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Congress will likely never know the exact amount of fraud
that occurred during the pandemic, but GAO observes that
``hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent
payments were disbursed''.\14\ The pandemic may have been a
failed stress test, but the problem of improper payments under
any condition is likely to grow, with criminal organizations
and fraudsters increasingly using more sophisticated means to
engage in efforts to defraud taxpayer-funded programs.
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\14\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19
Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025).
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The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) was
established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-136, Sec. 15010) to
conduct oversight over COVID-19 pandemic stimulus funds and to
provide free tools to Inspectors General to help detect and
prevent fraud. The PRAC developed the Pandemic Analytics Center
for Excellence (PACE) which was able to identify anomalies
indicating fraud schemes. This type of government-wide anti-
fraud analytics function had not existed since 2015, when the
Recovery Accountability Transparency Board (RATB), which
oversaw the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's $787
billion in funding, permanently expired. In 2022, GAO found
that the delayed establishment of PACE--more than a year after
agencies started distributing COVID-19 relief funds--resulted
in valuable time lost for programs to address fraud.\15\
Recently, the Working Families Tax Cut Act (WFTCA) (P.L. 119-
21) (i.e., the One Big Beautiful Bill Act) enhanced the PRAC's
oversight authorities to enable the use of its anti-fraud data
analytic tools and investigative resources to prevent fraud in
funding related to the Act.
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\15\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-22-105715, Emergency Relief
Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and
Accountability For COVID-19 and Beyond, at 26 (Mar. 17, 2022).
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According to the PRAC, in its most recent semiannual report
to Congress, it has promoted transparency in the spending of
over $5 trillion across 500 pandemic relief programs and
safeguarded taxpayer dollars by identifying and mitigating
risks, pursuing waste, fraud, abuse, and holding wrongdoers
accountable.\16\ As of September 2025, the PRAC reported that
it supports more than 50 law enforcement and agency IG partners
across 1,200 pandemic-related investigations into over 24,000
fraudsters, representing a potential fraud loss to the
government of $2.5 billion.\17\ And the PRAC's data analytics
hub--the PACE--has over 68 major public, non-public, and
commercial data sources in a secure platform with over 1.6
billion data points that enable fraud detection and
investigations.\18\
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\16\About the PRAC, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee,
https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/media/file/prac-primer (last visited
May 29, 2026).
\17\PRAC Releases Semiannual Report to Congress Highlighting
Accomplishment from October 1, 2024 through March 31, 2025, Pandemic
Response Accountability Committee (last visited May 29, 2026), https://
pandemicoversight.gov/news/articles/prac-releases-semiannual-report-
congress-highlighting-accomplishments-october-1-2024-march-31-2025.
\18\Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, Semiannual Report
to Congress: April 1, 2025-September 30, 2025 (Dec. 2025).
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While the PRAC received funding under the WFTCA to continue
operating through 2034, there is no plan to permanently
maintain the PRAC's data analysis tools or make its valuable
anti-fraud resources available to all federal programs, for
which there clearly is a need. An end to such operations would
mean that the data and analytical capabilities would be
permanently lost. Congress must ensure the permanent, continued
operation of the PRAC's government-wide, anti-fraud
investigative resources and support Treasury's further efforts
to support agency program integrity.
In recent subcommittee hearings, the Committee has heard
that aligning PRAC's anti-fraud analytics capabilities with the
U.S. Treasury and its Do Not Pay system, as well as making them
permanent, is critical to efficiently and effectively
preventing fraud across the government.\19\ It is estimated
that if the PRAC and PACE were established prior to the
pandemic, $79 billion dollars in fraud could have been
prevented.\20\
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\19\Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and
Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs: Hearing Before H. Comm on Oversight
and Gov't Reform Subcomm. On Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. 2, (Jan. 13,
2026); See also Fraud Prevention: Understanding Fraud in Federally
Funded Programs Run by the States: H. Comm on Oversight and Gov't
Reform Subcomm. On Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2026).
\20\PRAC: Data Analytics Could Have Prevented $79B COVID Fraud,
MeriTalk (last visited Apr. 22, 2026), available at https://
www.meritalk.com/articles/prac-data-analytics-could-have-prevented-79b-
covid-fraud/.
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During an emergency the government has historically forgone
establishing necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure that
funds go to the right person for the right purpose. Payment
integrity stakeholders have long recommended enhancing
government-wide anti-fraud efforts and this bill does just
that.\21\ GAO specifically recommended establishing a
permanent, government-wide analytics center to aid the
oversight community in identifying improper payments and
fraud.\22\
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\21\Steve Goodrich and Bob Westbrooks, IBM Center for the Business
of Government, A Prepared Federal Government: Preventing Fraud and
Improper Payments in Emergency Funding (Aug. 2024); see also Linda
Miller, What's Missing Is Not Another Task Force (Mar. 23, 2026),
available at https://govintegrity.substack.com/p/whats-missing-is-not-
another-task.
\22\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-22-105715, Emergency Relief
Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and
Accountability For COVID-19 And Beyond, at 41 (Mar. 17, 2022).
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The Fraud Prevention Accountability Act ensures that there
is a permanent, governmentwide anti-fraud IG analytics function
to assist agency IGs with their fraud work by providing cross-
agency fraud detection and data analysis tools. It establishes
a permanent IG for Fraud, Accountability and Recovery--which
assumes the resources (i.e., personnel, funding, information
technology) and functions of the PRAC through a legal transfer
of assets by December 2028. This eliminates the need to start
from scratch in the event of Congress passing a future
emergency supplemental spending relief package.
The bill also strengthens the U.S. Treasury's Fiscal
Service program integrity services by explicitly codifying
Treasury's role over maintaining the Do Not Pay system. It also
encourages the development of government-wide data analytic
support functions to support federal agencies in their pre-
award anti-fraud work. Lastly, the bill avoids duplication of
anti-fraud resources and functions by requiring Treasury to
negotiate data sharing agreements to benefit both the Fiscal
Service's program integrity functions and the new Inspector
General's investigative work.
The Treasury Secretary would also be required to develop
legislative recommendations to leverage and reinforce existing
government-wide anti-fraud resources whenever Congress drafts a
future emergency supplemental spending relief package over $100
billion in total funding or establish a new program that spends
more than $100 million in a single year.
Congress must ensure the permanent and continued operation
of the PRAC's government-wide anti-fraud services if it truly
intends for the massive fraud experienced during the pandemic
to never happen again.
This bill is the culmination of years of the Committee's
work to understand how agencies can improve their operations to
protect hard-earned, taxpayer money from fraudsters.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
The short title is the ``Fraud Prevention and
Accountability Act''.
Section 2. Establishment of fraud prevention and financial integrity
functions with the Department of the Treasury
Subsection (a) strikes and replaces 31 U.S.C. 306 (Fiscal
Service) to rename to the Bureau of Fiscal Service (BFS),
leaving in place the Fiscal Assistant Secretary as its head,
and making the following changes:
New subsection (c) establishes a Commissioner of the BFS to
maintain the functions related to financial integrity, spending
transparency, and preventing improper payments resulting in
loss to the government which includes administration and
operation of the Do Not Pay System, establishment of a
voluntary governmentwide data analysis program to provide
services to Federal agencies and any State or local government
that administers Federal funds, and providing the Inspector
General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery (IGFAR) in the
U.S. Treasury (as established in subsection (c) of this Act)
access to such information technology, data assets,
information, and records the support the function and services
of the IGFAR.
New subsection (d) requires the Treasury Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of OMB, to submit a report
within 2 years and annually thereafter to the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs on the Program's
effectiveness in reducing fraud and preventing improper
payments resulting in financial loss to the government.
New subsection (e) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to
designate another officer or employee of the Department to act
as the Fiscal Assistant Secretary when the office is vacant in
accordance with the current law.
Subsection (b) amends subsection (b)(1)(B) of section 3354
(Do Not Pay Initiative) of title 31 to require the Director of
OMB to coordinate with the Treasury Secretary on the
Initiative.
Subsection (c) amends section 6(c)(1) of the Federal
Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (Public Law 109-
282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) by striking ``may'' and inserting
``shall'' to ensure the Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board Data Analysis Center remains at the Treasury
Department.
Section 3. Establishment of Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery
Subsection (c) amends subchapter I of chapter 3 of title 31
by adding the following section, ``Sec. 317. Inspector General
for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within the Department
of the Treasury.''
New subsection (a) establishes the Office of the IGFAR.
New subsection (b) specifies that the IGFAR shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and without regard to political
affiliation. The subsection also details procedures for
removal from office, the non-policymaking role of the
IGFAR, aligns basic pay with other Inspectors General
(IGs), and authorizes the IGFAR to obtain legal advice
from a counsel reporting to an IG within the executive
branch.
New subsection (c) defines the duties of the IGFAR to
conduct, supervise, or coordinate oversight activities,
including audits and investigations, and the management
by agency heads of any program established by the use
of covered funds. Specifically, such duties include: In
paragraph (1)(A), providing support to agency IGs, if
requested, in order to detect and prevent fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement, identify major risks that cut
across programs and agency boundaries, and promote best
practices and tools to prevent, detect, and respond to
fraud; in paragraph (1)(B), coordinating with relevant
IGs, the Department of Justice, and, as appropriate,
the Fiscal Service to provide support in conducting
investigations, audits, and reviews; provide analytical
products to promote program integrity and prevent
improper payments; identify data assets and information
records that can be securely provided through data
sharing agreements; and report to the Attorney General
if the IGFAR has reasonable grounds to believe there
has been a violation of Federal criminal law; in
paragraph (1)(C), establishing an advisory committee
composed of other IGs, with at least three representing
an agency, to identify and prioritize cross-agency
fraud risks and activities to prevent, detect, and
otherwise mitigate such risks. The advisory committee
may make recommendations to agencies on measures to
prevent or address fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, and to mitigate major risks that cut
across programs and agency boundaries. The advisory
committee may also make recommendations to the Treasury
Secretary and to the appropriate congressional
committees as to preventing duplication in government
functions and provide for coordination of resources to
prevent fraud and improper payments; in paragraph (1),
providing investigative support to prosecutive and
enforcement authorities to protect program integrity
and coordinating the oversight and investigative
activities with the Comptroller General, State and
local government IGs, and State and local auditors, as
appropriate; in paragraph (2), establishing,
maintaining, and overseeing such systems and procedures
as the IGFAR considers appropriate; in paragraph (3),
providing technical assistance to support independent
oversight activities provided that appropriate data
privacy and security protection provisions are
provided. Such technical assistance may include sharing
data, data analytics services, and data analysis best
practices; in addition, paragraph (4) clarifies that
the duties and responsibilities of IGs under subsection
(b) through (e) of section 404 of title 5, apply to the
IGFAR but extend beyond the Treasury Department.
New subsection (d) provides the IGFAR with the
authorities provided under section 406 of title 5,
without limited such authorities to the Treasury
Department. The subsection also clarifies the treatment
of the Office of the IGFAR and the records of the
IGFAR, specifying that the Office is considered to be
conducting civil or criminal law enforcement activity
which is a component of its principal function for the
purposes of sections 552 and 552a of title 5.
New subsection (e) allows the Office of the IGFAR to
operate as if it were a temporary organization (as
defined in section 3161 of title 5), allowing the IGFAR
to rapidly appoint officers and employees as such. The
IGFAR is also given the authority to detail personnel
on a non-reimbursable basis to another IG, employ
annuitants, and enter into contracts with public
agencies and private persons to carry out the duties of
the Office.
New subsection (f) requires departments and agencies
of the Federal Government to furnish information
requested by the IGFAR to the extent practicable and
requires the IGFAR to immediately report an
unreasonable refusal to the appropriate congressional
committees.
New subsection (g) requires the IGFAR to provide
annual report to the appropriate committees of Congress
that summarizes the activities of the IGFAR and
includes estimates of fraudulent payments the Office
helped prevent and assisted in recovering, policy and
legislative recommendations to improve governmentwide
fraud and improper payment prevention, and may include
a classified annex. The IGFAR must also submit period
reports to the President and Congress as necessary,
provide periodic updates on the work of the Office, and
publish the reports publicly with appropriate
redactions so as not to disclose certain information.
New subsection (h) authorizes $10,000,000 to the
Office annually, in line with existing funding at the
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) whose
assets and obligations will be transferred to the
Office of the IGFAR on or before December 31, 2028.
New subsection (i) makes the IGFAR a member of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE).
New subsection (j) requires agency heads to address
deficiencies identified by the IGFAR or to certify to
the appropriate congressional committees that they do
not concur with the recommendation.
New subsection (k) requires the Office to establish
and maintain a user-friendly, public-facing website to
foster accountability and transparency in the use of
covered funds that will be a centralized,
governmentwide portal to key information relating to
the oversight of covered funds which provides
information and findings from the Office, agency IGs,
or State auditors and financial managers.
New subsection (l) defines key terms such as
``appropriate congressional committees'' and ``covered
funds''. The term ``covered funds'' means: any funds,
including loans or tax credits, that are made available
to any non-Federal entity or individual under Division
A or B of the CARES Act (Public Law 116-136), the
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116-123), the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (Public Law
116-127), the Paycheck Protection Program and Health
Care Enhancement Act (Public Law 116-139), Division M
or N of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
(Public Law 116-260), the American Rescue Plan Act of
2021 (Public Law 117-2), the One Big Beautiful Bill Act
(Public Law 119-21), and other enumerated laws; a
Federal award over $50,000; any intramural payment made
governmentwide for research activity; any emergency
spending related to disaster relief or economic
recovery.
New subsection (m) contains a rule of construction
stating that this section does not affect the
independent authority of an IG or require any IG to
provide funding to support the activities of the
Office.
Subsection (b) requires the Director of OMB, in
coordination with the Treasury Secretary and the IGFAR, to
issue a directive to the head of each agency that disburses or
awards federal funds that requires such agency to identify and
report opportunities to use the information system and data
analytics products of the Fiscal Service to detect and prevent
fraud and improper payments on or before March 1, 2029.
Subsection (c) requires the Chairperson of the PRAC (or the
Executive Director of the PRAC in the case the Chairperson
position is vacant) to temporarily perform the duties of the
IGFAR until the IGFAR is appointed under the process
established in the new section 317(b) above.
Subsection (d) requires that each employee of the PRAC that
is transferred to the Office of the IGFAR be appointed to
positions in the Office under terms and conditions of
employment that are substantively the same as their current
terms and conditions.
Subsection (e) updates the table of sections for subchapter
I of chapter 3 of title 31, to include the new section 317.
Subsection (f) sets the effective date of this section as
December 31, 2028.
Section 4. Data Sharing for fraud prevention and program integrity
Subsection (a) amends subsection (a) of section 321
(General authority of the Secretary) of title 31 by adding a
new paragraph (10) thereby providing the Treasury Secretary
with the authority to enter into memoranda of understanding
with the heads of other Federal agencies and agreements with
private entities to secure access to appropriate and allowable
data assets as may appropriate for the Fiscal Service to use to
prevent fraud and improper payments, support Do Not Pay, and,
beginning on December 31, 2028, the IGFAR.
Subsection (a) also adds a new paragraph (10) requiring the
Treasury Secretary to provide legislative recommendations to
Congress on any supplemental emergency disaster, pandemic,
economic relief, or other supplemental appropriations totaling
more than $100,000,000,000 or establishing a new program with
more than $100,000,000 in anticipated additional spending in a
single fiscal year to ensure that existing fraud prevention and
oversight functions and entities are not supplanted or
duplicated and are resourced appropriately.
Section 5. Termination and transfer of assets of Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee
Subsection (a) amends section 15010(k) of the CARES Act
(Public Law 116-136; 15 U.S.C. 9053) to terminate the PRAC on
December 31, 2028, instead of September 30, 2034.
Subsection (b) requires the transfer of assets and
obligations held by the PRAC to be transferred to the Office of
the IGFAR on December 31, 2028.
Subsection (c) repeals section 15010 of the CARES Act on
December 31, 2028.
Subsection (d) defines ``assets'' to include contracts,
agreements, facilities, property, data, records, unobligated or
unexpended balances of appropriations, appropriate personnel,
and other funds or resources.
Legislative History
H.R. 8312, the Fraud Prevention and Accountability Act, was
introduced on April 15, 2026, by Representative Pete Sessions
(R-TX). The following Representative is a cosponsor of the
bill: William Timmons (R-SC). The bill was referred to the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The Committee
considered H.R. 8312 at a business meeting on April 29, 2026,
and ordered the bill as amended favorably reported by a
recorded vote.
Committee Consideration
On April 29, 2026, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 8312, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
23-17, a quorum being present.
Roll Call Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the following roll call vote
occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 8312:
The roll call vote was on favorably reporting H.R. 8312.
The bill was agreed to in a recorded vote of 23-17.
Explanation of Amendments
During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative
James Comer (R-KY), Chairman of the Committee, offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute that made substantive
changes to the bill. The amendment in the nature of a
substitute clarified that the U.S. Treasury may only provide
data sharing and analysis services under Sec. 2 of the bill to
State and local governments (in addition to Federal agencies
which is the current law) responsible for the administration of
federal funds on a voluntary basis in accordance with all
applicable privacy and security laws and made certain
additional technicals edits throughout the bill text. The
amendment in the nature of a substitute passed by voice vote.
List of Related Committee Hearings
In accordance with House rule XIII, clause 3(c)(6), (1) the
following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 8312:
On January 13, 2026, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held a legislative hearing titled ``Curbing
Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent
Fraud in Federal Programs'' with Ken Dieffenbach, the Executive
Director for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee;
Renata Miskell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Accounting
Policy & Financial Transparency at the U.S. Department of
Treasury's Bureau of Fiscal Service, and Sterling Thomas, Chief
Scientist at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
(2) The following related hearings were held:
On February 12,2025, the Subcommittee on Delivering on
Government Efficiency held a legislative hearing titled ``The
War on Waste: Stamping Out the Scourge of Improper Payments and
Fraud'' with Stewart Whitson, Former FBI Special Agent and
Senior Director of Federal Affairs for the Foundation for
Government Accountability; Haywood Talcove, Chief Executive
Officer for LexisNexis Risk Solution; Dawn Royal, Director for
United Council on Welfare Fraud; and Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette,
Director of Government Affairs for Project On Government
Oversight (Minority Witness).
On March 11, 2025, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations held a legislative hearing titled, ``Shifting Gears:
Moving from Recovery to Prevention of Improper Payments and
Fraud'' with Kristen Kociolek, Managing Director of Financial
Management Assurance for the Government Accountability Office,
Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director for the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee; and Jennifer Wagner, Director of
Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment for the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (Minority Witness).
On January 7, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative
hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds
in Minnesota: Part I'' with Kristin Robbins, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; Walter Hudson, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; Marion Rarick, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; and Brendan Ballou, Former Special
Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice (Minority Witness).
On March 4, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative
hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds
in Minnesota: Part II'' with the Honorable Tim Walz, Governor
for the State of Minnesota; Honorable Keith Ellison, Attorney
General for the State of Minnesota; and Reverend Mariah
Tollgaard (Minority Witness).
On April 15, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations held a legislative hearing titled ``Fraud
Prevention: Understanding Fraud in Federally Funded Programs
Run by the States'' with Dr. O.J. Oleka, Chief Executive
Officer for the State Financial Officers Foundation; Allison
Ball, Auditor of Public Accounts for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky; Seto Bagdoyan, Director of Forensic Audits and
Investigative Services for the U.S. Government Accountability
Office; and Robert A. Westbrooks (Minority Witness), former
Federal Inspector General.
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and
recommendations are reflected in the Background and Need for
Legislation section above.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance
goals or objectives of this bill are to ensure federal agencies
have access to fraud preventions tools and techniques through a
permanent data analytics center developed at the U.S. Treasury
and to ensure that agency Inspectors General can effectively
detect and prevent fraud when any future emergency spending
relief package goes into effect by having reliable access to
current resources developed by the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee by transitioning such resources into
an expanded and permanent Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery.
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch
Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a
description of the application of this bill to the legislative
branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of
employment or access to public services and accommodations.
This bill does not relate to employment or access to public
services and accommodations in the legislative branch.
Duplication of Federal Programs
In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII no provision
of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, a program that was included in any report from the
Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to
section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a
program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
Pursuant to section 5(b) of Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C.
1004(b)), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Committee
finds that this Committee Print does not direct the
establishment of an advisory committee.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement
Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 the Committee has included a letter received from the
Congressional Budget Office below.
Earmark Identification
This bill does not include any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the
cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE I--GENERAL
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 3--DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
SUBCHAPTER I--ORGANIZATION
Sec.
* * * * * * *
317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within
the Department of the Treasury.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--ORGANIZATION
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 306. Fiscal Service
[(a) The Fiscal Service is a service in the Department of the
Treasury.
[(b) The head of the Fiscal Service is the Fiscal Assistant
Secretary appointed under section 301(d) of this title.
[(c) The Fiscal Service has a--
[(1) Bureau of Government Financial Operations,
having as its head a Commissioner of Government
Financial Operations; and
[(2) Bureau of the Public Debt, having as its head a
Commissioner of the Public Debt.
[(d) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another
officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal
Assistant Secretary when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is
absent or unable to serve or when the office of Fiscal
Assistant Secretary is vacant.]
Sec. 306. Fiscal Service
(a) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is a service in the
Department of the Treasury.
(b) The head of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service is the
Fiscal Assistant Secretary appointed under section 301(d).
(c) The Bureau of the Fiscal Service, having as its head a
Commissioner, shall maintain the following functions related to
financial integrity, spending transparency, and preventing
improper payments resulting in financial loss to the
government, and does not include any investigative or law
enforcement function, which, in addition to any other duty the
Secretary of the Treasury assigns--
(1) shall administer and operate the Do Not Pay
system required under section 3354 in a manner that
ensures that any data provided to the Secretary is used
only for the purposes set forth under section 3354 in
accordance with applicable law; and
(2) shall, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, establish and maintain
a voluntary governmentwide data analysis program in
accordance with applicable law and using the
authorities under section 6(c)(1) of the Federal
Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (Public Law
109-282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note)--
(A) to provide data sharing and analysis
services to Federal agencies and any State
(meaning a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, a territory or possession
of the United States, or a federally recognized
Indian Tribe) and local government responsible
for the administration of a federally funded
program or the disbursement of Federal funds,
to detect fraud and prevent improper payments
resulting in a financial loss to the
government, but for no other purpose including
any policy analysis and enforcement action
purpose, and, including by facilitating the
following services upon request and on a
voluntary basis in accordance with all
applicable privacy and security laws:
(i) Federal agency or State and local
government data sharing of known
fraudulent entities and transactions
resulting from final adverse action
determinations, payment denials,
referrals for criminal investigation,
or equivalent findings with the
Department of the Treasury.
(ii) Screening awardees and payees
against the centralized fraud database
prior to award or payment issuance, as
feasible and in accordance with
individual program requirements.
(iii) Screening relevant cyber
activity against the centralized fraud
database to review recipient or payee
changes to virtual identity or payment
information.
(iv) Establishing governmentwide
standards for the collection, labeling,
and sharing of data related to improper
payments, to include fraudulent
payments, with the Department of the
Treasury.
(v) Partnering with financial
institutions and industry to share best
practices and, as appropriate,
information on known fraud patterns and
results of investigations into
fraudulent activity.
(vi) Providing identity, eligibility,
account, and vital event verification
and validation tools and analytical
services to agencies, as necessary and
appropriate; and
(B) that is capable of receiving (including
in bulk data formats and through systems that
facilitate real-time data access) any data
asset, information, or record related to the
administration of Federal programs (including
federally funded State-administered programs)
and disbursement of Federal funds under such
programs, provided to the Secretary for secure
and confidential use by the center or the
Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability and
Recovery (in accordance with any terms included
in a written data sharing agreement between the
Secretary and the Inspector General) to
recognize and address patterns of fraudulent
actors, information, and claims across such
programs; and
(3) shall provide the Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery, access to such
information technology, data assets, information, and
records to support the functions and services of the
Office of the Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery established under section
317 in accordance with applicable law.
(d) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall not
later than 2 years after the establishment of this section, and
on an annual basis thereafter, submit, to the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, a report, which may be included as part of
another report submitted to Congress by the Secretary, on the
implementation of the Program, including participation rates
and an assessment of the Program's effectiveness in reducing
fraud and preventing improper payments resulting in a financial
loss to the government.
(e) The Secretary of the Treasury may designate another
officer or employee of the Department to act as the Fiscal
Assistant Secretary when the Fiscal Assistant Secretary is
absent or unable to serve or when the office of Fiscal
Assistant Secretary is vacant.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 317. Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery
within the Department of the Treasury
(a) Office of Inspector General.--There is established within
the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Inspector
General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery.
(b) Appointment of Inspector General; Removal.--
(1) In general.--The head of the Office shall be the
Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and
Recovery, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Nomination.--The nomination of the Inspector
General shall be made without regard to political
affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations.
(3) Removal.--The Inspector General shall be
removable from office in accordance with the provisions
of section 403(b) of title 5.
(4) Political activity.--For purposes of section 7324
of title 5, the Inspector General shall not be
considered an employee who determines policies to be
pursued by the United States in the nationwide
administration of Federal law.
(5) Basic pay.--The annual rate of basic pay of the
Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay
for an Inspector General under section 403(e) of title
5.
(6) Legal counsel.--The Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil
service, obtain legal advice from a counsel either
reporting directly to the Inspector General for Fraud,
Accountability, and Recovery or another inspector
general within the executive branch.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--
(1) In general.--It shall be the duty of the
Inspector General, in accordance with section 404(b)(1)
of title 5, to conduct, supervise, or coordinate
oversight activities, including audits and
investigations of the use of and the provision or award
of covered funds, and the management by agency heads of
any program established by the use of covered funds,
with such related activities of the Inspector General
to be considered civil or criminal law enforcement
activities, including by--
(A) providing support to agency Inspectors
General, if requested by the agency Inspector
General, in the oversight of covered funds in
order to--
(i) detect and prevent fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement;
(ii) identify major risks that cut
across
Minority Views
Since the beginning of his second term, President Trump and
his allies in Congress have sustained an unrelenting attack on
the Inspector General community. The assault began with the
illegal mass firing of Inspectors General during President
Trump's first month in office in 2025. Since that time,
President Trump has left many Inspector General positions
vacant and installed overtly partisan appointees in others. The
government-wide overhaul in Offices of Inspectors General has
generated a culture of fear. Independent oversight has been
blocked in order to deliberately facilitate illegal activity
and corruption by or within federal agencies.
This Administration's assault on the Inspector General
community continues with the Office of Management and Budget's
practice to apportion Congressionally appropriated funds to the
Council on Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE) quarterly rather than annually. CIGIE, an entity
created in statute, provides crucial services to the Inspector
General community, including training and back-end services for
websites and IT. CIGIE, however, has drawn the ire of Trump and
his allies in Congress over its peer investigative function,
the Integrity Committee. The apportionment process is
controlled by the Office of Management and Budget, which must
apportion funds to agencies before they can use it. CIGIE is an
indispensable enabler for the work of Inspectors General across
agencies. It facilitates information sharing and encourages
Offices of Inspector General to communicate and share best
practices. The inter-office function of CIGIE is also what made
it a natural home for the Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee (PRAC).
The PRAC has garnered wide bipartisan support for its work
examining pandemic-era programs. The PRAC's analytics ability,
bolstered by robust data-sharing agreements between agencies,
gives it a unique edge in both identifying fraud schemes and
clawing back money claimed by fraudsters. The PRAC stands as an
exemplar of what smart oversight can accomplish with strong
bipartisan support. Last year, the PRAC's authorization was
extended to September 30, 2034, and its remit was expanded with
the support of Oversight Democrats.
H.R. 8312 would move the PRAC from CIGIE to the Department
of Treasury. This would effectively clear the way for the Trump
Administration to further undermine or even completely defund
CIGIE by removing a key bipartisan initiative from its purview.
At the Department of the Treasury, PRAC would become the
third Office of Inspector General in that department. H.R. 8312
would create unnecessary issues with jurisdiction for this new
Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery,
without any offsetting benefits.
Committee Democrats support creating a permanent home for
the PRAC and giving it more power to coordinate and assist
Offices of Inspector General in performing their functions, but
we cannot support a bill that would give the Trump
Administration the ability to pull the rug out from under the
rest of the Inspector General community. Should the
Administration decide to completely withhold apportionment for
CIGIE, as it did in October 2025, it would be a disaster for
Offices of Inspector General and Congress alike: many oversight
websites would cease to function, preventing us from accessing
thousands of reports on how to improve government programs; law
enforcement officers in small Offices of Inspector General
would have no way to get their required law enforcement
training; and auditors and investigators across the oversight
community would be left without a way to get the training
necessary to perform their duties. H.R. 8312 purports to
further the effort to prevent fraud--a worthy and essential
effort--but it does so at too great a cost.
Committee Democrats strongly oppose this legislation, which
uses the facade of fraud prevention to undermine an entire
ecosystem intended to hold the executive branch accountable.
Robert Garcia,
Ranking Member.
[all]