Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 8464]
The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to whom
was referred the bill (H.R. 8464) to amend title 31, United
States Code, to authorize pausing and segmenting payments, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Purpose of Legislation............................... 4
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 5
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 8
Legislative History.............................................. 10
Committee Consideration.......................................... 10
Roll Call Votes.................................................. 11
Explanation of Amendments........................................ 13
List of Related Committee Hearings............................... 13
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the
Committee...................................................... 14
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 14
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch..................... 14
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 15
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 15
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement........................... 15
Earmark Identification........................................... 15
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 15
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost
Estimate....................................................... 15
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, As Reported............ 15
Minority Views................................................... 23
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act''.
SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO PAUSE PAYMENTS FOR FURTHER REVIEW AND CORRECTIVE
ACTION.
(a) Treasury Payment Voucher Waiver Authority.--
(1) Amendment.--Subchapter II of chapter 33 of title 31,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Sec. 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and
corrective action
``(a) Agency Obligation to Pause Disbursement Requests for Corrective
Action.--The head of an agency shall take a corrective action to
temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request before
the certification of a payment voucher under section 3325 if, as
determined by an official designated by the head of the agency, the
agency--
``(1) has sufficient reason to determine that the payment
presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk
indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to
the Government as estimated under the requirements of section
3352 in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility
requirements or other legally-established condition of the
program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment;
``(2) has sufficient reason to determine, based on a
notification by the relevant State or local government official
in the case of a payment from Federal funds disbursed by a
State or local government under a State-administered and
federally-funded program, that the payment presents an elevated
risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper
payment resulting in financial loss to the Government as
estimated under the requirements of section 3352 in accordance
with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other
legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be
eligible to receive payment; or
``(3) has been notified of an order from the Secretary of the
Treasury described under subsection (b).
``(b) Treasury Obligation to Return Payment Voucher and Issue
Corrective Action Order.--Except where otherwise required by law, the
Secretary shall promptly notify the relevant certifying official of an
order to return a certified payment voucher submitted to a disbursing
official under section 3325 and issue a corrective action order to the
head of an agency not later than 2 days after the Secretary makes a
determination that in accordance with the statutorily-defined
eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the
program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment that such payment
presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or
an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government based
on an output of the Do Not Pay system under section 3354.
``(c) Agency Documentation and Time-limited Corrective Action.--An
action taken by the head of an agency under subsection (a) shall--
``(1) be based on an objective, documented fraud-risk
indicator;
``(2) be narrowly applied to the portion of the payment
presenting the elevated risk; and
``(3) be limited in duration to the minimum period necessary,
as determined by the head of the agency, to verify eligibility
of the payee or accuracy of the payment per any program
requirement associated with the payment or as stipulated under
law.
``(d) Payee Notification and Time Limit of Paused Disbursement
Requests.--With respect to a disbursement request that has been
delayed, conditioned, or segmented pursuant to subsection (a) or a
payment voucher that is returned pursuant subsection (b), the head of
the agency shall take the following actions:
``(1) Promptly provide to the payee (not later than 2 days
after a determination under subsection (a) or a notification to
the agency under subsection (b)), as appropriate, and for a
case in which the payment from Federal funds disbursed by a
State or local government under a State-administered and
federally-funded program also provides to such relevant State
or local government official, a notification that--
``(A) a disbursement has been temporarily paused,
conditioned, or segmented;
``(B) identifies the nature of the fraud-risk
indicator or improper payment relied upon by the agency
to make the corrective action determination under
subsection (a) or notification to the agency under
subsection (b); and
``(C) outlines the process for the corrective action
review period.
``(2) Use a process tailored to the specific requirements and
design of the agency program for a payee, or the State or local
government described under paragraph (1), to contest any
factual inaccuracy or provide clarifying information during the
corrective action review period.
``(3) Issue such payment not later than 30 days after a
determination to take a corrective action is made by the head
of the agency under subsection (a) or the agency was notified
by the Secretary under subsection (b) of a corrective action
order, but not later than 7 days after the date on which the
payee contests the corrective action under the process
established pursuant to paragraph (2), if the head of the
agency determines that the payment does not present an elevated
risk of fraud or an improper payment resulting in financial
loss to the Government.
``(e) Segmentation of Low-risk Payments.--To the maximum extent
practicable, the head of each agency shall allow a routine,
historically consistent payment amount to proceed while temporarily
holding an anomalous, unusually large, or high-risk portion of a
payment, or class of payments, pending review and resolution of an
agency corrective action determination under subsection (a) or a
corrective action order under subsection (b).
``(f) Exemptions for Law Enforcement Activities.--The head of an
agency, in consultation with the Secretary and the Attorney General,
may waive any provision in this section on a case-by-case basis if
notified of or instructed by a Federal law enforcement authority,
including an agency Inspector General, that the action will jeopardize
an active criminal investigation or legal proceeding related to an
effort to defraud the Federal Government or violate sections 3729
through 3733 of title 31 (commonly known as the `False Claims Act').
``(g) Limitation of Liability.--No officer or employee of the Federal
Government shall be personally liable for an action taken in good faith
under this section. An action taken under this section may not
constitute a final determination of eligibility, liability, or
wrongdoing on the part of a payee.
``(h) Rule of Construction for Program Authorizing Statute.--Nothing
in this section may be construed to supersede any other provision of
law with respect to any statute that authorizes the payment or program
the payment is made under.
``(i) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Director, shall issue regulations and establish
procedures to administer the requirements of this section that shall be
published in the Federal Register that, at a minimum, specify the
following:
``(1) The minimum seniority of an agency official designated
under subsection (a) authorized to make a determination to
issue a corrective action.
``(2) The procedures by which the Secretary of the Treasury
will use the Do Not Pay system under section 3354 to make a
determination under subsection (b) in accordance with the
statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-
established condition of a program for a payee to be eligible
to receive payment.
``(3) The procedure for an agency to dispute an order to
return a certified payment voucher and appeal a related
corrective action order under subsection (b) to the Fiscal
Assistant Secretary, which shall at a minimum include a
requirement for the agency to receive a response not later than
five days after making such a dispute or appeal to the
Department of the Treasury.
``(4) The minimum information requirements of a notification
required under subsection (d)(1).
``(j) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget.
``(2) Fraud-risk indicator.--The term `fraud-risk indicator'
means an objective data point or analytic signal that indicates
an anomalous payment pattern or increase in the volume of a
payment amount, a verified data mismatch, network or behavioral
anomaly, or match identified by the Do Not Pay system under
section 3354 and any payment, account, or payee validation
program or service administered by the Secretary that would
result in financial loss to the Government.
``(3) Routine, historically consistent payment amount.--The
term `routine, historically consistent payment amount' means a
payment amount that is consistent with previous payment history
of the payee, established program use patterns, or other
objective benchmarks determined by the certifying agency.
``(4) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of
the Treasury.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of
sections for chapter 33 of title 31, United States Codes, is
amended by inserting after the item for section 3336 the
following:
``3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and
corrective action.''.
(b) Requirements and Authorities of Payment Disbursing Officials.--
Paragraph (3) of section 3325(a) of title 31, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``, compliance with an order to pause a
payment pursuant to section 3337(b),'' after ``except for the
correctness of computations on a voucher''; and
(2) by striking ``,,'' and inserting a comma.
(c) Relief of Accountable Officers.--Section 3527 of title 31, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting after ``the loss or
deficiency was not the result of an illegal or incorrect
payment'' the following: ``, or was made as a result of a good
faith effort to comply with the requirements of section 3337'';
and
(2) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii), by inserting after ``the
loss or deficiency was not the result of an illegal or
incorrect payment'' the following: ``, or was made as a result
of a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of
section 3337''.
(d) Requirements and Authorities of Payment Certifying Officials.--
Subsection (a) of section 3528 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (4)(C), by striking ``; and'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following
``(6) complying with an order to take a corrective action to
temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request
pursuant to section 3337.''.
(e) Relief of Certifying Officials.--Subsection (b)(1) of section
3528 of title 31, United States Code--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by inserting at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(C) the certification was made as a result of a good faith
effort to comply with the requirements of section 3337.''.
(f) Report on Results of Payments Paused for Further Review and
Corrective Action.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives, a report on the following:
(1) The total number of orders to return a certified payment
voucher submitted to a disbursing official under section 3325
of title 31, United States Code, and corrective action orders
issued to the head of an agency under the authorities provided
by section 3337(b) of such title, as added by this section.
(2) The percentage of such payments that are issued by the
agency, including by successful contestations filed by the
recipient or payee with the agency, and recommendations to
mitigate such errors in the fraud-risk indicators of the
Department of the Treasury in the future.
(3) The total savings to the Federal Government in payments
determined to be fraudulent or result in financial loss to the
Government under the authorities provided by subsections (a)
and (b) of section 3337 of title 31, United States Code, as
added by this section.
(4) Any necessary policy, regulatory, or legislative
recommendations related to the authorities and requirements
under section of section 3337 of title 31, United States Code,
as added by this section, or other relevant law.
(g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take
effect 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Summary and Purpose of Legislation
H.R. 8464 amends title 31 U.S. Code to establish a new
section 3337 (Authority to pause and segment payments) that
would require agencies to take corrective actions prior to
certifying a payment voucher request if there is an identified
risk of fraud or an improper payment that would result in a
financial loss to the government. Requires the U.S. Treasury to
return such payment requests to the agency for corrective
action for a period of time--with a payee recipient
notification and adjudication process--if a similar risk is
detected by the U.S. Treasury after an agency requests such a
payment.
Background and Need for Legislation
Every year, billions of Americans' tax dollars are lost by
the federal government due to fraudulent and improper payments.
In April 2026, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
estimated that the federal government cumulatively improperly
paid about $3 trillion dollars since 2003, with $186 billion in
fiscal year 2025 alone.\1\ The improper payment rate has been
trending up, with GAO recently reporting an increase of about
$24 billion from fiscal year 2024.\2\ Separately, GAO estimates
that between $233 billion and $521 billion is lost annually due
to fraud across all Federal programs and operations.\3\
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\1\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-26-108694, Payment
Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186
Billing in Fiscal Year 2025 (Apr. 2026).
\2\Id.
\3\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-105833, Fraud Risk
Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated
$233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, Based on Various Risk
Environments (Apr. 2024).
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While improper payments, which include payments obtained
through fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for
Congress, pandemic-era spending programs exposed the
vulnerability of federal agencies to criminals, especially
fraud due to identity theft. Between March 2020 and March 2021,
Congress enacted a series of six laws providing over $4.6
trillion in Federal funds to mitigate the economic and public
health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.\4\ In the first four
months alone, Congress appropriated over $2.7 trillion for
these purposes.\5\ Congress expanded eligibility for certain
programs, such as unemployment insurance (UI),\6\ and created
new programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program to help
individuals and businesses.\7\
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\4\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-21-387, COVID-19: Sustained
Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year (2021).
\5\Id.
\6\Peter Ganong, Recession Remedies, Lessons Learned From Expanded
Unemployment Insurance During COVID-19, Brookings Institution (last
visited Apr. 21, 2026), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/RR-OP-Chapter-2-final.pdf.
\7\Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, Sec. 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (2020) (amending 15 U.S.C.
636(a)).
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The scale of the fraud across these pandemic relief
packages is astounding. The U.S. Secret Service--the agency
leading criminal investigations into pandemic relief fraud--
found that more than $100 billion was illegally obtained from
the Small Business Administration's pandemic relief
programs.\8\ Furthermore GAO has documented numerous problems
of fraud in the pandemic relief programs, including in the
Small Business Administration's (SBA) Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) and COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan
(COVID-19 EIDL) program, the Department of Labor's (DOL)
Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs.\9\ In September 2024, the
Oversight Committee released a staff report documenting the
widespread failures and fraud in pandemic unemployment relief
programs specifically.\10\ The report found that the states
investigated chose to follow a `pay and chase' model by
sacrificing program integrity to get benefit payments out
quickly and that organized crime played a major role in the
proliferation of fraud by targeting preexisting system
vulnerabilities and outdated information systems.
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\8\Eamon Javers & Scott Zamost, Criminals have stolen nearly $100
billion in COVID relief funds, Secret Service said, CNBC, (Dec. 21,
2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/21/criminals-have-stolen-nearly-
100-billion-in-covid-relief-funds-secret-service.html.
\9\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106556, Emergency Relief
Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Address Fraud and
Improper Payments (Feb. 2023).
\10\See Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability,
Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10,
2024).
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Congress will likely never know the exact amount of fraud
that occurred during the pandemic, but GAO observes that
``hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent
payments were disbursed''.\11\ The pandemic may have been a
failed stress test, but the problem of improper payments under
any condition is likely to grow, with criminal organizations
and fraudsters increasingly using more sophisticated means to
engage in efforts to defraud taxpayer-funded programs.
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\11\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19
Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025).
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Improper payments, which include payments obtained through
fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for Congress as
evidenced by legislation such as the Payment Integrity
Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) which reformed and established
requirements intended to reduce improper payments.\12\ Pursuant
to PIIA, agencies report on improper payment rates, root causes
for improper payments, and actions taken to reduce these rates
and overpayments. All of these actions occur after payments
have been made. Years after the implementation of PIIA,
programs with high improper payment rates consistently reported
that a common root cause of most improper payments is a failure
to verify information before the payment is made.\13\
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\12\Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-117,
134 STAT. 113 (Mar. 2, 2020).
\13\Linda Miller, The Wheels that Squeak: Why Preventing Fraud is
Not a Government Priority, Government Executive (May 8, 2023).
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After payments have been made, agencies often use recovery
audits to determine if they need to take action to recover any
overpayments or fraudulent payments. Recovery auditors examine
a sample of payment data to determine if there is a potential
improper payment, for example, duplicate payments, errors on
invoices, or payments for items that have not been
received.\14\ To recover these overpayments, agencies may
offset other federal payments, establish a payment plan, bill
directly, garnish wages, or refer individuals to law
enforcement. All these activities take time to implement and do
not necessarily result in immediate return of overpayments.\15\
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\14\Garrett Hatch, Cong. Research Serv., R48296, Improper Payments:
Ongoing Challenges and Recent Legislative Proposals (Dec. 10, 2024).
\15\Id.
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Recovery audits are costly and, in some cases after
expending funds to conduct them, agencies may waive recovery
entirely because of the debtors' inability to repay the amount
owed, inability to locate the debtor, or the debt being
discharged through bankruptcy.\16\ And in the case of fraud,
costly investigations and prosecutions need to be pursued by
the Federal government and law enforcement entities--and that
is only possible if fraud is detected in the first place--with
funds rarely recovered in full to offset such costs. Federal
agencies are set up to `pay and chase'--identifying and
recovering improper payments after they are made--which is more
costly and difficult than preventing them in the first
place.\17\
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\16\Hatch, supra, note 14.
\17\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-23-105876, A Framework
for Managing Improper Payments in Emergency Assistance Programs (Jul.
2023).
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To better prevent and address fraud in federal programs,
program integrity stakeholders have recommended that federal
agencies be required to conduct fraud detection activities
prior to requesting payments.\18\ They have also recommended
that agencies and the U.S. Treasury be required to authorize
holds for high-risk payments and to report on the effectiveness
of fraud controls.\19\ Others have recommended expanding anti-
fraud authorities for the Department of the Treasury.\20\
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\18\Linda Miller, What's Missing Is Not Another Task Force (Mar.
23, 2026), available at https://govintegrity.substack.com/p/whats-
missing-is-not-another-task.
\19\Statement from the Program Integrity Alliance on Executive
Order 14390: Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes,
Program Integrity Alliance (Apr. 2, 2026), available at https://
www.programintegrity.org/articles/statement-on-executive-order-14390.
\20\Steve Goodrich and Bob Westbrooks, IBM Center for the Business
of Government, A Prepared Federal Government: Preventing Fraud and
Improper Payments in Emergency Funding, at 23 (Aug. 2024).
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Another root cause of fraud, as GAO has reported, is that
mechanisms of misrepresentation, such as document manipulation,
false declarations, and fictitious entities, leave agencies
open to significant fraud risk when they rely on self-
attestation.\21\
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\21\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19
Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025).
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For example, as the Committee highlighted in its report on
fraud in Minnesota's social services, Minnesota's state
agencies took provider's self-attested claims for services
rendered at face value without verifying that service
recipients actually received the services the providers were
requesting reimbursement for.\22\ The Committee's investigation
has so far uncovered $9 billion potentially stolen by
fraudsters.\23\ Once such payments are made it is extremely
hard to get them back.
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\22\Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability,
Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10,
2024).
\23\Id.
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Multiple Oversight Committee subcommittee hearings have
also highlighted the importance of preventing improper payments
before they are executed instead of the more difficult and
costly `pay and chase' approach that attempts to recover
payments after they are issued.\24\ GAO has also recommended
expanded agency access to, and use of, data to help with
eligibility verification in benefits programs and to decrease
the potential for making improper payments.\25\
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\24\See Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect
and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs: Hearing Before H. Comm on
Oversight and Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. 2,
(Jan. 13, 2026).
\25\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-13-386, Federal
Employees' Compensation Act: Case Examples Illustrate Vulnerabilities
That Could Result in Improper Payments or Overlapping Benefits (Apr. 3,
2013); and U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-18-287, Railroad
Retirement Board: Actions Needed to Improve the Effectiveness and
Oversight of Continuing Disability Reviews (Feb. 21, 2018).
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GAO has also long stated that one crucial strategy to
prevent improper payments is to require up-front verification
of recipient eligibility through data sharing and data
matching.\26\ The Do Not Pay (DNP) system--as established under
the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)\27\--was
developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the
U.S. Treasury to provide such data sharing and matching and
works as a match-based data query service that federal agencies
may use to prevent improper payments made to vendors, grantees,
loan recipients, and beneficiaries.\28\
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\26\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-15, Improper
Payments: Strategy and Additional Actions Needed to Help Ensure
Agencies Use the Do Not Pay Working System as Intended (Oct. 14, 2016).
\27\Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-117,
134 STAT. 113 (Mar. 2, 2020).
\28\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-107157, COVID-19:
Insights and Actions for Fraud Prevention (Nov. 2023).
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The operational components of this system now include
services such as online searches of names and businesses,
matching of large payee lists, and data analytics that
facilitate fraud detection. The DNP system also allows enrolled
agencies to check individuals and organizations that will
potentially receive government payments against a single online
data portal to confirm eligibility prior to distributing funds.
Currently, there is no government-wide legal mandate for
federal agencies and states administering federally funded
programs to conduct such anti-fraud and improper payment
recipient eligibility determinations and payment verification
activities prior to issuing awards. The Treasury's Do Not Pay
system can currently help verify if recipients of funding are
eligible for certain types of payments. However, when this
system identifies elevated fraud risks associated with current
and future payment recipients, payments are not automatically
stopped. When the U.S. Treasury identifies elevated fraud risks
associated with current and future payment recipients with the
DNP system, they are required by law to process such payments
as requested by other agencies. This system of enhanced review
is encouraged but not yet required in law.
H.R. 8464 addresses this vulnerability by requiring the
U.S. Treasury to return payments to agencies that are flagged
by the Do Not Pay system for elevated fraud risks and specific
indicators of fraud to the requesting agency for a period of
time for further review and corrective action if needed.
H.R. 8464 also ensures that agencies are required to use
existing tools to screen for eligibility before requesting
payments and Americans' tax dollars go out the door. H.R. 8464
also enhances and expands government financial integrity
controls by codifying important reforms, including requiring
pre-payment, anti-fraud risk evaluations to identify suspicious
payments before agencies request a payment be disbursed by the
U.S. Treasury and by placing an explicit prohibition on federal
agencies to issue such payment requests, and then take
corrective actions, if the agency has sufficient reason to
determine that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud
based on a fraud-risk indicator. This would be the first time
in federal law that agencies would be explicitly required as
part of their payment request processes to conduct fraud and
improper payment prevention activities and to be prohibited
from proceeding with a payment request if fraud is suspected.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
The short title is the ``Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act''
Section 2. Authority to pause payments for further review and
corrective action
Subsection (a) amends subchapter II of chapter 33 of title
31 by adding a new section,``Sec. 3337. Authority to pause
payments for further review and corrective action''.
New subsection (a) requires the head of an agency to take a
corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a
disbursement request before the certification of a payment
voucher if they have sufficient reason to determine that the
payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-
risk indicator, a notification by the relevant State or local
government official in the case of a payment from a State-
administered and federally-funded program, or a notification by
the Treasury described in the new subsection (b).
New subsection (b) requires the Treasury Secretary to
promptly notify the relevant certifying official and issue a
corrective action to the head of the relevant agency (within 2
days) of an order to return a certified payment voucher after
the Secretary determines, in accordance with the statutorily-
defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established
condition of eligibility to receive payment, that such payment
presents an elevated risk of fraud based on an output of the Do
Not Pay system.
New subsection (c) requires the corrective action described
in the new subsection (a) be based on an objective, documented
fraud-risk indicator, be narrowly applied to the portion of the
payment presenting the elevated risk, and be limited in
duration to the minimum period necessary to verify eligibility
or accuracy of the payment.
New subsection (d) requires the official taking a
corrective action in the new subsection (a) or (b) to notify
within 2 days the payee or the agency, respectively, of the
corrective action and determination. In the case of a State-
administered, federally-funded program, the appropriate State
or local government must be notified of the nature of the
corrective action and the fraud-risk indicator or improper
payment and outline the process of the corrective action.
Further, the notification must use a process tailored to the
specific requirements and design of the agency program.
The head of the agency is required to issue the relevant
payment no later than 30 days after the corrective action is
taken, or no later than 7 days after the corrective action is
contested by the payee, if the agency determines the payment
will not result in financial loss to the Government.
New subsection (e) requires that, to the extent
practicable, allow a routine, historically consistent payment
amount while temporarily holding a high-risk payment or class
of payments, pending resolution of the corrective action.
New subsection (f) allows an agency to waive any provision
in this section if notified of or instructed by a Federal law
enforcement authority that the action will jeopardize an active
criminal investigation or legal proceeding related to an effort
to defraud the Federal Government.
New subsection (g) provides that no officer or employee of
the Federal government shall be personally liable for an action
taken in good faith under this section and states that no
action under this section may constitute a final determination
of wrongdoing on the part of the payee.
New subsection (h) states that the provisions of this
section do not supersede any other provision of law with
respect to any statute that authorizes the payment or program
the payment is made under.
New subsection (i) requires the Treasury Secretary (within
180 days and annually thereafter), in consultation with the
Director of OMB, to issue regulations and establish procedures,
to be posted on the Federal Register, to implement this
section.
New subsection (j) includes definitions for relevant terms
including ``fraud-risk indicator'' and ``routine, historically-
consistent payment amount''.
Subsection (b) amends subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. 3325
(Vouchers) to ensure a disbursing official can comply with an
order to pause a payment under the new section 3337.
Subsection (c) amends subsections (a) and (b) of 31 U.S.C.
3527 (General authority to relieve accountable officials and
agents from liability) to limit liability on an employee or
official that made a good faith effort to comply with the new
section 3337.
Subsection (d) amends subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. 3528
(Responsibilities and relief from liability of certifying
officials) ensure a certifying official certifying a payment
voucher is responsible for complying with an order to take a
corrective action to the new section 3337.
Subsection (e) amends subsection (b) of section 3528
(Responsibilities and relief from liability of certifying
officials) title 31 to allow the Comptroller General to relieve
a certifying official that made a good faith effort to comply
with the new section 3337 from liability.
Subsection (f) requires the Treasury Secretary to submit a
report (within 18 months and annually thereafter) to the OMB
Director and Congress on the number of orders to return a
certified payment voucher, the percentage of such payments that
are successfully issued by the agency, the total savings to the
Federal Government, and recommendations for related to the
authorities and requirements of the new section 3337.
Subsection (g) sets an effective date for this section that
is one year after enactment of this Act.
Legislative History
H.R. 8464, Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act, was introduced
on April 23, 2026, by Representative James Comer (R-KY). The
following Representatives are cosponsors of the bill: Ken
Calvert (R-CA) and Jodey Arrington (R-TX). The bill was
referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
The Committee considered H.R. 8464 at a business meeting on
April 29, 2026, and ordered the bill as amended favorably
reported by a recorded vote.
Committee Consideration
On April 29, 2026, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 8464, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of
23-17, a quorum being present.
Roll Call Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the following roll call vote
occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 8464:
The roll call vote was on favorably reporting H.R. 8464.
The bill was agreed to in a recorded vote of 23-17.
Explanation of Amendments
During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative
James Comer (R-KY), Chairman of the Committee, offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute that made substantive
changes to the bill. The amendment in the nature of a
substitute added a requirement on an agency to pause
disbursement requests if they have reason to believe that the
payment will lead to financial loss to the government for a
State-administered program. The amendment also made technical
edits to clarify the U.S. Treasury's obligation to return
payment requests, shortened the returned payment period from 45
to 30 days, and more clearly defined the agency's notification
requirements to the payee, including States administering
federal funds, of the returned payment request including with a
2-day notification requirement. The amendment also required
more specificity in Treasury's implementing regulations, added
an implementation date of 1-year by adding a new subsection (f)
(Effective Date) under section 2. The amendment also added
additional conforming amendments, provided clarity on the
responsibilities of the certifying official with respect to the
Act, and added an annual Congressional reporting requirement by
the U.S. Treasury to track outcomes on fraud prevention. The
amendment in the nature of a substitute passed by voice vote.
List of Related Committee Hearings
In accordance with House rule XIII, clause 3(c)(6), (1) the
following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 8464:
On April 15, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations held a hearing titled ``Fraud Prevention:
Understanding Fraud in Federally Funded Programs Run by the
States'' with Dr. O.J. Oleka, Chief Executive Officer, State
Financial Officers Foundation; Ms. Allison Ball, Auditor of
Public Accounts, Commonwealth of Kentucky; Mr. Seto Bagdoyan,
Director of Forensic Audits and Investigative Services, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Robert A. Westbrooks,
former Federal Inspector General.
(2) The following related hearings were held:
On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations held a legislative hearing titled ``Curbing Federal
Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud
in Federal Programs'' with Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director
for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; Renate
Miskell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Accounting Policy and
Financial Transparency for the U.S. Department of Treasury's
Bureau of Fiscal Service; and Sterling Thomas, Chief Scientist
for the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
On March 11, 2025, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations held a legislative hearing titled, ``Shifting Gears:
Moving from Recovery to Prevention of Improper Payments and
Fraud'' with Kristen Kociolek, Managing Director of Financial
Management Assurance for the Government Accountability Office,
Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director for the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee; and Jennifer Wagner, Director of
Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment for the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (Minority Witness).
On February 12, 2025, the Subcommittee on Delivering on
Government Efficiency held a legislative hearing titled ``The
War on Waste: Stamping Out the Scourge of Improper Payments and
Fraud'' with Stewart Whitson, Former FBI Special Agent and
Senior Director of Federal Affairs for the Foundation for
Government Accountability; Haywood Talcove, Chief Executive
Officer for LexisNexis Risk Solution; Dawn Royal, Director for
United Council on Welfare Fraud; and Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette,
Director of Government Affairs for Project On Government
Oversight (Minority Witness).
On January 7, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative
hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds
in Minnesota: Part I'' with Kristin Robbins, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; Walter Hudson, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; Marion Rarick, Minnesota House of
Representatives Member; and Brendan Ballou, Former Special
Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice (Minority Witness).
On March 4, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative
hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds
in Minnesota: Part II'' with the Honorable Tim Walz, Governor
for the State of Minnesota; Honorable Keith Ellison, Attorney
General for the State of Minnesota; and Reverend Mariah
Tollgaard (Minority Witness).
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and
recommendations are reflected in the Background and Need for
Legislation section above.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance
goals or objectives of this bill are to address the problem of
the current `pay and chase' model by establishing in federal
law for the first time, a clear legal prohibition for federal
agencies to issue a payment request when there is sufficient
reason to determine that a payment request will lead to a
fraudulent or improper payment resulting in financial loss to
the government by amending title 31, U.S. Code, to establish a
new section 3337 (Authority to pause and segment payments) that
would require agencies to take corrective actions prior to
certifying a payment voucher request if there is an identified
risk of fraud or an improper payment or if a payment request
has been returned to the agency by the U.S. Treasury if a
similar risk is detected.
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch
Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a
description of the application of this bill to the legislative
branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of
employment or access to public services and accommodations.
This bill does not relate to employment or access to public
services and accommodations in the legislative branch.
Duplication of Federal Programs
In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII no provision
of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, a program that was included in any report from the
Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to
section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a
program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
Pursuant to section 5(b) of Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C.
1004(b)), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Committee
finds that this Committee Print does not direct the
establishment of an advisory committee.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement
Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 the Committee has included a letter received from the
Congressional Budget Office below.
Earmark Identification
This bill does not include any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the
cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE III--FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 33--DEPOSITING, KEEPING, AND PAYING MONEY
* * * * * * *
Sec.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--PAYMENTS
* * * * * * *
3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective
action.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--PAYMENTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3325. Vouchers
(a) A disbursing official in the executive branch of the
United States Government shall--
(1) disburse money only as provided by a voucher
certified by--
(A) the head of the executive agency
concerned; or
(B) an officer or employee of the executive
agency having written authorization from the
head of the agency to certify vouchers;
(2) examine a voucher if necessary to decide if it
is--
(A) in proper form;
(B) certified and approved; and
(C) computed correctly on the facts
certified; and
(3) except for the correctness of computations on a
voucher, compliance with an order to pause a payment
pursuant to section 3337(b), or pursuant to payment
intercepts or offsets pursuant to section 3716 or 3720A
of this title[,,], be held accountable for carrying out
clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection.
(b) In addition to officers and employees referred to in
subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section as having authorization to
certify vouchers, members of the armed forces may certify
vouchers when authorized, in writing, by the Secretary of
Defense or, in the case of the Coast Guard when it is not
operating as a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
(c) On request, the Secretary of the Treasury may provide to
the appropriate officer or employee of the United States
Government a list of persons receiving periodic payments from
the Government. When certified and in proper form, the list may
be used as a voucher on which the Secretary may disburse money.
(d) The head of an executive agency or an officer or employee
of an executive agency referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B), as
applicable, shall include with each certified voucher submitted
to a disbursing official pursuant to this section the taxpayer
identifying number of each person to whom payment may be made
under the voucher.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and
corrective action
(a) Agency Obligation to Pause Disbursement Requests for
Corrective Action.--The head of an agency shall take a
corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a
disbursement request before the certification of a payment
voucher under section 3325 if, as determined by an official
designated by the head of the agency, the agency--
(1) has sufficient reason to determine that the
payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a
fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting
in financial loss to the Government as estimated under
the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the
statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other
legally-established condition of the program for a
payee to be eligible to receive payment;
(2) has sufficient reason to determine, based on a
notification by the relevant State or local government
official in the case of a payment from Federal funds
disbursed by a State or local government under a State-
administered and federally-funded program, that the
payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a
fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting
in financial loss to the Government as estimated under
the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the
statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other
legally-established condition of the program for a
payee to be eligible to receive payment; or
(3) has been notified of an order from the Secretary
of the Treasury described under subsection (b).
(b) Treasury Obligation to Return Payment Voucher and Issue
Corrective Action Order.--Except where otherwise required by
law, the Secretary shall promptly notify the relevant
certifying official of an order to return a certified payment
voucher submitted to a disbursing official under section 3325
and issue a corrective action order to the head of an agency
not later than 2 days after the Secretary makes a determination
that in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility
requirements or other legally-established condition of the
program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment that such
payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-
risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial
loss to the Government based on an output of the Do Not Pay
system under section 3354.
(c) Agency Documentation and Time-limited Corrective
Action.--An action taken by the head of an agency under
subsection (a) shall--
(1) be based on an objective, documented fraud-risk
indicator;
(2) be narrowly applied to the portion of the payment
presenting the elevated risk; and
(3) be limited in duration to the minimum period
necessary, as determined by the head of the agency, to
verify eligibility of the payee or accuracy of the
payment per any program requirement associated with the
payment or as stipulated under law.
(d) Payee Notification and Time Limit of Paused Disbursement
Requests.--With respect to a disbursement request that has been
delayed, conditioned, or segmented pursuant to subsection (a)
or a payment voucher that is returned pursuant subsection (b),
the head of the agency shall take the following actions:
(1) Promptly provide to the payee (not later than 2
days after a determination under subsection (a) or a
notification to the agency under subsection (b)), as
appropriate, and for a case in which the payment from
Federal funds disbursed by a State or local government
under a State-administered and federally-funded program
also provides to such relevant State or local
government official, a notification that--
(A) a disbursement has been temporarily
paused, conditioned, or segmented;
(B) identifies the nature of the fraud-risk
indicator or improper payment relied upon by
the agency to make the corrective action
determination under subsection (a) or
notification to the agency under subsection
(b); and
(C) outlines the process for the corrective
action review period.
(2) Use a process tailored to the specific
requirements and design of the agency program for a
payee, or the State or local government described under
paragraph (1), to contest any factual inaccuracy or
provide clarifying information during the corrective
action review period.
(3) Issue such payment not later than 30 days after a
determination to take a corrective action is made by
the head of the agency under subsection (a) or the
agency was notified by the Secretary under subsection
(b) of a corrective action order, but not later than 7
days after the date on which the payee contests the
corrective action under the process established
pursuant to paragraph (2), if the head of the agency
determines that the payment does not present an
elevated risk of fraud or an improper payment resulting
in financial loss to the Government.
(e) Segmentation of Low-risk Payments.--To the maximum extent
practicable, the head of each agency shall allow a routine,
historically consistent payment amount to proceed while
temporarily holding an anomalous, unusually large, or high-risk
portion of a payment, or class of payments, pending review and
resolution of an agency corrective action determination under
subsection (a) or a corrective action order under subsection
(b).
(f) Exemptions for Law Enforcement Activities.--The head of
an agency, in consultation with the Secretary and the Attorney
General, may waive any provision in this section on a case-by-
case basis if notified of or instructed by a Federal law
enforcement authority, including an agency Inspector General,
that the action will jeopardize an active criminal
investigation or legal proceeding related to an effort to
defraud the Federal Government or violate sections 3729 through
3733 of title 31 (commonly known as the ``False Claims Act'').
(g) Limitation of Liability.--No officer or employee of the
Federal Government shall be personally liable for an action
taken in good faith under this section. An action taken under
this section may not constitute a final determination of
eligibility, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of a payee.
(h) Rule of Construction for Program Authorizing Statute.--
Nothing in this section may be construed to supersede any other
provision of law with respect to any statute that authorizes
the payment or program the payment is made under.
(i) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall issue
regulations and establish procedures to administer the
requirements of this section that shall be published in the
Federal Register that, at a minimum, specify the following:
(1) The minimum seniority of an agency official
Minority Views
H.R. 8464, the Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act, would add
a new section to title 31 U.S.C. giving the Treasury the
authority to pause and segment payments. It would require
agencies to take corrective action prior to certifying a
payment voucher request if there is an identified risk of fraud
or an improper payment that would result in a financial loss to
the government. It would require the Treasury to return such
payment requests to the agency for corrective action.
Committee Democrats strongly oppose H.R. 8464. In the face
of a deepening cost of living crisis, with growing economic
anxiety across the nation, the American people rely on critical
federal programs to make ends meet. This bill could make that
harder for some Americans due to process delays. This bill aims
to stop improper payments, which we all agree is important.
Unfortunately, it uses vague criteria which will stop many
legitimate payments, causing more red tape, delays, and
dysfunction.
The current Administration has a long record of wrongly
delaying payments for political reasons. Just last month,
citing unsubstantiated concerns about fraud in hospice care, it
suspended $1.3 billion in Medicaid payments to California. That
could harm nearly a million elderly and disabled residents of
the state. Last December, it threatened to withhold SNAP
benefits from Colorado and Minnesota. In January, the
Department of Health and Human Services froze $10 billion for
essential needs in funding to five states led by Democratic
governors.
It is against this backdrop that we must consider H.R.
8464. This bill would allow agencies to delay payments if they
have ``sufficient reason'' that the payment has an ``elevated
risk of fraud.'' This creates a significant amount of
discretion for agency officials. This discretion could be
misused for partisan political purposes.
The bill's stated intent is to stop improper payments,
which we all agree is important. However, millions of Americans
rely on critical federal programs for health care, food, and
rent to make ends meet.
The American people want programs to work, not unnecessary
red tape, delayed legitimate payments, and dysfunction.
Robert Garcia,
Ranking Member.
[all]