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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-684

STOPPING FRAUDULENT PAYMENTS ACT

2026-06-03

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[To accompany H.R. 8464] The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 8464) to amend title 31, United States Code, to authorize pausing and segmenting payments, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Summary and Purpose of Legislation............................... 4 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 5 Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 8 Legislative History.............................................. 10 Committee Consideration.......................................... 10 Roll Call Votes.................................................. 11 Explanation of Amendments........................................ 13 List of Related Committee Hearings............................... 13 Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee...................................................... 14 Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 14 Application of Law to the Legislative Branch..................... 14 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 15 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 15 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement........................... 15 Earmark Identification........................................... 15 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 15 New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate....................................................... 15 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, As Reported............ 15 Minority Views................................................... 23 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act''. SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO PAUSE PAYMENTS FOR FURTHER REVIEW AND CORRECTIVE ACTION. (a) Treasury Payment Voucher Waiver Authority.-- (1) Amendment.--Subchapter II of chapter 33 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action ``(a) Agency Obligation to Pause Disbursement Requests for Corrective Action.--The head of an agency shall take a corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request before the certification of a payment voucher under section 3325 if, as determined by an official designated by the head of the agency, the agency-- ``(1) has sufficient reason to determine that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government as estimated under the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment; ``(2) has sufficient reason to determine, based on a notification by the relevant State or local government official in the case of a payment from Federal funds disbursed by a State or local government under a State-administered and federally-funded program, that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government as estimated under the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment; or ``(3) has been notified of an order from the Secretary of the Treasury described under subsection (b). ``(b) Treasury Obligation to Return Payment Voucher and Issue Corrective Action Order.--Except where otherwise required by law, the Secretary shall promptly notify the relevant certifying official of an order to return a certified payment voucher submitted to a disbursing official under section 3325 and issue a corrective action order to the head of an agency not later than 2 days after the Secretary makes a determination that in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment that such payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government based on an output of the Do Not Pay system under section 3354. ``(c) Agency Documentation and Time-limited Corrective Action.--An action taken by the head of an agency under subsection (a) shall-- ``(1) be based on an objective, documented fraud-risk indicator; ``(2) be narrowly applied to the portion of the payment presenting the elevated risk; and ``(3) be limited in duration to the minimum period necessary, as determined by the head of the agency, to verify eligibility of the payee or accuracy of the payment per any program requirement associated with the payment or as stipulated under law. ``(d) Payee Notification and Time Limit of Paused Disbursement Requests.--With respect to a disbursement request that has been delayed, conditioned, or segmented pursuant to subsection (a) or a payment voucher that is returned pursuant subsection (b), the head of the agency shall take the following actions: ``(1) Promptly provide to the payee (not later than 2 days after a determination under subsection (a) or a notification to the agency under subsection (b)), as appropriate, and for a case in which the payment from Federal funds disbursed by a State or local government under a State-administered and federally-funded program also provides to such relevant State or local government official, a notification that-- ``(A) a disbursement has been temporarily paused, conditioned, or segmented; ``(B) identifies the nature of the fraud-risk indicator or improper payment relied upon by the agency to make the corrective action determination under subsection (a) or notification to the agency under subsection (b); and ``(C) outlines the process for the corrective action review period. ``(2) Use a process tailored to the specific requirements and design of the agency program for a payee, or the State or local government described under paragraph (1), to contest any factual inaccuracy or provide clarifying information during the corrective action review period. ``(3) Issue such payment not later than 30 days after a determination to take a corrective action is made by the head of the agency under subsection (a) or the agency was notified by the Secretary under subsection (b) of a corrective action order, but not later than 7 days after the date on which the payee contests the corrective action under the process established pursuant to paragraph (2), if the head of the agency determines that the payment does not present an elevated risk of fraud or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government. ``(e) Segmentation of Low-risk Payments.--To the maximum extent practicable, the head of each agency shall allow a routine, historically consistent payment amount to proceed while temporarily holding an anomalous, unusually large, or high-risk portion of a payment, or class of payments, pending review and resolution of an agency corrective action determination under subsection (a) or a corrective action order under subsection (b). ``(f) Exemptions for Law Enforcement Activities.--The head of an agency, in consultation with the Secretary and the Attorney General, may waive any provision in this section on a case-by-case basis if notified of or instructed by a Federal law enforcement authority, including an agency Inspector General, that the action will jeopardize an active criminal investigation or legal proceeding related to an effort to defraud the Federal Government or violate sections 3729 through 3733 of title 31 (commonly known as the `False Claims Act'). ``(g) Limitation of Liability.--No officer or employee of the Federal Government shall be personally liable for an action taken in good faith under this section. An action taken under this section may not constitute a final determination of eligibility, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of a payee. ``(h) Rule of Construction for Program Authorizing Statute.--Nothing in this section may be construed to supersede any other provision of law with respect to any statute that authorizes the payment or program the payment is made under. ``(i) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall issue regulations and establish procedures to administer the requirements of this section that shall be published in the Federal Register that, at a minimum, specify the following: ``(1) The minimum seniority of an agency official designated under subsection (a) authorized to make a determination to issue a corrective action. ``(2) The procedures by which the Secretary of the Treasury will use the Do Not Pay system under section 3354 to make a determination under subsection (b) in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally- established condition of a program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment. ``(3) The procedure for an agency to dispute an order to return a certified payment voucher and appeal a related corrective action order under subsection (b) to the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, which shall at a minimum include a requirement for the agency to receive a response not later than five days after making such a dispute or appeal to the Department of the Treasury. ``(4) The minimum information requirements of a notification required under subsection (d)(1). ``(j) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. ``(2) Fraud-risk indicator.--The term `fraud-risk indicator' means an objective data point or analytic signal that indicates an anomalous payment pattern or increase in the volume of a payment amount, a verified data mismatch, network or behavioral anomaly, or match identified by the Do Not Pay system under section 3354 and any payment, account, or payee validation program or service administered by the Secretary that would result in financial loss to the Government. ``(3) Routine, historically consistent payment amount.--The term `routine, historically consistent payment amount' means a payment amount that is consistent with previous payment history of the payee, established program use patterns, or other objective benchmarks determined by the certifying agency. ``(4) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of the Treasury.''. (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 33 of title 31, United States Codes, is amended by inserting after the item for section 3336 the following: ``3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action.''. (b) Requirements and Authorities of Payment Disbursing Officials.-- Paragraph (3) of section 3325(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) by inserting ``, compliance with an order to pause a payment pursuant to section 3337(b),'' after ``except for the correctness of computations on a voucher''; and (2) by striking ``,,'' and inserting a comma. (c) Relief of Accountable Officers.--Section 3527 of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting after ``the loss or deficiency was not the result of an illegal or incorrect payment'' the following: ``, or was made as a result of a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of section 3337''; and (2) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(ii), by inserting after ``the loss or deficiency was not the result of an illegal or incorrect payment'' the following: ``, or was made as a result of a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of section 3337''. (d) Requirements and Authorities of Payment Certifying Officials.-- Subsection (a) of section 3528 of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4)(C), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon; (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following ``(6) complying with an order to take a corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request pursuant to section 3337.''. (e) Relief of Certifying Officials.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 3528 of title 31, United States Code-- (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and (3) by inserting at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(C) the certification was made as a result of a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of section 3337.''. (f) Report on Results of Payments Paused for Further Review and Corrective Action.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives, a report on the following: (1) The total number of orders to return a certified payment voucher submitted to a disbursing official under section 3325 of title 31, United States Code, and corrective action orders issued to the head of an agency under the authorities provided by section 3337(b) of such title, as added by this section. (2) The percentage of such payments that are issued by the agency, including by successful contestations filed by the recipient or payee with the agency, and recommendations to mitigate such errors in the fraud-risk indicators of the Department of the Treasury in the future. (3) The total savings to the Federal Government in payments determined to be fraudulent or result in financial loss to the Government under the authorities provided by subsections (a) and (b) of section 3337 of title 31, United States Code, as added by this section. (4) Any necessary policy, regulatory, or legislative recommendations related to the authorities and requirements under section of section 3337 of title 31, United States Code, as added by this section, or other relevant law. (g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Summary and Purpose of Legislation H.R. 8464 amends title 31 U.S. Code to establish a new section 3337 (Authority to pause and segment payments) that would require agencies to take corrective actions prior to certifying a payment voucher request if there is an identified risk of fraud or an improper payment that would result in a financial loss to the government. Requires the U.S. Treasury to return such payment requests to the agency for corrective action for a period of time--with a payee recipient notification and adjudication process--if a similar risk is detected by the U.S. Treasury after an agency requests such a payment.

Background and Need for Legislation

Every year, billions of Americans' tax dollars are lost by the federal government due to fraudulent and improper payments. In April 2026, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the federal government cumulatively improperly paid about $3 trillion dollars since 2003, with $186 billion in fiscal year 2025 alone.\1\ The improper payment rate has been trending up, with GAO recently reporting an increase of about $24 billion from fiscal year 2024.\2\ Separately, GAO estimates that between $233 billion and $521 billion is lost annually due to fraud across all Federal programs and operations.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-26-108694, Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billing in Fiscal Year 2025 (Apr. 2026). \2\Id. \3\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-105833, Fraud Risk Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, Based on Various Risk Environments (Apr. 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While improper payments, which include payments obtained through fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for Congress, pandemic-era spending programs exposed the vulnerability of federal agencies to criminals, especially fraud due to identity theft. Between March 2020 and March 2021, Congress enacted a series of six laws providing over $4.6 trillion in Federal funds to mitigate the economic and public health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.\4\ In the first four months alone, Congress appropriated over $2.7 trillion for these purposes.\5\ Congress expanded eligibility for certain programs, such as unemployment insurance (UI),\6\ and created new programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program to help individuals and businesses.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-21-387, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year (2021). \5\Id. \6\Peter Ganong, Recession Remedies, Lessons Learned From Expanded Unemployment Insurance During COVID-19, Brookings Institution (last visited Apr. 21, 2026), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2022/04/RR-OP-Chapter-2-final.pdf. \7\Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, Sec. 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286 (2020) (amending 15 U.S.C. 636(a)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The scale of the fraud across these pandemic relief packages is astounding. The U.S. Secret Service--the agency leading criminal investigations into pandemic relief fraud-- found that more than $100 billion was illegally obtained from the Small Business Administration's pandemic relief programs.\8\ Furthermore GAO has documented numerous problems of fraud in the pandemic relief programs, including in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (COVID-19 EIDL) program, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs.\9\ In September 2024, the Oversight Committee released a staff report documenting the widespread failures and fraud in pandemic unemployment relief programs specifically.\10\ The report found that the states investigated chose to follow a `pay and chase' model by sacrificing program integrity to get benefit payments out quickly and that organized crime played a major role in the proliferation of fraud by targeting preexisting system vulnerabilities and outdated information systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\Eamon Javers & Scott Zamost, Criminals have stolen nearly $100 billion in COVID relief funds, Secret Service said, CNBC, (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/21/criminals-have-stolen-nearly- 100-billion-in-covid-relief-funds-secret-service.html. \9\U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106556, Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Address Fraud and Improper Payments (Feb. 2023). \10\See Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10, 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congress will likely never know the exact amount of fraud that occurred during the pandemic, but GAO observes that ``hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent payments were disbursed''.\11\ The pandemic may have been a failed stress test, but the problem of improper payments under any condition is likely to grow, with criminal organizations and fraudsters increasingly using more sophisticated means to engage in efforts to defraud taxpayer-funded programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Improper payments, which include payments obtained through fraudulent actions, have long been a concern for Congress as evidenced by legislation such as the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) which reformed and established requirements intended to reduce improper payments.\12\ Pursuant to PIIA, agencies report on improper payment rates, root causes for improper payments, and actions taken to reduce these rates and overpayments. All of these actions occur after payments have been made. Years after the implementation of PIIA, programs with high improper payment rates consistently reported that a common root cause of most improper payments is a failure to verify information before the payment is made.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-117, 134 STAT. 113 (Mar. 2, 2020). \13\Linda Miller, The Wheels that Squeak: Why Preventing Fraud is Not a Government Priority, Government Executive (May 8, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After payments have been made, agencies often use recovery audits to determine if they need to take action to recover any overpayments or fraudulent payments. Recovery auditors examine a sample of payment data to determine if there is a potential improper payment, for example, duplicate payments, errors on invoices, or payments for items that have not been received.\14\ To recover these overpayments, agencies may offset other federal payments, establish a payment plan, bill directly, garnish wages, or refer individuals to law enforcement. All these activities take time to implement and do not necessarily result in immediate return of overpayments.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Garrett Hatch, Cong. Research Serv., R48296, Improper Payments: Ongoing Challenges and Recent Legislative Proposals (Dec. 10, 2024). \15\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recovery audits are costly and, in some cases after expending funds to conduct them, agencies may waive recovery entirely because of the debtors' inability to repay the amount owed, inability to locate the debtor, or the debt being discharged through bankruptcy.\16\ And in the case of fraud, costly investigations and prosecutions need to be pursued by the Federal government and law enforcement entities--and that is only possible if fraud is detected in the first place--with funds rarely recovered in full to offset such costs. Federal agencies are set up to `pay and chase'--identifying and recovering improper payments after they are made--which is more costly and difficult than preventing them in the first place.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Hatch, supra, note 14. \17\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-23-105876, A Framework for Managing Improper Payments in Emergency Assistance Programs (Jul. 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- To better prevent and address fraud in federal programs, program integrity stakeholders have recommended that federal agencies be required to conduct fraud detection activities prior to requesting payments.\18\ They have also recommended that agencies and the U.S. Treasury be required to authorize holds for high-risk payments and to report on the effectiveness of fraud controls.\19\ Others have recommended expanding anti- fraud authorities for the Department of the Treasury.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Linda Miller, What's Missing Is Not Another Task Force (Mar. 23, 2026), available at https://govintegrity.substack.com/p/whats- missing-is-not-another-task. \19\Statement from the Program Integrity Alliance on Executive Order 14390: Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes, Program Integrity Alliance (Apr. 2, 2026), available at https:// www.programintegrity.org/articles/statement-on-executive-order-14390. \20\Steve Goodrich and Bob Westbrooks, IBM Center for the Business of Government, A Prepared Federal Government: Preventing Fraud and Improper Payments in Emergency Funding, at 23 (Aug. 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Another root cause of fraud, as GAO has reported, is that mechanisms of misrepresentation, such as document manipulation, false declarations, and fictitious entities, leave agencies open to significant fraud risk when they rely on self- attestation.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-25-107746, COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons for Prevention (Apr. 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For example, as the Committee highlighted in its report on fraud in Minnesota's social services, Minnesota's state agencies took provider's self-attested claims for services rendered at face value without verifying that service recipients actually received the services the providers were requesting reimbursement for.\22\ The Committee's investigation has so far uncovered $9 billion potentially stolen by fraudsters.\23\ Once such payments are made it is extremely hard to get them back. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 10, 2024). \23\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Multiple Oversight Committee subcommittee hearings have also highlighted the importance of preventing improper payments before they are executed instead of the more difficult and costly `pay and chase' approach that attempts to recover payments after they are issued.\24\ GAO has also recommended expanded agency access to, and use of, data to help with eligibility verification in benefits programs and to decrease the potential for making improper payments.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\See Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs: Hearing Before H. Comm on Oversight and Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Gov't Operations, 119th Cong. 2, (Jan. 13, 2026). \25\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-13-386, Federal Employees' Compensation Act: Case Examples Illustrate Vulnerabilities That Could Result in Improper Payments or Overlapping Benefits (Apr. 3, 2013); and U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-18-287, Railroad Retirement Board: Actions Needed to Improve the Effectiveness and Oversight of Continuing Disability Reviews (Feb. 21, 2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GAO has also long stated that one crucial strategy to prevent improper payments is to require up-front verification of recipient eligibility through data sharing and data matching.\26\ The Do Not Pay (DNP) system--as established under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)\27\--was developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury to provide such data sharing and matching and works as a match-based data query service that federal agencies may use to prevent improper payments made to vendors, grantees, loan recipients, and beneficiaries.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-15, Improper Payments: Strategy and Additional Actions Needed to Help Ensure Agencies Use the Do Not Pay Working System as Intended (Oct. 14, 2016). \27\Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-117, 134 STAT. 113 (Mar. 2, 2020). \28\U.S. Government Accountability Off., GAO-24-107157, COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud Prevention (Nov. 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The operational components of this system now include services such as online searches of names and businesses, matching of large payee lists, and data analytics that facilitate fraud detection. The DNP system also allows enrolled agencies to check individuals and organizations that will potentially receive government payments against a single online data portal to confirm eligibility prior to distributing funds. Currently, there is no government-wide legal mandate for federal agencies and states administering federally funded programs to conduct such anti-fraud and improper payment recipient eligibility determinations and payment verification activities prior to issuing awards. The Treasury's Do Not Pay system can currently help verify if recipients of funding are eligible for certain types of payments. However, when this system identifies elevated fraud risks associated with current and future payment recipients, payments are not automatically stopped. When the U.S. Treasury identifies elevated fraud risks associated with current and future payment recipients with the DNP system, they are required by law to process such payments as requested by other agencies. This system of enhanced review is encouraged but not yet required in law. H.R. 8464 addresses this vulnerability by requiring the U.S. Treasury to return payments to agencies that are flagged by the Do Not Pay system for elevated fraud risks and specific indicators of fraud to the requesting agency for a period of time for further review and corrective action if needed. H.R. 8464 also ensures that agencies are required to use existing tools to screen for eligibility before requesting payments and Americans' tax dollars go out the door. H.R. 8464 also enhances and expands government financial integrity controls by codifying important reforms, including requiring pre-payment, anti-fraud risk evaluations to identify suspicious payments before agencies request a payment be disbursed by the U.S. Treasury and by placing an explicit prohibition on federal agencies to issue such payment requests, and then take corrective actions, if the agency has sufficient reason to determine that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator. This would be the first time in federal law that agencies would be explicitly required as part of their payment request processes to conduct fraud and improper payment prevention activities and to be prohibited from proceeding with a payment request if fraud is suspected.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title The short title is the ``Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act'' Section 2. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action Subsection (a) amends subchapter II of chapter 33 of title 31 by adding a new section,``Sec. 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action''. New subsection (a) requires the head of an agency to take a corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request before the certification of a payment voucher if they have sufficient reason to determine that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud- risk indicator, a notification by the relevant State or local government official in the case of a payment from a State- administered and federally-funded program, or a notification by the Treasury described in the new subsection (b). New subsection (b) requires the Treasury Secretary to promptly notify the relevant certifying official and issue a corrective action to the head of the relevant agency (within 2 days) of an order to return a certified payment voucher after the Secretary determines, in accordance with the statutorily- defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of eligibility to receive payment, that such payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on an output of the Do Not Pay system. New subsection (c) requires the corrective action described in the new subsection (a) be based on an objective, documented fraud-risk indicator, be narrowly applied to the portion of the payment presenting the elevated risk, and be limited in duration to the minimum period necessary to verify eligibility or accuracy of the payment. New subsection (d) requires the official taking a corrective action in the new subsection (a) or (b) to notify within 2 days the payee or the agency, respectively, of the corrective action and determination. In the case of a State- administered, federally-funded program, the appropriate State or local government must be notified of the nature of the corrective action and the fraud-risk indicator or improper payment and outline the process of the corrective action. Further, the notification must use a process tailored to the specific requirements and design of the agency program. The head of the agency is required to issue the relevant payment no later than 30 days after the corrective action is taken, or no later than 7 days after the corrective action is contested by the payee, if the agency determines the payment will not result in financial loss to the Government. New subsection (e) requires that, to the extent practicable, allow a routine, historically consistent payment amount while temporarily holding a high-risk payment or class of payments, pending resolution of the corrective action. New subsection (f) allows an agency to waive any provision in this section if notified of or instructed by a Federal law enforcement authority that the action will jeopardize an active criminal investigation or legal proceeding related to an effort to defraud the Federal Government. New subsection (g) provides that no officer or employee of the Federal government shall be personally liable for an action taken in good faith under this section and states that no action under this section may constitute a final determination of wrongdoing on the part of the payee. New subsection (h) states that the provisions of this section do not supersede any other provision of law with respect to any statute that authorizes the payment or program the payment is made under. New subsection (i) requires the Treasury Secretary (within 180 days and annually thereafter), in consultation with the Director of OMB, to issue regulations and establish procedures, to be posted on the Federal Register, to implement this section. New subsection (j) includes definitions for relevant terms including ``fraud-risk indicator'' and ``routine, historically- consistent payment amount''. Subsection (b) amends subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. 3325 (Vouchers) to ensure a disbursing official can comply with an order to pause a payment under the new section 3337. Subsection (c) amends subsections (a) and (b) of 31 U.S.C. 3527 (General authority to relieve accountable officials and agents from liability) to limit liability on an employee or official that made a good faith effort to comply with the new section 3337. Subsection (d) amends subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. 3528 (Responsibilities and relief from liability of certifying officials) ensure a certifying official certifying a payment voucher is responsible for complying with an order to take a corrective action to the new section 3337. Subsection (e) amends subsection (b) of section 3528 (Responsibilities and relief from liability of certifying officials) title 31 to allow the Comptroller General to relieve a certifying official that made a good faith effort to comply with the new section 3337 from liability. Subsection (f) requires the Treasury Secretary to submit a report (within 18 months and annually thereafter) to the OMB Director and Congress on the number of orders to return a certified payment voucher, the percentage of such payments that are successfully issued by the agency, the total savings to the Federal Government, and recommendations for related to the authorities and requirements of the new section 3337. Subsection (g) sets an effective date for this section that is one year after enactment of this Act. Legislative History H.R. 8464, Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act, was introduced on April 23, 2026, by Representative James Comer (R-KY). The following Representatives are cosponsors of the bill: Ken Calvert (R-CA) and Jodey Arrington (R-TX). The bill was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The Committee considered H.R. 8464 at a business meeting on April 29, 2026, and ordered the bill as amended favorably reported by a recorded vote.

Committee Consideration

On April 29, 2026, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 8464, favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 23-17, a quorum being present. Roll Call Votes In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following roll call vote occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 8464: The roll call vote was on favorably reporting H.R. 8464. The bill was agreed to in a recorded vote of 23-17. Explanation of Amendments During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative James Comer (R-KY), Chairman of the Committee, offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute that made substantive changes to the bill. The amendment in the nature of a substitute added a requirement on an agency to pause disbursement requests if they have reason to believe that the payment will lead to financial loss to the government for a State-administered program. The amendment also made technical edits to clarify the U.S. Treasury's obligation to return payment requests, shortened the returned payment period from 45 to 30 days, and more clearly defined the agency's notification requirements to the payee, including States administering federal funds, of the returned payment request including with a 2-day notification requirement. The amendment also required more specificity in Treasury's implementing regulations, added an implementation date of 1-year by adding a new subsection (f) (Effective Date) under section 2. The amendment also added additional conforming amendments, provided clarity on the responsibilities of the certifying official with respect to the Act, and added an annual Congressional reporting requirement by the U.S. Treasury to track outcomes on fraud prevention. The amendment in the nature of a substitute passed by voice vote. List of Related Committee Hearings In accordance with House rule XIII, clause 3(c)(6), (1) the following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 8464: On April 15, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government Operations held a hearing titled ``Fraud Prevention: Understanding Fraud in Federally Funded Programs Run by the States'' with Dr. O.J. Oleka, Chief Executive Officer, State Financial Officers Foundation; Ms. Allison Ball, Auditor of Public Accounts, Commonwealth of Kentucky; Mr. Seto Bagdoyan, Director of Forensic Audits and Investigative Services, U.S. Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Robert A. Westbrooks, former Federal Inspector General. (2) The following related hearings were held: On January 13, 2026, the Subcommittee on Government Operations held a legislative hearing titled ``Curbing Federal Fraud: Examining Innovative Tools to Detect and Prevent Fraud in Federal Programs'' with Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; Renate Miskell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Accounting Policy and Financial Transparency for the U.S. Department of Treasury's Bureau of Fiscal Service; and Sterling Thomas, Chief Scientist for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. On March 11, 2025, the Subcommittee on Government Operations held a legislative hearing titled, ``Shifting Gears: Moving from Recovery to Prevention of Improper Payments and Fraud'' with Kristen Kociolek, Managing Director of Financial Management Assurance for the Government Accountability Office, Ken Dieffenbach, Executive Director for the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee; and Jennifer Wagner, Director of Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Minority Witness). On February 12, 2025, the Subcommittee on Delivering on Government Efficiency held a legislative hearing titled ``The War on Waste: Stamping Out the Scourge of Improper Payments and Fraud'' with Stewart Whitson, Former FBI Special Agent and Senior Director of Federal Affairs for the Foundation for Government Accountability; Haywood Talcove, Chief Executive Officer for LexisNexis Risk Solution; Dawn Royal, Director for United Council on Welfare Fraud; and Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette, Director of Government Affairs for Project On Government Oversight (Minority Witness). On January 7, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds in Minnesota: Part I'' with Kristin Robbins, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; Walter Hudson, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; Marion Rarick, Minnesota House of Representatives Member; and Brendan Ballou, Former Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice (Minority Witness). On March 4, 2026, the Full Committee held a legislative hearing titled ``Oversight of Fraud and Misuse of Federal Funds in Minnesota: Part II'' with the Honorable Tim Walz, Governor for the State of Minnesota; Honorable Keith Ellison, Attorney General for the State of Minnesota; and Reverend Mariah Tollgaard (Minority Witness). Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause (2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the Background and Need for Legislation section above. Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance goals or objectives of this bill are to address the problem of the current `pay and chase' model by establishing in federal law for the first time, a clear legal prohibition for federal agencies to issue a payment request when there is sufficient reason to determine that a payment request will lead to a fraudulent or improper payment resulting in financial loss to the government by amending title 31, U.S. Code, to establish a new section 3337 (Authority to pause and segment payments) that would require agencies to take corrective actions prior to certifying a payment voucher request if there is an identified risk of fraud or an improper payment or if a payment request has been returned to the agency by the U.S. Treasury if a similar risk is detected. Application of Law to the Legislative Branch Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a description of the application of this bill to the legislative branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services and accommodations. This bill does not relate to employment or access to public services and accommodations in the legislative branch. Duplication of Federal Programs In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII no provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement Pursuant to section 5(b) of Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C. 1004(b)), the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Committee finds that this Committee Print does not direct the establishment of an advisory committee. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 the Committee has included a letter received from the Congressional Budget Office below. Earmark Identification This bill does not include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives. Committee Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE * * * * * * * SUBTITLE III--FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT * * * * * * * CHAPTER 33--DEPOSITING, KEEPING, AND PAYING MONEY * * * * * * * Sec. * * * * * * * SUBCHAPTER II--PAYMENTS * * * * * * * 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action. * * * * * * * SUBCHAPTER II--PAYMENTS * * * * * * * Sec. 3325. Vouchers (a) A disbursing official in the executive branch of the United States Government shall-- (1) disburse money only as provided by a voucher certified by-- (A) the head of the executive agency concerned; or (B) an officer or employee of the executive agency having written authorization from the head of the agency to certify vouchers; (2) examine a voucher if necessary to decide if it is-- (A) in proper form; (B) certified and approved; and (C) computed correctly on the facts certified; and (3) except for the correctness of computations on a voucher, compliance with an order to pause a payment pursuant to section 3337(b), or pursuant to payment intercepts or offsets pursuant to section 3716 or 3720A of this title[,,], be held accountable for carrying out clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection. (b) In addition to officers and employees referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section as having authorization to certify vouchers, members of the armed forces may certify vouchers when authorized, in writing, by the Secretary of Defense or, in the case of the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Homeland Security. (c) On request, the Secretary of the Treasury may provide to the appropriate officer or employee of the United States Government a list of persons receiving periodic payments from the Government. When certified and in proper form, the list may be used as a voucher on which the Secretary may disburse money. (d) The head of an executive agency or an officer or employee of an executive agency referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B), as applicable, shall include with each certified voucher submitted to a disbursing official pursuant to this section the taxpayer identifying number of each person to whom payment may be made under the voucher. * * * * * * * Sec. 3337. Authority to pause payments for further review and corrective action (a) Agency Obligation to Pause Disbursement Requests for Corrective Action.--The head of an agency shall take a corrective action to temporarily delay, condition, or segment a disbursement request before the certification of a payment voucher under section 3325 if, as determined by an official designated by the head of the agency, the agency-- (1) has sufficient reason to determine that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government as estimated under the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment; (2) has sufficient reason to determine, based on a notification by the relevant State or local government official in the case of a payment from Federal funds disbursed by a State or local government under a State- administered and federally-funded program, that the payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud-risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government as estimated under the requirements of section 3352 in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment; or (3) has been notified of an order from the Secretary of the Treasury described under subsection (b). (b) Treasury Obligation to Return Payment Voucher and Issue Corrective Action Order.--Except where otherwise required by law, the Secretary shall promptly notify the relevant certifying official of an order to return a certified payment voucher submitted to a disbursing official under section 3325 and issue a corrective action order to the head of an agency not later than 2 days after the Secretary makes a determination that in accordance with the statutorily-defined eligibility requirements or other legally-established condition of the program for a payee to be eligible to receive payment that such payment presents an elevated risk of fraud based on a fraud- risk indicator or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government based on an output of the Do Not Pay system under section 3354. (c) Agency Documentation and Time-limited Corrective Action.--An action taken by the head of an agency under subsection (a) shall-- (1) be based on an objective, documented fraud-risk indicator; (2) be narrowly applied to the portion of the payment presenting the elevated risk; and (3) be limited in duration to the minimum period necessary, as determined by the head of the agency, to verify eligibility of the payee or accuracy of the payment per any program requirement associated with the payment or as stipulated under law. (d) Payee Notification and Time Limit of Paused Disbursement Requests.--With respect to a disbursement request that has been delayed, conditioned, or segmented pursuant to subsection (a) or a payment voucher that is returned pursuant subsection (b), the head of the agency shall take the following actions: (1) Promptly provide to the payee (not later than 2 days after a determination under subsection (a) or a notification to the agency under subsection (b)), as appropriate, and for a case in which the payment from Federal funds disbursed by a State or local government under a State-administered and federally-funded program also provides to such relevant State or local government official, a notification that-- (A) a disbursement has been temporarily paused, conditioned, or segmented; (B) identifies the nature of the fraud-risk indicator or improper payment relied upon by the agency to make the corrective action determination under subsection (a) or notification to the agency under subsection (b); and (C) outlines the process for the corrective action review period. (2) Use a process tailored to the specific requirements and design of the agency program for a payee, or the State or local government described under paragraph (1), to contest any factual inaccuracy or provide clarifying information during the corrective action review period. (3) Issue such payment not later than 30 days after a determination to take a corrective action is made by the head of the agency under subsection (a) or the agency was notified by the Secretary under subsection (b) of a corrective action order, but not later than 7 days after the date on which the payee contests the corrective action under the process established pursuant to paragraph (2), if the head of the agency determines that the payment does not present an elevated risk of fraud or an improper payment resulting in financial loss to the Government. (e) Segmentation of Low-risk Payments.--To the maximum extent practicable, the head of each agency shall allow a routine, historically consistent payment amount to proceed while temporarily holding an anomalous, unusually large, or high-risk portion of a payment, or class of payments, pending review and resolution of an agency corrective action determination under subsection (a) or a corrective action order under subsection (b). (f) Exemptions for Law Enforcement Activities.--The head of an agency, in consultation with the Secretary and the Attorney General, may waive any provision in this section on a case-by- case basis if notified of or instructed by a Federal law enforcement authority, including an agency Inspector General, that the action will jeopardize an active criminal investigation or legal proceeding related to an effort to defraud the Federal Government or violate sections 3729 through 3733 of title 31 (commonly known as the ``False Claims Act''). (g) Limitation of Liability.--No officer or employee of the Federal Government shall be personally liable for an action taken in good faith under this section. An action taken under this section may not constitute a final determination of eligibility, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of a payee. (h) Rule of Construction for Program Authorizing Statute.-- Nothing in this section may be construed to supersede any other provision of law with respect to any statute that authorizes the payment or program the payment is made under. (i) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall issue regulations and establish procedures to administer the requirements of this section that shall be published in the Federal Register that, at a minimum, specify the following: (1) The minimum seniority of an agency official

Minority Views

H.R. 8464, the Stopping Fraudulent Payments Act, would add a new section to title 31 U.S.C. giving the Treasury the authority to pause and segment payments. It would require agencies to take corrective action prior to certifying a payment voucher request if there is an identified risk of fraud or an improper payment that would result in a financial loss to the government. It would require the Treasury to return such payment requests to the agency for corrective action. Committee Democrats strongly oppose H.R. 8464. In the face of a deepening cost of living crisis, with growing economic anxiety across the nation, the American people rely on critical federal programs to make ends meet. This bill could make that harder for some Americans due to process delays. This bill aims to stop improper payments, which we all agree is important. Unfortunately, it uses vague criteria which will stop many legitimate payments, causing more red tape, delays, and dysfunction. The current Administration has a long record of wrongly delaying payments for political reasons. Just last month, citing unsubstantiated concerns about fraud in hospice care, it suspended $1.3 billion in Medicaid payments to California. That could harm nearly a million elderly and disabled residents of the state. Last December, it threatened to withhold SNAP benefits from Colorado and Minnesota. In January, the Department of Health and Human Services froze $10 billion for essential needs in funding to five states led by Democratic governors. It is against this backdrop that we must consider H.R. 8464. This bill would allow agencies to delay payments if they have ``sufficient reason'' that the payment has an ``elevated risk of fraud.'' This creates a significant amount of discretion for agency officials. This discretion could be misused for partisan political purposes. The bill's stated intent is to stop improper payments, which we all agree is important. However, millions of Americans rely on critical federal programs for health care, food, and rent to make ends meet. The American people want programs to work, not unnecessary red tape, delayed legitimate payments, and dysfunction. Robert Garcia, Ranking Member. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/684