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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-699

PROTECT AMERICA'S INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC SECURITY FROM CCP ACT

2026-06-15

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Dissenting Views

[To accompany H.R. 1468] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 1468) to establish the CCP Initiative program, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3 Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 3 Committee Consideration.......................................... 6 Committee Votes.................................................. 6 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 8 New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 8 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 8 Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 9 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 9 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 9 Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 9 Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 9 Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 9 Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 10 Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10 Dissenting Views................................................. 10 The amendment is as follows: Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act''. SEC. 2. CCP INITIATIVE. (a) Establishment.--There is established in the National Security Division of the Department of Justice the CCP Initiative to-- (1) curb spying by the CCP on United States intellectual property and academic institutions; (2) develop an enforcement strategy concerning nontraditional collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base, transferring technology to PRC- based individuals or entities, or those acting as their agents, contrary to United States interests; (3) review and take appropriate action, as part of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to address PRC-related risks arising from foreign investments in United States businesses and real estate; (4) prioritize, with respect to PRC-based individuals or entities, or those acting as their agents-- (A) identifying and criminally prosecuting those engaged in trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage, including those who aid, abet, or conspire to engage in trade secret theft, hacking, or economic espionage; (B) protecting the critical infrastructure of the United States from threats arising from foreign direct investment, insider threats and supply chain compromises; and (C) identifying theft of intellectual property from United States businesses; and (5) counter any other threats to the United States by the PRC or those acting as its agents. (b) Consultation.--In executing the CCP Initiative's objectives as set forth in subsection (a), the Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, shall consult with the relevant components of the Department of Justice, and coordinate activities with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any other Federal agency as necessary on matters including-- (1) identifying cases of concern involving PRC-based companies that compete with United States businesses; (2) identifying and investigating investments made by PRC- based or PRC-affiliated entities included on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce or the People's Republic of China Military Companies list maintained by the Department of Defense; and (3) any other matters relevant to fulfill the objectives set forth in subsection (a). (c) Requirement.--Under the CCP Initiative-- (1) the Initiative shall be separate from any other Department of Justice initiative dedicated to countering nation-state threats; and (2) resources shall be set aside for the CCP Initiative, which shall not be combined to support any other Department of Justice program, including other programs and initiatives dedicated to countering nation-state threats, except under exceptional circumstances, as determined by the Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, in which case, resources may be combined to support other programs and initiatives dedicated to countering nation-state threats. (d) Annual Report.--The Attorney General shall submit annually a written report, with a classified annex as necessary, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the intelligence community, the United States Trade Representative, and the head of any other Federal agency determined necessary by the Attorney General, for the purposes of the report, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on the progress and challenges of the CCP Initiative over the preceding year, including-- (1) its progress in accomplishing the objectives set forth in subsection (a); (2) the amount and sufficiency of resources provided to, and expended by, the CCP Initiative; (3) the level and effectiveness of coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal agencies; (4) the status of efforts by and the financial intelligence capabilities of the PRC to engage in trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage; (5) an analysis of the use of unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft required for the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system) by the PRC; (6) an analysis of the capabilities, effectiveness, and use of artificial intelligence by the PRC and its proxies to engage in trade secret theft, hacking, or economic espionage; (7) any non-privileged findings of investigations of investments made by PRC-based or PRC-affiliated entities included on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce or the People's Republic of China Military Companies list maintained by the Department of Defense, including findings related to subsidiaries or other entities controlled by PRC companies, whether or not such subsidiaries or other entities are registered in or operate in the PRC; (8) the impact of the CCP Initiative on those efforts of the PRC; (9) the level and effectiveness of coordination and information sharing between Government agencies and private companies about economic espionage threats; and (10) an assessment of the economic loss to the United States as a result of hacking and trade secret theft by the PRC. (e) Sunset.--This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and cease to be in effect on the date that is 6 years after that date. (f) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected thereby. (g) Definitions.--In this Act: (1) The term ``non-traditional collector'' means an individual who is not an intelligence collection professional but who collects sensitive technologies and information on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent. (2) The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist Party. (3) The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of China, the government of the People's Republic of China, and the CCP. (4) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 1468, the Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act, introduced by Rep. Lance Gooden (R-TX), would provide for the establishment of an initiative within the National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to address espionage by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on U.S. intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions. The initiative would focus on identifying and prosecuting individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and economic espionage, and protecting critical U.S. infrastructure from being compromised based on foreign investment and supply chains. Background and Need for the Legislation According to the DOJ, approximately 80 percent of all economic espionage cases prosecuted by DOJ involve theft of trade secrets by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities or agents, and approximately 60 percent of all trade secret misappropriation cases brought in the U.S. have a nexus to China.\1\ For example, in November 2021, a federal jury convicted Yanjun Xu of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and theft of trade secrets under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.\2\ Xu was the Deputy Division Director of the Sixth Bureau of the Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security (MSS)--an officer of the Chinese government's intelligence service.\3\ He recruited an employee of GE Aviation (now GE Aerospace) to travel to the PRC under the pretense of giving a presentation at a Chinese university.\4\ Afterwards, Xu leveraged this relationship to attempt to gain access to GE Aviation's proprietary information relating to its exclusive composite aircraft engine technology.\5\ He was apprehended in Belgium and extradited to the United States. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\David H. Laufman et al., The Department of Justice's National Security Division Chief Addresses China's Campaign to Steal U.S. Intellectual Property, Nat'l L. R., Aug. 24, 2020, https:// www.natlawreview.com/article/department-justice-s-national-security- division-chief-addresses-china-s-campaign-to; Dept. of Just., Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and Compilation of China- Related Prosecutions Since 2018 (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-about-department- justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related (``China Initiative Overview''). \2\Dept. of Just., Jury Convicts Chinese Intelligence Officer of Espionage Crimes, Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jury-convicts-chinese-intelligence- officer-espionage-crimes-attempting-steal-trade-secrets. \3\Id. \4\Id. \5\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In another example, the DOJ indicted Yanqing Ye in January 2020 for acting as an agent of the Chinese government, among other charges.\6\ Ye was a lieutenant in the PLA and a CCP member.\7\ According to the indictment, Ye posed as a student and enrolled at Boston University where she accessed U.S. military websites, researched U.S. military projects, and compiled information for the PLA on U.S. scientists with expertise in robotics and computer science, all at the direction of the Chinese military.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\Dept. of Just., Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases (Jan.28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two- chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related. \7\Id. \8\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Beyond physically deploying actual intelligence operatives and military personnel to the U.S., the Chinese government also makes extensive use of cyber-intrusions to steal American IP.\9\ For example, in July 2021, the DOJ indicted four Chinese nationals working with the MSS to hack into the computer systems of dozens of victim companies, universities, and government entities in the U.S. and elsewhere to steal valuable trade secrets and confidential information.\10\ The stolen trade secrets included sensitive technologies used for submersibles and autonomous vehicles, specialty chemical formulas, commercial aircraft servicing, and proprietary genetic-sequencing technology and data.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., Findings of the Investigation Into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, at 153-171 (2018) (``USTR 2018 Sec. 301 Report''), https:/ /ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. \10\Dept. of Justice, Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information, Including Infectious Disease Research (Jul. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-chinese- nationals-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer- intrusion. \11\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2018, DOJ secured an indictment of two Chinese hackers working with the MSS to conduct global campaigns of computer intrusions targeting, among other things, IP and confidential business and technological information.\12\ The hackers targeted a broad range of sectors, including aviation, satellite technology, maritime technology, industrial factory automation, telecommunications, consumer electronics, computer processor technology, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical manufacturing.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Dept. of Just., Two Chinese Hackers Working with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information, Including COVID-19 Research (Jul. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged- global-computer-intrusion. \13\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chinese IP theft activities are not limited to China's intelligence services and military. In February 2020, DOJ charged Huawei on 16 counts of stealing trade secrets and racketeering.\14\ Their tactics included fraudulently acquiring IP using non-disclosure agreements, recruiting employees of other companies to steal their employer's IP for Huawei, and using proxies such as professors working at research institutions to obtain technology and research.\15\ Huawei also provided financial incentives and bonuses to its employees for successfully acquiring confidential information and trade secrets from competitors.\16\ Its campaign yielded a treasure trove of stolen IP relating to internet router source code, cellular antenna technology, and robotics, which accelerated and boosted Huawei's own R&D efforts.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Dept. of Just., Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries- charged-racketeering. \15\Id. \16\Id. \17\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In light of China's sustained efforts to steal IP from U.S. companies and engage in economic espionage, the DOJ announced its China Initiative in November 2018--``a major initiative to combat Chinese commercial spying . . . .''\18\ The DOJ's China Initiative prosecuted dozens of cases, primarily during the Trump Administration.\19\ Over 160 individuals and entities were indicted under the China Initiative, at least 45 of which have since been convicted or pled guilty.\20\ Arguably, these cases brought under the China Initiative were just the tip of the iceberg. Nevertheless, the Biden Administration chose to end the China Initiative in February 2022, bowing to pressure from left-wing activists alleging that the program stoked anti- Asian bias and dissuaded Chinese students and scholars from coming to the U.S.\21\ The number of new economic espionage cases filed following cancellation of the initiative declined significantly--in fact, no new economic espionage cases were opened in 2022 or 2023, the most recent data available.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\Ellen Nakashima & David J. Lynch, U.S. charges Chinese hackers in alleged theft of vast trove of confidential data in 12 countries, Wash. Post (Dec. 21, 2018). \19\Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and Compilation of China- Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST., (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information- about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china- related (``China Initiative Overview''). \20\Christopher Pelham & Brian A. Sun, US DOJ formally ends the China Initiative, but leaves the underlying prosecution priorities intact, Norton Rose Fulbright (Mar. 2022), https:// www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-middle-east/knowledge/publications/ 0712bf2d/us-doj-formally-ends-the-china-initiative. \21\Ronn Blitzer & Jake Gibson, Biden DOJ ending national security initiative aimed at countering China amid complaints about bias, Fox News (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-ending- china-initiative-national-security-program-bias; David Spunt, Justice Department pressured to end China Initiative aimed at targeting espionage, Fox News (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ justice-department-china-initiative-doj-espionate-pressure. \22\Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics Data Tool, U.S. Dep't Of Just., https://fccps.bjs.ojp.gov/ home.html?dashboard=FJSP-Prosecution&tab= ProsecutionCourtsDefendantsChargedinCriminalCasesAdvanced (last visited Mar. 19, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security From CCP Act H.R. 1468 would reestablish a dedicated program at DOJ, the CCP Initiative, to protect the United States from the threats previously addressed by the China Initiative, statutorily requiring that this important work resumes. H.R. 1468 would mandate that DOJ coordinate efforts with the FBI, other elements of DOJ, and other federal agencies, as necessary. Further, to ensure effective Congressional oversight, H.R. 1468 requires robust annual reporting to key committees in the House and Senate.

Hearings

For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 1468: ``Protecting Our Edge: Trade Secrets and the Global AI Arms Race,'' a hearing held on May 7, 2025, before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Nicholas Anderson, President and Chief Operating Officer, Invictus International Consulting, LLC; Dr. Benjamin Jensen, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Christopher Mohr, President, Software and Information Industry Association; Ms. Helen Toner, Director of Strategy and Foundational Research Grants, Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology; and Dr. John Villasenor, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Law, Public Policy, and Management, University of California Los Angeles. The hearing addressed global competition in the development of artificial intelligence, including China's use of trade secret theft and economic espionage.

Committee Consideration

On March 26, 2026, the Committee met in open session and ordered the bill, H.R. 1468, favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by a roll call vote of 14-9, a quorum being present.

Committee Votes

In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 1468: 1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 1468, as amended--passed 14 ayes to 9 nays. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been timely submitted prior to filing of the report and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included in this report. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1468 from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 1468 would require the Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish a program to counter espionage, theft of intellectual property and trade secrets, and threats to critical infrastructure posed by the Chinese government. The bill also would require DOJ to report to the Congress annually on the program's activities. The bill's requirements would expire six years after enactment. Based on the costs of similar activities, and because DOJ is currently working to address those threats, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1468 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2026-2031 period, primarily for the bill's reporting requirements. Any related spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jeremy Crimm. The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision of H.R. 1468 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another federal program. Performance Goals and Objectives The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of House rule XIII, H.R. 1468 would provide for the establishment of an initiative within the National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice to address espionage by the Chinese Communist Party on U.S. intellectual property and academic institutions. Advisory on Earmarks In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 1468 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI. Federal Mandates Statement The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Advisory Committee Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104- 1).

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title The ``Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act.'' Section 2. CCP initiative This section establishes the ``CCP Initiative'' within DOJ's National Security Division to counter nation state threats to the United States, curb spying by the CCP on U.S. IP and academic institutions, and focus on identifying and prosecuting individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and economic espionage, as well as protecting the critical infrastructure of the United States from foreign investment and supply chain compromises. The Act requires consultation and coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other relevant elements of DOJ and federal agencies, and mandates that DOJ provide an annual report to Congress regarding the effectiveness and progress of the CCP Initiative and related information.

Dissenting Views

I oppose H.R. 1468, which would reestablish the discredited and discriminatory ``China Initiative'' at the Department of Justice (DOJ). The sponsors of this bill invite us all to participate in some magical thinking. They want us to pretend the China Initiative didn't happen during the last Trump Administration. They want us to pretend the China Initiative wasn't a total failure. They want us to pretend the first China Initiative didn't result in Chinese researchers at American universities being targeted for simple paperwork errors just so the DOJ could finally prosecute someone and claim a victory, even though many of the cases were dismissed or overturned on appeal.\1\ And my Republican colleagues want us to pretend that if we change the name just a little bit--from ``the China Initiative'' to ``the CCP Initiative''--no one will notice that this bill is the same failed enterprise all over again. No matter how hard they pretend, they can't change the past: The anti-Asian hate that proliferated around this country led to nearly 13,000 race- driven acts of hate and crimes against Asian Americans.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Blog Post, Engineering Professor Acquitted in Latest Setback to DOJ's ``China Initiative,'' Arnold & Porter (Sept. 20, 2021), https:// www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/enforcement-edge/2021/09/ engineering-professor-acquitted. \2\Report, The State of AA/PI Hate in 2024, STOP AAPI HATE (June 2025), https://stopaapihate.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/25-SAH- StateofHateReport-F-digital.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This bill is particularly tone deaf because Donald Trump is ceding more global power to China every day. During his first term, Chinese government and state-owned companies spent no less than $5.5 million dollars at Trump properties--to say nothing of the valuable trademarks Chinese authorities rushed to grant him and his family members. In exchange, he opposed sanctions against Chinese telecommunications companies and banks even when they threatened our national security. He even tried to cancel a military exercise with Japan and South Korea because China and Russia complained. Donald Trump's second term has been more of the same. Over the last 18 months, the Trump Administration has weakened America's soft power abroad by defunding foreign aid programs and closing embassies, hurt America's economy with unlawful and arbitrary tariffs, and hamstrung our ability to respond to threats by firing government workers, including experts on China and national security personnel. He has done all this while using his cryptocurrency ventures to pocket millions of dollars from Chinese billionaires with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In May, a tiny Chinese technology company with ties to the Chinese government announced it had bought as much as $300 million of President Trump's memecoin-- despite having no revenue and only eight employees.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\Michael Clark, Trump Forfeits U.S. Global Leadership at Americans' Expense and to China's Gain, Ctr. for American Progress (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trump- forfeits-u-s-global-leadership-at-americans-expense-and-to-chinas- gain/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- President Trump's use of his office for personal enrichment is corrupt. But what is possibly even more galling is how President Trump is using Chinese President Xi as a model for leadership. President Trump once referred to President Xi as a ``brilliant guy'' who controls ``1.4 billion people with an iron fist.''\4\ He assured President Xi that sending Uighurs to forced labor camps was ``exactly the right thing to do'' and that violently cracking down on pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong was acting ``very responsibly.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\Blog Post, Representative Quotations from President Trump on President Xi and China, Harvard Univ., https://www.belfercenter.org/ programs/thucydidess-trap/representative-quotations-president-trump- president-xi-and-china. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In his second term in office, President Trump appears to be committed to remaking his Administration in the image of President Xi's regime: cracking down on media outlets he disapproves of, attempting hostile takeovers of the ``ideology'' of colleges and universities, attacking attorneys for representing clients or causes he dislikes, purging libraries, sending masked agents in unmarked vans to arrest foreign students for voicing opinions he disagrees with, shipping people to El Salvador's notorious torture prison, and using artificial intelligence to surveil individuals' social media posts and to create a mega database of Americans' information. It is no surprise that we are not looking at reasonable, nonpartisan ways to augment national security at the DOJ, because Donald Trump has for over a year now been deconstructing our national security infrastructure, replacing experience with loyalists and common sense with partisan vitriol. Since taking office, Donald Trump has gutted the National Security Division at DOJ and fired thousands of experienced employees at the State Department, draining our agencies of incalculably valuable expertise. He has reassigned a quarter of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and almost all of the agents at Homeland Security Investigations away from their national security duties and reassigned them to immigration enforcement, including picking up moms and kids with no criminal histories, instead of going after actual terrorists and serious fraudsters. Donald Trump has left nuclear agreement negotiations to his son-in-law and Steve Witkoff, neither of whom have any experience with nuclear disarmament, and has recalled 30 ambassadors while leaving a whole 80 ambassador positions unfilled--even in key countries in the Middle East. He closed down the Global Engagement Center, the State Department's office tasked with combatting foreign disinformation and influence campaigns. He has jeopardized NATO and weakened strategic partnerships around the world, all while wreaking havoc on our economy with his punitive tariffs, used as a last- ditch effort because he can't actually employ effective international leverage and strategy. This Administration has no real interest in protecting our national security, from Chinese threats or otherwise. It is up to us, Congress, to take action to protect against strategic threats from China--and this bill does the opposite. I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation. Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/699