Dissenting Views
[To accompany H.R. 1468]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 1468) to establish the CCP Initiative program, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 3
Committee Consideration.......................................... 6
Committee Votes.................................................. 6
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 8
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 8
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 8
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects.......................... 9
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 9
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 9
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 9
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 9
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 9
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 10
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 10
Dissenting Views................................................. 10
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and
insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protect America's Innovation and
Economic Security from CCP Act''.
SEC. 2. CCP INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the National Security
Division of the Department of Justice the CCP Initiative to--
(1) curb spying by the CCP on United States intellectual
property and academic institutions;
(2) develop an enforcement strategy concerning nontraditional
collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and
the defense industrial base, transferring technology to PRC-
based individuals or entities, or those acting as their agents,
contrary to United States interests;
(3) review and take appropriate action, as part of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to
address PRC-related risks arising from foreign investments in
United States businesses and real estate;
(4) prioritize, with respect to PRC-based individuals or
entities, or those acting as their agents--
(A) identifying and criminally prosecuting those
engaged in trade secret theft, hacking, and economic
espionage, including those who aid, abet, or conspire
to engage in trade secret theft, hacking, or economic
espionage;
(B) protecting the critical infrastructure of the
United States from threats arising from foreign direct
investment, insider threats and supply chain
compromises; and
(C) identifying theft of intellectual property from
United States businesses; and
(5) counter any other threats to the United States by the PRC
or those acting as its agents.
(b) Consultation.--In executing the CCP Initiative's objectives as
set forth in subsection (a), the Attorney General, acting through the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, shall consult with
the relevant components of the Department of Justice, and coordinate
activities with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any other
Federal agency as necessary on matters including--
(1) identifying cases of concern involving PRC-based
companies that compete with United States businesses;
(2) identifying and investigating investments made by PRC-
based or PRC-affiliated entities included on the Entity List
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce or the People's Republic of China
Military Companies list maintained by the Department of
Defense; and
(3) any other matters relevant to fulfill the objectives set
forth in subsection (a).
(c) Requirement.--Under the CCP Initiative--
(1) the Initiative shall be separate from any other
Department of Justice initiative dedicated to countering
nation-state threats; and
(2) resources shall be set aside for the CCP Initiative,
which shall not be combined to support any other Department of
Justice program, including other programs and initiatives
dedicated to countering nation-state threats, except under
exceptional circumstances, as determined by the Attorney
General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security, in which case, resources may be combined to
support other programs and initiatives dedicated to countering
nation-state threats.
(d) Annual Report.--The Attorney General shall submit annually a
written report, with a classified annex as necessary, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
intelligence community, the United States Trade Representative, and the
head of any other Federal agency determined necessary by the Attorney
General, for the purposes of the report, to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on the progress and
challenges of the CCP Initiative over the preceding year, including--
(1) its progress in accomplishing the objectives set forth in
subsection (a);
(2) the amount and sufficiency of resources provided to, and
expended by, the CCP Initiative;
(3) the level and effectiveness of coordination with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal agencies;
(4) the status of efforts by and the financial intelligence
capabilities of the PRC to engage in trade secret theft,
hacking, and economic espionage;
(5) an analysis of the use of unmanned aircraft and
associated elements (including communication links and the
components that control the unmanned aircraft required for the
operator to operate safely and efficiently in the national
airspace system) by the PRC;
(6) an analysis of the capabilities, effectiveness, and use
of artificial intelligence by the PRC and its proxies to engage
in trade secret theft, hacking, or economic espionage;
(7) any non-privileged findings of investigations of
investments made by PRC-based or PRC-affiliated entities
included on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce or the
People's Republic of China Military Companies list maintained
by the Department of Defense, including findings related to
subsidiaries or other entities controlled by PRC companies,
whether or not such subsidiaries or other entities are
registered in or operate in the PRC;
(8) the impact of the CCP Initiative on those efforts of the
PRC;
(9) the level and effectiveness of coordination and
information sharing between Government agencies and private
companies about economic espionage threats; and
(10) an assessment of the economic loss to the United States
as a result of hacking and trade secret theft by the PRC.
(e) Sunset.--This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of
this Act and cease to be in effect on the date that is 6 years after
that date.
(f) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the
provisions of such to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected
thereby.
(g) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) The term ``non-traditional collector'' means an
individual who is not an intelligence collection professional
but who collects sensitive technologies and information on
behalf of, or for the benefit of, any foreign government,
foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.
(2) The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist Party.
(3) The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of China,
the government of the People's Republic of China, and the CCP.
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1468, the Protect America's Innovation and Economic
Security from CCP Act, introduced by Rep. Lance Gooden (R-TX),
would provide for the establishment of an initiative within the
National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) to address espionage by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
on U.S. intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions.
The initiative would focus on identifying and prosecuting
individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and
economic espionage, and protecting critical U.S. infrastructure
from being compromised based on foreign investment and supply
chains.
Background and Need for the Legislation
According to the DOJ, approximately 80 percent of all
economic espionage cases prosecuted by DOJ involve theft of
trade secrets by the Chinese government or its
instrumentalities or agents, and approximately 60 percent of
all trade secret misappropriation cases brought in the U.S.
have a nexus to China.\1\ For example, in November 2021, a
federal jury convicted Yanjun Xu of conspiracy to commit
economic espionage and theft of trade secrets under the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.\2\ Xu was the Deputy Division
Director of the Sixth Bureau of the Jiangsu Province Ministry
of State Security (MSS)--an officer of the Chinese government's
intelligence service.\3\ He recruited an employee of GE
Aviation (now GE Aerospace) to travel to the PRC under the
pretense of giving a presentation at a Chinese university.\4\
Afterwards, Xu leveraged this relationship to attempt to gain
access to GE Aviation's proprietary information relating to its
exclusive composite aircraft engine technology.\5\ He was
apprehended in Belgium and extradited to the United States.
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\1\David H. Laufman et al., The Department of Justice's National
Security Division Chief Addresses China's Campaign to Steal U.S.
Intellectual Property, Nat'l L. R., Aug. 24, 2020, https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/department-justice-s-national-security-
division-chief-addresses-china-s-campaign-to; Dept. of Just.,
Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and
Compilation of China- Related Prosecutions Since 2018 (Nov. 19, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-about-department-
justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related (``China
Initiative Overview'').
\2\Dept. of Just., Jury Convicts Chinese Intelligence Officer of
Espionage Crimes, Attempting to Steal Trade Secrets (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jury-convicts-chinese-intelligence-
officer-espionage-crimes-attempting-steal-trade-secrets.
\3\Id.
\4\Id.
\5\Id.
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In another example, the DOJ indicted Yanqing Ye in January
2020 for acting as an agent of the Chinese government, among
other charges.\6\ Ye was a lieutenant in the PLA and a CCP
member.\7\ According to the indictment, Ye posed as a student
and enrolled at Boston University where she accessed U.S.
military websites, researched U.S. military projects, and
compiled information for the PLA on U.S. scientists with
expertise in robotics and computer science, all at the
direction of the Chinese military.\8\
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\6\Dept. of Just., Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese
Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases (Jan.28, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-
chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related.
\7\Id.
\8\Id.
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Beyond physically deploying actual intelligence operatives
and military personnel to the U.S., the Chinese government also
makes extensive use of cyber-intrusions to steal American
IP.\9\ For example, in July 2021, the DOJ indicted four Chinese
nationals working with the MSS to hack into the computer
systems of dozens of victim companies, universities, and
government entities in the U.S. and elsewhere to steal valuable
trade secrets and confidential information.\10\ The stolen
trade secrets included sensitive technologies used for
submersibles and autonomous vehicles, specialty chemical
formulas, commercial aircraft servicing, and proprietary
genetic-sequencing technology and data.\11\
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\9\Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., Findings of the Investigation Into
China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, at 153-171 (2018) (``USTR 2018 Sec. 301 Report''), https:/
/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.
\10\Dept. of Justice, Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and
Confidential Business Information, Including Infectious Disease
Research (Jul. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-chinese-
nationals-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-
intrusion.
\11\Id.
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In 2018, DOJ secured an indictment of two Chinese hackers
working with the MSS to conduct global campaigns of computer
intrusions targeting, among other things, IP and confidential
business and technological information.\12\ The hackers
targeted a broad range of sectors, including aviation,
satellite technology, maritime technology, industrial factory
automation, telecommunications, consumer electronics, computer
processor technology, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
manufacturing.\13\
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\12\Dept. of Just., Two Chinese Hackers Working with the Ministry
of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign
Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information,
Including COVID-19 Research (Jul. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-
global-computer-intrusion.
\13\Id.
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Chinese IP theft activities are not limited to China's
intelligence services and military. In February 2020, DOJ
charged Huawei on 16 counts of stealing trade secrets and
racketeering.\14\ Their tactics included fraudulently acquiring
IP using non-disclosure agreements, recruiting employees of
other companies to steal their employer's IP for Huawei, and
using proxies such as professors working at research
institutions to obtain technology and research.\15\ Huawei also
provided financial incentives and bonuses to its employees for
successfully acquiring confidential information and trade
secrets from competitors.\16\ Its campaign yielded a treasure
trove of stolen IP relating to internet router source code,
cellular antenna technology, and robotics, which accelerated
and boosted Huawei's own R&D efforts.\17\
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\14\Dept. of Just., Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei
and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to
Steal Trade Secrets (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-
charged-racketeering.
\15\Id.
\16\Id.
\17\Id.
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In light of China's sustained efforts to steal IP from U.S.
companies and engage in economic espionage, the DOJ announced
its China Initiative in November 2018--``a major initiative to
combat Chinese commercial spying . . . .''\18\ The DOJ's China
Initiative prosecuted dozens of cases, primarily during the
Trump Administration.\19\ Over 160 individuals and entities
were indicted under the China Initiative, at least 45 of which
have since been convicted or pled guilty.\20\ Arguably, these
cases brought under the China Initiative were just the tip of
the iceberg. Nevertheless, the Biden Administration chose to
end the China Initiative in February 2022, bowing to pressure
from left-wing activists alleging that the program stoked anti-
Asian bias and dissuaded Chinese students and scholars from
coming to the U.S.\21\ The number of new economic espionage
cases filed following cancellation of the initiative declined
significantly--in fact, no new economic espionage cases were
opened in 2022 or 2023, the most recent data available.\22\
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\18\Ellen Nakashima & David J. Lynch, U.S. charges Chinese hackers
in alleged theft of vast trove of confidential data in 12 countries,
Wash. Post (Dec. 21, 2018).
\19\Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and
Compilation of China- Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST.,
(Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-
about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-
related (``China Initiative Overview'').
\20\Christopher Pelham & Brian A. Sun, US DOJ formally ends the
China Initiative, but leaves the underlying prosecution priorities
intact, Norton Rose Fulbright (Mar. 2022), https://
www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-middle-east/knowledge/publications/
0712bf2d/us-doj-formally-ends-the-china-initiative.
\21\Ronn Blitzer & Jake Gibson, Biden DOJ ending national security
initiative aimed at countering China amid complaints about bias, Fox
News (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-ending-
china-initiative-national-security-program-bias; David Spunt, Justice
Department pressured to end China Initiative aimed at targeting
espionage, Fox News (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/
justice-department-china-initiative-doj-espionate-pressure.
\22\Bureau Of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing
Statistics Data Tool, U.S. Dep't Of Just., https://fccps.bjs.ojp.gov/
home.html?dashboard=FJSP-Prosecution&tab=
ProsecutionCourtsDefendantsChargedinCriminalCasesAdvanced (last visited
Mar. 19, 2026).
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The Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security From CCP Act
H.R. 1468 would reestablish a dedicated program at DOJ, the
CCP Initiative, to protect the United States from the threats
previously addressed by the China Initiative, statutorily
requiring that this important work resumes. H.R. 1468 would
mandate that DOJ coordinate efforts with the FBI, other
elements of DOJ, and other federal agencies, as necessary.
Further, to ensure effective Congressional oversight, H.R. 1468
requires robust annual reporting to key committees in the House
and Senate.
Hearings
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII,
the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 1468:
``Protecting Our Edge: Trade Secrets and the Global AI Arms
Race,'' a hearing held on May 7, 2025, before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property, Artificial Intelligence, and
the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary. The
Subcommittee heard testimony from the following witnesses:
Mr. Nicholas Anderson, President and Chief
Operating Officer, Invictus International Consulting,
LLC;
Dr. Benjamin Jensen, Senior Fellow, Center
for Strategic and International Studies;
Mr. Christopher Mohr, President, Software
and Information Industry Association;
Ms. Helen Toner, Director of Strategy and
Foundational Research Grants, Georgetown University
Center for Security and Emerging Technology; and
Dr. John Villasenor, Professor of Electrical
Engineering, Law, Public Policy, and Management,
University of California Los Angeles.
The hearing addressed global competition in the development
of artificial intelligence, including China's use of trade
secret theft and economic espionage.
Committee Consideration
On March 26, 2026, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 1468, favorably reported with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute by a roll call vote of
14-9, a quorum being present.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 1468:
1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 1468, as
amended--passed 14 ayes to 9 nays.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 has been timely submitted prior to filing of the report
and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included
in this report.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has
received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1468 from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 1468 would require the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
establish a program to counter espionage, theft of intellectual
property and trade secrets, and threats to critical
infrastructure posed by the Chinese government. The bill also
would require DOJ to report to the Congress annually on the
program's activities. The bill's requirements would expire six
years after enactment.
Based on the costs of similar activities, and because DOJ
is currently working to address those threats, CBO estimates
that implementing H.R. 1468 would cost less than $500,000 over
the 2026-2031 period, primarily for the bill's reporting
requirements. Any related spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jeremy Crimm.
The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision
of H.R. 1468 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal
program.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
House rule XIII, H.R. 1468 would provide for the establishment
of an initiative within the National Security Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice to address espionage by the Chinese
Communist Party on U.S. intellectual property and academic
institutions.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 1468
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
The ``Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security
from CCP Act.''
Section 2. CCP initiative
This section establishes the ``CCP Initiative'' within
DOJ's National Security Division to counter nation state
threats to the United States, curb spying by the CCP on U.S. IP
and academic institutions, and focus on identifying and
prosecuting individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets,
hacking, and economic espionage, as well as protecting the
critical infrastructure of the United States from foreign
investment and supply chain compromises. The Act requires
consultation and coordination with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and other relevant elements of DOJ and
federal agencies, and mandates that DOJ provide an annual
report to Congress regarding the effectiveness and progress of
the CCP Initiative and related information.
Dissenting Views
I oppose H.R. 1468, which would reestablish the discredited
and discriminatory ``China Initiative'' at the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The sponsors of this bill invite us all to
participate in some magical thinking. They want us to pretend
the China Initiative didn't happen during the last Trump
Administration. They want us to pretend the China Initiative
wasn't a total failure.
They want us to pretend the first China Initiative didn't
result in Chinese researchers at American universities being
targeted for simple paperwork errors just so the DOJ could
finally prosecute someone and claim a victory, even though many
of the cases were dismissed or overturned on appeal.\1\ And my
Republican colleagues want us to pretend that if we change the
name just a little bit--from ``the China Initiative'' to ``the
CCP Initiative''--no one will notice that this bill is the same
failed enterprise all over again. No matter how hard they
pretend, they can't change the past: The anti-Asian hate that
proliferated around this country led to nearly 13,000 race-
driven acts of hate and crimes against Asian Americans.\2\
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\1\Blog Post, Engineering Professor Acquitted in Latest Setback to
DOJ's ``China Initiative,'' Arnold & Porter (Sept. 20, 2021), https://
www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/enforcement-edge/2021/09/
engineering-professor-acquitted.
\2\Report, The State of AA/PI Hate in 2024, STOP AAPI HATE (June
2025), https://stopaapihate.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/25-SAH-
StateofHateReport-F-digital.pdf.
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This bill is particularly tone deaf because Donald Trump is
ceding more global power to China every day. During his first
term, Chinese government and state-owned companies spent no
less than $5.5 million dollars at Trump properties--to say
nothing of the valuable trademarks Chinese authorities rushed
to grant him and his family members. In exchange, he opposed
sanctions against Chinese telecommunications companies and
banks even when they threatened our national security. He even
tried to cancel a military exercise with Japan and South Korea
because China and Russia complained.
Donald Trump's second term has been more of the same. Over
the last 18 months, the Trump Administration has weakened
America's soft power abroad by defunding foreign aid programs
and closing embassies, hurt America's economy with unlawful and
arbitrary tariffs, and hamstrung our ability to respond to
threats by firing government workers, including experts on
China and national security personnel. He has done all this
while using his cryptocurrency ventures to pocket millions of
dollars from Chinese billionaires with ties to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). In May, a tiny Chinese technology
company with ties to the Chinese government announced it had
bought as much as $300 million of President Trump's memecoin--
despite having no revenue and only eight employees.\3\
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\3\Michael Clark, Trump Forfeits U.S. Global Leadership at
Americans' Expense and to China's Gain, Ctr. for American Progress
(Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trump-
forfeits-u-s-global-leadership-at-americans-expense-and-to-chinas-
gain/.
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President Trump's use of his office for personal enrichment
is corrupt. But what is possibly even more galling is how
President Trump is using Chinese President Xi as a model for
leadership. President Trump once referred to President Xi as a
``brilliant guy'' who controls ``1.4 billion people with an
iron fist.''\4\ He assured President Xi that sending Uighurs to
forced labor camps was ``exactly the right thing to do'' and
that violently cracking down on pro-democracy protests in Hong
Kong was acting ``very responsibly.''
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\4\Blog Post, Representative Quotations from President Trump on
President Xi and China, Harvard Univ., https://www.belfercenter.org/
programs/thucydidess-trap/representative-quotations-president-trump-
president-xi-and-china.
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In his second term in office, President Trump appears to be
committed to remaking his Administration in the image of
President Xi's regime: cracking down on media outlets he
disapproves of, attempting hostile takeovers of the
``ideology'' of colleges and universities, attacking attorneys
for representing clients or causes he dislikes, purging
libraries, sending masked agents in unmarked vans to arrest
foreign students for voicing opinions he disagrees with,
shipping people to El Salvador's notorious torture prison, and
using artificial intelligence to surveil individuals' social
media posts and to create a mega database of Americans'
information.
It is no surprise that we are not looking at reasonable,
nonpartisan ways to augment national security at the DOJ,
because Donald Trump has for over a year now been
deconstructing our national security infrastructure, replacing
experience with loyalists and common sense with partisan
vitriol. Since taking office, Donald Trump has gutted the
National Security Division at DOJ and fired thousands of
experienced employees at the State Department, draining our
agencies of incalculably valuable expertise. He has reassigned
a quarter of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and almost
all of the agents at Homeland Security Investigations away from
their national security duties and reassigned them to
immigration enforcement, including picking up moms and kids
with no criminal histories, instead of going after actual
terrorists and serious fraudsters.
Donald Trump has left nuclear agreement negotiations to his
son-in-law and Steve Witkoff, neither of whom have any
experience with nuclear disarmament, and has recalled 30
ambassadors while leaving a whole 80 ambassador positions
unfilled--even in key countries in the Middle East. He closed
down the Global Engagement Center, the State Department's
office tasked with combatting foreign disinformation and
influence campaigns. He has jeopardized NATO and weakened
strategic partnerships around the world, all while wreaking
havoc on our economy with his punitive tariffs, used as a last-
ditch effort because he can't actually employ effective
international leverage and strategy.
This Administration has no real interest in protecting our
national security, from Chinese threats or otherwise. It is up
to us, Congress, to take action to protect against strategic
threats from China--and this bill does the opposite.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation.
Jamie Raskin,
Ranking Member.
[all]