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house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-703

CHINA EXCHANGE RATE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2026

2026-06-18

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 8290] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 8290) to require the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any quota increase at the International Monetary Fund for member countries that employ certain exchange rate practices, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3 Committee Consideration.......................................... 3 Related Hearings................................................. 3 Committee Votes.................................................. 4 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7 New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 7 Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 8 Earmark Statement................................................ 8 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 8 Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 8 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8 Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 9 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 9 Minority Views................................................... 11 The amendments are as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``China Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026''. SEC. 2. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER INCREASE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286-286aaa) is amended-- (1) by redesignating the 2nd section 73 (as added by section 1901 of division P of Public Law 116-94) as section 74; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 75. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER INCREASE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. ``(a) In General.--Not less than 7 days before consideration of any proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that sets forth a determination by the Secretary as to whether the People's Republic of China meets the following criteria: ``(1) The People's Republic of China, in the preceding 12 months, does not appear to have been in violation of its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, based on publicly available data. ``(2) The People's Republic of China-- ``(A) maintains transparent exchange rate policies and practices; and ``(B) publishes credible balance of payments data. ``(3) To the extent that the People's Republic of China, in the preceding 12 months, has recorded a current account surplus, the People's Republic of China has not persistently managed the rate of exchange between its currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade. ``(b) Effect of Determination.--On determining that the People's Republic of China has failed to meet any of the criteria set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall instruct the Governor of the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China in the Fund. ``(c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (b) with respect to the People's Republic of China on reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the waiver is important to the national interest of the United States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor. ``(d) Proposal Consideration.--For purposes of this section, consideration of a proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China does not include consent to an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that has been authorized by law. ``(e) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect 7 years after the date of the enactment of this section.''. Amend the title so as to read: A bill providing for circumstances requiring the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in voting the People's Republic of China at the International Monetary Fund, and for other purposes.

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 8290, the China Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026, was introduced on April 15, 2026, by Republican Representative Pete Sessions (TX-17). As reported, the bill requires that, before a vote at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to increase voting power for the PRC, the Secretary of the Treasury must determine whether the country meets certain criteria (adheres to general obligations of Fund members, has not persistently managed its exchange rates for unfair trade purposes, maintains transparent exchange rate policies and practices, and publishes credible balance of payments data). If China fails any of these criteria, the bill requires the Secretary to direct the U.S. Governor at the IMF to oppose the increase in China's voting power. The bill includes a national interest waiver and a seven-year sunset.

Background and Need for Legislation

Voting at the IMF is weighted based on a member country's core financial contributions to the Fund. These contributions, called quota, are reviewed at least every five years, and quota adjustments require at least 85 percent of voting power to be approved.\1\ The top shareholders at the IMF are, in descending order, the United States, Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, India, Russia, and Brazil.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\International Monetary Fund, IMF Quotas, https://www.imf.org/en/ about/factsheets/sheets/2022/imf-quotas (last visited April 8, 2026). \2\International Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, Last Updated: April 8, 2026, https:/ /www.imf.org/en/about/executive-board/members-quotas (last visited April 8, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC has engaged in non-transparent exchange rate management practices, as well as other trade-related policies that are inconsistent with the IMF's Articles of Agreement.\3\ Since the United States' voting share stands at 16.5 percent, giving it a potential veto for quota approvals, this legislation would prevent China from increasing its voting power relative to other countries at the IMF until it undertakes significant reforms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, Department of the Treasury, January 2026. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/January-2026-FX- Report.pdf. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee Consideration

119TH CONGRESS On April 15, 2026, Representative Sessions introduced H.R. 8290, the Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. A discussion draft version of the bill was included as part of the February 10, 2026, Committee hearing titled ``Priced Out of the American Dream: Understanding the Policies Behind Rising Costs of Housing and Borrowing.'' On April 21, 2026, the Committee on Financial Services met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 8290. The Committee ordered H.R. 8290, as amended, to be reported with a favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives. Related Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to develop H.R. 8290: On May 7, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing titled ``The Annual Testimony of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the International Financial System.'' The Committee received testimony from the Honorable Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury. Topics pertaining to the purpose and need for legislation for H.R. 8290 were discussed at this hearing.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. On April 21, 2026, the Committee ordered H.R. 8290, as amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 32 yeas and 20 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-264). The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 8290: Representative Sessions (R-TX) offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which specified the PRC for the purposes of the bill's determination requirements. This amendment was adopted by a voice vote. Ranking Member Maxine Waters (D-CA) offered an amendment (No. 7), designated Amdt 001. This amendment replaces the text with a reporting requirement on the top ten borrowers from the IMF which also received loans from a country that does not maintain transparent exchange rates or does not publish credible balance of payments data and also received stabilization support from the United States under 31 U.S.C 5302. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 28 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-263). [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 8290 is to hold the PRC accountable to multilateral norms and standards that underlie the balanced growth of trade. Committee Cost Estimate Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 8290. Clause 3(d)(2)(B) of that Rule provides that this requirement does not apply when, as with the present report, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of the CBO. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] H.R. 8290 would require the Secretary of the Treasury to report to the Congress on whether the People's Republic of China (PRC) is complying with the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) Articles of Agreement and is otherwise maintaining transparent and fair policies and practices concerning exchange rates. Such a report would be required whenever the IMF is scheduled to consider a proposal to increase the voting power of the PRC. The bill would direct the Secretary, in his role as U.S. Governor of the IMF, to oppose such a proposal if the PRC has failed to comply with those criteria. The bill's requirements would expire after seven years. On the basis of information about the costs of similar reports and diplomatic efforts to influence the actions of other nations and international organizations, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8290 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2026-2031 period. Any spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. The CBO staff contact for this estimate is David Rafferty. The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis. Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Congressional Budget Office. Unfunded Mandates Statement Pursuant to Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344 (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4), the Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the CBO pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Earmark Statement In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to the Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title Section 1 provides the short title is the ``China Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026''. Section 2. Opposition to IMF voting power increase for the PRC Section 2 requires the Secretary of the Treasury, not less than 7 days before consideration of any proposal to increase the voting power of the PRC in the IMF, to submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate to determine whether China meets certain criteria. This section further requires the Secretary to instruct the U.S. Governor of the Fund to oppose any increase in voting power for China if the country fails to meet any of the criteria. The bill provides for a national interest waiver and a seven-year sunset. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENTS ACT * * * * * * * SEC. [73.] 74. CAPITAL STOCK INCREASES. (a) Increases Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is authorized-- (1)(A) to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital stock of the Bank on a selective basis by 245,773 shares; and (B) to subscribe on behalf of the United States to 42,298 additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank, as part of the selective increase in the capital stock of the Bank, except that any subscription to such additional shares shall be effective only to the extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts; and (2)(A) to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital stock of the Bank on a general basis by 230,500 shares; and (B) to subscribe on behalf of the United States to 38,662 additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank, as part of the general increase in the capital stock of the Bank, except that any subscription to such additional shares shall be effective only to the extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts. (b) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--(1) In order to pay for the increase in the United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (a)(2)(B), there are authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitation, $4,663,990,370 for payment by the Secretary of the Treasury. (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1), $932,798,074 shall be for paid in shares of the Bank, and $3,731,192,296 shall be for callable shares of the Bank. (3) In order to pay for the increase in the United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (a)(1)(B), there are authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitation $5,102,619,230 for payment by the Secretary of the Treasury. (4) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (3), $306,157,153.80 shall be for paid in shares of the Bank, and $4,796,462,076.20 shall be for callable shares of the Bank. * * * * * * * SEC. 75. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER INCREASE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (a) In General.--Not less than 7 days before consideration of any proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that sets forth a determination by the Secretary as to whether the People's Republic of China meets the following criteria: (1) The People's Republic of China, in the preceding 12 months, does not appear to have been in violation of its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, based on publicly available data. (2) The People's Republic of China-- (A) maintains transparent exchange rate policies and practices; and (B) publishes credible balance of payments data. (3) To the extent that the People's Republic of China, in the preceding 12 months, has recorded a current account surplus, the People's Republic of China has not persistently managed the rate of exchange between its currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade. (b) Effect of Determination.--On determining that the People's Republic of China has failed to meet any of the criteria set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall instruct the Governor of the Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China in the Fund. (c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (b) with respect to the People's Republic of China on reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the waiver is important to the national interest of the United States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor. (d) Proposal Consideration.--For purposes of this section, consideration of a proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China does not include consent to an amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that has been authorized by law. (e) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect 7 years after the date of the enactment of this section.

Minority Views

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promotes international macroeconomic stability by providing financial assistance programs to countries in crisis, surveillance of the international economy, and technical assistance to help countries implement sound economic policies.\13\ The IMF has increased its membership from its initial 44 nations to 191 countries, although its mandate--promoting macroeconomic and financial stability--has remained unchanged since its inception. Today, the IMF focuses on three core areas: (1) emergency lending to countries in economic crisis; (2) surveillance of the global economy; and (3) technical assistance to help governments strengthen their capacity to design and implement effective financial policies.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\IMF, About the IMF (Accessed Apr. 26, 2025). \14\Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The IMF funds its activities primarily through ``quotas,'' which represent the monetary contribution by each country. A member country's quota generally reflects its size and position in the world economy, so larger, wealthier countries generally contribute the most and less developed countries have smaller quotas. The amount that a country contributes is also the amount that it can borrow from the IMF. Thus, the IMF likens itself to a ``credit union where members put in money to earn interest on their deposits and can also tap this pool of resources by taking out a loan.''\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\IMF, Explainer: How the IMF Finances Itself and Why it Matters for the Global Economy (Jun. 25, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A country's quota is also reflective of its vote in the IMF. Unlike other international organizations, where each country has one vote, voting power and decision-making at the IMF reflects a member country's relative economic position.\16\ The vote of each member is determined by the sum of its basic votes (which are equally distributed among all members) and quota-based votes.\17\ As the IMF increases the quotas, raising more finances for Fund activities (as has been approved on 16 occasions\18\), voting shares can (but do not always) change; in the most recent increase, for example, voting power stayed constant while the quota total increased to nearly $1 trillion, reflecting a 50% increase in what countries had previously paid in.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\International Monetary Fund, How Does the IMF Make Decisions? (Accessed Apr. 19, 2026). \17\Ibid. \18\IMF, IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota Increase Under 16th General Review Quotas (Dec. 18, 2023). \19\International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power (Apr. 19, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is significant in a nation's IMF engagement because major policy decisions require 85% of the total voting share. For the United States, which has the highest quota and therefore the highest voting share--16.49%, it means that the U.S. has the power to unilaterally veto all such policy decisions. Day-to-day decisions (non-policy decisions), however, at the IMF require only 50% of the voting share.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\Rebecca Nelson, The International Monetary Fund, Congressional Research Service (Dec. 8, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Separately, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to consider whether other countries manipulate their currency ``for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.''\21\ In 2019, the Treasury Secretary triggered this law for the first time in over 20 years, determining that China is a currency manipulator because it allowed its currency to fall to an 11-year low.\22\ The designation, which lasted five months, was mostly symbolic, seen as a lever in a trade disagreement between the U.S. and China.\23\ Treasury is also required to report on currency manipulation every six months: In the latest report, Treasury did not designate China as a currency manipulator, although it stated that China ``stands out among major trading partners in its lack of transparency around its exchange rate policies and practices.''\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\Treasury, Treasury Designates China as a Currency Manipulator (Aug. 5, 2019). \22\Ibid. \23\NPR, S. Horsley, Treasury Declares China A 'Currency Manipulator,' Escalating Trade War (Aug. 5, 2019). \24\Treasury, Treasury Releases Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States (Jan. 29, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R. 8290 directs Treasury to vote against IMF quota increases in the vote representation of China at the IMF, which effectively blocks all future quota increases, something Republicans on the Committee have long pursued. The bill removes the ability to negotiate future IMF quota increases, and is especially problematic in times of crisis, as happened during the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, the IMF raised its borrowing limits and offered Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to help members deal with the impacts of the crisis.\25\ HFSC Democrats supported a quota increase (up to $3 trillion)\26\ as part of the ``Heroes Act''\27\ to help support the IMF's programs, and especially struggling developing countries. Unfortunately, the first Trump Administration refused to vote in support of the increase at the IMF. However, early in the Biden Administration, HFSC Democrats pressed the Treasury to vote in support of an increase, which Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen later agreed to do.\28\ The quota increase provided hundreds of millions of dollars in reserves that developing countries used to lower their borrowing costs during the crisis.\29\ Some countries went further and used their allocations to fund specific projects, like a cold storage facility for COVID vaccines in Gambia and subsidies to vulnerable households in North Macedonia.\30\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\IMF, Temporary Modifications To Access Limits Under The Large Natural Disaster Window Of The Rapid Credit Facility And Of The Rapid Financing Instrument (Jun. 21, 2021). \26\116th Congress, Rep. Garcia (D-IL), H.R.6581--Robust International Response to Pandemic Act \27\H. Rept. 116-718--REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY of the COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES of the UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES for the ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS (Jan. 2, 2021). \28\PBS Newshour, M. Crutsinger, IMF policy panel endorses $650 billion increase in resources (Apr. 8, 2021). \29\IMF, Historic $650 Billion Liquidity Boost Continues to Benefit the Global Economy (Aug. 29, 2023) \30\Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Committee Republicans, then and since, have generally rejected IMF quota increases. In the pandemic-era situation, for example, Rep. Hill labeled the push to increase IMF funding in crisis as a, ``blank check to genocidal regimes and state sponsors of terrorism.''\31\ Nothing could be further from the truth. Sanctioned countries are unable to use their reserves (e.g., Iran, which has not used any of its reserves), due, in part, to stringent U.S. and allied sanctions. China has not drawn on its reserves either and has no need to use them.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\Rep. French Hill, Rep. Hill Introduces Bill to Stop Democrats' Blank Check to Genocidal Regimes and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Mar. 4, 2021). \32\Center for Economic and Policy Research, Righting the Record: Claims that SDRs ``Help US Enemies'' Are Baseless--CEPR (Apr.14, 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus, this bill works to accomplish what the majority has tried to do for years: cap the overall level of funds available for IMF activities. The bill would negatively affect the organization's ability to fulfill its mission to support economic policies that promote financial stability and monetary cooperation which are essential to increase productivity, job creation, and economic well-being. To be clear, in the past two Congresses, Democrats and Republicans have supported efforts that target China's currency interventions: H.R. 692, the ``China Exchange Rate Transparency Act'' (Meuser), would direct the Treasury to advocate for enhanced transparency in China's exchange rate arrangements at the IMF. Additionally, that legislation called for stricter IMF oversight of China's compliance with its IMF commitments. This bill, however, would not have any effect on China, which has generally rebuffed accusations and evidence about the manipulation of its exchange rates, but instead harm the IMF itself.\33\ For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 8290. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member. Nydia M. Velazquez, Brad Sherman, Stephen F. Lynch, Al Green, Emanuel Cleaver, II, Bill Foster, Joyce Beatty, Rashida Tlaib, Sylvia R. Garcia, Cleo Fields, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/703