Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 8290]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 8290) to require the use of the voice and vote
of the United States to oppose any quota increase at the
International Monetary Fund for member countries that employ
certain exchange rate practices, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments
and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Committee Consideration.......................................... 3
Related Hearings................................................. 3
Committee Votes.................................................. 4
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 7
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 7
Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 8
Earmark Statement................................................ 8
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 8
Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 8
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 8
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 9
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 9
Minority Views................................................... 11
The amendments are as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``China Exchange Rate Accountability Act
of 2026''.
SEC. 2. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER INCREASE
FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286-286aaa) is amended--
(1) by redesignating the 2nd section 73 (as added by section
1901 of division P of Public Law 116-94) as section 74; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 75. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER
INCREASE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
``(a) In General.--Not less than 7 days before consideration of any
proposal to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of
China, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that sets forth a
determination by the Secretary as to whether the People's Republic of
China meets the following criteria:
``(1) The People's Republic of China, in the preceding 12
months, does not appear to have been in violation of its
obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of
the Fund, based on publicly available data.
``(2) The People's Republic of China--
``(A) maintains transparent exchange rate policies
and practices; and
``(B) publishes credible balance of payments data.
``(3) To the extent that the People's Republic of China, in
the preceding 12 months, has recorded a current account
surplus, the People's Republic of China has not persistently
managed the rate of exchange between its currency and the
United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective
balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive
advantage in international trade.
``(b) Effect of Determination.--On determining that the People's
Republic of China has failed to meet any of the criteria set forth in
subsection (a), the Secretary shall instruct the Governor of the Fund
to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the proposal
to increase the voting power of the People's Republic of China in the
Fund.
``(c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (b) with respect to
the People's Republic of China on reporting to the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate that the waiver is important to the
national interest of the United States, with an explanation of the
reasons therefor.
``(d) Proposal Consideration.--For purposes of this section,
consideration of a proposal to increase the voting power of the
People's Republic of China does not include consent to an amendment to
the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that has been authorized by law.
``(e) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect 7
years after the date of the enactment of this section.''.
Amend the title so as to read:
A bill providing for circumstances requiring the use of the
voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in
voting the People's Republic of China at the International
Monetary Fund, and for other purposes.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 8290, the China Exchange Rate Accountability Act of
2026, was introduced on April 15, 2026, by Republican
Representative Pete Sessions (TX-17). As reported, the bill
requires that, before a vote at the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to increase voting power for the PRC, the Secretary of
the Treasury must determine whether the country meets certain
criteria (adheres to general obligations of Fund members, has
not persistently managed its exchange rates for unfair trade
purposes, maintains transparent exchange rate policies and
practices, and publishes credible balance of payments data). If
China fails any of these criteria, the bill requires the
Secretary to direct the U.S. Governor at the IMF to oppose the
increase in China's voting power. The bill includes a national
interest waiver and a seven-year sunset.
Background and Need for Legislation
Voting at the IMF is weighted based on a member country's
core financial contributions to the Fund. These contributions,
called quota, are reviewed at least every five years, and quota
adjustments require at least 85 percent of voting power to be
approved.\1\ The top shareholders at the IMF are, in descending
order, the United States, Japan, the People's Republic of China
(PRC), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, India,
Russia, and Brazil.\2\
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\1\International Monetary Fund, IMF Quotas, https://www.imf.org/en/
about/factsheets/sheets/2022/imf-quotas (last visited April 8, 2026).
\2\International Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting
Power, and IMF Board of Governors, Last Updated: April 8, 2026, https:/
/www.imf.org/en/about/executive-board/members-quotas (last visited
April 8, 2026).
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The PRC has engaged in non-transparent exchange rate
management practices, as well as other trade-related policies
that are inconsistent with the IMF's Articles of Agreement.\3\
Since the United States' voting share stands at 16.5 percent,
giving it a potential veto for quota approvals, this
legislation would prevent China from increasing its voting
power relative to other countries at the IMF until it
undertakes significant reforms.
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\3\Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading
Partners of the United States, Department of the Treasury, January
2026. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/January-2026-FX-
Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee Consideration
119TH CONGRESS
On April 15, 2026, Representative Sessions introduced H.R.
8290, the Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026. The bill
was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services.
A discussion draft version of the bill was included as part
of the February 10, 2026, Committee hearing titled ``Priced Out
of the American Dream: Understanding the Policies Behind Rising
Costs of Housing and Borrowing.''
On April 21, 2026, the Committee on Financial Services met
in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 8290. The
Committee ordered H.R. 8290, as amended, to be reported with a
favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives.
Related Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following hearing was used to
develop H.R. 8290:
On May 7, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services held a
hearing titled ``The Annual Testimony of the Secretary of the
Treasury on the State of the International Financial System.''
The Committee received testimony from the Honorable Scott
Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury. Topics pertaining to the
purpose and need for legislation for H.R. 8290 were discussed
at this hearing.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto.
On April 21, 2026, the Committee ordered H.R. 8290, as
amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded
vote of 32 yeas and 20 nays, a quorum being present. (Record
Vote No. FC-264).
The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R.
8290:
Representative Sessions (R-TX) offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, which
specified the PRC for the purposes of the bill's
determination requirements. This amendment was adopted
by a voice vote.
Ranking Member Maxine Waters (D-CA) offered
an amendment (No. 7), designated Amdt 001. This
amendment replaces the text with a reporting
requirement on the top ten borrowers from the IMF which
also received loans from a country that does not
maintain transparent exchange rates or does not publish
credible balance of payments data and also received
stabilization support from the United States under 31
U.S.C 5302. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of
24 yeas and 28 nays, a quorum being present. (Record
Vote No. FC-263).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 8290 is to hold the
PRC accountable to multilateral norms and standards that
underlie the balanced growth of trade.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 8290. Clause
3(d)(2)(B) of that Rule provides that this requirement does not
apply when, as with the present report, the Committee adopts as
its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director
of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee adopts as its
own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of
the CBO.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 8290 would require the Secretary of the Treasury to
report to the Congress on whether the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is complying with the International Monetary Fund's
(IMF's) Articles of Agreement and is otherwise maintaining
transparent and fair policies and practices concerning exchange
rates. Such a report would be required whenever the IMF is
scheduled to consider a proposal to increase the voting power
of the PRC. The bill would direct the Secretary, in his role as
U.S. Governor of the IMF, to oppose such a proposal if the PRC
has failed to comply with those criteria. The bill's
requirements would expire after seven years.
On the basis of information about the costs of similar
reports and diplomatic efforts to influence the actions of
other nations and international organizations, CBO estimates
that implementing H.R. 8290 would cost less than $500,000 over
the 2026-2031 period. Any spending would be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is David Rafferty.
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
Unfunded Mandates Statement
Pursuant to Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344 (as amended
by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4), the Committee adopts as its own the
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the CBO pursuant to
section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974.
Earmark Statement
In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides the short title is the ``China Exchange
Rate Accountability Act of 2026''.
Section 2. Opposition to IMF voting power increase for the PRC
Section 2 requires the Secretary of the Treasury, not less
than 7 days before consideration of any proposal to increase
the voting power of the PRC in the IMF, to submit a report to
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate to determine whether China meets certain criteria. This
section further requires the Secretary to instruct the U.S.
Governor of the Fund to oppose any increase in voting power for
China if the country fails to meet any of the criteria. The
bill provides for a national interest waiver and a seven-year
sunset.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENTS ACT
* * * * * * *
SEC. [73.] 74. CAPITAL STOCK INCREASES.
(a) Increases Authorized.--The United States Governor of the
Bank is authorized--
(1)(A) to vote in favor of a resolution to increase
the capital stock of the Bank on a selective basis by
245,773 shares; and
(B) to subscribe on behalf of the United States to
42,298 additional shares of the capital stock of the
Bank, as part of the selective increase in the capital
stock of the Bank, except that any subscription to such
additional shares shall be effective only to the extent
or in such amounts as are provided in advance in
appropriations Acts; and
(2)(A) to vote in favor of a resolution to increase
the capital stock of the Bank on a general basis by
230,500 shares; and
(B) to subscribe on behalf of the United States to
38,662 additional shares of the capital stock of the
Bank, as part of the general increase in the capital
stock of the Bank, except that any subscription to such
additional shares shall be effective only to the extent
or in such amounts as are provided in advance in
appropriations Acts.
(b) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--(1) In
order to pay for the increase in the United States subscription
to the Bank under subsection (a)(2)(B), there are authorized to
be appropriated, without fiscal year limitation, $4,663,990,370
for payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under
paragraph (1), $932,798,074 shall be for paid in shares of the
Bank, and $3,731,192,296 shall be for callable shares of the
Bank.
(3) In order to pay for the increase in the United States
subscription to the Bank under subsection (a)(1)(B), there are
authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitation
$5,102,619,230 for payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under
paragraph (3), $306,157,153.80 shall be for paid in shares of
the Bank, and $4,796,462,076.20 shall be for callable shares of
the Bank.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 75. OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTING POWER
INCREASE FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not less than 7 days before consideration of
any proposal to increase the voting power of the People's
Republic of China, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a
report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that sets forth a determination by the Secretary as to
whether the People's Republic of China meets the following
criteria:
(1) The People's Republic of China, in the preceding
12 months, does not appear to have been in violation of
its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund, based on publicly available
data.
(2) The People's Republic of China--
(A) maintains transparent exchange rate
policies and practices; and
(B) publishes credible balance of payments
data.
(3) To the extent that the People's Republic of
China, in the preceding 12 months, has recorded a
current account surplus, the People's Republic of China
has not persistently managed the rate of exchange
between its currency and the United States dollar for
purposes of preventing effective balance of payments
adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in
international trade.
(b) Effect of Determination.--On determining that the
People's Republic of China has failed to meet any of the
criteria set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary shall
instruct the Governor of the Fund to use the voice and vote of
the United States to oppose the proposal to increase the voting
power of the People's Republic of China in the Fund.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (b) with
respect to the People's Republic of China on reporting to the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the
waiver is important to the national interest of the United
States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor.
(d) Proposal Consideration.--For purposes of this section,
consideration of a proposal to increase the voting power of the
People's Republic of China does not include consent to an
amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that has
been authorized by law.
(e) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect
7 years after the date of the enactment of this section.
Minority Views
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) promotes
international macroeconomic stability by providing financial
assistance programs to countries in crisis, surveillance of the
international economy, and technical assistance to help
countries implement sound economic policies.\13\ The IMF has
increased its membership from its initial 44 nations to 191
countries, although its mandate--promoting macroeconomic and
financial stability--has remained unchanged since its
inception. Today, the IMF focuses on three core areas: (1)
emergency lending to countries in economic crisis; (2)
surveillance of the global economy; and (3) technical
assistance to help governments strengthen their capacity to
design and implement effective financial policies.\14\
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\13\IMF, About the IMF (Accessed Apr. 26, 2025).
\14\Ibid.
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The IMF funds its activities primarily through ``quotas,''
which represent the monetary contribution by each country. A
member country's quota generally reflects its size and position
in the world economy, so larger, wealthier countries generally
contribute the most and less developed countries have smaller
quotas. The amount that a country contributes is also the
amount that it can borrow from the IMF. Thus, the IMF likens
itself to a ``credit union where members put in money to earn
interest on their deposits and can also tap this pool of
resources by taking out a loan.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\IMF, Explainer: How the IMF Finances Itself and Why it Matters
for the Global Economy (Jun. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A country's quota is also reflective of its vote in the
IMF. Unlike other international organizations, where each
country has one vote, voting power and decision-making at the
IMF reflects a member country's relative economic position.\16\
The vote of each member is determined by the sum of its basic
votes (which are equally distributed among all members) and
quota-based votes.\17\ As the IMF increases the quotas, raising
more finances for Fund activities (as has been approved on 16
occasions\18\), voting shares can (but do not always) change;
in the most recent increase, for example, voting power stayed
constant while the quota total increased to nearly $1 trillion,
reflecting a 50% increase in what countries had previously paid
in.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\International Monetary Fund, How Does the IMF Make Decisions?
(Accessed Apr. 19, 2026).
\17\Ibid.
\18\IMF, IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota Increase Under 16th
General Review Quotas (Dec. 18, 2023).
\19\International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Voting
Power (Apr. 19, 2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is significant in a nation's IMF engagement because
major policy decisions require 85% of the total voting share.
For the United States, which has the highest quota and
therefore the highest voting share--16.49%, it means that the
U.S. has the power to unilaterally veto all such policy
decisions. Day-to-day decisions (non-policy decisions),
however, at the IMF require only 50% of the voting share.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Rebecca Nelson, The International Monetary Fund, Congressional
Research Service (Dec. 8, 2025).
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Separately, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 requires the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to consider
whether other countries manipulate their currency ``for
purposes of preventing effective balance of payments
adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in
international trade.''\21\ In 2019, the Treasury Secretary
triggered this law for the first time in over 20 years,
determining that China is a currency manipulator because it
allowed its currency to fall to an 11-year low.\22\ The
designation, which lasted five months, was mostly symbolic,
seen as a lever in a trade disagreement between the U.S. and
China.\23\ Treasury is also required to report on currency
manipulation every six months: In the latest report, Treasury
did not designate China as a currency manipulator, although it
stated that China ``stands out among major trading partners in
its lack of transparency around its exchange rate policies and
practices.''\24\
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\21\Treasury, Treasury Designates China as a Currency Manipulator
(Aug. 5, 2019).
\22\Ibid.
\23\NPR, S. Horsley, Treasury Declares China A 'Currency
Manipulator,' Escalating Trade War (Aug. 5, 2019).
\24\Treasury, Treasury Releases Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign
Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States (Jan.
29, 2026).
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H.R. 8290 directs Treasury to vote against IMF quota
increases in the vote representation of China at the IMF, which
effectively blocks all future quota increases, something
Republicans on the Committee have long pursued. The bill
removes the ability to negotiate future IMF quota increases,
and is especially problematic in times of crisis, as happened
during the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, the IMF raised its
borrowing limits and offered Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and
Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to help members deal with the
impacts of the crisis.\25\ HFSC Democrats supported a quota
increase (up to $3 trillion)\26\ as part of the ``Heroes
Act''\27\ to help support the IMF's programs, and especially
struggling developing countries. Unfortunately, the first Trump
Administration refused to vote in support of the increase at
the IMF. However, early in the Biden Administration, HFSC
Democrats pressed the Treasury to vote in support of an
increase, which Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen later agreed to
do.\28\ The quota increase provided hundreds of millions of
dollars in reserves that developing countries used to lower
their borrowing costs during the crisis.\29\ Some countries
went further and used their allocations to fund specific
projects, like a cold storage facility for COVID vaccines in
Gambia and subsidies to vulnerable households in North
Macedonia.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\IMF, Temporary Modifications To Access Limits Under The Large
Natural Disaster Window Of The Rapid Credit Facility And Of The Rapid
Financing Instrument (Jun. 21, 2021).
\26\116th Congress, Rep. Garcia (D-IL), H.R.6581--Robust
International Response to Pandemic Act
\27\H. Rept. 116-718--REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY of the COMMITTEE ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES of the UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES for
the ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS (Jan. 2, 2021).
\28\PBS Newshour, M. Crutsinger, IMF policy panel endorses $650
billion increase in resources (Apr. 8, 2021).
\29\IMF, Historic $650 Billion Liquidity Boost Continues to Benefit
the Global Economy (Aug. 29, 2023)
\30\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee Republicans, then and since, have generally
rejected IMF quota increases. In the pandemic-era situation,
for example, Rep. Hill labeled the push to increase IMF funding
in crisis as a, ``blank check to genocidal regimes and state
sponsors of terrorism.''\31\ Nothing could be further from the
truth. Sanctioned countries are unable to use their reserves
(e.g., Iran, which has not used any of its reserves), due, in
part, to stringent U.S. and allied sanctions. China has not
drawn on its reserves either and has no need to use them.\32\
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\31\Rep. French Hill, Rep. Hill Introduces Bill to Stop Democrats'
Blank Check to Genocidal Regimes and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Mar.
4, 2021).
\32\Center for Economic and Policy Research, Righting the Record:
Claims that SDRs ``Help US Enemies'' Are Baseless--CEPR (Apr.14, 2022).
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Thus, this bill works to accomplish what the majority has
tried to do for years: cap the overall level of funds available
for IMF activities. The bill would negatively affect the
organization's ability to fulfill its mission to support
economic policies that promote financial stability and monetary
cooperation which are essential to increase productivity, job
creation, and economic well-being.
To be clear, in the past two Congresses, Democrats and
Republicans have supported efforts that target China's currency
interventions: H.R. 692, the ``China Exchange Rate Transparency
Act'' (Meuser), would direct the Treasury to advocate for
enhanced transparency in China's exchange rate arrangements at
the IMF. Additionally, that legislation called for stricter IMF
oversight of China's compliance with its IMF commitments. This
bill, however, would not have any effect on China, which has
generally rebuffed accusations and evidence about the
manipulation of its exchange rates, but instead harm the IMF
itself.\33\
For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 8290.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Brad Sherman,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Al Green,
Emanuel Cleaver, II,
Bill Foster,
Joyce Beatty,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Cleo Fields,
Members of Congress.
[all]