Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 8286]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 8286) to amend the Federal securities laws with
respect to the materiality of disclosure requirements, to
establish the Public Company Advisory Committee, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do
pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 15
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 16
Committee Consideration.......................................... 21
Related Hearings................................................. 22
Committee Votes.................................................. 23
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 30
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 30
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 30
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 30
Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 30
Earmark Statement................................................ 30
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 30
Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 31
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 31
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 31
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 32
Documents included by Unanimous Consent.......................... 142
Minority Views................................................... 154
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting
Americans' Retirement Savings From Politics Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
Sec. 101. Limitation on disclosure requirements.
TITLE II--PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Sec. 201. Public Company Advisory Committee.
TITLE III--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY
Sec. 301. Study on detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability
Due Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Directive.
TITLE IV--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION
Sec. 401. Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory firms
and the proxy process.
TITLE V--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Sec. 501. Registration of proxy advisory firms.
TITLE VI--LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL
INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS
Sec. 601. Liability for certain failures to disclose material
information or making of material misstatements.
TITLE VII--DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION
FUNDS
Sec. 701. Duties of investment advisers, asset managers, and pension
funds.
TITLE VIII--PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS
Sec. 801. Requirements related to proxy voting.
TITLE IX--EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS
Sec. 901. Proxy voting of passively managed funds.
TITLE X--BEST INTEREST BASED ON PECUNIARY FACTORS
Sec. 1001. Protecting retail investors' savings.
TITLE I--MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
SEC. 101. LIMITATION ON DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Securities Act of 1933.--Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(b)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``; Limitation on
Disclosure Requirements'' after ``Formation'';
(2) by striking ``Whenever'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Whenever''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Limitation.--
``(A) In general.--Whenever pursuant to this title
the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding
disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall
expressly provide that an issuer is only required to
disclose information in response to such disclosure
obligations to the extent the issuer has determined
that such information is material with respect to a
voting or investment decision regarding the securities
of such issuer.
``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not
apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure
requirement with respect to an issuer.
``(C) Rule of construction.--For the purposes of this
paragraph, information is considered material with
respect to a voting or investment decision regarding
the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the
failure to disclose that information as having
significantly altered the total mix of information made
available to the investor.''.
(b) Securities Exchange Act of 1934.--Section 3(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(f)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``; Limitation on
Disclosure Requirements'' after ``Formation'';
(2) by striking ``Whenever'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Whenever''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Limitation.--
``(A) In general.--Whenever pursuant to this title
the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding
disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall
expressly provide that an issuer is only required to
disclose information in response to such disclosure
obligations to the extent the issuer has determined
that such information is material with respect to a
voting or investment decision regarding the securities
of such issuer.
``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not
apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure
requirement with respect to an issuer.
``(C) Rule of construction.--For the purposes of this
paragraph, information is considered material with
respect to a voting or investment decision regarding
the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the
failure to disclose that information as having
significantly altered the total mix of information made
available to the investor.''.
TITLE II--PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SEC. 201. PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by inserting after
section 40 (15 U.S.C. 78qq) the following:
``SEC. 40A. PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
``(a) Establishment and Purpose.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established within the
Commission the Public Company Advisory Committee (referred to
in this section as the `Committee').
``(2) Purpose.--The Committee shall--
``(A) provide the Commission with advice on the
rules, regulations, and policies of the Commission with
regard to the Commission's mission of protecting
investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitating capital formation, as they
relate to--
``(i) existing and emerging regulatory
priorities of the Commission;
``(ii) issues relating to the public
reporting and corporate governance of public
companies;
``(iii) issues relating to the proxy process
for shareholder meetings held by public
companies;
``(iv) issues relating to trading in the
securities of public companies; and
``(v) issues relating to capital formation;
``(B) not provide any advice with respect to any
policies, practices, actions, or decisions concerning
the Commission's enforcement program; and
``(C) submit to the Commission such findings and
recommendations as the Committee determines are
appropriate, including recommendations for proposed
regulatory and legislative changes.
``(b) Membership.--
``(1) In general.--The membership of the Committee shall be
not fewer than 10, and not more than 20, members appointed by
the Commission from among individuals who--
``(A) are officers, directors, or senior officials of
public companies registered with the Commission under
the Securities Act of 1933 and this Act, except for
those public companies that own asset management, fixed
income, investment advisory, broker-dealer, or proxy
services businesses;
``(B) are executives or other individuals with senior
managerial responsibility in business, professional,
trade, and industry associations that represent the
interests of such public companies; and
``(C) are professional advisers and service providers
to such public companies (including attorneys,
accountants, investment bankers, and financial
advisers).
``(2) Qualifications.--At least 50 percent of the Committee
membership shall be drawn from individuals who would qualify
for membership under paragraph (1)(A).
``(3) Term.--Each member of the Committee appointed under
paragraph (1) shall serve for a term of 4 years. Vacancies
among the members, whether caused by the resignation, death,
removal, expiration of a term, or otherwise, shall be filled
consistent with the Commission's procedures then in effect.
``(4) Staggered terms.--The members of the Committee shall
serve staggered terms, with half of the initial members of the
Committee each serving for 2 years and half serving for 4
years.
``(5) Members not on other advisory committees.--Public
companies and other organizations that are currently
represented on any other Commission Advisory Committee are not
eligible to have representatives also serve on the Public
Company Advisory Committee.
``(6) Members not commission employees.--Members appointed
under paragraph (1) shall not be considered to be employees or
agents of the Commission solely because of membership on the
Committee.
``(c) Chair; Vice Chair; Secretary; Assistant Secretary.--
``(1) In general.--The members of the Committee shall elect,
from among the members of the Committee--
``(A) a Chair;
``(B) a Vice Chair;
``(C) a Secretary; and
``(D) an Assistant Secretary.
``(2) Term.--Each member elected under paragraph (1) shall
serve for a term of 2 years in the capacity the member was
elected under paragraph (1).
``(3) Subcommittees.--The Chair may create subcommittees that
hold public or non-public meetings and provide recommendations
to the full Committee.
``(d) Meetings.--
``(1) Frequency of meetings.--The Committee shall meet--
``(A) not less frequently than twice annually, at the
call of the chair of the Committee; and
``(B) from time to time, at the call of the
Commission.
``(2) Notice.--The Chair of the Committee shall give the
members of the Committee written notice of each meeting, not
later than 2 weeks before the date of the meeting.
``(e) Staff.--The Commission shall make available to the Committee
such staff as the Chair of the Committee determines are necessary to
carry out this section.
``(f) Review by Commission.--The Commission shall--
``(1) review the findings and recommendations of the
Committee; and
``(2) each time the Committee submits a finding or
recommendation to the Commission, promptly issue a public
statement--
``(A) assessing the finding or recommendation of the
Committee; and
``(B) disclosing the action, if any, the Commission
intends to take with respect to the finding or
recommendation.
``(g) Committee Findings.--Nothing in this section shall require the
Commission to agree to or act upon any finding or recommendation of the
Committee.
``(h) Nonapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.--
Chapter 10 of part I of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to
the Committee and the activities of the Committee.''.
TITLE III--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY
SEC. 301. STUDY ON DETRIMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
DUE DILIGENCE DIRECTIVE AND CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING DIRECTIVE.
(a) Study.--The Securities and Exchange Commission shall conduct a
study to examine and evaluate--
(1) the detrimental impact and potential detrimental impact
of each of the Directives on--
(A) United States companies, consumers, and
investors; and
(B) the economy of the United States;
(2) the extent to which each of the Directives aligns with
international conventions and declarations on human rights and
environmental obligations; and
(3) the legal basis for the extraterritorial reach of each of
the Directives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall submit to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States
Trade Representative a report that includes--
(1) the results of the study conducted under this section;
and
(2) recommendations for policymakers and relevant
stakeholders on potential mitigating measures, alternative
approaches, or modifications to each of the Directives that
would address any concerns identified in the study.
(c) Access to Information.--The Securities and Exchange Commission
may request from private entities such relevant data and information as
the Securities and Exchange Commission determines necessary to carry
out the study required under this section and such private entities
shall provide such requested data and information to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
(d) Directives Defined.--In this section, the term ``Directives''
means--
(1) Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due
diligence;
(2) Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 14 December 2022 on corporate sustainability
reporting; and
(3) any directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council that amends, supplements, replaces, or otherwise
modifies a directive described in paragraph (1) or (2),
including Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 February 2026.
TITLE IV--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION
SEC. 401. STUDY OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
AND THE PROXY PROCESS.
Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78d) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(k) Study of Certain Issues With Respect to Proxy Advisory Firms
and the Proxy Process.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this subsection, and every 5 years thereafter,
the Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study on proxy
advisory firms and the proxy process.
``(2) Scope of study.--The studies required under paragraph
(1) shall cover--
``(A) the previous 10 years, with respect to the
initial study; and
``(B) the previous 5 years, with respect to each
other study.
``(3) Contents.--Each study required under paragraph (1)
shall address the following issues:
``(A) The financial and other incentives and
obligations of all groups involved in the proxy
process.
``(B) A consideration of whether financial and other
incentives have created a process that no longer serves
the economic interests of retail investors.
``(C) An analysis of whether regulations and
financial incentives have created and protected the
outsized influence of proxy advisors or a duopoly in
proxy advice, and if so, what are the benefits and
costs of that outsized influence or duopoly.
``(D) The costs incurred by issuers in responding to
politically-, environmentally-, or socially-motivated
shareholder proposals.
``(E) An analysis of the impact that shareholder
proposals have on discouraging private companies from
going public.
``(F) A thorough assessment of the economic analysis,
if any, conducted by proxy advisory firms and
institutional shareholders when recommending or voting
in favor of shareholder proposals.
``(G) A review of the extent to which institutional
investors, who owe fiduciary duties, rely on proxy
advisory firm recommendations.
``(H) An assessment of whether, in light of their
significant influence on corporate actions and vote
outcomes, proxy advisors are subject to sufficient and
effective regulation to ensure that their policies and
recommendations are accurate, free of conflicts, and
benefit the best economic interest of shareholders at
large.
``(4) Report.--At the completion of each study required under
paragraph (1), the Commission shall issue a report to the
Committee on Banking, Housing
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 8286, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings
from Politics Act, was introduced on April 15, 2026, by
Republican Representative Bryan Steil (WI-01). H.R. 8286
reinforces the materiality standard in financial disclosures
and increases the accountability of proxy advisory firms by
mandating that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
disclosures focus strictly on information relevant to
investment or voting decisions, requiring proxy advisors to
register and face liability for misstatements, and prohibiting
automated robo-voting to ensure institutional investors fulfill
their fiduciary duties.
Background and Need for Legislation
TITLE I: MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
Section 101 amends the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to
mandate that information required to be disclosed to the SEC by
issuers be material to voting or investment decisions regarding
those issuers, and for other purposes.
The SEC's pursuit of environmental, social and governance
(ESG) disclosure initiatives under its prior Chair, Gary
Gensler, threatened the Commission's longstanding materiality
standard. This standard has been the touchstone of our public
company disclosure regime since the concept was first included
in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Under the
principles-based materiality standard, a company must disclose
information to prospective investors and shareholders so that
they can make informed investment and proxy voting
decisions.\1\ With respect to ESG information, public companies
are already required to make disclosures under current law when
such information is material. Furthermore, the SEC has
previously stated that mandatory disclosures regarding
environmental and social issues should only be imposed if
required by law or if such information is material to
investors.\2\ This title will ensure that when the SEC is
engaged in rulemaking regarding issuers' disclosure
obligations, the SEC will expressly provide that an issuer is
only required to disclose information in response to such
disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined
that such information is material to a voting or investment
decision.
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\1\17 CFR Sec. 230.405.
\2\See SEC, Concept Release, Business and Financial Disclosure
Required by Regulation S-K, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/
concept/2016/33 10064.pdf?n=27847.
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A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, the Mandatory
Materiality Requirement Act of 2025, by Representative
Huizenga, in the September 10, 2025, Committee hearing titled,
``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to
Protect Shareholder Value.''
TITLE II: PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Section 201 amends the Exchange Act to establish within the
SEC the Public Company Advisory Committee (PCAC). The SEC has
four advisory committees, including the SEC Small Business
Advisory Committee, which was established by the SEC Small
Business Advocate Act of 2016. The committee is designed to
provide a formal mechanism for the SEC to receive advice and
recommendations on SEC rules, regulations, and policy matters
relating to small businesses. While this committee's
recommendations relating to small businesses include smaller
public companies, the SEC does not currently have an advisory
committee that provides recommendations related to all public
companies. This title will establish the PCAC to provide advice
and recommendations on SEC rules, regulations, and policies
regarding its mission. The committee will consist of appointed
members from public companies, business associations, and
professional advisors.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration in the September 10, 2025,
Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse:
Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value'' and was
subsequently introduced by Representative Lucas as H.R. 6967,
the Public Company Advisory Committee Act of 2026.
TITLE III: PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY
Section 301 requires the SEC to conduct a study on the
detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and Corporate Sustainability
Reporting Directive (CSRD) on United States companies. The CSDD
is a European Union directive that requires certain EU and non-
EU companies to identify and prevent, stop, or mitigate the
actual and potential impacts of their activities on the
environment and human rights. The CSDD would require companies
to conduct due diligence not just on their own operations, but
also on the activities of their subsidiaries and other entities
in their value chains with which they have direct and indirect
established business relationships. They would need to develop
and implement ``prevention action plans,'' obtain contractual
assurances from their direct business partners that they will
comply with the plans, and subsequently verify compliance.
Similarly, the EU's CSRD requires U.S. companies with EU
subsidiaries to provide comprehensive and granular disclosures
covering a spectrum of ESG topics. The information reported may
not be limited to a company's own operations but would extend
to direct and indirect business relationships across the value
chain. These disclosures are expected to be some of the most
challenging areas of reporting, given the scope and the
reliance on information from parties not controlled by the
company. This title mandates a study of the potential harmful
effects and implications of the CSDD and CSRD on U.S.
companies, consumers, investors, and the economy.
TITLE IV: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION
Section 401 requires the SEC to conduct comprehensive
studies on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process. The
study will be done within 180 days of the bill's enactment and
repeated every five years, covering the previous 10 years
initially and the previous 5 years subsequently.
The studies will address key issues, such as financial
incentives and obligations of parties involved, the impact on
long-term retail investors and the influence of proxy advisory
firms. The studies will provide data-driven insights to enhance
shareholder value and promote transparent corporate governance
practices. Results will be reported to relevant congressional
committees.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, the Corporate
Governance Examination Act, by Representative Wagner, in the
April 29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the
Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence
Markets'', and the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled,
``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to
Protect Shareholder Value.''
TITLE V: REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Section 501 requires proxy advisory firms to register with
the SEC, establish requirements for managing conflicts of
interest, and mandate disclosure of certain information.
The outsized influence of proxy advisory firms, such as
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, on
the proxy voting system has raised concerns about bias and
accountability. These firms command over 90% of the market and
hold significant sway over institutional investors' voting
decisions, impacting corporate governance's fairness and
transparency. Factors contributing to their increasing
influence include their role in providing voting
recommendations to busy institutional investors and the rise of
passive investing, which magnifies their impact on voting
decisions. Investment advisors should not wholly delegate their
fiduciary responsibilities to proxy advisors, and the SEC
should actively monitor investment advisors to ensure they
fulfill their duties. This title would require proxy advisors
to provide economic analysis when considering social and
political issues, ensuring their recommendations align with
investment advisors' fiduciary duties. In addition, the title
enhances transparency and accountability by requiring proxy
advisors to share draft reports with issuers, disclose
methodologies and sources of information, and publish annual
reports summarizing their activities.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the registration
of proxy advisory firms, by Representative Steil, in the April
29, 2025 Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy
Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets,'' and
the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power
and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder
Value.''
TITLE VI: LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL
INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS
Section 601 amends Section 14 of the Exchange Act to state
that failure to disclose material information or making
material misstatements regarding proxy voting advice will be
considered false or misleading with respect to a material fact.
Proxy advisors play a significant role in influencing
voting decisions of institutional investors, who rely on their
recommendations. If these firms provide inaccurate or
incomplete information, investors may make uninformed decisions
that can have detrimental effects on their investments.
Liability for proxy advisor firms is essential to protect
investors, maintain market integrity, promote transparency,
ensure fairness, and provide legal recourse in cases of
inaccurate or misleading proxy voting advice. Holding these
firms accountable for material misstatements or non-disclosures
encourages accuracy, objectivity, and independence in their
recommendations, safeguarding shareholder interests and
enhancing trust in the corporate governance process.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for liability for
certain failures to disclose material information or making of
material misstatements, by Representative Steil, in the April
29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy
Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets.''
TITLE VII: DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION
FUNDS
Section 701 requires proxy advisor clients to provide
annual reports to beneficiaries and customers, revealing how
they voted on shareholder proposals and whether the votes
aligned with proxy advisory recommendations. Larger entities
must also conduct economic analyses for votes against board
recommendations, which will be made public.
To enhance transparency and accountability, it is
imperative that proxy advisory firm clients are required to
publish detailed annual reports. These reports should encompass
essential information, such as the percentage of votes cast in
accordance with proxy advisory recommendations, the percentage
of votes in favor of ESG-related shareholder proposals, and an
explanation of how firms reconcile their votes with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best economic interest of
shareholders. By providing such comprehensive reporting,
investors gain valuable insights into the decision-making
processes of proxy advisory firm clients, enabling them to
evaluate whether the firm is meeting its fiduciary obligations.
Similarly, large asset managers must demonstrate their
commitment to accountability and transparency by publicly
disclosing the economic analysis behind their shareholder
voting decisions. By sharing the rationale behind their voting
decisions, including the financial factors considered when
opposing boards of independent directors, asset managers should
justify these inconsistencies and empower shareholders to
comprehend how economic interests are prioritized. This level
of transparency fosters trust and enables investors to evaluate
whether voting decisions align with their own financial
objectives effectively.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain disclosures
by institutional investment managers in connection with proxy
advisory firms, by Representative Loudermilk, in the April 29,
2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy
Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets'', and
was subsequently introduced as H.R. 3402, which was noticed at
the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power
and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder
Value.''
TITLE VIII: PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS
Section 801 prohibits robo-voting, the practice of
automated proxy voting based on proxy advisory firm
recommendations. It also clarifies that individuals are not
obligated to vote on proxy materials.
Investment advisers bear the ultimate responsibility for
overseeing the proxy advisory firms they retain. While SEC
Staff Legal Bulletin 20 provides a starting point for this
oversight, it is necessary to examine whether institutional
investors are genuinely fulfilling their fiduciary duties when
relying on these firms' recommendations.\3\ The concern arises
when institutional investors blindly follow proxy advisory
recommendations without conducting thorough evaluations. This
hasty approach not only undermines the quality of decision-
making but also compromises companies' ability to present their
case effectively. While proxy advisory firms play a role in the
proxy voting analysis, they should not have undue influence
over voting decisions. Institutional investors must exercise
their fiduciary duties by critically evaluating recommendations
and ensuring they align with the best interests of their
clients. The prohibition of robo-voting will prevent hasty and
uninformed decisions, encouraging investors to engage in
thorough analysis before casting their votes. Moreover, by
removing the robo-voting mechanism, institutional investors
will be compelled to critically evaluate proxy advisory firm
recommendations before casting their votes. This shift will
allow for greater due diligence, thereby protecting the
economic interests of retail investors.
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\3\See Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment
Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy
Advisory Firms; Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (Jun. 30, 2014).
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A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration in the April 29, 2025,
Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory
Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets'', and the
September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and
Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder
Value.'' The bill was subsequently introduced by Representative
Nunn as H.R. 8383, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act.
TITLE IX: EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS
Section 901 requires managers of passive funds to either
follow the specific instructions of individual investors, vote
in alignment with the company's board, mirror vote, or abstain
from the vote entirely.
The dominant position of the three largest index fund
providers grants them unparalleled influence, with a combined
voting share of approximately one-quarter at shareholder
meetings of most S&P 500 companies. However, it's crucial to
emphasize that passive index funds are designed to be exactly
that--passive. Their primary goal is not to pick winners and
losers but rather to replicate the performance of the
underlying index more broadly. Consequently, using these funds
as a platform to advance specific social and political
ideologies, such as ESG and DEI, may not align with the true
essence of passive investing and can potentially divert focus
from maximizing investor returns. This divergence in the
intended nature of passive index funds raises legitimate
concerns about the prioritization of political ideologies over
the financial interests of retail investors. As such, it is
essential to take measures to safeguard the integrity of these
funds and ensure that they remain true to their passive nature.
For instance, when an investment adviser has the authority to
vote on a proxy in connection with a passively managed fund,
they should give deference to the recommendations of those
boards on shareholder proposals related to social or political
policy issues.
A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title
was noticed for consideration in the September 10, 2025,
Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse:
Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value'' and was
subsequently introduced by Representative Huizenga as H.R.
8265, the Empowering Shareholders Act of 2026.
TITLE X: BEST INTEREST BASED ON PECUNIARY FACTORS
Section 1001 amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to
specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary factors, with the option for investors to
consent to the use of non-pecuniary factors in decision-making.
Investment advisers have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best financial interest of their clients. Title X aims to
ensure that investment advisers are not prioritizing non-
financial goals over financial returns without the explicit
consent of their clients. Moreover, this title ensures such
clients are provided with information regarding the expected
pecuniary effects and all fees, costs, and other expenses
incurred to consider non-pecuniary factors. The goal is to
safeguard investors from potentially harmful consequences and
to guarantee that ESG investing does not compromise the
fiduciary duty of investment advisers.
Committee Consideration
119TH CONGRESS
On April 15, 2026, Representative Steil introduced the
Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act,
with Representative Ann Wagner (R-MO) as original cosponsor.
Representative Dan Meuser (R-PA) was added subsequently as a
cosponsor. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on
Financial Services.
On April 21, 2026, the Committee on Financial Services met
in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 8286. The
Committee ordered H.R. 8286, as amended, to be reported with a
favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives.
118TH CONGRESS
On July 20, 2023, Representative Steil introduced H.R.
4767, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from
Politics Act. This bill is an earlier iteration of H.R. 8286.
The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial
Services. On July 27, 2023, the Committee ordered H.R. 4767 to
be reported by a vote of 29 to 21 and filed H. Rept. 118-324 to
accompany the bill. H.R. 4767 was subsequently included in H.R.
4790, the Prioritizing Economic Growth Over Woke Policies Act,
introduced by Representative Huizenga. The Committee ordered
H.R. 4790 to be reported by a vote of 29 to 21 and filed H.
Rept. 118-336. On September 19, 2024, H.R. 4790 passed the
House by a vote of 215 to 203. On September 23, 2024, the bill
was received by the Senate and referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. There was no further
action on either H.R. 4767 or H.R. 4790 in the 118th Congress.
Related Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following hearings were used to
develop H.R. 8286:
On April 29, 2025, the Subcommittee on Capital Markets held
a hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS
& Glass Lewis Influence Markets.'' The Subcommittee heard
testimony from: Mr. Charles Crain, Managing Vice President,
Policy, National Association of Manufacturers; Ms. Elizabeth
Ising, Partner, Gibson Dunn; Mr. Paul Rose, Dean, School of
Law, Case Western Reserve; Mr. Paul Washington, President and
CEO, Society for Corporate Governance; and Ms. Nell Minow, Vice
Chair, ValueEdge Advisors.
On September 10, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services
held a hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse:
Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' The
Committee heard testimony from: Mr. James Copland, Senior
Fellow & Director of Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute; Mrs.
Ferrell Keel, Partner, Jones Day; Mr. Ron Mueller, Partner,
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP; and Mr. Brad Lander, Comptroller,
City of New York.
H.R. 8286 is composed of provisions from ten bills. These
bills are:
A discussion draft, H.R.___, the Mandatory
Materiality Requirement Act of 2025, by Representative
Huizenga.
H.R. 6967, the Public Company Advisory
Committee Act of 2026, introduced by Representative
Lucas. On January 22, 2026, H.R. 6967, as amended, was
ordered to be reported by the Committee by a vote of 39
to 15. On March 19, 2026, the Committee filed H. Rept.
119-557 to accompany the bill.
A discussion draft, H.R.___, To require the
SEC to conduct a study on the detrimental impact of the
Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and
Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive on United
States companies, by Representative Meuser.
A discussion draft, H.R.___, the Corporate
Governance Examination Act, by Representative Wagner.
A discussion draft, H.R.___, To amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the
registration of proxy advisory firms, by Representative
Steil.
A discussion draft, H.R.___, To amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for
liability for certain failures to disclose material
information or making of material misstatements, by
Representative Steil.
H.R. 3402, To amend the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to require certain disclosures by
institutional investment managers in connection with
proxy advisory firms, and for other purposes,
introduced by Representative Loudermilk.
H.R. 8383, the Protecting Americans' Savings
Act, by Representative Nunn.
H.R. 8265, the Empowering Shareholders Act
of 2026, introduced by Representative Huizenga
H.R. 2358, the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act
of 2025, introduced by Representative Barr.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto.
On April 21, 2026, the Committee ordered H.R. 8286, as
amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded
vote of 27 yeas and 24 nays, a quorum being present. (Record
Vote No. FC-262).
The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R.
8286:
Representative Steil offered an amendment in
the nature of a substitute, which made minor edits and
technical changes. This amendment was adopted by a
voice vote.
Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) offered
an amendment (No. 2), designated Meeks 125. This
amendment includes a Sense of Congress stating that the
principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion have a
real and material impact on a business' overall
performance and financial outlook. This amendment
failed by a recorded vote of 22 yeas and 26 nays, a
quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-257).
Representative Juan Vargas (D-CA) offered an
amendment (No. 3), designated Vargas 032. This
amendment ensures that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has the authority to issue disclosure-
based rulemakings pertaining to climate, corporate
diversity, or human capital management. This amendment
failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 26 nays, a
quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-258).
Ranking Member Maxine Waters (D-CA) offered
an amendment (No. 4), designated Waters 165. This
amendment terminates the SEC's Staff Legal Bulletin
(SLB) 14M, which replaced the ``significant social
policy'' test under SLB 14L. This amendment failed by a
recorded vote of 24 yeas and 27 nays, a quorum being
present. (Record Vote No. FC-259).
Representative Sean Casten (D-IL) offered an
amendment (No. 5), designated Casten 105. This
amendment mandates the SEC conduct an economic impact
study on the consequences of the United States failing
to adopt comprehensive climate change disclosure
requirements for publicly traded companies. This
amendment failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 27
nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC 260).
Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) offered
an amendment (No. 6), designated Tlaib 127. This
amendment creates a safe harbor for proxy votes on
issues of executive compensation from the entirety of
the underlying bill's provisions. This amendment failed
by a recorded vote of 23 yeas and 27 nays, a quorum
being present. (Record Vote No. FC-261).
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 8286 is to modernize
corporate governance by refocusing federal oversight on
financial materiality and fiduciary integrity.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 8286. The
Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). However,
pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own
the cost estimate by the Director of the CBO once it has been
prepared.
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as
its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director
of the CBO. However, a cost estimate was not made available to
the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The
Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be
printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the
Committee.
Unfunded Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the CBO an estimate of the Federal mandates
pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be
printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the
Committee.
Earmark Statement
In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides the short title is the ```Protecting
Americans'' Retirement Savings From Politics Act.''
Section 101. Limitation on disclosure requirements
Section 101 ensures that when the SEC is engaged in
rulemaking regarding issuers' disclosure obligations, the SEC
will expressly provide that an issuer is only required to
disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations
to the extent the issuer has determined that such information
is material to a voting or investment decision.
Section 201. Public Company Advisory Committee
Section 201 establishes the Public Company Advisory
Committee to provide advice and recommendations on SEC rules,
regulations, and policies regarding its mission. The committee
will consist of appointed members from public companies,
business associations, and professional advisors.
Section 301. Study on detrimental impact of the Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Corporate
Sustainability Reporting Directive
Section 301 mandates a study of the potential harmful
effects and implications of the Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Directive on U.S. companies, consumers, investors, and the
economy.
Section 401. Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory
firms and the proxy process
Section 401 requires the SEC to conduct comprehensive
studies on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process,
addressing key issues such as financial incentives and
obligations of parties involved, the impact on long-term retail
investors and the influence of proxy advisory firms.
Section 501. Registration of proxy advisory firms
Section 501 requires proxy advisors to provide economic
analysis when considering social and political issues, ensuring
their recommendations align with investment advisors' fiduciary
duties.
Section 601. Liability for certain failures to disclose material
information or making of material misstatements
Section 601 amends Section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act to state that failure to disclose material information or
making material misstatements regarding proxy voting advice
will be considered false or misleading with respect to a
material fact.
Section 701. Duties of investment advisers, asset managers, and pension
funds
Section 701 requires proxy advisor clients to provide
annual reports to beneficiaries and customers, revealing how
they voted on shareholder proposals and whether the votes
aligned with proxy advisory recommendations. Larger entities
must also conduct economic analyses for votes against board
recommendations, which will be made public.
Section 801. Requirements related to proxy voting
Section 801 prohibits robo-voting, the practice of
automated proxy voting based on proxy advisory firm
recommendations. It also clarifies that individuals are not
obligated to vote on proxy materials.
Section 901. Proxy voting of passively managed funds
Section 901 requires managers of passive funds to either
follow the specific instructions of individual investors, vote
in alignment with the company's board, mirror vote, or abstain
from the vote entirely.
Section 1001. Protecting retail investors' savings
Section 1001 amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to
specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary factors, with the option for investors to
consent to the use of non-pecuniary factors in decision-making.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
TITLE I--
* * * * * * *
definitions
Sec. 2. (a) Definitions.--When used in this title, unless the
context otherwise requires--
(1) The term ``security'' means any note, stock,
treasury stock, security future, security-based swap,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a ``security'', or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
(2) The term ``person'' means an individual, a
corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-
stock company, a trust, any unincorporated
organization, or a government or political subdivision
thereof. As used in this paragraph the term ``trust''
shall include only a trust where the interest or
interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are
evidenced by a security.
(3) The term ``sale'' or ``sell'' shall include every
contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value. The term ``offer to
sell'', ``offer for sale'', or ``offer'' shall include
every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security, for value. The terms defined in this
paragraph and the term ``offer to buy'' as used in
subsection (c) of section 5 shall not include
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an
issuer (or any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under direct
or indirect common control with an issuer) and any
underwriter or among underwriters who are or are to be
in privity of contract with an issuer (or any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an
issuer, or under direct or indirect common control with
an issuer). Any security given or delivered with, or as
a bonus on account of, any purchase of securities or
any other thing, shall be conclusively presumed to
constitute a part of the subject of such purchase and
to have been offered and sold for value. The issue or
transfer of a right or privilege, when originally
issued or transferred with a security, giving the
holder of such security the right to convert such
security into another security of the same issuer or of
another person, or giving a right to subscribe to
another security of the same issuer or of another
person, which right cannot be exercised until some
future date, shall not be deemed to be an offer or sale
of such other security; but the issue or transfer of
such other security upon the exercise of such right of
conversion or subscription shall be deemed a sale of
such other security. Any offer or sale of a security
futures product by or on behalf of the issuer of the
securities underlying the security futures product, an
affiliate of the issuer, or an underwriter, shall
constitute a contract for sale of, sale of, offer for
sale, or offer to sell the underlying securities. Any
offer or sale of a security-based swap by or on behalf
of the issuer of the securities upon which such
security-based swap is based or is referenced, an
affiliate of the issuer, or an underwriter, shall
constitute a contract for sale of, sale of, offer for
sale, or offer to sell such securities. The publication
or distribution by a broker or dealer of a research
report about an emerging growth company that is the
subject of a proposed public offering of the common
equity securities of such emerging growth company
pursuant to a registration statement that the issuer
proposes to file, or has filed, or that is effective
shall be deemed for purposes of paragraph (10) of this
subsection and section 5(c) not to constitute an offer
for sale or offer to sell a security, even if the
broker or dealer is participating or will participate
in the registered offering of the securities of the
issuer. As used in this paragraph, the term ``research
report'' means a written, electronic, or oral
communication that includes information, opinions, or
recommendations with respect to securities of an issuer
or an analysis of a security or an issuer, whether or
not it provides information reasonably sufficient upon
which to base an investment decision.
(4) The term ``issuer'' means every person who issues
or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust
certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with
respect to certificates of interest or shares in an
unincorporated investment trust not having a board of
directors (or persons performing similar functions) or
of the fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the
term ``issuer'' means the person or persons performing
the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or
manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or
other agreement or instrument under which such
securities are issued; except that in the case of an
unincorporated association which provides by its
articles for limited liability of any or all of its
members, or in the case of a trust, committee, or other
legal entity, the trustees or members thereof shall not
be individually liable as issuers of any security
issued by the association, trust, committee, or other
legal entity; except that with respect to equipment-
trust certificates or like securities, the term
``issuer'' means the person by whom the equipment or
property is or is to be used; and except that with
respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, the term ``issuer'' means the
owner of any such right or of any interest in such
right (whether whole or fractional) who creates
fractional interests therein for the purpose of public
offering.
(5) The term ``Commission'' means the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
(6) The term ``Territory'' means Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the insular possessions of the
United States.
(7) The term ``interstate commerce'' means trade or
commerce in securities or any transportation or
communication relating thereto among the several States
or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of
the United States and any State or other Territory, or
between any foreign country and any State, Territory,
or the District of Columbia, or within the District of
Columbia.
(8) The term ``registration statement'' means the
statement provided for in section 6, and includes any
amendment thereto and any report, document, or
memorandum filed as part of such statement or
incorporated therein by reference.
(9) The term ``write'' or ``written'' shall include
printed, lithographed, or any means of graphic
communication.
(10) The term ``prospectus'' means any prospectus,
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which
offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of
any security; except that (a) a communication sent or
given after the effective date of the registration
statement (other than a prospectus permitted under
subsection (b) of
Minority Views
H.R. 8286 includes several provisions that make it more
difficult for shareholders to offer shareholder proposals,
thereby limiting their ability to have a say in how the
corporations they own are managed and giving more power to
corporate management. Specifically, this bill limits investor
voices by silencing proxy advisory firms. These firms provide
independent analysis of the impact of shareholder proposals to
shareholders and their representatives to help them make
informed voting decisions at a company's annual meeting. In
this way, proxy advisory firms ensure investors have an outside
perspective that may differ from what management is
recommending on specific proposals. Among its provisions
limiting the role of proxy advisors are provisions: mandating
that investment advisers, asset managers, and pension funds
that use proxy advisors file an annual report with the SEC to
disclose the use of such services; requiring the SEC to issue
final rules prohibiting investors from allowing their
fiduciaries to automatically vote on their behalf based on
common-sense proxy advisor analysis and recommendations; and
preventing investment advisers that vote on behalf of
shareholders of passively managed funds to rely on and use
analysis from proxy advisors. This bill would also impede the
use of the systems proxy advisors have created to help fund
managers vote on behalf of their fund's shareholders.
Additionally, H.R. 8286 would allow issuers, rather than
investors, to determine which types of information get
disclosed in a company's SEC filings. The legal concept for
determining what information is important enough for a company
to be required to disclose it is known as ``materiality''.
Under current case law and SEC precedent, information is
``material'' if there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable
investor would find it important in determining whether or not
to invest in the issuer's securities. This particular provision
of H.R. 8286 amends the law to require issuers to only disclose
information ``to the extent the issuer has determined that such
information is material'' (emphasis added). In doing so, the
entity whose conduct is being disclosed now gets to decide what
investors need to know about that conduct. This is the opposite
of how a disclosure regime works, and flies in the face of how
courts and the SEC have conducted the materiality analysis--
which has long treated investors, rather than issuers, as the
primary determiners of the types of information that a company
should disclose to the public.
Furthermore, the bill would restrict the SEC's ability to
require public companies disclose critical information about
climate risk and political spending--depriving markets and
investors of information needed to make sound and fully
informed investment decisions. H.R. 8286 would also create a
Public Company Advisory Committee that would give companies,
their attorneys, and lobbyists an additional insider avenue to
influence SEC policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\NCRC, Over 200+ Organizations Urge House Financial Services
Committee to Oppose Any Amendment to Delay or Weaken Small Business and
Farm Fair Lending Law (Apr. 21, 2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the titles in this bill were included in a package
offered in the 118th Congress, which Financial Services
Committee Democrats unanimously opposed at markup. That package
went on to receive near-unanimous Democratic opposition when it
was considered on the full House floor.
Various titles within this package were also opposed in the
118th and/or 119th Congress by the following groups: AFL CIO;
Americans for Financial Reform; Better Markets; US SIF;
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility; Ceres; OUT
Leadership; US Impact Investing Alliance; Shareholder Rights
Group; Green America; PRI; Family Farm Defenders; Food and
Water Watch; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; and
Union for Concerned Scientists. In a letter submitted by AFL
CIO in opposition to the bill, the authors stated:
``this bill will undermine corporate accountability to
investors--including the retirement savings of working
people--by undermining our nation's public company
disclosure rules and the ability of retirement plans to
vote proxies in the best interests of their
participants and beneficiaries . . . [it will also]
restrict the ability of the [SEC] to adopt effective
disclosure rules by allowing public companies to opt
out of disclosure if the company determines that such
information is not material to its investors [thereby
making] corporate disclosure[s] less comparable and
less consistent, and will allow corporate bad actors to
conceal information from their investors. In effect,
allowing public companies to determine whether they
must comply with disclosure rules is letting the fox
guard the henhouse. H.R. 8286 also will interfere with
the rights of investors to vote proxies at company
shareholder meetings by putting the thumb on the scale
in favor of corporate CEOs and boards of directors. In
sum, H.R. 8286 would insulate corporate CEOs from
accountability to their own investors, reduce corporate
transparency, and restrict investors' access to
information and their freedom to make their own
investment and proxy voting decisions, all to the
detriment of working people's hard earned retirement
savings.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\AFL-CIO, Letter Opposing Legislation That Would Undermine
Corporate Accountability to Investors (Apr. 21, 2026).
In another letter in opposition, Americans for Financial Reform
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:
``this bill would reduce transparency, weaken investor
protections, and make it even more difficult for
shareholders to hold corporations accountable [and]
would undermine the ability of the [SEC] to equip
investors with information needed to make sound
investment decisions. It would do so by allowing
companies themselves to determine what information they
need to provide to investors--even in the context of
SEC disclosure rules--by creating an advisory entity
within the SEC to represent the interests of corporate
boards and executives, and by mandating studies and
reports biased in favor of management interests. These
changes would undermine the SEC's statutory investor
protection mission and distort it into a corporate
management-protection mission. The bill would also
further tilt the playing field in favor of corporate
boards and executives by creating strong and
inappropriate incentives for asset managers to either
cast votes in favor of management or not vote at all.
Similarly, other provisions would strongly
disincentivize proxy advisors from making voting
recommendations against management. This would
undermine the ability of these service providers to act
in the best interests of the investors who hire
them.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\AFR, Re: Opposition to H.R. 8286, the Protecting Americans'
Retirement Savings from Politics Act (Apr. 20, 2026).
A coalition of over 30 investors, labor unions, and public
interest organizations also wrote to oppose a similar bill last
Congress.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\AFR, Coalition Letter Re: Opposition to anti-ESG bills that
threaten workers' retirement security and our financial system, and
weaken tools of corporate accountability (Nov. 7, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 8286.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Brad Sherman,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Al Green,
Emanuel Cleaver, II,
Bill Foster,
Joyce Beatty,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Cleo Fields,
Members of Congress.
[all]