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H. Rept. 119-712

PROTECTING AMERICANS' RETIREMENT SAVINGS FROM POLITICS ACT

2026-06-24

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Minority Views

[To accompany H.R. 8286] The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 8286) to amend the Federal securities laws with respect to the materiality of disclosure requirements, to establish the Public Company Advisory Committee, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page Purpose and Summary.............................................. 15 Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 16 Committee Consideration.......................................... 21 Related Hearings................................................. 22 Committee Votes.................................................. 23 Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 30 Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 30 Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 30 New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 30 Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 30 Earmark Statement................................................ 30 Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 30 Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 31 Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 31 Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 31 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 32 Documents included by Unanimous Consent.......................... 142 Minority Views................................................... 154 The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings From Politics Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT Sec. 101. Limitation on disclosure requirements. TITLE II--PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Sec. 201. Public Company Advisory Committee. TITLE III--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY Sec. 301. Study on detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. TITLE IV--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION Sec. 401. Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory firms and the proxy process. TITLE V--REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS Sec. 501. Registration of proxy advisory firms. TITLE VI--LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS Sec. 601. Liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements. TITLE VII--DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION FUNDS Sec. 701. Duties of investment advisers, asset managers, and pension funds. TITLE VIII--PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS Sec. 801. Requirements related to proxy voting. TITLE IX--EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS Sec. 901. Proxy voting of passively managed funds. TITLE X--BEST INTEREST BASED ON PECUNIARY FACTORS Sec. 1001. Protecting retail investors' savings. TITLE I--MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT SEC. 101. LIMITATION ON DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS. (a) Securities Act of 1933.--Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(b)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``; Limitation on Disclosure Requirements'' after ``Formation''; (2) by striking ``Whenever'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Whenever''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Limitation.-- ``(A) In general.--Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of such issuer. ``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure requirement with respect to an issuer. ``(C) Rule of construction.--For the purposes of this paragraph, information is considered material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the failure to disclose that information as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available to the investor.''. (b) Securities Exchange Act of 1934.--Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(f)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``; Limitation on Disclosure Requirements'' after ``Formation''; (2) by striking ``Whenever'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Whenever''; and (3) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Limitation.-- ``(A) In general.--Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of such issuer. ``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure requirement with respect to an issuer. ``(C) Rule of construction.--For the purposes of this paragraph, information is considered material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the failure to disclose that information as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available to the investor.''. TITLE II--PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE SEC. 201. PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by inserting after section 40 (15 U.S.C. 78qq) the following: ``SEC. 40A. PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE. ``(a) Establishment and Purpose.-- ``(1) Establishment.--There is established within the Commission the Public Company Advisory Committee (referred to in this section as the `Committee'). ``(2) Purpose.--The Committee shall-- ``(A) provide the Commission with advice on the rules, regulations, and policies of the Commission with regard to the Commission's mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation, as they relate to-- ``(i) existing and emerging regulatory priorities of the Commission; ``(ii) issues relating to the public reporting and corporate governance of public companies; ``(iii) issues relating to the proxy process for shareholder meetings held by public companies; ``(iv) issues relating to trading in the securities of public companies; and ``(v) issues relating to capital formation; ``(B) not provide any advice with respect to any policies, practices, actions, or decisions concerning the Commission's enforcement program; and ``(C) submit to the Commission such findings and recommendations as the Committee determines are appropriate, including recommendations for proposed regulatory and legislative changes. ``(b) Membership.-- ``(1) In general.--The membership of the Committee shall be not fewer than 10, and not more than 20, members appointed by the Commission from among individuals who-- ``(A) are officers, directors, or senior officials of public companies registered with the Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 and this Act, except for those public companies that own asset management, fixed income, investment advisory, broker-dealer, or proxy services businesses; ``(B) are executives or other individuals with senior managerial responsibility in business, professional, trade, and industry associations that represent the interests of such public companies; and ``(C) are professional advisers and service providers to such public companies (including attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, and financial advisers). ``(2) Qualifications.--At least 50 percent of the Committee membership shall be drawn from individuals who would qualify for membership under paragraph (1)(A). ``(3) Term.--Each member of the Committee appointed under paragraph (1) shall serve for a term of 4 years. Vacancies among the members, whether caused by the resignation, death, removal, expiration of a term, or otherwise, shall be filled consistent with the Commission's procedures then in effect. ``(4) Staggered terms.--The members of the Committee shall serve staggered terms, with half of the initial members of the Committee each serving for 2 years and half serving for 4 years. ``(5) Members not on other advisory committees.--Public companies and other organizations that are currently represented on any other Commission Advisory Committee are not eligible to have representatives also serve on the Public Company Advisory Committee. ``(6) Members not commission employees.--Members appointed under paragraph (1) shall not be considered to be employees or agents of the Commission solely because of membership on the Committee. ``(c) Chair; Vice Chair; Secretary; Assistant Secretary.-- ``(1) In general.--The members of the Committee shall elect, from among the members of the Committee-- ``(A) a Chair; ``(B) a Vice Chair; ``(C) a Secretary; and ``(D) an Assistant Secretary. ``(2) Term.--Each member elected under paragraph (1) shall serve for a term of 2 years in the capacity the member was elected under paragraph (1). ``(3) Subcommittees.--The Chair may create subcommittees that hold public or non-public meetings and provide recommendations to the full Committee. ``(d) Meetings.-- ``(1) Frequency of meetings.--The Committee shall meet-- ``(A) not less frequently than twice annually, at the call of the chair of the Committee; and ``(B) from time to time, at the call of the Commission. ``(2) Notice.--The Chair of the Committee shall give the members of the Committee written notice of each meeting, not later than 2 weeks before the date of the meeting. ``(e) Staff.--The Commission shall make available to the Committee such staff as the Chair of the Committee determines are necessary to carry out this section. ``(f) Review by Commission.--The Commission shall-- ``(1) review the findings and recommendations of the Committee; and ``(2) each time the Committee submits a finding or recommendation to the Commission, promptly issue a public statement-- ``(A) assessing the finding or recommendation of the Committee; and ``(B) disclosing the action, if any, the Commission intends to take with respect to the finding or recommendation. ``(g) Committee Findings.--Nothing in this section shall require the Commission to agree to or act upon any finding or recommendation of the Committee. ``(h) Nonapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.-- Chapter 10 of part I of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to the Committee and the activities of the Committee.''. TITLE III--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY SEC. 301. STUDY ON DETRIMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY DUE DILIGENCE DIRECTIVE AND CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING DIRECTIVE. (a) Study.--The Securities and Exchange Commission shall conduct a study to examine and evaluate-- (1) the detrimental impact and potential detrimental impact of each of the Directives on-- (A) United States companies, consumers, and investors; and (B) the economy of the United States; (2) the extent to which each of the Directives aligns with international conventions and declarations on human rights and environmental obligations; and (3) the legal basis for the extraterritorial reach of each of the Directives. (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative a report that includes-- (1) the results of the study conducted under this section; and (2) recommendations for policymakers and relevant stakeholders on potential mitigating measures, alternative approaches, or modifications to each of the Directives that would address any concerns identified in the study. (c) Access to Information.--The Securities and Exchange Commission may request from private entities such relevant data and information as the Securities and Exchange Commission determines necessary to carry out the study required under this section and such private entities shall provide such requested data and information to the Securities and Exchange Commission. (d) Directives Defined.--In this section, the term ``Directives'' means-- (1) Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence; (2) Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on corporate sustainability reporting; and (3) any directive of the European Parliament and of the Council that amends, supplements, replaces, or otherwise modifies a directive described in paragraph (1) or (2), including Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2026. TITLE IV--CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION SEC. 401. STUDY OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS AND THE PROXY PROCESS. Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78d) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(k) Study of Certain Issues With Respect to Proxy Advisory Firms and the Proxy Process.-- ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process. ``(2) Scope of study.--The studies required under paragraph (1) shall cover-- ``(A) the previous 10 years, with respect to the initial study; and ``(B) the previous 5 years, with respect to each other study. ``(3) Contents.--Each study required under paragraph (1) shall address the following issues: ``(A) The financial and other incentives and obligations of all groups involved in the proxy process. ``(B) A consideration of whether financial and other incentives have created a process that no longer serves the economic interests of retail investors. ``(C) An analysis of whether regulations and financial incentives have created and protected the outsized influence of proxy advisors or a duopoly in proxy advice, and if so, what are the benefits and costs of that outsized influence or duopoly. ``(D) The costs incurred by issuers in responding to politically-, environmentally-, or socially-motivated shareholder proposals. ``(E) An analysis of the impact that shareholder proposals have on discouraging private companies from going public. ``(F) A thorough assessment of the economic analysis, if any, conducted by proxy advisory firms and institutional shareholders when recommending or voting in favor of shareholder proposals. ``(G) A review of the extent to which institutional investors, who owe fiduciary duties, rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations. ``(H) An assessment of whether, in light of their significant influence on corporate actions and vote outcomes, proxy advisors are subject to sufficient and effective regulation to ensure that their policies and recommendations are accurate, free of conflicts, and benefit the best economic interest of shareholders at large. ``(4) Report.--At the completion of each study required under paragraph (1), the Commission shall issue a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 8286, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act, was introduced on April 15, 2026, by Republican Representative Bryan Steil (WI-01). H.R. 8286 reinforces the materiality standard in financial disclosures and increases the accountability of proxy advisory firms by mandating that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures focus strictly on information relevant to investment or voting decisions, requiring proxy advisors to register and face liability for misstatements, and prohibiting automated robo-voting to ensure institutional investors fulfill their fiduciary duties.

Background and Need for Legislation

TITLE I: MANDATORY MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT Section 101 amends the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to mandate that information required to be disclosed to the SEC by issuers be material to voting or investment decisions regarding those issuers, and for other purposes. The SEC's pursuit of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure initiatives under its prior Chair, Gary Gensler, threatened the Commission's longstanding materiality standard. This standard has been the touchstone of our public company disclosure regime since the concept was first included in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Under the principles-based materiality standard, a company must disclose information to prospective investors and shareholders so that they can make informed investment and proxy voting decisions.\1\ With respect to ESG information, public companies are already required to make disclosures under current law when such information is material. Furthermore, the SEC has previously stated that mandatory disclosures regarding environmental and social issues should only be imposed if required by law or if such information is material to investors.\2\ This title will ensure that when the SEC is engaged in rulemaking regarding issuers' disclosure obligations, the SEC will expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material to a voting or investment decision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\17 CFR Sec. 230.405. \2\See SEC, Concept Release, Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ concept/2016/33 10064.pdf?n=27847. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, the Mandatory Materiality Requirement Act of 2025, by Representative Huizenga, in the September 10, 2025, Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' TITLE II: PUBLIC COMPANY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Section 201 amends the Exchange Act to establish within the SEC the Public Company Advisory Committee (PCAC). The SEC has four advisory committees, including the SEC Small Business Advisory Committee, which was established by the SEC Small Business Advocate Act of 2016. The committee is designed to provide a formal mechanism for the SEC to receive advice and recommendations on SEC rules, regulations, and policy matters relating to small businesses. While this committee's recommendations relating to small businesses include smaller public companies, the SEC does not currently have an advisory committee that provides recommendations related to all public companies. This title will establish the PCAC to provide advice and recommendations on SEC rules, regulations, and policies regarding its mission. The committee will consist of appointed members from public companies, business associations, and professional advisors. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration in the September 10, 2025, Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value'' and was subsequently introduced by Representative Lucas as H.R. 6967, the Public Company Advisory Committee Act of 2026. TITLE III: PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS SOVEREIGNTY Section 301 requires the SEC to conduct a study on the detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) on United States companies. The CSDD is a European Union directive that requires certain EU and non- EU companies to identify and prevent, stop, or mitigate the actual and potential impacts of their activities on the environment and human rights. The CSDD would require companies to conduct due diligence not just on their own operations, but also on the activities of their subsidiaries and other entities in their value chains with which they have direct and indirect established business relationships. They would need to develop and implement ``prevention action plans,'' obtain contractual assurances from their direct business partners that they will comply with the plans, and subsequently verify compliance. Similarly, the EU's CSRD requires U.S. companies with EU subsidiaries to provide comprehensive and granular disclosures covering a spectrum of ESG topics. The information reported may not be limited to a company's own operations but would extend to direct and indirect business relationships across the value chain. These disclosures are expected to be some of the most challenging areas of reporting, given the scope and the reliance on information from parties not controlled by the company. This title mandates a study of the potential harmful effects and implications of the CSDD and CSRD on U.S. companies, consumers, investors, and the economy. TITLE IV: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EXAMINATION Section 401 requires the SEC to conduct comprehensive studies on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process. The study will be done within 180 days of the bill's enactment and repeated every five years, covering the previous 10 years initially and the previous 5 years subsequently. The studies will address key issues, such as financial incentives and obligations of parties involved, the impact on long-term retail investors and the influence of proxy advisory firms. The studies will provide data-driven insights to enhance shareholder value and promote transparent corporate governance practices. Results will be reported to relevant congressional committees. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, the Corporate Governance Examination Act, by Representative Wagner, in the April 29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets'', and the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' TITLE V: REGISTRATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS Section 501 requires proxy advisory firms to register with the SEC, establish requirements for managing conflicts of interest, and mandate disclosure of certain information. The outsized influence of proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, on the proxy voting system has raised concerns about bias and accountability. These firms command over 90% of the market and hold significant sway over institutional investors' voting decisions, impacting corporate governance's fairness and transparency. Factors contributing to their increasing influence include their role in providing voting recommendations to busy institutional investors and the rise of passive investing, which magnifies their impact on voting decisions. Investment advisors should not wholly delegate their fiduciary responsibilities to proxy advisors, and the SEC should actively monitor investment advisors to ensure they fulfill their duties. This title would require proxy advisors to provide economic analysis when considering social and political issues, ensuring their recommendations align with investment advisors' fiduciary duties. In addition, the title enhances transparency and accountability by requiring proxy advisors to share draft reports with issuers, disclose methodologies and sources of information, and publish annual reports summarizing their activities. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms, by Representative Steil, in the April 29, 2025 Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets,'' and the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' TITLE VI: LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN FAILURES TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION OR MAKING OF MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS Section 601 amends Section 14 of the Exchange Act to state that failure to disclose material information or making material misstatements regarding proxy voting advice will be considered false or misleading with respect to a material fact. Proxy advisors play a significant role in influencing voting decisions of institutional investors, who rely on their recommendations. If these firms provide inaccurate or incomplete information, investors may make uninformed decisions that can have detrimental effects on their investments. Liability for proxy advisor firms is essential to protect investors, maintain market integrity, promote transparency, ensure fairness, and provide legal recourse in cases of inaccurate or misleading proxy voting advice. Holding these firms accountable for material misstatements or non-disclosures encourages accuracy, objectivity, and independence in their recommendations, safeguarding shareholder interests and enhancing trust in the corporate governance process. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements, by Representative Steil, in the April 29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets.'' TITLE VII: DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS, ASSET MANAGERS, AND PENSION FUNDS Section 701 requires proxy advisor clients to provide annual reports to beneficiaries and customers, revealing how they voted on shareholder proposals and whether the votes aligned with proxy advisory recommendations. Larger entities must also conduct economic analyses for votes against board recommendations, which will be made public. To enhance transparency and accountability, it is imperative that proxy advisory firm clients are required to publish detailed annual reports. These reports should encompass essential information, such as the percentage of votes cast in accordance with proxy advisory recommendations, the percentage of votes in favor of ESG-related shareholder proposals, and an explanation of how firms reconcile their votes with their fiduciary duty to act in the best economic interest of shareholders. By providing such comprehensive reporting, investors gain valuable insights into the decision-making processes of proxy advisory firm clients, enabling them to evaluate whether the firm is meeting its fiduciary obligations. Similarly, large asset managers must demonstrate their commitment to accountability and transparency by publicly disclosing the economic analysis behind their shareholder voting decisions. By sharing the rationale behind their voting decisions, including the financial factors considered when opposing boards of independent directors, asset managers should justify these inconsistencies and empower shareholders to comprehend how economic interests are prioritized. This level of transparency fosters trust and enables investors to evaluate whether voting decisions align with their own financial objectives effectively. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration as H.R.___, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain disclosures by institutional investment managers in connection with proxy advisory firms, by Representative Loudermilk, in the April 29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets'', and was subsequently introduced as H.R. 3402, which was noticed at the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' TITLE VIII: PROTECTING AMERICANS' SAVINGS Section 801 prohibits robo-voting, the practice of automated proxy voting based on proxy advisory firm recommendations. It also clarifies that individuals are not obligated to vote on proxy materials. Investment advisers bear the ultimate responsibility for overseeing the proxy advisory firms they retain. While SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 20 provides a starting point for this oversight, it is necessary to examine whether institutional investors are genuinely fulfilling their fiduciary duties when relying on these firms' recommendations.\3\ The concern arises when institutional investors blindly follow proxy advisory recommendations without conducting thorough evaluations. This hasty approach not only undermines the quality of decision- making but also compromises companies' ability to present their case effectively. While proxy advisory firms play a role in the proxy voting analysis, they should not have undue influence over voting decisions. Institutional investors must exercise their fiduciary duties by critically evaluating recommendations and ensuring they align with the best interests of their clients. The prohibition of robo-voting will prevent hasty and uninformed decisions, encouraging investors to engage in thorough analysis before casting their votes. Moreover, by removing the robo-voting mechanism, institutional investors will be compelled to critically evaluate proxy advisory firm recommendations before casting their votes. This shift will allow for greater due diligence, thereby protecting the economic interests of retail investors. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\See Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms; Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (Jun. 30, 2014). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration in the April 29, 2025, Subcommittee hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets'', and the September 10, 2025 Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' The bill was subsequently introduced by Representative Nunn as H.R. 8383, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act. TITLE IX: EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS Section 901 requires managers of passive funds to either follow the specific instructions of individual investors, vote in alignment with the company's board, mirror vote, or abstain from the vote entirely. The dominant position of the three largest index fund providers grants them unparalleled influence, with a combined voting share of approximately one-quarter at shareholder meetings of most S&P 500 companies. However, it's crucial to emphasize that passive index funds are designed to be exactly that--passive. Their primary goal is not to pick winners and losers but rather to replicate the performance of the underlying index more broadly. Consequently, using these funds as a platform to advance specific social and political ideologies, such as ESG and DEI, may not align with the true essence of passive investing and can potentially divert focus from maximizing investor returns. This divergence in the intended nature of passive index funds raises legitimate concerns about the prioritization of political ideologies over the financial interests of retail investors. As such, it is essential to take measures to safeguard the integrity of these funds and ensure that they remain true to their passive nature. For instance, when an investment adviser has the authority to vote on a proxy in connection with a passively managed fund, they should give deference to the recommendations of those boards on shareholder proposals related to social or political policy issues. A standalone discussion draft of the language of this title was noticed for consideration in the September 10, 2025, Committee hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value'' and was subsequently introduced by Representative Huizenga as H.R. 8265, the Empowering Shareholders Act of 2026. TITLE X: BEST INTEREST BASED ON PECUNIARY FACTORS Section 1001 amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, with the option for investors to consent to the use of non-pecuniary factors in decision-making. Investment advisers have a fiduciary duty to act in the best financial interest of their clients. Title X aims to ensure that investment advisers are not prioritizing non- financial goals over financial returns without the explicit consent of their clients. Moreover, this title ensures such clients are provided with information regarding the expected pecuniary effects and all fees, costs, and other expenses incurred to consider non-pecuniary factors. The goal is to safeguard investors from potentially harmful consequences and to guarantee that ESG investing does not compromise the fiduciary duty of investment advisers.

Committee Consideration

119TH CONGRESS On April 15, 2026, Representative Steil introduced the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act, with Representative Ann Wagner (R-MO) as original cosponsor. Representative Dan Meuser (R-PA) was added subsequently as a cosponsor. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. On April 21, 2026, the Committee on Financial Services met in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 8286. The Committee ordered H.R. 8286, as amended, to be reported with a favorable recommendation to the House of Representatives. 118TH CONGRESS On July 20, 2023, Representative Steil introduced H.R. 4767, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act. This bill is an earlier iteration of H.R. 8286. The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. On July 27, 2023, the Committee ordered H.R. 4767 to be reported by a vote of 29 to 21 and filed H. Rept. 118-324 to accompany the bill. H.R. 4767 was subsequently included in H.R. 4790, the Prioritizing Economic Growth Over Woke Policies Act, introduced by Representative Huizenga. The Committee ordered H.R. 4790 to be reported by a vote of 29 to 21 and filed H. Rept. 118-336. On September 19, 2024, H.R. 4790 passed the House by a vote of 215 to 203. On September 23, 2024, the bill was received by the Senate and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. There was no further action on either H.R. 4767 or H.R. 4790 in the 118th Congress. Related Hearings Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 8286: On April 29, 2025, the Subcommittee on Capital Markets held a hearing titled, ``Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS & Glass Lewis Influence Markets.'' The Subcommittee heard testimony from: Mr. Charles Crain, Managing Vice President, Policy, National Association of Manufacturers; Ms. Elizabeth Ising, Partner, Gibson Dunn; Mr. Paul Rose, Dean, School of Law, Case Western Reserve; Mr. Paul Washington, President and CEO, Society for Corporate Governance; and Ms. Nell Minow, Vice Chair, ValueEdge Advisors. On September 10, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services held a hearing titled, ``Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value.'' The Committee heard testimony from: Mr. James Copland, Senior Fellow & Director of Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute; Mrs. Ferrell Keel, Partner, Jones Day; Mr. Ron Mueller, Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP; and Mr. Brad Lander, Comptroller, City of New York. H.R. 8286 is composed of provisions from ten bills. These bills are: A discussion draft, H.R.___, the Mandatory Materiality Requirement Act of 2025, by Representative Huizenga. H.R. 6967, the Public Company Advisory Committee Act of 2026, introduced by Representative Lucas. On January 22, 2026, H.R. 6967, as amended, was ordered to be reported by the Committee by a vote of 39 to 15. On March 19, 2026, the Committee filed H. Rept. 119-557 to accompany the bill. A discussion draft, H.R.___, To require the SEC to conduct a study on the detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive on United States companies, by Representative Meuser. A discussion draft, H.R.___, the Corporate Governance Examination Act, by Representative Wagner. A discussion draft, H.R.___, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for the registration of proxy advisory firms, by Representative Steil. A discussion draft, H.R.___, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements, by Representative Steil. H.R. 3402, To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain disclosures by institutional investment managers in connection with proxy advisory firms, and for other purposes, introduced by Representative Loudermilk. H.R. 8383, the Protecting Americans' Savings Act, by Representative Nunn. H.R. 8265, the Empowering Shareholders Act of 2026, introduced by Representative Huizenga H.R. 2358, the Ensuring Sound Guidance Act of 2025, introduced by Representative Barr.

Committee Votes

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. On April 21, 2026, the Committee ordered H.R. 8286, as amended, to be reported favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 27 yeas and 24 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-262). The Committee considered the following amendments to H.R. 8286: Representative Steil offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, which made minor edits and technical changes. This amendment was adopted by a voice vote. Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) offered an amendment (No. 2), designated Meeks 125. This amendment includes a Sense of Congress stating that the principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion have a real and material impact on a business' overall performance and financial outlook. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 22 yeas and 26 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-257). Representative Juan Vargas (D-CA) offered an amendment (No. 3), designated Vargas 032. This amendment ensures that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to issue disclosure- based rulemakings pertaining to climate, corporate diversity, or human capital management. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 26 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-258). Ranking Member Maxine Waters (D-CA) offered an amendment (No. 4), designated Waters 165. This amendment terminates the SEC's Staff Legal Bulletin (SLB) 14M, which replaced the ``significant social policy'' test under SLB 14L. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 27 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-259). Representative Sean Casten (D-IL) offered an amendment (No. 5), designated Casten 105. This amendment mandates the SEC conduct an economic impact study on the consequences of the United States failing to adopt comprehensive climate change disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 24 yeas and 27 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC 260). Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) offered an amendment (No. 6), designated Tlaib 127. This amendment creates a safe harbor for proxy votes on issues of executive compensation from the entirety of the underlying bill's provisions. This amendment failed by a recorded vote of 23 yeas and 27 nays, a quorum being present. (Record Vote No. FC-261). Committee Oversight Findings Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. Performance Goals and Objectives Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 8286 is to modernize corporate governance by refocusing federal oversight on financial materiality and fiduciary integrity. Committee Cost Estimate Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 8286. The Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). However, pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate by the Director of the CBO once it has been prepared. New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director of the CBO. However, a cost estimate was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Unfunded Mandates Statement The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the CBO an estimate of the Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee. Earmark Statement In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI. Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. Applicability to the Legislative Branch The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Duplication of Federal Programs Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, including any program that was included in a report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law 111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation Section 1. Short title Section 1 provides the short title is the ```Protecting Americans'' Retirement Savings From Politics Act.'' Section 101. Limitation on disclosure requirements Section 101 ensures that when the SEC is engaged in rulemaking regarding issuers' disclosure obligations, the SEC will expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material to a voting or investment decision. Section 201. Public Company Advisory Committee Section 201 establishes the Public Company Advisory Committee to provide advice and recommendations on SEC rules, regulations, and policies regarding its mission. The committee will consist of appointed members from public companies, business associations, and professional advisors. Section 301. Study on detrimental impact of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive Section 301 mandates a study of the potential harmful effects and implications of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive on U.S. companies, consumers, investors, and the economy. Section 401. Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory firms and the proxy process Section 401 requires the SEC to conduct comprehensive studies on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process, addressing key issues such as financial incentives and obligations of parties involved, the impact on long-term retail investors and the influence of proxy advisory firms. Section 501. Registration of proxy advisory firms Section 501 requires proxy advisors to provide economic analysis when considering social and political issues, ensuring their recommendations align with investment advisors' fiduciary duties. Section 601. Liability for certain failures to disclose material information or making of material misstatements Section 601 amends Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act to state that failure to disclose material information or making material misstatements regarding proxy voting advice will be considered false or misleading with respect to a material fact. Section 701. Duties of investment advisers, asset managers, and pension funds Section 701 requires proxy advisor clients to provide annual reports to beneficiaries and customers, revealing how they voted on shareholder proposals and whether the votes aligned with proxy advisory recommendations. Larger entities must also conduct economic analyses for votes against board recommendations, which will be made public. Section 801. Requirements related to proxy voting Section 801 prohibits robo-voting, the practice of automated proxy voting based on proxy advisory firm recommendations. It also clarifies that individuals are not obligated to vote on proxy materials. Section 901. Proxy voting of passively managed funds Section 901 requires managers of passive funds to either follow the specific instructions of individual investors, vote in alignment with the company's board, mirror vote, or abstain from the vote entirely. Section 1001. Protecting retail investors' savings Section 1001 amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to specify requirements concerning the consideration of pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, with the option for investors to consent to the use of non-pecuniary factors in decision-making. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 TITLE I-- * * * * * * * definitions Sec. 2. (a) Definitions.--When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-- (1) The term ``security'' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ``security'', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. (2) The term ``person'' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint- stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof. As used in this paragraph the term ``trust'' shall include only a trust where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security. (3) The term ``sale'' or ``sell'' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term ``offer to sell'', ``offer for sale'', or ``offer'' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value. The terms defined in this paragraph and the term ``offer to buy'' as used in subsection (c) of section 5 shall not include preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer (or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under direct or indirect common control with an issuer) and any underwriter or among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer (or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under direct or indirect common control with an issuer). Any security given or delivered with, or as a bonus on account of, any purchase of securities or any other thing, shall be conclusively presumed to constitute a part of the subject of such purchase and to have been offered and sold for value. The issue or transfer of a right or privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the holder of such security the right to convert such security into another security of the same issuer or of another person, or giving a right to subscribe to another security of the same issuer or of another person, which right cannot be exercised until some future date, shall not be deemed to be an offer or sale of such other security; but the issue or transfer of such other security upon the exercise of such right of conversion or subscription shall be deemed a sale of such other security. Any offer or sale of a security futures product by or on behalf of the issuer of the securities underlying the security futures product, an affiliate of the issuer, or an underwriter, shall constitute a contract for sale of, sale of, offer for sale, or offer to sell the underlying securities. Any offer or sale of a security-based swap by or on behalf of the issuer of the securities upon which such security-based swap is based or is referenced, an affiliate of the issuer, or an underwriter, shall constitute a contract for sale of, sale of, offer for sale, or offer to sell such securities. The publication or distribution by a broker or dealer of a research report about an emerging growth company that is the subject of a proposed public offering of the common equity securities of such emerging growth company pursuant to a registration statement that the issuer proposes to file, or has filed, or that is effective shall be deemed for purposes of paragraph (10) of this subsection and section 5(c) not to constitute an offer for sale or offer to sell a security, even if the broker or dealer is participating or will participate in the registered offering of the securities of the issuer. As used in this paragraph, the term ``research report'' means a written, electronic, or oral communication that includes information, opinions, or recommendations with respect to securities of an issuer or an analysis of a security or an issuer, whether or not it provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision. (4) The term ``issuer'' means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors (or persons performing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management, or unit type, the term ``issuer'' means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated association which provides by its articles for limited liability of any or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, committee, or other legal entity, the trustees or members thereof shall not be individually liable as issuers of any security issued by the association, trust, committee, or other legal entity; except that with respect to equipment- trust certificates or like securities, the term ``issuer'' means the person by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except that with respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, the term ``issuer'' means the owner of any such right or of any interest in such right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of public offering. (5) The term ``Commission'' means the Securities and Exchange Commission. (6) The term ``Territory'' means Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the insular possessions of the United States. (7) The term ``interstate commerce'' means trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the several States or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia. (8) The term ``registration statement'' means the statement provided for in section 6, and includes any amendment thereto and any report, document, or memorandum filed as part of such statement or incorporated therein by reference. (9) The term ``write'' or ``written'' shall include printed, lithographed, or any means of graphic communication. (10) The term ``prospectus'' means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security; except that (a) a communication sent or given after the effective date of the registration statement (other than a prospectus permitted under subsection (b) of

Minority Views

H.R. 8286 includes several provisions that make it more difficult for shareholders to offer shareholder proposals, thereby limiting their ability to have a say in how the corporations they own are managed and giving more power to corporate management. Specifically, this bill limits investor voices by silencing proxy advisory firms. These firms provide independent analysis of the impact of shareholder proposals to shareholders and their representatives to help them make informed voting decisions at a company's annual meeting. In this way, proxy advisory firms ensure investors have an outside perspective that may differ from what management is recommending on specific proposals. Among its provisions limiting the role of proxy advisors are provisions: mandating that investment advisers, asset managers, and pension funds that use proxy advisors file an annual report with the SEC to disclose the use of such services; requiring the SEC to issue final rules prohibiting investors from allowing their fiduciaries to automatically vote on their behalf based on common-sense proxy advisor analysis and recommendations; and preventing investment advisers that vote on behalf of shareholders of passively managed funds to rely on and use analysis from proxy advisors. This bill would also impede the use of the systems proxy advisors have created to help fund managers vote on behalf of their fund's shareholders. Additionally, H.R. 8286 would allow issuers, rather than investors, to determine which types of information get disclosed in a company's SEC filings. The legal concept for determining what information is important enough for a company to be required to disclose it is known as ``materiality''. Under current case law and SEC precedent, information is ``material'' if there is a substantial likelihood a reasonable investor would find it important in determining whether or not to invest in the issuer's securities. This particular provision of H.R. 8286 amends the law to require issuers to only disclose information ``to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material'' (emphasis added). In doing so, the entity whose conduct is being disclosed now gets to decide what investors need to know about that conduct. This is the opposite of how a disclosure regime works, and flies in the face of how courts and the SEC have conducted the materiality analysis-- which has long treated investors, rather than issuers, as the primary determiners of the types of information that a company should disclose to the public. Furthermore, the bill would restrict the SEC's ability to require public companies disclose critical information about climate risk and political spending--depriving markets and investors of information needed to make sound and fully informed investment decisions. H.R. 8286 would also create a Public Company Advisory Committee that would give companies, their attorneys, and lobbyists an additional insider avenue to influence SEC policy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\NCRC, Over 200+ Organizations Urge House Financial Services Committee to Oppose Any Amendment to Delay or Weaken Small Business and Farm Fair Lending Law (Apr. 21, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many of the titles in this bill were included in a package offered in the 118th Congress, which Financial Services Committee Democrats unanimously opposed at markup. That package went on to receive near-unanimous Democratic opposition when it was considered on the full House floor. Various titles within this package were also opposed in the 118th and/or 119th Congress by the following groups: AFL CIO; Americans for Financial Reform; Better Markets; US SIF; Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility; Ceres; OUT Leadership; US Impact Investing Alliance; Shareholder Rights Group; Green America; PRI; Family Farm Defenders; Food and Water Watch; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; and Union for Concerned Scientists. In a letter submitted by AFL CIO in opposition to the bill, the authors stated: ``this bill will undermine corporate accountability to investors--including the retirement savings of working people--by undermining our nation's public company disclosure rules and the ability of retirement plans to vote proxies in the best interests of their participants and beneficiaries . . . [it will also] restrict the ability of the [SEC] to adopt effective disclosure rules by allowing public companies to opt out of disclosure if the company determines that such information is not material to its investors [thereby making] corporate disclosure[s] less comparable and less consistent, and will allow corporate bad actors to conceal information from their investors. In effect, allowing public companies to determine whether they must comply with disclosure rules is letting the fox guard the henhouse. H.R. 8286 also will interfere with the rights of investors to vote proxies at company shareholder meetings by putting the thumb on the scale in favor of corporate CEOs and boards of directors. In sum, H.R. 8286 would insulate corporate CEOs from accountability to their own investors, reduce corporate transparency, and restrict investors' access to information and their freedom to make their own investment and proxy voting decisions, all to the detriment of working people's hard earned retirement savings.''\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\AFL-CIO, Letter Opposing Legislation That Would Undermine Corporate Accountability to Investors (Apr. 21, 2026). In another letter in opposition, Americans for Financial Reform --------------------------------------------------------------------------- stated: ``this bill would reduce transparency, weaken investor protections, and make it even more difficult for shareholders to hold corporations accountable [and] would undermine the ability of the [SEC] to equip investors with information needed to make sound investment decisions. It would do so by allowing companies themselves to determine what information they need to provide to investors--even in the context of SEC disclosure rules--by creating an advisory entity within the SEC to represent the interests of corporate boards and executives, and by mandating studies and reports biased in favor of management interests. These changes would undermine the SEC's statutory investor protection mission and distort it into a corporate management-protection mission. The bill would also further tilt the playing field in favor of corporate boards and executives by creating strong and inappropriate incentives for asset managers to either cast votes in favor of management or not vote at all. Similarly, other provisions would strongly disincentivize proxy advisors from making voting recommendations against management. This would undermine the ability of these service providers to act in the best interests of the investors who hire them.''\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\AFR, Re: Opposition to H.R. 8286, the Protecting Americans' Retirement Savings from Politics Act (Apr. 20, 2026). A coalition of over 30 investors, labor unions, and public interest organizations also wrote to oppose a similar bill last Congress.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\AFR, Coalition Letter Re: Opposition to anti-ESG bills that threaten workers' retirement security and our financial system, and weaken tools of corporate accountability (Nov. 7, 2023). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 8286. Sincerely, Maxine Waters, Ranking Member. Nydia M. Velazquez, Brad Sherman, Stephen F. Lynch, Al Green, Emanuel Cleaver, II, Bill Foster, Joyce Beatty, Rashida Tlaib, Sylvia R. Garcia, Cleo Fields, Members of Congress. [all]

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/712