Skip to content

house · Committee report

H. Rept. 119-729

PBM KICKBACK PROHIBITION ACT

2026-07-02

Committees

Associated legislation

Text

Additional Views

[To accompany H.R. 7895] The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 7895) to amend section 408 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to prohibit kickbacks to pharmacy benefit managers, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. The amendment is as follows: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``PBM Kickback Prohibition Act''. SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER KICKBACKS. (a) In General.--Section 408(b)(2)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. 1108(b)(2)(B)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(xi)(I) In the case of a contract or arrangement between a covered plan and a covered service provider for pharmacy benefit management services, no amount of compensation (whether direct compensation or indirect compensation) may be paid by such service provider to any individual or entity for-- ``(aa) the referral, recommendation, placement, retention, or renewal of, or access to, the business of the covered plan or the health insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage for the covered plan; ``(bb) inclusion in, participation in, or the design of-- ``(AA) a request for proposal; ``(BB) a market check; ``(CC) an evaluation; ``(DD) the volume, value, or use of covered plan business; or ``(EE) any other contracting process. ``(II) For the purposes of this clause, the characterization of compensation shall be based on the economic substance and practical operation of the contract or arrangement, without regard to the characterization or labeling of the compensation by the covered service provider. ``(III) Any compensation paid by a covered service provider to a brokerage firm, broker, consultant, advisor, or related entity shall be presumed to be related to an activity described in item (aa) or (bb) of subclause (I) unless the parties demonstrate through contemporaneous written documentation that such compensation-- ``(aa) reflects fair market value for bona fide services actually rendered; and ``(bb) is not related, directly or indirectly, to any activity described in such items.''. (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply for plan years beginning after the date of enactment of this Act. Purpose The purpose of H.R. 7895, PBM Kickback Prohibition Act, is to prohibit payments from PBMs to brokers and consultants that help employers design group health plans and select service providers for those plans.

Committee Action

119TH CONGRESS Second Session--Hearing On April 22, 2026, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing entitled ``Profits Over Patients: the PBM Business Model Under Scrutiny,'' which examined the practices of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), including compensation streams from PBMs to brokers and consultants that pose as trusted advisors to employers in designing their group health plans and plan fiduciaries who select service providers for those plans. Witnesses were Mr. James Gelfand, President and CEO, The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Chris Deacon, Principal and Founder, VerSan Consulting, Moorestown, New Jersey; Ms. Mariana Socal, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland; and Ms. Hannah Anderson, Director, Healthy America Policy and Senior Director of Policy, America First Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. Second Session--Legislative Action On March 12, 2026, HELP Subcommittee Chairman Rick Allen (R-GA) introduced H.R. 7895, PBM Kickback Prohibition Act. On May 21, 2026, the Committee considered H.R. 7895 in legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 34-0. The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Representative Allen with the changes to prohibit pharmacy benefit manager payments from the referral, recommendation, placement, retention, or renewal of--or access to--the group health plan's business. This includes payments for inclusion in, participation in, or the design of, a request for proposal or any other contracting process. Committee Views INTRODUCTION The health care challenges facing working families and small businesses require urgent attention. One factor in the rising cost of health care is pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs. PBMs and middlemen are driving up prescription drug costs through opaque pricing practices and hidden financial arrangements. H.R. 7895 eliminates steering payments and referral fees PBMs are paying to consultants and brokers helping design benefit plans for employer-sponsored health care. The purpose of the legislation is to eliminate a conflict of interest in the advice that employer plan sponsors are receiving from trusted advisors. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE COVERAGE The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs the operation of retirement, health, and welfare plans sponsored by private employers covering 156 million workers, retirees, and their families.\1\ These benefits are provided through about 827,000 private retirement plans, 2.8 million health plans, and 521,000 other welfare benefit plans, which together hold approximately $15.2 trillion in assets. Of this, the health plans alone hold more than $150 billion in assets and cover about 136 million people.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ- 2027-V2-01.pdf (EBSA-140). \2\https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/ statistics/retirement-bulletins/annual-report-on-self-insured-group- health-plans-2025.pdf at 3, 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Department of Labor's (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) administers and enforces ERISA. ERISA protects plan participants and beneficiaries and authorizes participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor to enforce its provisions in federal court.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ERISA Sec. 502, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1132. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS A pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) is a third-party administrator of prescription drug programs for group health plans, including ERISA health plans. PBMs are intermediaries in the pharmaceutical supply chain stretching from drug manufacturers through ERISA group health plans to about 90 million patients.\4\ PBM services include formulary design, pharmacy network management, claims processing, and negotiation of rebates or price concessions from drug manufacturers. In this role, PBMs wield enormous power over pricing, distribution, and whether a drug is accessible through a patient's health plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ ebsa20260129#: :text=The%20U.S.%20 Department%20of%20Labor's%20Employee%20Benefits,with%20prescription%20dr ugs%20 dispensed%20to%20the%20plan; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR- 2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) describes one of the largest pharmacy benefit managers as ``positioned at the center of the intricate and opaque pharmaceutical distribution chain, [wielding] significant influence over which drugs patients can access and at what prices.''\5\ According to allegations filed by the FTC, certain PBMs have engaged in anti-competitive conduct that may inflate drug prices and increase PBM compensation through rebate and other pricing arrangements. PBMs receive compensation from self-insured group health plans as well as other sources in the pharmaceutical supply chain.\6\ PBM compensation includes administrative fees, rebates, and ``spread pricing'' discounts from the pharmaceutical supply chain.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-12/pdf/2026- 02844.pdf. \6\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-30/pdf/2026- 01907.pdf. \7\Spread pricing refers to the difference between the amount the PBM charges to the group health plan and the amount the PBM pays the pharmaceutical company. See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR- 2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf at 4351-52. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The HELP Subcommittee held a hearing on April 22, 2026, about PBM fees paid to consultants and brokers for steering employers to PBMs. Federal regulators have also expressed concerns that PBM compensation structures, including payments to brokers and consultants, create conflicts of interest in plan design.\8\ Fiduciaries for ERISA-covered self-insured group health plans often rely on a trusted broker or consultant for advice and recommendations on PBM services.\9\ President Trump has cited PBM steering fees paid to brokers as critical issues affecting transparency and competition in prescription drug markets.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\DOL, Fact Sheet: Proposed Pharmacy Benefit Manager Fee Disclosure (Jan. 2026) (stating that DOL's proposed PBM rule would require PBM-affiliated brokers and consultants to disclose direct and indirect compensation associated with PBM arrangements), https:// www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/ fact-sheets/proposed- pharmacy-benefit-manager-fee-disclosure-rule. \9\https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/30/2026-01907/ improving-transparency-into-pharmacy-benefit-manager-fee-disclosure at 4349. \10\https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet- president-donald-j-trump- announces-actions-to-lower-prescription-drug-prices/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARISING FROM BROKER AND CONSULTANT COMPENSATION PRACTICES Given the complexity of PBM contracting and pricing arrangements, many employers rely on brokers and consultants to help design health plans, select PBMs, and monitor PBM performance. However, some financial relationships among PBMs, brokers, and consultants may create conflicts of interest that are not readily apparent to plan sponsors. On April 22, 2026, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing entitled ``Profits Over Patients: The PBM Business Model Under Scrutiny'' to examine these compensation arrangements and their impact on employer sponsored health plans.\11\ The hearing demonstrated that payments from PBMs to brokers and consultants can create direct financial incentives for advisors to steer employer health plans toward particular PBMs. Witnesses testified that some brokers and consultants, while purporting to advise plan fiduciaries, receive compensation from the very PBMs they are retained to evaluate. Mr. James Gelfand, President and CEO of the ERISA Industry Committee, testified: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\https://edworkforce.house.gov/calendar/ eventsingle.aspx?EventID=413217. Unfortunately, we have been made aware of a troubling practice wherein some, not all, but some brokers, consultants and advisors who are supposed to advise employer plans are actually paid what appear to be kickbacks from the very vendors they are supposed to be sorting through and fairly evaluating. These arrangements create clear conflicts of interest, and undermine employers' ability to make informed cost- effective decisions for our beneficiaries. The kickbacks in the form of fees, commissions, overrides and even per prescription cost add-ons, drive costs higher and have the potential to prioritize revenue --------------------------------------------------------------------------- over value in the vendor selection process. Mr. Gelfand further testified that ``a ban would be more effective than simple transparency.''\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\Id. Mrs. Chris Deacon, founder of VerSan Consulting, testified that ``the current kickback pay to play model is failing employees, employers and taxpayers.'' She provided concrete examples of the compensation arrangements at issue, explaining that some PBM procurement documents ask whether a bidder will pay a broker $50,000 annually over the life of the contract and that employers may never see bidders who refuse to make such payments. She further testified that, in one example, CVS Caremark agreed to pay Gallagher Benefit Services, Inc., $2.50 per retail prescription and $7 per mail or specialty prescription filled by group health plan members. According to Mrs. Deacon, this arrangement ``does not reward reducing cost, nor does it reward reducing utilization.'' Mrs. Deacon said that instead the arrangement ``rewards increased volume and handsomely rewards increased volume filled through those channels that generate the highest profits for PBMs and their affiliates.'' She also testified that ``disclosures alone here are really insufficient.''\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Id. Dr. Mariana Socal, Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, testified that PBM payments to consultants create structural conflicts of --------------------------------------------------------------------------- interest. Specifically, she testified: [T]hese consultants often get paid by the PBMs that ultimately get selected. This can create a conflict of interest, incentivizing some consultants to prefer the PBM that pays the most, not necessarily the PBM that provides the best option for the plan.'' Professor Socal concluded that ``Congress should prohibit such payments to avoid this conflict of interest.''\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ms. Hannah Anderson, Director, Healthy America Policy and Senior Director of Policy at the America First Policy Institute similarly testified that broker and consultant compensation arrangements can undermine independent advice provided to employers. She stated: [Employers] often turn to brokers and consultants to help them offer a more competitive benefits package . . . to stretch the company's dollar further, getting lower costs, greater coverage and better health for the employee population. However, that's not been the case. The problem is that those consultants [the employers] rely on to select PBMs are not always independent. Reports have found that [those consultants] often take more in kickbacks from the PBMs than they do payments by the plan sponsors.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\Id. She further testified, ``Disclosure alone is not enough when the underlying financial perverse incentive still exists.'' She explained that H.R. 7895 ``ends the structural incentive, not just requires the disclosure of it.'' H.R. 7895 H.R. 7895 eliminates kickbacks from PBMs to brokerage middlemen that deceptively raise the cost of health insurance.\16\ The legislation does this through ERISA's current prohibited transaction provisions, which work in a two- step process. The first step in ERISA is an absolute prohibition on transactions between the plan and related parties, referred to in ERISA as ``parties in interest.''\17\ Because a service provider is a party in interest,\18\ the prohibited transaction provisions in ERISA categorically bar a service provider (such as a PBM) from providing services to an ERISA plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The- Great-Healthcare-Plan.pdf. \17\ERISA Sec. 406(a), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a). \18\ERISA Sec. 3(14)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(14)(B). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The second step of ERISA's two step framework relates to ``exemptions'' or exceptions to the prohibited transaction rules. ERISA separately enumerates 21 ``statutory exemptions'' to prohibited transactions.\19\ ERISA provides that the Secretary of Labor may also grant additional ``administrative exemptions'' to the prohibited transaction rules.\20\ The Secretary has promulgated hundreds of administrative exemptions under ERISA.\21\ ERISA further provides a statutory exemption (the ``Service Provider Exemption'') for ``contracting or making reasonable arrangements'' with a service provider for ``services necessary for the . . . operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.''\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Statutory exemptions are in ERISA Sec. 408(b), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b). \20\The Secretary of Labor's authority to grant administrative exemptions is conditional upon a finding that the exemption is protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries. ERISA Sec. 408(a), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(a). \21\Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 604 U.S. 693, 705 (2025). \22\Statutory exemptions are in ERISA Sec. 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The effect of H.R. 7895 is to render ERISA's Service Provider Exemption unavailable in the event that a PBM compensates a broker or consultant in the form of a kickback or a referral fee. As a result, the underlying service arrangement between the PBM and the group health plan constitutes a prohibited transaction under ERISA.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ERISA Sec. Sec. 406(a), 408(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1106(a), 1108(b)(2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Conclusion Compensation arrangements between PBMs and brokers, consultants, and similar advisers create conflicts of interest that may distort PBM procurement, reduce transparency, and increase costs for employer-sponsored health plans and their participants. Disclosure requirements, while important, do not fully address the underlying incentives created by these arrangements. Accordingly, PBMs should be prohibited from compensating brokers, consultants, advisors, or similar intermediaries in exchange for steering employer health plan business to a PBM. Summary SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY Section 1--Short title Section 1 provides that the short title is ``PBM Kickback Prohibition Act.'' Section 2--Prohibition on pharmacy benefit manager kickbacks Section 2(a)(I) of H.R. 7895 amends ERISA section 408(b)(2) (29 U.S.C. 1108(b)(2)(B)) by adding a new clause (xi) to the exemption for reasonable arrangements, supported by reasonable compensation, for services necessary for the operation of the employee benefit plan. Under section 2(a)(I) of the bill, new section 408(b)(2)(xi) of ERISA has three parts. The first part, ERISA section 408(b)(2)(xi)(I), provides that in the case of a contract or arrangement between a covered plan and a covered service provider for pharmacy benefit management services, no amount of compensation may be paid, directly or indirectly, by such service provider to a brokerage firm, broker, consultant, advisor, or any other individual for the following: the referral, recommendation, placement, retention, or renewal of--or access to--the business of the covered plan or health insurance issuer offering health insurance for the covered plan; or inclusion in, participation in, or the design of a request for proposal; a market check; an evaluation; the volume, value, or use of covered plan business; or any other contracting process. This language prohibits payments from PBMs to consultants or brokers for the business of group health plans whether individually, or in the aggregate, and whether characterized as something other than a steering or referral fee. New section 408(b)(2)(xi)(I) of ERISA also provides that compensation paid by PBMs to brokers and consultants in connection with group health plan business will be covered by the prohibition regardless of how that compensation is characterized or whether that compensation is paid directly by the PBM or through an intermediary. New section 408(b)(1) of ERISA further provides that compensation paid by a covered service provider to a brokerage firm, broker, consultant, advisor, or related entity will be presumed to be compensation prohibited under ERISA section 2(a)(I) unless the parties demonstrate, through contemporaneous written documentation, that the compensation reflects fair market value for bona fide services actually rendered and is not related, directly or indirectly, to compensation prohibited by ERISA section 2(a)(I).

Additional Views

INTRODUCTION H.R. 7895, the PBM Kickback Prohibition Act, amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act\1\ (ERISA) to prohibit pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) from paying referral fees to brokers, consultants, and similar entities. In doing so, the legislation takes a modest step to address inappropriate compensation arrangements and potential conflicts of interest between brokers and consultants and PBMs that raise costs for both workers and employers alike. In previous congresses, the Committee on Education and Workforce (Committee) worked in a bipartisan manner to develop meaningful legislation that addresses related challenges that employer-sponsored health plans confront when working with PBMs. However, rather than engage in such a process in developing and advancing H.R. 7895, the Majority chose to proceed through a rushed, partisan approach that dismisses Democratic suggestions for improvements to this legislation. As a result, both the introduced and reported versions of H.R. 7895 are inadequate to address the scope of the problem the bill seeks to address. Instead, the bill serves primarily as a partisan talking point to promote President Trump's so-called ``Great Healthcare Plan.''\2\ Committee Democrats supported the legislation because it is a small step toward addressing misaligned incentives in health care. However, moving forward, the legislation should be improved to ensure that it meaningfully addresses the full scope of conflicts of interest among health plan service providers such as insurance companies, third party administrators, and other middlemen. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\Pub. L. No. 93-406 (1974). \2\The Great Healthcare Plan, The White House (Jan. 2026), https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Great-Healthcare- Plan.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RISING COSTS INCREASINGLY MAKE HEALTH CARE UNAFFORDABLE FOR CONSUMERS High health care costs represent an urgent issue for American consumers, who increasingly face unaffordable health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket costs. In 2024, total national health expenditures in the United States reached $5.3 trillion or 18.0 percent of gross domestic product.\3\ Americans' per capita health care spending has risen to $14,775, approximately double the average amount spent per capita in peer countries.\4\ These expenditures are heavily driven by high prescription drug prices and the rates charged by hospitals, physicians, and other providers.\5\ Additionally, growing health care spending is also directly correlated with rising administrative costs associated with middlemen, particularly for individuals with private health coverage.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures 2024 Highlights 1 (2026), https://www.cms.gov/files/ document/highlights.pdf. \4\Imani Telesford et al., How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other Countries?, Peterson-KFF Health Sys. Tracker (Mar. 11, 2026), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health- spending-u-s-compare-countries/. \5\See Cong. Budget Off., The Prices That Commercial Health Insurers and Medicare Pay for Hospitals' and Physicians' Services (Jan. 2022), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57778. \6\See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Untangling the Complex Web: Summary of a New Expert Perspective, Georgetown Ctr. on Health Ins. Reforms (Nov. 19, 2025), https://chir.georgetown.edu/untangling-the- complex-web-summary-of-a-new-expert-perspective/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Approximately 181 million people in the United States receive health coverage through an employment-based plan.\7\ Although individuals with job-based health benefits generally express satisfaction with their plans,\8\ rising health care costs present a substantial affordability challenge for millions of workers and their families. Since 2015, the average annual premium in an employer-sponsored family plan has risen 53 percent, reaching $26,993 in 2025.\9\ The average general annual deductible for single coverage in the employer market has increased 42.9 percent over the last decade, growing from $1,320 in 2015 to $1,886 in 2025.\10\ These rising costs continue to squeeze workers and their families, and addressing the drivers of these costs should be a top priority for Congress. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\Lisa N. Bunch & Halelujha Ketema, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2024 2 (Sept. 2025), https://www2.census.gov/ library/publications/2025/demo/p60-288.pdf. \8\What Leads to Greater Satisfaction With Health Plan Coverage?, Emp. Benefits Rsch. Inst. 1 (Apr. 6, 2023), https://www.ebri.org/docs/ default-source/fast-facts/ff-463-cehcs7-6 apr23.pdf?sfvrsn=c599392f_2. \9\2025 Employer Health Benefits Survey 35, KFF (Oct. 22, 2025), https://files.kff.org/ attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-2025-Annual-Survey.pdf. \10\Id. at 101. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HEALTH PLAN SERVICE PROVIDERS OFTEN HAVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT HARM CONSUMERS Employers who sponsor health plans often rely on a range of service providers to assist in administering and managing their plans. While many such service providers play a valuable role in delivering benefits, their business models have also been described as ``a complex web of common ownership, contracting arrangements, and financial deals which create an array of conflicts of interests and hidden flows of money.''\11\ These business models can have an inflationary effect on health care spending, ultimately at the expense of consumers who must shoulder rising premiums and cost-sharing.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\Blumberg et al., supra note 6. \12\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PBMs, which are the primary focus of H.R. 7895, are one such type of service provider. They contract with health plans to perform a number of services related to the administration of prescription drug benefits, including developing and maintaining lists of covered drugs (formularies), negotiating prices and rebates with drug manufacturers, and reimbursing pharmacies for drugs dispensed to plan participants.\13\ The opaqueness of PBM practices has received substantial scrutiny in recent years, resulting in major legislative reforms enacted by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026\14\ and a proposed rule issued by the U.S. Department of Labor earlier this year.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\Christopher J. Sroka, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/ 20001129_RL30754_ae8115ed5c22ac5d657bb297e78f9a 8b62bd060f.pdf. \14\Pub. L. No. 119-75, div. J, tit. VII (2026). \15\Improving Transparency Into Pharmacy Benefit Manager Fee Disclosure, 91 Fed. Reg. 4,348 (Jan. 30, 2026), https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, PBMs are just one component of the ``complex web'' of middlemen whose business models harm consumers and employers alike. For example, the majority of workers with job-based health benefits are covered through a self-insured plan, in which the employer bears the financial risk, rather than an insurer.\16\ Due to the complexity of administering such plans, employers generally contract with third party administrators (TPAs) to perform critical functions with respect to the plans.\17\ These TPAs are often owned by commercial insurers that, in turn, often own hospitals and physician groups, creating structural conflicts of interest that misalign incentives to the detriment of both plan sponsors and workers.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\Christine Monahan, Questionable Conduct: Allegations Against Insurers Acting as Third-Party Administrators, Georgetown Ctr. on Health Ins. Reforms (Mar. 24, 2023), https://chir.georgetown.edu/ questionable-conduct-allegations-insurers-acting-third-party- administrators/. \17\Karen Handorf et al., Third-Party Administrators--The Middlemen of Self-Funded Health Insurance, Georgetown Ctr. on Health Ins. Reforms (May 28, 2025), https://chir.georgetown.edu/third-party-administrators- the-middlemen-of-self-funded-health-insurance/. \18\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Payments from these service providers to brokers and consultants are one such example of potential conflict of interest. A 2023 article in Stat investigated the fees paid by PBMs to certain brokers and consultants who encouraged their clients to contract with PBMs from whom they received such payments.\19\ However, this article highlights just one instance of such fees steering plans toward favored service providers. In 2019, for example, ProPublica found that insurers frequently pay commissions to brokers based on the number of employers they enroll in coverage.\20\ These fees are substantial, often between three to six percent of the plans' premiums, creating an incentive to further drive up health care spending.\21\ Similar compensation arrangements, regardless of whether the payments are made by PBMs or any other service provider, steer health plans toward service providers who generate profits for brokers and consultants but may not be the best choice for employers and workers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\Bob Herman, It's Beyond unethical' Opaque Conflicts of Interest Permeate Prescription Drug Benefits, Stat (June 23, 2023), https:// www.statnews.com/2023/06/20/pbms-consulting-firms- investigation/. \20\Marshall Allen, Behind the Scenes, Health Insurers Use Cash and Gifts to Sway Which Benefits Employers Choose, ProPublica (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/health- insurance-brokers-cost-commissions-bonuses. \21\Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE COMMITTEE HAS PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN A BIPARTISAN MANNER TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY The Committee has a long history of working in a bipartisan manner to address problems in employer-sponsored health plans. These efforts have resulted in meaningful reforms that increase transparency and have protected consumers from the rising costs of health care. During the 116th Congress, the Committee negotiated and advanced H.R. 5800, the Ban Surprise Billing Act,\22\ introduced by Rep. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA) and Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-NC). This legislation addressed the pernicious issue of surprise medical billing by out-of-network health care providers and relied on a benchmark payment rate that would help keep prices down. Additionally, it shined a light on excessive fees and conflicts of interest among service providers such as brokers, consultants, PBMs, and TPAs by requiring disclosure of direct and indirect compensation to plan fiduciaries. Several provisions of the ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, 2021 (CAA 2021)\23\ incorporated the Committee's efforts, including groundbreaking service provider disclosure requirements added to section 408(b)(2) of ERISA.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\See Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. BB (2020). \24\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B). \22\H. Rept. No. 116-615 at 49 (2020). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the 118th Congress, the Committee took a number of additional actions to reduce costs and address conflicts of interest, including the markup of a package of bills relating to transparency. These bills included H.R. 2401, the Hidden Fee Disclosure Act, introduced by Rep. Joe Courtney (D-CT) and Rep. Erin Houchin (R-IN), which strengthened the 408(b)(2) disclosure requirements to ensure that plan fiduciaries have information needed to responsibly monitor TPAs and PBMs for conflicts of interest. Additionally, H.R. 4507, the Transparency in Coverage Act, introduced by Rep. Bob Good (R- VA) and Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), improved transparency by, among other reforms, requiring PBMs to disclose their rebates, fees, alternative discounts, and other remuneration. This bipartisan work contributed to the enactment of similar reforms in the 119th Congress as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (CAA 2026),\25\ including similar PBM reporting requirements and a clarification of which service providers must fully disclose their direct and indirect compensation under section 408(b)(2).\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\Pub. L. No. 119-75 (2026). \26\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B)(ii)(bb). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE MAJORITY'S PARTISAN APPROACH TO H.R. 7895 HAS RESULTED IN INADEQUATE LEGISLATION Despite this history of working in a bipartisan manner, the Majority has regrettably chosen to advance H.R. 7895 through a partisan process and without input from Democrat Members. As a result, the bill fails to fully advance a comprehensive policy that addresses the needs of workers and employers alike. H.R. 7895's deficiencies could have been addressed had the Majority chosen to engage in a deliberate, bipartisan process. This legislation seeks to address the single PBM business practice of referral fees paid by PBMs to certain brokers and consultants that create an incentive to steer clients to those same PBMs. Unfortunately, the introduced version of the legislation was flawed in addressing even this limited issue. For example, rather than encompass the wide range of ways in which PBMs could structure or characterize such payments to brokers and consultants, the bill instead relies upon the undefined concept of ``referral'' of a client's business to a PBM. Experts noted that this would allow PBMs and brokers, consultants, and similar entities to simply characterize these payments as something else, such as a ``consulting service'' or another label, and evade the bill's prohibition entirely.\27\ Fortunately, this particular deficiency was corrected through last minute changes to the text in the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\Terence Park et al., The PBM Kickback Prohibition Act: Well- Intentioned but Potentially Ineffective Reform, Frier Levitt (Apr. 3, 2026), https://www.frierlevitt.com/articles/pbm-kickback-prohibition- act-erisa-plan-sponsors/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, even with this change in the ANS, the Majority's exclusive focus on PBMs falls short of addressing the scope of the problem facing workers and employers. As noted previously, it has been documented that brokers and consultants receive payments from service providers other than PBMs, including insurers and third party administrators, that steer employers to such service providers.\28\ The Committee understood this fact when advancing the Ban Surprise Billing Act on a bipartisan basis.\29\ That bill improved transparency with respect to such payments in the form of compensation received from ``any [indirect] source'' and certain provisions were enacted into law in the CAA 2021.\30\ Regrettably, H.R. 7895 fails to incorporate this previous bipartisan approach to address a much broader problem and instead only proposes to prohibit these payments with respect to PBMs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\See Allen, supra note 20. \29\Ban Surprise Billing Act, H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. (2020). \30\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B)(ii)(dd)(CC). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Majority has not provided a satisfactory explanation for this approach. During the Markup of H.R. 7895, Rep. DeSaulnier expressed concern that the bill's narrow scope failed to address compensation received from other service providers that present a potential conflict of interest.\31\ He offered an amendment that would have ensured that the kickback prohibition applies to all covered service providers described in section 408(b)(2) of ERISA, consistent with the Committee's past, bipartisan approach. In opposing the amendment, Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee Chair Rick Allen (R-GA) offered no substantive explanation for the Majority's position. In fact, he seemed to concede that the issue remains unaddressed by H.R. 7895 but noted that, rather than tackle this problem, the Committee should defer to the policy wishes of the Trump White House, stating: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\Comm. on Educ. and Workforce Democrats, Markup: H.R. 8736, H.R. 8705, H.R. 7362, H.R. 7895, H.R. 8684, YouTube at 2:42:47 (May 21, 2026), https://youtu.be/o_KSOp_SvLI. Cracking down on PBMs paying kickbacks to consultants and brokers is a key feature of President Trump's ``Great Healthcare Plan.'' Other entities may also be making steering payments to brokers and consultants. However, to address PBMs' pharmaceutical monopoly we must keep the scope of this bill focused on PBMs to lower costs as part of the President's ``Great Healthcare Plan.''\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\Id. at 2:45:33. It is regrettable that the Majority would defer to a 22- word bullet point contained in President Trump's so-called ``Great Healthcare Plan,''\33\ rather than develop legislation that meets the needs of the American people. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\Supra note 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONCLUSION Addressing the growing cost of health care in the United States requires legislation that results in reforms that meaningfully address the problems presented. Committee Democrats supported H.R. 7895 because it represents a small step toward addressing misaligned incentives and improving employer-sponsored health care. However, the legislation should be improved to ensure that it meaningfully addresses the full scope of conflicts of interest among health plan service providers such as insurance companies, third party administrators, and other middlemen. Moving forward, the Committee should work to advance legislation that goes beyond the narrow scope of H.R. 7895 and consider these important issues in a more comprehensive manner. I hope the Majority will work with us to improve H.R. 7895 as it moves forward in the House. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Ranking Mem

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/hrpt/729