Additional Views
[To accompany H.R. 7895]
The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 7895) to amend section 408 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to prohibit
kickbacks to pharmacy benefit managers, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``PBM Kickback Prohibition Act''.
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER KICKBACKS.
(a) In General.--Section 408(b)(2)(B) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. 1108(b)(2)(B)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(xi)(I) In the case of a contract or arrangement between a
covered plan and a covered service provider for pharmacy
benefit management services, no amount of compensation (whether
direct compensation or indirect compensation) may be paid by
such service provider to any individual or entity for--
``(aa) the referral, recommendation, placement,
retention, or renewal of, or access to, the business of
the covered plan or the health insurance issuer
offering health insurance coverage for the covered
plan;
``(bb) inclusion in, participation in, or the design
of--
``(AA) a request for proposal;
``(BB) a market check;
``(CC) an evaluation;
``(DD) the volume, value, or use of covered
plan business; or
``(EE) any other contracting process.
``(II) For the purposes of this clause, the characterization
of compensation shall be based on the economic substance and
practical operation of the contract or arrangement, without
regard to the characterization or labeling of the compensation
by the covered service provider.
``(III) Any compensation paid by a covered service provider
to a brokerage firm, broker, consultant, advisor, or related
entity shall be presumed to be related to an activity described
in item (aa) or (bb) of subclause (I) unless the parties
demonstrate through contemporaneous written documentation that
such compensation--
``(aa) reflects fair market value for bona fide
services actually rendered; and
``(bb) is not related, directly or indirectly, to any
activity described in such items.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply
for plan years beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 7895, PBM Kickback Prohibition Act, is
to prohibit payments from PBMs to brokers and consultants that
help employers design group health plans and select service
providers for those plans.
Committee Action
119TH CONGRESS
Second Session--Hearing
On April 22, 2026, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing entitled ``Profits
Over Patients: the PBM Business Model Under Scrutiny,'' which
examined the practices of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs),
including compensation streams from PBMs to brokers and
consultants that pose as trusted advisors to employers in
designing their group health plans and plan fiduciaries who
select service providers for those plans. Witnesses were Mr.
James Gelfand, President and CEO, The ERISA Industry Committee
(ERIC), Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Chris Deacon, Principal and
Founder, VerSan Consulting, Moorestown, New Jersey; Ms. Mariana
Socal, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland; and Ms. Hannah Anderson,
Director, Healthy America Policy and Senior Director of Policy,
America First Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.
Second Session--Legislative Action
On March 12, 2026, HELP Subcommittee Chairman Rick Allen
(R-GA) introduced H.R. 7895, PBM Kickback Prohibition Act. On
May 21, 2026, the Committee considered H.R. 7895 in legislative
session and reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a recorded vote of 34-0. The Committee
adopted by voice vote an amendment in the nature of a
substitute offered by Representative Allen with the changes to
prohibit pharmacy benefit manager payments from the referral,
recommendation, placement, retention, or renewal of--or access
to--the group health plan's business. This includes payments
for inclusion in, participation in, or the design of, a request
for proposal or any other contracting process.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
The health care challenges facing working families and
small businesses require urgent attention. One factor in the
rising cost of health care is pharmacy benefit managers, or
PBMs. PBMs and middlemen are driving up prescription drug costs
through opaque pricing practices and hidden financial
arrangements. H.R. 7895 eliminates steering payments and
referral fees PBMs are paying to consultants and brokers
helping design benefit plans for employer-sponsored health
care. The purpose of the legislation is to eliminate a conflict
of interest in the advice that employer plan sponsors are
receiving from trusted advisors.
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE COVERAGE
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
governs the operation of retirement, health, and welfare plans
sponsored by private employers covering 156 million workers,
retirees, and their families.\1\ These benefits are provided
through about 827,000 private retirement plans, 2.8 million
health plans, and 521,000 other welfare benefit plans, which
together hold approximately $15.2 trillion in assets. Of this,
the health plans alone hold more than $150 billion in assets
and cover about 136 million people.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-
2027-V2-01.pdf (EBSA-140).
\2\https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/
statistics/retirement-bulletins/annual-report-on-self-insured-group-
health-plans-2025.pdf at 3, 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA) administers and enforces ERISA. ERISA
protects plan participants and beneficiaries and authorizes
participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of
Labor to enforce its provisions in federal court.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ERISA Sec. 502, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS
A pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) is a third-party
administrator of prescription drug programs for group health
plans, including ERISA health plans. PBMs are intermediaries in
the pharmaceutical supply chain stretching from drug
manufacturers through ERISA group health plans to about 90
million patients.\4\ PBM services include formulary design,
pharmacy network management, claims processing, and negotiation
of rebates or price concessions from drug manufacturers. In
this role, PBMs wield enormous power over pricing,
distribution, and whether a drug is accessible through a
patient's health plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/
ebsa20260129#::text=The%20U.S.%20
Department%20of%20Labor's%20Employee%20Benefits,with%20prescription%20dr
ugs%20
dispensed%20to%20the%20plan; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) describes one of the
largest pharmacy benefit managers as ``positioned at the center
of the intricate and opaque pharmaceutical distribution chain,
[wielding] significant influence over which drugs patients can
access and at what prices.''\5\ According to allegations filed
by the FTC, certain PBMs have engaged in anti-competitive
conduct that may inflate drug prices and increase PBM
compensation through rebate and other pricing arrangements.
PBMs receive compensation from self-insured group health plans
as well as other sources in the pharmaceutical supply chain.\6\
PBM compensation includes administrative fees, rebates, and
``spread pricing'' discounts from the pharmaceutical supply
chain.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-12/pdf/2026-
02844.pdf.
\6\https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-30/pdf/2026-
01907.pdf.
\7\Spread pricing refers to the difference between the amount the
PBM charges to the group health plan and the amount the PBM pays the
pharmaceutical company. See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf at 4351-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The HELP Subcommittee held a hearing on April 22, 2026,
about PBM fees paid to consultants and brokers for steering
employers to PBMs. Federal regulators have also expressed
concerns that PBM compensation structures, including payments
to brokers and consultants, create conflicts of interest in
plan design.\8\ Fiduciaries for ERISA-covered self-insured
group health plans often rely on a trusted broker or consultant
for advice and recommendations on PBM services.\9\ President
Trump has cited PBM steering fees paid to brokers as critical
issues affecting transparency and competition in prescription
drug markets.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\DOL, Fact Sheet: Proposed Pharmacy Benefit Manager Fee
Disclosure (Jan. 2026) (stating that DOL's proposed PBM rule would
require PBM-affiliated brokers and consultants to disclose direct and
indirect compensation associated with PBM arrangements), https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
fact-sheets/proposed-
pharmacy-benefit-manager-fee-disclosure-rule.
\9\https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/30/2026-01907/
improving-transparency-into-pharmacy-benefit-manager-fee-disclosure at
4349.
\10\https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-
president-donald-j-trump-
announces-actions-to-lower-prescription-drug-prices/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARISING FROM BROKER AND CONSULTANT COMPENSATION
PRACTICES
Given the complexity of PBM contracting and pricing
arrangements, many employers rely on brokers and consultants to
help design health plans, select PBMs, and monitor PBM
performance. However, some financial relationships among PBMs,
brokers, and consultants may create conflicts of interest that
are not readily apparent to plan sponsors.
On April 22, 2026, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
entitled ``Profits Over Patients: The PBM Business Model Under
Scrutiny'' to examine these compensation arrangements and their
impact on employer sponsored health plans.\11\ The hearing
demonstrated that payments from PBMs to brokers and consultants
can create direct financial incentives for advisors to steer
employer health plans toward particular PBMs. Witnesses
testified that some brokers and consultants, while purporting
to advise plan fiduciaries, receive compensation from the very
PBMs they are retained to evaluate. Mr. James Gelfand,
President and CEO of the ERISA Industry Committee, testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\https://edworkforce.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=413217.
Unfortunately, we have been made aware of a troubling
practice wherein some, not all, but some brokers,
consultants and advisors who are supposed to advise
employer plans are actually paid what appear to be
kickbacks from the very vendors they are supposed to be
sorting through and fairly evaluating. These
arrangements create clear conflicts of interest, and
undermine employers' ability to make informed cost-
effective decisions for our beneficiaries. The
kickbacks in the form of fees, commissions, overrides
and even per prescription cost add-ons, drive costs
higher and have the potential to prioritize revenue
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
over value in the vendor selection process.
Mr. Gelfand further testified that ``a ban would be more
effective than simple transparency.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id.
Mrs. Chris Deacon, founder of VerSan Consulting,
testified that ``the current kickback pay to play model
is failing employees, employers and taxpayers.'' She
provided concrete examples of the compensation
arrangements at issue, explaining that some PBM
procurement documents ask whether a bidder will pay a
broker $50,000 annually over the life of the contract
and that employers may never see bidders who refuse to
make such payments. She further testified that, in one
example, CVS Caremark agreed to pay Gallagher Benefit
Services, Inc., $2.50 per retail prescription and $7
per mail or specialty prescription filled by group
health plan members. According to Mrs. Deacon, this
arrangement ``does not reward reducing cost, nor does
it reward reducing utilization.'' Mrs. Deacon said that
instead the arrangement ``rewards increased volume and
handsomely rewards increased volume filled through
those channels that generate the highest profits for
PBMs and their affiliates.'' She also testified that
``disclosures alone here are really insufficient.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Id.
Dr. Mariana Socal, Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins
University Bloomberg School of Public Health, testified that
PBM payments to consultants create structural conflicts of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interest. Specifically, she testified:
[T]hese consultants often get paid by the PBMs that
ultimately get selected. This can create a conflict of
interest, incentivizing some consultants to prefer the
PBM that pays the most, not necessarily the PBM that
provides the best option for the plan.''
Professor Socal concluded that ``Congress should prohibit
such payments to avoid this conflict of interest.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Hannah Anderson, Director, Healthy America Policy and
Senior Director of Policy at the America First Policy Institute
similarly testified that broker and consultant compensation
arrangements can undermine independent advice provided to
employers. She stated:
[Employers] often turn to brokers and consultants to
help them offer a more competitive benefits package . .
. to stretch the company's dollar further, getting
lower costs, greater coverage and better health for the
employee population. However, that's not been the case.
The problem is that those consultants [the employers]
rely on to select PBMs are not always independent.
Reports have found that [those consultants] often take
more in kickbacks from the PBMs than they do payments
by the plan sponsors.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\Id.
She further testified, ``Disclosure alone is not enough
when the underlying financial perverse incentive still
exists.'' She explained that H.R. 7895 ``ends the structural
incentive, not just requires the disclosure of it.''
H.R. 7895
H.R. 7895 eliminates kickbacks from PBMs to brokerage
middlemen that deceptively raise the cost of health
insurance.\16\ The legislation does this through ERISA's
current prohibited transaction provisions, which work in a two-
step process. The first step in ERISA is an absolute
prohibition on transactions between the plan and related
parties, referred to in ERISA as ``parties in interest.''\17\
Because a service provider is a party in interest,\18\ the
prohibited transaction provisions in ERISA categorically bar a
service provider (such as a PBM) from providing services to an
ERISA plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-
Great-Healthcare-Plan.pdf.
\17\ERISA Sec. 406(a), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a).
\18\ERISA Sec. 3(14)(B), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(14)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second step of ERISA's two step framework relates to
``exemptions'' or exceptions to the prohibited transaction
rules. ERISA separately enumerates 21 ``statutory exemptions''
to prohibited transactions.\19\ ERISA provides that the
Secretary of Labor may also grant additional ``administrative
exemptions'' to the prohibited transaction rules.\20\ The
Secretary has promulgated hundreds of administrative exemptions
under ERISA.\21\ ERISA further provides a statutory exemption
(the ``Service Provider Exemption'') for ``contracting or
making reasonable arrangements'' with a service provider for
``services necessary for the . . . operation of the plan, if no
more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Statutory exemptions are in ERISA Sec. 408(b), 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 1108(b).
\20\The Secretary of Labor's authority to grant administrative
exemptions is conditional upon a finding that the exemption is
protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries. ERISA
Sec. 408(a), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(a).
\21\Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 604 U.S. 693, 705 (2025).
\22\Statutory exemptions are in ERISA Sec. 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 1108(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effect of H.R. 7895 is to render ERISA's Service
Provider Exemption unavailable in the event that a PBM
compensates a broker or consultant in the form of a kickback or
a referral fee. As a result, the underlying service arrangement
between the PBM and the group health plan constitutes a
prohibited transaction under ERISA.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ERISA Sec. Sec. 406(a), 408(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1106(a),
1108(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Compensation arrangements between PBMs and brokers,
consultants, and similar advisers create conflicts of interest
that may distort PBM procurement, reduce transparency, and
increase costs for employer-sponsored health plans and their
participants. Disclosure requirements, while important, do not
fully address the underlying incentives created by these
arrangements. Accordingly, PBMs should be prohibited from
compensating brokers, consultants, advisors, or similar
intermediaries in exchange for steering employer health plan
business to a PBM.
Summary
SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY
Section 1--Short title
Section 1 provides that the short title is ``PBM Kickback
Prohibition Act.''
Section 2--Prohibition on pharmacy benefit manager kickbacks
Section 2(a)(I) of H.R. 7895 amends ERISA section 408(b)(2)
(29 U.S.C. 1108(b)(2)(B)) by adding a new clause (xi) to the
exemption for reasonable arrangements, supported by reasonable
compensation, for services necessary for the operation of the
employee benefit plan.
Under section 2(a)(I) of the bill, new section
408(b)(2)(xi) of ERISA has three parts. The first part, ERISA
section 408(b)(2)(xi)(I), provides that in the case of a
contract or arrangement between a covered plan and a covered
service provider for pharmacy benefit management services, no
amount of compensation may be paid, directly or indirectly, by
such service provider to a brokerage firm, broker, consultant,
advisor, or any other individual for the following:
the referral, recommendation, placement,
retention, or renewal of--or access to--the business of
the covered plan or health insurance issuer offering
health insurance for the covered plan; or
inclusion in, participation in, or the
design of a request for proposal; a market check; an
evaluation; the volume, value, or use of covered plan
business; or any other contracting process.
This language prohibits payments from PBMs to consultants
or brokers for the business of group health plans whether
individually, or in the aggregate, and whether characterized as
something other than a steering or referral fee.
New section 408(b)(2)(xi)(I) of ERISA also provides that
compensation paid by PBMs to brokers and consultants in
connection with group health plan business will be covered by
the prohibition regardless of how that compensation is
characterized or whether that compensation is paid directly by
the PBM or through an intermediary.
New section 408(b)(1) of ERISA further provides that
compensation paid by a covered service provider to a brokerage
firm, broker, consultant, advisor, or related entity will be
presumed to be compensation prohibited under ERISA section
2(a)(I) unless the parties demonstrate, through contemporaneous
written documentation, that the compensation reflects fair
market value for bona fide services actually rendered and is
not related, directly or indirectly, to compensation prohibited
by ERISA section 2(a)(I).
Additional Views
INTRODUCTION
H.R. 7895, the PBM Kickback Prohibition Act, amends the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act\1\ (ERISA) to prohibit
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) from paying referral fees to
brokers, consultants, and similar entities. In doing so, the
legislation takes a modest step to address inappropriate
compensation arrangements and potential conflicts of interest
between brokers and consultants and PBMs that raise costs for
both workers and employers alike. In previous congresses, the
Committee on Education and Workforce (Committee) worked in a
bipartisan manner to develop meaningful legislation that
addresses related challenges that employer-sponsored health
plans confront when working with PBMs. However, rather than
engage in such a process in developing and advancing H.R. 7895,
the Majority chose to proceed through a rushed, partisan
approach that dismisses Democratic suggestions for improvements
to this legislation. As a result, both the introduced and
reported versions of H.R. 7895 are inadequate to address the
scope of the problem the bill seeks to address. Instead, the
bill serves primarily as a partisan talking point to promote
President Trump's so-called ``Great Healthcare Plan.''\2\
Committee Democrats supported the legislation because it is a
small step toward addressing misaligned incentives in health
care. However, moving forward, the legislation should be
improved to ensure that it meaningfully addresses the full
scope of conflicts of interest among health plan service
providers such as insurance companies, third party
administrators, and other middlemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Pub. L. No. 93-406 (1974).
\2\The Great Healthcare Plan, The White House (Jan. 2026), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Great-Healthcare-
Plan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RISING COSTS INCREASINGLY MAKE HEALTH CARE UNAFFORDABLE FOR CONSUMERS
High health care costs represent an urgent issue for
American consumers, who increasingly face unaffordable health
insurance premiums and out-of-pocket costs. In 2024, total
national health expenditures in the United States reached $5.3
trillion or 18.0 percent of gross domestic product.\3\
Americans' per capita health care spending has risen to
$14,775, approximately double the average amount spent per
capita in peer countries.\4\ These expenditures are heavily
driven by high prescription drug prices and the rates charged
by hospitals, physicians, and other providers.\5\ Additionally,
growing health care spending is also directly correlated with
rising administrative costs associated with middlemen,
particularly for individuals with private health coverage.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health
Expenditures 2024 Highlights 1 (2026), https://www.cms.gov/files/
document/highlights.pdf.
\4\Imani Telesford et al., How Does Health Spending in the U.S.
Compare to Other Countries?, Peterson-KFF Health Sys. Tracker (Mar. 11,
2026), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-
spending-u-s-compare-countries/.
\5\See Cong. Budget Off., The Prices That Commercial Health
Insurers and Medicare Pay for Hospitals' and Physicians' Services (Jan.
2022), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57778.
\6\See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Untangling the Complex Web:
Summary of a New Expert Perspective, Georgetown Ctr. on Health Ins.
Reforms (Nov. 19, 2025), https://chir.georgetown.edu/untangling-the-
complex-web-summary-of-a-new-expert-perspective/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately 181 million people in the United States
receive health coverage through an employment-based plan.\7\
Although individuals with job-based health benefits generally
express satisfaction with their plans,\8\ rising health care
costs present a substantial affordability challenge for
millions of workers and their families. Since 2015, the average
annual premium in an employer-sponsored family plan has risen
53 percent, reaching $26,993 in 2025.\9\ The average general
annual deductible for single coverage in the employer market
has increased 42.9 percent over the last decade, growing from
$1,320 in 2015 to $1,886 in 2025.\10\ These rising costs
continue to squeeze workers and their families, and addressing
the drivers of these costs should be a top priority for
Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Lisa N. Bunch & Halelujha Ketema, Health Insurance Coverage in
the United States: 2024 2 (Sept. 2025), https://www2.census.gov/
library/publications/2025/demo/p60-288.pdf.
\8\What Leads to Greater Satisfaction With Health Plan Coverage?,
Emp. Benefits Rsch. Inst. 1 (Apr. 6, 2023), https://www.ebri.org/docs/
default-source/fast-facts/ff-463-cehcs7-6 apr23.pdf?sfvrsn=c599392f_2.
\9\2025 Employer Health Benefits Survey 35, KFF (Oct. 22, 2025),
https://files.kff.org/
attachment/Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-2025-Annual-Survey.pdf.
\10\Id. at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEALTH PLAN SERVICE PROVIDERS OFTEN HAVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT
HARM CONSUMERS
Employers who sponsor health plans often rely on a range of
service providers to assist in administering and managing their
plans. While many such service providers play a valuable role
in delivering benefits, their business models have also been
described as ``a complex web of common ownership, contracting
arrangements, and financial deals which create an array of
conflicts of interests and hidden flows of money.''\11\ These
business models can have an inflationary effect on health care
spending, ultimately at the expense of consumers who must
shoulder rising premiums and cost-sharing.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Blumberg et al., supra note 6.
\12\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PBMs, which are the primary focus of H.R. 7895, are one
such type of service provider. They contract with health plans
to perform a number of services related to the administration
of prescription drug benefits, including developing and
maintaining lists of covered drugs (formularies), negotiating
prices and rebates with drug manufacturers, and reimbursing
pharmacies for drugs dispensed to plan participants.\13\ The
opaqueness of PBM practices has received substantial scrutiny
in recent years, resulting in major legislative reforms enacted
by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026\14\
and a proposed rule issued by the U.S. Department of Labor
earlier this year.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Christopher J. Sroka, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Cong. Rsch.
Serv. (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20001129_RL30754_ae8115ed5c22ac5d657bb297e78f9a
8b62bd060f.pdf.
\14\Pub. L. No. 119-75, div. J, tit. VII (2026).
\15\Improving Transparency Into Pharmacy Benefit Manager Fee
Disclosure, 91 Fed. Reg. 4,348 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-30/pdf/2026-01907.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, PBMs are just one component of the ``complex web''
of middlemen whose business models harm consumers and employers
alike. For example, the majority of workers with job-based
health benefits are covered through a self-insured plan, in
which the employer bears the financial risk, rather than an
insurer.\16\ Due to the complexity of administering such plans,
employers generally contract with third party administrators
(TPAs) to perform critical functions with respect to the
plans.\17\ These TPAs are often owned by commercial insurers
that, in turn, often own hospitals and physician groups,
creating structural conflicts of interest that misalign
incentives to the detriment of both plan sponsors and
workers.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Christine Monahan, Questionable Conduct: Allegations Against
Insurers Acting as Third-Party Administrators, Georgetown Ctr. on
Health Ins. Reforms (Mar. 24, 2023), https://chir.georgetown.edu/
questionable-conduct-allegations-insurers-acting-third-party-
administrators/.
\17\Karen Handorf et al., Third-Party Administrators--The Middlemen
of Self-Funded Health Insurance, Georgetown Ctr. on Health Ins. Reforms
(May 28, 2025), https://chir.georgetown.edu/third-party-administrators-
the-middlemen-of-self-funded-health-insurance/.
\18\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payments from these service providers to brokers and
consultants are one such example of potential conflict of
interest. A 2023 article in Stat investigated the fees paid by
PBMs to certain brokers and consultants who encouraged their
clients to contract with PBMs from whom they received such
payments.\19\ However, this article highlights just one
instance of such fees steering plans toward favored service
providers. In 2019, for example, ProPublica found that insurers
frequently pay commissions to brokers based on the number of
employers they enroll in coverage.\20\ These fees are
substantial, often between three to six percent of the plans'
premiums, creating an incentive to further drive up health care
spending.\21\ Similar compensation arrangements, regardless of
whether the payments are made by PBMs or any other service
provider, steer health plans toward service providers who
generate profits for brokers and consultants but may not be the
best choice for employers and workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Bob Herman, It's Beyond unethical' Opaque Conflicts of Interest
Permeate Prescription Drug Benefits, Stat (June 23, 2023), https://
www.statnews.com/2023/06/20/pbms-consulting-firms-
investigation/.
\20\Marshall Allen, Behind the Scenes, Health Insurers Use Cash and
Gifts to Sway Which Benefits Employers Choose, ProPublica (Feb. 20,
2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-
insurance-brokers-cost-commissions-bonuses.
\21\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE COMMITTEE HAS PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN A BIPARTISAN MANNER TO IMPROVE
TRANSPARENCY
The Committee has a long history of working in a bipartisan
manner to address problems in employer-sponsored health plans.
These efforts have resulted in meaningful reforms that increase
transparency and have protected consumers from the rising costs
of health care.
During the 116th Congress, the Committee negotiated and
advanced H.R. 5800, the Ban Surprise Billing Act,\22\
introduced by Rep. Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA) and Rep.
Virginia Foxx (R-NC). This legislation addressed the pernicious
issue of surprise medical billing by out-of-network health care
providers and relied on a benchmark payment rate that would
help keep prices down. Additionally, it shined a light on
excessive fees and conflicts of interest among service
providers such as brokers, consultants, PBMs, and TPAs by
requiring disclosure of direct and indirect compensation to
plan fiduciaries. Several provisions of the
ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, 2021 (CAA 2021)\23\ incorporated the
Committee's efforts, including groundbreaking service provider
disclosure requirements added to section 408(b)(2) of ERISA.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\See Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. BB (2020).
\24\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B).
\22\H. Rept. No. 116-615 at 49 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 118th Congress, the Committee took a number of
additional actions to reduce costs and address conflicts of
interest, including the markup of a package of bills relating
to transparency. These bills included H.R. 2401, the Hidden Fee
Disclosure Act, introduced by Rep. Joe Courtney (D-CT) and Rep.
Erin Houchin (R-IN), which strengthened the 408(b)(2)
disclosure requirements to ensure that plan fiduciaries have
information needed to responsibly monitor TPAs and PBMs for
conflicts of interest. Additionally, H.R. 4507, the
Transparency in Coverage Act, introduced by Rep. Bob Good (R-
VA) and Rep. Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), improved transparency by,
among other reforms, requiring PBMs to disclose their rebates,
fees, alternative discounts, and other remuneration. This
bipartisan work contributed to the enactment of similar reforms
in the 119th Congress as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2026 (CAA 2026),\25\ including similar PBM
reporting requirements and a clarification of which service
providers must fully disclose their direct and indirect
compensation under section 408(b)(2).\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Pub. L. No. 119-75 (2026).
\26\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B)(ii)(bb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE MAJORITY'S PARTISAN APPROACH TO H.R. 7895 HAS RESULTED IN
INADEQUATE LEGISLATION
Despite this history of working in a bipartisan manner, the
Majority has regrettably chosen to advance H.R. 7895 through a
partisan process and without input from Democrat Members. As a
result, the bill fails to fully advance a comprehensive policy
that addresses the needs of workers and employers alike. H.R.
7895's deficiencies could have been addressed had the Majority
chosen to engage in a deliberate, bipartisan process.
This legislation seeks to address the single PBM business
practice of referral fees paid by PBMs to certain brokers and
consultants that create an incentive to steer clients to those
same PBMs. Unfortunately, the introduced version of the
legislation was flawed in addressing even this limited issue.
For example, rather than encompass the wide range of ways in
which PBMs could structure or characterize such payments to
brokers and consultants, the bill instead relies upon the
undefined concept of ``referral'' of a client's business to a
PBM. Experts noted that this would allow PBMs and brokers,
consultants, and similar entities to simply characterize these
payments as something else, such as a ``consulting service'' or
another label, and evade the bill's prohibition entirely.\27\
Fortunately, this particular deficiency was corrected through
last minute changes to the text in the Amendment in the Nature
of a Substitute (ANS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\Terence Park et al., The PBM Kickback Prohibition Act: Well-
Intentioned but Potentially Ineffective Reform, Frier Levitt (Apr. 3,
2026), https://www.frierlevitt.com/articles/pbm-kickback-prohibition-
act-erisa-plan-sponsors/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, even with this change in the ANS, the Majority's
exclusive focus on PBMs falls short of addressing the scope of
the problem facing workers and employers. As noted previously,
it has been documented that brokers and consultants receive
payments from service providers other than PBMs, including
insurers and third party administrators, that steer employers
to such service providers.\28\ The Committee understood this
fact when advancing the Ban Surprise Billing Act on a
bipartisan basis.\29\ That bill improved transparency with
respect to such payments in the form of compensation received
from ``any [indirect] source'' and certain provisions were
enacted into law in the CAA 2021.\30\ Regrettably, H.R. 7895
fails to incorporate this previous bipartisan approach to
address a much broader problem and instead only proposes to
prohibit these payments with respect to PBMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\See Allen, supra note 20.
\29\Ban Surprise Billing Act, H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. (2020).
\30\29 U.S.C. Sec. 1108(b)(2)(B)(ii)(dd)(CC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Majority has not provided a satisfactory explanation
for this approach. During the Markup of H.R. 7895, Rep.
DeSaulnier expressed concern that the bill's narrow scope
failed to address compensation received from other service
providers that present a potential conflict of interest.\31\ He
offered an amendment that would have ensured that the kickback
prohibition applies to all covered service providers described
in section 408(b)(2) of ERISA, consistent with the Committee's
past, bipartisan approach. In opposing the amendment, Health,
Employment, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee Chair Rick Allen
(R-GA) offered no substantive explanation for the Majority's
position. In fact, he seemed to concede that the issue remains
unaddressed by H.R. 7895 but noted that, rather than tackle
this problem, the Committee should defer to the policy wishes
of the Trump White House, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Comm. on Educ. and Workforce Democrats, Markup: H.R. 8736, H.R.
8705, H.R. 7362, H.R. 7895, H.R. 8684, YouTube at 2:42:47 (May 21,
2026), https://youtu.be/o_KSOp_SvLI.
Cracking down on PBMs paying kickbacks to consultants
and brokers is a key feature of President Trump's
``Great Healthcare Plan.'' Other entities may also be
making steering payments to brokers and consultants.
However, to address PBMs' pharmaceutical monopoly we
must keep the scope of this bill focused on PBMs to
lower costs as part of the President's ``Great
Healthcare Plan.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Id. at 2:45:33.
It is regrettable that the Majority would defer to a 22-
word bullet point contained in President Trump's so-called
``Great Healthcare Plan,''\33\ rather than develop legislation
that meets the needs of the American people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
Addressing the growing cost of health care in the United
States requires legislation that results in reforms that
meaningfully address the problems presented. Committee
Democrats supported H.R. 7895 because it represents a small
step toward addressing misaligned incentives and improving
employer-sponsored health care. However, the legislation should
be improved to ensure that it meaningfully addresses the full
scope of conflicts of interest among health plan service
providers such as insurance companies, third party
administrators, and other middlemen. Moving forward, the
Committee should work to advance legislation that goes beyond
the narrow scope of H.R. 7895 and consider these important
issues in a more comprehensive manner. I hope the Majority will
work with us to improve H.R. 7895 as it moves forward in the
House.
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott,
Ranking Mem