Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 5267]
The Committee on Education and Workforce, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5267) to preserve the franchise
business model, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``American Franchise Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) A franchise is a commercial relationship under which a
franchisee acquires the right to operate an independent
business that offers, sells, or distributes goods or services
using a franchisor's system of operations, which typically
includes the franchisor's business system and marketing plan,
and its service mark, trademark, trade dress, or trade name.
(2) To protect the integrity of its system of operations, a
franchisor must set and enforce uniform quality, marketing, and
operational standards that govern its use. Doing so helps
maintain consistency and uniformity in the nature and quality
of the goods and services distributed under the franchisor's
trademarks. That consistency and uniformity, in turn, help
ensure that consumer expectations are satisfied, increase the
value of the franchisor's brand, and enhance the recognition
and profitability of individual franchises.
(3) Although franchisees must comply with these standards,
franchisees are independent business owners. It is the
franchisee who determines how to implement the franchisor's
standards, controlling on a day-to-day basis the operations of
its franchise and its labor relations.
(4) The economic impact of this business model has been
profound. According to a September 2023 report from Oxford
Economics, in 2022, the economic output of franchise
establishments in the United States was approximately
$825,000,000,000. During that year, franchises employed
approximately 5 percent of all workers in the United States,
which was approximately 8,400,000 workers.
(5) Inconsistent and expansive views of what constitutes a
``joint employer'' have impacted the viability of franchising
by creating joint employer liability based on the franchisor's
exercise of control that is inherent in franchise
relationships.
SEC. 3. CLARIFICATION OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT FOR FRANCHISING.
(a) National Labor Relations Act.--The National Labor Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 20. CLARIFICATION OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT FOR FRANCHISING.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Direct and immediate control.--The term `direct and
immediate control' means the following with respect to each
respective essential term and condition of employment:
``(A) Wages.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over wages if it actually determines
the wage rates, salary, or other rate of pay that is
paid to individual employees of a franchisee or job
classifications of employees of a franchisee.
``(B) Benefits.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over benefits if it actually
determines the fringe benefits to be provided or
offered to a franchisee's employees. Such direct and
immediate control--
``(i) includes selecting the benefit plans
(such as health insurance plans and pension
plans) or level of benefits provided to a
franchisee's employees; and
``(ii) does not include permitting a
franchisee, under an arm's-length contract, to
participate in a benefits plan of the
franchisor.
``(C) Hours of work.--A franchisor exercises direct
and immediate control over hours of work if it actually
determines work schedules or the work hours, including
overtime, of a franchisee's employees. Such direct and
immediate control does not include--
``(i) establishing a franchisee's operating
hours; or
``(ii) establishing minimum staffing levels
to satisfy the franchise's service standards.
``(D) Hiring.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over hiring if it actually determines
which particular employees will be hired or which
employees will not be hired. Such direct and immediate
control does not include--
``(i) encouraging, recommending, or
requesting changes in staffing levels to
accomplish tasks; or
``(ii) setting minimal recruiting and hiring
standards, such as those required by law, for
consumer or employee safety, or for brand
protection.
``(E) Discharge.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over discharge if it actually decides
to terminate the employment of an employee of a
franchisee. Such direct and immediate control does not
include--
``(i) bringing misconduct or poor performance
to the attention of a franchisee that makes the
actual discharge decision;
``(ii) expressing a negative opinion of a
franchisee's employee; or
``(iii) setting minimal standards of
performance or conduct, such as those required
by law, for consumer or employee safety, or for
brand protection.
``(F) Discipline.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over discipline if it actually
decides to suspend or otherwise discipline a
franchisee's employee. Such direct and immediate
control does not include--
``(i) bringing misconduct or poor performance
to the attention of a franchisee that makes the
actual disciplinary decision;
``(ii) expressing a negative opinion of a
franchisee's employee;
``(iii) refusing to allow a franchisee's
employee to perform work under a franchise
offer or contract; or
``(iv) setting minimal standards of
performance or conduct, such as those required
by law, for consumer or employee safety or for
brand protection.
``(G) Supervision.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over supervision by consistently and
directly instructing a franchisee's employees how to
perform their work or by actually issuing employee
performance appraisals. Such direct and immediate
control does not include--
``(i) providing instructions to a
franchisee's employees that--
``(I) are limited and routine; and
``(II) consist primarily of telling a
franchisee's employees what work to
perform, or where and when to perform
the work, but not how to perform the
work;
``(ii) setting brand standards for the
performance of the work;
``(iii) offering training materials
(including training demonstrations) for a
franchisee to use in training the employees of
the franchisee; or
``(iv) establishing minimum training
requirements for the employees of a franchisee.
``(H) Direction.--A franchisor exercises direct and
immediate control over direction by assigning
particular employees of a franchisee their individual
work schedules, positions, and tasks. Such direct and
immediate control does not include offering resources
and tools for a franchisee to consider using to direct
the work schedules, positions, and tasks of the
employees of the franchisee.
``(2) Essential terms and conditions of employment.--The term
`essential terms and conditions of employment' means wages,
benefits, hours of work, hiring, discharge, discipline,
supervision, and direction.
``(3) Franchise; franchisee; franchisor.--The terms
`franchise', `franchisee', and `franchisor' have the meanings
given such terms in section 436.1 of title 16, Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of this
section.
``(4) Substantial direct and immediate control.--The term
`substantial direct and immediate control'--
``(A) means direct and immediate control that has a
regular or continuous consequential effect on an
essential term and condition of employment of a
franchisee's employees; and
``(B) does not include direct and immediate control
that is only exercised on a sporadic, isolated, or de
minimis basis.
``(b) Joint Employment.--For the purposes of this Act, a franchisor
may be considered a joint employer of the employees of a franchisee
only if the franchisor possesses and exercises substantial direct and
immediate control over one or more essential terms and conditions of
employment of the employees of the franchisee.''.
(b) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.--The Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of the
following:
``SEC. 20. CLARIFICATION OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT FOR FRANCHISING.
``(a) In General.--For purposes of this Act, a franchisor may be
considered a joint employer of the employees of a franchisee only if
the franchisor meets the criteria for a joint employer with a
franchisee under section 20 of the National Labor Relations Act, except
that, for purposes of determining joint-employer status under this Act,
the terms `employee' and `employer' referenced in section 20 of the
National Labor Relations Act shall have the meanings given such terms
in section 3 of this Act.''.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `franchisor' and
`franchisee' have the meanings given such terms in section 20(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act.''.
SEC. 4. APPLICABILITY.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall not apply to any
proceeding that is commenced before the date of enactment of this Act.
Purpose
H.R. 5267, American Franchise Act, amends the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
to provide a standard for determining whether a joint
employment relationship exists between a franchisor and
franchisee.
Committee Action
114TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearings
On August 25, 2015, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor, and Pensions (HELP) held a field hearing titled
``Redefining `Employer' and the Impact on Alabama's Workers and
Small Business Owners'' in Mobile, Alabama. Witnesses were Mr.
Marcel Debruge, Burr and Forman LLP, Birmingham, Alabama; Mr.
Chris Holmes, CEO, CLH Development Holdings, Tallahassee,
Florida; and Col. Steve Carey, Owner and Operator, CertaPro
Painters of Mobile and Baldwin Counties, Daphne, Alabama,
testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local Businesses
and the International Franchise Association. Witnesses
testified that the new joint-employer standard would threaten
the independence of small businesses in Alabama and deter
franchisors from licensing new franchisees.
On August 27, 2015, the HELP Subcommittee held a field
hearing titled ``Redefining `Employer' and the Impact on
Georgia's Workers and Small Business Owners'' in Savannah,
Georgia. Witnesses were Mr. Jeffrey M. Mintz, Shareholder,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia; Mr. Kalpesh ``Kal''
Patel, President and COO, Image Hotels, Inc., Pooler, Georgia;
Mr. Alex Salgueiro, Savannah Restaurants Corp., Savannah,
Georgia; and Mr. Fred Weir, President, Meadowbrook Restaurant
Company Inc., Cumming, Georgia, testifying on behalf of the
Coalition to Save Local Businesses and the International
Franchise Association. Witnesses testified that the new joint-
employer standard would hurt small business growth in Georgia
and create barriers to entry for potential franchise owners.
On September 29, 2015, the HELP Subcommittee held a
legislative hearing on H.R. 3459 (114th Congress), Protecting
Local Business Opportunity Act. Witnesses were Mr. Ed Braddy,
President, Winlee Foods, LLC, Timonium, Maryland, testifying on
behalf of himself and the National Franchisee Association; Mr.
Kevin Cole, CEO, Enniss Electric Company, Manassas, Virginia,
testifying on behalf of the Independent Electrical Contractors;
Mr. Charles Cohen, Senior Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Ms. Mara Fortin, President and CEO,
Nothing Bundt Cakes, San Diego, testifying on behalf of herself
and the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Mr. Michael Harper,
Professor, Boston University School of Law, Boston,
Massachusetts; and Dr. Anne Lofaso, Professor, West Virginia
University College of Law, Morgantown, West Virginia. Witnesses
testified that H.R. 3459 would restore the joint-employer
standard that had worked well for workers and business owners
for decades and would protect opportunities for small business
growth.
Legislative Action
On September 9, 2015, then-Committee on Education and the
Workforce (Committee) Chairman John Kline (R-MN) introduced
H.R. 3459 (114th Congress), Protecting Local Business
Opportunity Act, with Representatives David P. Roe (R-TN), Tim
Walberg (R-MI), Virginia Foxx (R-VA), Todd Rokita (R-IN), Joe
Wilson (R-SC), Hunter D. Duncan (R-CA), Glenn Thompson (R-PA),
Matt Salmon (R-AZ), Brett Guthrie (R-KY), Lou Barletta (R-PA),
Joseph J. Heck (R-NV), Luke Messer (R-IN), Bradley Byrne (R-
AL), Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter (R-GA), Mike Bishop (R-MI), Glenn
Grothman (R-WI), Steve Russell (R-OK), Carlos Curbelo (R-FL),
Rick W. Allen (R-GA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), Blaine Luetkemeyer
(R-MO), Vicky Hartzler (R-MO), Jason Smith (R-MO), Cresent
Hardy (R-NV), and Stephen Knight (R-CA) as original cosponsors.
Recognizing the threat to small businesses posed by the
National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) August 2015 decision in
Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (Browning-
Ferris), the legislation amended the NLRA to restore the long-
held standard that two or more employers can only be considered
joint employers for purposes of the NLRA if each shares and
exercises control over essential terms and conditions of
employment and such control over these matters is actual,
direct, and immediate.
On October 28, 2015, the Committee considered H.R. 3459 in
legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 21-15.
Representative Carter offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, making a technical change to the bill, which was
adopted by voice vote.
115TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearings
On February 14, 2017, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
titled ``Restoring Balance and Fairness to the National Labor
Relations Board.'' Witnesses criticized decisions of the NLRB
during the Obama administration, including the expanded joint-
employer standard. Witnesses were Ms. Reem Aloul, BrightStar
Care of Arlington, Arlington, Virginia, testifying on behalf of
the Coalition to Save Local Businesses; Ms. Susan Davis,
Partner, Cohen, Weiss and Simon, LLP, New York; Mr. Raymond J.
LaJeunesse, Jr., Vice President, National Right to Work Legal
Defense and Education Foundation, Springfield, Virginia; and
Mr. Kurt G. Larkin, Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond,
Virginia.
On July 12, 2017, the Committee held a hearing titled
``Redefining Joint Employer Standards: Barriers to Job Creation
and Entrepreneurship.'' Witnesses were Mr. Michael Harper,
Professor, Boston University School of Law, Boston; Mr. Richard
Heiser, Vice President, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,
Chicago; Mr. G. Roger King, Senior Labor and Employment
Counsel, HR Policy Association, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Jerry
Reese II, Director of Franchise Development, Dat Dog, New
Orleans, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local
Businesses; Ms. Catherine K. Ruckelhaus, General Counsel,
National Employment Law Project, New York; and Ms. Mary Kennedy
Thompson, Chief Operating Officer of Franchise Brands, Dwyer
Group, Waco, Texas, testifying on behalf of the International
Franchise Association. Witnesses testified about the importance
of reining in expanded joint-employer standards.
On September 13, 2017, the HELP and Workforce Protections
subcommittees held a joint legislative hearing on H.R. 3441
(115th Congress), Save Local Business Act. Witnesses were Mr.
Zachary D. Fasman, Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York; Ms.
Tamra Kennedy, President, Twin Cities T.J.'s Inc., Roseville,
Minnesota, testifying on behalf of the Coalition to Save Local
Businesses; Mr. Granger MacDonald, Chief Executive Officer, The
MacDonald Companies, Kerrville, Texas, testifying on behalf of
the National Association of Home Builders; and Mr. Michael
Rubin, Partner, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco. Witnesses
testified that H.R. 3441 clarifies the joint-employer standard
used under both the NLRA and FLSA and benefits workers and
business owners.
Legislative Action
On July 27, 2017, then-Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections Chairman Bradley Byrne (R-AL) introduced H.R. 3441,
Save Local Business Act, with 29 original cosponsors. The bill
amended the NLRA and FLSA to provide that two or more employers
can only be considered joint employers if each shares and
exercises control over essential terms and conditions of
employment and such control over those matters is actual,
direct, and immediate.
On October 4, 2017, the Committee considered H.R. 3441 in
legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives by a recorded vote of 23-17.
Representative Byrne offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, making technical changes to the bill. The amendment
was adopted by voice vote.
117TH CONGRESS
Legislative Action
On May 13, 2021, Representative James Comer (R-KY)
introduced H.R. 3185 (117th Congress), Save Local Business Act,
with 54 original cosponsors. The bill set the standard by which
a worker may be considered employed by a joint employer under
the NLRA and FLSA.
118TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On December 13, 2023, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
titled ``Protecting Workers and Small Businesses from Biden's
Attack on Worker Free Choice and Economic Growth'' to examine
solutions to protect small businesses, including regarding the
joint-employer standard. Witnesses were Mr. G. Roger King,
Senior Labor and Employment Counsel, HR Policy Association,
Washington, D.C.; Mr. Matthew Haller, President and CEO,
International Franchise Association, Washington, D.C.; Mr. F.
Vincent Vernuccio, President, Institute for the American
Worker, Hamilton, Virginia; and Mr. Richard Griffin, Of
Counsel, Bredhoff and Kaiser, Washington, D.C.
Legislative Action
On April 25, 2023, Representative James Comer (R-KY)
introduced H.R. 2826 (118th Congress), Save Local Business Act,
with 61 original cosponsors. The bill set the standard by which
a worker may be considered employed by a joint employer under
the NLRA and FLSA.
119TH CONGRESS
First Session--Hearing
On June 11, 2025, the HELP Subcommittee held a hearing
titled ``Restoring Balance: Ensuring Fairness and Transparency
at the NLRB,'' which examined the NLRB's joint-employer
standard, among other topics. Witnesses were Mr. G. Roger King,
Senior Labor and Employment Counsel, HR Policy Association,
Washington, D.C.; Mr. F. Vincent Vernuccio, President,
Institute for the American Worker, Hamilton, Virginia; Mr.
Aaron Solem, Staff Attorney, National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation, Springfield, Virginia; and Ms. Jennifer
Abruzzo, Senior Advisor to the President, Communications
Workers of America, Washington D.C.
Legislative Action
On July 14, 2025, Representative James Comer (R-KY)
introduced H.R. 4366, Save Local Business Act, which sets the
standard by which a worker may be considered employed by a
joint employer under the NLRA and FLSA. On July 23, 2025, the
Committee considered H.R. 4366 in legislative session and
reported it favorably, as amended, to the House of
Representatives by a vote of 20-16. The Committee considered
the following amendments to H.R. 4366:
1. Representative Robert F. Onder (R-MO) offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, making
technical changes to the bill. The amendment was
adopted by voice vote.
2. Representative Alma S. Adams (D-NC) offered an
amendment to prevent the provision in the bill amending
the definition of employer under the FLSA from going
into effect in cases of unlawful child labor under the
FLSA. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 16-20.
On September 10, 2025, Representative Kevin Hern (R-OK)
introduced H.R. 5267, American Franchise Act, which was
referred solely to the Committee on Education and Workforce and
had 13 original cosponsors. The bill amends the NLRA and FLSA
to require that a franchisor may only be considered a joint
employer of the employees of a franchisee if the franchisor
exerts substantial direct and immediate control over one or
more of the essential terms and conditions of employment, which
the bill defines as meaning wages, benefits, hours of work,
hiring, discharge, discipline, supervision, and direction. On
July 21, 2026, the Committee considered H.R. 5267 in
legislative session and reported it favorably, as amended, to
the House of Representatives by a vote of 18-15. The Committee
considered the following amendments to H.R. 5267:
1. Delegate James C. Moylan (R-Guam) offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, making
technical changes to the bill. The amendment was
adopted by voice vote.
2. Ranking Member Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott (D-VA)
offered an amendment to establish the right of
franchisees to sue franchisors for damages if the
franchisee is found liable for NLRA or FLSA violations
due to franchisor-mandated policies or guidance. The
amendment failed by a recorded vote of 15-18.
3. Ranking Member Scott offered an amendment to
strike the bill's definition of joint employment under
the NLRA. The amendment also replaced the bill's
definition of joint employment under the NLRA to
consider as relevant reserved authority to control
terms and conditions of employment. The amendment
failed by a recorded vote of 15-18.
Committee Views
INTRODUCTION
The joint-employer standard can impact any business that
contracts with another business, such as franchisors and
franchisees, contractors and subcontractors, suppliers, and
other businesses. The test for determining when two or more
entities are to be considered joint employers has fluctuated
with presidential administrations for the last decade, sowing
chaos for job creators. During the first Trump administration,
the NLRB and Department of Labor (DOL) reversed disastrous
Obama-era policies regarding the joint-employer standard and
promulgated commonsense rules that limited liability for job
creators.\1\ However, the Biden-Harris NLRB replaced the first
Trump administration NLRB's joint-employer final rule,
destabilizing this area of the law again. H.R. 5267, American
Franchise Act, would stabilize this area of the law for the
franchise industry.
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\1\Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85
Fed. Reg. 11,184 (Feb. 26, 2020); Joint Employer Status under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 40,939 (Jan. 16, 2020).
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THE NLRB JOINT EMPLOYER STANDARD
The NLRA's purpose is to protect the rights of most
private-sector employees to organize and collectively bargain
with their employers, or to refrain from those activities; to
minimize industrial strife; and to curtail certain behaviors of
labor and management deemed harmful to the general welfare of
workers, businesses, and the economy overall. The NLRB is an
independent federal agency established by the NLRA to fulfill
two principal functions: (1) to determine whether employees
wish to be represented by a union and (2) to prevent and remedy
employer and union unlawful acts.
From 1984 to 2015, the NLRB determined whether two separate
entities should be considered joint employers by analyzing
whether the entities shared control over or co-determined the
essential terms and conditions of employment.\2\ Essential
terms and conditions of employment could include hiring,
firing, discipline, supervision, and direction of employees.
Prior to 2015, each entity's control over these employment
matters needed to be ``actual, direct, and immediate'' for the
Board to find two or more entities to be joint employers.\3\
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\2\TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798, 798-99 (1984), overruled by Browning-
Ferris Indus. (BFI), 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015).
\3\See Airborne Express, 338 NLRB 597, 597 n.1 (2002) (``[The]
essential element in [joint employer] analysis is whether a putative
joint employer's control over employment matters is direct and
immediate.''); AM Prop. Holding Corp., 350 NLRB 998, 1000 (2007) (``In
assessing whether a joint employer relationship exists, the Board . . .
looks to the actual practice of the parties.'').
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In 2015, the NLRB issued its decision in Browning-Ferris
Industries, radically revising the joint-employer standard.\4\
Under this standard, companies sharing indirect or potential
control over another entity's workforce may be considered joint
employers. Practically, an entity could be held liable for the
decisions of another entity--whether or not the first entity
was even aware of the second entity's decisions and activities.
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\4\BFI, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015).
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During the first Trump administration, the NLRB promulgated
a rule restoring the historic, direct-control standard and
effectively overruled Browning-Ferris.\5\ In 2023, however, the
Biden-Harris NLRB issued a final rule of its own,\6\ largely
reviving the Obama-era Browning-Ferris standard.\7\ The 2023
Biden-Harris rule rescinded and replaced the Trump NLRB's
joint-employer rule.\8\
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\5\Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85
Fed. Reg. 11,184 (Feb. 26, 2020).
\6\Standard for Determining Joint-Employer Status, 88 Fed. Reg.
53,946 (Oct. 27, 2023).
\7\BFI, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015).
\8\Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85
Fed. Reg. 11,184 (Feb. 26, 2020).
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Under the 2023 Biden-Harris NLRB rule, a joint-employer
relationship is established when employers codetermine, whether
directly or indirectly, employees' essential terms and
conditions of employment.\9\ In other words, under the Biden-
Harris NLRB rule, an entity can be considered a joint employer
even if it does not actually control the employees involved.
Any entity that exercises or even reserves the right to
exercise control, even indirect control, over at least one
essential term of employment is a joint employer under this
rule. As a practical matter, the 2023 Biden-Harris NLRB rule
treats most entities that contract for labor as joint employers
because nearly every contract for third-party labor includes
terms that bear on at least one of the specified essential
terms and conditions of employment. This sweeping joint-
employer rule was vacated by a Texas federal district court in
March 2024.\10\ In July 2024, the NLRB withdrew its appeal of
the district court's decision vacating the Biden-Harris NLRB
rule.\11\ On February 27, 2026, the NLRB issued a final rule
for determining joint-employer status under the NLRA, formally
rescinding the 2023 Biden rule and reinstating the Trump 2020
rule.\12\
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\9\Standard for Determining Joint Employer Status, 88 Fed. Reg.
73,946 (Oct. 27, 2023).
\10\Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. NLRB, 723 F. Supp. 3d 498 (E.D. Tex.
2024).
\11\https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-
abandons-bid-to-revive-joint-employer-regulation.
\12\https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-
03955/withdrawal-of-2023-standard-for-determining-joint-employer-
status.
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THE JOINT-EMPLOYER STANDARD UNDER THE FLSA
The FLSA is the primary federal statute establishing
standards for minimum wage, overtime pay, child labor,
recordkeeping, and other wage-and-hour standards covering over
140 million individuals, including most private and public-
sector employees.\13\ Congress delegates authority to DOL to
interpret the FLSA via regulations, but state wage-and-hour
laws are not preempted by the FLSA provided the states' laws
are more protective of employees.\14\ The FLSA also provides
for enforcement actions by DOL and private litigation brought
by employees against employers. The resulting decisions of
federal courts also shape the law.
---------------------------------------------
Background
Labor and employment laws have long held that, where more
than one entity controls terms and conditions of employment, an
employee may have multiple employers. This is referred to as
``joint employment.'' Under both the FLSA and NLRA, determining
joint employment relies on determining the degree of control an
entity exercises over a worker, regardless of whether it is
direct, indirect, or reserved control.\1\ A narrower definition
of joint employment would make it easier for low-road
businesses to evade liability for obligations under and
violations of the NLRA and FLSA. H.R. 5267 does exactly that
for franchisors.
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\1\``Reserved control'' is the right an employer retains to exert
control over an employee, even if it is not being currently exercised.
As summarized by the Supreme Court in the common law context, ``the
relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the
right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well
as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, `not only what
shall be done, but how it shall be done.''' Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn,
132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889) (quoting Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 649,
657 (1872)).
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THE FLSA AND JOINT EMPLOYMENT
Joint employment under the FLSA arises not only out of the
definition of employer, which ``includes any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee,''\2\ but also out of the broad
``suffer or permit'' definition of ``employ,'' which Congress
borrowed from the early state child labor laws of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.\3\ State authorities used this broad
language to hold businesses accountable for child labor
violations despite arrangements such as the ``inside shop,''
where a manufacturer might subdivide the departments of the
business into shops contracted out to other business operators,
who all nevertheless contributed to the manufacturer's
enterprise.\4\
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\2\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 203(d) (emphasis added).
\3\Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the
Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of
Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 991 (1999).
\4\Id. at 1057-58.
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The Supreme Court first examined FLSA joint employment in
the 1947 case Rutherford Food.\5\ In that case, a
slaughterhouse operator retained an independent contractor to
provide labor for a deboning process, and the deboning
contractor directly hired workers to perform that work.\6\ The
employees worked on the meatpacking company's premises,
received cattle carcasses from the meatpacking company's
employees, deboned the cattle using the meatpacking company's
tools and equipment, and then conveyed the deboned cattle along
an overhead rail to another room where the meatpacking
company's employees continued processing the carcasses into
food products.\7\ During this work, the deboning contractor's
employees were supervised by one of the meatpacking company's
``managing official[s].''\8\ Taking account of ``the
circumstances of the whole activity,'' the Court agreed with
the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division that the
deboning employees constituted ``a part of the integrated unit
of production under such circumstances that the workers
performing the task were employees of the establishment.''\9\
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\5\Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
\6\Id. at 724-25.
\7\Id. at 726, 730.
\8\Id. at 730.
\9\Id. at 729-730.
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More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit advised that scrutiny of potential joint employer
liability should focus less on the relationship between
business and worker and more on the interrelationships of the
businesses themselves.\10\ In Salinas, the Fourth Circuit
considered wage theft allegations brought by workers employed
by a drywall and framing subcontractor, which almost
exclusively worked on jobs for a construction contractor that
specialized in finishing interiors.\11\ Among other things, the
contractor assessed the final work product of the
subcontractor's employees and required the subcontractor to
order re-execution of work the contractor deemed insufficient;
mandated that the subcontractor's employees wear the
contractor's logo and hold themselves out as employees of the
contractor; and periodically instructed the subcontractor to
dispatch workers to meet the contractor's needs.\12\ Finding
that the contractor was indeed jointly liable with the
subcontractor for FLSA violations, the Salinas court clarified
that joint employment inquiry ``requires courts to determine
whether the putative joint employers are not wholly
disassociated or, put differently, share or codetermine the
essential terms and conditions of a worker's employment.''\13\
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\10\Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir.
2017).
\11\Id.
\12\Id. at 145-46.
\13\Id. at 139.
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Joint employment is not a major factor in FLSA cases. The
National Employment Law Project (NELP) reviewed FLSA
enforcement and litigation in 2019 and found:
there are not very many joint employer cases overall,
as compared to other FLSA cases, despite the [business
community's] pronouncements that the joint employer
question is harming business . . . . NELP's research
and case compendium of joint employer cases shows that
the majority arise in FLSA cases brought by
agricultural workers, and over half of all cases do not
result in a finding of joint and several liability.\14\
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\14\Christine Owens et al., Nat'l Emp. L. Proj., Comments on RIN
1235-AA26: Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 3
n.1 (June 25, 2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/app/uploads/2019/06/
Comments-USDOL-Joint-Employer-Status-FLSA.pdf.
In sum, establishing joint employment liability under the
FLSA is a comprehensive, case-by-case, and fact-specific
process that requires flexibility to ensure that in the cases
where joint employment liability is appropriate, workers can
receive the justice to which they are entitled.
THE NLRA AND JOINT EMPLOYMENT
The NLRA's definition of ``employer'' contemplates that
there can be joint employers in an employment relationship.
Under Section 2(2) of the Act, the term ``employer'' includes
``any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly.''\15\ Likewise, the term ``employee'' is not
limited to the employees of a particular employer. Section 2(3)
of the Act states: ``The term `employee' shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer, unless [the Act] explicitly states
otherwise.''\16\
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\15\See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2) (emphasis added).
\16\See id. Sec. 152(3).
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For most of the time since the 1935 enactment of the NLRA,
the NLRB has held that an entity may be liable to bargain with
the employees of a subcontractor as a joint employer even if
its control over terms and conditions of employment was
indirect, such as exercised through an intermediary, or
reserved but not yet exercised.\17\ This traditional standard
is consistent with the Supreme Court's requirement\18\ that the
NLRB interpret the NLRA's definition of employer as consistent
with the common law regarding the principles that govern
``master'' and ``servant'' relationships and that liability is
determined by the degree of control the ``master'' has over the
``servant.''\19\ The NLRA's joint employment standard is also
consistent with the legislative history of the NLRA's 1947
amendments, which explicitly aligned the NLRA's statutory
definition of employee with the common law standard.\20\
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\17\See, e.g., Floyd Epperson, 202 NLRB 23, 23 (1973) (finding
proof of joint employment where client employer had ``some indirect
control over [employees'] wages'' and ``some control, albeit indirect,
over [employee] discipline''), enforced 491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974);
Franklin Stores Corp., 199 NLRB 52, 53 (1972) (upholding ALJ finding of
joint employment where one employer, ``by virtue of the lease
arrangement with'' the other employer, ``has the right to veto the
employment of employees by'' the other ``and to insist on the discharge
of employees by'' the other).
\18\See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256
(1968) (requiring the Board to ``apply general agency principles in
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the
Act'').
\19\See Restatement (First) of Agency Sec. Sec. 2, 220, Am. Law
Inst. (1933).
\20\See H.R. Rep. No. 80-510, at 32-33 (1947) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, at 536-37 (1948) (explaining the exclusion of independent
contractors from the definition of employee in order to overturn a
Supreme Court decision that ``held that ordinary tests of the law of
agency could be ignored by the Board'' in determining the existence of
employment relationships).
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JOINT EMPLOYMENT AND THE FISSURED WORKPLACE
Joint employment is a flashpoint in labor and employment
law because of the recent trend toward ``fissuring,'' or the
disintegration of the firm through the use of overlapping
arrangements of contracting, subcontracting, franchising, and
temping.\21\ Fissuring is increasingly common in low wage
industries, including but not limited to logistics,\22\ food
service, retail, and janitorial services.\23\ Today, there are
nearly 9 million Americans working at over 800,000 individual
franchises.\24\ Fissured work arrangements are associated with
increased incidence of a host of workplace violations.\25\
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\21\See generally David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work
Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It (2014).
\22\See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell & Olivia LaVecchia, Amazon's
Stranglehold: How the Company's Tightening Grip Is Stifling
Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities (Nov. 2016),
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
ILSR_AmazonReport_final.pdf.
\23\See Catherine Ruckelshaus et al., Who's the Boss: Restoring
Accountability for Labor Standards in Outsourced Work, Nat'l Emp. Law
Proj. (May 7, 2014), https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2015/02/Whos-the-
Boss-Restoring-Accountability-Labor-Standards-Outsourced-Work-
Report.pdf.
\24\Franchising Economic Outlook, Int'l Franchise Ass'n (2026),
https://indd.adobe.com/view/c09364f3-8c80-4b2f-bbcc-56414924ae67.
\25\Weil, supra note 21.
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The rise of the ``fissured workplace'' makes FLSA
enforcement challenging. For example, it can be difficult for
workers experiencing wage theft at the bottom of a chain of
contracts to collect stolen wages when the nominal employer is
a fly-by-night staffing company. In such a case, the joint
employer theory allows workers to seek their stolen wages from
a larger company further up that chain, if that larger company
shares power over the terms of employment.
Fissuring can also weaken workers' bargaining power. Absent
the joint employment doctrine, workers hired by an intermediary
firm but laboring for a larger, more powerful firm with actual
control over their working conditions and wages will find it
difficult to bargain meaningfully.
THE FRANCHISE MODEL AND JOINT EMPLOYMENT
In the franchise business model, the corporate parent or
``franchisor'' allows an independent business owner, or
franchisee, to use its branding, business model, and other
intellectual property. In return, the franchisee agrees to pay
an upfront franchise fee, ongoing royalties, and is subject to
the terms of the franchise agreement that sets operating,
performance, and management standards for the franchisee.\26\
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\26\Introduction to the Franchise Business Model, Int'l Franchise
Ass'n, https://www.franchise.org/franchising-overview/introduction-to-
the-franchise-business-model/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2026).
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Despite claims that franchisees operate as independent
small businesses, corporate franchisors can and do exercise
significant amount of control over their franchisees. Through
franchise agreements, brand standards, and operational
requirements, franchisors often set operating hours, mandate
staffing levels, require specific scheduling or payroll
software, establish detailed rules for how work must be
performed, and restrict who may work under a franchise
agreement. For example, some fast-food franchisors provide
their franchises with extensive operation manuals that set
franchise requirements on everything from workers' training,
dress, and appearance to approved food and merchandise
suppliers to participation in advertising, sales promotions,
and required computer systems.\27\
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\27\Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, Univ. of
Pennsylvania Law Rev. Online (May 24, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903691.
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Franchisees are under immense pressure to conform with
franchisor standards and directives and risk losing their
businesses if they do not. This level of control and
supervision meaningfully constrains and directs how franchisees
conduct their day-to-day business and worker supervision.
Adding to franchisees' constrictions, the American Franchise
Act explicitly shields franchisors from any sort of liability
for these sorts of practices when determining joint employment
liability.
A Narrow Joint Employment Standard Will Harm Workers and Small
Businesses and Benefit Low-Road Employers
The American Franchise Act seeks to radically rewrite
longstanding law by amending the FLSA and NLRA to dramatically
narrow the standard for finding joint employer liability for
franchisors and franchisees. The bill would limit the finding
of joint employment liability to a franchisor's possession and
exercise of ``substantial direct and immediate control'' over
their franchisees' workers' terms and conditions of employment,
such as their pay, hiring, firing, and scheduling. While this
extremely narrow standard is problematic enough, the bill goes
a step further by also creating explicit safe harbors in which
certain actions that could normally be considered ``direct and
immediate control, are carved out from being indicators of
joint employment.
The bill would weaken enforcement under the FLSA, which
also governs federal wage theft and child labor laws. By
limiting FLSA liability only to franchisors that exercise
``substantial direct and immediate control,'' the American
Franchise Act would allow franchisors to evade liability for
unlawful business practices and technology requirements that
could result in wage theft and child labor violations. Instead,
the franchisee, who may be obligated to follow these unlawful
practices if it wishes to comply with its franchise agreement,
is left fully liable for any damages and other consequences
caused by the franchisor.
This bill would also severely limit how unionized workers
could effectively bargain over all of the terms and conditions
of their employment under the NLRA, which provides private-
sector workers the right to organize a union and collectively
bargain with their employer.\28\ Under common law, the employer
does not need to exercise substantial direct and immediate
control in order to determine the essential terms and
conditions of employment because a joint employer can limit the
wages and benefits paid by the employees' direct employers
through contractual arrangements, such as salary caps. By
narrowing joint employment liability to only franchisors that
exercise ``substantial direct and immediate control,'' workers
for the franchisee would be unable to bargain with the
franchisor that determines wages and other conditions, and the
franchisee would be unable to meaningfully bargain with its
employees on its own.
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\28\See generally 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151-169.
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The American Franchise Act would also create a safe harbor
for franchisors to engage in worker retaliation. The bill
allows franchisors to supervise a franchisee's workers--so long
as it is not ``consistently and directly''\29\ exercised--and
inform the franchisee of their ``opinions'' on the performance
of employees, and whether they meet acceptable standards.
Through this safe harbor, a franchisor could strongly encourage
a franchisee to terminate a worker engaged in union organizing
activity or who raises concerns about unlawful actions in the
workplace and face zero consequences.
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\29\The bill does not provide a definition of ``consistently and
directly'' and instead only lists examples of supervision that would
not constitute consistent and direct control, leaving a large degree of
uncertainty regarding what qualifies as consistent and direct control.
See American Franchise Act, H.R. 5267, 119th Cong. Sec. 20(a)(G)
(2025).
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In sum, the American Franchise Act is bad for workers, bad
for small business franchisees, and writes a blank check to big
businesses to bully and control small businesses and their
workers without any accountability.
Democratic Amendments Offered During the Markup of
H.R. 5267
Committee Democrats proffered two amendments to improve
H.R. 5267. The first amendment would have struck the joint
employment definition under the FLSA created by H.R. 5267 and
replaced the joint employment defi