Committee Action
On May 20, 2026, a quorum being present, the Committee met to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The Committee took the following actions: Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex The Committee made the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for Fiscal Year 2027, the base text for purposes of amendment. By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two amendments to the base text. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to amend the National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 regarding certain whistleblower-related authorities. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich-- aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to prohibit IC contractors and subcontractors from collecting and selling certain location data. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye. By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted a motion to table by Chairman Cotton in response to Senator Wyden's appeal of the ruling of the Chairman that Senator Wyden's two annex amendments were not filed in compliance with Committee deadlines. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; Senator Kelly--no. Votes to report the committee bill On May 20, 2026, the Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote of 14 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff-- no; Senator Kelly--aye. By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to make technical and conforming changes to the bill and classified annex. Compliance With Rule XLIV Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits. Estimate of Costs Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 20, 2026, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of this legislation. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN COTTON, SENATOR RISCH, SENATOR COLLINS, SENATOR ROUNDS, AND SENATOR BUDD We are pleased to include in this bill several corrective provisions that respond to abuses of intelligence authorities that took place under the Biden administration. First, this bill clarifies that the definition of intelligence includes only foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. According to 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3003, ``the term intelligence includes `foreign intelligence' and `counterintelligence'.'' Yet under the Biden administration, we witnessed various elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) engage in mission creep into purely domestic activities. Section 609 of the bill refines the definition of intelligence to ensure only foreign and counterintelligence can be considered as ``intelligence'' for the purposes of intelligence activities under Title 50. Similarly, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the Biden administration interpreted the existing statute as permitting the production of intelligence analysis on domestic, law enforcement matters lacking any foreign or counterintelligence nexus. The NCTC was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in response to the failure of law enforcement and the IC to ``connect the dots'' leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks. The NCTC was to serve as a ``go-between'' where law enforcement could check IC holdings as to whether a person of interest in a terrorism investigation might have a connection to foreign terrorist groups. The NCTC itself was never meant to work solely in the domestic, law enforcement space. Section 305 of the bill clarifies a limitation in what NCTC can do with regard to domestic activities. While it remains entirely appropriate for law enforcement to query NCTC's holdings for foreign connections, NCTC may not perform solely domestic work. Nothing in this section is meant to limit NCTC's support for Trump administration efforts to go after transnational criminal organizations such as the cartels, all of which have been designated as ``foreign terrorist organizations'' and therefore fall squarely within NCTC's responsibilities. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in 2002 with the enactment of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). Its primary mission was to ``access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such information'' in order to identify, assess, detect, and understand terrorist threats to the homeland. This mission filled a critical gap by enabling information sharing among state and local governments, the private sector, and relevant parts of the Federal government (including the IC and the other components of DHS). This was in keeping with the long-held precedent in U.S. law that foreign intelligence collection and analysis should be separate and distinct from domestic law enforcement. With enactment in 2007 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), I&A's mission expanded beyond facilitating information sharing to preventing terror attacks against the homeland. Specifically, this Act directed I&A to support both the functions of the newly-created National Counterterrorism Center, as well as the ``mission responsibilities of the Department'' as they related to terrorism against the homeland. This is significant, because DHS defines ``terrorism'' in part as ``any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States.'' This statute fundamentally changed I&A's original foreign intelligence function by giving it responsibilities that fall squarely in the domestic, law enforcement arena. The Committee has witnessed this statute being used inappropriately in numerous instances, to include in 2021, when I&A began producing analysis on ``domestic terrorism'' that lacked any connection to a foreign nexus. It was also deputized to be a part of DHS's ill-advised, and now-defunct, ``Disinformation Governance Board,'' an effort to restrict American speech by labeling speech the government disapproved of as ``disinformation.'' I&A also collects information on U.S. persons, even if those individuals lack any foreign or counterintelligence nexus. These are just some of the disturbing activities I&A supported in recent years. Intelligence elements should not engage in activities that lack any foreign intelligence or counterintelligence nexus, and we are pleased that the underlying bill includes a section that provides needed reforms to I&A. Section 506 amends I&A's underlying statute to ensure that it stays within the scope of responsibilities of an intelligence element. Specifically, section 506 replaces the references to ``terrorism'' or ``terror attacks'' with ``foreign threats,'' and strikes I&A's responsibility to support the ``mission responsibilities of the Department.'' Further, section 506 better protects Americans' privacy by prohibiting I&A from collecting any intelligence or information on U.S. persons, and prohibiting any clandestine collection. The IC is vitally important to national security, and it is critical that it remain laser-focused on foreign intelligence threats to the United States. Domestic activities lacking any foreign intelligence nexus fall squarely within law enforcement. We are pleased that several of the provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 reinforce this important distinction. With enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress provided the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) broad authority to coordinate relationships and intelligence sharing with foreign intelligence services with the expectation that the DNI would be transparent with the congressional intelligence committees in doing so. At the time, Congress did not believe it was necessary to hold the DNI to the same notification requirements imposed on the Secretaries of Defense and State for military assistance. However, during Israel's effort to bring to justice the HAMAS perpetrators of the horrific October 7, 2023 attacks on Israeli civilians as well as hostage recovery efforts of United States persons, the Secretary of Defense notified Congress of pauses in weapons shipments, but DNI Avril Haines did not notify Congress regarding any adjustments to intelligence support to Israel. This lack of transparency hinders the congressional intelligence committees' oversight responsibilities to ensure that intelligence sharing enhances the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United States. Section 622 amends the DNI's authority to require notification to the congressional intelligence committees of any major change to the intelligence sharing relationship between the United States and Israel and prohibits suspension or material reduction of intelligence sharing with Israel absent a significant national security concern. It further authorizes DNI Walter ``Jay'' Clayton and the Trump administration to enhance intelligence sharing with Israel and Abraham Accord countries in support of the President's policies to eliminate the threat posed by Iran. Tom Cotton. James E. Risch. Susan M. Collins. M. Michael Rounds. Ted Budd. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BENNET I am pleased that under the leadership of Chairman Cotton and Vice Chairman Warner, the Committee reached bipartisan agreement on an Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 2027 that will strengthen U.S. national security by providing our intelligence community (IC) personnel, including thousands of Coloradans, with the resources and authorities that they need to protect our nation. This bill addresses many of my priorities, most especially the importance of ensuring the uninterrupted provision of U.S. intelligence support to Ukraine. As a result of U.S. and allied investments, Ukraine has substantially halted Russia's momentum on the battlefield and developed a capacity to conduct warfare unlike any NATO member state. Ukraine's armed forces are now not only less dependent on U.S. military support; they also are postured to contribute to U.S. and NATO efforts to deter and help defeat any future Russian aggression in Europe, as well as address evolving threats to U.S. forces in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. The Committee's bipartisan action to codify U.S. intelligence support to Ukraine in this bill ensures that the architecture underlying Ukraine's recent battlefield success will not be interrupted and increases pressure on Russian President Putin to come to the negotiating table, supporting diplomacy aimed at securing a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Moreover, by removing the ambiguity as to whether the United States will continue its intelligence support of Ukraine in the event of any future peace deal, the bill enables long- term planning, budgeting, and execution by the IC necessary to help enforce a future agreement, bolster U.S. and NATO deterrence against future Russian aggression, and deepen joint efforts with Ukraine in areas of mutual benefit (e.g., U.S.- Ukraine cooperation on unmanned aerial systems and countering unmanned aerial systems, which Sen. McConnell and I propose to strengthen through the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act). I am similarly pleased that this bill provides for stronger intelligence cooperation with U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to enhance multilateral deterrence, requires measures to address the national security risks posed by the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to U.S. adversaries, and supports sustained investment in intelligence diplomacy. These are all priorities that I championed. Separately, and consistent with the Committee's longstanding practice, the bill provides for continued U.S. intelligence cooperation with Israel. Although such cooperation offers potential benefits to the United States, I am concerned by the gaps between what Israeli intelligence officials reportedly anticipated would occur in the event of an armed conflict with Iran and what has unfolded after the United States and Israel jointly attacked Iran on February 28, 2026, without congressional authorization. Additional bipartisan oversight is necessary to clarify why senior U.S. decisionmakers apparently discounted U.S. intelligence and military assessments that diverged from Israel's optimistic-- and, in hindsight, mostly inaccurate--projections of how the war with Iran would unfold. I have repeatedly warned that some actions by Prime Minister Netanyahu's government are detrimental to U.S. national security and risk undermining the American people's support for U.S.-Israel security cooperation. In particular, I am gravely concerned by the explosion in extremist settler violence in the West Bank, which affects U.S. citizens and permanent residents and which current and former Israeli officials acknowledge the Netanyahu government has failed to curtail. As I noted during the drafting process of this year's IAA, the U.S. government lacks a systematic intelligence assessment of extremist settler violence in the West Bank and the consequences for U.S. policy goals. I hope there will be bipartisan support in the future for directing the production of such an assessment, consistent with Congress's Article I authority to direct intelligence production in support of its oversight responsibilities. Similarly, senior Administration officials, including the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, have rightly and publicly reaffirmed U.S. opposition to Israeli annexation of the West Bank. In seeming contravention of this U.S. policy, however, the Netanyahu government has directed record levels of new settlement authorization in the West Bank, legalized previously unauthorized outposts, approved large-scale land declarations, and provided for significant Israeli government expenditures on settlement construction and administration. Structured IC scrutiny of these and other Israeli activities, in the form of a recurring assessment, would inform Congress' oversight. I have long argued that the IC is the essential backbone of U.S. national security. Critical to the IC's remarkable successes is ensuring that our IC personnel are not asked to undertake missions that may be better suited for other U.S. departments and agencies. Indeed, experience suggests that IC mission creep and an over-reliance by policymakers on covert tools of statecraft can sometimes lead to unintended consequences and undermine progress toward U.S. national security goals. With this as context, I expect that the Committee, in furtherance of its best bipartisan tradition and mandate, will continue robust oversight aimed at ensuring that the IC's evolving activities and mission set complement and do not supplant the equally consequential work performed by U.S. diplomats and military personnel. Michael F. Bennet. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN The Fiscal Year 2027 Intelligence Authorization Act represents a dramatic retreat from years, and in some cases decades, of congressional oversight. As was the case last year, the bill eliminates Senate Advice and Consent for key Intelligence Community leadership positions. First, it surrenders the Committee's, and the Senate's, opportunity to vet the general counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. At a time of rampant lawbreaking by the Trump Administration, it is especially troubling that the only Intelligence Community general counsels currently subject to Senate confirmation--the people responsible for offering legal advice on secret, potentially controversial intelligence activities--would be appointed without any congressional or public input or scrutiny. The bill also eliminates Senate Advice and Consent for the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center at a time in which the Center is expanding its activities into the realm of