Minority Views
[To accompany S. 2342]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2342) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 4, 2025,
that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP)
for Fiscal Year 2026 was $81.9 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared
a classified annex to this report that contains a classified
Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of
Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and has the legal status
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended,
and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2026 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year
2026.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2026 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 103 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 104. Limitation on transfer and reprogramming of funds
Section 104 clarifies that funds authorized to be
appropriated for the NIP may not be transferred or reprogrammed
until those funds are made available for purposes of Section
102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and may only be
transferred or reprogrammed as authorized by section 102A(d).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2026.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property
Section 301 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized
access to IC property.
Section 302. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft.
Section 302 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by
unmanned aircraft.
Section 303. Modification of acquisition authorities
Section 303 amends Section 102A of the National Security
Act of 1949 to enhance the authority of the Director of the
National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into transactions and
agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research
and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.
Section 304. Strategies for enhancing jointness during modernization of
Common Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination systems
Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to develop and submit
strategies for the use by the Department of Defense (DoD) of
the Distributed Common Ground System.
Section 305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and
employees of elements of the intelligence community
Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to
conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual survey of analytic objectivity among such element's
officers and employees.
Section 306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic
standards
Section 306 modifies section 6312 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure analytic
training includes instructions on avoiding political bias.
Section 307. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence
Community Directive 705
Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of
obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government
to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information
facilities of the IC are compliant with Intelligence Community
Directive 705.
Section 308. Amendments regarding Presidential appointments for
intelligence community positions
Section 308 amends the requirements for Presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions.
Section 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of the Treasury
Section 309 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of
the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence
and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
Section 310. Counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury
networks and systems
Section 310 requires the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Treasury to implement policies
and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to
Department of Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding
networks and systems, and to coordinate counterintelligence
threat mitigation, cyber network, and system defense efforts.
Section 311. Report on Director's Initiatives Group personnel matters
Section 311 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the
Director's Initiatives Group.
Section 312. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain
activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field
Intelligence Programs of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security
Section 312 prohibits funds made available to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland
Security from being used for certain activities of the Overt
Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence programs.
Section 313. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule
Section 313 makes a technical correction to the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended by Section 7316 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, with
respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC.
Section 314. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate
assessment
Section 314 amends Section 30 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to require the Director of the CIA to
complete and submit to the appropriate congressional committees
an annual workplace climate assessment that includes an
opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions
regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to
allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual
harassment, and the effectiveness of such response.
Section 315. Report on sensitive commercially available information
Section 315 requires each element of the IC to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
the access to, as well as collection, processing, and use of,
sensitive commercially available information by such element.
Section 315 further requires the DNI to make available to the
public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and
procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially
available information.
Section 316. Report on secure mobile communications systems available
to employees and of the intelligence community
Section 316 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile
communications systems available to employees and officers of
the IC, disaggregated by element of the IC.
Section 317. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the
intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive
compartmented information facilities
Section 317 requires the DNI to develop and submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a plan to implement an
integrated tracking system for the accreditation of sensitive
compartmented information facilities.
Section 318. Counterintelligence threats to United States space
interests
Section 318 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an assessment of the
counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Section 318 also requires the head of
the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to develop and appropriately distribute an
assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial
spaceports.
Section 319. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 319 amends Section 26 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to make certain enhancements to the Chaplain
Corps of the CIA, including by requiring that the Chief of
Chaplains report directly to the Director of CIA and that the
Chaplain Corps have a global presence.
Section 320. Review by Inspectors General of reform efforts for special
access programs and controlled access programs
Section 320 requires the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community (IC IG) and the Inspector General of DoD
to jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and
management of special access programs and controlled access
programs.
Section 321. Prohibition on contractors collecting or selling location
data of individuals at intelligence community locations
Section 321 prohibits contractors or subcontractors of an
element of the IC from collecting location data of individuals
at IC locations, except as necessary for the provision of
contracted services, and from selling such data to any
individual or entity that is not an element of the IC.
Section 322. Technical amendment to procurement activities of Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 322 makes a technical correction to Section 3(a) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Section 323. Consolidation of reporting requirements applicable to All-
domain Anomaly Resolution Office
Section 323 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3373a to consolidate
certain All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting
requirements.
Section 324. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting
Federal Reserve information
Section 324 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to
brief the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and work with the
Chair of the Board of Governors to implement security and
classification measures for protecting information collected,
generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.
Section 325. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data
and services program management office
Section 325 requires the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the NRO to
submit a plan to establish a joint program management office
for commercial geospatial and data services.
Section 326. Inspector General review of adequacy of policies and
procedures governing use of commercial messaging applications
by intelligence community
Section 326 requires the IC IG to submit a review of the
adequacy of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of
commercial messaging applications.
Section 327. Authority for National Security Agency to produce and
disseminate intelligence products
Section 327 permits the Director of the NSA to correlate,
evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to national
security.
Section 328. Conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment
by intelligence community
Section 328 directs the IC to utilize standard contractual
clauses to promote cybersecurity in the acquisition of
telecommunications products or services.
Section 329. Reforms to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security
Section 329 prohibits the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting information
or intelligence targeting United States persons, with
exceptions for sharing and receiving certain information or
intelligence.
Section 330. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons
Section 330 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which
requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding
to unmasking requests.
Section 331. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community
Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the head
of each element of the IC, to revise all regulations, policies,
procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance
to ensure such materials do not allow the use of NIP funds for
discriminatory practices prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other Federal
law.
Section 332. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data
Section 332 requires the FBI to submit a report on the
number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber
national security cases.
TITLE IV--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
Section 401. Short title
Section 401 names the Title the ``Intelligence Community
Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.''
Section 402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the
Director of National Intelligence
Section 402 modifies the DNI's authority to prescribe
personnel policies and programs and eliminates certain
reporting requirements. Section 402 also eliminates the
authority to establish National Intelligence Centers, as well
as the authority to transfer personnel to those Centers (which
are replaced by National Intelligence Task Forces in Section
409), and permits the DNI to delegate to IC elements certain
foreign investment analyses and impact statements. Finally,
Section 402 requires the DNI to submit a plan to reform each IC
element's acquisition process so that the process uses existing
authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference
for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with
current law.
Section 403. Reforms relating to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 403 requires the DNI to submit a plan within 90
days of enactment to reduce ODNI staff to a maximum number of
full-time equivalents, including assignees, detailees, and
contractors, that the DNI requires for the optimized execution
of the DNI's statutory authorities. Section 403 further
requires the DNI to initiate the staff reductions on a date
that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is
submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, whichever is later, with interim written updates to the
congressional intelligence committees. Section 403 requires the
DNI to certify that staff subject to the reductions will have
opportunities to accept alternative government employment, and
prohibits involuntary terminations, except in cases involving
documented security, counterintelligence, misconduct, or
performance issues.
Section 404. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence
and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence
Section 404 renames the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence, the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence and creates DNI-appointed Assistant Directors of
National Intelligence for Mission Integration and Policy and
Capabilities.
Section 405. Reform of the National Intelligence Council and National
Intelligence Officers
Section 405 modifies the National Intelligence Council's
(NIC's) duties, including by clarifying that the NIC may
produce or coordinate the production of National Intelligence
Estimates.
Section 406. Transfer of National Counterintelligence and Security
Center to Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 406 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to
submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to the
Counterintelligence Division of the FBI and the duties of
Director of the NCSC to the Assistant Director of the FBI for
Counterintelligence. Section 406 further requires the DNI to
initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days
after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is
later, and to complete those transfers within two years, with
quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 406 further makes conforming amendments to the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.
Section 407. Redesignation and reform of National Counterterrorism
Center
Section 407 redesignates the National Counterterrorism
Center the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
Center and imposes limitations regarding domestic
counterterrorism intelligence.
Section 408. Transfer and reform of National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center
Section 408 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to
submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) to
the CIA and the duties of Director of the NCBC to the Director
of the CIA. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate
such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the
date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to
complete those transfers within 455 days, with quarterly
reports to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 409. National intelligence task forces
Section 409 gives the DNI the authority to convene national
intelligence task forces from other IC elements for a limited
time, as necessary to address certain intelligence priorities.
Section 409 requires congressional notifications wh
Committee Action
On July 15, 2025, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2026, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By unanimous consent, the Committee adopted for inclusion
in the en bloc amendment (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton,
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of
the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (2) an
amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the
potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western
Hemisphere countries.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-five
amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton to consolidate certain All-Domain Anomaly Resolution
Office reporting requirements; (2) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton regarding protections for Federal Reserve information;
(3) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding processing of
Church Committee records; (4) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring an assessment of investments by the PRC in Brazil's
agricultural sector; (5) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring a report on the wealth of CCP leadership; (6) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a review by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regarding
real estate transactions near IC facilities; (7) an amendment
by Chairman Cotton improving the requirement for monitoring
Iranian enrichment of Uranium-235; (8) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton requiring a duty to warn United States persons
threatened by Iranian lethal plotting; (9) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton requiring annual training and reporting on
analytic standards; (10) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring an annual survey of analytic objectivity among IC
officers and employees; (11) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
establishing a China Economics and Intelligence Cell to publish
a China Economic Power Report; (12) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton establishing certain reforms of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; (13) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
codifying procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons; (14) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring protection of classified
information related to budget functions; (15) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton establishing reforms of the ODNI and broader
IC; (16) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying section 307
of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text regarding the
Deputy Director of the CIA's position; (17) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton prohibiting discrimination in the IC; (18) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying certain reporting on CCP
influence operations; (19) an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner, cosponsored by Senator Collins, to secure election
systems; (20) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to impose
certain limitations on reprogramming funds; (21) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Warner imposing additional functions and
requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center;
(22) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner establishing
procurement conditions on IC telecommunications equipment; (23)
an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner applying IC AI policies to
publicly available models used for intelligence purposes; (24)
an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner revising interim guidance
regarding acquisition and use of foundation models; (25) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding IC AI development
and usage; (26) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding
high-impact AI systems; (27) an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text,
modifying certain IC acquisition authorities; (28) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Warner requiring a plan to establish a
Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data and Services Program
Management Office; (29) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner
requiring an IC IG review of policies and procedures governing
the IC's use of commercial messaging applications; (30) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring counterintelligence
support for Department of Treasury networks and systems; (31)
an amendment by Senator Moran permitting certain foreign
material acquisitions within the Department of Energy; (32) an
amendment by Senator Kelly requiring a report on Executive
Branch approval of access to classified intelligence
information outside of established review processes; (33) an
amendment by Senator Lankford requiring identification of
entities that provide support to the PLA; (34) an amendment by
Senator Young requiring a strategy on intelligence coordination
and sharing related to critical and emerging technologies; (35)
an amendment by Senator Budd authorizing the NSA to produce and
disseminate intelligence products; (36) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike
section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text;
and (37) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment
of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western
Hemisphere countries.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by Vice
Chairman Warner to extend the expiration date of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, with Senator Wyden
recorded as a no. By unanimous consent, the Committee approved
Senator Wyden's request to submit a separate statement
regarding his vote.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Chairman Cotton to prohibit access by certain
foreign nationals to National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons
Production Facilities. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator
Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator
Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; Senator Kelly--no.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to substitute a
second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own original-
filed amendment providing certain protections, mandating that
incumbents in competitive service positions converted to
excepted service positions retain their competitive service
rights under Title 5, imposing reporting requirements on the IC
regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director
of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in
accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the
congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director
determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national
security and provides an explanation for such determination to
the committees. The second-degree amendment did the same, but
omitted the provisions regarding converted positions. By a vote
of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt Senator
Wyden's amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no;
Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator
Kelly--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator King to Senator Wyden's
amendment to require annual FBI reporting on the number of
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, domestic terrorism, and
cyber national security cases. The second-degree amendment
omitted the number of domestic terrorism cases. By voice vote,
the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Wyden to require that, if the head of
an IC element transfers money from an Inspector General and
that Inspector General does not approve, the head of that IC
element has to explain to the relevant congressional committees
why it is in the vital national security interests of the
United States to do so. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator
Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator
Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator
Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye;
Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye;
Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--
aye.
By a vote of 5 ayes and 12 noes, the Committee did not
adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to the classified annex.
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator
Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator
Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator
King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator
Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--no.
Votes to report the committee bill
On July 15, 2025, the Committee voted to report the bill,
as amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and two noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye;
Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye;
Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--
aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--
aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 16,
2025, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act
represents a significant step backward for congressional
oversight of the Intelligence Community. First, the bill
eliminates the long-standing requirement that the general
counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence be confirmed by the Senate. This change would
leave a conspicuous hole in congressional oversight of national
security, given that the general counsels of the Department of
Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of
Homeland Security and Energy, as well as the Legal Advisor of
the State Department, are all Senate confirmed. It is
particularly troubling as Intelligence Community general
counsels operate secretly, making decisions and offering legal
advice on topics such as surveillance and torture, with no
public accountability other than the vetting and scrutiny that
comes from the confirmation process.
Second, the bill lacks a provision, which was included in
last year's Committee-passed bill, that would require the
Intelligence Community to explain to the Committee when the
heads of Intelligence Community entities exercise their
authority to fire personnel without any process or protections.
Given the rash of dubious and unexplained firings in recent
months, this lack of oversight hamstrings the Committee's
ability to scrutinize and mitigate efforts to politicize the
Intelligence Community workforce.
I have a number of concerns related to the bill's
provisions related to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and urge the Committee to conduct an in-depth
review of what reforms will advance, rather than undermine the
purposes for which the Office was created after 9/11. For
example, the bill renames the National Counterterrorism Center
the ``National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center,''
suggesting that two very different threats to the country
should be addressed under the same government framework,
relying on the same resources and personnel, and operating
under the same set of intelligence authorities. Such an
approach risks undermining the country's efforts to combat
both.
The bill extends for ten years the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose passage I opposed due to
a lack of protections for Americans' personal information. In
September 2024, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector
General issued a report (OIG-24-60) that found that the
government was not sharing cyber threat information with
companies, and that companies were not sharing cyber threat
information with each other or the government. These findings
highlight how the program has failed and is not worthy of
reauthorization.
I also have serious concerns about classified matters that
are either in the classified annex or that the annex fails to
address. At the same time, I am deeply troubled by increasing
impediments to Committee oversight. Abuses of both the ``Gang
of 8'' briefings, whereby the Intelligence Community withholds
information from the full Committee, and restrictions on staff
access to intelligence programs are the worst they have been in
20 years.
Several other topics related to the bill are worthy of
discussion. First, the bill prohibits the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
from ``engaging in the collection of information or
intelligence targeting any United States person.'' Given I&A's
abuses in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, I welcome efforts to rein
in its authorities, particularly if they have the effect of
prohibiting the compilation of dossiers of Americans' First
Amendment-protected speech and precluding I&A from secretly
infiltrating private communications, which the current nominee
to be Under Secretary for I&A has incorrectly asserted is
permissible. I am concerned, however, that this provision falls
short. The exception permitting I&A to collect from the
``private sector'' might be read to allow I&A to obtain
information on Americans through their landlords, their bosses,
their neighborhood grocery stores or data brokers. The
provision also fails to address collection on Americans by
other intelligence components within the Department of Homeland
Security, despite the Under Secretary's statutory mandate to
issue policies and guidelines for those components.
Second, the bill is being reported at a time of serious
threat to the independence of the inspectors general. The
Director of National Intelligence recently fired the IC IG's
acting counsel under a mistaken reading of the law that grants
IGs final approval for personnel decisions (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3033(j)(3)). That statutory language originated with the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the report
to which clearly stated it was intended to bring the
authorities of the IC IG into conformity with the augmented
authorities created by the Inspector General Reform Act of
2008. That law established that ``each Office of Inspector
General shall be considered to be a separate agency'' and ``the
Inspector General who is the head of an office . . . shall,
with respect to such office, have the functions, powers, and
duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such
provisions.'' The IG's statutory personnel authorities
concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of
Inspector General is thus clearly intended to cover all OIG
personnel not detailed from another agency, rather than
creating an arbitrary and unworkable carve out of the IG's
authorities over its own personnel, as the DNI would have it.
It is in the context of this dispute that I offered an
amendment requiring that, if the head of an IC element
transfers money from an IG over the IG's objections, the IC has
to explain to the Committee why it is in the vital national
security interests of the United States to do so. The
Committee's defeat of this amendment represents another set-
back for oversight.
Despite these concerns, I am pleased that the bill includes
many provisions I put forward. These include protections for
whistleblowers, allowing them to come to Congress without
having to go through their agencies, ensuring that their
efforts to communicate with Congress through the IC's offices
of congressional and legislative affairs are protected from
reprisal, ensuring that their security clearances can't be
revoked on a pretext, removing the cap on damages for
retaliatory revocation of whistleblower clearances, and
prohibiting, as acts of reprisal, disclosures of
whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake
psychological examinations. The bill also includes a provision
from last year's bill requiring congressional and public
reporting on the Intelligence Community's purchase and use of
sensitive data on Americans.
The bill further includes my provision prohibiting the
Intelligence Community from contracting with companies that
collect and sell geolocation data associated with intelligence
facilities, as well as my amendment requiring annual reporting
on FBI national security investigations.
Finally, the bill includes my provision requiring the FBI
to declassify any information related to whether foreign
government officials have helped their nationals flee the
United States while under investigation or awaiting trial or
sentencing for a crime committed in the United States. In 2016,
a Saudi national was accused in the hit-and-run death of Fallon
Smart, a 15-year-old Portland girl. The flight from the United
States of that Saudi national before trial prompted me to push
through legislation r