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senate · Committee report

S. Rept. 119-51

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

2025-07-29

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Minority Views

[To accompany S. 2342] The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an original bill (S. 2342) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass. Classified Annex to the Committee Report Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 4, 2025, that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2026 was $81.9 billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of United States intelligence activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended, and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee. Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Section 101. Authorization of appropriations Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year 2026. Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2026 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. Section 103. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law Section 103 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 104. Limitation on transfer and reprogramming of funds Section 104 clarifies that funds authorized to be appropriated for the NIP may not be transferred or reprogrammed until those funds are made available for purposes of Section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and may only be transferred or reprogrammed as authorized by section 102A(d). TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Section 201. Authorization of appropriations Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2026. TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS Section 301. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property Section 301 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized access to IC property. Section 302. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft. Section 302 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by unmanned aircraft. Section 303. Modification of acquisition authorities Section 303 amends Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1949 to enhance the authority of the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into transactions and agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities. Section 304. Strategies for enhancing jointness during modernization of Common Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination systems Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to develop and submit strategies for the use by the Department of Defense (DoD) of the Distributed Common Ground System. Section 305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual survey of analytic objectivity among such element's officers and employees. Section 306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards Section 306 modifies section 6312 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure analytic training includes instructions on avoiding political bias. Section 307. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705 Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information facilities of the IC are compliant with Intelligence Community Directive 705. Section 308. Amendments regarding Presidential appointments for intelligence community positions Section 308 amends the requirements for Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions. Section 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury Section 309 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Section 310. Counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury networks and systems Section 310 requires the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Treasury to implement policies and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to Department of Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding networks and systems, and to coordinate counterintelligence threat mitigation, cyber network, and system defense efforts. Section 311. Report on Director's Initiatives Group personnel matters Section 311 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the Director's Initiatives Group. Section 312. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security Section 312 prohibits funds made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from being used for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence programs. Section 313. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule Section 313 makes a technical correction to the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended by Section 7316 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, with respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC. Section 314. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate assessment Section 314 amends Section 30 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to require the Director of the CIA to complete and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual workplace climate assessment that includes an opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment, and the effectiveness of such response. Section 315. Report on sensitive commercially available information Section 315 requires each element of the IC to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the access to, as well as collection, processing, and use of, sensitive commercially available information by such element. Section 315 further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially available information. Section 316. Report on secure mobile communications systems available to employees and of the intelligence community Section 316 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile communications systems available to employees and officers of the IC, disaggregated by element of the IC. Section 317. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities Section 317 requires the DNI to develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to implement an integrated tracking system for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities. Section 318. Counterintelligence threats to United States space interests Section 318 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Section 318 also requires the head of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop and appropriately distribute an assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial spaceports. Section 319. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central Intelligence Agency Section 319 amends Section 26 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to make certain enhancements to the Chaplain Corps of the CIA, including by requiring that the Chief of Chaplains report directly to the Director of CIA and that the Chaplain Corps have a global presence. Section 320. Review by Inspectors General of reform efforts for special access programs and controlled access programs Section 320 requires the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) and the Inspector General of DoD to jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and management of special access programs and controlled access programs. Section 321. Prohibition on contractors collecting or selling location data of individuals at intelligence community locations Section 321 prohibits contractors or subcontractors of an element of the IC from collecting location data of individuals at IC locations, except as necessary for the provision of contracted services, and from selling such data to any individual or entity that is not an element of the IC. Section 322. Technical amendment to procurement activities of Central Intelligence Agency Section 322 makes a technical correction to Section 3(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Section 323. Consolidation of reporting requirements applicable to All- domain Anomaly Resolution Office Section 323 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3373a to consolidate certain All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting requirements. Section 324. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting Federal Reserve information Section 324 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to brief the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and work with the Chair of the Board of Governors to implement security and classification measures for protecting information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System. Section 325. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data and services program management office Section 325 requires the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the NRO to submit a plan to establish a joint program management office for commercial geospatial and data services. Section 326. Inspector General review of adequacy of policies and procedures governing use of commercial messaging applications by intelligence community Section 326 requires the IC IG to submit a review of the adequacy of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of commercial messaging applications. Section 327. Authority for National Security Agency to produce and disseminate intelligence products Section 327 permits the Director of the NSA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to national security. Section 328. Conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment by intelligence community Section 328 directs the IC to utilize standard contractual clauses to promote cybersecurity in the acquisition of telecommunications products or services. Section 329. Reforms to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security Section 329 prohibits the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting information or intelligence targeting United States persons, with exceptions for sharing and receiving certain information or intelligence. Section 330. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons Section 330 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding to unmasking requests. Section 331. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the head of each element of the IC, to revise all regulations, policies, procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance to ensure such materials do not allow the use of NIP funds for discriminatory practices prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other Federal law. Section 332. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data Section 332 requires the FBI to submit a report on the number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber national security cases. TITLE IV--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS Section 401. Short title Section 401 names the Title the ``Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.'' Section 402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence Section 402 modifies the DNI's authority to prescribe personnel policies and programs and eliminates certain reporting requirements. Section 402 also eliminates the authority to establish National Intelligence Centers, as well as the authority to transfer personnel to those Centers (which are replaced by National Intelligence Task Forces in Section 409), and permits the DNI to delegate to IC elements certain foreign investment analyses and impact statements. Finally, Section 402 requires the DNI to submit a plan to reform each IC element's acquisition process so that the process uses existing authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with current law. Section 403. Reforms relating to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 403 requires the DNI to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to reduce ODNI staff to a maximum number of full-time equivalents, including assignees, detailees, and contractors, that the DNI requires for the optimized execution of the DNI's statutory authorities. Section 403 further requires the DNI to initiate the staff reductions on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, with interim written updates to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 403 requires the DNI to certify that staff subject to the reductions will have opportunities to accept alternative government employment, and prohibits involuntary terminations, except in cases involving documented security, counterintelligence, misconduct, or performance issues. Section 404. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence Section 404 renames the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence and creates DNI-appointed Assistant Directors of National Intelligence for Mission Integration and Policy and Capabilities. Section 405. Reform of the National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Officers Section 405 modifies the National Intelligence Council's (NIC's) duties, including by clarifying that the NIC may produce or coordinate the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Section 406. Transfer of National Counterintelligence and Security Center to Federal Bureau of Investigation Section 406 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI and the duties of Director of the NCSC to the Assistant Director of the FBI for Counterintelligence. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to complete those transfers within two years, with quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 406 further makes conforming amendments to the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002. Section 407. Redesignation and reform of National Counterterrorism Center Section 407 redesignates the National Counterterrorism Center the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center and imposes limitations regarding domestic counterterrorism intelligence. Section 408. Transfer and reform of National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center Section 408 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) to the CIA and the duties of Director of the NCBC to the Director of the CIA. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to complete those transfers within 455 days, with quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 409. National intelligence task forces Section 409 gives the DNI the authority to convene national intelligence task forces from other IC elements for a limited time, as necessary to address certain intelligence priorities. Section 409 requires congressional notifications wh

Committee Action

On July 15, 2025, a quorum being present, the Committee met to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The Committee took the following actions: Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for Fiscal Year 2026, the base text for purposes of amendment. By unanimous consent, the Committee adopted for inclusion in the en bloc amendment (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (2) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western Hemisphere countries. By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-five amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton to consolidate certain All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting requirements; (2) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding protections for Federal Reserve information; (3) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding processing of Church Committee records; (4) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring an assessment of investments by the PRC in Brazil's agricultural sector; (5) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a report on the wealth of CCP leadership; (6) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regarding real estate transactions near IC facilities; (7) an amendment by Chairman Cotton improving the requirement for monitoring Iranian enrichment of Uranium-235; (8) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a duty to warn United States persons threatened by Iranian lethal plotting; (9) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring annual training and reporting on analytic standards; (10) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring an annual survey of analytic objectivity among IC officers and employees; (11) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing a China Economics and Intelligence Cell to publish a China Economic Power Report; (12) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing certain reforms of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (13) an amendment by Chairman Cotton codifying procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons; (14) an amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring protection of classified information related to budget functions; (15) an amendment by Chairman Cotton establishing reforms of the ODNI and broader IC; (16) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying section 307 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text regarding the Deputy Director of the CIA's position; (17) an amendment by Chairman Cotton prohibiting discrimination in the IC; (18) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying certain reporting on CCP influence operations; (19) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner, cosponsored by Senator Collins, to secure election systems; (20) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to impose certain limitations on reprogramming funds; (21) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner imposing additional functions and requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center; (22) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner establishing procurement conditions on IC telecommunications equipment; (23) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner applying IC AI policies to publicly available models used for intelligence purposes; (24) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner revising interim guidance regarding acquisition and use of foundation models; (25) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding IC AI development and usage; (26) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding high-impact AI systems; (27) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text, modifying certain IC acquisition authorities; (28) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring a plan to establish a Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data and Services Program Management Office; (29) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring an IC IG review of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of commercial messaging applications; (30) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury networks and systems; (31) an amendment by Senator Moran permitting certain foreign material acquisitions within the Department of Energy; (32) an amendment by Senator Kelly requiring a report on Executive Branch approval of access to classified intelligence information outside of established review processes; (33) an amendment by Senator Lankford requiring identification of entities that provide support to the PLA; (34) an amendment by Senator Young requiring a strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing related to critical and emerging technologies; (35) an amendment by Senator Budd authorizing the NSA to produce and disseminate intelligence products; (36) an amendment by Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (37) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western Hemisphere countries. By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to extend the expiration date of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, with Senator Wyden recorded as a no. By unanimous consent, the Committee approved Senator Wyden's request to submit a separate statement regarding his vote. By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an amendment by Chairman Cotton to prohibit access by certain foreign nationals to National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; Senator Kelly--no. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to substitute a second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own original- filed amendment providing certain protections, mandating that incumbents in competitive service positions converted to excepted service positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5, imposing reporting requirements on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and provides an explanation for such determination to the committees. The second-degree amendment did the same, but omitted the provisions regarding converted positions. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden-- aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet-- aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a second-degree amendment by Senator King to Senator Wyden's amendment to require annual FBI reporting on the number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, domestic terrorism, and cyber national security cases. The second-degree amendment omitted the number of domestic terrorism cases. By voice vote, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to require that, if the head of an IC element transfers money from an Inspector General and that Inspector General does not approve, the head of that IC element has to explain to the relevant congressional committees why it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to do so. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly-- aye. By a vote of 5 ayes and 12 noes, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to the classified annex. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--no. Votes to report the committee bill On July 15, 2025, the Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and two noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner-- aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King-- aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye. By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to make technical and conforming changes to the bill and classified annex. Compliance With Rule XLIV Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits. Estimate of Costs Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 16, 2025, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of this legislation. Changes to Existing Law In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to expedite the business of the Senate. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN The Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant step backward for congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community. First, the bill eliminates the long-standing requirement that the general counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence be confirmed by the Senate. This change would leave a conspicuous hole in congressional oversight of national security, given that the general counsels of the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy, as well as the Legal Advisor of the State Department, are all Senate confirmed. It is particularly troubling as Intelligence Community general counsels operate secretly, making decisions and offering legal advice on topics such as surveillance and torture, with no public accountability other than the vetting and scrutiny that comes from the confirmation process. Second, the bill lacks a provision, which was included in last year's Committee-passed bill, that would require the Intelligence Community to explain to the Committee when the heads of Intelligence Community entities exercise their authority to fire personnel without any process or protections. Given the rash of dubious and unexplained firings in recent months, this lack of oversight hamstrings the Committee's ability to scrutinize and mitigate efforts to politicize the Intelligence Community workforce. I have a number of concerns related to the bill's provisions related to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and urge the Committee to conduct an in-depth review of what reforms will advance, rather than undermine the purposes for which the Office was created after 9/11. For example, the bill renames the National Counterterrorism Center the ``National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center,'' suggesting that two very different threats to the country should be addressed under the same government framework, relying on the same resources and personnel, and operating under the same set of intelligence authorities. Such an approach risks undermining the country's efforts to combat both. The bill extends for ten years the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose passage I opposed due to a lack of protections for Americans' personal information. In September 2024, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General issued a report (OIG-24-60) that found that the government was not sharing cyber threat information with companies, and that companies were not sharing cyber threat information with each other or the government. These findings highlight how the program has failed and is not worthy of reauthorization. I also have serious concerns about classified matters that are either in the classified annex or that the annex fails to address. At the same time, I am deeply troubled by increasing impediments to Committee oversight. Abuses of both the ``Gang of 8'' briefings, whereby the Intelligence Community withholds information from the full Committee, and restrictions on staff access to intelligence programs are the worst they have been in 20 years. Several other topics related to the bill are worthy of discussion. First, the bill prohibits the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) from ``engaging in the collection of information or intelligence targeting any United States person.'' Given I&A's abuses in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, I welcome efforts to rein in its authorities, particularly if they have the effect of prohibiting the compilation of dossiers of Americans' First Amendment-protected speech and precluding I&A from secretly infiltrating private communications, which the current nominee to be Under Secretary for I&A has incorrectly asserted is permissible. I am concerned, however, that this provision falls short. The exception permitting I&A to collect from the ``private sector'' might be read to allow I&A to obtain information on Americans through their landlords, their bosses, their neighborhood grocery stores or data brokers. The provision also fails to address collection on Americans by other intelligence components within the Department of Homeland Security, despite the Under Secretary's statutory mandate to issue policies and guidelines for those components. Second, the bill is being reported at a time of serious threat to the independence of the inspectors general. The Director of National Intelligence recently fired the IC IG's acting counsel under a mistaken reading of the law that grants IGs final approval for personnel decisions (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(j)(3)). That statutory language originated with the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the report to which clearly stated it was intended to bring the authorities of the IC IG into conformity with the augmented authorities created by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. That law established that ``each Office of Inspector General shall be considered to be a separate agency'' and ``the Inspector General who is the head of an office . . . shall, with respect to such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such provisions.'' The IG's statutory personnel authorities concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General is thus clearly intended to cover all OIG personnel not detailed from another agency, rather than creating an arbitrary and unworkable carve out of the IG's authorities over its own personnel, as the DNI would have it. It is in the context of this dispute that I offered an amendment requiring that, if the head of an IC element transfers money from an IG over the IG's objections, the IC has to explain to the Committee why it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to do so. The Committee's defeat of this amendment represents another set- back for oversight. Despite these concerns, I am pleased that the bill includes many provisions I put forward. These include protections for whistleblowers, allowing them to come to Congress without having to go through their agencies, ensuring that their efforts to communicate with Congress through the IC's offices of congressional and legislative affairs are protected from reprisal, ensuring that their security clearances can't be revoked on a pretext, removing the cap on damages for retaliatory revocation of whistleblower clearances, and prohibiting, as acts of reprisal, disclosures of whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake psychological examinations. The bill also includes a provision from last year's bill requiring congressional and public reporting on the Intelligence Community's purchase and use of sensitive data on Americans. The bill further includes my provision prohibiting the Intelligence Community from contracting with companies that collect and sell geolocation data associated with intelligence facilities, as well as my amendment requiring annual reporting on FBI national security investigations. Finally, the bill includes my provision requiring the FBI to declassify any information related to whether foreign government officials have helped their nationals flee the United States while under investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime committed in the United States. In 2016, a Saudi national was accused in the hit-and-run death of Fallon Smart, a 15-year-old Portland girl. The flight from the United States of that Saudi national before trial prompted me to push through legislation r

Source: https://api.congress.gov/v3/committee-report/119/srpt/51