Volume 84 · 473
Public Law 91–358
To reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia, to revise the procedures for handling juveniles in the District of Columbia, to codify title 23 of the District of Columbia Code, and for other purposes.
Approved July 29, 1970
Statutory text
AN ACT
To reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia, to revise the procedures for handling juveniles in the District of Columbia, to codify title 23 of the District of Columbia Code, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That this Act may
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.
be cited as the “District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970”.
TITLE I— REORGANIZATION OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS
Sec. 101. short title
This title may be cited as the “District of Columbia Court
Citation of title.
Reorganization Act of 1970”.
Part A— Revision of Title 11 of the District of Colombia Code
Sec. 111. revision of title 11
Title 11 of the District of Columbia Code is amended to
D.C. Code 11–101 to 11–2314.
read as follows:
‘TITLE 11.— ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
“Chapter 1.— GENERAL PROVISIONS
“§ 11–101. Judicial power
“The judicial power in the District of Columbia is vested in the following courts:
“(1) The following Federal Courts established pursuant to article 111 of the Constitution:
“(A) The Supreme Court of the United States.
“(B) The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
“(C) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
“(2) The following District of Columbia courts established pursuant to article I of the Constitution:
“(A) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
“(B) The Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–102. Status of District of Columbia Court of Appeals
“The highest court of the District of Columbia is the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Final judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, United States Code.
Post, p. 590.
“Chapter 3.— UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
“§ 11–301. Jurisdiction of appeals from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
“In addition to its jurisdiction as a United States court of appeals and any other jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has jurisdiction of appeals from judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—
“(1) with respect to violations of criminal laws of the United States which are not applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia if a petition for the allowance of an appeal from that judgment is filed within ten days after its entry; or
“(2) entered before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970 in any other case if a petition for the allowance of an appeal from that judgment is filed within ten days after its entry.
“Chapter 5.— UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“SUBCHAPTER I.— JURISDICTION
“§ 11–501. Civil jurisdiction
“In addition to its jurisdiction as a United States district court and any other jurisdiction conferred on it by law. the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction of the following:
“(1) Any civil action or other matter begun in the court before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court. Reorganization Act of 1970 other than any matter over which the Superior Court of the District of Columbia takes jurisdiction under section ll–921(a)(4)(G) or 11–921 (a)(5)(B).
“(2) During the eighteen-month period beginning on such effective date, any civil action or other matter which is brought under—
“(A) chapter 3 of title 21 (relating to gifts to minors);
“(B) chapter 5 of title 21 (relating to hospitalization of the mentally ill);
“(C) chapter 7 of title 21 (relating to property of the mentally ill);
“(D) chapter 11 of title, 21 (relating to commitment and maintenance of substantially retarded persons);
“(E) chapter 13 of title 21 (relating to appointment of committees for alcoholics and addicts): or
“(F) chapter 15 of title 21 (relating to appointment of conservators) .
“(3) During the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date, any civil action or other matter—
“(A) which is brought under chapter 29 of title 16 (relating
D.C. Code 16–2901 to 16–2925.
to partition and assignment of dower);
“(B) which would have been within Hie jurisdiction of the Orphans Court of Washington County, District of Columbia, before June 21, 1870;
“(C) relating to the execution or validity of wills devising real property within the District of Columbia, and of wills and testaments properly presented for probate in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the admission to probate and recording of those wills;
“(D) relating to the proof of wills of either persona] or real property and the revocation of probate of wills for cause;
“(E) involving the granting and revocation for cause of letters testamentary, letters of administration, letters ad colligendum and letters of guardianship, and the appointment of successors to persons whose letters have been revoked.
“(F) involving the hearing, examination, and issuance of decrees upon accounts, claims, and demands existing between executors or administrators and legatees or persons entitled to a distributive share of an intestate estate, or between wards and their guardians;
“(G) involving the enforcement of the rendition of inventories and accounts by executors, administrators, collectors, guardians, and trustees required to account to the court,
“(H) involving the enforcement of distribution of estates by executors and administrators and the payment or delivery by guardians of money or property belonging to their wards: or
“(I) otherwise within the probate jurisdiction of the court on the day before such effective date.
“(4) Any civil action (other than a matter over which the Superior Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction under paragraph (3) or (4) of section 11–921 (a)) begun in the court during the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.
“§ 11–502. Criminal jurisdiction
“In addition to its jurisdiction as a United States district court and any other jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction of the following:
“(1) Any criminal ease begun in the court by the return of an indictment or the filing of an information be fore the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970.
“(2) Any criminal case which is begun in the court by the return of an indictment or the filing of an information during the eighteen-month period beginning on such effective date and which—
“(A) involves a violation of any one of the following sections of the Act entitled ‘An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia’, approved March 3, 1901:
“(i) section 809 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–201) (relating to
abortion),
“(ii) section 803 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–501) (relating to
assault, with intent to kill, rob, rape, or poison),
“(iii) section 823(a)(D.C. Code, sec. 22–1801 (a)) (relating
to burglary in the first degree),
“(iv) section 812 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2101) (relating to
kidnapping),
“(v) sections 798 through 802 (D.C. Code. secs, 22–2401 through 22–2405) (relating to murder and manslaughter),
“(vi) section 808 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2801) (relating to rape),
“(vii) section 810 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2901) (relating to robbery); or
“(B) involves any other offense under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined in such information or indictment with any of the offenses listed in subparagraph (A).
“(3) Any offense under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined in the same information or indictment, with any Federal offense.
“§ 11–503. Removal of cases from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
“A civil action or criminal prosecution in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is removable to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in accordance with chapter 89 of title
Post, p. 591.
28, United States Code.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— AUDITOR
“§ 11–521. Appointment of Auditor
“For so long as the business of the court may require, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia may appoint an Auditor for the court.
“Chapter 7.— DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
“SUBCHAPTER I.— CONTINUATION AND ORGANIZATION
“§ 11–701. Continuation of court; court of record; seal
“(a) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals (hereafter in this subchapter referred to as the ‘court’) shall continue as a court of record in the District of Columbia.
“(b) The court shall have a seal.
“§ 11–702. Composition
“The court shall consist of a chief judge and eight associate judges.
“§ 11–703. Judges; service; compensation
“(a) The chief judge and the judges of the court shall serve in accordance with chapter 15 of this title.
“(b) judges of the court shall be compensated at 90 per centum of the rate prescribed by law for judges of the United States courts of appeals. The chief judge, during his service in that position, shall receive an additional $500 per annum.
“§ 11–704. Oath of judges
“Each judge, when appointed, shall take the oath prescribed for judges of courts of the United States.
“§ 11–705. Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings
“(a) Judges of the court shall sit on the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.
“(b) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by divisions of the court unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered. Each division of the court shall consist of three judges.
“(c) A hearing before the court in banc may be ordered by a majority of the judges of the court in regular active service. The court in banc for a hearing shall consist of the judges of the court in regular active service.
“(d) A rehearing before the court in banc may be ordered by a majority of the judges of the court in regular active service. The court in banc for a rehearing shall consist of the judges of the court in regular active service, except that a retired judge may sit as a judge of the court in banc in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat on the court or a division of the court at the original hearing thereof.
“§ 11–706. Absence, disability, or disqualification of judges; vacancies; quorum
“(a) When the chief judge of the court is absent or disabled, liis duties shall devolve upon and be performed by such associate judge as the chief judge may designate in writing. In the event that the chief judge is (1) disqualified or suspended, or (2) unable or fails to make such a designation, his duties shall devolve upon and be performed by the associate judges of the court according to the seniority of their original commissions.
“(b) A chief judge whose term as chief judge has expired shall continue to serve until redesignated or until his successor has been designated. When there is a vacancy in the position of chief judge, the position shall be filled temporarily as provided in subsection (a).
“(c) Two judges shall constitute a quorum of a division of the court, and six judges shall constitute a quorum of the court sitting in banc.
“§ 11–707. Assignment of judges to and from Superior Court
“(a) The chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals may designate and assign temporarily one or more judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to serve on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals or a division thereof whenever the business of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals so requires. Such designations or assignments shall be in conformity with the rules or orders of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
“(b) Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals may designate and assign temporarily one or more judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to serve as a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–708. Clerks and secretaries for judges
“Each judge may appoint and remove a personal secretary. The chief judge may appoint and remove two personal law clerks, and each associate judge may appoint and remove a personal law clerk. In addition, the chief judge may appoint and remove not more than three law clerks for the court. The law clerks appointed for the court shall serve as directed by the chief judge.
‘§ 11–709. Reports
“Each judge shall submit to the chief judge such reports and data as the chief judge may request. Each judge shall submit a monthly written report to the chief judge and the Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure which shall be in a form prescribed by the chief judge after consultation with the Commission and which shall set forth the following:
“(1) The number of days’ attendance in court of the judge during the month covered.
“(2) The division of the court which he attended.
“(3) The number of hours per day of his attendance.
“(1) The number and type of matters disposed of by the judge during the month covered.
“(5) Such other data as the chief judge may require.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— JURISDICTION
“§ 11–721. Orders and judgments of the Superior Court
“(a) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of appeals from—
“(1) all final orders and judgments of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia;
“(2) interlocutory orders of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia—
“(A) granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions;
“(B) appointing receivers, guardians, or conservators or refusing to wind up receiverships, guardianships, or the administration of conservators or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof; or
“(C) changing or a ffecting the possession of property; and
“(3) orders or rulings of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia appealed by the United States or the District of
Post, pp. 606, 609.
Columbia pursuant to section 23–104 or 23–111(d)(2).
“(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a party aggrieved by an order or judgment specified in subsection (a) of this section, may appeal therefrom as of right to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
“(c) Review of judgments of the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and of judgments in the Criminal Division of that court where the penalty imposed is a fine of less than $50 for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or less, or by fine of not more than $1,000, or both, shall be by application for the allowance of an appeal, filed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
“(d) When a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in making in a civil case (other than a case in which a child, as defined in section 16–2301, is alleged to be delinquent, neglected, or
Post, p. 523.
in need of supervision) a ruling or order not otherwise appeal able under this section, shall be of the opinion that the ruling or order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the ruling or order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation or case, he shall so state in writing in the ruling or order. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from that ruling or order, if application is made to it within ten days after the issuance or entry of the ruling or order. An application for an appeal under this subsection shall not stay proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia unless the judge of that court who made such ruling or order or the District of Columbia Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
“(e) On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
“§ 11–722. Administrative orders and decisions
“The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has jurisdiction (1) except as provided in clause (2), to review orders and decisions of the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Council, any agency of the District of Columbia (including the Board of Zoning Adjustment of the District of Columbia and the Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia), and the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, in accordance with the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501–1–1510); and (2) to review orders and decisions of the Public Service
82 Stat. 1203; Post, p. 582.
Commission of the District of Columbia in accordance with section 8 of the Act of March 4, 1913 (D.C. Code, chapters 1 through 10, title 43).
“SUBCHAPTER III.— MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
“§ 11–741. Contempt powers
“In addition to the powers conferred by section 402 of title 18, United States Code, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, or a
judge thereof, may punish for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court.
“§ 11–742. Oaths, affirmations, and acknowledgments
“Each judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and each employee of the court authorized by the chief judge may administer oaths and affirmations and take acknowledgments.
“§ 11–743. Rules of court
“The District, of Columbia Court of Appeals shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure unless the
28 USC app.
court prescribes or adopts modifications of those Rules.
“Chapter 9— SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“SUBCHAPTER I.— CONTINUATION AND ORGANIZATION
“§ 11–901. Continuation of courts; court of record; seal
“The District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, and the District of Columbia Tax Court are consolidated in a single court to be known as the Superior Court, of the District of Columbia (hereafter in this title referred to as the ‘Superior Court’). The Superior Court, shall be a court of record in the District of Columbia and shall have a single seal.
“§ 11–902. Organization of the court
“The Superior Court shall consist, of the following divisions: Civil Division, Criminal Division, Family Division, Probate Division, and Tax Division. The divisions of the Superior Court may be divided into such branches as the Superior Court may by rule prescribe.
“§ 11–903. Composition
“The Superior Court shall consist of a chief judge and forty-three associate judges (seven of whom shall not be appointed until twelve months after the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970).
“§ 11–904. Judges; service; compensation
“(a) The chief judge and the judges of the Superior Court shall serve as provided in chapter 15 of this title.
“(b) Judges of the Superior Court shall be compensated at 90 per centum of the rate prescribed by law for judges of United States district courts. The chief judge, during his service in that position, shall receive an additional $500 per annum.
“§ 11–905. Oath of judges
“Each judge of the Superior Court, when appointed shall take the oath prescribed for judges of courts of the United States.
“§ 11–906. Administration by chief judge; discharge of duties
“(a) The chief judge shall administer and superintend the business of the Superior Court, as provided in chapter 17 of this title. He
Post, p. 508.
shall give his attention to the discharge of the duties especially pertaining to his office and to the performance of such additional judicial work as he is able to perform.
“(b) He shall, insofar as is consistent with this title, arrange and divide the business of the Superior Court and fix the time of sessions of the various divisions and branches of the Superior Court.
“§ 11–907. Absence, disability, or disqualification of chief judge
“(a) When the chief judge of the court is absent or disabled, his duties shall devolve upon and be performed by such associate judge as the chief judge may designate in writing. In the event that the chief judge is (1) disqualified or suspended, or (2) unable or fails to make such a designation, his duties shall devolve upon and be performed by the associate judges of the court according to the seniority of their original commissions.
“(b) A chief judge whose term us chief judge has expired shall continue to serve until redesignated or until his successor has been designated. When there is a vacancy in the position of chief judge, the position shall be filled temporarily as provided in subsection (a).
“§ 11–908. Designation and assignment of judges
“(a) The chief judge may designate the number of judges to serve in any division and branch of the Superior Court and may assign and reassign any judge to sit in any division or branch. When making assignments to the Family Division and Tax Division, the chief judge shall consider the qualifications and interest of the judges. Each associate judge shall attend and serve in the division and branch to which he is assigned.
“(b) When the business of the Superior Court requires, the chief judge may certify to the chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals the need for temporary assignment of an additional judge or judges as provided in section 11–707.
“(c) Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge of the Superior Court, the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit may designate and assign temporarily a judge or judges as provided in subsection (c) of section 292 of title 28, United States Code.
Post, p. 591.
“§ 11–909. Meetingsand reports
“(a) The judges of the Superior Court shall meet upon the cal] of the chief judge, but not less than once each month, to consider matters relating to the business and operations of the court. The court may by rule require additional meetings.
“(b) Each associate judge shall submit to the chief judge such reports and data as the chief judge may request. Each judge shall submit a monthly written report to the chief judge and the Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure which shall be in a form prescribed by the chief judge after consultation with the Commission and which shall set forth the duties performed by the reporting judge as follows:
“(1) The number of days’ attendance in court of the judge during the month covered.
“(2) The division and branch (if any) of the court which he attended.
“(3) The number of horn’s per day of his attendance.
“(4) The number and type of matters disposed of by the judge during the month covered.
“(5) Such other data as the chief judge may require.
“§ 11–910. Clerks and secretaries for judges
“Each judge of the Superior Court may appoint and remove a personal law clerk and a personal secretary.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— JURISDICTION
“§ 11–921. Civil jurisdiction
“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia. Such jurisdiction shall vest in the court as follows:
“(1) Beginning on the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter begun before such effective date in the District, of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court, of the District of Columbia, or the District of Columbia Tax Court.
“(2) Beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, which is begun in the Superior Court on or after such effective date and in which the amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000.
“(3) Beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction (regardless of the amount in controversy) of any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, which—
“(A) is brought under—
“(i) subchapter I of chapter 11 of title 16 (relating to ejectment);
“(ii) subchapter II or III of chapter 13 of title 16 (relating to the condemnation of land on behalf of the District of Columbia);
“(iii) chapter 19 of title 16 (relating to writs of habeas corpus directed to persons other than Federal officers and employees);
“(iv) chapter 25 of title 16 (relating to change of name);
“(v) chapter 33 of title 16 (relating to quieting title to real property);
“(vi) subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 16 (relating to writ of quo warranto);
“(vii) chapter 37 of title 16 (relating to replevin of personal property);
“(viii) the Hospital Treatment for Drug Addicts Act for the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. secs. 24–601 through
24–611) (relating to commitment of narcotics users); or
“(ix) section 2 of the Act of August 3, 1968 (D.C. Code. sec. 1–804(b)) (relating to contractors bonds).
“(B) involves an appeal from or petition for review of any assessment of tax (or civil penalty thereon) made by the District of Columbia; or
“(C) is brought under chapter 23 of title 16.
“(4) Immediately following the expiration of the eighteen-month period beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction (regardless of the amount in controversy) of any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, brought under—
“(A) chapter 3 of title 21 (relating to gifts to minors);
“(B) chapter 5 of title 21 (relating to hospitalization of the mentally ill);
“(C) chapter 7 of title 21 (relating to property of the mentally ill);
“(D) chapter 11 of title 21 (relating to commitment, and maintenance of substantially retarded persons);
“(E) chapter 13 of title 21 (relating to appointment of committees
D.C. Code 21–1301.
D.C. Code 21–1501.
D.C. Code 21–301 to 21–1301.
for alcoholics and addicts);
“(F) chapter 15 of title 21 (relating to appointment of conservators); or
“(G) chapter 3, 7, 11, 13, or 15 of title 21 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and not completed in that court before the expiration of such eighteen-month period.
“(5) Immediately following the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction (regardless of the amount in controversy)—
“(A) of any matter (at law or in equity) —
“(i) brought under chapter 29 of title 16 (relating to partition
Post, p. 561.
of property and assignment of dower);
“(ii) which would have been within the jurisdiction of the Orphans Court of Washington County, District of Columbia, before June 21, 1870;
“(iii) relating to the execution or validity of wills devising real property within the District of Columbia, and of wills and testaments properly presented for probate in the court, and the admission to probate and recording of those wills;
“(iv) relating to the proof of wills of either personal or real property and the revocation of probate of wills for cause;
“(v) involving the granting and revocation for cause of letters testamentary, letters of administration, letters ad colligendum and letters of guardianship, and the appointment of successors to persons whose letters have been revoked;
“(vi) involving the hearing, examination, and issuance of decrees upon accounts, claims, and demands existing between executors or administrators and legatees or persons entitled to a distributive share of an intestate estate, or between wards and their guardians;
“(vii) involving the enforcement of the rendition of inventories and accounts by executors, administrators, collectors, guardians, and trustees required to account to the court;
“(viii) involving the enforcement of distribution of estates by executors and administrators and the payment or delivery by guardians of money or property belonging to their wards; or
“(ix) otherwise within the probate jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on the day before such effective date; and
“(B) any matter (at law or in equity) described in subparagraph (A) which was begun in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and not completed in that court before the expiration of such thirty-month period.
“(6) Immediately following the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction (regardless of the amount in controversy) of any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, brought in the District of Columbia.
“(b) The Superior Court does not have jurisdiction over any civil action or other matter (1) over which exclusive jurisdiction is vested in a Federal court in the District of Columbia, or (2) over which jurisdiction is vested in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under section 11–501 (relating to civil actions or
Ante, p. 476.
other matters begun in such court before the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970).
“§ 11–922. Transfer of civil actions to Superior Court
“(a) In a civil action begun in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970 (other than an action for equitable relief), where it appeal’s to the satisfaction of the court at or subsequent to any pretrial hearing but before trial thereof that the action will not justify a judgment in excess of $10,000 and does not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of the court, the court, may certify the action to the Superior Court for trial.
“(b) In a civil action begun in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia during the thirty-month period beginning on the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the court may certify the action to the Superior Court if it appears to (lie satisfaction of the United States District Court at or subsequent to any pretrial hearing, but before the trial thereof, that—
“(1) the action will not justify a judgment in excess of $50,000; and
“(2) the action does not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
“(c) When an action is transferred under this section, the pleadings in the action, together with a copy of the docket entries and copies of any orders entered therein, and the deposit for costs, shall be sent to the Superior Court. The Superior Court shall thereafter treat the case as though it had been filed originally in that court, except that the jurisdiction of the court shall extend to the amount claimed in the action even though it exceeds the applicable jurisdictional limitation.
“§ 11–923. Criminal jurisdiction; commitment
“(a) The Superior Court has jurisdiction over all criminal cases pending in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970.
“(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.
“(2) The Superior Court shall not have jurisdiction of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia begun in the United States District Court for the District of
Ante, p. 477.
Columbia under section 11–502(2) by the return of an indictment or the filing of an information during the eighteen-month period beginning on such effective date.
“(c) (1) With respect to any criminal case over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction, that court may make, preliminary examinations and commit offenders, either for trial or for further examination, and may release or detain offenders in accordance with chapter 13 of
Post, p. 639.
title 23.
“(2) With respect to any criminal case, over which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction, the Superior Court (A) may make preliminary examinations and commit offenders, either for trial or for further examination, but only during the eighteen-month period beginning on the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, and (B) may release or detain offenders in accordance with chapter 13 of title 23.
“SUBCHAPTER III.— MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
“§ 11–941. Issuance of warrants; record
“Subject to title 23, judges of the Superior Court may, at any time,
Post, p. 604.
including Sundays and legal holidays, on complaint or application under oath or actual view, issue warrants for arrest, search or seizure, or electronic surveillance in connection with crimes and offenses committed within the District of Columbia, or for administrative inspections hi connection with laws relating to the public health, safety, and welfare. Each proceeding respecting a warrant shall be recorded as prescribed by the court. Warrants snail be issued free of charge.
“§ 11–942. Subpenas
“(a) The Superior Court may compel the attendance of witnesses by attachment. At the request of any party, subpenas for attendance at a hearing or trial in the Superior Court shall be issued by the clerk of court. A subpena may be served at any place within the District of Columbia, or at any place without the District of Columbia that is within twenty-five miles of the place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpena. The form, issuance, and manner of service of the subpena shall be as prescribed by the rule of the court.
“(b) A subpena in a criminal case in which a felony is charged may be served at any place within the United States upon order of a judge of the court.
“§ 11–943. Process
“(a) All process other than a subpena may be served at any place within the District of Columbia, and, when authorized by statute or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at any place without the
28 USC app.
District of Columbia.
“(b) Service upon a thirdparty defendant, upon a person whose joinder is needed for just adjudication, and upon persons required to respond to any order of commitment for civil contempt may be served at all places outside the District of Columbia that are not more than cue hundred miles from the place of hearing or trial specified.
“(c) The form, issuance, and manner of service of process shall be prescribed by rule of the court.
“§ 11–944. Contempt power
“In addition to the powers conferred by section 402 of title 18, United States Code, the Superior Court, or a judge thereof, may punish
for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court.
“§ 11–945. Oaths, affirmations, and acknowledgments
“Each judge and each employee of the Superior Court authorized by the chief judge may administer oaths and affirmations and take acknowledgments.
“§ 11–946. Rules of court
“The Superior Court shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (except as otherwise provided in title 23) unless it prescribes
18 USC app.
or adopts rules which modify those Rules. Rules which modify the Federal Rules shall be submitted for the approval of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and they shall not take effect until approved by that court. The Superior Court may adopt and enforce other rules as it may deem necessary without the approval of the District of Columbia Court, of Appeals if such rules do not modify the Federal Rules. The Superior Court may appoint a committee of lawyers to advise it in the performance of its duties under this section.
“Chapter 11— FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
“§ 11–1101. Exclusive jurisdiction
Ante, p. 482.
“The Family Division of the Superior Court shall be assigned, in accordance with chapter 9, exclusive jurisdiction of—
“(1) actions for divorce from the bond of marriage and legal separation from bed and board, including proceedings incidental thereto for alimony, pendente lite and permanent and for support and custody of minor children;
“(2) applications for revocation of divorce from bed and board;
“(3) actions to enforce support of any person as required by law;
“(4) actions seeking custody of minor children, including petitions for writs of habeas corpus;
“(5) actions to declare marriages void;
“(6) actions to declare marriages valid;
“(7) act ions for annulments of marriage;
“(8) determinations and adjudications of property rights, both real and personal, in any action referred to in this subsection, irrespective of any jurisdictional limitation imposed on the Superior Court;
“(9) proceedings in adoption;
“(10) proceedings under the Act of July 10, 1937 (D.C. Code. secs. 30–301 to 30–324);
“(11) proceedings to determine paternity of any child born out of wedlock;
“(12) civil proceedings for protection involving intrafamily offenses, instituted pursuant to chapter 10 of title 16;
“(13) proceedings in which a child, as defined in section 16–2301, is alleged to be delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision:
“(14) proceedings under chapter 3 of title 21 relating to the commitment of the mentally ill;
“(15) proceedings under chapter 11 of title 21 relating to the commitment of the substantially retarded; and
“(16) proceedings tinder Interstate Compact on Juveniles (described in title VII of the District of Columbia Court Reform
Post, p. 657.
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970).
“Chapter 12.— TAX DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
“§ 11–1201. Exclusive jurisdiction
“The Tax Division of the Superior Court shall be assigned exclusive jurisdiction of—
“(1) all appeals from and petitions for review of assessments of tax (and civil penalties thereon) made by the District of Columbia; and
“(2) all proceedings brought by the District of Columbia for the imposition of criminal penalties pursuant to the provisions of the statutes relating to taxes levied by or in behalf of the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–1202. Abolition of other remedies
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the jurisdiction of the Tax Division of the Superior Court to review the validity and amount of all assessments of tax made by the District of Columbia is exclusive. Effective on and after the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, any common-law remedy with respect to assessments of tax in the District of Columbia and any equitable action to enjoin such assessments available in a court other than the former District of Columbia Tax Court is abolished. Actions properly filed before the effective date of that Act are not affected by this section and the court in which any such action has been filed may retain jurisdiction until its disposition.
“§ 11–1203. Rules and regulations
“The Superior Court may make such rules and regulations for conducting business in the Tax Division, consistent with the statutes applicable to such business and with the Superior Court’s general rules of practice and procedure, as it may deem necessary and proper. Rules and regulations for the Tax Division shall, insofar as possible, assure the prompt disposition of matters before the Tax Division to the end that the taxing statutes of the District of Columbia shall be fairly and efficiently en forced.
“Chapter 13.— SMALL CLAIMS AND CONCILIATION BRANCH OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
“SUBCHAPTER I.— CONTINUATION AND SESSIONS
“§ 11–1301. Continuation of Branch
“The Small Claims and Conciliation Branch shall continue as a branch of the Civil Division in the Superior Court.
“§ 11–1302. Sessions
“The Small Claims and Conciliation Branch, with a judge in attendance, shall be open for the transaction of business on every day of the year except Saturday afternoons, Sundays, and legal holidays, and shall hold at least one evening session during each week.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES
“§ 11–1321. Exclusive jurisdiction of small claims
“The Small Claims and Conciliation Branch has exclusive jurisdiction of any action within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court which is only for the recovery of money, if the amount in controversy does not exceed $750, exclusive of interest, attorney fees, protest fees, and costs. Au action which affects an interest in real property may not be brought in the Branch. If a counterclaim, cross claim, or any other claim or any defense, affecting an interest in real property’s made in an action brought in the Branch, the action shall be certified to the Civil Division.
“§ 11–1322. Arbitration and conciliation
“In order to effect the speedy settlement of controversies, and with the consent of the parties thereto, the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch may settle cases, irrespective of the amount involved, by the methods of arbitration and conciliation. A judge sitting in the Branch may act as a referee or arbitrator, either alone or in conjunction with other persons, as provided by rule of the court. A judge, officer, or employee of the Superior Court may not accept any fee or compensation in addition to his salary for services performed pursuant to this section.
“§ 11–1323. Certification of cases by Superior Court judges; recertification; certification by Branch
“(a) When the interests of justice, seem to require and all parties consent thereto, a judge of the Superior Court may certify a case to the. Small Claims and Conciliation Branch for conciliation or to obtain a complete or partial agreed statement of facts or stipulation, which will simplify and expedite the ultimate trial of the case. With the consent of all parties, the trial of the case may be completed in the Branch. In the absence of consent, the case shall be recertified to another judge of the Civil Division for trial.
“(b) When the interests of justice seem to require, the Branch may certify to the Civil Division any action brought in the Branch under section 11–1321.
“Chapter 15.— JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS
“SUBCHAPTER I.— APPOINTMENT; QUALIFICATIONS; SERVICE OF JUDGES
“§ 11–1501. Appointment and qualifications of judges
“(a) The President of the United States shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint all judges of the District of Columbia courts. He shall have power to fill all vacancies that may occur in those courts during a recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the next session of the Senate.
“(b) A person may not be appointed a judge of a District of Columbia court unless he—
“(1) is a citizen of the United States:
“(2) (A) is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia, and (B)(1) has been a member of such bar for a period of at least five years, or (ii) in the case of a professor of law in a law school in the District of Columbia or of an attorney employed in the District of Columbia by the United States or the District of Columbia, has been eligible for membership in the bar of the District of Columbia for at least five years prior to his appointment;
“(3) has been actively engaged, for at least five of the ten years immediately prior to his appointment, as an attorney in the practice of law in the District of Columbia, as a judge of a District of Columbia court, as a professor of law in a law school in the District of Columbia, or as an attorney employed in the District of Columbia by the United States or the District of Columbia; and
“(4) is a bona fide resident of the area consisting of the District of Columbia, Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in Maryland, Arlington and Fairfax Counties and the city of Alexandria in Virginia and has maintained an actual place of abode in such area for at least five years prior to his appointment.
During his term of service and for one year after the termination thereof, no member of the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure shall be eligible for nomination or appointment to a District of Columbia court.
“§ 11–1502. Tenure
“Subject to mandatory retirement at age 70 and to the provisions of subchapters II and III of this chapter, a judge of a District of Columbia court appointed on or after the date of enactment of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970 shall serve for a term of fifteen years, and upon completion of such term, such judge shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
“§ 11–1503. Designation of Chief Judge
“(a) The chief judge of a District of Columbia court shall be designated by the President of the United States from among the judges of the court in regular active service, and shall serve for a term of four years or until his successor is designated. He shall be eligible for redesignation. A judge may relinquish his position as chief judge, after giving notice to the President.
“(b) If a chief judge is not redesignated, or relinquishes (he office of chief judge, he shall continue as an associate judge.
“§ 11–1504. Service of retired judges
“A judge, retired for reasons other than disability may perform, upon designation of a chief judge, those judicial duties which he is willing and able to undertake.
“§ 11–1505. Vacations
“(a) Each judge of the District of Columbia courts shall be entitled to an annual vacation of not more than 30 calendar days. Such vacation shall be taken at such time or times as prescribed by the chief judge of (he District, of Columbia Court of Appeals for judges of that court and by the chief judge of the Superior Court for judges of that court. Time spent by a judge as a member of any conference, committee, or commission established by law shall not be deducted from his vacation period.
“(b) In determining when a judge shall take a vacation, and the length thereof, the chief judge exercising authority under this section shall be mindful of the necessity of retaining sufficient judicial manpower in the court under his supervision to permit at all times the prompt and effective disposition of the business of such court.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES AND TENURE
“§ 11–1521. Establishment of Commission
“There shall be a District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure (hereafter in this subchapter referred to as the ‘Commission’). The Commission shall have power to suspend retire, or remove a judge of a District of Columbia court, as provided in this subchapter.
“§ 11–1522. Membership
“(a) The Commission shall consist of five members appointed as follows:
“(1) The President of the United States shall appoint three members of the Commission. Of the members appointed by the President—
“(A) at least one member must be a member of the District of Columbia bar who has been actively engaged in the practice of law in the. District of Columbia for at least five of the ten years immediately before his appointment; and
“(B) at least two members must be residents of the District of Columbia.
“(2) the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall appoint one member of the Commission. The member appointed y the Commissioner must be a resident of the District of Columbia and not an attorney.
“(3) The chief judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall appoint one member of the Commission. The member appointed by the chief judge shall be an active or retired Federal judge serving in the District of Columbia.
The President shall designate as Chairman of the Commission one of his appointees who is a member of the District of Columbia bar who has been actively engaged in the practice of law in the District of Columbia for at least five of the ten years before the member’s appointment.
“(b) There shall be three alternate members of the Commission, who shall serve as members pursuant to rules adopted by the Commission. The alternate members shall be appointed as follows:
“(1) The President shall appoint one alternate member, who shall be a resident of the District of Columbia and a member of the bar of the District of Columbia who has been actively engaged in the practice of law in the District of Columbia for at least, five of the ten years immediately before his appointment.
“(2) The Commissioner shall appoint one alternate member who shall be a resident of the District, of Columbia and not an attorney.
“(3) The chief judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall appoint one alternate member who shall be an active or retired Federal judge serving in the District of Columbia.
“(c) No member or alternate member of the Commission shall be a member, officer, or employee of the legislative branch or of an executive or military department of the United States Government (listed in section 101 or 102 of title 5, United States Code); and no member
80 Stat. 378, 948.
or alternate member (other than a member or alternate member appointed by the chief judge of the United States District Court, for the District of Columbia) shall be an officer or employee of the judicial branch of the United States Government. No member or alternate member of the Commission shall be an officer or employee of the District of Columbia government (including its judicial branch).
“§ 11–1523. Terms of office; vacancy; continuation of service by a member
“(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the term of office of members and alternate members of the Commission shall be six years.
“(2) Of the members and alternate members first appointed to the Commission—
“(A) one member and alternate member appointed by the President shall be appointed for a term of six years, one member appointed by the President shall be appointed for a term of four years, and one such member shall be appointed for a term of two years, as designated by the President at the time of appointment;
“(B) the member and alternate member appointed by the chief judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall be appointed for a term of four years; and
“(C) the member and alternate member appointed by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall be appointed for a term of two years.
“(b) A member or alternate member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term of his predecessor shall serve only for the remainder of that term. Any vacancy on the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made.
“(c) If approved by the Commission, a member may serve after the expiration of his term for purposes of participating until conclusion in a matter, relating to the suspension, retirement, or removal of a judge, begun before the expiration of his term. A member’s successor may be appointed without regard to the member’s continuation in service, but his successor may not participate in the matter for which the member’s continuation in service was approved.
“§ 11–1524. Compensation
“Any member or alternate member who is an active or retired Federal judge or an officer or employee of the United States shall serve without compensation. Other members or alternate members shall receive the daily equivalent of the rate provided for GS–18 of the General Schedule when actually engaged in service for the Commission.
Ante, p. 198–1.
“§ 11–1525. Operations; personnel; administrative services
“(a) The Commission may make such rules and regulations for its operations as it may deem necessary, and such rules and regulations shall be effective on the date specified by the Commission. The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, (D.C, Code, secs.
1–1501 to 1510) shall be applicable to the Commission only as provided by this subsection. For the purposes of the publication of rules and regulations, judicial notice, and the tiling and compilation of rules, sections 5, 7, and 8 of that Act (D.C. Code, sees. 1–1504, 1–1500, and 1–1507), insofar as consistent with this subchapter, shall be applicable to the Commission; and for purposes of those sections, the Commission shall be deemed an independent agency as defined in section 3(5) of that Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–1502). Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require prior public notice and hearings on the subject of rules adopted by the Commission.
“(b) The, Commission is authorized, without regard to the provisions governing appointment and classification of District of Columbia employees, to appoint and fix the compensation of, or to contract for, such officers, assistants, reporters, counsel, amt other persons as may be necessary for the performance of its duties. It is authorized to obtain the services of medical and other experts in accordance with the
provisions of section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily equivalent of the rate provided for GS–18 of
Ante, p. 198–1.
the General Schedule.
“(c) The District of Columbia is authorized to detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of its personnel to assist in carrying out the duties of the Commission.
“(d) Financial and administrative services (including those related to budgeting and accounting, financial reporting, personnel, and procurement) shall be provided to the Commission by the District of Columbia, for which payment shall be made in advance, or by reimbursement, from funds of the Commission in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the Chairman of the Commission and the District of Columbia government. Regulations of the District of Columbia for the administrative control of funds shall apply to funds appropriated to the Commission.
“§ 11–1526. Removal; involuntary retirement; proceedings
“(a) (1) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall be removed from office upon the filing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by the Commission of an order of removal certifying the entry, in any court, within the United States, of a final judgment of conviction of a crime which is punishable as a felony under Federal law or which would be a felony in the District of Columbia.
“(2) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall also be removed from office upon affirmance of an appeal from an order of removal filed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by the Commission (or upon expiration of the time within which such an appeal may be taken) after a determination by the Commission of—
“(A) willful misconduct in office,
“(B) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties, or
“(C) any other conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the judicial office into disrepute.
“(b) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall be involuntarily retired from office when (1) the Commission determines that the judge suffers from a mental or physical disability (including habitual intemperance) which is or is likely to become permanent and which prevents, or seriously interferes with, the proper performance of his judicial duties, and (2) the Commission files in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals an order of involuntary retirement and the order is affirmed on appeal or the time within which an appeal may be taken from the order has expired.
“(c) (1) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall be suspended, without salary—
“(A) upon—
“(i) proof of his conviction of a crime referred to in subsection (a)(I) which has not become final, or
“(ii) the filing of an order of removal under subsection (a)(2) which has not become final: and
“(B) upon the filing by the Commission of an order of suspension in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Suspension under this paragraph shall continue until termination of all appeals. If the conviction is reversed or the order of removal is set aside, the judge shall be reinstated and shall recover his salary and all rights and privileges of his office.
“(2) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall be suspended from all judicial duties, with such retirement salary as he may be entitled to pursuant to subchapter III of this chapter, upon the filing by the Commission of an order of involuntary retirement under subsection (b) in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Suspension shall continue until termination of all appeals. If the order of involuntary retirement is set aside, the judge shall be reinstated and shall recover his judicial salary less any retirement salary received and shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of his office.
“(3) A judge of a District of Columbia court shall be suspended from all or part, of his judicial duties, with salary, if the Commission, upon the concurrence of three members, (A) orders a hearing for the removal or retirement of the judge pursuant to this subchapter and determines that his suspension is in the interest of the administration of justice, and (B) files an order of suspension in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The suspension shall terminate as specified in the order (which may be modified, as appropriate, by the Commission) but in no event later than the termination of all appeals.
“§ 11–1527. Procedures
“(a) (1) On its own initiative, or upon complaint or report of any person, formal or informal, the Commission may undertake an investigation of the conduct or health of any judge. After such investigation as it deems adequate, the Commission may terminate the investigation or it may order a hearing concerning the health or conduct of the judge. No order affecting the tenure of a judge based 011 grounds for removal set forth in section 11–1526(a)(2) or 11–1630(b)(3) shall be made except after a hearing as provided by this subchapter. Nothing in this subchapter shall preclude any informal contacts with the judge, or the chief judge of his court, by the Commission, whether before or after a hearing is ordered, to discuss any matter related to its investigation.
“(2) A judge whose conduct or health is to be the subject of a hearing by the Commission shall be given notice of such hearing and of the nature of the matters under inquiry not less than thirty days before the date on which the hearing is to be held. He shall be admitted to such hearing and to every subsequent hearing regarding his conduct or health. He may be represented by counsel, offer evidence in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
“(3) Within ninety days after the adjournment of bearings, the Commission shall make findings of fact and a determination regarding the conduct or health of a judge who was the subject of the hearing. The concurrence of at least four members shall be required for a determination of grounds for removal or retirement. Upon a deter-urination of grounds for removal or retirement, the Commission shall tile an appropriate order pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of section 11–1526. On or before the date the order is filed, the Commission shall notify the judge, the chief judge of his court, and the President of the United States.
“(b) The Commission shall keep a record of any hearing on the conduct or health of a judge and one copy of such record shall be provided to the judge at the expense of the Commission.
“(c) (1) In the conduct of investigations and hearings under this section the Commission may administer oaths, order and otherwise provide for the inspection of books and records, and issue subpenas for attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents, and testimony relevant to any such investigation or hearing. It may order a judge whose health is in issue to submit to a medical examination by a duly licensed physician designated by the Commission.
“(2) Whenever a witness before the Commission refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce books, papers, documents, records, recordings, or other materials, and the Commission determines that the testimony or production of evidence is necessary to the conduct of its proceedings, it may order the witness to testify or produce the evidence. The Commission may issue the order no earlier than ten days after the day on which it served the Attorney General with notice of its intention to issue the order-The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or production of evidence) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, nor may it be used as a basis for subjecting the witness to any penalty or forfeiture contrary to constitutional right or privilege. No witness shall be exempt under this subsection from prosecution for perjury committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this subsection.
“(3) If any person refuses to attend, testify, or produce any writing or things required by a subpena issued by the Commission, the Commission may petition the United States district court for the district in which the person may be found for an order compelling him to attend and testify or produce the writings or things required by subpena. The court shall order the person to appear before it at a specified time and place and then and there shall consider why he has not attended, testified, or produced writings or things as required. A copy of the order shall be served upon him. If it appears to the court that the subpena was regularly issued, the court shall order the person to appear before the Commission at the time or place fixed in the order and to testify or produce the required writings or things. Failure to obey the order shall be punishable as contempt of court.
“(4) In pending investigations or proceedings before it, the Commission may order the deposition of any person to be taken in such form and subject to such limitation as may be prescribed in the order. The Commission may file in the Superior Court a petition, stating generally, without identifying the judge, the nature of the pending matter, the name and residence of the person whose testimony is desired, and directions, if any, of the Commission requesting an order requiring the person to appear and testify before a designated officer. Upon the filing of the petition the Superior Court may order the person to appear and testify. A subpena for such deposition shall be issued by the clerk of the Superior Court and the deposition shall be taken and returned in the manner prescribed by law for civil actions.
“(d) It shall be the duty of the United .States marshals upon the request, of the Commission to serve process and to execute all lawful orders of the Commission.
“(e) Each witness, other than an officer or employee of the United States or the District of Columbia, shall receive for his attendance the same fees, and all witnesses shall receive the allowances, prescribed by section 15–714 for witnesses in civil cases. The amount shall be paid
Post, p. 554.
by the Commission from funds appropriated to it.
“§ 11–1528. Privilege; confidentiality
“(a) The filing of papers with and the giving of testimony before the Commission shall be privileged. Unless otherwise authorized by the judge whose conduct or health is the subject of the proceedings under this subchapter, the hearings before the Commission, the record thereof, and all papers filed in connection with such hearings shall be confidential. But on prosecution of a witness for perjury or on review of a decision of the Commission, the record of hearings before the Commission and all papers filed in connection therewith shall be disclosed to the extent required for the prosecution or review.
“(b) If the Commission determines that no grounds for removal or involuntary retirement exist it shall notify the judge and inquire whether he desires the Commission to make available to the public information pertaining to the nature of its investigation, its hearings, findings, determinations, or any other fact related to its proceedings regarding his health or conduct. Upon receipt of such request in writing from the judge, the Commission shall make such information available to the public.
“§ 11–1529. Judicial review
“(a) A judge aggrieved by tin order of removal or retirement filed by the Commission pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of section 11–1526 may seek judicial review thereof by filing notice of appeal with the Chief Justice of the United States. Notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the order of the Commission in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
“(b) Upon receipt of notice of appeal from an order of the Commission, the Chief Justice shall convene a special court consisting of three Federal judges designated from among active or retired judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
“(c) The special court shall review the order of the Commission appealed from and, to the extent necessary to decision and when presented, shall decide all relevant questions of law and interpret constitutional and statutory provisions. Within 90 days after oral argument or submission on the briefs if oral argument is waived, the special court, shall affirm or reverse the order of the Commission or remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings.
“(d) The special court shall hold unlawful and set aside a Commission order or determination found to be—
“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
“(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
“(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
“(4) without-observance of procedure required by law; or
“(5) unsupported by substantia] evidence.
In making the foregoing determinations, the special court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by the judge or the Commission, and shall take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.
“(e) As appropriate and to the extent consistent with this chapter, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governing appeals in civil cases shall apply to appeals taken under this section.
“(f) Decisions of the special court shall be final and conclusive.
“§ 11–1530. Financial statements
“(a) Pursuant to such rules as the Commission shall promulgate, each judge of the District of Columbia courts shall, within one year following the date of enactment of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970 and at least annually thereafter, file with the Commission the following reports of his personal financial interests:
“(1) A report of his income and his spouse’s income for the period covered by the report, the sources thereof, and the amount and nature of the income received from each such source.
“(2) The name and address of each private foundation or eleemosynary institution, and of each business or professional corporation, firm, or enterprise in which he was an officer, director, proprietor, or partner during such period;
“(3) The identity of each liability of $5,000 or more owed by him or by him and his spouse jointly at any time during such period.
“(4) The source and value of all gifts in the aggregate amount or value of $50 or more from any single source received by him during such period, except gifts from his spouse or any of his children or parents.
“(5) The identity of each trust in which he held a beneficial interest having a value of $10,000 or more at any lime during such period, and in the case of any trust in which he held any beneficial interest during such period, the identity, if known, of each interest in real or persona] property in which the trust held a beneficial interest having a value of $10,000 or more at any time during such period. If he cannot obtain the identity of the trust interest, he shall request the trustee to report that information to the Commission in such manner as the Commission shall by rule prescribe.
“(6) The identity of each interest in real or personal property having a value of $10,000 or more which he owned at any time during such period.
“(7) The amount or value and source of each honorarium of $300 or more received by him during such period.
“(8) The source and amount of all money, other than that received from the United States Government, received in the form of an expense account or as reimbursement for expenditures during such period.
“(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the content of any report filed under this section shall not be open to inspection by anyone other than (A) the person filing the report, (B) authorized members, alternate members, or staff of the Commission to determine if this section has been complied with or in connection with duties of the Commission under this subchapter, or (C) a special court convened under section 11–1529 to review a removal order of the Commission.
“(2) Reports filed pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (7) of subsection (a) shall be made available for public inspection and copy-ing promptly after filing and during the period they are kept by the Commission, and shall be kept by the Commission for not less than three years.
“(3) The intentional failure by a judge of a District of Columbia court to file a report required by this section, or the filing of a fraudulent report, shall constitute willful misconduct in office and shall be grounds for removal from office under section 11–1526(a)(2).
“SUBCHAPTER III.— RETIREMENT
“§ 11–1561. Definitions
“For purposes of this subchapter—
“(1) The term ‘judge’ means any judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals or the Superior Court or any person with judicial service as described in paragraph (2) of this section.
“(2) The term ‘judicial service’ means service as a judge in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Superior Court, or the former Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, District of Columbia Tax Court, police court, municipal court, Municipal Court of Appeals, or District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.
“(3) The terms ‘retire’ and ‘retirement’ include retirement, resignation, or failure to be recommissioned or reappointed upon the expiration of a commission.
“(4) The term ‘fund’ means the District of Columbia Judicial Retirement and Survivors Annuity Fund as provided in section 11–1570.
“(5) The term ‘widow’ means a surviving wife of a judge who has either (A) been married to the judge for at least two years preceding his death or (B) is the mother of issue by the marriage and has not remarried.
“(6) The term ‘widower’ means a surviving husband of a judge who has either (A) been married to the judge for at least two years preceding her death or (B) is the father of issue by the marriage and has not remarried.
“(7) The term ‘Commissioner’ means the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
“(8) The term ‘child’ means—
“(A) an unmarried child under eighteen year’s of age, including (i) an adopted child, and (iij a stepchild or recognized natural child who lived with the judge in a regular parent-child relationship;
“(B) such unmarried child regardless of age who is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical disability incurred before age eighteen; or
“(C) such unmarried child between eighteen and twenty-two years of age who is a student regularly pursuing a full-time course of study or training in residence in a high school, trade school, technical or vocational institute, junior college, college, university or comparable recognized educational institution. For the purpose of this paragraph, a child whose twenty-second birthday occurs before July 1 or after August 31 of a calendar year, and while he is regularly pursuing such a course of study or training, is deemed to have become twenty-two years of age on the first day of July after that birthday. A child who is a student is deemed not to have ceased to be a student during an interim between school years if the interim is not more than five months and if he shows to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he has a bona fide intention of continuing to pursue a course of study or training in the same or different school during the school semester (or other period into which the school year is divided) immediately after the interim.
“(9) The term ‘lump-sum credit for retirement’ means the unrefunded amount consisting of—
“(A) retirement deductions made from the basic salary of a judge;
“(B) amounts deposited covering earlier judicial and nonjudicial service; and
“(C) interest on the deductions and deposits at 4 per centum a year to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum a year thereafter compounded annually to December 31, 1956, or, in the case of a judge separated or transferred to a position not within the purview of (his section before he has completed five years of service, to the date of the separation or transfer;
but the term ‘lump-sum credit for retirement’ does not include interest—
“(i) if the service covered thereby aggregates one year or less; or
“(ii) for the fractional part of a month in the total service.
“(10) The term ‘lump-sum credit for survivor annuity’ means the unrefunded amount consisting of—
“(A) survivor annuity deductions made from the salary of a judge;
“(B) amounts deposited for survivor annuity covering earlier judicial and non judicial service; and
“(C) interest on the deductions and deposits at 4 per centum a year to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum a year thereafter compounded annually to December 31, 1956, or, in the case of a judge separated or transferred to a position not within the purview of this section before he has completed five years of service, to the date of the separation or transfer;
but the term ‘lump-sum credit, for survivor annuity’ does not include interest—
“(i) if the service covered thereby aggregates one year or less; or
“(ii) for the fractional part of a month in the total service.
“§ 11–1562. Eligibility for retirement
“(a) A judge is eligible for retirement under this subchapter when he has completed ten years of judicial service, whether continuous or not, or upon mandatory retirement as provided in section 11–1502.
“(b) The retirement salary of a judge who retires shall commence as follows:
“(1) With twenty or more years of judicial service, at age fifty.
“(2) With less than twenty years of judicial service, at age sixty, unless he elects to receive a reduced salary beginning at age fifty-five or at the date of retirement if subsequent to that age.
“(c) A judge with five years or more of judicial service, including civilian service performed by the judge which is creditable under section 8332 of title 5, United States Code, may voluntarily retire for a mental or physical disability which is or is likely to become permanent and which prevents, or seriously interferes with, the proper performance of judicial duties. Such disability shall be established by furnishing to the Commissioner a certificate of disability signed by a duly licensed physician, approved by the Surgeon General of the United States, and containing such information and conclusions as the Commissioner by regulation may require consistent with this subsection.
“(d) Eligibility for retirement salary of a judge involuntarily retired for disability under section 11–1526(b) shall not be conditioned upon prior service.
“§ 11–1563. Withholding of retirement payments; lump-sum credit
“(a) There shall be deducted and withheld from the basic salary of each judge appointed after October 31, 1964, and each judge appointed Wore November 1, 1964, who has elected to come within the provisions of this subchapter an amount equal to 3½ per centum of his basic salary. Amounts so deducted and withheld shall be deposited in the fund in accordance with procedures established by the Commissioner. Each judge subject to this section shall be deemed to consent and agree to such deductions from basic salary, and payment less such deductions shall constitute a full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands whatsoever for all regular service during the period covered by such payment, except the right to the benefits to which he shall be entitled under this subsection, not withstanding any law, rule, or regulation affecting the judge’s salary.
“(b) If he has not previously so deposited, each judge subject to this section shall deposit in the fund, with interest at 4 per centum per annum to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum per annum thereafter, compounded on December 31 of each year, a sum equal to 3½ per centum of his basic salary received for judicial service performed by him as a judge prior to the date he became subject to the District of Columbia
Judges Retirement Act of 1964. Each judge may elect to make such deposits in installments during the continuance of his judicial service in such amounts as may be determined in each instance by the Commissioner. Notwithstanding the failure of any judge to make such deposits, credit shall be allowed for the service rendered but the retirement pay for such judge shall be reduced by 10 per centum of such deposit remaining unpaid unless the judge shall elect to eliminate the service involved for purposes of retirement salary computation, except as provided in section 11–1564(d).
“(c) If any judge who is subject to this section is removed, resigns, or fails to be recommissioned or reappointed, be is entitled to be paid his lump-sum credit for retirement, if application for payment is filed with the Commissioner at least thirty-one days before the commencing date of any retirement salary for which he is eligible. The receipt of tin lump-sum credit for retirement by the judge voids all retirement salary rights under this subehapter, until he is reemployed in judicial service subject to this subchapter.
“(d) If a judge who has not elected to bring himself within the survivor annuity provisions of this subchapter dies while in regular active service, the lump-sum credit for retirement shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, to the person or persons surviving him in the order of precedence established in section 11–1569 (b). Such payments shall be a bar to recovery by any other person.
“§ 11–1564. Computation of retirement salary; election to credit other service
“(a) The retirement salary of a judge who retires pursuant to section 11–1562 (a) and (b) shall be paid annually in equal monthly installments during the remainder of his life and shall bear the same ratio to his basic salary immediately prior to the date of his retirement as the total of his aggregate years of service bears to the period of thirty years. A judge who elects to receive a reduced retirement salary pursuant to section 11–1562(b)(2) shall have his retirement salary reduced by one-twelfth of 1 per centum for each month or fraction of a month he is under the age of sixty at the time of the commencement of his reduced retirement salary. In no event shall the retirement salary (including the amount provided by subsection (c) of this section) of a judge exceed 80 per centum of Iris basic salary immediately prior to the date of his retirement.
“(b) The retirement salary of a judge retired for disability pursuant to section 11–1526(b) or section 11–1562 (c) or (d) shall be paid annually in equal monthly installments during the remainder of his life and shall be computed as provided in subsection (a). If a judge is retired for disability, his retirement salary shall not be reduced because of his age at the time of retirement, tn ho event shall the retirement salary of a judge retired for disability be less than 50 per centum or exceed 80 per centum of Iris basic salary immediately prior to the date of his retirement.
“(c) In computing the retirement salary of a judge retiring under section 11–1562, the judge shall be entitled, if he so elects during the continuance of Iris judicial service or at the time of iris retirement, to receive, in addition to the amount provided for in subsection (a) of this section, an amount (payable annually in equal monthly installments during the remainder of his life) based on military and civilian service performed by the judge which is creditable under section 8332
80 Stat. 587; 81 Stat. 214; 83 Stat. 831.
of title 5, United States Code, computed in accordance with section 8339 (a), (b), (c), (d), (g), and (h) of that title, as applicable, subject to the provisions of section 8334 (c) and (d) of that title and the provisions of subsection (d) of this section; except that average pay for the purpose of the computation shall be deemed to be the basic salary of the judge immediately prior to the date of his retirement under section 11–1562.
“(d) (1) The crediting of service with respect to any judge under subsection (c) of this section shall be made on the standard basis of a deposit in the sum equal to 3½ per centum of his basic salary, pay, or compensation for civilian service creditable under section 8332 of title 5, United States Code, with interest as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
“(2) Interest on deposits under this subsection is computed from the midpoint of each service period included in the computation to the date of deposit or the commencing date of the retirement salary of the judge, whichever date is the earlier. Interest is computed at the rate of 4 per centum a year to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum a year thereafter, compounded annually. Interest may not be charged for a period of separation from the service which began before October 31, 1956.
“(3) Deposit under this subsection may not be required for—
“(A) service before August 1, 1920;
“(B) military service; or
“(C) service for the Panama Railroad Company before January 1, 1924.
“(4) If a judge elects to be credited with service under subsection (c) of this section, his lump-sum credit, or any remaining balance thereof, in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund or in the retirement fund of any other retirement system for civilian employees of the Government of the United States or the District of Columbia, shall be transferred to the District of Columbia Judicial Retirement and Survivors Annuity Fund. The judge shall be deemed to consent to the transfer. The transfer shall be a complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands against the retirement system from which the funds were transferred on account of the service so credited.
“(5) A judge whose lump-sum credit is transferred to the fund under paragraph (4) of this subsection is not required to make deposits in addition to the amount transferred for periods of service for which full contributions were made to the retirement system from which the transfer was made.
“(6) In the case of a judge whose lump-sum credit has been transferred to the fund under paragraph (4) of this subsection and who has not elected a survivor annuity under section 11–1566, or prior corresponding provision of law, the Commissioner shall refund to the judge any amount which the Commissioner determines to be in excess of the amount of the deposit required by this subsection. In the case of a judge whose lump-sum credit has been transferred to the fund tinder paragraph (4) of this subsection and who, prior to the effective date of this section, had elected a survivor annuity and made deposits to the fund for survivor annuity purposes, the Commissioner shall refund to the judge any amount which the Commissioner determines in excess of the amount of the deposit, required by section 11–1567.
“(7) If any civilian service performed by the judge which is creditable under section 8332 of title 5, United States Code, is not covered
80 Stat. 567; 81 Stat. 214; 83 Stat. 831.
by the amount of the lump-sum credit transferred under paragraph (4) of this subsection, the judge may make deposit, on the standard basis prescribed by paragraph (1) of this subsection, with interest as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, in accordance with and subject to the applicable provisions of section 8334 (c) and (d) of that title, of the amount or amounts necessary for him to receive full credit,
for that service for the purposes of subsection (c) of this section. The deposit may be made, as the judge may elect, in installments, during the continuance of his judicial service, in such amounts as the Commissioner may determine in each instance, or in a lump sum prior to or at the time of his retirement under section 11–1562. A judge electing to make installment deposits shall not be given full credit for the service until the total required deposit is made.
“(8) For the purpose of survivor annuity, deposits authorized by this subsection also may be made by the survivor of a judge.
“(e) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a judge eligible therefor from simultaneously receiving his retirement salary under this section and any annuity or retired pay to which he would otherwise be entitled under any other law without regard to this subchapter. However, in computing the retirement salary of a judge under this section, service used in the computation of such other annuity shall not be credited.
“§ 11–1565. Service by retired judges
“Any retired judge performing full-time judicial duties on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals or the Superior Court shall be entitled, during the period for which he serves, to receive the salary of the office in which he performs such duties, but there shall be deducted from such salary an amount equal to his retirement salary for that period. No deduction shall be withheld for health benefits, Federal employees’ life insurance, or retirement purposes from the salary paid to a retired judge during judicial service. The performance of such judicial service shall not create an additional retirement, change a retirement, or create or in any manner affect a survivor annuity.
“§ 11–1566. Survivor annuity; election; relinquishment
“(a) Any judge, whether or not subject to sections 11–1562 to 11–1565, may, by written election filed with the Commissioner within six months after the date on which he takes office or is reappointed or recommissioned, or within six months after he marries, bring himself within the survivor annuity provisions of this subchapter.
“(b) Any judge in regular active service or any retired judge, who shall have elected survivor annuity, and who after that election is unmarried and does not have a dependent child, may elect—
“(1) to terminate the deductions and withholdings from his salary under section 11–1567(a) and any installment payments elected to be made under section 11–1567(b); and
“(2) to have paid to him the lump-sum credit forsurvivor annuity.
Any election under this subsection shall be made hi writing and Hied with the Commissioner.
“(c) If any judge who shall have elected survivor annuity resigns from office otherwise than under the provisions of this subchapter or is removed, he shall be entitled to be paid the lump-sum credit for survivor annuity.
“(d) Payment of the lump-sum credit for survivor annuity as provided in this section shall extinguish all claims with respect to survivor annuity.
“§ 11–1567. Survivor annuity; payments to fund
“(a) There shall be deducted and withheld from the salary (whether basic, or retirement) of each judge who has elected survivor annuity a sum equal to 3 per centum of that salary. The amounts so deducted and withheld shall, in accordance with such procedures as may be prescribed by the Commissioner, be deposited in the fund. Every judge who elects survivor annuity shall be deemed thereby to consent and agree to the deductions from his salary as provided in this subsection, and payment less such deductions shall constitute a full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands whatever for all judicial services rendered by such judge during the period covered by such payment, except the right to the benefits to which he or his survivors shall be entitled under the survivor annuity provisions of this subchapter.
“(b) If he has not previously so deposited, each judge who has elected survivor annuity shall deposit to the fund, with interest at 4 per centum per annum to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum per annum thereafter, compounded on December 31 of each year, a sum equal to 3 per centum of his salary received for judicial service and of retirement salary (but excluding salary for judicial service under section 11–1565); and a sum equal to 3 per centum of his basic salary, pay, or compensation for civilian service creditable under section 8332
80 Stat. 567; 81 Stat. 214; 83 Stat. 831.
of title 5, United States Code, with interest as provided in section 11–1564(d). Except to the extent that the Commissioner has made refund to the judge under section 11–1564(d)(6), deposit is not required with respect to that portion of the service of the judge covered by the transfer, under section 11–1564(d)(4), of his lump-sum credit to the fund. In addition, deposit may not be required for the types of service described in section 11–1564(d)(3). Each judge may elect to make deposits under this subsection in installments during the continuance of his judicial service in such amounts as may be determined in each instance by the Commissioner. Deposits under this subsection also may be made by the survivor of a judge.
“(c) If a judge or survivor fails to make such deposits, credit shall be allowed for 1 be service, but the annuity of the widow or widower of such judge shall be reduced by an amount equal to 10 per centum of the deposit required by this section, computed as of the date of the death of the judge, unless the widow or widower elects to eliminate the service not covered by deposit entirely from credit for computation purposes except as provided in section 11–1564(d)(3).
“§ 11–1568. Survivor annuity; entitlement; computation
“(a) The service of a judge for the purpose of computing a survivor annuitv includes his judicial service (and retired service for which deductions are made) and, subject to section 8334(d) of title 5, United States Code, his military and civilian service which is creditable under
section 8332 of that title.
“(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a widow or widower eligible therefor from simultaneously receiving a survivor annuity under this subchapter and any other annuity (survivor or otherwise) or retired pay to which he or she would otherwise be entitled under any other law without regard to this subchapter. However, in computing the survivor annuity of that widow or widower under this subchapter, service used in the computation of such other annuity shall not be credited.
“(c) If a judge who has elected a survivor annuity dies in regular active service or after having retired from such service with at least five years of allowable service under this section for which payments have been withheld or deposits made, the survivor annuity shall be paid as follows:
“(1) If the judge is survived by a widow or widower but no child, the widow or widower shall receive, beginning on the day after the judge dies, an amount computed as provided in subsection (e).
“(2) If the judge is survived by a widow or widower and one or more children—
“(A) the widow or widower shall receive an immediate annuity in the amount computed as provided in subsection (e); and
“(B) there also shall be paid to or on behalf of each such child an immediate annuity equal to one-half the amount of the annuity of such widow or widower, but not to exceed the lesser of (i) $2,700 per year divided by the number of such children or (ii) $900 per child per year.
“(3) If the judge leaves no surviving widow or widower but leaves a surviving child or children, there shall be paid to or on behalf of each such child an immediate annuity equal to the amount of the annuity to which the widow or widower would have been entitled under paragraph (1) of this subsection had he or she survived, but not to exceed the lesser of (A) $3,240 per year divided by the number of children or (B) $1,080 per child per year.
An annuity payable to a widow or widower under this section shall be terminable upon death or remarriage. The annuity payable to a child shall be terminable upon his death or marriage or his ceasing to be a child as defined in section 11–1561(8). In case of the death of a widow or widower of a judge leaving a child or children of the judge surviving, the annuity of such child or children shall be recomputed and paid as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection. In any case in which the annuity of a child is terminated, the annuities of any remaining child or children, based upon the .service of the same judge, shall be recomputed and paid as though the child whose annuity was terminated had not survived the judge.
“(d) Questions of disability or other eligibility requirements of a child under this section shall be determined by the Commissioner who may order such medical or other examinations at any time as he deems necessary with respect to determining the facts concerning the disability of a child receiving or applying for an annuity under this subchapter. An annuity may be denied or suspended for failure to submit to examination.
“(e) The annuity of a widow or widower of a judge electing survivor annuity shall be an amount equal to the sum of—
“(1) 1¼ per centum of the average annual salary received for service allowable under subsection (a) during the last three years of such service prior to death or retirement multiplied by the sum of his years of judicial service and his Member, congressional employee, and his military service allowable under subsection (a); and
“(2) threefourths of 1 per centum of such average annual salary multiplied by his years of all other civilian service allowably under subsection (a).
A survivor annuity shall not exceed 44 per centum of the average annual salary described in paragraph (1) of this subsection and shall be subject to reduction as provided in section 11–1567 (c).
“§ 11–1569. Survivor annuity; payment; order of precedence
“(a) Survivor annuities shall accrue monthly and shall be due and payable in monthly installments on the first business day of the month following the month or other period for which the annuity shall have accrued.
“(b) In any case in which—
“(1) a judge who has elected survivor annuity shall die (A) while in regular active service after having rendered five years of allowable service as provided in section 11 1568(a) or while receiving retirement salary under this subchapter but without a survivor or survivors entitled to annuity under section 11–1568(c) or (B) while in regular active service but before having rendered five years of allowable service; or
“(2) the right, of all persons entitled to an annuity under section 11–1568(c) based on the service of the judge shall terminate before a valid claim therefor shall have been established;
the lump-sum credit shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, to the person or persons surviving at the date title to the payment arises, in the following order of precedence, and such payment shall be a bar to recovery by any other person:
“First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries whom the judge may have designated in writing to the Commissioner prior to the judge’s death; “Second, if there be no such beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the judge; “Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the judge and the descendants of any deceased children by representation; “Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the judge or the survivor of them; “Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of such judge; “Sixth, if none of the above, to such other next of kin of the judge as may be determined by the Commissioner to be entitled under the laws of the domicile of the judge at the time of his death.
Determination as to the widow, widower, or child of a judge for purposes of this subsection shall be made by the Commissioner without regard to the definitions in section 11–1561.
“(c) In any case in which the annuities of all persons entitled to annuity based upon the service of a judge shall terminate before the aggregate amount of annuity paid (together with any amounts received by the judge as retirement salary) equals the total amount credited to the individual account of the judge, with interest at 4 per centmn per annum to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum per annum thereafter, compounded on December 31 of each year, to the date of the death of such judge, the difference shall be paid upon establishment of a valid claim therefor, in the order of precedence prescribed in subsection (b).
“(d) Any accrued annuity remaining unpaid upon the termination (other than by reason of death) of the annuity of any person based upon the service of a judge shall be paid to such person. Any accrued annuity remaining unpaid upon the death of any person receiving an annuity based upon the service of a judge shall be paid, upon establishment of a valid claim therefor, in the following order or precedence: “First, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of the annuitant: “Second, if there is no such executor or administrator, payment may be made, after the expiration of thirty days from the date of death of the annuitant, to such person or persons as may appear in the judgment of the Commissioner to be legally entitled thereto, and such payments shall be a bar to recovery by any other person.
“(e) Where any payment under sections 11–1566 to 111569 is to be made to a minor or to a person mentally incompetent or under other legal disability adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, such payment may be made to the person who is constituted guardian or other fiduciary by the law of the jurisdiction wherein the claimant, resides or is otherwise legally vested with the care of the claimant or his estate. Where no guardian or other fiduciary of the person under legal disability has been appointed under the laws of the jurisdiction wherein the claimant resides, payment may be made to any person who, in the judgment of the Commissioner, is responsible for the care of the claimant, and the payment bars recovery by any other person.
“§ 11–1570. Retirement and annuity fund
“(a) The District of Columbia Judicial Retirement and Survivors Annuity Fund is hereby continued in the Treasury and appropriated for the payment of retirement salaries, annuities, refunds, and allowances as provided in this subchapter. If at any time the balance of the fund is insufficient to pay current obligations arising under this subchapter, there is authorized to be appropriated to the fund, out of any moneys in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the District, of Columbia not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to pay current obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare the estimates of the annual appropriations required to be made to the fund, and shall make actuarial evaluations of the fund at intervals of five years or more if deemed necessary by the Secretary.
“(b) The Secretary shall invest, from time to time, in interest-bearing securities of the United States or Federal farm loan bonds, any portions of such funds as in his judgment may not be immediately required for payments from the fund and the income derived from such investments shall constitute a part of the fund.
“(c) All amounts deposited by, or deducted and withheld from the salary of, any judge for credit to the fund shall, under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner, be credited to an individual account of the judge.
“(d) None of the moneys mentioned in this subchapter shall be assignable, either in law or in equity, or be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.
“§ 11–1571. Periodic increases; existing rights
“(a) The retirement salary of any judge, or the annuity of any person based upon the service of a judge, who, on the effective date of any increase which, after the effective date of this section, becomes payable under the provisions of section 8340(b) of title 5, United
States Code, is receiving such salary or annuity (1) under the provisions of this subchapter, or (2) under the provisions of section 11–1701, as in effect prior to the effective date of this section, and its predecessor laws, shall be increased on the effective date of the increase by a percentage equal to the percentage of such increase under section 8340 of title 5, United States Code.
“(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall defeat or diminish rights acquired under section 11–1701, as in effect prior to the effective date of this section, and its predecessor laws, except on the election and with the consent of the judge, annuitant, or other person affected.
“Chapter 17— ADMINISTRATION OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS
“SUBCHAPTER I.— COURT ADMINISTRATION
“§ 11–1701. Administration of District of Columbia court system
“(a) There shall be a Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the ‘Joint Committee’) consisting of (1) the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, who shall serve as Chairman, (2) an associate judge of that court elected annually by the judges thereof, (3) the Chief Judge of the Superior Court, and (4) two associate judges of that court elected annually by the judges thereof.
“(b) The Joint Committee shall have responsibility within the District of Columbia court system for the following matters:
“(1) General personnel policies, including those for recruitment, removal, compensation, and training.
“(2) Accounts and auditing.
“(3) Procurement and disbursement.
“(4) Submission of the annual budget requests of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court to the Commissioner of the District of Colombia as the integrated budget of the District of Columbia court system, except that such requests may be modified upon the concurrence of four of the five members of the Joint Committee.
“(5) Approval of the bonds of fiduciary employees within the District, of Columbia court system.
“(6) Formulation and enforcement of standards for outside activities of and receipt of compensation by the judges of the District of Columbia court system.
“(7) Development and coordination of statistical and management information systems and reports supporting the annual report of the District of Columbia court system.
“(8) Liaison between the District of Columbia court system and the court systems of other jurisdictions, including the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Federal Judicial Center.
“(9) With the concurrence of the respective chief judges of the District of Columbia courts, other policies and practices of the District of Columbia court system and resolution of other matters which may be of joint and mutual concern of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court.
“(c) The Joint Committee, with the assistance of the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts, shall—
“(1) consider and evaluate the business of the courts and means of improving the administration of justice within the District of Columbia court system and shall report thereon in its annual report;
“(2) prepare and publish an annual report, of the District of Columbia court system regarding the work of the courts, the performance of the duties enumerated in this chapter, and of any recommendations relating to the courts;
“(3) recommend from time to time to the Congress changes in the organization, jurisdiction, operation, and procedures of the courts which are appropriate for legislative action, and institute such changes, pursuant to the responsibilities enumerated in subsection (b), in the methods of administering judicial business in the court system as would improve the administration of justice; and
“(4) arrange for such training seminars, and other related services, as are desirable and feasible for judges and other court personnel, including services from the Federal Judicial Center on a reimbursable basis.
“(d) The Joint Committee shall have authority to issue all orders and directives necessary to implement the responsibilities and duties enumerated in this section.
“§ 11–1702. Responsibilities of chief judges in the respective courts
“(a) The Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in addition to the authority conferred on him by chapter 7 of this title,
Ante, p. 478.
shall supervise the internal administration of that court—
“(1) including all administrative mutters other than those within the responsibility enumerated in section 11–1701 (b), and
“(2) including the implementation in that, court of the matters enumerated in section 11–1701 (b),
consistent with the general policies and directives of the Joint Committee.
“(b) The Chief Judge of the Superior Court, in addition to the authority conferred on him by chapter 9 of this title, shall supervise the internal administration of that court—
“(1) including all administrative matters other than those within the responsibility enumerated in section 11–1701(b), and
“(2) including the implementation in that court of the matters enumerated in section 11–1701 (b),
consistent with the general policies and directives of the Joint Committee.
“§ 11–1703. Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts; appointment; compensation
“(a) There shall be an Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the ‘Executive Officer’). He shall be responsible for the administration of the District of Columbia court system subject to the supervision of the Joint Committee and the chief judges of the respective courts as provided in this chapter. He shall be subject to the supervision of the Joint Committee regarding administrative matters that are enumerated in section 11–1701 (b). He shall be subject to the supervision of the chief judges in their respective courts: (1) regarding all administrative matters other than those within the responsibility enumerated in section 11–1701 (b), and (2) regarding the implementation in the respective courts of the matter’s enumerated in section 11–1701 (b), consistent with the general policies and directives of the Joint Committee.
“(b) The Executive Officer shall be selected by, and subject to removal by, the Joint Committee with the concurrence of the respective chief judges. He shall be selected from a list of at least three qualified persons, submitted by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
“(c) The Executive Officer shall receive the same compensation as an associate judge of the Superior Court.
“§ 11–1704. Oath and bond of the Executive Officer
“(a) The Executive Officer shall take an oath or affirmation for the faithful and impartial discharge of the duties of his office.
“(b) The Executive Officer shall give bond, with two or more sureties, to be approved by the Joint Committee, in an amount prescribed by the Joint Committee, faithfully to discharge the duties of his office.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— COURT PERSONNEL
“§ 11–1721. Clerks of courts
“The District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court shall each have a clerk who shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him.
“§ 11–1722. Director of Social Services
“(a) There shall be a Director of Social Services in the Superior Court who shall have charge of all social services for the Superior Court, subject to the supervision of the Executive Officer. With respect to adults, he shall provide probation services, intake procedures, marital and family counseling, social casework, rehabilitation and training programs, and such other services as the court shall prescribe. With respect to juveniles, he shall provide intake procedures, counseling, education and training programs, probation services, and such o her services as the court shall prescribe.
“(b) To the maximum extent feasible, the Director shall coordinate with and utilize the services of appropriate public and private agencies within the District of Columbia, and shall coordinate and provide administrative services to volunteers utilized by the Superior Court or any divisions thereof.
“(c) As directed by the Executive Officer, the Director shall conduct studies and make reports relating to the utilization of social services as an adjunct to the Superior Court.
“(d) The Director shall make recommendations with respect to the consolidation or disposition of causes before the court relating to members of the same family or household.
“§ 11–1723. Fiscal Officer
“(a) (1) There shall be a Fiscal Officer in the District of Columbia court system who shall be responsible for the budget of the court system and for the accounts of the courts, subject to the supervision of the Executive Officer.
“(2) The Fiscal Officer shall receive, safeguard, and account for all fees, costs, payments, and deposits of money or other items, and shall be responsible for depositing in the Treasury of the United States all fines, forfeitures, fees, unclaimed deposits, and other moneys.
“(3) The Fiscal Officer shall be responsible for the approval of vouchers and the internal auditing of the accounts of the courts and shall arrange for an annual independent audit of the accounts of the courts by the District of Columbia government.
“(b) The Fiscal Officer shall give bond with two or more sureties, to be approved by the Joint Committee, in an amount prescribed by the Joint Committee, faithfully to discharge the duties of his office.
“§ 11–1724. Auditor-Master
“There shall be an Auditor-Master of the Superior Court who shall (1) audit and state fiduciary accounts, (2) execute orders of reference referred by the Superior Court and perform duties in connection with the execution of such orders in accordance with Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other applicable rule, and (3) perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Superior Court. The Auditor-Master shall give bond faithfully to discharge the duties of his office. The bond shall have two or more sureties, to be approved by the chief judge of the Superior Court, and shall be in an amount prescribed by him.
“§ 11–1725. Appointment of nonjudicial personnel
“(a) Subject to the approval of the Joint Committee, the Executive Officer shall appoint, and may remove, the Fiscal Officer, and such other personnel whose principal function is to perform duties for both District of Columbia courts.
“(b) The Executive Officer shall appoint, and may remove, the Director of Social Services, the clerks of the courts, the Auditor-Master, and all other nonjudicial personnel for the courts (other than the Register of Wills and personal law clerks and secretaries of the judges) as may be necessary, subject to—
“(1) regulations approved by the Joint Committee; and
“(2) the approval of the chief judge of the court to which the personnel are or will be assigned.
Appointments and removals of court personnel shall not be subject to the laws, rules, and limitations applicable to District of Columbia employees, except as otherwise specified in the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970.
“§ 11–1726. Compensation
“In the case of nonjudicial employees of the District of Columbia courts whose compensation is not otherwise fixed by this title, the Executive Officer shall fix the rates of compensation of such employees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of
80 Stat. 443, 467.
Ante, p. 198–1.
title 5, United States Code, and such rates shall not exceed the maximum rate prescribed for GS–15 of the General Schedule, except that the Executive Officer may fix the rates of compensation of—
“(1) 5 positions at not to exceed the maximum rate prescribed for CIS–16 of the General Schedule; and
“(2) 2 positions at not to exceed the maximum rate prescribed for GS–17.
In fixing the rates of non judicial employees under this section, the Executive Officer shall be guided by the rates of compensation fixed for other employees in the executive and judicial branches of the Federal and District of Columbia Governments occupying the same or similar positions or occupying positions of similar responsibility, duty, and difficulty.
“§ 11–1727. Court reporters
“(a) The Executive Officer shall appoint reporter’s who shall be full-time employees of the courts. When necessary, the Executive Officer may contract for additional temporary reporting services. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the Superior Court of the District of Columbia from providing by rule for the sound recording of proceedings in lieu of mechanical (audio or manual) transcription in any branch, division or courtroom of the court. Court reporters shall, in addition to being subject to the general supervision of the Executive Officer, be subject to the supervision of the chief judges of the courts and of the other District of Columbia judges for whom they perform services, regarding the performance of their duties in the respective courts.
“(b) In addition to their annual salaries, court reporters may charge and collect from parties, including the United States and the District of Columbia, who request transcripts of the original records of proceedings, only such fees as may be prescribed from time to time by the Executive Officer. The reporters shall furnish all supplies at their own expense. The Executive Officer shall prescribe, such rules, practice, and procedure pertaining to fees for transcripts as he deems necessary, conforming as nearly as practicable to the rules, practice, and procedure established for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A fee may not be charged or taxed for a copy of a transcript delivered to a judge at his request or for copies of a transscript delivered to the clerk of a court for the records of the court. Except as to transcripts that are to be paid for by the United States or the District of Columbia, the reporters may require a party requesting a transcript to prepay the estimated fee therefor in advance of delivery of the transcript.
“§ 11–1728. Recruitment and training of personnel
“The Executive Officer shall be responsible for recruiting such qualified personnel as may be necessary for the District of Columbia courts and for providing inservice training for court personnel.
“§ 11–1729. Service of United States marshal
“The United States Marshal for the District of Columbia shall continue to serve the courts of the District of Columbia, subject to the supervision of the Attorney General of the United States.
“§ 11–1730. Reports of court personnel
“(a) Judges of the courts shall furnish time and attendance records pursuant to sections 11–709 and 11–909 to the respective chief judges, with a copy to the Executive Officer.
“(b) All non judicial personnel of the courts shall furnish such reports and information to the Executive Officer as he shall request.
“§ 11–1731. Reports of other personnel
“The Executive Officer or the chief judge may request such reports as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the courts from—
“(1) the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
“(2) the Corporation Counsel,
“(3) the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia,
“(4) the Commissioner of the District of Columbia,
“(5) the superintendent of any hospitals or institutions to which persons have been committed by the Superior Court,
“(6) the District of Columbia Public Defender Service,
“(7) the District of Columbia Bail Agency,
“(8) the District of Columbia Department of Corrections,
“(9) the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department,
“(10) the District of Columbia Department of Public Health, and
“(11) the District of Columbia Department of Public Welfare.
These officials, agencies, and departments shall furnish such reports and information as may be requested pursuant to this section.
“SUBCHAPTER III.— DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
“§ 11–1741. Court operations and organization
“Within the respective District of Columbia courts, and subject to the supervision of the chief judges thereof, the Executive Officer shall—
“(1) supervise, analyze, and improve case assignments, calendars, and dockets;
“(2) provide improved services and introduce new methods to better utilize the time of and accommodate government and other witnesses:
“(3) supervise, analyze, and improve the management of jurors;
“(4) recommend changes and improvements in court rules and procedures affecting his administrative responsibilities;
“(5) report periodically to the appropriate chief judge with respect to case volumes, backlogs, length of time cases have been pending, number and identity of incarcerated defendants awaiting trial, and such other information as the respective chief judges may request;
“(6) mechanize and computerize court operations and services where feasible and desirable and carry on continuing studies and evaluations of increased and innovative uses of mechanization and computerization;
“(7) conduct studies and research with respect to court operations on his own initiative or on request of the respective chief judges;
“(8) make recommendations to the chief judge of the Superior Court relating to the arrangement and division of the business of that court and the fixing of the time of sessions of the various divisions and branches of that court; and
“(9) perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by a chief judge.
“§ 11–1742. Property and disbursement
“(a) The Executive Officer shall be responsible, subject to the supervision of the Joint Committee, for the management of such buildings and space as may be assigned to the courts and shall maintain liaison with the appropriate Federal and District of Columbia officials with respect thereto.
“(b) The Executive Officer shall be responsible for the procurement of necessary equipment, supplies, and services for the courts and shall have power, subject to applicable law, to reimburse the District of Columbia government for services provided and to contract for such equipment, supplies, and services as may be necessary.
“(c) The Executive Officer shall serve as disbursing officer and payroll officer of the District of Columbia courts and shall assign and distribute necessary equipment and supplies.
“§ 11–1743. Annual budget
“(a) The Joint Committee shall prepare and submit to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia annual estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary for the maintenance and operations of the District of Columbia court system.
“(b) All such estimates shall be forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget by the District of Columbia without revision, but subject to the recommendations of the District of Columbia. Similarly, all estimates shall be included in the budget without revision by the President but subject to his recommendations.
“§ 11–1744. Information and liaison services
“The Executive Officer shall be responsible for—
“(1) collecting and compiling statistical information with respect to the volume and disposition of the work of the courts and the personnel of the courts;
“(2) printing and the distribution of court rules;
“(3) keeping the courts advised of pending legislative and executive actions relating to the courts;
“(4) serving as the public information officer of the courts; and
“(5) performing such other duties as may be assigned tn him by the Joint Committee and the chief judges in their respective courts.
“§ 11–1745. Reports and records
“(a) The Executive Officer shall prepare and publish, subject to the approval of the Joint Committee, the annual report of the District of Columbia court system of the work of the courts and their operations during the preceding year together with any recommendations relating to the courts. The principal purpose of the annual report shall be to provide meaningful and objective information concerning the performance, progress, and problems of the District of Columbia courts. The report shall include narrative comments analyzing the significance of statistical data and shall show trends with regard to the work of such courts, current data on the age and type of pending cases, and methods of disposition of cases. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the respective chief judges from preparing and publishing any other reports as they may wish.
“(b) The Executive Officer shall be responsible for maintaining and safeguarding the records of the courts. Except for those records required by law to be kept under court seal, he shall make the records available at all reasonable times to—
“(1) the United States Department of Justice,
“(2) the Commissioner of the District of Columbia,
“(3) the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, and
“(4) such other agencies as the. Joint Committee may specify.
“§ 11–1746. Certification of copies of papers or documents filed in District of Columbia courts
“The Executive Officer shall provide that, if any person filing any paper or document in a District of Columbia court requests a certification of such filing, a copy of such paper or document provided by such person shall be appropriately marked for such person to show the time and date of such filing and the identity of the individual with whom such paper or document was filed. Such certified copy shall be prima facie evidence in any proceeding that the original of such paper or document was filed as shown by the certification.
“§ 11–1747. Delegation of authority
“The Executive Officer and court officers appointed by him may delegate to their subordinates authority and responsibility to perform the functions vested in them by law.
“Chapter 19— JURIES AND JURORS
“§ 11–1901. Qualifications of jurors
“Jurors serving within the District of Columbia shall have the same qualifications as provided for jurors in the Federal courts.
“§ 11–1902. Single jury selection system
“There shall be a single system in the District of Columbia for the selection of jurors for both Federal and District of Columbia courts. The selection system shall be that prescribed by Federal law and executed in accordance therewith as provided by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–1903. Grand jury; additional grand jury
“(a) A grand jury serving in the District of Columbia may take cognizance of all matters brought before it regardless of whether an indictment is returnable in the Federal or District of Columbia courts,
“(b) If the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia certifies in writing to the chief judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the chief judge of the Superior Court, that the exigencies of the public service require it, the judge may, in his discretion, order an additional grand jury summoned, which shall be drawn at such time as he designates. Unless sooner discharged by order of the judge, the additional grand jury shall serve until the end of the term for which it is drawn.
“§ 11–1904. Assignment of jury panels
“The names of persons to serve as jurors in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Superior Court shall be drawn from time to time as may be required, and such persons shall be assigned to jury panels within those courts as the courts may decide.
“§ 11–1905. Length of service
“Petit jurors summoned for service in the District of Columbia shall serve for such period of time and at such sessions as the particular court shall direct, but, unless actually engaged as a trial juror in a particular case, may not be required to serve in the court for more than thirty days in any two-year period.
“§ 11–1906. Fees of jurors
“Jurors serving in the Superior Court shall receive the same fees as jurors serving in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
“Chapter 21.— REGISTER OF WILLS
“§ 11–2101. Continuation of office
“The Office of the Register of Wills shall continue as an office in the Probate Division of the Superior Court.
“§ 11–2102. Appointment; oath; bond; qualifications; compensation
“(a) The Superior Court shall appoint and remove the Register of Wills. The Register of Wills shall—
“(1) take an oath for the faithful and impartial discharge of the duties of his office; and
“(2) give bond, with two or more sureties, to be approved by the chief judge or the Superior Court, in the amount designated by the court, faithfully to discharge the duties of his office, and seasonably to record (A) the decrees and orders of the court in any matters over which the court exercises probate jurisdiction or powers, (B) all wills proved before him or the court, and (C) all other matters directed to be recorded in the court or in his office.
The bond shall be entered in full upon the minutes of the Superior Court and the original filed with the records of the Superior Court.
“(b) A person may not be appointed the Register of Wills for the District of Columbia unless he—
“(1) is a citizen of the United States;
“(2) has been a member of the bar of the District of Columbia for a period of at least five of the ten years immediately before his appointment; and
“(3) has been actively engaged in the practice of probate law in the District of Columbia or otherwise has broad experience in, or knowledge on the subject of, the administration of the estates of deceased persons in the District of Columbia.
“(c) The compensation of the Register of Wills shall be fixed by the Superior Court without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5 of the United States Code but at a rate not to exceed the maximum rate prescribed for GS–16 of the General Schedule.
“§ 11–2103. Services as clerk
“With respect to the Probate Division of the Superior Court, the Register of Wills shall perform such duties as clerk as the chief judge of the Superior Court may assign.
“§ 11–2104. Powers and duties; restrictions; penalties
“(a) The Register of Wills may—
“(1) receive inventories and accounts of sales, examine vouchers, and state accounts of executors, administrators, collectors, and guardians, subject to final approval of the court;
“(2) take the probate of claims against the estates of deceased persons that are properly brought before him, and approve or reject claims not exceeding $300; and
“(3) take the probate of wills and accept the bonds of executors, administrators, collectors, and guardians, subject to approval of the court.
“(b) In matters over which the Superior Court has probate jurisdiction or powers, the Register of Wills shall—
“(1) make full and fair entries, in separate records, of the proceedings of the court;
“(2) make fair record in strong bound books of all wills proved before him or the court, keeping separate books for wills within the jurisdiction of the court;
“(3) make fair and separate record of other matters required by law to be recorded in the court;
“(4) lodge in places of safety, designated by the court, original papers filed with him;
“(5) make out and issue every summons, process, and order of the court;
“(6) make fair and uniform tables of his fees, and post them in a conspicuous place in his office for the inspection of persons having business therein;
“(7) prepare and submit to the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts such reports as may be required; and
“(8) in every respect, act under the control and direction of the court.
“(c) The Register of Wills may not—
“(1) practice law in any court of the District of Columbia or of the United States; or
“(2) demand or receive any fee, gratuity, gift, or reward for giving his advice in any matter relating to his office.
“(d) The Register of Wills shall forfeit to the court the sum of $50 for each day that the tables referred to in subsection (b)(6) are missing through his neglect, which may be recovered as other debts for the same amount are recoverable.
“(e) If the Register of Wills or a person acting for him takes a greater fee than the fee provided for by law, he shall pay the party injured $100, which may be recovered as other debts for the same amount are recoverable.
“§ 11–2105. Deputies and other employees
“The Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts shall appoint and remove such personnel as may be needed by the Register of Wills, pursuant to chapter 17 of this title.
Ante, p. 508.
“§ 11–2106. Accounts
“All fees, costs, and other moneys, except uncollected fees not required by law to be prepaid, collected by the Register of Wills with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court shall he turned over to the Fiscal Officer of the District of Columbia courts.
“Chapter 23.— MEDICAL EXAMINER
“§ 11–2301. Medical Examiner; Deputies; appointment, qualifications, and compensation
“(a) The Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall designate or appoint a Chief Medical Examiner and such Deputy Medical Examiners for the District of Columbia as may be necessary.
“(b) The Chief Medical Examiner and his deputies shall be physicians licensed in the District of Columbia. The Chief Medical Examiner and at least one deputy shall be certified in anatomic pathology by the American Board of Pathology or be board eligible. They may be designated from among physicians practicing in the District of Columbia Department of Public Health.
“(c) The Commissioner shall fix the compensation of the Chief Medical Examiner and his deputies at a rate or rates not in excess of the per diem equivalent of the rate for GS–18 of the General Schedule
Ante, p. 198–1.
contained in section 5332 of title 5 of the United States Code.
“§ 11–2302. Supporting services and facilities
“The Commissioner shall furnish or make available such investigative, technical, and clerical personnel, facilities, and equipment as the medical examiners shall require, or he may arrange or contract for such services, equipment, and facilities with the United States Government or universities and hospitals in the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–2303. Former duties of coroner; oaths; teaching
“(a) The Chief Medical Examiner shall be responsible for all the medical functions formerly performed by the coroner in the District of Columbia, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, and the Chief Medical Examiner and his deputies may administer oaths and affirmations and take affidavits in connection with the performance of their duties.
“(b) The Chief Medical Examiner and his deputies may be authorized by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia to teach medical and law school classes, to conduct special classes for law enforcement personnel, and to engage in other activities related to their work.
“§ 11–2304. Deaths to be investigated; notification and investigation of deaths
“(a) Under regulations established by the Chief Medical Examiner, the following types of human deaths occurring in the District of Columbia shall be investigated:
“(1) Violent deaths, whether apparently homicidal, suicidal, or accidental, including deaths due to thermal, chemical, electrical, or radiational injury, and deaths due to criminal abortion, whether apparently self-induced or not.
“(2) Sudden deaths not caused by readily recognizable disease.
“(3) Deaths under suspicious circumstances.
“(4) Deaths of persons whose bodies are to be cremated dissected, buried at sea, or otherwise disposed of so as to be thereafter unavailable for examination.
“(5) Deaths related to disease resulting from employment or to accident while employed.
“(6) Deaths related to disease which might constitute a threat to public health,
“(b) All law enforcement officers, physicians, undertakers, embalmers and other persons shall promptly notify a medical examiner of the occurrence of all deaths coming to their attention which are subject to investigation under subsection (a) of this section and shall assist in making dead bodies and related evidence available to the medical examiner for investigation and autopsy.
“(c) Any physician, undertaker, or embalmer who willfully fails to comply with this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000.
“(d) The Chief Medical Examiner shall by regulation prescribe procedures for taking possession of a body following a death subject to investigation under subsection (a) of this section and for obtaining all essential facts concerning the medical causes of death and the names and addresses of as many witnesses as it is practicable to obtain.
“§ 11–2305. Possession of evidence and property
“(a) At the scene of any death subject to investigation under section 11–2301, a law enforcement officer or the medical examiner shall take possession of any objects or articles useful in establishing the cause of death and shall hold them as evidence.
“(b) In the absence of the next of kin, a police officer or the medical examiner may take possession of all property of value found on or in the custody of the deceased. If possession is taken of the property, the police officer or medical examiner shall make an exact inventory of it, and deliver the property to the property clerk of the Metropolitan Police Department.
“§ 11–2306. Further investigation; autopsy
“(a) If, in the opinion of the medical examiner, the cause of death is established with reasonable medical certainty, he shall complete a report thereon.
“(b) If, in the opinion of the Chief Medical Examiner, or the United States attorney, further investigation as to the cause of death is required or the public interest so requires, a medical examiner shall either perform, or arrange for a qualified pathologist to perform, an autopsy on the body of the deceased. No consent of next of kin shall be required for an autopsy performed pursuant, to this section.
“(c) The medical examiner shall make a complete record of the findings of the autopsy and his conclusions with respect thereto and shall prepare a report, and, upon request, furnish a copy to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
“§ 11–2307. Autopsy by pathologist other than medical examiner
“(a) If an autopsy is performed by a pathologist other than a medical examiner by request of a medical examiner, the pathologist shall furnish to the medical examiner a complete record of the findings of the autopsy and his conclusions with respect thereto. The medical examiner shall thereupon prepare a report, indicating the name of the, pathologist performing the autopsy and his findings and conclusions, and the medical examiner’s own comments with respect thereto, if appropriate, and, upon request, shall furnish a copy thereof to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
“(b) A pathologist other than a medical examiner who performs an autopsy at the request of a medical examiner shall be compensated in accordance, with a fee rate established by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–2308. Delivery of body; expenses
“(a) Following investigation or autopsy, the medical examiner shall release the body of the deceased to the person having the, right to the body for purposes of burial pursuant to law. If there is no such person, he shall dispose of it according to law.
“(b) Expenses of transportation of a body by a medical examiner and of autopsies performed pursuant to this chapter shall be borne by the District of Columbia.
“§ 11–2309. Records; reports; fees for other services
“(a) The Chief Medical Examiner shall be responsible for maintaining full and complete records and files, properly indexed, giving the name, if known, of every person whose death is investigated, the place where the body was found, the date, cause, and manner of death, and all other relevant information and reports of the medical examiner concerning the death, and shall issue a death certificate.
“(b) The records and files maintained under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be open to inspection by the Commissioner of the District, of Columbia or his authorized representative, the United States attorney and his assistants, the Metropolitan Police Department, or any other law enforcement agency or official; and the medical examiner shall promptly deliver to such persons copies of all records relating to every death as to which further investigation may be advisable.
“(c) Any other person with a legitimate interest may obtain copies of records maintained under the provisions of subsection (a) upon such conditions and payment of such fees as may be prescribed by the Chief Medical Examiner. If such person fails to meet the prescribed conditions, he may obtain copies of such records pursuant to court order if the court is satisfied that he has a legitimate interest.
“(d) The Chief Medical Examiner shall prepare an annual report to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia containing information on the number of autopsies performed, statistics as to cause of death, and such other relevant information as the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall require. The report shall be open to inspection by the public. The report shall not identify by name deceased persons examined.
“(e) Medical examiners may charge fees, at rates prescribed by the Chief Medical Examiner, for completing insurance forms or performing similar services for private parties.
“§ 11–2310. Records as evidence
“The records maintained pursuant to section 11–2309, or reproductions thereof certified by the Chief Medical Examiner, are admissable in evidence in any court in the District of Columbia, except that statements made by witnesses or other persons and conclusions upon nonmedical matters are not made admissible by this section.
“§ 11–2311. Autopsies performed under court order
“In the case of sudden, violent, or suspicious death when the body is buried without investigation, the United States attorney, on his own motion or on request of a medical examiner or the Metropolitan Police Department, may petition the appropriate court for an order to conduct an inquiry. The court may order the body exhumed and an autopsy performed. In such cases, records and reports shall be filed as if the autopsy were performed prior to burial except that a copy of the report shall be furnished directly to the court.
“§ 11–2312. Tissue transplants
“The Chief Medical Examiner may allow the removal of tissue pursuant to section 9 of the District of Columbia Tissue Bank Act (D.C.
Post, p. 579.
Code. sec. 2–258).
“Chapter 25.— ATTORNEYS
“§ 11–2501. Admission to bar; regulations; prior admission
“(a) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and expulsion.
“(b) Members of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall be eligible to practice in the District of Columbia courts.
“(c) Members of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in good standing on April 1, 1972, shall be automatically enrolled as members of the bur of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to its disciplinary jurisdiction.
“§ 11–2502. Censure, suspension, or disbarment for cause
“The District of Columbia Court of Appeals may censure, suspend from practice, or expel a member of its bar for crime, misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional misconduct, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. A fraudulent act or misrepresentation by an applicant in connection with this application or admission is sufficient cause for the revocation by the court of his admission.
“§ 11–2503. Disbarment upon conviction of crime; procedure for censure, suspension, or disbarment
“(a) When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.
“(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), a member of the bar may not be censured, suspended, or expelled under this chapter until written charges, under oath, against him have been presented to the court, stating distinctly the grounds of complaint. The court may order the charges to be filed in the office of the clerk of the court and shall fix a time for hearing thereon. Thereupon a certified copy of the charges and order shall be served upon the member personally, or if it is established to the satisfaction of the court that personal service cannot be had, a certified copy of the charges and order shall be served upon him by mail, publication, or otherwise as the court directs. After the filing of the written charges, the court may suspend the person charged from practice at its bar pending the hearing thereof.
“§ 11–2504. Censure, suspension, or disbarment by other courts
“The Federal courts in the District of Columbia and the Superior Court may censure, suspend, or expel an attorney from the practice at their respective bars, for a crime involving moral turpitude, or professional misconduct, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. If an attorney is expelled from practice under this section, the court expelling him shall notify the other Federal courts in the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of the action taken.”
Part B— Proceedings Regarding Juvenile Delinquency and Related Matters
Sec. 121. revision of chapter 23 of title 16
Chapter 23 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended to read as follows:
“Chapter 23.— FAMILY DIVISION PROCEEDINGS
“SUBCHAPTER I.— PROCEEDINGS REGARDING DELINQUENCY, NEGLECT, OR NEED OF SUPERVISION
“§ 16–2301. Definitions
“As used in this subchapter—
“(1) The term ‘Division’ means the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“(2) The term ‘judge’ means a judge assigned to the Family Division of the Superior Court.
“(3) The term ‘child’ means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that the term ‘child’ does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older and—
“(A) charged by the United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with mt ent to commit any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable with such an offense;
“(B) charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) and convicted by plea or verdict of a lesser included offense; or
“(C) charged with a traffic offense.
For purposes of this subchapter the term ‘child’ also includes a person under the age of twenty-one who is charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) or (C) committed before he attained the age of sixteen, or a delinquent act committed before he attained the age of eighteen.
“(4) The term ‘minor’ means an individual who is under the age of twenty-one years.
“(5) The term ‘adult’ means an individual who is twenty-one years of age or older.
“(6) The term ‘delinquent child’ means a child who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation.
“(7) The term ‘delinquent act’ means an act designated as an offense under the law of the District of Columbia, or of a State if the act occurred in a State, or under Federal law. Traffic offenses shall not be deemed delinquent acts unless committed by an individual who is under the age of sixteen.
“(8) The term ‘child in need of supervision’ means a child who—
“(A) (i) is subject to compulsory school attendance and habitually truant from school without justification;
“(ii) has committed an offense committable only by children; or
“(iii) is habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or other custodian and is ungovernable: and
“(B) is in need of care or rehabilitation.
“(9) The term ‘neglected child’ means a child—
“(A) who has been abandoned or abused by his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
“(B) who is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to (he lack of financial means of his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
“(C) whose parent, guardian, or other custodian is unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization, or other physical or mental incapacity; or
“(D) who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
No child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered a neglected child for purposes of this subchapter.
“(10) The term ‘mentally ill child’ means a child who is mentally ill within the meaning of section 21–501.
“(11) The term ‘substantially retarded child’ means a child who is substantially retarded within the meaning of section 21–1101.
“(12) The term ‘custodian’ means a person or agency, other than a parent or legal guardian, to whom legal custody of a child has been given by court order and who is acting in loco parentis.
“(13) The term ‘detention’ means the temporary, secure custody of a child in facilities, designated by the Division, pending a final disposition of a petition.
“(14) The term ‘shelter care’ means the temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting facilities, designated by the Division, pending a final disposition of a petition.
“(15) The term ‘detention or shelter care hear nig’ means a hearing to determine whether a child who is in custody should be placed or continued in detention or shelter care.
“(16) The term ‘factfinding hearing’ means a hearing to determine whether the allegations of a petition are true.
“(17) the term ‘dispositional hearing’ means a hearing, after a finding of fact, to determine—
“(A) whether the child in a delinquency or need of supervision case is in need of care or rehabilitation and, if so, what order of disposition should be made; or
“(B) what order of disposition should be made in a neglect case.
“(18) The term ‘probation’ means a legal status created by Division order following an adjudication of delinquency or need of supervision, whereby a minor is permitted to remain in the community subject to appropriate supervision and return to the Division for violation of probation at any time during the period of probation.
“(19) The term ‘protective supervision means a legal status created by Division order in neglect eases whereby a minor is permitted to remain in his home under supervision, subject to return to the Division during the period of protective supervision.
“(20) The term ‘guardianship of the person of a rainor’ means the duty and authority to make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on the life and development of the minor, and concern with his general welfare. It includes (but is not limited to)—
“(A) authority to consent to marriage, enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, and major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment; to represent the minor in legal actions; and to make other decisions concerning the minor of substantive legal significance;
“(B) the authority and duty’ of reasonable visitation (except as limited by Division order);
“(C) the rights and responsibilities of legal custody when guardianship of the person is exercised by the natural or adoptive parent (except where legal custody has been vested in another person or an agency or institution); and
“(D) the authority to exercise residual parental rights and responsibilities when the rights of his parents or only living parent have been judicially terminated or when both parents are dead.
“(21) The term ‘legal custody’ means a legal status created by Division order which vests in a custodian the responsibility for the custody of a minor which includes—
“(A) physical custody and the determination of where and with whom the minor shall live;
“(B) the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the minor;and
“(C) the responsibility to provide the minor with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care.
A Division order of ‘legal custody’ is subordinate to the rights and responsibilities of the guardian of the person of the minor and any residual parental rights and responsibilities.
“(22) The term‘residual parental rights and responsibilities’means those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after transfer of legal custody or guardianship of the person, including (but not limited to) the right of visitation, consent to adoption, and determination of religious affiliation and the responsibility for support.
“§ 16–2302. Transfer of criminal matters to Family Division
“(a) If it appears to a court, during the pendency of a criminal charge and before the time when jeopardy would attach in the case of an adult, that a minor defendant was a child at the time of an alleged offense, the court shall forthwith transfer the charge against the defendant, together with all papers and documents connected therewith, to the Division. All action taken by the court prior to transfer of the case shall be deemed null and void unless the Division transfers the child for criminal prosecution under section 16–2307.
“(b) If at the time of an alleged offense, a minor defendant was a child but this fact is not discovered by the court until after jeopardy has attached, the court shall proceed to verdict. If judgment has not been entered, the court shall determine on the basis of the criteria in section 16–2307(e) whether to enter judgment or to refer the case to the Division for disposition. If judgment, has been entered, it shall not be set aside on the ground of the defendant’s age unless the court, after hearing, determines that (1) neither the defendant nor his counsel, prior to the entry of judgment, had reason to believe that defendant was under the age of eighteen years, and (2) the defendant would not have been transferred for criminal prosecution if his age had been known and the procedure set forth in section 16–2307 had been followed. If the judgment is set aside, the case shall be referred to the Division for disposition. The disposition and all prior proceedings in any court of any ease referred to the Division for disposition pursuant to this section shall be subject to the confidentiality provisions of sections 16–2330 through 16–2335.
“(c) The court making a transfer shall order the minor to be taken forthwith to the Division or to a place of detention designated for children by the Division. The Division shall then proceed as provided in this subchapter.
“(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction of a court over a person twenty-one years of age or older.
“§ 16–2303. Retention of jurisdiction
“For purposes of this subchapter, jurisdiction obtained by the Division in the case of a child shall be retained by it until the child becomes twenty-one years of age, unless jurisdiction is terminated before that time. This section does not affect the jurisdiction of other divisions of the Superior Court or of other courts over offenses committed by a person after he ceases to be a child. If a minor already under the jurisdiction of the Division is convicted in the Criminal Division or another court of a crime committed after he ceases to be a child, the Family Division may, in appropriate cases, terminate its jurisdiction.
“§ 16–2304. Right to counsel
“(a) A child alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of Division proceedings, including the time of admission or denial of allegations in the petition and all subsequent stages. If the child and his parent, guardian, or custodian are financially unable to obtain adequate representation, the child shall be entitled to have counsel appointed for him in accordance with rules established by the Superior Court. In its discretion, the Division may appoint counsel for the child over the objection of the child, his parent, guardian, or other custodian.
“(b) When a child is alleged to be neglected, the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child named in the petition is entitled to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the Division proceedings and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed in accordance with rules established by the Superior Court. The Division shall, where appropriate, appoint separate counsel
Post, p. 557.
to represent the child, as provided in section 16–918.
“§ 16–2305. Petition; contents; amendment
“(a) Complaints alleging delinquency, need of supervision, or neglect shall be referred to the Director of Social Services who shall conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the best, interests of the child or the public require that a petition be filed. If judicial action appears warranted, under intake criteria established by rule of the Superior Court, the Director shall recommend that a petition be filed. If the Director decides not to recommend the filing of a petition, the complainant in a delinquency or neglect case shall have a right to have that decision reviewed by the Corporation Counsel, and the Director shall notify the complainant of such right of review.
“(b) Petitions initiating judicial action may be signed by any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or, being informed of them, believes they are true, except that petitions alleging need of supervision may only be signed by the Director of Social Services, a representative of a public agency or a nongovernmental agency licensed and authorized to care for children, a representative of a public or private agency providing social service for families a school official, or a law enforcement officer. Petitions shall be verified and verification may be upon information or belief.
“(c) Each petition shall be prepared by the Corporation Counsel after an inquiry into the facts and a determination of the legal basis for the petition. If the Director of Social Services has refused to recommend the filing of a delinquency or neglect petition, the Corporation Counsel, on request of the complainant, shall review the facts presented and shall prepare and file a petition if he believes such action is necessary to protect the community or the interests of the child. Any decision of the Corporation Counsel on whether to file a petition shall be final.
“(d) A petition shall be filed by the Corporation Counsel within seven days (excluding Sundays and legal holidays) after the complaint has been referred to the Director of Social Services, except as otherwise provided in section 16–2312. A petition shall set forth plainly and concisely the facts which give the Division jurisdiction of
Ante, p. 488.
the child under section 11–1101(13). In delinquency cases the petition shall also state the specific statute or ordinance on which the charge is based. If delinquency or need of supervision is alleged, a statement shall be included in the petition that the child appears to be in need of care or rehabilitation. The petition shall contain such other facts and information as may be required by rules of the Superior Court.
“(e) A petition may be amended by leave of the Division on motion of the Corporation Counsel or counsel for the child, at any time prior to the conclusion of the factfinding hearing. The Division shall grant the Corporation Counsel, the child, and his parent, guardian, or custodian notice of the amendment and, where necessary, additional time to prepare.
“(f) The District of Columbia shall be a party to all proceedings under this subchapter.
“§ 16–2306. Service of summons and petition
“(a) When a petition is filed, the Division shall set a time for initial appearance and shall direct the issuance of summonses. If delinquency or need of supervision is alleged, a summons, together with a copy of the petition, shall be served upon the child and upon his spouse (if any) and his parent, guardian, or other custodian. If neglect is alleged, the summons, together with a copy of the petition, shall be served on the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child named in the petition. Where appropriate to the proper disposition of the case, the Division may direct service of summonses upon other persons. A summons issued pursuant to this section shall advise the parties of the right to counsel as provided in section 16–2304.
“(b) Upon request of the Corporation Counsel, the Division may endorse upon the summons an order directing the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child to appear personally at the hearing and directing the person having physical custody or control of the child to bring the child to the hearing.
“(c) If it appears, from information presented to the Division, that there are grounds to take the child into custody as provided in section 16–2309, or that the child may leave or be removed from the jurisdiction of the Superior Court or will not be brought to the hearing, notwithstanding service of the summons, the Division may endorse upon the summons an order that, the officer serving the summons shall at once take the child into custody. If the child is taken into custody under this section, the provisions of sections 16–2309 to 16–2312 shall apply.
“§ 16–2307. Transfer for criminal prosecution
“(a) Within seven days (excluding Sundays and legal holidays) of the filing of a delinquency petition, or later for good cause shown, and prior to a factfinding hearing on the petition, the Corporation Counsel, following consultation with the Director of Social Services, may file a motion, supported by a statement of facts, requesting transfer of the child for criminal prosecution, if—
“(1) the child was fifteen or more years of age at the time of the conduct charged, and is alleged to have committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult;
“(2) the child is sixteen or more years of age and is already under commitment to an agency or institution as a delinquent child; or
“(3) a minor eighteen years of age or older is alleged to have committed a delinquent act prior to having become eighteen years of age.
“(b) Following the filing of the motion by I he Corporation Counsel, summonses shall be issued and served in conformity with the provisions of section 16–2306.
“(c) When there are grounds to believe the child is substantially retarded or mentally ill, the Division shall stay the proceedings for the purpose of obtaining an examination. After examination, the Division shall proceed to a determination under subsection (d) unless it deter-mines that the child is incompetent to participate in the proceedings, in which event it shall order the child committed to a mental hospital pursuant to section 16–2315 or section 927 of the Act of March 3, 1901
Post, p. 601.
(D.C. Code. sec. 24–301(a)).
“(d) Unless a commitment under subsection (c) of this section has intervened, the Division shall conduct a hearing on each transfer motion to determine if there are reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child before his majority. Such hearing shall be held within ten days (excluding Sundays and legal holidays) of the filing of the transfer motion. In any such hearing, the child who is the subject of the hearing shall not be required to establish that there are reasonable prospects for his rehabilitation prior to his majority. Unless the Division determines that there are reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child before his majority, it shall order the transfer of the child for criminal prosecution and notify the United States attorney of such order. Accompanying the order of transfer shall be a statement of the reasons of the Division for ordering the transfer of the child. Included in the statement shall be the Division’s findings with respect to each of the factors set forth in subsection (e) relating to the prospects for the rehabilitation of the child. This statement shall be available upon request to any court in which the transfer is challenged, but shall not be available to the trier of fact of the criminal charge prior to verdict.
“(e) Evidence of the following factors shall be considered in determining whether there are reasonable prospects for rehabilitating a child prior to his majority:
“(1) the ehihl’s age;
“(2) the nature of the present offense and the extent and nature of the child’s prior delinquency record;
“(3) the child’s mental condition;
“(4) the nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child’s response to past treatment efforts; and
“(5) the techniques, facilities, and personnel for rehabilitation available to the Division and to the court that would have jurisdiction after transfer.
The rules of evidence at transfer hearings shall be the same as those that govern dispositional proceedings in delinquency cases, asset forth in section 16–2317. At a transfer hearing, only the propriety of eventual Division disposition shall be considered, and evidence bearing on probable cause or the likelihood that the child committed the act alleged shall not be admitted.
“(f) Prior to a transfer hearing, a study and report, in writing, relevant to the factors in subsection (e), shall be made by the Director of Social Services. This report and all social records that are to be made available to the judge at the transfer hearing shall be made available to counsel for the child and to the Corporation Counsel at least three days prior to the hearing.
“(g) A judge who conducts a hearing pursuant to this section shall not, over the objection of the child whose prospects for rehabilitation were at issue, participate in any subsequent factfinding proceedings relating to the offense.
“(h) Transfer of a child for criminal prosecution terminates the jurisdiction of the Division over the child with respect to any subsequent delinquent act; except that jurisdiction of the Division over the child is restored if (1) the criminal prosecution is terminated other than by a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and (2) at the time of the termination of the criminal prosecution no indictment or information has been filed for criminal prosecution for an offense alleged to have been committed by the child subsequent to transfer.
“§ 16–2308. Initial appearance
“The initial appearance, before a judge assigned to the Division, of a child named tn a delinquency or need of supervision petition or of the parent, guardian, or custodian of a child named in a neglect petition shall be at the time set forth in the summons, which shall be not later than five days after the petition has been filed. At the initial appearance, the child and his parent, guardian, or custodian shall be advised of the contents of the petition and of the right to counsel as provided in section 16–2304. At the initial appearance the child, or in neglect cases the parent, guardian, or custodian, may admit or deny the allegations in the petition, but it shall not be necessary at the initial appearance for the Corporation Counsel to establish probable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition are true. At the initial appearance, the judge may set the time for the factfinding hearing or continue the matter until a later time. Failure to hold the initial appearance at the lime specified shall not be grounds for dismissal of the petition. This section shall not apply in any case where, prior to or at the time of the initial appearance, a detention or shelter care hearing is required by section 16–2312.
“§ 16–2309. Taking into custody
“A child may be taken into custody—
“(1) pursuant to order of the Division under section 16–2306 or 16–2311;
“(2) by a law enforcement officer when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act;
“(3) by a law enforcement officer when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is suffering from illness or injury or is in immediate danger from his surroundings, and that his removal from his surroundings is necessary; or
“(4) by a law enforcement officer when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the child has run away from his parent, guardian, or other custodian.
“§ 16–2310. Criteria for detaining children
“(a) A child shall not be placed in detention prior to a factfinding hearing or a dispositional hearing unless he is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision and unless it appears from available information that detention is required—
“(1) to protect the person or property of others or of the child, or
“(2) to secure the child’s presence at the next court hearing.
“(b) A child shall not be placed in shelter care prior to a factfinding hearing or a dispositional hearing unless it. appears from available information that shelter care is required—
“(1) to protect the person of the child, or
“(2) because the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person or agency able to provide supervision and care for him, and the child appears unable to care for himself.
“(c) The criteria for detention and shelter care provided in this section, as implemented by rules of the Superior Court, shall govern the decisions of all persons responsible for determining whether detention or shelter care is warranted prior to the factfinding hearing.
“§ 16–2311. Release or delivery to Family Division
“(a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed—
“(1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child’s placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16–2310;
“(2) bring the child before the Director of Social Services; or
“(3) bring the child to a medical facility if the child appears to require prompt treatment or to require prompt diagnosis for medical or evidentiary purposes.
Any person taking a child into custody shall give prompt notice to the Corporation Counsel and to the parent, guardian, or custodian (if known) together with the reasons for custody.
“(b) When a child is brought before the Director of Social Services, the Director shall in all cases review the need for detention or shelter care prior to the admission of the child to the place of detention or shelter care. The child shall be released to his parent, guardian, or custodian unless the Director of Social Services finds that detention or shelter care is required under section 16–2310. If the child is not released, the Director of Social Services shall advise him of the right to counsel as provided in section 16–2304.
“(c) If a parent, guardian, or custodian fails, when requested, to bring the child to the Division as provided in subsection (a)(1), the Division may issue a warrant directing that the child be taken into custody and brought before the Division.
“§ 16–2312. Detention or shelter care hearing; intermediate disposition
“(a) When a child is not released as provided in section 16–2311—
“(1) a detention or shelter care hearing shall be commenced not later than the next day (excluding Sundays) after the child has been taken into custody or transferred from another court as provided by section 16–2302; and
“(2) a petition shall be filed at or prior to the detention or shelter care hearing.
“(b) Prompt notice of the detention or shelter care hearing shall be given, if delinquency or need of supervision is alleged, to the child, and to his spouse (if any), parent, guardian, or custodian, if he can be found, or, if neglect is alleged, to the child, and to the parent, guardian, or custodian named in the petition if he can be found. Counsel for the child, and in neglect cases counsel for the parent, guardian, or custodian, shall be entitled to a copy of the petition prior to the hearing.
“(c) At the commencement of the hearing the judge shall advise the parties of the right to counsel, as provided in section 16–2304, and shall appoint counsel if required. He shall also inform them of the contents of the petition and shall afford the child, or in a neglect case, the parent, guardian, or custodian, an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations in the petition. He shall then hear from the Corporation Counsel to determine whether the child should be placed or continued in detention or shelter care under the criteria in section 16–2310, The child and his parent, guardian, or custodian shall have a right to be heard in their own behalf.
“(d) (1) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge, shall—
“(A) order detention or shelter care, setting forth in writing his reasons therefor, if he finds that the child’s detention or shelter care is required under the criteria in section 16–2310; or
“(B) order the child released if he finds that the child’s detention or shelter care is not required under such criteria.
“(2) If a child is ordered released under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, the judge may impose one or more of the following conditions:
“(A) Placement of the child in the custody of a parent, guardian, or custodian or under supervision of a person or organization agreeing to supervise him.
“(B) Placement of restrictions on the child’s travel, activities, or place of abode during the period of release.
“(C) Any other condition reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the child at a fact finding hearing or his protection from harm, including a requirement that the child return to the physical custody of the parent, guardian, or custodian after specified hours.
“(e) When a judge finds that a child’s detention or shelter care is required under the criteria of section 16–2310, he shall then hear evidence presented by the Corporation Counsel to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true. The child, his parent, guardian or custodian may present evidence on the issues and be heard in their own behalf.
“(f) When a judge finds there is probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true, he shall order the child to be placed or continued in detention or shelter care and set forth his reasons. When a judge finds that there is not probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true, he shall order the child to be released.
“(g) The Division at a detention or shelter care hearing may not postpone the determination of whether detention or shelter care is required. For good cause shown, however, the Division may grant a continuance of any other part of the hearing (including the filing of a petition) for a period not to exceed five days.
“(h) On motion by or on behalf of the child, a child in custody shall be released from custody if his detention or shelter care hearing is not commenced within the time set herein.
“(i) If a child is not released after his detention or shelter care hearing and the parent, guardian or custodian did not receive notice thereof, the Division may, in the interest of justice, conduct a new hearing in accordance with rules prescribed by the Superior Court.
“(j) Upon objection of the child or his parent, guardian or custodian, a judge who conducted a detention or shelter care hearing shall not conduct a factfinding hearing on the petition.
“§ 16–2313. Place of detention or shelter
“(a) A child who is alleged to be neglected and who is in custody may be placed at any time prior to disposition, only in—
“(1) a foster home;
“(2) a group home, youth shelter, or other appropriate home for nondelinquent children; or
“(3) another facility for shelter care designated by the Division, including an appropriate facility operated by the District of Columbia.
No child alleged to be neglected may be placed in a facility described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) A child who is alleged to be in need of supervision or (except as provided in subsection (d) or (e)) is alleged to be delinquent and who is in custody may be detained at any time prior to disposition only in—
“(1) a foster home;
“(2) a group home, youth shelter, or other appropriate home for allegedly delinquent children; or
“(3) a detention home for allegedly delinquent children or children alleged to be in need of supervision, designated by the Division, including an appropriate facility operated by the District of Columbia.
Unless the Division shall by order so authorize, no child may be detained in a facility described in paragraph (3) if it would result in his commingling with children who have been adjudicated delinquent and committed by order of the Division.
“(c) A child in detention or shelter care may be temporarily transferred to a medical facility for physical care and may, on order of the Division, be temporarily transferred to a facility for mental examination or treatment.
“(d) Except as provided in subsection (e), no child under eighteen years of age may be detained in a jail or other facility for the detention of adults, unless transferred as provided in section 1(5–2307. The appropriate official of a jail or other facility for the detention of adults shall inform the Superior Court immediately when a child under the age of eighteen years is received there (other than by transfer) and shall (1) deliver him to the Director of Social Services upon request, or (2) transfer him to a detention facility described in subsection (b)(3).
“(e) A child sixteen years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent and who is in detention, whose conduct constitutes a menace to other children, and who cannot-be controlled, may on order of the Division be transferred to a place of detention for adults, but shall be kept separate from adults.
“§ 16–2314. Consent decree
“(a) At any time after the filing of a delinquency or need of supervision petition and prior to adjudication at a factfinding hearing, the Division may, on motion of the Corporation Counsel or counsel for the child, suspend the proceedings and continue the child under supervision, without commitment, under terms and conditions established by rules of the Superior Court. Such a consent decree shall not be entered unless the child is represented by counsel and has been informed of the consequences of the decree; nor shall it be entered over the objection of the child or of the Corporation Counsel.
“(b) A consent decree shall remain in force for six months unless the child is sooner discharged by the Director of Social Services. Upon application of the Director of Social Services or an agency supervising the child made prior to the expiration of the decree, a consent decree may, after notice and hearing, be extended for not more than six additional months by order of the Division.
“(c) If prior to the expiration of the decree or discharge by the Director of Social Services, the child fails to fulfill the express conditions of the decree or a new delinquency or need of supervision petition is filed concerning the child, the original petition under which the decree was filed may, in the discretion of the Corporation Counsel following consultation with the Director of Social Services, be reinstated. The child shall thereafter be held accountable on the original petition as if the consent decree had never been entered.
“(d) If a child completes the period of continuance under supervision in accordance with the consent decree or is sooner discharged by the Director of Social Services, the Division shall dismiss the original petition.
“§ 16–2315. Physical and mental examinations
“(a) At any time following the filing of a petition, on motion of the Corporation Counsel or counsel for the child, or on its own motion, the Division may order a child to be examined to aid in determining his physical or mental condition.
“(b) Wherever possible examinations shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, but the Division may, if it deems necessary, commit the child to a suitable medical facility or institution for the purpose of examination. Commitment for examination shall be for a period of not more than forty-five days; except that the Division may, for good cause shown, grant extensions of the commitment which may not exceed forty-five days in the aggregate.
“(c) (1) If as a result of a mental examination the Division determines that a child alleged to be delinquent is incompetent to participate in proceedings under the petition by reason of mental illness or substantial retardation, it shall, except as provided in subsection (2), suspend further proceedings and the Corporation Counsel shall initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to chapter 5 or 11 of title 21.
79 Stat. 750, 766; Post, p. 1087.
D.C. Code 21–501, 21–1101.
“(2) If a motion for transfer for criminal prosecution has been filed pursuant to section 16–2307 and the Division determines that a child alleged to be delinquent is incompetent to participate in the transfer proceedings by reason of mental illness, it shall suspend further proceedings and order the child confined to a suitable hospital or facility for the mentally ill until his competency is restored. If prior to the time the child reaches the age of 21 it appears that he will not regain his competency to participate in the proceedings, the Corporation Counsel shall initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to chapter 5 of title 21.
“(3) If, as a result of mental examination, the Division determines that a child alleged to be in need of supervision is incompetent to participate in proceedings under the petition by reason of mental illness or substantial retardation, it shall suspend further proceedings. If proceedings are suspended, the Corporation Counsel may initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to chapter 5 or 11 of title 21.
“(d) The results of an examination under this section shall be admissible in a transfer hearing pursuant to section 16–2307, in a dispositional hearing under this subchapter, or in a commitment proceeding under chapter 5 or 11 of title 21. The results of examination may be admitted into evidence at a factfinding hearing to aid the Division in determining a material allegation of the petition relating to the child’s mental or physical condition, but not for the purpose of establishing a defense of insanity.
“(e) Following an adjudication at a factfinding hearing that a child is neglected, the Division may order the mental or physical examination of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child whose ability to care for the child is at issue. The results of the examination are admissible at a dispositional hearing on the petition alleging neglect.
“§ 16–2316. Conduct of hearings; evidence
“(a) The Division shall, without a jury, hear and adjudicate cases involving delinquency, need of supervision, or neglect. The Corporation Counsel shall present evidence in support of all petitions arising under this subchapter and otherwise represent the District of Columbia in all proceedings.
“(b) Evidence which is competent, material, and relevant shall be admissible at factfinding hearings. Evidence which is material and relevant shall be admissible at detention hearings, transfer hearings under section 16–2307, and dispositional hearings.
“(c) All hearings and proceedings under this subchapter shall be recorded by appropriate means. Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public shall be excluded from hearings arising under this subchapter. Only persons necessary to the proceedings shall be admitted, but the Division may, pursuant to rule of the Superior Court, admit such other persons (including members of the press) as have a proper interest m the case or the work of the court on condition that they refrain from divulging information identifying the child or members of his family involved in the proceedings.
“(d) If the Division finds that it is in the best interest of the child, it may temporarily exclude him from any proceeding except a factfinding hearing. If the petition alleges neglect, the child may also be temporarily excluded from a factfinding hearing. In any case, counsel for the child may not be excluded.
“§ 16–2317. Hearings, findings: dismissal
“(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute or court rule, all motions shall be heard at the time of the factfinding hearing.
“(b) After a factfinding hearing on the allegations in the petition, the Division shall make and file written findings in all cases as to the truth of the allegations, and in neglect cases, he shall also make and file written findings as to whether the child is neglected. If the Division finds that—
“(1) in the case of a delinquency petition, that the allegations have not been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
“(2) in the case of a need of supervision or neglect petition, that the allegations have not been established by the preponderance of the evidence,
the Division shall dismiss the petition and order the child released from any detention or shelter care or other restriction previously ordered. If the proceedings are not terminated after the fact finding hearing, the Division shall review the need for detention or shelter care of the child.
“(c) If the Division finds in a factfinding hearing that—
“(1) the allegations in a delinquency petition have been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
“(2) the allegations in a need of supervision or neglect petition have been established by the preponderance of the evidence,
the Division, after giving the notice required by subsection (e) of this section, shall proceed to hold a dispositional hearing. The Division may postpone a dispositional hearing to await the predisposition study and report of the Director of Social Services required by section 16 2319. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a finding of the commission of an act which would constitute a criminal offense if committed by an adult is sufficient to sustain a finding of need for care or rehabilitation in delinquency and need of supervision cases.
“(d) If the Division finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation it shall terminate the proceedings and discharge the child from detention, shelter care, or other restriction previously ordered.
“(e) The Division shall give prompt notice of any dispositional hearing as follows:
“(1) In delinquency and need of supervision cases, to the child, Ms spouse (if any), and Ms parent, guardian, or custodian.
“(2) In neglect cases, to the child and to the parent, guardian, or custodian named in the petition if he can be found.
“§ 16–2318. Order of adjudication noncriminal
“A consent decree, order of adjudication, or order of disposition in a proceeding under this subchapter is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a con-viction, nor does it operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examination, appointment, or application for public service in either the Government of the United States or of the District of Columbia.
“§ 16–2319. Predisposition study and report
“After a motion for transfer has been filed, or after the Division has made findings pursuant to subsection (c) of section 16–2317 sustaining the allegations of a petition and, in neglect cases, the conclusion that the child is neglected, the Division shall direct that a predisposition study and report to the Division be made by the Director of Social Services or a qualified agency designated by the Division concerning the child, his family, his environment, and other matters relevant to the need for treatment or disposition of the case. Except, in connection with a hearing on a transfer motion, no predisposition study or report shall be furnished to or considered by the Division prior to completion of tile factfinding hearing.
“§ 16–2320. Disposition of child who is neglected, delinquent, or in need of supervision
“(a) If a child is found to be neglected, the Division may order any of the following dispositions which will be in the best interest of the child:
“(1) Permit the child to remain with his parent, guardian, or other custodian, subject to such conditions and limitations as the Division may prescribe, including but not limited to medical, psychiatric, or other treatment at an appropriate facility on an outpatient basis.
“(2) Place the child under protective supervision.
“(3) Transfer legal custody to any of the following—
“(A) a public agency responsible for the care of neglected children;
“(B) a child placing agency or other private organization or facility which is licensed or otherwise authorized by law and is designated by the Commissioner of the District, of Columbia to receive and provide care for the child; or
“(C) a relative or other individual who is found by the Division to be qualified to receive and care for the child.
“(4) Commitment of the child for medical, psychiatric, or other treatment at an appropriate facility on an inpatient basis if, at the dispositional hearing provided for in section 16–2317, the Division finds that confinement is necessary to the treatment of the child. A child for whom medical, psychiatric, or other treatment is ordered may petition the Division for review of the order thirty days after treatment under the order has commenced, and, if, after a hearing for the purpose of such review, the original order is affirmed, the child may petition for review thereafter every six months.
“(5) Make such other disposition as may be provided by law and as the Division deems to be in the best interests of the child and the community.
“(b) Unless a child found neglected is also found to be delinquent, he shall not be committed to, or confined in, an institution for delinquent children.
“(c) If a child is found to be delinquent or in need of supervision, the Division may order any of the following dispositions for his supervision, care, and rehabilitation:
“(1) Any disposition authorized by subsection (a)(other than paragraph (3)(A) thereof).
“(2) Transfer of legal custody to a public agency for the care of delinquent, children.
“(3) Probation under such conditions and limitations as the Division may prescribe.
“(d) No child found in need of supervision, unless also found delinquent, shall be committed to or placed in an institution or facility for delinquent children; except that if such child has previously been found in need of supervision and the Division, after hearing, so finds, the Division may specify that such child be committed to or placed in an institution or facility for delinquent children.
“(e) No child who is found to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected shall be committed to a penal or correctional institution for adult offenders.
“§ 16–2321. Disposition of mentally ill or substantially retarded child
“(a) If no previous examination has been made under section 16–2315 and the Division, after a factfinding but before a dispositional hearing, has reason to believe that a child is mentally ill or substantially retarded, it may order an examination as provided in section 16–2315.
“(b) If as a result of the examination the child is found to be mentally ill or substantially retarded, the Division may, in lieu of other disposition, direct the appropriate authority to initiate commitment
79 Stat. 750, 766; Post, p. 1087.
D.C. Code 21–501, 21–1101.
proceedings under chapter 5 or 11 of title 21. The Division may order the child detained in suitable facilities pending commitment proceedings.
“(c) If the examination does not indicate that commitment proceedings should be initiated or if the proceedings do not result in commitment, the Division shall proceed to disposition pursuant to this subchapter.
“§ 16–2322. Limitation of time on dispositional orders
“(a) (1) A dispositional order vesting legal custody of a child in a department, agency, or institution shall remain in force for an indeterminate period not exceeding two years. Unless the order specifies that release is permitted only by order of the Division, the department, agency, or institution may release the child at any time that it appears the purpose of the disposition order has been achieved.
“(2) An order vesting legal custody of a child in an individual other than his parent shall remain in force for two years unless sooner terminated by order of the Division.
“(3) An order of probation or a protective supervision order shall remain in force for a period not exceeding one year from the date entered, but the Director of Social Services or the agency providing supervision may terminate supervision at any time that it appears the purpose of the order has been achieved.
“(b) A dispositional order vesting legal custody of a child in an agency or institution may be extended for additional periods of one year, upon motion of the department, agency, or institution to which the child was committed, if, after notice and hearing, the Division finds that—
“(1) in the case of a neglected child, the extension is necessary to safeguard his welfare; or
“(2) in the case of a child adjudicated delinquent or in need of supervision, the extension is necessary for his rehabilitation or the protection of the public interest.
“(c) Any other dispositional order may be extended for additional periods of one year, upon motion of the Director of Social Services, if, after notice and hearing, the Division finds that extension is necessary to protect the interest of the child.
“(d) A release or termination of an order prior to expiration of the order pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (3), shall promptly be reported in writing to the Division.
“(e) Upon termination of a dispositional order a child shall be notified in writing of its termination. Upon termination of an order or release a child shall be notified, in accordance with rules of the Superior Court, of his right to move for the sealing of his records as provided in section 16–2334.
“(f) Unless sooner terminated, all orders of the Division under this subchapter in force with respect to a child terminate when he reaches twenty-one years of age.
“§ 16–2323. Modification, termination of orders
“(a) An order of the Division under this subchapter shall be set aside if—
“(1) it was obtained by fraud or mistake sufficient to set aside an order or judgment in a civil action;
“(2) the Division lacked jurisdiction; or
“(3) newly discovered evidence so requires.
“(b) A child who has been committed under this subchapter to the custody of an institution, agency, or person, or the parent or guardian of the child, may file a motion for modification or termination of the order of commitment on the ground that the child no longer is in need of commitment, if the child or his parent or guardian has applied to the institution or agency for release and the application was denied or not acted upon within a reasonable time.
“(c) The Director of Social Services shall conduct a preliminary review of motions filed under subsection (b) and shall prepare a report to the Division on the allegations contained therein. The Division may dismiss the motion if it concludes from the report that it is without substance. Otherwise, the Division, after notice, shall hear and determine the issues raised by the motion and deny the motion, or enter an appropriate order modifying or terminating the order of commitment, if it finds such action necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the interest of the public.
“(d) A motion may be filed under subsection (b) only once every six months.
“§ 16–2324. Support of committed child
“Whenever legal custody of a child is vested in any agency or individual other than the child’s parent, after due notice to the parent or other persons legally obligated to care for and support the child and after hearing, the Division may, at the dispositional hearing or thereafter, order and decree that the parent or other legally obligated person shall pay, in such manner as the Division may direct, a reasonable sum that will cover in whole or in part the support and treatment of the child after the decree is entered. If the parent or other legally obligated person wilfully fails or refuses to pay such sum, the Division may proceed against him for contempt, or the order may be filed and shall nave the effect of a civil judgment.
“§ 16–2325. Court costs and expenses
“If, at the dispositional hearing or thereafter, the Division finds, after due notice and hearing, that the parent or other person legally obligated to care for and support a child subject to proceedings under this subchapter is financially able to pay, the Division may order him to pay all of or part of the costs of—
“(1) physical and mental examinations and treatment of the child ordered by the Division; and
“(2) reasonable compensation for services and related expenses of counsel appointed by the court to represent the child, or, in neglect cases, himself.
Payment shall be made as prescribed by rules of the Superior Court.
“§ 16–2326. Probation revocation; disposition
“(a) If a child on probation incident to an adjudication of delinquency or need of supervision violates any term of his probation he may be proceeded against in a probation revocation hearing.
“(b) A proceeding to revoke probation shall be commenced by the tiling of a revocation petition by the Corporation Counsel. The petition to revoke probation shall be in such form as may be prescribed by rule of the Superior Court and shall be served together with a summons in the manner provided in sect ion 16–2306.
“(c) Probation revocation proceedings shall be heard without a jury and shall require establishment of the facts alleged by a preponderance of the evidence. As nearly as may be appropriate, probation revocation proceedings shall conform to the procedures established by this subchapter for delinquency and need of supervision cases.
“(d) If a child is found to have violated the terms of his probation, the Division may modify the terms and conditions of the probation order, extend the period of probation, or enter any other order of disposition specified in section 16–2320 for a delinquent child.
“§ 16–2327. Interlocutory appeals
“(a) A child who has been ordered transferred for criminal prosecution under section 16–2307 or detained or placed in shelter care or subjected to conditions of release under section 16–2312, may, within two days of the date of entry of the Division’s order, file a notice of interlocutory appeal.
“(b) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall (1) hear argument on an appeal under subsection (a) on or before the third day (excluding Sundays) after the filing of notice under that subsection, (2) dispense with any requirement of written briefs other than the supporting materials previously submitted to the Division, and (3) render its decision on or before the next day following argument on appeal. The court may in rendering its decision dispense with the issuance of a written opinion.
“(c) In cases involving transfer for criminal prosecution, the pendency of an interlocutory appeal shall act to stay criminal proceedings. Until the time for filing an interlocutory appeal has lapsed, or if an appeal is filed until its completion, no child who has been ordered transferred for criminal prosecution shall be removed to a place of adult detention, except as provided in section 16–2313, or otherwise treated as an adult.
“(d) The decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall be final.
“§ 16–2328. Finality of judgments; appeals; transcripts
“(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, in all hearings and cases tried before the Division pursuant to this subchapter, the judgment of the Division is final.
“(b) In all appeals from decisions of the Division with respect to a child alleged to be neglected, delinquent, or in need of supervision, the child shall be identified only by initials in all transcripts, briefs, and other papers filed, and all necessary steps, as prescribed by rule of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, shall be taken to protect the identity of the child.
“(c) Upon the filing of a motion and supporting affidavit stating that he is financially unable to purchase a transcript, a party who has filed notice of appeal or of interlocutory appeal shall be furnished, at no cost or at such part of cost as he is able to pay, so much of the transcript as is necessary adequately to prepare and support the appeal.
“(d) An appeal does not operate to stay the order, judgment, or decree appealed from, but on application and hearing whenever the case is properly before the appellate court, that court may order otherwise if suitable provision is made for the care and custody of the child.
“§ 16–2329. Time computation
“(a) In all proceedings in the Division, time limitations shall be reasonably construed by the Division for the protection of the community and of the child.
“(b) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time limits established for proceedings under this subchapter:
“(1) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted, upon grounds constituting unusual circumstances, at the request or with the consent, in any case, of the child or his counsel, or, in neglect cases, also of the parent, guardian, or custodian.
“(2) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the child, including but not limited Io an examination or hearing on mental health or retardation and a hearing on a transfer motion.
“(3) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the Corporation Counsel if the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the case, when the Corporation Counsel has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at the later date; or if the continuance is granted to allow the Corporation Counsel additional time to prepare his case and additional time is required due to the exceptional circumstances of the case.
“(4) The period of delay resulting from the imposition of a consent decree.
“(5) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the child.
“(6) A reasonable period of delay when the child is joined for a hearing with another child as to whom the time for a hearing has not run and there is good cause for not hearing the cases separately,
“§ 16–2330. Juvenile case records; confidentiality; inspection and disclosure
“(a) As used in this section, the term ‘juvenile case records’ refers to the following records of a case over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11–1101(13):
Ante, p. 488.
“(1) Notices filed with the court by an arresting officer pursuant to this subchapter.
“(2) The docket of the court and entries therein.
“(3) Complaints, petitions, and other legal papers filed in the case.
“(4) Transcripts of proceedings before the court.
“(5) Findings, verdicts, judgments, orders, and decrees.
“(6) Other writings filed in proceedings before the court, other than social records.
“(b) Juvenile ease records shall be kept confidential and shall not be open to inspection; but, subject to the limitations of subsection (c), the inspection of those records shall be permitted to—
“(1) judges and professional staff of the Superior Court;
“(2) the Corporation Counsel and his assistants assigned to the Division;
“(3) the respondent, his parents or guardians, and their duly authorized attorneys;
“(4) any court or its probation staff, for purposes of sentencing the respondent as a defendant in a criminal case and the counsel for the defendant in that case;
“(5) public or private agencies or institutions providing supervision or treatment or having custody of the child, if supervision, treatment, or custody is under order of the Division;
“(6) the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, his assistants, and any other prosecuting attorneys involved in the investigation or trial of a criminal case arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as a case in which a child is alleged to be delinquent; and
“(7) other persons having a professional interest in the protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the respondent or of a member of his family, or in the work of the Superior Court, if authorized by rule or special order of the court.
Records inspected may not be divulged to unauthorized persons. The prosecuting attorney inspecting records pursuant to paragraph (6) of this subsection may divulge the contents to the extent required in the prosecution of a criminal case, and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and his assistants may inspect a transcript of the testimony of any witness and divulge the contents to the extent required by the prosecution of the witness for perjury, without, wherever possible, naming or otherwise revealing the identity of a child under the jurisdiction of the Division.
“(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Superior Court may by rule or special order provide that particular items or classes of items in juvenile case records shall not be open to inspection except pursuant to rule or special order; but, in dispositional proceedings after an adjudication, no item considered by the judge (other than identification of the sources of confidential information) shall be withheld from inspection (1) in delinquency or need of supervision cases, by the attorney for the child, or (2) in neglect cases, by the attorney for the child and an attorney for the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child.
“(d) The Superior Court may by rule or special order provide procedures for the inspection or copying of juvenile case records by persons entitled to inspect them. No person receiving any record or information pursuant to this section may publish or use it for any purpose other than that for which it was received without a special order of the court.
“(e) No person shall disclose, inspect, or use records in violation of this section.
“§ 16–2331. Juvenile social records; confidentiality; inspection and disclosure
“(a) As used in this section, the term ‘juvenile social records’ refers to all social records made with respect to a child in any proceedings
Ante, p. 488.
over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11–1101(13), including preliminary inquiries, predisposition studies, and examination reports.
“(b) Juvenile social records shall be kept confidential and shall not be open to inspection; but, subject to the 1 imitations of subsection (c), the inspection of those records shall be permitted to—
“(1) judges and professional staff of the Superior Court and the Corporation Counsel and his assistants assigned to the Division;
“(2) the attorney for the child at any stage of a proceeding in the Division, including intake;
“(3) any court or its probation staff, for purposes of sentencing the child as a defendant in a criminal case, and, if and to the extent other presentence materials are disclosed to him, the counsel for the defendant, in that ease;
“(4) public or private agencies or institutions providing supervision or treatment, or having custody of the child, if the supervision, treatment, or custody is under order of the Division; and
“(5) other persons having a professional interest in the protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the respondent or of a member of his family, or in the work of the Division, if authorized by rule or special order of the court.
Records inspected may not be divulged to unauthorized persons.
“(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Superior Court may by rule or special order provide that particular items or classes of items in juvenile social records shall not be open to inspection except pursuant to rule or special order: but, in dispositional proceedings after an adjudication, no item considered by the judge (other than identification of the sources of confidential information) shall be withheld from inspection (1) in delinquency or need of supervision cases, by the attorney for the child, or (2) in neglect cases, by the attorney for the child and an attorney for the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child.
“(d) The Superior Court may by rule or special order provide procedures for the inspection or copying of juvenile social records by persons entitled to inspect, them. No person receiving any record or information pursuant to this section may publish or use it for any purpose other than that for which it was received without a special order of the court.
“(e) No person shall disclose, inspect, or use records in violation of this section.
“§ 16–2332. Police and other law enforcement records
“(a) Law enforcement, records and files concerning a child shall not be open to public inspection nor shall their contents or existence be disclosed to the public unless a charge of delinquency is transferred for criminal prosecution under section 16–2307, the interest of national security requires, or the court otherwise orders in the interest of the child.
“(b) Inspection of such records and files is permitted by—
“(1) the Superior Court, having the child currently before it in any proceeding;
“(2) the officers of public and private institutions or agencies to which the child is currently committed, and those professional persons or agencies responsible for his supervision after release;
“(3) any other person, agency or institution, by order of the court, having a professional interest in the child or in the work of the law enforcement department;
“(4) law enforcement officers of the United States, the District of Columbia, and other jurisdictions when necessary for the discharge of their current official duties;
“(5) a court in which a person is charged with a criminal offense for the purposes of determining conditions of release or bail;
“(6) a court in which a person is convicted of a criminal offense for the purpose of a presentence report or other dispositional proceeding, or by officials of penal institutions and other penal facilities to which he is committed, or by a parole board in considering his parole or discharge or in exercising supervision over him; and
“(7) the parent, guardian, or other custodian and counsel for the child.
“(c) Photographs may be displayed to potential witnesses for identification purposes, in accordance with the standards of fairness applicable to adults.
“(d) No person shall disclose, inspect, or use records or files in violation of this section.
“§ 16–2333. Fingerprint records
“(a) The contents or existence of law enforcement records and files of the fingerprints of a child shall not be disclosed by the custodians thereof, except—
“(1) to a law enforcement officer of the United States, the District of Columbia, or other jurisdiction for purposes of the investigation and trial of a criminal offense; or
“(2) pursuant to rule or special order off the court.
“(b) When a child is transferred for criminal prosecution under section 16–2307, law enforcement records and files of his fingerprints relating to any matter so transferred shall be deemed those of an adult.
“(c) No person shall disclose, inspect, or use records in violation of this section.
“§ 16–2334. Sealing of records
“(a) On motion of a person who has been the subject of a petition filed pursuant to section 16–2305, or on the Division’s own motion, the Division shall vacate its order and findings and shall order the sealing of the case and social records referred to in sections 16–2330 and 16–2331 and the law enforcement records and files referred to in section 16–2332, or those of any other agency active in the case if it finds that—
“(1) (A) a neglected child has reached his majority; or
“(B) two years have elapsed since the final discharge of the person from legal custody or supervision, or since the entry of any other Division order not involving custody or supervision; and
“(2) he has not been subsequently convicted of a crime, or adjudicated delinquent or in need of supervision prior to the filing of the motion, and no proceeding is pending seeking such conviction or adjudication.
“(b) Reasonable notice of a motion shall be given to—
“(1) the person who is the subject of the petition;
“(2) the Corporation Counsel;
“(3) the authority granting the discharge, if the final discharge was from an institution, parole, or probation; and
“(4) the law enforcement department having custody of the files and records specified in section 16–2332.
“(c) Upon the entry of the order, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred. All facts relating to the action including arrest, the filing of a petition, and the adjudication, filing, and disposition of the Division shall no longer exist as a matter of law. The Division, the law enforcement department, or any other department or agency that received notice under subsection (b) and was named in the order shall reply, and the person who is the subject matter of the records may reply, to any inquiry that no record exists with respect to such person.
“(d) Inspection of the files and records included in the order may thereafter be permitted by the Division only upon motion by the person who is the subject of such records, and may be made only by those persons named in the motion; but the Division in its discretion may, by special order in an individual case, permit inspection by or release of information in the records to persons having a professional interest in the protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the person who is the subject of the petition or other members of his family.
“(e) Any adjudication of delinquency or need of supervision or conviction of a felony subsequent to sealing shall have the effect of nullifying the vacating and sealing order.
“(f) A person who has been the subject of a petition filed under this subchapter shall be notified of his rights under subsection (a) at the time a dispositional order is entered and again at the time of his final discharge from supervision, treatment, or custody.
“(g) No person shall disclose, receive, or use records in violation of this section.
“§ 16–2335. Unlawful disclosure of records; penalties
“Whoever willfully discloses, receives, makes use of, or knowingly permits the use of information concerning a child or other person in violation of sections 16–2330 through 16–2334,shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both. Violations of this section shall be prosecuted by the Corporation Counsel in the name of the District of Columbia.
“§ 16–2336. Additional powers of the Director of Social Services
“In addition to the powers and duties prescribed in section 11–1722,
Ante, p. 510.
the Director of Social Services shall have power to take into custody and place in detention or shelter care, in accordance with this subchapter, children who are under his supervision as delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected, or children who have run away from agencies or institutions to which they were committed under this subchapter.
“§ 16–2337. Emergency medical treatment
“Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a public agency having custody of a child who is under the jurisdiction of the Division from providing the child with emergency medical treatment.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
“§ 16–2311. Representation
“(a) Where a public support burden has been incurred or is threatened, the Corporation Counsel, or any of Ids assistants, shall bring a civil action in the Family Division on behalf of any wife or child to enforce support of such wife or child.
“(b) In all cases over which the Division has jurisdiction under paragraphs (3), (4), (10), and (11) of section 11–1101, where the court deems it necessary and proper, an attorney shall be appointed by the court to represent the respondent.
“(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with the right of an individual to file a civil action over which the Division has jurisdiction under the paragraphs of section 11–1101 referred to in subsection (b).
“§ 16–2342. Time of bringing complaint
“Proceedings over which the Division has jurisdiction under paragraphs (3) and (11) of section 11–1101 to establish paternity and provide for the support of a child born out of wedlock may be instituted after four months of pregnancy or within two years after the birth of the child, or within one year after the putative father has ceased making contributions for the support of the child. The time during which the respondent is absent from the jurisdiction shall be excluded from the computation of the time within which a complaint may be filed.
“§ 16–2343. Blood tests
“When it is relevant to an action over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11–1101, the court may direct that the mother, child, and the respondent submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether or not the respondent can be excluded as being the father of the child, but the results of the test may be admitted as evidence only in cases where the respondent does not object to its admissability. Where the parties cannot afford the cost of a blood test, the court may direct the Department of Public Health to perform such tests without fee.
“§ 16–2344. Exclusion of public
“Upon trial or proceedings over which the Division has jurisdiction under paragraph (3), (4), (10), or (11) of section 11–1101, the court may exclude the general public and, at the request of either party, shall exclude the general public.
“§ 16–2345. New birth record upon marriage of natural parents
“When a certified copy of a marriage certificate is submitted to the Director of Public Health, establishing that the previously unwed parents of a child born out of wedlock nave intermarried subsequent to the birth of the child, and the paternity of the child has been judicially determined or acknowledged by the husband before the Commissioner of the District of Columbia or his designated agent, or has been acknowledged in an affidavit sworn to by the husband before a judge or the clerk of a court of record, or before an officer of the armed forces of the United States authorized to administer oaths, and the affidavit is delivered to the Commissioner or his designated agent, a new certificate of birth bearing the original date of birth and the names of both parents shall be issued and substituted for the certificate of birth then on file. The original certificate of birth and all papers pertaining to the issuance of the new certificate shall be placed under seal and opened for inspection only upon order of the Family Division.
“§ 16–2346. Reports to Director of Public Health
“(a) Upon entry of a final judgment determining the paternity of a child born out of wedlock, the clerk of the court shall forward a certificate to the Director of Public Health of the District of Columbia, or his authorized representative in the jurisdiction in which the child was born, giving the name of the person adjudged to be the father of the child.
“(b) Upon receipt of the certificate provided for by subsection (a) of this section, the Director of Public Health or his authorized representative shall file it with the original birth record, and thereafter may issue a certificate of birth registration including thereon the name of the person adjudged to be the father of the child.
“§ 16–2347. Death of respondent; liability of estate
“If the respondent dies after paternity has been established and prior to the time the child reaches the age of 18 years, any sums due and unpaid under an order of the court at the time of his death shall constitute a valid claim against his estate.
“§ 16–2348. Paternity records; confidentiality; inspection and disclosure
“(a) Except on order of the Family Division, no records in a case over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11–1101(11)
Ante, p. 488.
shall be open to inspection by anyone other than the plaintiff, respondent, their attorneys of record, or authorized professional staff of the Superior Court. The Family Division, upon proper showing, may authorize the furnishing of certified copies of the records or portions thereof to the respondent, the mother, or custodian of the child, a party in interest, or their duly authorized attorneys. Certified copies of the records or portions thereof may be furnished, upon request, to the Corporation Counsel for use as evidence in nonsupport proceedings and to the Director of Public Health as provided by section 16–2346 (a).
“(b) No person shall disclose, receive, or use records in violation of this section. Whoever willfully discloses, receives, makes use of, or knowingly permits the use of information in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both. Violations of this section shall be prosecuted by the Corporation Counsel in the name of the District of Columbia.”
The item relating to chapter 23 in the analysis of title 16 of the District, of Columbia Code is amended by striking out “Juvenile Court”
and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division”.
Part C— Intrafamily Offenses; Jurisdiction and Process Outside the District of Columbia; Competency of Witnesses
Sec. 131. intrafamily offenses
Title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended by inserting after chapter 9 the following new chapter:
D.C. Code 16–901.
“Chapter 10.— PROCEEDINGS REGARDING INTRAFAMILY OFFENSES
“§ 16–1001. Definitions
“For purposes of this chapter:
“(1) The term ‘intrafamily offense’ means an act, punishable as a criminal offense, committed—
“(A) by one spouse against the other;
“(B) by a parent, guardian, or other legal custodian against a child; or
“(C) by one person against another person with whom he shares a mutual residence and is in a close relationship rendering the application of this chapter appropriate.
“(2) The terms ‘complainant’ and ‘family member’ include any individual in the relationship described in paragraph (1).
“(3) The term ‘Family Division’ means the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“(4) The term ‘Director of Social Services’ means the Director of Social Services in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“§ 16–1002. Complaint of criminal conduct; referrals to Family Division
“(a) If, upon the complaint of any person of criminal conduct by another or the arrest of a person charged with criminal conduct, it appears to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the ‘United States attorney’) that the conduct involves an intrafamily offense, he shall notify the Director of Social Services. The Director of Social Services may investigate the matter and make such recommendations to the United States attorney as the Director deems appropriate.
“(b) The United States attorney may also (1) file a criminal charge based upon the conduct and may consult with the Director of Social Services concerning appropriate recommendations for conditions of release taking into account the intrafamily nature of the offense; or (2) refer the matter to the Corporation Counsel for the filing of a petition for civil protection in the Family Division. Prior to any such referral, the United States attorney shall consult with the Director of Social Services concerning the appropriateness of the referral. A referral to the Corporation Counsel by the United States attorney shall not preclude the United States attorney from subsequently filing a criminal charge based upon the conduct, if he deems it appropriate, but no criminal charge may be filed after the Family Division begins receiving evidence pursuant to section 16–1005.
“§ 16–1003. Petition for civil protection
“(a) Upon referral by the United States attorney, or upon application of any person or agency for a civil protection order with respect to an intrafamily offense committed or threatened, the Corporation Counsel may file a petition for civil protection in the Family Division.
“(b) In any matter referred to the Corporation Counsel by the United States attorney in which the Corporation Counsel does not file a petition, he shall so notify the United States attorney.
“§ 16–1004. Petition; notice; temporary order
“(a) Upon a filing of a petition for civil protection by the Corporation Counsel, the Family Division shall set the matter for hearing, consolidating it, where appropriate, with other matters before the Family Division involving members of the same family.
“(b) The Family Division shall cause notice of the hearing to be served on the respondent, the complainant and, if appropriate, the family member endangered (or, if a child, the person then having physical custody of the child), the Director of Social Services, and the Corporation Counsel. The respondent shall be served with a copy of the petition together with the notice and shall be directed to appear at the hearing. The Family Division may also cause notice to be served on other members of the family whose presence at the hearing is necessary to the proper disposition of the matter.
“(c) If, upon the filing of the petition, the Division finds that (he safety or welfare of a family member is immediately endangered by the respondent, it may, ex parte, issue a temporary protection order of not more than ten days duration and direct that the order be served along with the notice required by this section.
“§ 16–1005. Hearing; evidence; protection order
“(a) Members of the family receiving notice shall appear at the hearing. In addition to the parties, the Corporation Counsel and the Director of Social Services may present evidence at the hearing.
“(b) Notwithstanding section 14–306, in a hearing under this section,
one spouse shall be a competent and compellable witness against the other and may testify as to confidential communications, but testimony compelled over a claim of a privilege conferred by such section shall be inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial over the objection of a spouse entitled to claim that privilege.
“(c) If, after hearing, the Family Division finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent has committed or is threatening an intrafamily offense, it may issue a protection order—
“(1) directing the respondent to refrain from the conduct committed or threatened and to keep the peace toward the family member;
“(2) requiring the respondent, alone or in conjunction with any other member of the family before the court, to participate in psychiatric or medical treatment or appropriate counseling programs;
“(3) directing, where appropriate, that the respondent avoid the presence of the family member endangered;
“(4) directing the respondent to perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter; or
“(5) combining two or more of (he directions or requirements prescribed by the preceding paragraphs.
“(d) A protection order issued pursuant to this section shall be effective for such period up to one year as the Family Division may specify, but the Family Division may, upon motion of any party to the original proceeding, extend, rescind, or modify the order for good cause shown.
“(e) Any final order issued pursuant to this section and any order granting or denying extension, modification, or rescission of such order shall be appeal able.
“(f) Violation of any temporary or permanent order issued under this chapter and failure to appear as provided in subsection (a) shall be punishable as contempt.
“§ 16–1006. Dismissal of petition; notice
“(a) The Family Division may dismiss a petition if the matter is not appropriate for disposition in the Family Division.
“(b) If a petition dismissed under subsection (a) was originated by referral from the United States attorney, and the dismissal was prior to the receipt of evidence pursuant to section 16–1005, the Family Division shall notify the United States attorney of the dismissal.”
The analysis of title 16 is amended by adding after the item relating to chapter 9 the following:
Sec. 132. jurisdiction and process outside the district of columbia
Title 13 of the District of Columbia Code is amended
D.C. Code 13–301.
by inserting after chapter 3 the following new chapter:
“Chapter 4.— CIVIL JURISDICTION AND SERVICE OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“SUBCHAPTER I,— GENERAL PROVISIONS
“§ 13–401. Relation to other provisions of law
“Except in cases of irreconcilable conflict, this chapter shall be construed to augment, and not to repeal, any other law of the District of Columbia authorizing another basis of jurisdiction or permitting another procedure for service in civil proceedings in the District of Columbia courts.
“§ 13–402. Uniformity of interpretation
“When the statutory language so permits, this chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to make it uniform with the laws of those jurisdictions which enact in comparable form the first two
9B U.L.A.
articles of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— BASES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“§ 13–421. Definition of person
“As used in this subchapter, the term ‘person’ includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of the District of Columbia and whether or not organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.
“§ 13–422. Personal jurisdiction based upon enduring relationship
“A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief.
“§ 13–423. Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct
“(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s—
“(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
“(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
“(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
“(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia;
“(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of Columbia; or
“(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement, located, executed, or to be performed within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
“(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
“§ 13–424. Service outside the District of Columbia
“When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this subchapter, service may be made outside the District of Columbia.
“§ 13–425. Inconvenient forum
“When any District of Columbia court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss such civil action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
“SUBCHAPTER III.— SERVICE OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“§ 13–431. Manner and proof of service
“(a) When the law of the District of Columbia authorizes service outside the District of Columbia, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made—
“(1) by personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within the District of Columbia;
“(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
“(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt; or
“(4) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory.
“(b) Proof of service outside the District of Columbia may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service or in the manner prescribed by the law of the District of Columbia, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is made for proof of service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction. When service is made by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
“§ 13–432. Individuals eligible to make service
“Service outside the District of Columbia may be made by an individual who is permitted to make service of process under the law of the District of Columbia or under the law of the place in which the service is made or who is designated by a District of Columbia court.
“§ 13–433. Individuals to be served; special cases
“When the law of the District of Columbia requires that in order to effect service one or more designated individuals be served, service outside the District of Columbia under this article must be made upon such designated individual or individuals.
“§ 13–434. Assistance to tribunals and litigants outside the District of Columbia
“(a) A District of Columbia court may order service upon any person who is domiciled or can be found within the District of Columbia of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside the District of Columbia. The order may be made upon application of any interested person or in response to a letter rogatory issued by a tribunal outside the District of Columbia and shall direct the manner of service.
“(b) Service in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside the District of Columbia may be made within the District of Columbia without an order of court.
“(c) Service under this section does not, of itself, require the recognition or enforcement of an order, judgment, or decree rendered outside the District of Columbia.”
The analysis of title 13 is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 3 the following new item:
Sec. 133. competency of witnesses
Section 14–305 of title 14 of the District of Columbia
Code is amended to read as follows:
“§ 14–305. Competency of witnesses; impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime
“(a) No person is incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of a criminal offense.
“(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde, but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment). A party establishing conviction by means of cross-examination shall not be bound by the witness’ answers as to matters relating to the conviction.
“(2) (A) Evidence of a conviction of a witness is inadmissible under this section if—
“(i) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure granted or issued on the basis of innocence, or
“(ii) the conviction has been the subject of a certificate of rehabilitation or its equivalent and such witness has not been convicted of a subsequent criminal offense.
“(B) In addition, no evidence of any conviction of a witness is admissible under this section if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the later of (i) the date of the release of the witness from confinement imposed for his most recent conviction of any criminal offense, or (ii) the expiration of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with respect to his most recent conviction of any criminal offense.
“(c) For purposes of this section, to prove conviction of crime it is not necessary to produce the whole record of the proceedings containing the conviction, but the certificate, under seal, of the clerk of the court wherein the proceedings were had, stating the fact of the conviction and for what cause, shall be sufficient.
“(d) The pendency of an appeal from a conviction does not render evidence of that conviction inadmissible under this section. Evidence of the pendency of such an appeal is admissible.”
The item relating to section 14–305 in the analysis of chapter 3 of such title 14 is amended to read as follows:
Part D— Conforming Amendments
Subpart 1— Amendments to District of Columbia Code
Sec. 141. amendments to title 12
Title 12 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as
D.C. Code 12–101.
follows:
Section 12–102 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 12–102. Substitution of parties
“The substitution of parties in civil actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
28 USC app.
Section 12–309 is amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Sec. 142. amendments to title 13
Title 13 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
Chapter 1 is repealed.
The analysis of title 13 is amended by striking out the item relating to chapter 1.
Section 13–301 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 13–301. Courts to which applicable
“Except as otherwise specifically provided by law or rules of court, this chapter applies to the District of Columbia courts.”
Section 13–302 is amended by striking out “, and the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, including the Domestic Relations Branch thereof” and inserting in lieu thereof “and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 13–331 (1) is amended by inserting “chapter 4 of this title or,” after “including”.
Chapter 7 is repealed.
The analysis of title 13 is amended by striking out the item relating to chapter 7.
Sec. 143. amendments to title 14
Title 14 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
Section 14–103 is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof “, or by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the manner prescribed by the rules of that court.”
Section 14–104 is amended—
by striking out “Court of General Sessions” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”;
by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”; and
by striking out all after the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “The testimony shall be taken as provided in the rules of the Superior Court.”
The item relating to section 14–104 in the analysis of chapter 1 is amended by striking out “Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”,
Section 14–307 is amended—
by striking out “courts of the District of Columbia” in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia courts”;
by inserting “or where the court is required under prevailing law to raise the defense sua sponte” immediately after “where the accused raises the defense of insanity” in subsection (b)(2); and
by striking out “or” at the end of paragraph (1) of subsection (b), by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (2) of such subsection and inserting in lieu thereof “; or”, and by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of a child alleged to be delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision in any proceeding before the Family Division of the Superior Court.”
Section 14–309 is amended by striking out “courts of the District
D.C. Cade 14–309.
of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal courts in the District of Columbia and District of Columbia courts”.
Section 14–503 is amended by striking out “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or by the former orphans’ court of the District” and inserting in lieu thereof “a court in the District of Columbia”.
Section 14–505 is amended by striking out “by the secretary or an assistant secretary of the Board of Commissioners” and substituting in lieu thereof “as provided by the Commissioner”.
Sec. 144. amendments to title 15
Title 15 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as
D.C. Code 15–101.
follows:
Paragraph (2) of section 15–101 (a) is amended to read as follows:
“(2) Superior Court of the District of Columbia,”.
Section 15–102 is amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sections 15–108 and 15–111 are each amended by inserting “or
78 Stat. 677, 678.
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia” after “District of Columbia”.
Subchapter II of chapter 1 is repealed.
Repeal.
D.C. Code 15–131 to 15–133.
Chapter 1 is amended by striking out the heading “SUBCHAPTER I.—GENERALLY”
The analysis of chapter 1 is amended by striking out the heading “subchapter i.—generally” and by striking out the matter relating to subchapter II.
Section 15–307 is amended by inserting “or the Superior Court of the District of Columbia” after “United States District Court for the District of Columbia”.
Section 15–310 is repealed.
Repeal.
Section 15–301 is amended by striking out “15–310,”.
The analysis for chapter 3 is amended by striking out the item relating to section 15–310.
Sections 15–311, 15–318, and 15–320 are each amended by striking
out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Subchapter II of chapter 5 is amended—
D.C. Code 15–521.
by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” in sections 15–521 and 15–522 and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”; and
by striking out in the subchapter heading “court of general sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “superior court”.
The analysis of chapter 5 is amended by striking out in the heading relating to subchapter II “court of general sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “superior court”.
Section 15–706 (a) is amended—
by striking out paragraph (14),
by inserting “and” at the end of paragraph (13), and
by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (14).
Section 15–707 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 15–707. Probate fees
“(a) Except, as provided in subsection (b), the Register of Wills may demand and receive in advance for services performed by him such fees as shall be set by the Superior Court.
“(b) Where the estate does not exceed two hundred dollars in value the Register of Wills shall receive no fees, and where the estate does not exceed five hundred dollars in value the fees may not exceed ten dollars.”
The item relating to section 15–707 in the analysis of chapter 7 is amended by striking out “Court”.
Section 15–708 is amended by striking out “the probate court” in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “probate”, and by striking out “court” in the section heading.
The item relating to section 15–708 in the analysis of chapter 7 is amended by striking out “court”.
Section 15–709 is amended—
by striking out “District of Columbia Court, of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”,
by striking out “the Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “the Superior Court”.
by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
“(b) Fees for services by the United States marshals for processes issued by the Superior Court shall be prescribed by rules of that court.”; and
by amending the section heading to read as follows:
“§ 15–709. Fees and costs in Superior Court
The item relating to section 15–709 in the analysis of chapter 7 is amended to read as follows;
Section 15–710 is repealed and the item relating to that section in the analysis of chapter 7 is repealed.
Sections 15–711, 15–712, and 15–713 are each amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
The section heading for each of those sections and the items relating to those sections in the analysis of chapter 7 are each amended by striking out “Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
Section 15–714 is amended—
by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” in subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”;
by adding after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) No travel allowance shall be paid to any witness residing within the District of Columbia.”; and
by striking out “Court of General Sessions” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
The item relating to section 15–714 in the analysis of chapter 7 is amended by striking out “Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
Section 15–716 is repealed and the item relating to that section in the analysis of chapter 7 is repealed.
Section 15–717 is amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sec. 145. amendments to title 16
Chapter 3 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is
D.C. Code 16–301.
amended as follows:
Section 16–301 is amended—
by striking out “Domestic Relations Branch of the District of Columbia Court, of General Sessions” in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”; and
by striking out “Commissioners” in subsection (b)(3) and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Sections 16–304, 16–305, 16–307, and 16–314 are each amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and “Board” each place they appear and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Chapter 5 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended as
D.C. Code 16–501.
follows:
Sections 16–501 and 16–502 are each amended by striking out
“District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sections 16–516 and 16–549 are each amended by striking out
77 Stat. 548, 553.
“Probate Court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
Sections 16–533 and 16–578 are each amended (i) by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”, and (ii) by striking out “Court of General Sessions” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
The items relating to such sections in the analysis of chapter 5 are each amended by striking out “Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
Section 16–578 is amended (A) by striking out “docketed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “filed and recorded”, (B) by striking out “six years” and inserting in lieu thereof “twelve years”, and (C) by striking out “section 15–132(a)” and inserting in lieu thereof “section 15–101”.
Section 16–581 is amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 16–601 of the District of Columbia Code is amended—
by striking out “, or a judge thereof,” in the first sentence of the first paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof “or the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,”, and
by striking out “has” in the first sentence of the second paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof the following: “(as specified in section 11–501) and the Superior Court of the District
Ante, p. 476.
Ante, p. 484.
of Columbia (as specified insertion 11–921) have”.
Chapter 7 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended as follows:
Section 16–7(11 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–701. Rules and regulations
“The Superior Court may make such rules and regulations for conducting business in the Criminal Division of the court, consistent with statutes applicable to such business and in the manner provided in section 11–946, as it may deem necessary and proper.”
Ante, p. 487.
Section 16–702 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–702. Prosecution by indictment or information
“An offense prosecuted in the Superior Court which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment returned by a grand jury. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year shall be prosecuted by indictment, but it may be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of the nature of the charge and of Ms rights, waives in open court, prosecution by indictment. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An information subscribed by the proper prosecuting officer may be filed without leave of court.”
The item relating to section 16–702 in the analysis of chapter 7 is amended to read as follows:
Section 16–703 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–703. Process of Criminal Division; fees
“(a) The Criminal Division of the Superior Court may issue process for the arrest of a person against whom an indictment is returned, an information is filed, or a complaint under oath is made.
“(b) Process shall—
“(1) be under the seal of the court;
“(2) bear teste in the name of a judge of the court, and
“(3) be signed by a clerk or employee of the court authorized to administer oaths.
“(c) In cases arising out of violations of any of the ordinances of the District of Columbia, process shall be directed to the Chief of Police, who shall execute the process and make return thereof in like manner as in other cases.
“(d) In all other criminal cases, the process issued by the Superior Court may be directed to the United States marshal or to the Chief of Police.
“(e) For services pursuant to subsection (d) of this section the marshal shall receive the fees prescribed by section 15–709(b)(2).”
Section 16–705 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–705. Jury trial; trial by court
“(a) In a criminal case tried in the Superior Court in which, according to the Constitution of the United States, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial shall be by jury, unless the defendant in open court expressly waives trial by jury and requests trial by the court, and the court and the prosecuting officer consent thereto. In the case of a trial without a jury, the trial shall be by a single judge, whose verdict shall have the same force and effect as that of a jury.
“(b) In any case where the defendant is not under the Constitution of the United States entitled to a trial by jury, the trial shall be by a single judge without a jury, except that if—
“(1) the case involves an offense which is punishable by a fine or penalty of more than $300 or by imprisonment for more than ninety days (or for more than six months in the case of the offense of contempt of court), and
“(2) the defendant demands a trial by jury and does not subsequently waive a trial by jury in accordance with subsection (a), the trial shall be by jury.
“(c) The jury shall consist of twelve persons, unless the parties, with the approval of the court, and in the manner provided by rules of the court, agree to a number less than twelve.”
Section 16–706 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–706. Enforcement of judgments; commitment upon nonpayment of fine
“The Superior Court may enforce any of its judgments rendered in criminal cases by fine or imprisonment, or both. Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the relief provided in section 3569 of
title 18, United States Code, in any case where the court imposes a fine, the court may, in the event of default, in the payment of the fine imposed, commit the defendant for a term not to exceed one year.”
Sections 16–704, 16–707, 16–709, and 16–710 are each amended
by striking out “Court, of General Sessions” and “District of Columbia Court of Genera] Sessions” wherever they appear and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
The heading of chapter 7 is amended by striking out “COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS” and inserting in lieu thereof “SUPERIOR COURT”.
Chapter 9 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended as
D.C. Code 16–901.
follows:
Section 16–901 is amended by striking out “Domestic. Relations Branch of the District, of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 16–916 is amended—
by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and by adding after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) Whenever any father or mother shall fail to maintain his or her minor child or children, the court may decree that he or she shall pay reasonable sums periodically for the support and maintenance of his or her child or children, and the court may decree that the father or mother pay court costs, including counsel fees, to enable plaintiff to conduct the cases.”, and
by amending the section heading to read as follows:
“§ 16–916. Maintenance of wife and minor children; maintenance of former wife; maintenance of minor children; enforcement”.
The item relating to section 16–916 m the analysis of chapter 9 is amended to read as follows:
Section 16–918 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–918. Appointment of counsel; compensation
“(a) In all uncontested divorce cases, and in any other divorce or annulment case where the court deems it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney shall be appointed by the court to enter his appearance for the defendant and actively defend the cause.
“(b) In any proceeding wherein the custody of a child is in question, the court may appoint a disinterested attorney to appear on behalf of the child and represent his best interests.
“(c) An attorney appointed under this section may receive such compensation for his services as the court determines to be proper, which the court may direct to be paid by the parties.”
The item relating to section 16–918 in the analysis of chapter 9 is amended to read as follows:
Chapter 13 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended
D.C. Code 16–1301.
as follows:
Section 16–1301 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–1301. Jurisdiction of District Court
“The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings for the condemnation of real property authorized by subchapters IV and V of this chapter, with
77 Stat. 577; Post, p. 559.
D.C. Code 16–1351, 16–1331.
full power to hear and determine all issues of law and fact that may arise in the proceedings.”
Subchapter I is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“§ 16–1303. Jurisdiction of Superior Court
“The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction of all proceedings for the condemnation of real property authorized
D.C. Code 16–1311 and 16–1331.
by subchapters II and III of this chapter with full power to hear and determine all issues of law and fact that may arise in the proceedings.”
Section 16–1311 is amended—
by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”,
by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”,
by striking out “name of the Board” and inserting in lieu thereof “name of the District of Columbia”, and
by striking out “Board of Commissioners” in the heading and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia”.
Section 16–1312 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–1312. Juries for condemnation proceedings
“For purposes of this subchapter, a special jury list shall be prepared of not less than one hundred persons who are qualified jurors in the District of Columbia. When a jury is required for a condemnation proceeding under this subchapter, the names of such number of persons as may be necessary shall be selected from this list by lot and furnished to the Superior Court.”
Section 16–1314(a) is amended by striking out “members of the Board of Commissioners” in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”, and by striking out “Commissioners” in paragraph (5) of the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
The third sentence of section 16–1318 is amended to read as follows: “If the appraisement is vacated and set aside, the court shall order the necessary number of new persons selected from the special jury list and, from among the persons so selected, shall appoint, a new jury of five capable and disinterested persons who shall proceed as in the case of the first jury.”
Sections 16–1319, 16–1321 and 16–1336 are each amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Section 16–1331 is amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, and agencies of the United States authorized by law to acquire real property,” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner of the District of Columbia”.
Section 16–1332 is amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia and agencies of the United States authorized by law to acquire real property” in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner of the District of Columbia”, and by striking out “, and where the property sold was acquired under an appropriation authorized for the use of the District of Columbia, moneys received from the sale shall be deposited in the Treasury” in subsection (c).
Section 16–1334 is amended by striking out “or the United States” wherever it appears.
Section 16–1337 is repealed and section 16–1338 is redesignated as 16–1337.
The first sentence of section 16–1357 is amended to read as follows: “When the date for trial has been set, as provided by section 16–1356, the court shall order the names of a number of persons, not less than twenty, selected from the special jury list provided by section 16–1312, and the names of the persons selected shall be certified
Ante, p. 558.
to the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as a panel of prospective jurors.”
Chapter 13 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
D.C. Code 16–1301 to 16–1368.
new subchapter:
“SUBCHAPTER V.— EXCESS PROPERTY FOR THE UNITED STATES
“§ 16–1381. Acquisition of property in excess of needs
“In order to promote the orderly and proper development of the seat of government of the United States, agencies of the United States authorized by law to acquire real property, may acquire, in the public interest, by gift, dedication, exchange, purchase, or condemnation fee simple title to land (or rights in or on land or easements or restrictions therein) within the District of Columbia for public uses, works, and improvements authorized by Congress, in excess of that actually needed for and essential to their usefulness, in order to preserve the view, appearance, light, and air and to enhance their usefulness, to prevent the use of private property adjacent to them in such a manner as to impair the public benefit derived from the construction thereof, or to prevent inequities or hardships to the owners of adjacent private property by depriving them of the beneficial use of their property.
“§ 16–1382. Retention, for public use, of excess property
“When the authorities of the United States having jurisdiction of real property (or rights or easements) acquired pursuant to this subchapter, elect to retain any of them for the use of the United States, they may use the property (or rights or easements) for park, playground, highway, or alley purposes, or for any other lawful purposes that they deem advantageous or in the public interest.
“§ 16–1383. Availability of appropriations for purchases of excess property
“When real property is purchased pursuant to this subchapter in excess of that needed for a particular project or improvement, appropriations available for the payment of the purchase price, costs, and expenses incident to the project or improvement may be used in the payment of the purchase price, costs, find expenses of excess real property purchased in connection with the project or improvement, as provided by this subchapter.
“§ 16–1384. Condemnation of excess real property by United States agencies; payment of awards, damages and costs
“(a) When excess real property is condemned by agencies of the United States as provided by this subchapter, the condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of the property shall be in accordance with subchapter IV of this chapter, or any laws in effect at the time of the commencement of condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of real property in the District of Columbia for the use of the United States.
“(b) Appropriations available for the condemnation of property pursuant to subchapter IV of this chapter may be used in the payment of awards, damages, and costs in condemnation proceedings pursuant to that subchapter for the acquisition of excess real property as provided in this subchapter.
“§ 16–1385. Construction of subchapter
“This subchapter does not repeal any provisions of existing law pertaining to the condemnation or acquisition of streets, alleys, or land, or the laws relating to the subdividing of lands in the District of Columbia.”
The analysis of chapter 13 is amended—
by adding after the item relating to section 16–1302 the following:
by amending the item relating to section 16–1311 to read as follows:
by amending the item relating to section 16–1312 to read as follows:
by striking out the item relating to section 16–1337 and by striking out “16–1338” and inserting in lieu thereof “16–1337”; and
by adding at the end thereof:
Chapter 15 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended as follows:
Sections 16–1501 and 16–1505 are each amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”
Section 16–1504 and the item relating to that section in the analysis of chapter 15 are repealed.
Section 16–1901 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended—
by striking out “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “the appropriate court”;
by inserting “(a)” immediately before “A person” and by adding after and below the last sentence the following new subsections:
“(b) Petitions for writs directed to Federal officers and employees shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
“(c) Petitions for writs directed to any other person shall be filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”: and
by striking out “to District Court” in the section heading.
The item relating to section 16–1901 in the analysis of chapter 19 of title 16 is amended by striking out “to District Court”.
Section 16–2501 of tide 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”.
The second paragraph of section 16–2701 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit” and inserting in lieu thereof “appellate court”.
Chapter 29 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is
D.C. Code 16–2901.
amended as follows:
Sections 16–2901 and 16–2921 are each amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 16–2901(d) is amended by striking out “section 21–213” and inserting in lieu thereof “sections 21–146 and 21–704”.
Sections 16–2923, 16–2924, and 16–2925 are each amended by striking out “District Court” and inserting in lieu thereof “court”.
Chapter 31 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended us follows:
Section 16–3101 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–3101. Definition
“As used in this chapter, the term ‘Probate Court’ means the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”
Sections 16–3103, 16–3105, and 16–3106 are each amended by striking out “powers of enforcement and punishment as provided by section 401 of title 18, United States Code” and inserting in lieu
thereof “contempt power”.
Section 16–3104(b) is amended by striking out. “to the United States”.
Section 16–3301 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended by striking out “United States District. Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court, of the District of Columbia”.
Chapter 35 of title 16, District of Columbia Code, is amended
D.C. Code 16–3501.
to read as follows:
“Chapter 35.— QUO WARRANTO
“SUBCHAPTER I.— ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES
“§ 16–3501. Persons against whom issued; civil action
“A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
“§ 16–3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings
“The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified setting forth the grounds of the application, or until the relator files a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such penalty as the court prescribes, conditioned on the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ if costs are not recovered from and paid by the defendant.
“§ 16–3503. Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act; procedure
“If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of the interested person on his compliance with the condition prescribed by section 16–3502 as to security for costs.
“SUBCHAPTER II.— ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS OR CORPORATIONS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“§ 16–3521. Persons against whom issued; civil action
“A quo warranto may be issued from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in the name of the District of Columbia against—
“(1) a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the District of Columbia, a public office of the District of Columbia, civil or military, or an office in a domestic corporation; or
“(2) one or more persons who act as a corporation within the District of Columbia without being duly authorized, or exercise within the District of Columbia corporate rights, privileges, or franchises not granted them by law in force in the District of Columbia.
The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
“§ 16–3522. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings
“The United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel may institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion, or on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified, setting forth the grounds of the application, or until the relator files a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such penalty as the court prescribes, conditioned on the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ if costs are not recovered from and paid by the defendant.
“§ 16–3523. Refusal of United States attorney or Corporation Counsel to act; procedures
“If the United States attorney or Corporation Counsel refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the District of Columbia, on the relation of the interested person, on his compliance with the conditions prescribed by section 16–3522 as to security for costs.
“SUBCHAPTER III.— PROCEDURES AND JUDGMENTS
“§ 16–3541. Allegations in petition of relator claiming office
“When a quo warranto proceeding is against a person for usurping an office, on the relation of a person claiming the same office, the relator shall set forth in his petition the facts upon which he claims to Ire entitled to the office.
“§ 16–3542. Notice to defendant
“On the issuing of a writ of quo warranto the court may fix a time within which the defendant may appear and answer the writ. When the defendant cannot be found in the District, of Columbia, the court may direcl notice to be given to him by publication as in other cases of proceedings against nonresident defendants, and upon proof of publication, if the defendant does not appear, judgment may be rendered as if he had been personally served.
“§ 16–3543. Proceedings on default
“If the defendant does not appear as required by a writ of quo warranto, after being served, the court may proceed to hear proof in support of the writ and render judgment accordingly.
“§ 16–3544. Pleading; jury trial
“In a quo warranto proceeding, the defendant may demur, plead specially, or plead “not guilt” as the genera] issue, and the United States or the District of Columbia, as the case may lie, may reply as in other actions of a civil character. Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury of either party requests it. Otherwise they shall be determined by the court.
“§ 16–3545. Verdict and judgment
“Where a defendent in a quo warranto proceeding is found by the jury to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised an office or franchise, the verdict shall be that he is guilty of the act or acts in question, and judgment shall be rendered that he be ousted and excluded therefrom mid that the relator recover his costs.
“§ 16–3546. Usurping corporate franchise; judgment
“Where a quo warranto proceeding is against persons acting as a corporation without being legally incorporated, the judgment against the defendants shall be that they be perpetually restrained and enjoined from the commission or continuance of the acts complained of.
“§ 16–3547. Proceedings against corporate directors and trustees; judgment and order; enforcement
“Where a quo warranto proceeding is against a director or trustee of a corporation and the court finds tit at at his election either illegal votes were received or legal votes rejected, or both, sufficient to change the result if the error is corrected, the court may render judgment that the defendant be ousted, and that the relator, if entitled to be declared elected, be admitted to the office, and the court may issue an order to the proper parties, being officers or members of the corporation, to admit him to the office. The judgment may require the defendant to deliver to the relator all books, papers, and other things in his custody or control pertaining to the office, and obedience to judgment may be enforced by attachment.
“§ 16–3548. Recovery of damages from usurper; limitation
“At any time within a year from a judgment in a quo warranto proceeding, the relator may bring an action against the party ousted and recover the damages sustained by the relator by reason of the ousted party’s usurpation of the office to which the relator was entitled.”
Chapter 37 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended—
by repealing subchapter II;
by striking out the heading “SUBCHAPTER I.—GENERAL PROVISIONS”; and
by striking out the items relating to subchapter II in the chapter analysis and by striking out “subchapter i.—general provisions” in that analysis.
Chapter 39 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
The chapter heading is amended by striking out “COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS” and inserting in lieu thereof “SUPERIOR COURT”.
Section 16–3901 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 16–3901. Practice; applicability of other laws and rules of court
“All provisions of law relating to the Superior Court, of the District of Columbia and the miles of the court apply to the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the court as far as they may be applicable
Ante, p. 489.
and are not in conflict with this chapter or chapter 13 of title 11. In ease of conflict, this chapter and chapter 13 of title 11 control.”
Section 16–3902 is amended—
by striking out “of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” in subsection (a); and
by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and “Court of General Sessions” in the form prescribed by subsection (e) and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sections 16–3903 and 16–3905 are each amended by striking out “of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions”.
The third sentence of section 16–3904 is amended to read as follows: “When the set-off or counterclaim is for more than the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch, as provided by section 11–1321, but within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, the action shall nevertheless remain in the Branch and be tried therein in its entirety.”
Section 16–3907 is amended by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”,
Section 16–3910 is amended by striking out “, or the rules prescribed pursuant to section 13–101(c)” and inserting in lieu thereof “or the rules of the court” and by striking out “of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions”,
Sec. 146. amendments to title 17
Title 17 of the District of Columbia Code is amended
as follows:
Chapter 1 and the item relating to such chapter in the chapter
Repeal.
D.C. Code 17.
analysis are repealed
Section 17–301 is amended—
by striking out “Court of General Sessions” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”,
by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”, and
by striking out “section 11–741 (c)” and inserting in lieu thereof “section 11–721 (c)”.
The item relating to section 17–301 in the analysis of chapter 3 is amended by striking out “Court of General Sessions“and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court”,
Section 17–303 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 17–303. Appeals from administrative orders and decisions
“An appeal from an order or decision as provided for in section 11–722, is commenced by filing, within the time prescribed pursuant to
Ante, p. 481.
section 17–307(a), the written petition for review provided by section
Infra.
11 of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–1510). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals may
Post, p. 582.
prescribe the necessary rules and procedures for review of administrative orders and decisions, consistent with such section 11.”
The item relating to section 17–303 in the analysis of chapter 3 is amended by striking out “: petition; records, procedure”.
Section 17–304 is amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner or Council” and by inserting after “District of Columbia,” the first time it appears the following: “by the independent agency,”.
Section 17–305 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 17–305. Scope of review
“(a) In considering an order or judgment of a lower court (or any of its divisions or branches) brought before it for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall review the record on appeal. When the issues of fact were tried by jury, the court shall review the case only as to matters of law. When the case was tried without a jury, the court may review both as to the facts and the law, but the judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
“(b) The provisions of section 11 of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–1510) shall apply with respect to review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of an order or decision under that Act.”
Section 17–306 is amended by striking out “branch” and inserting in lieu thereof “division or branch” and by striking out “order or decision of an administration agency” and inserting in lieu thereof “administrative order or decision”.
Section 17–307 is amended by striking out “section 11–741 or 11–742” in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “section 11–721 or 11–722”, by striking out “District of Columbia Court of General Sessions” in subsection (b) and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”, and by striking out “section 11–741(c)” in subsection (b) and inserting in lieu thereof “section 11–721(c)”.
Sec. 147. amendments to title 18
Title 18 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
The last paragraph of section 18–101 is amended to read as follows:
“‘Probate Court’ and ‘court’, respectively, mean the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”
Subsection (d) of section 18–505 is amended to read as follows:
“(d) The rules of the court with respect to the taking and use of testimony of out of District witnesses apply to testimony taken pursuant to this section. The original will or codicil shall be sent with the notice or order of appointment or commission or letters rogatory, and exhibited to the witnesses.”
Section 18–513 is amended to read as follows:
“§ 18–513. Rules of procedure
“The court shall prescribe rules of procedure governing the trial of issues when a caveat is filed, including provisions for notice, appointment of guardians ad litem, trial by jury, and effect of judgments.”
The item relating to section 18–513 in the analysis of chapter 5 is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 148. amendments to title 19
Title 19 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
Section 19–701 is amended by striking out “Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
The following new section is added after section 19–114:
“§ 19–115. Definition
“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘Probate Court’ means the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”
The analysis of chapter 1 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Sec. 149. amendments to title 20
Title 20 of the District of Columbia Code is amended as follows:
Sections 20–302,20–332(a)(2), 20–502(b), and 20–1107 are each amended by striking out “to the United States”.
Sections 20–312, 20–337, and 20–501 are each amended by striking out in the forms referred to therein “the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 20–351 (a)(2) is amended by striking out “an insane person” and inserting in lieu thereof “a mentally-ill person”.
Section 20–364(a) is amended by striking out “in the name of the United States” and inserting in lieu thereof “in the name of the District of Columbia”.
Section 20–502 is further amended by striking out in the form
referred to therein “Probate Court of the District of Columbia” and “Probate Court of the District” and inserting in lieu thereof “Probate Court”.
Section 20–1110 is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Probate Court”, and by striking out “shall be given to the United States and”.
Sections 20–1320 and 20–1505 are each amended by striking out “Probate Court of the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Probate Court”.
Section 20–2801 is amended by striking out “United States
District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Probate Court” and by striking out “United States attorney” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Corporation Counsel”.
The item relating to section 20–2301 in the analysis of chapter 23 is amended by striking out “ratted States attorney” and inserting in lieu thereof “Corporation Counsel”.
Sec. 150. amendments to title 21
Chapter 1 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is
D.C. Code 21–101.
amended as follows:
Section 21–112 is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia,” and inserting in lieu thereof “Probate Court”.
Section 21–115 is amended by striking out “to the United States”.
Section 21–158 is amended by striking out “in the name of the United States”.
Section 21–301(4) of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Chapter 5 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended as follows:
Sections 21–501 and 21–502 (a) are each amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superio’r Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–521 is amended by striking out “the family physician” and inserting in lieu thereof “a physician”.
Sections 21–544, 21–564(a), 21–564(b), and 21–590 are each amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–564(a) is further amended by striking out “Board of Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Section 21–581 is amended—
by striking out “Commissioners” in subsection (a) and in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”, and
by striking out “(a)” and subsection (b).
The item relating to section 21–581 in the analysis of chapter 5 is amended by striking out “Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Section 21–584 is amended by striking out “witnesses in the courts of the United States” and inserting in lieu thereof “other witnesses in the court”.
The following new section is added after section 21–591:
“§ 21–592. Return to hospital of an escaped mentally ill person
“When a person has been ordered confined hi a hospital or institution for the mentally ill pursuant to this chapter and has left such hospital or institution without authorization or has failed to return as directed, the court which ordered confinement shall, upon the request of the administrator of such hospital or institution, order the return of such person to such hospital or institution.”
The analysis of chapter 5 is amended by adding after the item relating to section 21–591 the following:
Members of the Commission on Mental Health established under section 21–502 of title 21 of the District of Columbia Code who are in office on the effective date of this title shall continue in office as provided in subsection (b) of that section.
Section 21–706(a) of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–906 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Chapter 11 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended as follows:
Sections 21–1101, 21–1102, 21–1103, 21–1104, 21–1105, 21–1106, 21–1107, 21–1108, 21–1110, 21–1111, 21–1113, 21–1115, 21–1118, and 21–1123 are each amended by striking out “feeble-minded” each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “substantially retarded”.
The section heading for section 21–1118 is amended by striking out “feeble-minded” and inserting in lieu thereof “substantially retarded”.
Sections 21–1102 and 21–1120 are each amended by striking out “Department of Public Welfare” and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Council”.
Section 21–1103 is amended—
by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”, and
by striking out “of District Court as to feeble-mindedness” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “as to substantial retardation”.
Section 21–1104 is amended by striking out “District Court of the United States for the District or Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–1109 (a) is amended by striking out “running to the United States”.
Section 21–1111 (a) is amended by striking out “Commissioners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Commissioner”.
Section 21–1114 is amended—
by striking out “juvenile court of the District of Columbia as a dependent or delinquent child” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court upon allegations that he is delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision”,
by striking out “feeble-minded” and inserting in lieu thereof “substantially retarded”,
by inserting “, other than proceedings on a motion to transfer pursuant to section 16–2307, after “the proceedings” in the first sentence, and
by striking out “brought before juvenile court appears feeble-minded” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “brought before Family Division appears substantially retarded”.
Sections 21–1116 and 21–1122 are each amended by striking out
79 Stat. 771; Post, p. 1087.
“United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–1117 is amended—
by striking out “feeble-mindedness” and inserting in lieu thereof “substantial retardation”, and
by striking out “feeble-minded” in the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof “substantially retarded”
The analysis of chapter 11 is amended—
by striking out “of District Court as to feeble-mindedness” in the item relating to section 21–1103 and inserting in lieu thereof “as to substantial retardation”, and
by striking out “before juvenile court appears feeble-minded” in the item relating to section 21–1114 and inserting in lieu thereof “before Family Division appears substantially retarded”, and
by striking out “feeble-minded” in the items relating to sections 21–1117 and 21–1118 and inserting in lieu thereof “substantially retarded”.
The chapter heading for chapter 11 is amended by striking out “FEEBLE-MINDED” and inserting in lieu thereof “SUBSTANTIALLY RETARDED”.
Chapter 13 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended
as follows:
Section 21–1301 is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
The first sentence of section 21 1302 is amended by striking out “to the United States”.
Chapter 15 of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended
D.C. Code 21–1301.
as follows:
Section 21–1501 is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 21–1506 is amended by striking out “of the Civil Division”.
The analysis of title 21, District of Columbia Code, is amended by striking out “Feeble-Minded” in the reference to chapter 11 mid inserting in lieu thereof “Substantially Retarded”.
Sec. 151. amendments to title 28
Sections 28–2103 and 28–2104 of title 28 of the District of Columbia Code are each amended by striking out “United
D.C. Code 21–1501.
States District. Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 28–2105 of title 28 of the District of Columbia Code is amended by striking out. “District Court” and inserting in lieu thereof “court, having probate jurisdiction”.
Subpart 2— Amendments to Other Laws
Sec. 155. redesignation of courts
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all laws of the United States (other than this Act) applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia, in force on the effective date of this Act, in which reference is made to the—
justice of the peace,
justice of the peace court,
police court, of the District of Columbia,
Municipal Court of the District of Columbia,
Municipal Court for the District of Columbia (established by the Act of April 1, 1942 (56 Stat. 190)), and
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions (established by the Act of July 8, 1963 (77 Stat. 77)) or any division or branch of that Court,
are amended by substituting “Superior Court of the District of Columbia” for each such reference.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all laws of the United States (other than this Act) applicable exclusively to the District of (Columbia, in force on the effective date of this Act, in which reference is made to the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (established by the Act of April 1, 1942), are amended by substituting “District of Columbia Court of Appeals” for such reference.
The following laws of the United States applicable to the District of Columbia, in force on the effective date of this Act, are amended by striking out all references therein to the United States District. Court for the District of Columbia and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”:
The following sections of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901:
Section 491a of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 7–202).
Section 491n of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 7–215).
Section 1608e of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 7–313).
Section 1610 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 7–323).
Section 869b of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 22–1510).
Section 632 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–228).
Section 586 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–413).
Section 586f of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–419).
Section 793 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–725).
Section 1225 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–910),
Section 12 of the Boiler Inspection Act of the District of Columbia, approved June 25, 1936 (D.C. Code. sec. 1–713).
Section 2 of the Act of August 3, 1968 (D.C. Code. sec. 1–804b).
Section 41 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of the healing art and to protect the public health in the District of
45 Stat. 1338.
54 Stat. 716.
Columbia”, approved February 27, 1929 (D.C. Code, sec. 2–132).
Section 4 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–304).
Section 7 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of pharmacy and the sale of poisons in the District of Columbia, and
44 Stat. 1414; 77 Stat. 78, 616.
for other purposes”, approved May 7, 1906 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–606).
Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act to amend the Act to regulate the, practice of podiatry in the District of Columbia”,
54 Stat. 697.
approved June 29, 1940 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–703).
Section 29 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the examination and registration of architects and to regulate the practice of architecture in the District of Columbia”, approved December 13,
45 Stat. 952.
1924 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1029).
The following sections of the Professional Engineers’ Registration Act, approved September 19, 1950:
Section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1808).
Section 9(b) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1809(b)).
Section 13 of the District of Columbia Charitable Solicitation Act, approved July 10, 1957 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–2112).
The following sections of the District of Columbia Securities Act, approved August 30, 1964:
Section 11 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–2410).
Section 12 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–2411).
Section 18 of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act, approved October 15, 1962 (D.C. Code. sec. 3–217).
Section 389 of the Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. sec. 4–135).
The following sections of the Act entitled “An Act to punish false swearing before the trial board of the Metropolitan police force and fire department of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved May 11, 1892:
The first section of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 4–601).
Section 3 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 4–603).
Section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act providing for the establishment of a uniform building line on streets in the District of Columbia less than ninety feet in width”, approved June 21, 1906 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–202).
Section 11 of the Act entitled “An Act to require the erection of fire escapes in certain buildings in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved March 19, 1906 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–311).
Section 7 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for means of egress for buildings in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved December 24, 1942 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–323).
Section 8 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the height of buildings in the District of Columbia”, approved June 1, 1910 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–408).
Section 7(a) of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, approved August 2, 1946 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–706).
The third proviso of section 11(a) of the Horizontal Property Act of the District of Columbia, approved December 21, 1963 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–911).
The first section of the Act of March 4, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec. 6–505).
Section 5 of the Act of December 15, 1932 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–405).
The fifth paragraph of so much of the first section of the Act of March 3, 1905, as relates to bridges (D.C. Code. sec. 7–505).
33 Stat. 372, 893.
The second paragraph of so much of the first section of the Act of June 29, 1932, as relates to bridges (D.C. Code. sec. 7–514).
The first section of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the elimination of the Michigan Avenue grade crossing in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved March 3, 1927 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–520).
The third paragraph of so much of the first section of the Act of July 3, 1930, as relates to bridges (D.C. Code. sec. 7–523).
Section 11 of the District of Columbia Public Space Utilization Act, approved October 17, 1968 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–950).
The first section and section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the elimination of grade crossings of steam railroads in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved March 3, 1927 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–1215 (a), (b)).
The first section of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the establishment of a municipal center in the District of Columbia”, approved
February 28, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec. 9–201).
The Act entitled “An Act to prohibit the introduction of contraband into the District of Columbia penal institutions”, approved
December 15, 1941 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2603).
Section 5 of the Hospital Treatment for Drug Addicts Act for the District of Columbia, approved June 24, 1956 (D.C. Code, sec.
24–605),
Section 345 of the Public Health Service Act, approved July
1, 1944 (D.C.Code, sec. 24–614).
Section 26 of the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, approved January 24, 1934 (D.C. Code. sec. 25–126).
Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act concerning commontrust funds and to make uniform the law with reference thereto”, approved
October 27, 1949 (D.C. Code. sec. 26–703).
Section 5 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of medical and dental colleges in the District
of Columbia”, approved May 4, 1896 (D.C. Code. sec. 31–904).
The Act entitled “An Act to amend the Code of Law for the District of Columbia”, approved April 16, 1934 (D.C. Code. sec.
35–205).
The following sections of the Life Insurance Act, approved June 19, 1934:
Section 13, chapter II of such Act (D.C. Code, sec.
35–412).
Section 24, chapter II of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 35–423).
Section 15, chapter HI of such Act (D.C. Code. sec.
35–515).
Section 5, title II of the Act of September 19, 1918 (D.C. Code.
sec. 36–435).
The following sections of the Act of March 4, 1913:
Section 8, paragraph 97(a) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec.
43–201).
Section 8, paragraph 35 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec.
43–405).
Section 8, paragraph 48 of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 43–418).
Section 5 of the Act entitled “An Act to authorize the Metropolitan Railroad Company to change its motive power for the propulsion of the cars of said company”, approved August 2, 1894 (D.C.
Code, sec. 44–208).
Section 305 of the District of Columbia Real Estate Deed Recordation Tax Act, approved March 2, 1962 (D.C. Code. sec.
45–725).
The following sections of the Act of August 25, 1937:
Sect ion 9 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–1409).
Sect ion 11 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–1411).
The following sections of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate rents in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved December 2, 1941:
Section 7 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–1607).
Section 10 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–1610).
The following sections of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for unemployment compensation in the District of Columbia, authorize appropriations, and for other purposes”, approved August 28, 1935:
Section 3(c)(10) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 46–303
(c)(10)).
Section 4(e) of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 46–304 (e)).
Section 12 of such Act (I).C. Code, sec. 46–312).
Section 13(h) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 46–313(11)).
Section 13 of the Act of August 14, 1894 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–606).
The Act entitled “An Act to authorize reassessment for improvements and general taxes in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved April 24, 1896 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–721).
The first section of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for enforcing the lien of the District of Columbia upon real estate bid oil in its name when offered for sale for arrears of taxes and assessments, and for other purposes”, approved March 2, 1936 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1011).
Section 5 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (D.C. Code, sec. 47–1209).
The following sections of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, approved August 17, 1937:
Section 1 of title I of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1401).
Section 6 of title I of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1406).
Section 3 of article III of title V of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47–1618).
Section 29 of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act, approved July 26, 1939 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1529).
Section 3 of title XII of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947, approved July 16, 1947 (D.C. Code, sec. 47–1586b).
Section 145 of the District of Columbia Sales Tax Act, approved May 27, 1949 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2622).
Section 8 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the regulation of closing-out and fire sales in the District of Columbia”, approved September 1, 1959 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–3008).
Section 11 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (D.C. Code. sec. 48–211).
Section 2 of the Act of February 18, 1932 (D.C. Code. sec. 48–402).
The Act of February 26, 1907 (D.C. Code. sec. 45–707), is
amended to read as follows: “That the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia shall recopy such of the records in his office as may, in his judgment and that of a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia appointed for that purpose, need recopying in order to preserve the originals from destruction. The expense of such recopying may not in any fiscal year exceed $1,000 and such expense shall be certified by a judge of the Superior Court appointed for that purpose and audited by the General Accounting Office.”
Sec. 156. amendments redesignating district of columbia tax court
Section 303 of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1949 (D.C. Code. sec. 40–603–1) is amended by striking out
“Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 314 of the Act of March 2, 1962 (D.C. Code. sec. 45–734), is amended by striking out “District of Columbia Tax Court”
and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 5 of the Act entitled “An Act to define the real property exempt from taxation in the District, of Columbia,” approved December 24, 1942 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–801e), is amended by striking
out “Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Subsection (e) of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the taxation of rolling stock of railroad and other companies operated in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved
December 15, 1945 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1215(e)), is amended by striking out “Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sections 31 and 34 of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act, approved July 26, 1939 (D.C. Code. secs. 47–1531, 47–1534), are each amended by striking out “Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 11 of title XII and section 1 of title XV of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 (D.C. Code. secs.
61 Stat. 355, 359; 70 Stat. 78.
47–1586j, 47–1593) are each amended by striking out “Board or Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Sections 7 and 13 of title IX of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937 (D.C. Code. secs. 47–2407, 47–2412) are each amended by striking out “the Board” and inserting in lieu thereof “the Superior Court”.
All other laws of the United States applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia in force on the effective date of this Act in which reference is made to the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia or to the District of Columbia Tax Court are amended by substituting “Superior Court of the District of Columbia” for such reference.
Sec. 157. miscellaneous amendments relating to transfers of jurisdiction
Criminal Jurisdiction
Section 40 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of the healing art to protect the public health in the District of Columbia”, approved February 27, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec.
2–131), is amended by striking out “in the United States District Court for the District, of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “in the District of Columbia”.
Section 8 of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a Board of Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for the District of Columbia and to determine its functions, and for other purposes”, approved
July 15, 1932 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–2601), is amended by striking out “in any court of the United States”.
The Act entitled “An Act to provide for the treatment of sexual psychopaths in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved June 9, 1948, is amended as follows:
Section 201 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 22–3503) is amended—
by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
“(2) The term ‘court’ means a court in the District of Columbia having jurisdiction of criminal offenses or delinquent acts.”, and
by striking out “an offense in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia” in paragraph (4) and inserting in lieu thereof “a delinquent act”.
Section 202(a) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 22–3504) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 164A(f) of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (D.C. Code. sec. 33–416a(f)) is amended by striking out “United States branch of the municipal court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Settlement of Claims
The Act entitled “An Act authorizing the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to settle claims and suits against the District of Columbia”, approved February 11, 1929, is amended as follows:
The first section of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–902) is
amended by striking out “court of the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “courts in the District of Columbia”.
Section 2 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–903) is amended by
striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,” and inserting in lieu thereof “courts in the District of Columbia”,
Law Enforcement Council
Section 401(b) of the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953, approved June 29, 1953 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1901 (b)), is
amended by striking out paragraph (12) and by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (15) as paragraphs (12) through (14), respectively.
Real Property Actions
Section 1227 of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 45–912), is amended by striking out “, either in said United
States District Court for the District of Columbia or before a justice of the peace”.
Tort Claims
Paragraph (b) of section 2 of the District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–921) is amended to read
as follows:
“(b) ‘Court’ means the court in the District of Columbia having the necessary civil jurisdiction pursuant to section 11–501 or 11–921 of the District of Columbia Code.”
Ante, pp. 476, 484.
Damages to National Guard Property
Section 38 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the organization of the militia of the District of Columbia”, approved March 1, 1889 (D.C. Code. sec. 39–513), is amended by striking out “any justice
of the peace, with the right of appeal to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “the court in the District of Columbia having jurisdiction of the amount in controversy”.
Unclaimed Freight
Section 643 of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 44–102), is amended—
by striking out “United States District Court, for the District, of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”, and
by striking out the proviso.
Sec. 158. amendments reflecting transfer of probate jurisdiction
The Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia are amended as follows:
Section 416(b) of such Revised Statutes (D.C. Code. sec. 4–159) is amended—
by striking out “United States District Court, for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court, having probate jurisdiction”, and
by striking out “Probate Court” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 454 of such Revised Statutes (D. C. Code, sec. 29–514) is amended by striking out “United States District. Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
The Act entitled “An Act regulating admissions to the Institution of the Association for Works of Mercy in certain cases, and for other purposes”, approved October 12, 1888, is amended as follows:
The first section of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 32–101) is amended by striking out “the judge of the orphans’ court of the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “a judge of the court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 4 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 32–104) is amended by striking out “orphans’ court of the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
The Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901, is amended as follows:
Section 534 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–611) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 537 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–619) is amended by striking out “said United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “the court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 6(59 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 27–113) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 746 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 26–334) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
The District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937 is amended as follows:
Section 3 of article I of title V of such Act (D.C. (’ode, sec. 47–1603) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 5 of article I of title V of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1605) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 9 of article III of title V of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1624) is amended—
by striking out “United States District Court, for the District of Columbia” each place it occurs and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”, and
by striking out “said District Court” and inserting in lieu thereof “such court”.
Section 9 of the Act entitled “An Act to create a board for the condemnation of insanitary buildings in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved May 1, 1906 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–624), is
amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court, having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 5 of the Act entitled “An Act authorizing the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to settle claims and suits against the District of Columbia”, approved February 11, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec. 1–906), is amended by striking out “United States District Court
for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Section 2 of the Act of April 5, 1939 (D.C. Code. sec. 31–711),
is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having probate jurisdiction”.
Sec. 159. amendments relating to the jurisdiction of the family division
Section 5 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the mandatory reporting by physicians and institutions in the District of Columbia of certain physical abuse of children”, approved November 6, 1966 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–165), is amended by striking out “Juvenile
Court” both times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Section 4 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the care of dependent children in the District of Columbia and to create a board of children’s guardians”, approved July 26, 1892 (D.C. Code, sec. 3–116), is amended by striking out “police court or the criminal
court of the District” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
The first section of the Act entitled “An Act to enlarge the powers of the courts of the District of Columbia in cases involving delinquent children, and for other purposes”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 3–120), is amended by striking out “criminal and
police courts” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Section 405 of the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–106) is amended to read as follows:
67 Stat. 105; 68 Stat. 730; 77 Stat. 77.
“Sec. 405. “psychiatrist and psychologist
The Commissioner shall appoint a qualified psychiatrist and a qualified psychologist whose services shall be available to the following officers to assist them in carrying out their duties:
“(1) In criminal cases, the judges and probation officers of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the judges and Director of Social Services of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
“(2) The judges and such personnel assigned to the Family Division of the Superior Court as (he Chief Judge may designate.
“(3) Such officers of the Department of Corrections as the Director thereof shall designate.
“(4) The Board of Parole of the District.”
Section 927(a) of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–301), is amended by striking out “juvenile court” and
inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
The Act entitled “An Act to improve and extend, through reciprocal legislation, the enforcement of duties of support in the District of Columbia”, approved July 10, 1957, is amended as follows:
Section 2(d) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 30–302(d)j is amended by striking out “Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Section 22 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 30–322) is amended by striking out “civil branch of the municipal court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia in civil cases”.
Section 3 of article III of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for compulsory school attendance, for the taking of a school census in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved February
4, 1925 (D. C. Code, sec. 31–213), is amended by striking out “juvenile court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act for the protection of children in the District of Columbia and for other purposes”, approved
February 13, 1885 (D.C. Code, sec. 32–209), is amended—
by striking out “police court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”, and
by striking out the proviso at the end thereof.
Section 6 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the placing of children in family homes, and for other purposes”, approved April 22,
1944 (D.C. Code. sec. 32–786), is amended by striking out “Domestic Relations Branch of the Municipal Court” each time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
The Act entitled “An Act to regulate the employment of minors within the District of Columbia”, approved May 29, 1928, is amended as follows:
The third sentence of section 22 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 36–222) is amended by striking out “juvenile court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Section 26 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 36–228) is amended by striking out “juvenile court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Family Division of the Superior Court”.
Sec. 160. amendments relating to the chief medical examiner
The Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901, is amended as follows:
Section 683 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 27–125) is amended—
by striking out “coroner of said District” each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Chief Medical Examiner”, and
by striking out “Coroner” each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Chief Medical Examiner”.
Section 686 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 27–128) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 686.
This subchapter shall not be construed to (1) interfere with or prevent the disinterment of any body in accordance with section
Ante, p. 520.
11–2311 of the District of Columbia Code, or (2) interfere with the disposal of the ashes of bodies which have been cremated.”
Section 802(a) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 40–606) is amended by striking out the second paragraph.
Section 9 of the District of Columbia Tissue Bank Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–258) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 9. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner.—
(a) The Commissioner is authorized to appoint physicians to perform the functions of the Chief Medical Examiner, in accordance with chapter 23 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code.
Ante, p. 518.
“(b) The Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia may, in his discretion, allow tissue to be removed from any dead human body in his custody or under his jurisdiction. Such tissue removal shall not interfere with other functions of his Office. The person who, in accordance with section 2(b) of the District of Columbia Anatomical Gift. Act, is authorized to donate tissues from the body, shall first
Ante, p. 266.
authorize the tissue removal.”
Sec. 161. amendments relating to the revenue laws of the district of columbia
The District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937 is amended as follows:
Section 1 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2401) is
amended—
by striking out “The word ‘Board’, means the Board of Tax Appeals for the District, of Columbia created by this title.”, and
by striking out “The word ‘court’ shall mean the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” and inserting in lieu thereof “The word ‘court’ shall mean the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, unless the context indicates otherwise.”
Section 2 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2402) is
amended (A) by striking out the first four paragraphs, (B) by striking out “(a)”, and (C) by striking out the paragraph designated “(b)”.
Section 3 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2403) is
amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 3.
Any person aggrieved by any assessment by the District of any personal-property, inheritance, estate, business-privilege, gross-receipts, gross-earnings, insurance premiums, or motor-vehicle-fuel tax or taxes, or penalties thereon, may within six months after payment of the tax, together with penalties and interest assessed thereon, appeal from the assessment to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The mailing to the taxpayer of a statement of taxes due shall be considered notice of assessment, with respect to the taxes. The court shall hear and determine all questions arising on appeal and shall make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and shall render its decision in writing. The court may affirm, cancel, reduce, or increase tho assessment.”
Section 4 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2404) is
amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 4.
(a) Decisions of the Superior Court in civil tax cases are reviewable in the same manner as other decisions of the court in civil cases tried without a jury. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Superior Court with or without remanding the case for hearing.
“(b) The decision of the Superior Court, shall become final (1) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no petition is filed within that time; (2) upon the expiration of time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari if the decision of the Superior Court has been affirmed on appeal, the appeal has been dismissed, or no petition for certiorari has been filed; (3) upon denial of a peti-tion for certiorari if the decision of the Superior Court has been affirmed on appeal or the appeal has been dismissed; or (4) upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court, if that Court has affirmed the decision of the Superior Court or dismissed the petition for review.
“(c) If the Supreme Court directs that the decision of the Superior Court be modified or reversed, the decision rendered in accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate shall become final upon the expiration of thirty days from the time it was rendered unless within that time either the District or the taxpayer has instituted proceedings to have the decision corrected to accord with the mandate, in which event the decision of the Superior Court shall become final when so corrected.
“(d) If the decision of the Superior Court is modified or reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and if (1) the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired and no such petition has been filed, (2) the petition for certiorari has been denied, or (3) the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the decision of the Superior Court rendered in accordance with the mandate of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall become final upon the expiration of thirty days from the time the decision of the Superior Court was rendered, unless within that time either the District or the taxpayer has instituted proceedings to have the decision corrected so that it will accord with the mandate, in which event the decision of the Superior Court, shall become final when corrected.
“(e) If the Supreme Court orders a rehearing, or if the case is remanded by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for rehearing and if (1) the time allowed for filing of a petition for certiorari has expired and no petition has been filed; (2) the petition for certiorari has been denied; or (3) the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the decision of the Superior Court rendered upon such rehearing shall become final in the same manner as though no prior decision had been rendered.
“(f) As used in this section the term ‘mandate’, in case a mandate has been recalled prior to the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance, means the final mandate.”
Section 5 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. secs. 47–709, 47–710,
47–711, 47–712, 47–716, and 47–2405) is amended by striking out “ninety days” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “six months”.
Sections 6, 8, and 9 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. secs. 47–2406,47–2408, and 47–2409) are repealed.
Section 14 of title IX of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2413) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 14.
(a) Where there has been an overpayment of any tax, the amount of the overpayment shall be refunded to the taxpayer. No refund (other than inheritance and estate taxes) shall be allowed after two years from the date the tax is paid unless the taxpayer files a claim before the expiration of that period. The amount of refund of taxes (other than inheritance and estate taxes) shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the claim or. if no claim is filed, then the two years immediately preceding the allowance of the refund. No refund of inheritance and estate taxes shall be allowed after three years from the date the tax is paid unless the taxpayer files a claim before the expiration of that period The amount of refund of inheritance and estate taxes shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the three years immediately preceding the filing of the claim or, if no claim is filed, then during the three years immediately preceding the allowance of the refund. Every claim for refund must be in writing under oath, must state the specific grounds on which it is founded, and must be filed with the Commissioner. If the Commissioner disallows all or any part of the refund claim, he shall notify the taxpayer by registered or certified mail. After receiving notice of disallowance, if the claim is acted upon within six months of filing, or after the expiration of six months from the date of filing if the claim is not acted upon, the taxpayer may appeal as provided in sections 3 and 4 of this title. This subsection does not apply to real estate taxes and it does not apply to taxes imposed by the District of Columbia Income Tax Act, by the District of Columbia
D.C. Code 47–1501 note.
D.C. Code 47–1551 note.
D.C. Code 47–2601, 47–2701 notes.
Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947, or by titles I and II of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1949, refunds of which are otherwise provided by law.
“(b) In any proceeding under this title the Superior Court has jurisdiction to determine whether there has been any overpayment of tax and to order that any overpayment be credited or refunded to the taxpayer, if a timely refund claim has been filed.
“(c) Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, if it is determined by the Commissioner or by the Superior Court that there has been an overpayment of any tax, whether as a deficiency or otherwise, interest shall be allowed and paid on the overpayment at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from the date the overpayment was paid until the date of refund, but with respect to that part of any overpayment which was not assessed and paid as a deficiency or as additional tax interest shall be allowed and paid only from the date of filing a claim for refund or a petition to the Superior Court as the case may be.
“(d) For purposes of this section, any interest or penalties paid by the taxpayer in connection with an overpayment of tax shall be deemed to be a part of the overpayment of tax.”
Section 34 of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1534) is amended by striking out the last sentence.
Section 34 of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1534) is amended by striking out “ninety days” and inserting in lieu thereof “six months”.
The District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1949 is amended as follows:
Section fill of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2810) is amended
by striking out “, except for such violations as are felonies, and prosecutions for such violations as are felonies shall be by the United Stales attorney in and for the District of Columbia, or any of his assistants”.
Section 303 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 40–603–1) is amended—
by striking out the second sentence thereof, and
by striking out “ninety days” and inserting in lieu thereof “six months”.
Section 141 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2618) is amended
to read as follows—
“Sec. 141.
(a) Any vendor or purchaser aggrieved by a final determination of tax or denial of an application for refund of any tax may appeal to the Superior Court in the same manner and to the same extent as set forth in sections 3, 4, 7, 10 and 11 of title IX of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937.
Ante, pp. 579, 580.
D.C. Code 47–2407, 47–2410, 47–2411.
“(b) If it is determined by the Commissioner or by the Superior Court that any part of any tax which was assessed as a deficiency, and any interest thereon paid by the taxpayer, was an overpayment, interest shall be allowed and paid on the overpayment of tax at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from the date the overpayment was paid until the date of refund.”
The Act of March 2, 1962, is amended as follows:
Section 314 of such Act (D,C, Code, sec. 45–734) is amended—
by striking out subsection (b),and
by striking out “(a)”,
Section 320 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–740) is amended by striking out “, except for such violations as are felonies, and prosecution for such violations as are felonies shall be by the United states attorney in and for the District of Columbia, or any of his assistants”.
Section 4 of the Act entitled “An Act to designate parcels of land in the District of Columbia for purposes of assessment and taxation, and for other purposes”, approved February 23, 1905 (D.C. Code.
sec. 47–107), is amended by inserting after “clerk of the United States District Court, for the District of Columbia,” the following: “clerk of the Superior Court, of the Distinct of Columbia,”,
Paragraph 11 of section 6 of the Act of July 1, 1902 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1213), is repealed.
The Act entitled “An Act to amend the laws relating to assessment and collection of taxes in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved February 18, 1929, is amended as follows:
The first section of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1304) is amended by inserting after “shall be available also” in the second sentence thereof the following: “in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 2 of such Act (D.C. Code, sec. 47–1305) is amended by striking out “equity court” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Section 2 of title XV of the District, of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 (D.C. Code. sec. 41–1593a) is repealed.
Section 7 of the Act entitled “An Act to amend certain tax laws applicable to the District of Columbia”, approved July 10, 1952
(D.C. Code. sec. 47–2414), is repealed.
Section 1 of title XV of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–1593) is amended by striking out “ninety days” and inserting in lieu thereof “six months”.
Sec. 162. amendments to the district of columbia administrative procedure act
Section 11 of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–1510 is amended—
in the first sentence, by striking out “, except” and all that fol lows in that sentence and inserting in lieu thereof of period; and
by repealing the last sentence.
Sec. 163. additional amendments relating to administrative procedure
The second proviso of section 586d of the Act entitled
45 Stat. 1504; 63 Stat. 107; 80 Stat. 1430.
“An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 29–417), is amended by striking out “have the action of the said Board of Higher Education reviewed by the United States District. Court for the District of Columbia at an equity term thereof” and inserting in lieu thereof “appeal as provided in the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C.
Supra.
Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”.
Subsection (c) of section 137 of the District of Columbia Business
Corporation Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–948(c)) is amended to read as follows:
“(c) Appeals from all filial orders and judgments entered by the court under this section may be taken by either party to the proceeding within sixty days after service on the party of a copy of the order or judgment of the court.”
The first paragraph of section 28 of the Life Insurance Act, approved June 19, 1934 (D.C. Code. sec. 35–427) is amended by striking
out “from the ruling of the superintendent to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in equity” and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof “as provided by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Ante, p. 582.
Section 1210 of the District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, approved August 1, 1968 (D.C. Code. sec. 35–1709), is amended
by striking out “section 11–742 of the District of Columbia Code” and inserting in lieu thereof “the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”.
Subsection (b) of section 10 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for voluntary apprenticeship in the District of Columbia”, approved May 21, 1946 (D.C. Code. sec. 36–130(b)), is amended by
striking out the fourth sentence and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof “Any person aggrieved by the action of the Council may appeal as provided in the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Subsection (a) of section 9 of the Act of September 19, 1918 (D.C. Code. sec. 36–409), is amended by striking out the second sentence
and all that follows thereafter and inserting in lieu thereof “The review shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
The District of Columbia Traffic Act, 1925, is amended as follows:
Subsection (a) of section 13 (D.C. Code. sec. 40–302(a)) is
amended by striking out “sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code” and inserting in lien thereof “the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”.
Subsection (d) of section 6 (D.C. Code. sec. 40–603(d)) is
amended by striking out “and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Court of Appeals of the district for this purpose”.
The second paragraph of section 4 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, approved May 25, 1954 (D.C. Code. sec. 40–420), is amended by striking out the second
and succeeding sentences and inserting in lieu thereof “Appeal shall be as provided in the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure. Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Section 8 of the Act of March 4, 1913, is amended as follows:
Paragraph 50 of such section (D.C. Code, sec. 43–420) is
amended by striking out “circuit courts” and inserting in lieu thereof “the Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Paragraph 65 of such section (D.C. Code. sec. 43–705) is
amended by striking out the third subparagraph.
Paragraph 68 of such section (D.C. Code. sec. 43–708) is
Repeal.
repealed.
The Act entitled “An Act to provide for unemployment compensation in the District of Columbia, authorize appropriations, and for other purposes”, approved August 28, 1935, is amended as follows:
Section 3(c)(10) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 46–303(c)(10))
is amended by striking out the last sentence thereof.
Section 12 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 46–312) is amended by striking out “(a)” and by striking out subsection (b).
Sec. 164. amendments relating to review of administrative actions regarding occupations and professions
The Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of the healing art to protect the public health in the District of Columbia”, approved February 27, 1929, is amended as follows:
Section 38 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–129) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 38.
The Commission may refuse to license or to register any person for any cause that in the judgment of the Commission would authorize suspension or revocation of a license or registration under
Infra.
section 27 of this Act. Before the Commission refuses to lice, use or register any applicant for cause under this section, it shall give him an opportunity to be heard in person or by attorney and to produce witnesses in his behalf. Witnesses may be produced on behalf of the Commission and on behalf of any interested person. The attendance and testimony of witnesses may be compelled by subpena issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and that court is authorized to issue and enforce the subpenas on petition of the Commission. Any person failing or refusing, without just cause, to appear and testify in response to a subpena, or in any way obstructing the course on any hearing to which he has been subpenaed, is guilty of contempt of court and may be punished as other persons guilty of contempt of court are punished. Any member of the Commission may administer oaths at any hearing. Review of the Commission’s action may be had in accordance with the District of Columbia Administrative
Ante, p. 582.
Procedure Act (D. C. Code, secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Section 27 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–123) is amended to read as follows—
“Sec. 27.
Suspension or revocation by the Commission of any license issued or registration effected under this Act, with respect to a person guilty of misconduct or professionally incapacitated, shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. sec. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
The Act of July 2, 1940, is amended as follows:
Section 11 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–311) is amended—
by striking out all that precedes paragraph (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “The Board may revoke or suspend the license of any dentist in the District of Columbia upon proof satisfactory to the Board—”, and
by striking out “the said court” in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “the Board”.
The last sentence of section 25 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–325) is amended to read as follows: “The license of a dentist who permits a dental hygienist, operating under his supervision, to perform any operation other than that permitted under this section, may be suspended or revoked, and the license of the hygienist violating this Act may also be suspended or revoked, in accordance with section 12 of this Act.”
Section 12 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–312) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 12.
Suspension or revocation by the Board of any license issued or registration effected under this Act, with respect to a person guilty of misconduct or professionally incapacitated, shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
The Act entitled “An Act to amend the Act to regulate the practice of podiatry in the District of Columbia”, approved June 29, 1940, is amended as follows:
Section 7 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–707) is amended—
by striking out all that precedes paragraph (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “The Board may revoke or suspend the license of any podiatrist in the District of Columbia upon proof satisfactory to the Board—”, and
by striking out “the said court” in the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof “the Board”.
Section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–708) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 8.
Suspension or revocation by the Board of any license issued or registration effected under this Act, with respect to a person guilty of misconduct or professionally incapacitated, shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Ante, p. 582.
Section 6 of the Act entitled “An Act to define the term of ‘registered nurse’ and to provide for the registration of nurses in the District of Columbia”, approved February 9, 1907 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–407), is amended by striking out all after the first sentence and inserting
in lieu thereof “Suspension or revocation by the Nurses’ Examining Board of any license issued or registration effected under this Act, with respect to a person guilty of misconduct or professionally incapacitated, shall be governed by the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”
Section 7 of the Act of March 2, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–406),
is amended by striking out “sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305 (b), 17–306, and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code” and inserting in lieu thereof “the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code, secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”,
Section 4(d) of the District of Columbia Tissue Bank Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–253) is amended by striking out “, and may seek
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia” and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof a period.
The District of Columbia Practical Nurses’ Licensing Act is amended as follows:
Section 15 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–434) is amended by
striking out “, and may seek a review by the United States Court of Appeals” and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof a period.
Section 8(b) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–427) is amended by striking out “in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c), section 5 of the Act of April 1, 1942 (56 Stat. 193, ch. 207; sec. 11–756(c),D.C. Code, 1951 edition)”.
Section 14 of the Physical Therapists Practice Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–163) is amended by striking out “, and may seek a review by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia” and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof a period.
The third sentence of section 10 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in the District of Columbia”, approved February 1, 1907 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–810), is amended
by striking out “, as provided by section 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code”.
The second paragraph of section 10 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate barbers in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved June 7, 1938 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1110), is amended
by striking out “in the manner provided by sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306, and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code”.
The fourth paragraph of section 7 of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate the practice of pharmacy and the sale of poisons in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes”, approved May 7, 1906
(D.C. Code. sec. 2–606), is amended by striking out “, in the manner provided by sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Section 28 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the examination and registration of architects and to regulate the practice of architecture in the District of Columbia”, approved December 13,
1924 (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1028), is amended by striking out “, in the manner provided by sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305 (b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Section 7 (a) of the Act entitled “An Act to regulate and license pawnbrokers in the District of Columbia”, approved August 6, 1956
(D.C. Code. sec. 2–2007), is amended by striking out “in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c), section 5 of the Act of April 1, 1912 (56 Stat. 193, ch. 207; sec. 11–756(c), D.C. Code, 1951 edition)”.
Section 9 of the Professional Engineers Registration Act (D.C. Code. sec. 2–1809) is amended—
by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:
“(e) Any person aggrieved by the action of the Board may appeal as provided in the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure
Ante, p. 582.
Act (D.C. Code, secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510).”, and
by striking out subsections (f), (g), and (h).
Section 9 of the Act of August 25, 1937 (D.C. Code. sec. 45–1409), is amended by striking out “sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code” and inserting in lieu thereof “the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”.
Paragraph 42 of section 7 of the Act of July 1, 1902 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2101), is amended by striking out “sections 11–742, 17–303, 17–304, 17–305(b), 17–306 and 17–307 of the District of Columbia Code” and inserting in lieu thereof “the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (D.C. Code. secs. 1–1501 to 1–1510)”.
Sec. 165. amendments relating to enforcement of support
The Act of March 23, 1906 (D.C. Code. secs. 22–903, 22–904, 22–905), is repealed.
The proviso of so much of the first section of the Act of May 18, 1910, as appears under the heading “COURTS” and the subheading
“juvenile court” (D.C. Code. sec. 22–906) is repealed.
Subsection (c) of section 19 of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962 (D.C. Code. sec. 3–218) is repealed.
Section 6 of the Act entitled “An Act to improve and extend, through reciprocal legislation, the enforcement of duties of support in the District of Columbia”, approved July 10, 1957 (D.C. Code. sec.
30–306), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec 6.
Proceedings to enforce duties of support initiated by the District, of Columbia shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint irrespective of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Jurisdiction of all proceedings under this Act is vested in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia which shall have all power and authority heretofore vested in the Domestic Relations Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.”
Sec. 166. amendments relating to the condemnation of land
Section 2(b) of the District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act, approved June 12, 1934 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–104), is amended
by striking out “the Act entitled ‘An Act, to provide for the acquisition of land in the District of Columbia for the use of the United States’; approved March 1, 1929” and inserting in lieu thereof “chapter 13 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Ante, p. 557.
Section 5 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 (D.C. Code. sec. 5–704) is amended by striking out “the Act
entitled ‘An Act to provide for the acquisition of land in the District of Columbia for the use of the United States’, approved March 1, 1929 (45 Stat. 1415) or Acts which may amend or supplement said Act” and inserting in lieu thereof “chapter 13 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Section 1 of the Act of March 4, 1929 (D.C. Code. sec. 6–505),
is amended by striking out “Chapter XV of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “chapter 13 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Section 491d of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–205), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 491d.
After the return of the marshal and filing of proof of publication of the notice provided for in section 491c, the court shall order the selection of a condemnation jury as provided in section 16–1312 of the District of Columbia Code. The jury shall consist of five persons and each juror shall take an oath or affirmation that he is not interested in any manner in the land to be condemned, is not related to the parties interested therein, and will fairly and impartially ascertain the damages each owner of land to be taken may sustain by reason of the opening, extension, widening, or straightening of the street, avenue, road, or highway, and the condemnation of land needed for the purpose thereof, and to assess the benefits resulting therefrom as hereinafter provided.”
Section 491h of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–209), is amended by striking out “shall order the jury commission
to draw from the special box the names of as many persons as the court may direct, and from among the persons so drawn the court shall thereupon appoint” and inserting in lieu thereof “shall order the selection in accordance with section 491d of”.
Section 491m of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 7–214), is amended by striking out “court of appeals of the
District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Court, of Appeals”.
Section 3(a) of the Act entitled “An Act to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to acquire, operate, and regulate public off-street parking facilities, and for other purposes”, approved February 16, 1942 (D.C. Code. sec. 40–804 (a)), is amended by striking
out “sections 483 to 491, inclusive, of chapter XV, as amended, of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia, approved March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. 1265–1266)” and inserting in lieu thereof “chapter 13 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code”.
Sec. 167. amendments relating to landlord-tenant actions
The Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901, is amended as follows—
Section 1235 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–909) is amended to read as follows—
“Sec. 1235.
Whenever real and personal property are leased together, as, for example, a house with furniture contained therein, the landlord, either in an action of ejectment or in the summary proceeding for possession, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, may have a judgment for recovery of the personalty as well as the realty.”
Section 1225 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–910) is amended by striking out “or the landlord may bring an action to recover possession before a justice of the peace, as provided in chapter one, subchapter one, aforesaid”.
Section 1228 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 45–914) is repealed.
Sec. 168. amendments relating to actions by and against certain business
Public Utilities
The Act of March 4, 1913, is amended as follows:
Paragraph 64 of section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 43–704) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Court of Appeals”.
Paragraph 65 of section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 43–705) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District, of Columbia” each time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Court of Appeals”.
Paragraph 67 of section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 43–707) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Court of Appeals”.
Paragraph 94 of section 8 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 43–401) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “District of Columbia Court of Appeals”.
Section 11 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 43–502) is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court for the District of Columbia”.
Section 7 of the Act of April 22, 1904 (D.C. Code. sec. 43–1515), is amended by striking out “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “Superior Court of the District of Columbia”.
Business Corporations
The District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, approved June 8, 1954, is amended as follows:
Section 2(r) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–902(r)) is amended to read as follows:
“(r) ‘The court’, except where otherwise specified, means the court in the District of Columbia having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.”
Sections 81, 89, and 90 of such Act (D.C. Code. secs. 29–930e, 29–931a, 29–93lb) are each amended by striking out “United States
District Court for the District of Columbia” each time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “court”.
Section 137 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–948) is amended by
striking out “United States District Court for tire District of Columbia” each time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “court”.
The Act entitled “An Act to establish a. Code of laws for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901, is amended as follows:
Section 639d of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–240) is amended—
by striking out “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” the first time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “the court having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000”,
by striking out “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” the second time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “such court”, and
by striking out “said United States District Court for the District of Columbia” each time it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “such court”.
Sections 768, 782, and 786 of such Act (D.C. Code. secs. 29–701, 29–715, and 29–719) are each amended by striking out “United
States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000”.
The District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act is amended as follows:
Section 2(k) of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29~1002(k)) is
amended to read:
“(k) ‘The court’, except where otherwise specified, means the court in the District of Columbia having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.”
Section 55 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–1055) is amended
by striking out “The United States District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “The court”.
Section 94 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–1094) is amended
by striking out “the United States District Court for the District of Columbia” each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “the court”.
Insurance Companies
Section 20 of chapter II of the Life Insurance Act (D.C. Code. sec. 35–419) is amended by striking out “United States District Court
for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000”.
Section 5 of chapter II of the Fire and Casualty Act (D.C. Code. sec. 35–1308) is amended by striking out “United States District
Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court, having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000”.
Partnerships
Section 25 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (D.C. Code. sec. 41–425) is amended by striking out “United States
District Court for the District of Columbia” and inserting in lieu thereof “court having jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000”.
Sec. 169. amendments relating to illegal action by corporations
The Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901, is amended as follows:
Section 632 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–228) is amended by striking out “to the United States” and inserting in lieu thereof “to the District of Columbia”.
Section 786 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–719) is amended by striking out “in the name of the United States”.
Section “93 of such Act (D.C. Code. sec. 29–725) is amended by striking out “in the name of the United States”.
Sec. 170. amendment relating to hospitalization of addicts
Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the treatment of users of narcotics in the District of Columbia”, approved
June 24, 1953 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–602), is amended by striking out “Juvenile .Court Act of the District of Columbia, as amended” and inserting in lieu thereof “chapter 23 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code”,
Sec. 171. amendment relating to transfer of prisoners
So much of the first section of the Act of March 2, 1911, as relates to the workhouse (D.C. Code. sec. 24–403) is amended by inserting after “United States District Court for the District of Columbia” each time it appears the following: “, Superior Court of the District of Columbia,”.
Sec. 172. amendments to the united states code
Section 1257 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding after and below paragraph (3) the following new sentence: “For the purposes of this section, the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the. District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”
Chapter 133 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“§ 2113. Definition
“For purposes of this chapter, the terms ‘State court’, ‘State courts’, and ‘highest court of a State’ include the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”
The analysis of chapter 133 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Section 1869(f) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking out everything following “Canal Zone Code” and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: “except that for purposes of sections 1861, 1862, 1866(c), 1866(d), and 1867 of this chapter such terms shall include the Superior Court of the District of Columbia;”.
Chapter 85 of title 28 of the United States Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“§ 1363. Construction of references to laws of the United States or Acts of Congress
“For the purposes of this chapter, references to laws of the United States or Acts of Congress do not include laws applicable, exclusively to the District of Columbia.”
The analysis of chapter 85 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Chapter 89 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“§ 1451. Definitions
“For purposes of this chapter—
“(1) The term ‘State court’ includes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
“(2) The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia.”
The analysis of chapter 89 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Section 292 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—
by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; and
by adding after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) The chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit may, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to section 11–908(e) of the District of Columbia Code, designate and assign temporarily any district
Ante, p. 483.
judge of the circuit to serve as a judge of such Superior Court, if such assignment (1) is approved by the Attorney General of the United States following a determination by him to the effect that such assignment is necessary to meet the ends of justice, and (2) is approved by the chief judge of the United States District Court, for the District of Columbia.”
Section 5102(c)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
“(4) teachers, school officials, and employees of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia whose pay is fixed under chapter 15 of title 31, District of Columbia Code; the chief judges and the associate judges
69 Stat. 521; Ante, p. 358.
D.C. Code 31–1501 to 31–1548.
of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; and nonjudicial employees of the District of Columbia court system whose pay is fixed under title 11 of the District of Columbia Code;”.
Ante, p. 475.
Sec. 173. amendments relating to the district of columbia’s share of expenses of the federal courts
All outstanding and future obligations of the Commissioner of the District of Columbia with respect to the District of Columbia’s share of the cost of construction, operation, maintenance, and repair of the United States courthouse in the District of Columbia, as required by the Act of May 14, 1948 (62 Stat. 235), are canceled upon the effective date of this title.
Beginning on the effective date of this title, the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts shall reimburse to the United States from any funds in the Treasury to the credit of the District of Columbia courts the amount determined by the Administrator of General Services to be necessary to cover seventy-five per centum of the costs of operation, maintenance, and repair of space used by the United States attorney and the United States marshal for the District of Columbia.
Section 7 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–204), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 7.
(a) (1) Until the day before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall reimburse the United States for 60 per centum of the expenditures made on or before that day for the expenses of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that are described in paragraph (2). During the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date, the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts shall reimburse the United States for expenditures made during that period for such expenses at the following rates of reimbursement:
“(A) 40 per centum for the first eighteen months of such period.
“(B) 20 per centum for the remainder of such period.
“(2) The expenses referred to in paragraph (1) are fees of witnesses, fees of jurors, pay of bailiffs and criers (including salaries of deputy marshals who act as bailiffs or criers), and all other miscellaneous expenses of the United States District Court for the District, of Columbia.
“(b) Beginning after the thirty-month period referred to in subsection (a), the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts shall reimburse the United States for the District of Columbia’s share of the cost for jury selection and grand jury expenses, as determined by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Estimates of the District of Columbia’s share of such costs for each fiscal year shall be submitted to the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration of the District of Columbia courts for transmission with the annual estimate of the District of Columbia courts under section 11–1743 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code.
“(c) Reimbursement made under this section shall be made from funds in the Treasury to the credit of the District of Columbia.”
Section 6 of the Act of August 2, 1949 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–213), is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof “, until eighteen months after the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970”.
Until the day before the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall reimburse the United States for 30 per centum of the expenditures made on or before that day for the expenses of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. During the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date, the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia Courts shall reimburse the United States for expenditures made during that period for such expenses at the following rates of reimbursement:
20 per centum for the first eighteen months of such period.
10 per centum for the remainder of such period.
Not withstanding any other provision of law, no reimbursement for such ex [lenses shall be required after the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on such effective date.
Part E— Transition Provisions; Appointment of Addition in Judges; and Effective Date
Sec. 191. existing records, files, property, and funds
The files, records, property, and unexpended balances of appropriations and other funds of the former District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, and the District of Columbia Tax Court are transferred to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
The files, records, and property of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia with respect to its jurisdiction on the day before the effective date of this title under—
chapters 5, 7, 11, 13, and 15 of title 21, respectively of the
District of Columbia Code, as in effect on such day, shall be transferred to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia not later than forty-five days after the Superior Court takes jurisdiction under section 11–921 (a)(4) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in the revision made by part A of this title)
Ante, p. 484.
of actions or other matters brought under such chapters, as determined jointly by the chief judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Superior Court after consultation with the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts; and
section 11–522 of title 11 and chapter 29 of title 16 of the District of Columbia Code, as in effect on such day, shall be transferred
77 Stat. 482, 596.
to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia not later than forty-five days after the Superior Court takes jurisdiction under section 11–921(a)(5) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in the revision made by part A of this title) of actions or other matters brought under such provisions, as determined jointly by the chief judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Superior Court, after consultation with the Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts and the Register of Wills.
Sec. 192. existing personnel
The personnel of the former District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, and the District of Columbia Tax Court shall be transferred to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and shall, with respect to all rights, privileges, and benefits, be considered as continuous employees of that court without break in service.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), personnel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia who the Director of the Office of Management and Budget determines are, as a substantial part of their duties, performing functions incident to jurisdiction transferred under this title, to the Superior Court shall be entitled to transfer to the Superior Court and upon such transfer shall retain all of their rights, privileges, and benefits, and shall be considered as continuous employees of the Superior Court without break in service.
The individual holding the office of Register of Wills under the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on the day before the date the Superior Court takes jurisdiction of probate actions and related matters under section 11–921 (a)(5) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, shall continue in office as the Register of Wills under the Probate Division of the Superior Court until his successor has been selected by that court under section 11–2102 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this
Ante, p. 516.
title, and shall retain all of his rights, privileges, and benefits and shall be considered as a continuous employee of the Superior Court. If the individual serving as the Auditor of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is appointed to serve as the Auditor-Master of the Superior Court, he shall retain all of his rights, privileges, and benefits, and shall be considered as a continuous employee of the Superior Court without break in service.
Nothing in this title shall affect the status of persons in the competitive civil service on the date of enactment of this title, but such persons may be assigned within the District of Columbia court system without regard to such status.
Sec. 193. retirement of certain district of columbia judges
The person serving as judge of the District of Columbia Tax Court on the day prior to the effective date of this title may, within sixty days of such date, elect to retain retirement benefits under section 2 of title IX of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of
Ante, p. 579.
1937 (D.C. Code. sec. 47–2402), or relinquish such benefits and elect retirement benefits under chapter 15 of title 11 of the District of Columbia
Ante, p. 490.
Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this title.
Any judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, or the former District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals or Municipal Court, who had retired prior to the effective date of this subsection, may elect to have his retirement salary recomputed and paid in accordance with this subsection. Such election may be made in writing within sixty days after such effective date and shall be filed with the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
The retirement salary of each judge making such election shall be recomputed in accordance with applicable law then in effect at the time of his retirement, except that in the recomputation of such retirement salary, the salary of the corresponding judicial office on the day immediately following the effective date of this subsection shall be deemed to be the salary which such judge was receiving immediately prior to the date of his retirement.
Each judge who elects recomputation of his retirement salary in accordance with this subsection shall—
deposit in the District of Columbia Judicial Retirement and Survivors Annuity Fund an amount equal to 3½ per centum of his basic salary received for judicial service, with interest at 4 per centum per annum to December 31, 1947, and 3 per centum per annum thereafter, compounded on December 31 of each year; or
have his retirement salary, as recomputed in accordance with this subsection, reduced by 10 per centum of the amount of such deposit remaining unpaid.
The retirement salary of any judge which is recomputed in accordance with this subsection shall be payable only with respect to those months beginning on and after the first day of the first month following the date of the election made by such judge under this subsection.
Sec. 194. continuation of service of judges of district of columbia counts
A judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile, Court of the District of Columbia, or the District. of Columbia Tax Court who is serving as a judge of such a court on the day before the effective date of this title under an appointment made before such date shall on such date continue to serve as a judge of the Superior Court, of the District of Columbia. No amendment made by this title shall be construed to extend the term of any such judge appointed before the date of enactment of this title. No amendment made by this title shall be construed to extend the term of office of a judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals appointed before the date of enactment of this title. The chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in office on the day before the effective date of this title shall, on and after such date, continue in office as chief judge of that court: and, notwithstanding section 11–1503 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in the revision made by part A of this title), his term of office shall expire
Ante, p. 491.
at the time his term of office under his latest appointment as chief judge expires. The chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions in office on the day before the effective date of this title shall, on and after such date, serve as the chief judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and, notwithstanding section 11–1503 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in the revision made by part A of this title), his term of office as chief judge of that court shall expire at the time his term of office under his latest appointment as chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions would have expired but for the merger of that court into the Superior Court.
Sec. 195. appointment of additional judges and executive officer of district of columbia courts
The President of the United States shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, three additional judges to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals who shall have the qualifications prescribed by section 11–1501 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, and who shall, upon taking the oath required by law, enter into immediate service on that court. Subject to mandatory retirement at age 70 and to the provisions of subchapters II and III of chapter 15 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in such revision), the term of office of a judge appointed under this paragraph shall be 15 years. At the expiration of his term, such judge shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
The President of the United States shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, ten additional judges to the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions who shall have the qualifications prescribed by section 11–1501 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, and who shall, upon taking the oath required by law, enter into immediate service on that court. Subject to mandatory retirement at age 70 and to the provisions of subchapters II and III of chapter 15 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in such revision), the term of office of a judge appointed under this paragraph shall be 15 years. At the expiration of his term, such judge shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit a list of at least three qualified persons and a committee (consisting of (1) the chief judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions; (2) one associate judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals elected by the judges of that court; and (3) two associate judges of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions elected by the judges of that court) shall appoint from such list (and may remove), with the concurrence of the respective chief judges, an Executive Officer of the District of Columbia courts. Until the effective date of this title, the Executive Officer shall receive the same compensation as is prescribed for an associate judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. The Executive Officer in office on the effective date of this title, shall continue to serve in such office until removed or until his successor has been selected in accordance with subchapter I of chapter 17 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code,
Ante, p. 508.
as contained in the revision made by part A of this title.
Notwithstanding title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as in effect on the date of enactment of this title, in the case of any vacancy in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, or the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia occurring before the effective date of this title, a judge appointed after the date of enactment of this title to fill any such vacancy (1) shall have the qualifications prescribed in section 11–1501 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code as contained
Ante, p. 491.
in the revision made by part A, and (2) shall, subject to mandatory retirement at age seventy and to the provisions of subchapters it and III of chapter 15 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (as contained in such revision), have a term of office of 15 years. At the expiration of his term, such judge shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed and qualifies.
Sec. 196. temporary administration of juvenile court of the district of columbia and assignment of judges to that court
Notwithstanding the provisions of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as in effect on the date of enactment of this title, the chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions (1) shall without additional compensation be responsible for the administration of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this title and ending on the day before the effective date of this title; and (2) may during the same period assign judges of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions to serve as judges of the Juvenile Court.
Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 15 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code as in effect on the date of enactment of this title, the judge appointed to fill the vacancy in the office of chief judge of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia existing on that date shall serve as an associate judge of that court.
Sec. 197. assignment of united states judges to superior court during transition period
With respect to the assignments of district judges to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia under subsection (c) of section 292 of title 28, United States Code, as amended by section
Ante, p. 591.
172(e) of this Act, during the thirty-month period following the effective date of this title, the approval of the Attorney General of the United States shall not be required.
Sec. 198. references to abolished agencies and offices
Any reference in an amendment made by this title to an agency or office of the government of the District of Columbia abolished by Reorganization Plan Number 5 of 1952 (D.C. Code, title 1, App.) is not to be construed as a reestablishment of that office or
agency or as a change in the functions, powers, and duties of the Commissioner of the District of Columbia or of the District of Columbia Council.
Sec. 199. effective date
The effective date of this title (and the amendments made by this title) shall be the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the following provisions shall take effect as provided in the following paragraphs:
The provisions of chapter 25 (relating to attorneys) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, shall take effect on April ], 1972. The provisions
Ante, p. 520.
of chapter 21 (relating to attorney’s) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, in effect on the day Wore the effective date of this title, shall remain in effect until April 1, 1972; except that during the period beginning on the effective date of this title and ending April 1, 1972, section 11–2103 of such chapter is amended to read as
Ante, p. 516.
follows:
“§ 11–2103. Disbarment by District Court upon conviction of crime
“When a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.”
The provisions of chapter 21 (relating to the Register of Wills) of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, shall take effect immediately following the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the effective date of this title. The provisions of sections 11–504 through 11–506 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code (relating to the
Register of Wills), in effect on the day before the effective date of this title, shall remain in effect until the expiration of such thirty-month period. During such thirty-month period, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall fix the compensation of the Register of Wills without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5 of the United States Code, but at a rate not exceeding
80 Stat. 443, 467.
Ante, p. 198–1.
the maximum rate authorized for GS–16 of the General Schedule.
The amendments made by the following sections of this title (relating to those matters over which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia retains temporary jurisdiction) shall take effect as follows:
Immediately following the expiration of the eighteen-month period beginning on the effective date of this title in the case of amendments made by sections 150(b). 150(c)(1), 150(c)(3),
Ante, p. 567.
150(c)(5)(A)(ii), 150(e), 150(f), 150(g)(3)(A), 150(g)(4), 150(g)(5), 150(g)(8), 150(h), and 150(i)(1).
Immediately following the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on such date in the case of amendments made by sections 144(10), 145(b)(2), 145(k)(l), 145(1), 147(1), 148
Ante, p. 553.
(2), 149(2), 149(4), 149(6), and 150(a).
The amendments made by section 150 to chapter 5 of title 21 of the District of Columbia Code (relating to hospitalization of the mentally ill) shall not apply with respect to any case pending before the United State District Court for the District of Columbia or the Commission on Mental Health at the expiration of such eighteen-month period.
Section 146(a)(1) (relating to the repeal of certain review provisions) shall not apply with respect to any appeal from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals over which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has jurisdiction
Ante, p. 476.
under section 11–301 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code as in effect immediately before the date of enactment of this Act.
Section 11–722 of the District of Columbia Code, as contained in the revision made by part A of this title, shall take effect with respect to petitions filed after the effective date of this title for review of decisions or orders.
The amendments made by subpart 2 of part D of this title to section 8 of the Act of March 4, 1913, shall not apply with inspect to proceedings brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on or before the effective date of this title.
The amendments made by section 162 shall take effect with respect to petitions filed after the effective date of this title for review of decisions or orders.
Sections 195 and 196 shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
For purposes of this title and any amendment made by this title, the term “effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970” means the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE II— CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Sec. 201. sentencing of multiple offenders
Section 907 of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901
(D.C. Code. sec. 22–104), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 907.
(a) If any person—
“(1) is convicted of a criminal offense (other than a non-moving traffic offense) under a law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia, and
“(2) was previously convicted of a criminal offense under any law of the United States or of a State or territory of the United States which offense, at the time of the conviction referred to in paragraph (1), is the same as, constitutes, or necessarily includes, the offense referred to in that paragraph,
such person may be sentenced to pay a fine in an amount not more than one and one-half times the maximum fine prescribed for the conviction referred to in paragraph (1) and sentenced to imprisonment for a term not more than one and one-half times the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for that conviction. If such person was previously convicted more than once of an offense described in paragraph (2), he may be sentenced to pay a fine in an amount not more than three times the maximum fine prescribed for the conviction referred to in paragraph (1) and sentenced to imprisonment for a term not more than three times the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for that conviction. No conviction with respect to which a person has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall be taken into account in applying this section.
“(b) This section shall not apply in the event of conflict with any other provision of law which provides an increased penalty for a specific offense by reason of a prior conviction of the same or any other offense.”
Such Act is amended by adding after section 907 the following
Ante, p. 598.
new section:
“Sec. 907A.
(a) If—
“(1) any person (A) is convicted in the District of Columbia of a felony, and (B) before the commission of such felony, was convicted of at least two felonies; and
“(2) the court is of the opinion that the history and character of such person and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration or lifetime supervision, or both, will best serve the public interest,
the court may, in lieu of any sentence otherwise authorized for the felony referred to in clause (A) of paragraph (1), impose such greater sentence as it deems necessary, including imprisonment for the natural life of such person.
“(b) For purposes of paragraph (1) of subsection (a)—
“(1) a person shall be considered as having been convicted of a felony if he was convicted (A) of a felony in a court of the District of Columbia or of the United States, or (B) in any other jurisdiction of a crime classified as a felony under the laws of that jurisdiction or punishable by imprisonment for more than two years; and
“(2) a person shall be considered as having been convicted of two felonies if his initial sentencing under a conviction of one felony preceded the commission of the second felony for which he was convicted.
No conviction with respect to which a person has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall be taken into account in applying this section.”
Sec. 202. conspiracy
Such Act of March 3, 1901, is further amended by adding after section 908 the following new section:
D.C. Code 22–105.
“Sec. 908A.
(a) If two or more persons conspire either to commit a criminal offense or to defraud the District of Columbia or any court or agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that if the object of the conspiracy is a criminal offense punishable by less than five years, the maximum penalty for the conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum penalty provided for that offense.
“(b) No person may be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act is alleged and proved to have been committed by one of the conspirators pursuant to the conspiracy and to effect its purpose.
“(c) When the object of a conspiracy contrived within the District of Columbia is to engage in conduct in a jurisdiction outside the District of Columbia which would constitute a criminal offense under an Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia if performed therein, the conspiracy is a violation of this section if (1) such conduct would also constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein, or (2) such conduct would constitute a criminal offense under an Act of Congress exclusively applicable to the District of Columbia even if performed outside the District of Columbia.
“(d) A conspiracy contrived in another jurisdiction to engage in conduct within the District of Columbia which would constitute a criminal offense under an Act of Congress exclusively applicable to the District of Columbia if performed within the District of Columbia is a violation of this section when an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy is committed within the District of Columbia. Under such circumstances, it is immaterial and no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that the conduct which is the object of the conspiracy would not constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction.”
Sec. 203. breaking and entering vending machines and similar devices
Whoever in the District of Columbia breaks open, opens, or enters, without right, any parking meter, coin telephone, vending machine dispensing goods or services, money changer, or any other device designed to receive currency, with intent to carry away any part of such device or anything contained therein, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than three years, or to a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Sec. 204. penalty for rape
Section 808 of such Act of March 31, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2801), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 808.
Whoever has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will or whoever carnally knows and abuses a female child under sixteen years of age, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”
Sec. 205. committing crime of violence while armed
Section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act to control the possession, sale, transfer, and use of pistols and other dangerous weapons in the District of Columbia, to provide penalties, to prescribe rules of evidence, and for other purposes”, approved July 8, 1932
(D.C, Code, sec. 22–3202), is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 2.
(a) Any person who commits a crime of violence in the District of Columbia when armed with or having readily available any pistol or other firearm (or imitation thereof) or other dangerous or deadly weapon (including a sawed-off shotgun, shotgun, machinegun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher knife, switchblade knife, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false knuckles)—
“(1) may, if he is convicted for the first time of having so committed a crime of violence in the District of Columbia, be sentenced, in addition to the penalty provided for such crime, to a period of imprisonment which may be up to life imprisonment; and
“(2) shall, if he is convicted more than once of having so committed a crime of violence in the District of Columbia, be sentenced, in addition to the penalty provided for such crime, to a minimum period of imprisonment of not less than five years and a maximum period of imprisonment which may not be less than three tunes the minimum sentence imposed and which may be up to life imprisonment.
“(b) Where the maximum sentence imposed under this section is life imprisonment, the minimum sentence imposed under subsection (a) may not exceed fifteen years’ imprisonment.
“(c) Any person sentenced under subsection (a)(2) of this section may be released on parole in accordance with the Act of July 15, 1932 (chapter 2 of title 24 of the District of Columbia Code), at any time
47 Stat. 696; 54 Stat. 242; 61 Stat. 378.
D.C. Code 24–201a.
after having served the minimum sentence imposed under that subsection.
“(d) (1) Chapter 402 of title 18 of the United States Code (Federal Youth Corrections Act) shall not apply with respect to any person
sentenced under paragraph (2) of subsection (a).
“(2) The execution or imposition of any term of imprisonment imposed under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) may not be suspended and probation may not be granted.
“(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as reducing any sentence otherwise imposed or authorized to be imposed.
“(f) No conviction with respect to which a person has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall be taken into account in applying this section.”
Section 13 of such Act is amended by striking out “This” and
D.C. Code 22–3213.
inserting in lieu thereof the following: “Except as provided in section 2 and section 14 (b) of this Act, this”.
Sec. 206. resisting arrest
Subsection (a) of section 432 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. sec. 22–505(a)) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following: “It is neither justifiable nor excusable cause for a person to use force to resist an arrest, when such arrest is made by an individual he has reason to believe is a law enforcement officer, whether or not such arrest is lawful.”
Sec. 207. insane criminals
Section 927 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–3(4), is amended—
by striking out “(a) Whenever a person is arrested” and all that follows down through “is mentally incompetent” in the first sentence of subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
“(a) If it appears to a court having jurisdiction of—
“(1) a person arrested or indicted for, or charged by information with, an offense, or
“(2) a child subject to a transfer motion in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to section 16–2307 of the District of Columbia Code,
Ante, . 527.
that, from the court’s own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted to it and prior to the imposition of sentence, the expiration of any period of probation, or the hearing on the transfer motion, as the case may be, such person or child (hereafter in this subsection and subsection (b) referred to as the ‘accused’) is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent”;
by striking out the period at the end of the second sentence of subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof “or to participate in transfer proceedings.”;
by inserting after “stand trial” in the third sentence of subsection (a) “or to participate in transfer proceedings”;
by inserting after “stand trial” in both places it appears hi subsection (b) “or to participate in transfer proceedings”;
by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
“(d) (1) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e).
“(2) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release from custody. At the conclusion of the criminal action referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court shall provide such person with representation by counsel—
“(A) in the case of a person who is eligible to have counsel appointed by the court, by continuing any appointment of counsel made to represent such person in the prior criminal action or by appointing new counsel; or
“(B) in the case of a person who is not eligible to have counsel appointed by the court, by assuring representation by retained counsel.
If the hearing is not waived, the court, shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate.
“(3) An appeal may be taken from an order entered under paragraph (2) to the court having jurisdiction to review final judgments of the court entering the order.”;
by adding at the end of subsection (i) the following sentence: “No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that be was insane at the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence.”; and
by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
“(k) (1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of his release, or to grant other relief.
“(2) A motion for relief may be made at any time after a hearing has been held or waived pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of this section.
“(3) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the person is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional Or unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate.
“(4) A court may entertain and determine the motion without requiring the production of the persons at the hearing.
“(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for relief under this section more often than once every six months. A court for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more often than once every six months.
“(6) An appeal may be taken from an order entered under this section to the court having jurisdiction to review final judgments of the court entering the order.
“(7) An application for habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court, having jurisdiction to entertain a motion pursuant to this section, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention.”
Sec. 208. narcotic drugs
Section 23 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (D.C. Code. sec. 33–123) is amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 23.
(a) Except as hereinafter provided, a person violating any provision of this Act, or any regulation made by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia Council under authority of this Act, for which no specific penalty is otherwise provided, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
“(b) A person convicted of an offense punishable pursuant to this section, who shall have previously been convicted in the District of Columbia of such an offense, or who shall have previously been convicted, either hi the District of Columbia or elsewhere, of a violation of the laws of the United States or of a State or subdivision thereof which would have been a violation of this Act and punishable pursuant to this section if committed in the District of Columbia and prosecuted pursuant to this Act, shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both.
“(c) For additional penalities for two or more violations of this Act, see sections 907 and 907A of the Act of March 3, 1901 (as amended by title II of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970).”
Ante, p. 598.
Sec. 209. explosive devices
The Act entitled “An Act to control the possession, sale, transfer, and use of pistols and other dangerous weapons in the District of Columbia, to provide penalties, to prescribe rules of evidence, and for other purposes”, approved July 8, 1932 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–3201 et seq.), is amended by adding after section 15 (D.C. Code. sec.
22–3215) the following new section:
“Sec. 15A “molotov cocktails and other explosive devices
(a) No person shall within the District of Columbia manufacture, transfer, use, possess, or transport a molotov cocktail. As
Definition.
used in this subsection, the term ‘molotov cocktail’ means (1) a breakable container containing flammable liquid and having a wick or a similar device capable of being ignited, or (2) any other device designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion upon impact; but such term does not include a device lawfully and commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination, construction work, or other lawful purpose.
“(b) No person shall manufacture, transfer, use, possess, or transport any device, instrument, or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion, with the intent that the same may be used unlawfully against any person or property.
“(c) No person shall, during a state of emergency in the District of Columbia declared by the Commissioner pursuant to law. or during a situation in the District of Columbia concerning which the President has invoked any provision of chapter 15 of title 10, United
70A Stat. 15; 82 Stat. 841.
10 USC 331–336.
States Code, manufacture, transfer, use, possess, or transport any device. instrument, or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion, except at his residence or place of business.
“(d) Whoever violates this section shall (1) for the first offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one and not more than five years, (2) for the second offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than three and not more than fifteen years, and (3) for the third or subsequent offense, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years and of any term of year’s up to life imprisonment. In the case of a person convinced of a third or subsequent violation of this section, chapter 402 of title 18,
64 Stat. 1086; 81 Stat. 741.
18 USC 5005–5026.
United States Code (Federal Youth Corrections Act) shall not apply.”
Sec. 210. codification of title 23 of district of columbia code
The general and permanent laws of the District of Columbia relating to criminal procedure are revised, codified, and enacted as title 23 of the District of Columbia Code, “Criminal Procedure”, and may be cited “D.C. Code. sec.”, as follows:
“TITLE 23— CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
“Chapter 1— GENERAL PROVISIONS
“§ 23–101. Conduct of prosecutions
“(a) Prosecutions for violations of all police or municipal ordinances or regulations and for violations of all penal statutes in the nature of police or municipal regulations, where the maximum punishment is a fine only, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia or his assistants, except as otherwise provided in such ordinance, regulation, or statute, or in this section.
“(b) Prosecutions for violations of section 6 of the Act of July 29, 1892 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–1107), relating to disorderly conduct, and for
violations of section 9 of that Act (D.C. Code. sec. 22–1112), relating to lewd, indecent, or obscene acts, shall be conducted in the name of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel or his assistants.
“(c) All other criminal prosecutions shall be conducted in the name of the United States by the United States attorney for the District of Columbia or his assistants, except as otherwise provided by law.
“(d) An indictment or information brought, in the name of the United States may include, in addition to offenses prosecutable by the United States, offenses prosecutable by the District of Columbia, and such prosecution may be conducted either solely by the Corporation Counsel or his assistants or solely by the United States attorney or his assistants if the other prosecuting authority consents.
“(e) Separate indictments or informations, or both, charging offenses prosecutable by the District of Columbia and by the United States may be joined for trial if the offenses charged therein could have been joined in the same indictment. Such prosecution may be conducted either solely by the Corporation Counsel or his assistants or solely by the United States attorney or his assistants if the other prosecuting authority consents.
“(f) If in any case any question shall arise as to whether, under this section, the prosecution should be conducted by the Corporation Counsel or by the United States attorney, the presiding judge shall forthwith, either on his own motion or upon suggestion of the Corporation Counsel or the United States attorney, certify the case to the District, of Columbia Court of Appeals, which court shall hear and determine the question in a summary way. In every such case the defendant or defendants shall have the right to be heard in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The decision of such court shall be final.
“§ 23–102. Abandonment of prosecution; enlargement of time for taking action
“If any person charged with a criminal offense shall have been committed or held to bail to await the action of the grand jury and within nine months thereafter the grand jury shall not have taken action on the case, either by ignoring the charge or by returning an indictment, the prosecution of such charge shall be deemed to have been abandoned and the accused shall be set free or his bail discharged, as the case may lie: but, the court having jurisdiction to try the offense for which the person has been committed, when practicable and upon good cause shown in writing and upon due notice to the accused, may from time to time enlarge the time for the taking action in such case by the grand jury.
“§ 23–103. Statements prior to sentence
“Before imposing sentence the court may disclose to the defendant’s counsel and to the prosecuting attorney, but not to one and not the other, all or part of any presentencing report submitted to the court in the case. The court also prior to imposing sentence shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. At anytime when the defendant or his counsel addresses the court on the sentence to be imposed, the prosecuting attorney shall, if he wishes, have an equivalent opportunity to address the court and to make a recommendation to the court, on the sentence to be imposed and to present information in support of bis recommendation, Such information as the defendant or his counsel or the prosecuting attorney may present shall at all times be subject to the applicable rules of mutual discovery.
“§ 23–104. Appeals by United States and District of Columbia
“(a) (1) The United States or the District of Columbia may appeal an order, entered before the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense, which directs the return of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial, if the United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant.
“(2) A motion for return of seized property or to suppress evidence shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion.
“(b) The United States or the District of Columbia may appeal a ruling made during the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense which suppresses or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence on the ground that it was invalidly obtained, if the United States attorney or the Corporal ion Counsel conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the judge who made the ruling that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge being tried against the defendant. The trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal shall be resolved; except that, if the decision on appeal has not been rendered within the ninety-six-hour period following the adjournment of the trial, the trial shall resume on the next day of regular court business following the expiration of the ninety-six-hour period, and the appeal shall be deemed void and without effect.
“(c) The United States or the District of Columbia may appeal an order dismissing an indictment or information or otherwise terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant or defendants as to one or more counts thereof, except where there is an acquittal on the merits.
“(d) The United States or the District of Columbia may appeal any other ruling made during the trial of a person charged with an offense which the United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel certifies as involving a substantial and recurring question of law which requires appellate resolution. Such an appeal may be taken only during the trial and only with leave of the court. The trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal shall be resolved; except that, if the decision on appeal has not been rendered within the ninety-six-hour period following the adjournment of the trial, the trial shall resume on the next day of regular court business following the expiration of the ninety-six-hour period, and the appeal shall be deemed void and without effect.
“(e) Any appeal taken pursuant to this section either before or during trial shall be expedited. If an appeal is taken pursuant to subsection (b) or (d) during trial, the appellate court shall hear argument on such appeal within forty-eight hours of the adjournment of the trial pursuant to that subsection, shall dispense with any requirement of written briefs other than the supporting materials previously submitted to the trial court, shall render its decision within forty-eight ]lours of argument on appeal, and may dispense with the issuance of a written opinion in rendering its decision. Such appeal and decision shall not affect the right of the defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a judgment of conviction, to claim as error reversal by the trial court on remand of a ruling appealed from during trial.
“(f) Pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken pursuant to this section, the defendant shall be detained or released in accordance with chapter 13 of this title.
Post, p, 639.
“§ 23–105. Challenges to jurors
“(a) In a trial for an offense punishable by death, each side is entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. In a trial for an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, each side is entitled to ten peremptory challenges. In all other criminal cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, or if a case is prosecuted both by the United States and by the District of Columbia, the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly, but in no event shall one side be entitled to more peremptory challenges than the other.
“(b) The court may direct that jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. In addition to those otherwise allowed, each side is entitled to one peremptory challenge if one or two alternate jurors are to be impaneled, to two peremptory challenges if three or four alternate juror’s are to be impaneled, and to three peremptory challenges if five or six alternate jurors are to be impaneled.
“(c) Any juror or alternate juror may be challenged for cause.
“(d) No verdict shall be set aside for any cause which might be alleged as ground for challenge of a juror before the jury is sworn, except when the objection to the juror is that he had a bias against the defendant such as would have disqualified him, such disqualification was not known to or suspected by the defendant or his counsel before the juror was sworn, and the basis for such disqualification was the subject of examination or request for examination of the prospective jurors by or on request of the defendant.
“§ 23–106. Witnesses for defense; fees
“The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued for service upon a named witness on behalf of a defendant if the defendant makes an application for such an order and makes a satisfactory showing that he is financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. If the court orders the subpoena to be issued the costs incurred by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed shall be paid in the same manner in which similar costs and fees are paid in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the prosecuting authority.
“§ 23–107. Discharge or acquittal of joint defendant during trial in order to be witness
“(a) When two or more persons are jointly indicted or charged by information, or charged by separate indictments or informations which have been joined for trial, the court may, with the consent of the prosecuting authority, direct that a defendant who has not gone into his defense be discharged so that he may be a witness for the prosecution.
“(b) When two or more persons are jointly tried, a person desiring that another defendant testify on his behalf may request a judgment of acquittal on behalf of such defendant, which the court shall consider in the same manner as a motion made by such defendant.
“(c) At the request of a defendant who wishes to testify on behalf of another person with whom he is jointly tried, if the evidence against such defendant is sufficient to be submitted to the jury and if such other person consents, the court may submit the case concerning such defendant to the jury separately so that his testimony may not be considered against him by such jury.
“(d) A discharge granted pursuant to subsection (a), or an acquittal secured pursuant to subsection (b) or (c), shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense of the defendant so discharged or acquitted.
“§ 23–108. Depositions
“(a) If a material witness for either the prosecution or the defendant resides more than twenty-five miles from the place of holding court, is sick or infirm, or is about to leave the District of Columbia, and the prosecution or the defendant applies in writing to the court for a commission to examine such witness, the court may grant the commission and enter an order stating for what length of time notice shall be given to the other party before such witness shall be examined. At or before the time fixed in the notice, when the examination is upon written interrogatories, the other party may file crossinterrogatories. When the examination is conducted orally, the other party may cross-examine the deponent. If the other party fails to file written interrogatories or fails to attend an oral examination, the clerk shall file the following interrogatories:
“‘(1)
Are all your statements in the foregoing answers made from your own personal knowledge? If not, show what is stated upon information and give its source.
“‘(2)
State everything you know in addition to what is stated in your above answers concerning this case favorable to either the prosecution or the defendant.’
“(b) The court may order in any case that the examination be conducted orally.
“(c) The commission shall issue from the clerk’s office, the examination of the witnesses shall be made and certified, and the return thereof made in the same manner as in civil cases, and unimportant irregularities or errors in the proceedings under the commission shall not cause the deposition to be excluded where no substantial prejudice can be wrought to the prosecution or the defendant by such irregularities or errors.
“(d) Copies of the depositions or answers to interrogatories shall be made available to all of the parties upon the completion of the examination.
“§ 23–109. Powers of investigators assigned to United States attorney
“Any special investigator appointed by the Attorney General and assigned to the United States attorney for the District shall have authority to execute all lawful writs, process, and orders issued under authority of the United States, and command all necessary assistance to execute his duties, and shall have the same powers to make arrests as are possessed by members of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–110. Remedies on motion attacking sentence
“(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
“(b) A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
“(c) Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the, court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that (1) the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, (2) the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, (3) there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner, resentence him, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, as may appear appropriate.
“(d) A court may entertain and determine the motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
“(e) The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
“(f) An appeal may be taken to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
“(g) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that (he Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
“§ 23–111. Proceedings to establish previous convictions
“(a) (1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under the laws of the District of Columbia shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more previous convictions, unless prior to trial or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel, as the case may be, files an information with the clerk of the court, and serves a copj’ of such information on the person or counsel for the person, stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon a showing by the Government that facts regarding previous convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of a plea of guilty, the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts. Clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.
“(2) An information may not be filed under this section if the increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in excess of three years, unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed.
“(b) If the prosecutor files an information under this section, the court shall, after conviction but before pronouncement of sentence, inquire of the person with respect to whom the information was filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the information, and shall inform him that any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.
“(c) (1) If the person denies any allegation of the information of previous conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written response to the information. A copy of the response shall be served upon the prosecutor. The court shall hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which would except the person from increased punishment. The failure of the Government to include in the information the complete criminal record of the person or any facts in addition to the convictions to be relied upon shall not constitute grounds for invalidating the notice given in the information required by subsection (a)(1). The hearing shall be before the court without a jury and either party may introduce evidence. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the prosecuting authority shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact. At the request of either party, the court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
“(2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised by the response. Any challenge to a previous conviction, not raised by response to the information be fore an increased sentence is imposed in reliance thereon, shall be waived unless good cause be shown for failure to make a timely challenge.
“(d) (1) If the person files no response to the information, or if the court determines, after hearing, that the person is subject to increased punishment by reason of previous convictions, the court shall proceed to impose sentence upon him as provided by law.
“(2) If the court determines that the person has not been convicted as alleged in the information, that a conviction alleged in the information is invalid, or that the person is otherwise not subject to an increased sentence as a matter of law, the court shall, at the request of the prosecutor, postpone sentence to allow an appeal from that determination. If no such request is made, the court shall impose sentence as provided by law. The person may appeal from an order postponing sentence as if sentence had been pronounced and a final judgment of convict ion entered.
“§ 23–112. Consecutive and concurrent sentences
“A sentence imposed on a person for conviction of an offense shall, unless the court imposing such sentence expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively to any other sentence imposed on such person for conviction of an offense, whether or not the offense (1) arises out of another transaction, or (2) arises out of the same transaction and requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
“Chapter 3.— INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATIONS
“SUBCHAPTER I— GENERAL PROVISIONS
“§ 23–301. Prosecution by indictment or information
“An offense prosecuted in the Superior Court which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment returned by a grand jury. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year shall be prosecuted by indictment, but it may be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives in open court prosecution by indictment. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An information subscribed by the proper prosecuting officer may be filed without leave of court.
“SUBCHAPTER II— JOINDER
“§ 23–311. Joinder of offenses and of defendants
“(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
“(b) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information as provided in subsection (a) even though one or more is in violation of the laws of the United States and another is in violation of the laws applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia and may be prosecuted as provided in section 11–502(3).
Ante, p. 477.
“(c) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transact ions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
“§ 23–312. Joinder of indictments or informations for trial
“The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as it the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
“§ 23–313. Relief from prejudicial joinder
“If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government. to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
“§ 23–314. Joinder of inconsistent offenses concerning the same property
“An indictment or information may contain a count for larceny, a count for obtaining the same property by false pretenses, a count for embezzlement thereof, and a count for receiving or concealing the same property, knowing it to be stolen or embezzled, or any of such counts, and the jury may convict of any of such offenses, and may find any or all of the person’s indicted guilty of any of said offenses.
“SUBCHAPTER III— SUFFICIENCY
“§ 23–321. Description of money
“In every indictment or information, except for forgery, in which it is necessary to make an averment as to any money or bank bill or notes, United States Treasury notes, postal and fractional currency, or other bills, bonds, or notes, issued by lawful authority and intended to pass and calculate as money, it shall be sufficient to describe such money, bills, notes, currency, or bonds simply as money, without specifying any particular coin, note, bill, or bond; and such allegation snail be sustained by proof that the accused has stolen or embezzled any amount of coin, or any such note, bill, currency, or bond, although the particular amount or species of such coin, note, bill, currency, or bond be not proved.
“§ 23–322. Intent to defraud
“In an indictment or information in which it is necessary to allege an intent to defraud, it shall be sufficient to allege that the party accused did the act complained of with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person or body corporate. On the trial of such an indictment or information it shall not be necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove a general intent to defraud.
“§ 23–323. Perjury
“In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify the matter or matters wherein the perjury or perjuries is or are assigned; without setting forth the bill, answer, information, indictment, declaration, or any part of any record of proceeding either in law or equity, other than as aforesaid; and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court, or person or persons before whom the perjury was committed; any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
“§ 23–324. Subordination of perjury
“In every information or indictment for subornation of perjury, or for corrupt bargaining or contracting with others to commit perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, without setting forth the bill, answer, information, indictment, declaration, or any part of any record or proceeding either in law or equity, and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court, or person or persons before whom the perjury was committed, or was agreed or promised to be committed, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
“Chapter 5.— WARRANTS AND ARRESTS
“SUBCHAPTER I— DEFINITIONS
“§ 23–501. Definitions
“As used in subchapters II, IV, and V of this chapter—
“(1) The term ‘judicial officer means a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or a United States commissioner or magistrate for the District of Columbia.
“(2) The term ‘law enforcement officer’ means an officer or member of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia or of any other police force operating in the District of Columbia, or an investigative officer or agent of the United States.
“(3) The term ‘prosecutor’ means the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia or his assistant, the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia or his assistant, or an attorney employed by, and who has entered an appearance on behalf of, the United States or the District of Columbia in a criminal case or in an investigation being conducted by a grand jury.
“SUBCHAPTER II— SEARCH WARRANTS
“§ 23–521. Nature and issuance of search warrants
“(a) Under circumstances described in this subehapter, a judicial officer may issue a search warrant upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecutor. A warrant may authorize a search to be conducted anywhere in the District of Columbia and may be executed pursuant to its terms.
“(b) A search warrant may direct a search of any or all of the following:
“(1) one or more designated or described places or premises;
“(2) one or more designated or described vehicles;
“(3) one or more designated or described physical objects; or
“(4) designated persons.
“(c) A search warrant may direct the seizure of designated property or kinds of property, and the seizure may include, to such extent as is reasonable under all the circumstances, taking physical or other impressions, or performing chemical, scientific, or other tests or experiments of, from, or upon designated premises, vehicles, or objects.
“(d) Property is subject to seizure pursuant to a search warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it—
“(1) is stolen or embezzled;
“(2) is contraband or otherwise illegally possessed;
“(3) has been used or is possessed tor the purpose of being used, or is designed or intended to be used, to commit or conceal the commission of a criminal offense; or
“(4) constitutes evidence of or tends to demonstrate the commission of an offense or the identity of a person participating in the commission of an offense.
“(e) A search warrant may be addressed to a specific law enforcement officer or to any classification of officers of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia or other agency authorized to make arrests or execute process in the District of Columbia.
“(f) A search warrant shall contain—
“(1) the name of the issuing court, the name and signature of the issuing judicial officer, and the date of issuance;
“(2) if the warrant is addressed to a specific officer, the name of that officer, otherwise, the classifications of officers to whom the warrant is addressed;
“(3) a designation of the premises, vehicles, objects, or persons to be searched, sufficient for certainty of identification;
“(4) a description of the property whose seizure is the object of the warrant;
“(5) a direction that the warrant he executed during the hours of daylight or, where the judicial officer has found cause therefor, including one of the grounds set forth in section 23–522 (c)(1), an authorization for execution at any time of day or night;
“(6) where the judicial officer has found cause therefor, including one of the grounds set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (D) of section 23–591 (c)(2), an authorization that the executing officer may break and enter the dwelling house or other building or vehicles to be searched without giving notice of his identity and purpose; and
“(7) a direction that, the warrant and an inventory of any property seized pursuant thereto be returned to the court on the next court day after its execution.
“§ 23–522. Applications for search warrants
“(a) Each application for a search warrant shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judicial officer.
“(b) Each application shall include—
“(1) the name and title of the applicant;
“(2) a statement that there is probable cause, to believe that property of a kind or character described in section 23–521 (d) is likely to be found in a designated premise, in a designated vehicle or object, or upon designated persons;
“(3) allegations of fact supporting such statement; and
“(4) a request that the judicial officer issue a search warrant directing a search for and seizure of the property in question.
The applicant may also submit depositions or affidavits of other persons containing allegations of fact supporting or tending to support those contained in the application.
“(c) The application may also contain—
“(1) a request that the search warrant be made executable at any hour of the day or night, upon the ground that there is probable cause to believe that (A) it cannot be executed during the hours of daylight, (B) the property sought is likely to be removed or destroyed if not seized forthwith, or (C) the property sought is not likely to be found except at certain times or in certain circumstances; and
“(2) a request that the search warrant authorize the executing officer to break and enter dwelling houses or other buildings or vehicles to be searched without giving notice of his identity and purpose, upon probable cause to believe that one of the conditions set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (D) of section 23–591 (c)(2) is likely to exist at the time and place at which such warrant
Post, p. 630.
is to be executed.
Any request made pursuant to this subsection must be accompanied and supported by allegations of fact supporting such request.
“§ 23–523. Time of execution of search warrants
“(a) A search warrant shall not be executed more than ten days after the date of issuance and shall be returned to the court after its execution or expiration in accordance with section 23–521 (f)(7).
“(b) A search warrant may be executed on any day of the week and, in the absence of express authorization in the warrant pursuant to section 23–521 (f)(5), shall be executed only during the hours of daylight.
“§ 23–524. Execution of search warrants
“(a) An officer executing a warrant directing a search of a dwelling house or other building or a vehicle shall execute such warrant in accordance with section 23–591.
“(b) An officer executing a warrant directing a search of a person shall give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of his identity and purpose to the person, and, if such person thereafter resists or refuses to permit the search, such person shall be subject to arrest by such officer pursuant to section 23–581 (a) for violation of section 432 of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia (D.C. Code, sec. 22–505)(resisting a police officer) or other applicable provision of law.
“(c) (1) An officer or agent executing a search warrant shall write and subscribe an inventory setting forth the time of the execution of the search warrant, and the property seized under it.
“(2) If the search is of a person, a copy of the warrant and of the return shall be given to that person.
“(3) If the search is of a place, vehicle, or object, a copy of the warrant and of the return shall be given to the owner thereof if he is present, or if he is not, to an occupant, custodian, or other person present; or if no person is present, the officer shall post a copy of the warrant and of the return upon the premises, vehicle, or object searched.
“(d) A copy of the warrant shall be filed with the court whose judge or magistrate authorized its issuance on the next court day after its execution, together with a copy of the return.
“(e) An officer or agent executing a search warrant may seize any property discovered in the course of the lawful execution oi such warrant if be has probable cause to believe that, such property is subject to seizure under section 23–521 (d), even if the property is not enumerated in the warrant or the application therefor, and no additional warrant shall be required to authorize such seizure, if the property is fully set forth in the return. Such seizure may include taking physical or oilier impressions or performing chemical, scientific, or other tests or experiments.
“(f) An officer or agent executing a search warrant may take photographs and measurements during the execution.
“(g) An officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises or a vehicle may search any person therein (1) to the extent reasonably necessary to protect himself or others from the use of any weapon which may be concealed upon the person, or (2) to the extent reasonably necessary to find property enumerated in the warrant which may be concealed upon the person.
“§ 23–525. Disposition of property
“An officer or agent who seizes property in the execution of a search warrant, shall cause it to be safely Kept for use rs evidence. No property seized shall be released or destroyed except in accordance with law and upon order of a court or of the United States attorney or Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia or one of their assistants.
“SUBCHAPTER III— WIRE INTERCEPTION AND INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
“§ 23–541. Definitions
“As used in this subchapter—
“(1) the term ‘wire communication’ means any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities;
“(2) the term ‘oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying the expectation;
“(3) the term ‘intercept’ means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device;
“(4) the term ‘intercepting device’ means any electronic, mechanical, or other device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than—
“(A) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties; or
“(B) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal;
“(5) the term ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ means any officer of the United States or of the District of Columbia who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this subchapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses;
“(6) the term ‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire or oral communication, includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to the communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication;
“(7) the term ‘judge’ means a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, a judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit:
“(8) the term ‘judge of competent jurisdiction’ means, in addition to the judges included in paragraph (7)—
“(A) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court, of appeals not in the District of Columbia; and
“(B) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire or oral communications;
“(9) the term ‘aggrieved person’ means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed;
“(10) the term ‘communication common carrier’ has the same meaning which is given the term ‘common carrier’ by sect ion 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153(h)): and
“(11) the term ‘United States attorney’ means the United States attorney for the District of Columbia or any of his assistants designated by him or otherwise designated by law to act in his place for the particular purpose in question.
“§ 23–542. Interception, disclosure, and use of wire or oral communications prohibited
“(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in ibis subehapter, any person who in the District of Columbia—
“(1) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication:
“(2) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication; or
“(3) willfully uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication;
shall he fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both: except that paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection shall not apply to the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, that has become common knowledge or public information.
“(b) It shall not be unlawful under this section for—
“(1) an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, agent, or employee of a communication common carrier, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication, in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the render mg of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the carrier of such communication, or to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to an investigative or law enforcement officer who, under this subchapter, is authorized to intercept a wire or oral communication, but no communication common carrier shall utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks;
“(2) a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception; or
“(3) a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception, unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, any State, or the District of Columbia, or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
“§ 23–543. Possession, sale, distribution, manufacture, assembly, and advertising of wire or oral communication intercepting devices prohibited
“(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person who in the District of Columbia—
“(1) willfully possesses, sells, distributes, manufactures, or assembles an intercepting device, the design of which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a wire or oral communication; or
“(2) willfully places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement of—
“(A) any intercepting device, the design of which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a wire or oral communication; or
“(B) any intercepting device where such advertisement promotes the use of such device for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a wire or oral communication;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
“(b) It shall not be unlawful under this section for—
“(1) a communication common carrier or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with a communication common carrier, in the usual course of the communication common carrier’s business; or
“(2) a person under contract with the Government of the United States, a State or a political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or an officer, agent, or employee of the Government of the United States, a State or a political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia;
to possess, sell, distribute, manufacture or assemble, or advertise any intercepting device, while acting in furtherance of the appropriate activities of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or a communication common carrier.
“§ 23–544. Confiscation of wire or oral communication intercepting devices
“Any intercepting device in the District of Columbia—
“(1) possessed;
“(2) used;
“(3) sold;
“(4) distributed; or
“(5) manufactured or assembled;
in violation of section 23–542 or 23–543 may be seized and forfeited to the District of Columbia. Insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, all provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such property; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; the compromise of claims; and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this title; except that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this section by such officers, agents or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Commissioner, except to the extent that, such duties arise from seizures and forfeitures effected by any customs officer. The proceeds from the sale of any property forfeited under this section shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the general fund of the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–545. Immunity of witnesses
“(a) Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before a court or grand jury in the District of Columbia involving any violation of this subchapter and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. But no testimony or other information compelled under the order issued under subsection (b) of this section, or any information obtained by the exploitation of such testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
“(b) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before a court or grand jury in the District of Columbia, the court before which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, upon the request of the United States attorney, an order requiring such individual to give any testimony or provide any other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
“(c) The United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General designated by the Attorney General, request an order under subsection (b) when in the judgment of the United States attorney—
“(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
“(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
“§ 23–546. Applications for authorization or approval of interception of wire or oral communications
“(a) The United States attorney may authorize, in writing, any investigative or law enforcement officer to make application to a court for an order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications.
“(b) The United States attorney may authorize, in writing, any investigative or law enforcement officer to make application to a court for an order of approval of the previous interception of any wire or oral communication, when the contents of such communication—
“(1) relate to an offense other than that specified in an order of authorization;
“(2) were intercepted in an emergency situation; or
“(3) were intercepted in an emergency situation and relate to an offense other than that contemplated at the time the interception was made.
“(c) An application for an order of authorization (as provided in subsection (a) of this section) or of approval (as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section) may be authorized only when the interception of wire or oral communications may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of or a conspiracy to commit any of the following offenses:
“(1) Any of the offenses specified in the Act entitled ‘An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia’, approved March 3, 1901, and listed in the following table:
“Offense: Specified in— Arson sections 820, 821 (D.C. Code. secs. 22–401, 22–402). Blackmail section 819 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–23051. Bribery section 861 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–701). Burglary section 823 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–1801). Destruction of property of value in excess of $200. section 848 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–103). Gambling sections 863, 866, 869e, (D.C. Code. secs. 22–1601. 22–1505, 22–1513). Grand larceny section 826 1 D.C. Code, sec, 22–2201). Kidnapping section 812 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–2101). Murder sections 708, 800 (D.C. Code. secs, 22–2401, 22–2403). Obstruction of justice section 862 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–703). Receiving stolen property of value in excess of $100. section 829 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–2205). Robbery section 810 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–2901). “(2) Bribery as specified (A) in the second paragraph under the center heading ‘General Expenses’ in the first section of the Act of
July 1, 1902 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–702), and (B) in the Act of February 26, 1936 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–704):
“(3) Extortion and threats as specified in sections 1501 and 1502 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (D.C. Code.
secs. 22–2306, 22–2307).
“(4) Offenses involving dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs as specified in sections 2 and 16 of the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act (D.C. Code. secs. 33–102, 33–416) and section 203 of the Dangerous Drug Act for the District of Columbia (D.C. Code,
sec. 33–702).
“§ 23–547. Procedure for authorization or approval of interception of wire or oral communications
“(a) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge and shall state the applicant s authority to make the application. Each application shall include—
“(1) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the application;
“(2) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (A) details as to the particular offense that hits been, is being, or is about to be committed, (B) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is Io be or was intercepted, (C) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be or which were intercepted, and (D) the identity of the person, if known, who committed, is committing, or is about to commit the offense and whose communications are to be or were intercepted;
“(3) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear or appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
“(4) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is or was required to be maintained, and if the nature of the investigation is or was such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate or should not have automatically terminated when the described type of communication has been or was first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will or would occur thereafter;
“(5) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications, known to the individual authorizing or making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such application; and
“(6) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain results.
“(b) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application.
“(c) Upon application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications within the District of Columbia, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that—
“(1) there is or was probable cause for belief that the person whose communication is to be or was intercepted is or was committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 23–546;
“(2) there is or was probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will or would be obtained through the interception;
“(3) normal investigative procedures have or would have been tried and have or had failed or reasonably appear or appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous: and
“(4) there is or was probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be or were intercepted were used, are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense, or are or were leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the person referred to in paragraph (1).
“(d) If the facilities from which a wire communication is to be or was intercepted are or were being used by, are or were about to be used by, or are or were leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by, a licensed physician, a licensed attorney, or practicing clergyman, or if the place where an oral communication is to be or was intercepted is or was a place used primarily for habitation by a husband and wife er primarily by a licensed physician, licensed attorney, or practicing clergyman for his own professional purposes, no order authorizing or approving such interception may be issued unless the court, in addition to the matters provided in subsection (c) of this section, determines that—
“(1) such facilities or place are or were being used or are or were about to be used in connection with conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; and
“(2) such interceptions will be so conducted as to minimize or eliminate the number of interceptions of privileged wire or oral communications between licensed physicians and patients, licensed attorneys and clients, practicing clergymen and confidants, and husbands and wives.
No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this subchapter shall lose its privileged character.
“(e) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify—
“(1) the identity of the person, if known, or otherwise a particular description of the person, if known, whose communications are to be or were intercepted;
“(2) the nature and location of the communication facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept or any approval of interception is or was granted;
“(3) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be or which was intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
“(4) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept or whose interception is approved, and of the person authorizing the application; and
“(5) the period of time during or for which the interception is authorized or approved, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.
“(f) An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. Any communication common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated therefore by the applicant at the prevailing rates.
“(g) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (a) of this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (c) of this section. The period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event for longer than thirty days. Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize or eliminate the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this subchapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.
“(h) Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this subchapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require.
“§ 23–548. Additional procedure for approval of interception of wire or oral communications
“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the United States attorney for the District of Columbia, who reasonably determines that—
“(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime that requires a wire or oral communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing the interception can with due diligence be obtained, and
“(2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this subchapter to authorize interception,
may intercept the wire or oral communication if an application for an order approving the interception is initiated in accordance with this section within twelve hours and is completed within seventy-two hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur. In the absence of an order, the interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is obtained or when the application for (he order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event the application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the interception is terminated without an order having been issued, the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this subchapter, and an inventory shall be served as provided for in section 23–550 on the person named in the application.
“(b) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized by this subchapter, intercepts wire or oral communications relating either to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or (o offenses other than those offenses for which interception was made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall make an application to a judge as soon as practicable for approval for disclosure and use, in accordance with section 23–553, of the information intercepted.
“§ 23–549. Maintenance and custody of records
“(a) The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this subchapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire or oral communication under this subchapter shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, the recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing the order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of section 23–553, for investigations. The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (b) of section 23–553.
“(b) Applications made and orders grunted under this subchapter shall be sealed by the judge. Custody of the applications and orders shall be wherever the judge directs. The applications and orders shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall not be destroyed except on order of the issuing or denying judge, and in any event shall be kept for ten years.
“(c) Any violation of the provisions of this subsection may be punished as contempt of court.
“§ 23–550. Inventory
“(a) Within a reasonable time hut not later than ninety days after the filing of an application for an order of approval under section 23–548 which is denied, or the termination of the period of any order or extensions thereof, the issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the order or the application, and such other parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine, in his discretion, are necessary in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include notice of—
“(1) the fact of the entry of the order or the application for an order of approval which was denied;
“(2) the date of the entry of the order or the denial of the application for an order of approval;
“(3) The period of authorized, approved, or disapproved interception; and
“(4) whether during the period wire or oral communications were intercepted.
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in his discretion make available to the person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communications, applications, and orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of good cause to a judge, the serving of the inventory required by this subsection may be postponed.
“§ 23–551. Procedure for disclosure and supression of intercepted wire or oral communications
“(a) The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States or the District of Columbia unless not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding—
“(1) the inventory as provided in section 23–550 has been served; and
“(2) the parties to the action have been served with a copy of the order and accompanying application under which the interception was authorized or approved.
This ten-day period may be waived by court order where a court, finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving the information.
“(b) Any aggrieved person m any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States or the District of Columbia, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that—
“(1) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
“(2) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face;
“(3) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval;
“(4) service was not made as provided in section 23–547; or
“(5) the seal prescribed by subsection (i) of this section is not present and there is no satisfactory explanation for its absence.
The motion shall be made before the trial, hearing or proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this subchapter and shall not be received in evidence in the trial, hearing, or proceeding. The judge, upon the filing of the motion by the aggrieved person, may in his discretion make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the interests of justice.
“§ 23–552. Government appeals
“In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States or the District of Columbia, as the case may be, shall have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress made under section 23–551 or from the denial of an application for an order of approval, if the United States or the District of Columbia, as the case may be, shall certify to the judge or other official granting such motion or denying the application that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. Appeal shall be taken within thirty days after the date the order was entered and shall be diligently prosecuted.
“§ 23–553. Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire or oral communications
“(a) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any authorized means and in conformity with this subchapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose or use such contents or evidence to the extent that such disclosure or use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.
“(b) Any person who, by any authorized means and in conformity with this subchapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance with this subchapter, or other lawful authority, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose the contents of such communication or evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal trial, hearing, or proceeding before any grand jury or court.
“(c) The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted in conformity with this subchapter, or evidence derived therefrom, may otherwise be disclosed or used only by court order upon a showing of good cause.
“§ 23–554. Authorization for recovery of civil damages
“(a) Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this subchapter shall—
“(1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications; and
“(2) be entitled to recover from any such person—
“(A) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation, or $1,000 whichever is higher;
“(B) punitive damages; and
“(C) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
“(b) Good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to an action brought under this section or any other law.
“(c) As used in this section, the term ‘person’ includes the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia shall not assert any governmental immunity to avoid liability under this section. Judgment against the District of Columbia shall not constitute a bar to action against any other person.
“§ 23–555. Reports concerning intercepted wire or oral communications
“(a) Within thirty days after the expiration of an order or an extension entered under section 23–547 or 23–548 or the denial of an order of approval, the issuing or denying court shall report, to the chief judge of the District of Columbia of Appeals—
“(1) that an order or extension was applied for;
“(2) the kind of order or extension applied for;
“(3) if the order or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied;
“(4) the period of the interceptions authorized by the order, and the number and duration of any extensions of the order;
“(5) the offense specified in the order or application, or extension of an order;
“(6) the identity of the applying investigative or law enforcement officer, the agency making the application, and the person authorizing the application; and
“(7) the character and location of the facilities from which and the place where communications were (and were to be) intercepted.
“(b) In January of each year the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia shall report to the Congress of the United States and the chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—
“(1) the information required by paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section with respect to each application for an order or extension made during the immediately preceding calendar year;
“(2) a genera] description of the interceptions made under such order or extension, including—
“(A) the approximate character and frequency of incriminating communications intercepted;
“(B) the approximate character and frequency of other communications intercepted;
“(C) the approximate number of persons whose communications were intercepted; and
“(D) the approximate character, amount, and cost of the manpower and other resources used in the interceptions;
“(3) the number of arrests resulting from interceptions made under such order or extension;
“(4) the offenses for which the arrests were made;
“(5) the number of trials resulting from such interceptions;
“(6) the number of motions to suppress made with respect to such interceptions;
“(7) the number of motions to suppress granted or denied;
“(8) the number of convictions resulting from such interceptions;
“(9) the offenses for which the convictions were obtained;
“(10) a general assessment of the importance of the interceptions; and
“(11) for purposes of comparison, the information required by paragraphs (2) through (10) of this subsection with respect to orders and extensions obtained in other preceding calendar years.
“(c) Reports made pursuant to the section shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Director of the Administration Office of the United States Courts under section 2519(3) of title 18, United States Code.
“§ 23–556. Relation to Federal law on wire interception and interception of oral communications
“(a) Sections 23–542, 23–543, 23–545, 23–553, 23–554, and 23–555 of this subchapter shall be construed to supplement, and not to supersede or otherwise limit, the provisions of chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (relating to wire interception and interception of
oral communications).
“(b) Sections 23–546, 23–547, 23–548, 23–549, 23–550, 23–551, and 23–552 of this subchapter shall be construed not to supersede or otherwise limit the provisions of chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code, except in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
“SUBCHAPTER IV— ARREST WARRANT AND SUMMONS
“§ 23–561. Issuance, form, and contents
“(a) (1) A judicial officer may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person upon a sworn complaint which states facts constituting an offense over which the judicial officer has jurisdiction for trial or preliminary examination, and establishing probable cause to believe that the person committed the offense. More than one warrant may issue on the same complaint.
“(2) Upon request of the prosecutor, a summons shall issue instead of an arrest warrant. More than one summons may issue on the same complaint. If a person fails to appear in response to a summons, a warrant shall issue for his arrest.
“(b) (1) An arrest warrant shall be signed by the judicial officer and shall state or contain the name of the issuing court, the date of issuance of the warrant, a description of the offense charged, and the name of the person to be arrested or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty. It shall command that the person be arrested and brought before the issuing court or officer. If the complaint establishes probable cause to believe that one of the conditions set out in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 23–591(c)(2) is likely to exist at the time and place at which such warrant is to be executed, the warrant may contain an authorization that it be executed as provided in section 23–591.
“(2) A summons shall be in the same form as an arrest warrant except that it shall Summon the person named to appear before the issuing court or officer at a stated time and place.
“(c) An arrest warrant may be directed to a specific law enforcement officer or to any classifications of officers of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia or other agency authorized to make arrests or execute process.
“(d) Each complaint shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation. Except for good cause shown, no warrant shall be issued unless the complaint has been approved by an appropriate prosecutor.
“§ 23–562. Execution and return
“(a) (1) A warrant issued pursuant to this subchapter shall be-executed by the arrest of the person named. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request he shall show the warrant to the person as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, he shall inform the person of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has been issued.
“(2) A summons shall be served upon a person by delivering a copy to him personally, by leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by mailing it to the person’s last known address.
“(b) (1) The officer executing a warrant shall make return thereof to the judicial officer before whom the person is brought for preliminary examination. At the request of the appropriate prosecutor, any unexecuted and unexpired warrant shall be returned to the issuing court or judicial officer and shall be canceled.
“(2) On or before the return day the person to whom a summons was delivered for service shall make return thereof to the court or officer before whom the summons is returnable.
“(3) At the request of the appropriate prosecutor made at any time while the complaint is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not canceled or expired or a summons returned unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the judicial officer to the marshal or other authorized person for execution or service.
“(c) (1) A law enforcement officer within the District of Columbia making an arrest under a warrant issued pursuant to this subchapter, making an arrest without a warrant, or receiving a person arrested by a special policeman or other person pursuant to section 23–582, shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the court or other judicial officer empowered to commit persons charged with the offense for which the arrest was made. This subsection, however, shall not be construed to conflict with or otherwise supersede section 3501
of title 18, United States Code. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a judicial officer, a complaint or information shall be filed forthwith.
“(2) Before taking an arrested person to a judicial officer, a law enforcement officer may perform any recording, fingerprinting, photographing, or other preliminary police duties required in the particular case, and if such duties are performed with reasonable promptness, the period of time required therefor shall not constitute a delay within the meaning of this section.
“§ 23–563. Territorial and other limits
“(a) A warrant or summons for an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia may be served at any place within the jurisdiction of the Unit ed States.
“(b) A warrant or summons issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for an offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine only, or by suck imprisonment and a fine, may be served in any place in the District of Columbia but may not be executed more than one year after the date of issuance.
“(c) A person arrested outside the District of Columbia on a warrant issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia shall be taken before a judge, commissioner, or magistrate, and held to answer in the Superior Court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as if the warrant had been issued by the United States District
18 USC app.
Court for the District of Columbia.
“(d) When an application alleges that (J) an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult has been committed by a child, (2) the child may not with due diligence be found within the District of Columbia, and (3) if the District of Columbia is a party to article XVII of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, the child is
Post, p. 665.
not known to be in a jurisdiction which is a party to such article, a juvenile officer may secure a warrant for the arrest of the child as if he were an adult. When the child is brought before the issuing court or officer pursuant to the warrant he shall be ordered transferred to the Family Division of the Superior Court pursuant to section 16–2302. If
Ante, p. 525.
the child is found in a jurisdiction which is a party to such article and if the District of Columbia is a party to such article, he shall be returned as provided in that article and the warrant shall be null and void.
“SUBCHAPTER V— ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT
“§ 23–581. Arrests without warrant by law enforcement officers
“(a) (1) A law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant having previously been issued therefor—
“(A) a person whom he has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing a felony;
“(B) a person whom he has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing an offense in his presence;
“(C) a person whom he has probable cause to believe has committed or is about to commit any offense listed in paragraph (2) and, unless immediately arrested, may not be apprehended, may cause injury to others, or may tamper with, dispose of, or destroy evidence.
“(2) The offenses referred to in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) are. the following:
“(A) The following offenses specified in the Act entitled ‘An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia’, approved March 3, 1901, and listed in the following table:
“Offense: Specified in— Assault section 806 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–504). Petit larceny section 827 (D.C, Code, sec. 22–2202). Receiving stolen goods section 829 (D.C. Code, sec. 22–2205). Unlawful entry section 824 (D.C. Code. sec. 22–3102). “(B) Attempts to commit the following offenses specified in such Act and listed in the following table:
“Offense: Specified in— Burglary section 823 (D.C, Code, sec. 22–1801). Grand larceny section 826 (D.C, Code. sec. 22–2201). Unauthorized use of vehicles section 826b (D.C. Code, sec. 22–2204). “(b) A law enforcement officer may, even if his jurisdiction does not extend beyond the District of Columbia, continue beyond the District, if necessary, a pursuit commenced within the District of a person who has committed an offense or whom he has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing a felony, and may arrest that person in any State the laws of which contain provisions equivalent to those of section 23–901.
“§ 23–582. Arrests without warrant by other persons
“(a) A special policeman shall have the same powers as a law enforcement officer to arrest without warrant for offenses committed within premises to which his jurisdiction extends, and may arrest outside the premises on fresh pursuit for offenses committed on the premises.
“(b) A private person may arrest another—
“(1) whom he has probable cause to believe is committing in his presence—
“(A) a felony, or
“(B) an offense enumerated in section 23–581 (a)(2); or
“(2) in aid of a law enforcement officer or special policeman, or other person authorized by law to make an arrest.
“(c) Any person making an arrest pursuant to this section shall deliver the person arrested tn a law enforcement officer without unreasonable delay.
“SUBCHAPTER VI— AUTHORITY TO BREAK AND ENTER UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
“§ 23–591. Authority to break and enter under certain conditions
“(a) Any officer authorized by law to make arrests, or to execute search warrants, or any person aiding such an officer, may break and enter any premises, any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building, or any part thereof, any vehicle, or anything within such dwelling house, budding, or vehicle, or otherwise enter to execute search or arrest warrants, to make an arrest where authorized by law without a warrant, or where necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of such warrant or in making such arrest.
“(b) Breaking and entry shall not be made until after such officer or person makes an announcement of his identity and purpose and the officer reasonably believes that admittance to the dwelling house or other building or vehicle is being denied or unreasonably delayed.
“(c) An announcement of identity and purpose shall not be required prior to such breaking and entry—
“(1) if the warrant expressly authorizes breaking and entry without such a prior announcement, or
“(2) if circumstances known to such officer or person at the time of breaking and entry, but, in the case of the execution of a warrant, unknown to the applicant when applying for such warrant, give him probable cause to believe that—
“(A) such notice is likely to result in the evidence subject to seizure being easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
“(B) such notice is likely to endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person,
“(C) such notice is likely to enable the party to be arrested to escape, or
“(D) such notice would be a useless gesture.
“(d) Whoever, after notice is given under subsection (b) or after entry where such notice is unnecessary under subsection (c), destroys, conceals, disposes of, or attempts to destroy, conceal, or dispose of, or otherwise prevents or attempts to prevent the seizure of, evidence subject to seizure shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for
Penalty.
not more than 5 years, or both.
“(e) As used in this section and in subchapters II and IV, the terms
“Break and enter,” “breaking and entering.”
‘break and enter’ and ‘breaking and entering’ include any use of physical force or violence or other unauthorized entry but do not include entry obtained by trick or strategem.
“Chapter 7.— EXTRADITION AND FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE
“§ 23–701. Warrants for the arrest of fugitives from justice
“Whenever any person who is (1) within the District of Columbia, (2) charged with any offense committed in any State, and (3) liable by the Constitution and laws of the United States to be delivered
USC prec. title I1.
over upon the demand of the Governor of that State, any judge of the Superior Court may, upon complaint on oath or affirmation of any credible witness, setting forth the offense, that the person is a fugitive from justice, and such other matters as are necessary to bring the ease within the provisions of law, issue a warrant to bring the person so charged before the Superior Court, to answer the complaint.
“§ 23–702. Procedure on arrest of fugitives
“(a) Any person arrested upon a warrant issued pursuant, to section 23–701, or arrested within the District of Columbia as a fugitive from justice without a warrant having been issued, shall be taken before the Criminal Division of the Superior Court for preliminary examination on a complaint charging him as a fugitive.
“(b) If, upon the examination of the person charged, it shall appear to the court that there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint is true and that the person may be lawfully demanded of the chief judge, the person shall be detained or released according to law, in like manner as if the offense had been committed in the District of Columbia, to appear before the court at a future date, allowing thirty days to obtain a requisition from the Governor of the State from which the person is a fugitive. The complaint of fugitivity from another jurisdiction shall create a presumption that the person is unlikely to appear if released, which may be overcome only by clear and convincing proof.
“(c) If the person so released or detained shall appear before the court upon the day ordered, he shall be discharged, unless he shall be demanded by requisition, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section or section 23–704, or unless the court shall find cause to detain or to release him as provided by subsection (b) until a later day; but regardless of whether the person shall be detained or released as provided in subsection (b) or discharged, his delivery to any person authorized by the warrant of the Governor shall be a discharge of any bond or obligation.
“(d) The Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department shall give notice to the police official or sheriff of the city or county from which the person is a fugitive that the person is so held in the District of Columbia.
“(e) A person detained as provided by this section shall not be detained in jail longer than to allow a reasonable time for the person receiving the notice required by subsection (d) to apply for and obtain a proper requisition for the person detained according to the circumstances of the case and the distance of the place where the offense is alleged to have been committed.
“(f) (1) At any time prior to the filing of a requisition, a person arrested pursuant to this section may in open court waive further proceedings pursuant to this chapter.
“(2) Following waiver, a judge of the Superior Court may, in his discretion, if the United States attorney consents, release the person upon such conditions as the judge shall deem necessary to insure his appearance before the proper official in the State from which he is a fugitive, and shall otherwise order his return to the jurisdiction of that State in the custody of a proper official.
“(3) Following waiver, a person not released pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be ordered to return to the jurisdiction from which he is a fugitive in the custody of a proper official, and may be detained to await return.
“(4) A person detained pursuant to paragraph (3) for more than three days (not including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) shall be returned to the court and shall thereupon be released pursuant to paragraph (2), unless the court shall find good reason to extend his detention for an additional three days to obtain the attendance of a proper official of the demanding jurisdiction.
“(g) If a person has not waived further proceedings pursuant to subsection (f), and a requisition from the Governor of the jurisdiction from which the person is a fugitive is presented to the court, the court shall order the requisition to be filed and referred to the chief judge for extradition proceedings pursuant to section 23–704, and shall order the person committed pending those proceedings.
“§ 23–703. Failure to appear
“Any person released pursuant to section 23–702 who fails to appear as required shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
“§ 23–704. Extradition
“(a) In all cases where the laws of the United States provide that fugitives from justice shall be delivered up, the chief judge of the Superior Court shall cause to be apprehended and delivered up fugitives from justice who shall be found within the District of Columbia, in the same manner and under the same regulations as the executive authority of a State is required to do by the provisions of chapter 209
of title 18, United States Code, and all executive and judicial officers are required to obey the lawful precepts or other process issued for that purpose, and to aid and assist in that delivery.
“(b) The chief judge of the Superior Court may also surrender, on demand of the Governor of any State, any person in the District of Columbia charged in that State in the manner provided in subsection (a) of this section with committing an act in the District of Columbia, or in another State, intentionally resulting in a crime in the State whose executive authority is making the demand, even though the accused was not in that State at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom.
“(c) No person apprehended in accordance with the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken before the chief judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender, and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel.
“(d) If the person or his counsel shall state that he desires to test the legality of the person’s arrest, the chief judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether the person shall be delivered over as demanded. At the hearing, the person shall have the same rights to challenge his detention and extradition as if the hearing were upon a writ of habeas corpus.
“(e) If the chief judge shall order the person delivered over, he may appeal, within twenty-four hours, from that order to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the chief judge who rendered the order, or a judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, issues a certificate of probable cause. The appeal shall be expedited by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is authorized to demand a hearing pursuant to this subsection shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to demand such a hearing or that the chief judge, after hearing, has ordered him delivered over, unless it also appears that the remedy by hearing is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
“(f) Nothing contained in this subsection shall prevent a person from waiving his right to appear before the chief judge of the Superior Court and voluntarily returning in custody of a proper official to the jurisdiction of the State which is demanding him.
“(g) No person demanded by the Governor of a State pursuant to this section shall be released upon bond or other obligation except pursuant to an order of a court of the demanding State.
“(h) Any associate judge designated by the chief judge or acting chief judge shall have the same power to act pursuant to this section as the chief judge.
“§ 23–705. Removal proceedings and returns to foreign countries not affected
“Nothing contained in this chapter shall repeal, modify, or in any way affect existing law concerning the procedure for the return of any person apprehended in the District of Columbia to a Federal judicial district to answer a Federal charge, or repeal, modify, or affect existing law or treaty concerning the return to a foreign country of a person apprehended or detained in the District of Columbia as a fugitive from a foreign country.
“§ 23–706. Confinement
“(a) The agent of the demanding State to whom the prisoner may have been delivered in accordance with the provisions of section 23–704, may, when necessary, confine the prisoner in a facility of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and the Department of Corrections must receive and safely keep the prisoner for such reasonable time as will enable the officer or person having charge of him to proceed on his route, such officer or person being chargeable with the expense of keeping.
“(b) The officer or agent of a demanding State to whom a prisoner may have been delivered following extradition proceedings in another State, or to whom a prisoner may have been delivered after waiving extradition in the other State, and who is passing through the District of Columbia with a prisoner for the purpose of immediately returning the prisoner to the demanding State, may, when necessary, confine the, prisoner in a facility of the Department of Corrections. The Department of Cor sections must receive and safely keep the prisoner for such reasonable time as will enable the officer or agent to proceed on his route, such officer or agent being chargeable with the exfiense of keeping. That officer or agent shall produce and show to the Jepartment of Corrections satisfactory written evidence of the fact that he is actually transporting the prisoner to the demanding State after a requisition by the executive authority of the demanding State. The prisoner, shall not be entitled to demand a new requisition while in the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–707. Definitions
“For purposes of this chapter—
“(1) the term ‘State’ includes any territory or possession of the United States; and
“(2) the term ‘Governor’ means the executive authority of a State.
“Chapter 9.— FRESH PURSUIT
“§ 23–901. Arrests in the District of Columbia by officers of other States
“Any member of a duly organized peace unit of any State (or county or municipality thereof) of the United States who enters the District of Columbia in fresh pursuit and continues within the District of Columbia in fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in such State shall have the same authority to arrest, and hold that person in custody as has any member of any duly organized peace unit of the District of Columbia to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in the District of Columbia. This section shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in the District of Columbia which would otherwise be lawful.
“§ 23–902. Hearing; commitment; discharge
“If an arrest is made in the District of Columbia by an officer of another State in accordance with the provisions of section 23–901, he shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, who shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he shall order the release or detention of the person arrested, pursuant to section 23–702, to await for a reasonable time a requisition from the Governor of the State demanding the extradition of the person arrested. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful he shall order the person discharged.
“§ 23–903. ‘Fresh pursuit’ defined
“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘fresh pursuit’ shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the common law. also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony or one whom the pursuing officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed a felony. It shall also include the pursuit of a person whom the pursuing officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed a felony, although no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed. Such term shall not necessarily imply an instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
“Chapter 11.— PROFESSIONAL BONDSMEN
“§ 23–1101. Definitions
“For purposes of this chapter—
“(1) the term ‘bonding business’ means the business of becoming surety for compensation upon bonds in criminal cases in the District of Columbia; and
“(2) the term ‘bondsman’ means any person or corporation engaged in the bonding business either as a principal or as an agent, clerk, or representative of another engaged in such business.
“§ 23–1102. Bonding business impressed with public interests
“The bonding business is impressed with a public interest.
“§ 23–1103. Procuring business through official or attorney for a consideration prohibited
“It shall be unlawful for any bondsman, either directly or indirectly, to give, donate, lend, contribute, or to promise to give, donate, lend, or contribute any money, property, entertainment, or other thing of value whatsoever to any attorney at law, police officer, deputy United States marshal, jailer, probation officer, clerk, or other attache of a criminal court, or public official of any character, for procuring or assisting in procuring any person to employ the bondsman to execute as surety any bond for compensation in any criminal case in the District of Columbia. It shall be unlawful for any attorney at law, police officer, deputy United States marshal, jailer, probation officer, clerk, bailiff, or other attaché of a criminal court, or public official of any character, to accept or receive from a bondsman any money, property, entertainment, or other thing of value whatsoever for procuring or assisting in procuring a person to employ a bondsman to execute as surety any bond for compensation in a criminal case in the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–1104. Attorneys procuring employment through official or bondsman for a consideration prohibited
“It shall be unlawful for any attorney at law, either directly or indirectly, to give, loan, donate, contribute, or to promise to give, loan, donate, or contribute any money, property, entertainment, or other thing of value whatsoever to, or to split or divide any fee or commission with, any bondsman, police officer, deputy United States marshal, probation officer, bailiff, clerk, or other attache of any criminal court for causing or procuring or assisting in causing or procur-ing a person to employ the attorney to represent him in a criminal case in the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–1105. Receiving other than regular fee for bonding prohibited; bondsmen prohibited from endeavoring to secure dismissal or settlement
“It shall be lawful to charge for executing a bond in a criminal ease in the District of Columbia, but it shall be unlawful for a bondsman, either directly or indirectly, to charge, accept, or receive a sum of money, or other thing of value, other than the regular fee for bonding, from a person for whom he has executed bond, for any other service whatever performed in connection with any indictment, information, or charge upon which the person is bailed or held in the District of Columbia. It also shall be unlawful for any bondsman to settle, or attempt to settle, or to procure or attempt to procure the dismissal of any indictment, information, or charge against any person in custody or held upon bond in the District of Columbia, with a court, or with the prosecuting attorney in a court in the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–1106. Posting names of authorized bondsmen; list to be furnished prisoners; prisoners may communicate with bondsmen; record to be kept by police
“A typewritten or printed list alphabetically arranged of all persons engaged under the authority of any of the courts of criminal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia in the business of becoming surety upon bonds for compensation in criminal cases shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each police precinct, jail, prisoner’s dock, house of detention, and every other place in the District of Columbia in which persons in custody of the law are detained, and one or more copies thereof kept on hand; and when a person who is detained in custody in a place of detention shall request a person in charge thereof to furnish him the name of a bondsman, or to put him in communication with a bondsman, the list shall be furnished to the person in charge of the place of detention within a reasonable time to put the person detained in communication with the bondsman selected, and the person in charge of the place of detention shall contemporaneously with that transaction make in the blotter or book of record kept in the place of detention, a record showing the name of the person requesting the bondsman, the offense with which the person is charged, the time at which the request, was made, the bondsman requested, and the person by whom the bondsman was called, and preserve that as a permanent record in the book or blotter in which entered.
“§ 23–1107. Bondsmen prohibited from entering place of detention unless requested by prisoner; record of visit to be kept
“It shall be unlawful for a bondsman to enter a police precinct, jail, prisoner’s dock, house of detention, or other place where, persons in the custody of the law are detained in the District of Columbia for the purpose of obtaining employment as a bondsman, without having been previously called by a person detained or by some relative or other authorized person acting for or on behalf of the person detained. Whenever a bondsman enters a police precinct, jail, prisoner’s dock, house of detention, or other place where persons in the custody of the law are detained in the District of Columbia, he shall forthwith give to the person in charge thereof his mission there mid the name of the person calling him and requesting him to come to such place. That information shall be recorded by the person in charge of the place of detention and preserved as a public record, and the failure of the bondsman to give that information, or the failure of the person in charge of the place of detention to make and preserve a record of that information, shall constitute a violation of this chapter.
“§ 23–1108. Qualifications of bondsmen; rules to be prescribed by courts; list of agents to be furnished; renewal of authority to act; detailed records to be kept; penalties and disqualifications
“(a) It shall be the duty of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, each, to provide, under reasonable rules and regulations, the qualifications of persons and corporations applying for authority to engage in the bonding business in criminal cases in the District of Columbia, and the terms and conditions upon which the business shall be carried on, and no person or corporation shall, either as principal, or as agent, clerk, or representative of another, engage in the bonding business in either court until he shall, by order of the court, be authorized to do so. The courts, in making these rules and regulations, and in granting authority to persons to engage in the bonding business, shall take into consideration both the financial responsibility and the moral qualities of the person so applying, and no person shall be permitted to engage, either as principal or agent, in the bonding business, who has ever been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, or who is not known to be a person of good moral character. It shall be the duty of each of the courts to require every person qualifying to engage in the bonding business as principal to file with the court a list showing the name, age, and residence of each person employed by the bondsman as agent, clerk, or representative in the bonding business, and require an affidavit from each of these persons stating that he will abide by the terms and provisions of this chapter. Each of the courts shall require the authority of each of those persons to be renewed from time to time at such periods as the court may by rule provide, and before the authority shall be renewed the court shall require from each of those persons an affidavit that since his previous qualification to engage in the bonding business he has abided by the provisions of this chapter, and any person swearing falsely in any of the affidavits shall be guilty of perjury.
“(b) Each court shall prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to insure that whenever a bondsman becomes surety for compensation upon a bond in a criminal case before the court, the bondsman shall make 11 record, which shall be accurate to the best of the maker’s knowledge and belief and shall thereafter be open for inspection by the court or its designated representative, and by the designated representative of other law enforcement agencies of the District of Columbia, of the following matters:
“(1) the full name and address of the person for whom the bond is executed (referred to in this subsection as the ‘defendant’) and the full name and address of his employer, if any;
“(2) the offense with which the defendant is charged;
“(3) the mime of the court or officer authorizing the defendant’s admission to bail;
“(4) the amount of the bond;
“(5) the name of the person who called the bondsman, if other than the defendant;
“(6) the amount of the bondsman’s charge for executing the bond;
“(7) the full name and address of the person to whom the bondsman presented his bill for the charge:
“(8) the full name and address of the person paying the charge; and
“(9) the manner of payment of the charge.
Whoever violates any rule or regulation prescribed under this subsection shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both, and if he is a bondsman shall be disqualified from thereafter engaging in any manner in the bonding business for such period of time as the trial judge shall order.
“§ 23–1109. Giving advance information of proposed raid prohibited
“It shall be unlawful for any police officer or other public official, in advance of any mid by police or other peace officers or public officials or the execution of any search warrant or warrant of arrest, to give or furnish, either directly or indirectly, any information concerning the proposed raid or arrest to any person engaged in any manner in the bonding business, or to any attorney at law; but it shall not be unlawful for any police or other peace officer, in conducting any raid or in executing any search warrant or warrant of arrest, to communicate to tiny attorney at law or person engaged in the bonding business, any fact necessary to enable the officer to obtain from the attorney at law or person engaged in the bonding business information necessary to enable the officer to carry out the raid or execute the process.
“§ 23–1110. Designation of official to take bail or collateral when court is not in session; issuance of citations
“(a) The judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia shall have the authority to appoint some official of the Metropolitan Police Department to act as a clerk of the court with authority to take bail or collateral from persons charged with offenses triable in the Superior Court at all times when the court is not open and its clerks accessible. The official so appointed shall have the same authority at those times with reference to taking bonds or collateral as the clerk of the Municipal Court had on March 3, 1933; shall receive no compensation for those services other than his regular salary: shall be subject to the orders and rules of the Superior Court in discharge of his duties, and may be removed as the clerk at any time by the judges of the court. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have power to authorize the official appointed by the Superior Court to take bond of persons arrested upon writs and process from that court in criminal cases between 4 o clock postmeridian and 9 o’clock antemeridian and upon Sundays and holidays, and shall have power at any time to revoke the authority granted by it.
“(b) (1) An officer or member of the Metropolitan Police Department who arrests without a warrant a person for committing a misdemeanor may, instead of taking him into custody, issue a citation requiring the person to appear before an official of the Metropolitan Police Department designated under subsection (a) of this section to act as a clerk of the Superior Court.
“(2) Whenever a pei’son is arrested without a warrant for committing a misdemeanor and is booked and processed pursuant to law, an official of the Metropolitan Police Department designated under subsection (a) of this section to act as a clerk of the Superior Court may issue a citation to him for an appearance in court or at some other designated place, and release him from custody.
“(3) No citation may be issued under paragraph (1) or (2) unless the person authorized to issue the citation has reason to believe that the arrested person will not cause injury to persons or damage to property and that he will make an appearance in answer to the citation.
“(4) Whoever willfully fails to appear as required in a citation, shall be fined not more than the maximum provided for the misde-meanor for which such citation was issued or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. Prosecution under this paragraph shall be by the prosecuting officer responsible for prosecuting the offense for which the citation is issued.
“§ 23–1111. Penalties
“Any person violating any provision of this chapter shall be lined not less than $50 nor more than $100, or imprisoned for not less than ten nor more than sixty days, or both, where no other penalty is provided by this chapter: and if the person so convicted is (1) a police officer or other public official, he shall upon recommendation of the trial judge also be forthwith dismissed from office, (2) a bondsman, he shall be disqualified from thereafter engaging in any manner in the bonding business for such a period of time as the trial judge shall order, or (3) an attorney at law, he shall be subject to suspension or disbarment as attorney at law.
“§ 23–1112. Enforcement
“It shall be the duty of the Superior Court and of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to see that this chapter is enforced, and upon the impaneling of each grand jury in the District of Columbia it shall be the duty of the judge impaneling such jury to charge it to investigate the manner in which this chapter is enforced and all violations thereof in connection with the matter under investigation by such jury.
“Chapter 13.— BAIL AGENCY AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
“SUBCHAPTER I— DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAIL AGENCY
“§ 23–1301. District of Columbia Bail Agency
“The District of Columbia Bail Agency (hereafter in this subchapter referred to as the ‘agency’) shall continue in the District of Columbia and shall secure pertinent data and provide for any judicial officer in the District of Columbia or any officer or member of the Metropolitan Police Department issuing citations, reports containing verified information concerning any individual with respect to whom a bail or citation determination is to be made.
“§ 23–1302. Definitions
“As used in this chapter—
“(1) the term ‘judicial officer’ means, unless otherwise indicated, the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or any justice or judge of those courts or a United States commissioner or magistrate; and
“(2) the term ‘bail determination’ means any order by a judicial officer respecting the terms and conditions of detention or release (including any order setting the amount of bail bond or any other kind of security) made to assure the appearance in court of—
“(A) any person arrested in the District of Columbia, or
“(B) any material witness in any criminal proceeding in a court referred to in paragraph (1).
“§ 23–1303. Interviews with detainees; investigations and reports; information as confidential; consideration and use of reports in making bail determinations
“(a) The agency shall, except when impracticable, interview any person detained pursuant to law or charged with an offense in the District of Columbia who is to appear before a judicial officer or whose case arose in or is before any court named in section 23–1302(1). The interview, when requested by a judicial officer, shall also be undertaken with respect, to any person charged with intoxication or a traffic violation. The agency shall seek independent verification of information obtained during the interview, shall secure any such person’s prior criminal record which shall be made available by the Metropolitan Police Department, and shall prepare a written report of the information for submission to the appropriate judicial officer. The report to the judicial officer shall, where appropriate, include a recommendation as to whether such person should be released or detained under any of the conditions specified in subchapter II of this chapter. If the agency does not make a recommendation, it shall submit a report without recommendation. The agency shall provide copies of its report and recommendations (if any) to the United States attorney for the District of Columbia or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and to counsel for the person concerning whom the report is made. The report shall include but not be limited to information concerning the person accused, his family, his community ties, residence, employment, and prior criminal record, and may include such additional verified information as may become available to the agency.
“(b) With respect to persons seeking review under subchapter II of this chapter of their detention or conditions of release, the agency shall review its report, seek and verify such new information as may be necessary, and modify or supplement its report to the extent appropriate.
“(c) The agency, when requested by any appellate court or a judge or justice thereof, or by any other judicial officer, shall furnish a report as provided in subsection (a) of this section respecting any person whose case is pending before any such appellate court or judicial officer or in whose behalf an application for a bail determination shall have been submitted.
“(d) Any inform at ion contained in the agency’s files, presented in its report, or divulged during the course of any hearing shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding, but such information may be used in proceedings under sections 23–1327, 23–1328, and 23–1329, in perjury proceedings, and for the purposes of impeachment in any subsequent proceeding.
“(e) The agency, when requested by a member or officer of the Metropolitan Police Department acting pursuant to court rules governing the issuance of citations in the District of Columbia, shall furnish to such member or officer a report as provided in subsection (a).
“(f) The preparation and the submission by the agency of its report as provided in this section shall be accomplished at the earliest practicable opportunity.
“(g) A judicial officer in making a bail determination shall consider the agency’s report and its accompanying recommendation, if any. The judicial officer may order such detention or may impose such terms and set. Such conditions upon release, including requiring the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties as shall appear warranted by the facts, except that such judicial officer may not order any detention or establish any term or condition for release not otherwise authorized by law.
“(h) The agency shall—
“(1) supervise all persons released on nonsurety release, including release on personal recognizance, personal bond, nonfinancial conditions, or cash deposit or percentage deposit with the registry of the court;
“(2) make reasonable effort to give notice of each required court appearance to each person released by the court;
“(3) serve as coordinator for other agencies and organizations which serve or may be eligible to serve as custodians for persons released under supervision and advise the judicial officer as to the eligibility, availability, and capacity of such agencies and organizations:
“(4) assist persons released pursuant to subchapter II of this chapter in securing employment or necessary medical or .social services:
“(5) inform the judicial officer and the United States attorney for the District of Columbia or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia of any failure to comply with pretrial release conditions or the arrest of persons released under its supervision and recommend modifications of release conditions when appropriate;
“(6) prepare, in cooperation with the United States marshal for the District of Columbia and the United States attorney for the District of Columbia, such pretrial detention reports as are required by Rule 46(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
18 USC app.
“(7) perform such other pretrial functions as the executive committee may, from time to time, assign.
“§ 23–1304. Executive committee; composition; appointment and qualifications of Director
“(a) The agency shall function tinder authority of and be responsible to an executive committee of five members of which three shall constitute a quorum. The executive committee shall be composed of the respective chief judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-peals, the Superior Court, or if circumstances may require, the designee of any such chief judge, and a fifth member who shall be selected by the chief judges.
“(b) The executive committee shall appoint a Director of tire agency who shall be a member of the bar of the District of Columbia.
“§ 23–1305. Duties of Director; compensation; tenure
“The Director of the agency shall be responsible for the supervision and execution of the duties of the agency. The Director shall receive such compensation as may be set by the executive committee but not in excess of the compensation authorized for GS–16 of the General Schedule contained in section 5332 of title 5, United States Code. The
Ante, P. 198–1.
Director shall hold office at the pleasure of the executive committee.
“§ 23–1306. Chief assistant and other agency personnel; compensation
“The Director, subject to the approval of the executive committee, shall employ a chief assistant and such assisting and clerical staff and may make assignments of such agency personnel as may be necessary properly to conduct the business of the agency. The staff of the agency, other than clerical, shall be drawn from law students, graduate students, or such other available sources as may be approved by the executive committee. The chief assistant to the Director shall receive compensation as may be set by the executive committee, but in an amount not in excess of the amount authorized for GS–14 of the General Schedule contained in section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, and shall hold office at the pleasure of the executive committee. All other employees of the agency shall receive compensation, as set by the executive committee, which shall be comparable to levels of compensation
established in such chapter 53. From time to time, the Director, subject to the approval of the executive committee, may set merit and longevity salary increases.
“§ 23–1307. Annual reports to executive committee, Congress, and Commissioner
“The Director shall on June 15 of each year submit to the executive committee a report as to the agency’s administration of its responsibilities for the previous period of June 1 through May 31, a copy of which report will be transmitted by the executive committee to the Congress of the United States, and to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia. The Director shall include in his report, to be prepared as directed by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, a statement of financial condition, revenues, and expenses for the past June 1 through May 31 period.
“§ 23–1308. Budget estimates
“Budget estimates for the agency shall be prepared by the Director and shall be subject to the approval of the executive committee.
“SUBCHAPTER II— RELEASE AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
“§ 23–1321. Release in noncapital cases prior to trial
“(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the the appearance of the person as required or the safety of any other person or the community. When such a determination is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or the safety of any other person or the community, or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
“(1) Place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him.
“(2) Place, restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the period of release.
“(3) Require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the performance of the conditions of release.
“(4) Require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof.
“(5) Impose any other condition, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after specified hours of release for employment or other limited purposes.
No financial condition may be imposed to assure the safety of any other person or the community.
“(b) In determining which conditions of release, if any, will reasonably assure the appearance of a person as required Or the safety of any other person or the community, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against such person, his family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental conditions, past conduct, length of residence in the community, record of convictions, and any record of appearance at court proceedings, flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings.
“(c) A judicial officer authorizing the release of a person under this section shall issue an appropriate order containing a statement, of the conditions imposed, if any, shall inform such person of the penalties applicable to violations or the conditions of his release, shall advise him that a warrant for his arrest will be issued immediately upon any such violation, and shall warn such person of the penalties provided in section 23–1328.
“(d) A person for whom conditions of release are imposed and who, after twenty-four hours from the time of the release hearing, continues to be detained as a result of his inability to meet the conditions of release, shall, upon application, be entitled to have the conditions reviewed by the judicial officer who imposed them. Unless the conditions of release are amended and the person is thereupon released, the judicial officer shall set forth in writing the reasons for requiring the conditions imposed. A person who is ordered released on a condition which requires that he return to custody after specified hours shall, upon application, be entitled to a review by the judicial officer who imposed the condition. Unless the requirement is removed and the person is thereupon released on another condition, the judicial officer shall set forth in writing the reasons for continuing the requirement. In the event that the judicial officer who imposed conditions of release is not available, any other judicial officer may review such conditions.
“(e) A judicial officer ordering the release of a person on any condition specified in this section may at any time amend his order to impose additional or different conditions of release, except that if the imposition of such additional or different conditions results in the detention of the person as a result of his inability to meet such conditions or in the release of the person on a condition requiring him to return to custody after specified hours, the provisions of subsection (d) shall apply.
“(f) Information stated in, or offered in connection with, any order entered pursuant to this section need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in a court of law.
“(g) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the disposition of any case or class of cases by forfeiture of collateral security where such disposition is authorized by the court.
“(h) The following shall be applicable to any person detained pursuant to this subchapter:
“(1) The person shall be confined, to the extent practicable, in facilities separate from convicted persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal.
“(2) The person shall be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel and, for good cause shown, shall be released upon order of the judicial officer in the custody of the United States marshal or other appropriate person for limited periods of time to prepare defenses or for other proper reasons.
“§ 23–1322. Detention prior to trial
“(a) Subject, to the provisions of this section, a judicial officer may order pretrial detention of—
“(1) a person charged with a dangerous crime, as defined in section 23–1331(3), if the Government certifies by motion that based on such person’s pattern of behavior consisting of his past and present conduct, and on the other factors set out in section 23–1321 (b), there is no condition or combination of conditions which will reasonably assure the safety of the community;
“(2) a person charged with a crime of violence, as defined in section 23–1331(4), if (i) the person has been convicted of a crime of violence within the ten-year period immediately preceding the alleged crime of violence for which he is presently charged; or (ii) the crime of violence was allegedly committed while the person was, with respect to another crime of violence, on bail or other release or on probation, parole, or mandatory release pending completion of a sentence; or
“(3) a person charged with any offense if such person, for the purpose of obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice, threatens, injures, intimidates, or attempts to threaten, injure, or intimidate any prospective witness or juror.
“(b) No person described in subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered detained unless the judicial officer—
“(1) holds a pretrial detention hearing in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section:
“(2) finds—
“(A) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section;
“(B) that—
“(i) in the case of a person described only in paragraph (1) of subsection (a), based on such person’s pattern of behavior consisting of his past and present conduct, and on the other factors set out in section 23–1321 (b), or
“(ii) in the case of a person described in paragraph (2) or (3) of such subsection, based on the factors set out in section 23–1321 (b),
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release which will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community; and
“(C) that, except with respect to a person described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section, on the basis of information presented by proffer or otherwise to the judicial officer there is a substantial probability that the person committed the offense for which he is present before the judicial officer; and
“(3) issues an order of detention accompanied by written findings of fact and the reasons for its entry.
“(c) The following procedures shall apply to pretrial detention hearings held pursuant to this section:
“(1) Whenever the person is before a judicial officer, the hearing may be initiated on oral motion of the United States attorney.
“(2) Whenever the person has been released pursuant, to section 23–1321 and it subsequently appears that such person may be subject to pretrial detention, the United States attorney may initiate a pretrial detention hearing by ex parte written motion. Upon such motion the judicial officer may issue a warrant for the arrest of the person and if such person is outside the District of Columbia, he shall be brought before a judicial officer in the district where he is arrested and shall then be transferred to the District of Columbia for proceedings in accordance with this section.
“(3) The pretrial detention hearing shall be held immediately upon the person being brought before the judicial officer for such hearing unless the person or the United States attorney moves for a continuance. A continuance granted on motion of the person shall not exceed five calendar days, unless there are extenuating circumstances. A continuance on motion of the United States attorney shall be granted upon good cause shown and shall not exceed three calendar days. The person may be detained pending the hearing.
“(4) The person shall be entitled to representation by counsel and shall be entitled to present information by proffer or otherwise, to testify, and to present witnesses in his own behalf.
“(5) Information stated in, or offered in connection with, any order entered pursuant to this section need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in a court of law.
“(6) Testimony of the person given during the hearing shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any other judicial proceeding, but such testimony shall be admissible in proceedings under sections 23–1327, 23–1328, and 23–1329, in perjury proceedings, and for the purposes of impeachment, in any subsequent proceedings.
“(7) Appeals from orders of detention may be taken pursuant to section 23–1324.
“(d) The following shall be applicable to persons detained pursuant to this section:
“(1) The case of such person shall be placed on an expedited calendar and, consistent with the sound administration of justice, his trial shall be given priority.
“(2) Such person shall be treated in accordance with section 23–1321—
“(A) upon the expiration of sixty calendar days, unless the trial is in progress or the trial has been delayed at the request of the person other than by the filing of timely motions (excluding motions for continuances); or
“(B) whenever a judicial officer finds that a subsequent event has eliminated the basis for such detention.
“(3) The person shall be deemed detained pursuant to section 23–1325 if he is convicted.
“(e) The judicial officer may detain for a period not to exceed five calendar days a person who comes before him for a bail determination charged with any offense, if it appears that such person is presently on probation, parole, or mandatory release pending completion of sentence for any offense under State or Federal law and that such person may flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released. During the five-day period, the United States attorney or the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia shall notify the appropriate State or Federal probation or parole officials. If such officials fail or decline to take the person into custody during such period, the person shall be treated in accordance with section 23–1321, unless he is subject to detention under this section. If the person is subsequently convicted of the offense charged, he shall receive credit toward service of sentence for the time he was detained pursuant to this subsection.
“§ 23–1323. Detention of addict
“(a) Whenever it appears that a person charged with a crime of violence, as defined in section 23–1331 (4), may be an addict, as defined in section 23–1331(5), the judicial officer may, upon motion of the United States attorney, order such person detained in custody for it period not to exceed three calendar days, under medical supervision, to determine whether the person is an addict.
“(b) Upon or before the expiration of three caterer days, the person shall be brought before a judicial officer and the results of the determination shall be presented to such judicial officer. The judicial officer thereupon (1) shall treat the person in accordance with section 23–1321, or (2) upon motion of the United States attorney, may (A) hold a hearing pursuant to section 23–1322, or (B) hold a hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
“(c) A person who is an addict may be ordered detained in custody under medical supervision if the judicial officer—
“(1) holds a pretrial detention hearing in accordance with subsection (c) of section 23–1322;
“(2) finds that—
“(A) there is clear and convincing evidence that the person is an addict;
“(B) based on the factors set out in subsection (b) of section 23–1321, there is no condition or combination of conditions of release which will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community; and
“(C) on the basis of information presented to the judicial officer by proffer or otherwise, there is a substantial probability that the person committed the offense for which he is present before the judicial officer: and
“(3) issues an order of detention accompanied by written findings of fact and the reasons for its entry.
“(d) The provisions of subsection (d) of section 23–1322 shall apply to this section.
“§ 23–1324. Appeal from conditions of release
“(a) A person who is detained, or whose release on a condition requiring him to return to custody after specified hours is continued, after review of his application pursuant to section 23–1321(d) or section 23–1321 (e) by a judicial officer, other than a judge of the court having original jurisdiction over the offense with which he is charged or a judge of a United States court of appeals or a Justice of the Supreme Court, may move the court having original jurisdiction over the offense with which he is charged to amend the order. Such motion shall be determined promptly.
“(b) In any case in which a person is detained after (1) a court denies a motion under subsection (a) to amend an order imposing conditions of release, (2) conditions of release have been imposed or amended by a judge of the court having original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or (3) he is ordered detained or an order for his detention has been permitted to stand by a judge of the court having original jurisdiction over the offense charged, an appeal may be taken to the court having appellate jurisdiction over such court. Any order so appealed shall be affirmed if it is supported by the proceedings below. If the order is not So supported, the court may remand the case for a further hearing, or may, with or without additional evidence, order the person released pursuant to section 23–1321 (a). The appeal shall be determined promptly.
“(c) In any case in which a judicial officer other than a judge of the court having original jurisdiction over the offense with which a person is charged orders his release with or without setting terms or conditions of release, or denies a motion for the pretrial detention of a person, the United States attorney may move the court having original jurisdiction over the offense to amend or revoke the order. Such motion shall be considered promptly.
“(d) In any case in which—
“(1) a person is released, with or without the setting of terms or conditions of release, or a motion for the pretrial detention of a person is denied, by a judge of the court having original jurisdiction over the offense with which the person is charged, or
“(2) a judge of a court having such original jurisdiction does not grant the motion of the United States attorney filed pursuant to subsection (c),
the United States attorney may appeal to the court having appellate jurisdiction over such court. Any order so appealed shall be affirmed if it is supported by the proceedings below. If the order is not so supported, (A) the court may remand the case for a further hearing, (B) with or without additional evidence, change the terms or conditions of release, or (C) in cases in which the United States attorney requested pretrial detention pursuant to sections 23–1322 and 23–1323, order such detention.
“§ 23–1325. Release in capital cases or after conviction
“(a) A person who is charged with an offense punishable by death shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 23–1321 unless the judicial officer has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. If such a risk of flight or danger is believed to exist, the person may be ordered detained.
“(b) A person who has been convicted of an offense and is awaiting sentence shall be detained unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the property of others. Upon such finding, the judicial officer shall treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 28–1321.
“(c) A person who has been convicted of an offense and sentenced to a term of confinement or imprisonment and has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be detained unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the property of others, and (2) the appeal or petition for a writ of certiorari raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in a reversal or an order for new trial. Upon such findings, the judicial officer shall treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 23–1321.
“(d) The provisions of section 23–1324 shall apply to persons detained in accordance with this section, except that the finding of the judicial officer that the appeal or petition for writ of certiorari does not raise by clear and convincing evidence a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in a reversal or order for new trial shall receive de novo consideration in the court in which review is sought.
“§ 23–1326. Release of material witnesses
“If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his presence by subpena, a judicial officer shall impose conditions of release pursuant to section 23–1321. No material witness shall be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant
18 USC app.
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
“§ 23–1327. Penalties for failure to appear
“(a) Whoever, having been released under this title prior to the commencement of his sentence, willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required, shall, subject to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, incur a forfeiture of any security which was given or pledged for his release, and, in addition, shall, (1) if he was released in connection with a charge of felony, or while awaiting sentence or pending appeal or certiorari prior to commencement of his sentence after conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not less than one year and not more than five years, (2) if he was released in connection with a charge of misdemeanor, be fined not more than the maximum provided for such misdemeanor and imprisoned for not less than ninety days and not more than one year, or (3) if he was released for appearance as a material witness, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
“(b) Any failure to appear after notice of the appearance date shall be prim a facie evidence that such failure to appear is willful. Whether the person was warned when released of the penalties for failure to appear shall be a factor in determining whether such failure to appear was willful, but the giving of such warning shall not be a prerequisite to conviction under this section.
“(c) The trier of facts may convict under this section even if the defendant has not received actual notice of the appearance date if (1) reasonable efforts to notify the defendant have been made, and (2) the defendant, by his own actions, has frustrated the receipt of actual notice.
“(d) Any term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.
“§ 23–1328. Penalties for offenses committed during release
“(a) Any person convicted of an offense committed while released pursuant to section 23–1321 shall be subject to the following penalties in addition to any other applicable penalties:
“(1) A term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than five years if convicted of committing a felony while so released: and
“(2) A term of imprisonment of not less than ninety days and not more than one year if convicted of committing a misdemeanor while so released.
“(b) The giving of a warning to the person when released of the penalties imposed by this section shall not be a prerequisite to the application of this section.
“(c) Any term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.
“§ 23–1329. Penalties for violation of conditions of release
“(a) A person who has been conditionally released pursuant to section 23–1321 and who has violated a condition of release shall be subject to revocation of release, an order of detention, and prosecution for contempt of court.
“(b) Proceedings for revocation of release may be initiated on motion of the United States attorney. A warrant for the arrest of a person charged with violating a condition of release may be issued by a judicial officer and if such person is outside the District of Columbia he shall be brought before a judicial officer in the district where he is arrested and shall then be transferred to the District of Columbia for proceedings in accordance with this section. No order of revocation and detention shall be entered unless, after a hearing, the judicial officer finds that—
“(1) there is clear and convincing evidence that such person has violated a condition of his release; and
“(2) based on the factors set out in subsection (b) of section 23–1321, there is no condition or combination of conditions of release which will reasonably assure that such person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community.
The previsions of subsections (c) and (d) of section 23–1322 shall apply to this subsection.
“(c) Contempt sanctions may be imposed if, upon a hearing and in accordance with principles applicable to proceedings for criminal contempt, it is established that such person has intentionally violated a condition of his release. Such contempt proceedings shall be expedited and heard by the court without a jury. Any person found guilty of criminal contempt for violation of a condition of release shall be imprisoned for not more than six months, or fined not more than $1,000, or both.
“(d) Any warrant issued by a judge of the Superior Court for violation of release conditions or for contempt of court, for failure to appear as required, or pursuant to subsection (c)(2) of section 23–1322, may be executed at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States. Such warrants shall be executed by a United States marshal or by any other officer authorized by law.
“§ 23–1330. Contempt
“Nothing in this subchapter shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court of the United States of its power to punish for contempt.
“§ 23–1331. Definitions
“As used in this subchapter:
“(1) The term ‘judicial officer’ means, unless otherwise indicated, any person or court in the District of Columbia authorized
18 USC app.
pursuant to section 3041 of title 18, United States Code, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bail or otherwise release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court.
“(2) The term ‘offense’ means any criminal offense committed in the District of Columbia, other than an offense triable by courtmartial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal, which is in violation of an Act of Congress.
“(3) The term ‘dangerous crime’ means (A) tailing or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business with the intent to commit an onlense therein. (C) arson or attempted arson of any premises adaptable for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business, (D) forcible rape, or assault with intent to commit forcible rape, or (E) unlawful sale or distribution of a narcotic or depressant or stimulant drug (as defined by any Act of Congress) if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
“(4) The term ‘crime of violence’ means murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen, taking or attempting to take immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to commit any offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses, as defined by any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more, than one year.
“(5) The term ‘addict’ means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug as defined by section 4731 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare.
“§ 23–1332. Applicability of subchapter
“The provisions of this subchapter shall apply in the District of Columbia in lieu of the provisions of sections 3146 through 3152 of title
18, United States Code.
“Chapter 15— OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES
“§ 23–1501. Definitions
“As used in this chapter—
“(1) The term ‘witness’ includes a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal action, prosecution, or proceeding.
“(2) The term ‘State’ includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession of the United States.
“(3) The term ‘summons’ includes a subpena, order, or other notice requiring the appearance of a witness.
“§ 23–1502. Hearing on recall of out of State witnesses by State courts; determination; travel allowance; penalty
“(a) If a judge of a court of record in any State which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that State to attend and testify in the District of Columbia certifies under the seal of the court (1) that there is a criminal prosecution pending in that court, or that a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence, (2) that a person within the District of Columbia is a material witness in the prosecution or grand jury investigation, and (3) that his presence will be required for a specified number of days, upon presentation of that certificate to any judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, except as provided in subsection (c), such judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing, and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at a time and place certain for the hearing.
“(b) If at the hearing the judge determines that the witness is material and necessary, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to attend and testify in the prosecution or grand jury investigation in the requesting State, and that the laws of such State and of any other State through which the witness may be required to pass by ordinary course of travel, will give to him protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process, he shall issue a summons, with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the prosecution or grand jury investigation, as the ease may be, at a time and place specified in the summons. In any such hearing the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated therein.
“(c) If the certificate presented under subsection (a) recommends that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting State to assure his attendance, in the requesting State, the judge may in lieu of notification of hearing, direct that the witness be forthwith brought before him for a hearing. If the judge at the hearing is satisfied of the desirability of the custody and delivery of the witness, he may, in lieu of issuing subpena or summons, order the witness to be forthwith taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting State. The certificate shall be prima facie proof of the desirability of the custody and delivery of the witness.
“(d) Any witness who is summoned as above provided and, after being paid or tendered by some properly authorized person the fees and allowances authorized for witnesses in criminal cases in United States district courts, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from the Superior Court.
“§ 23–1503. Certificate providing for attendance of witnesses at criminal prosecutions in the District of Columbia; travel allowance; penalty
“(a) If a person in any State, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions or grand jury investigations in the District of Columbia, is a material witness in such a prosecution or a grand jury investigation in the District of Columbia which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge may issue a certificate under seal stating these facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required. The certificate may include a recommendation that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the United States or the District of Columbia to assure his attendance in the District of Columbia. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the county in which the witness is found.
“(b) If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in the District of Columbia he shall be tendered the fees and allowances authorized for witnesses in criminal cases in United States district courts. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the summons shall not be required to remain within the District of Columbia for a period longer than that specified in the certificate, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the witness, after coming into the District of Columbia, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he may be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any other witness who disobeys a summons issued from the court in the District of Columbia where the prosecution has been instituted or the grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence.
“§ 23–1504. Exemption from arrest
“(a) Any person who comes into the District of Columbia in obedience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in the District of Columbia shall not, while in the District of Columbia, pursuant to the summons, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with any matter which arose before his entrance into the District of Columbia under the summons.
“(b) Any person who is in the process of passing through the District of Columbia for the purpose of proceeding to or returning from a State which has summoned him to attend and testify shall not be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with any matter which arose at some other time.
“Chapter 17.— DEATH PENALTY
“§ 23–1701. Capital punishment
“The mode of capital punishment in the District of Columbia shall be by the process commonly known as electrocution. The punishment of death shall be inflicted by causing to pass through the body of the convict a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death, and the application of the current shall be continued until the convict is dead. The time fixed for the execution of the sentence shall not be considered an essential part of the sentence, and if it be not executed at the time therein appointed, by reason of the pendency of an appeal or for other cause, the court may appoint another day for carrying the same into execution.
“§ 23–1702. Provision for death chamber; appointment of executioner and assistants; fees
“The Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall provide a death chamber and necessary apparatus for inflicting the death penalty by electrocution and designate an executioner and necessary assistants, not exceeding three in number. The District of Columbia Council shall fix the fees for the executioner and his assistants.
“§ 23–1703. Sentences to be in writing and certified copy furnished
“If a person is sentenced to death for a conviction in the District of Columbia the presiding judge shall sentence the convicted person to death according to the terms of this chapter, and make the sentence in writing, such sentence shall be filed with the papers in the case against the convicted person, and a certified copy thereof shall be transmitted, by the clerk of the court in which such sentence is pronounced, to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections not less than ten days prior to the time fixed in the sentence of the court for the execution.
“§ 23–1704. Who may be present at execution; fact of execution to be certified to clerk of court
“At the execution of the death penalty there shall be present only the following persons: The executioner and his assistant; the prison physician and one other physician if the condemned person so desires; the condemned person’s counsel and relatives, not exceeding three, if they so desire; the prison chaplain and such other ministers of the Gospel, not exceeding two, as may attend by desire of the condemned; the superintendent of the prison, or, in the event of his disability, a deputy designated by him; and not fewer than three nor more than five respectable citizens whom the superintendent of the prison shall designate, and, if necessary to insure their attendance, shall subpena to be present. The fact of execution shall be certified by the prison physician and the executioner to the clerk of the court in which sentence was pronounced, which certificate shall be filed by the clerk with the papers in the case. No person under the age of twenty-one years shall be allowed to witness any execution.
“§ 23–1705. Place of execution
“Any person adjudged to suffer death shall be executed within the walls of the designated facility of the Department of Corrections, or within the yard or inclosure thereof, and not elsewhere.”
The following provisions of law are repealed on the effective
Repeals.
date of this Act, except with respect to rights and duties which matured, penalties which were incurred, and proceedings which were begun before the effective date of this Act:
Sections 397 and 398 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. secs. 4–140,4–141).
The following provision of British law in effect in the District of Columbia: 23 Geo. II, chapter 11, sections 1 and 2 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–204, 23–205).
The following sections of the Act entitled “An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia”, approved March 3, 1901:
Sections 911 to 914 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–301 to 23–304).
Sections 915 to 917 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–201 to 23–203).
Sections 918 to 924 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–107 to 23–113).
Section 926 (D.C. Code. sec. 23–114)
Sections 930 and 931 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–401, 23–402).
Sections 932 and 933 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–101, 23–102).
Sections 935 and 938 (D.C. Code. secs. 23–105, 23–106).
Section 939 (D.C. Code, sec. 23–104).
Section 1200 (D.C.Code, sec. 23–706).
Section 1203 (D.C. Code, sec. 23–705).
Act of January 30, 1925 (43 Stat. 798; D.C. Code. secs. 23–701 to 23–704).
Act of April 21, 1928 (45 Stat. 440; D.C. Code. secs. 23–403 to 23–410).
Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1482; D.C. Code. secs. 23–601 to 23–612).
Section 5 of the Act of April 5, 1938 (52 Stat. 198, 199; D.C. Code. sec. 23–305).
Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit (53 Stat. 1124; D.C. Code. secs. 23–501 to 23–504).
Act of March 5, 1952 (66 Stat. 15: D.C. Code, sees. 23–801 to 23–804).
Sections 207, 402, and 407(b) of the District of Columbia Law Enforcement Act of 1953 (67 Stat. 90, 96, 102, 106; D.C. Code. secs. 23–306, 23–115,and 23–411) .
The District of Columbia Bail Agency Act (80 Stat. 327; D.C. Code. secs. 23–901 to 23–909).
Act of July 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 460; D.C. Code, sec. 23–101a).
Sec. 211. conforming amendments
Section 2511(2)(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended (1) by inserting “(i)” immediately after “(2)(a)”; and (2) by adding at the end thereof the following:
“(ii) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of any communication common carrier to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to an investigative or law enforcement officer who, pursuant to this chapter, is authorized to intercept a wire or oral communication.”.
Section 2518(4) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after and below paragraph (e) the following:
“An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. Any communication common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated therefor by the applicant at the prevailing rates.”
The last sentence of section 2520 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: “A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law.”.
TITLE III— PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE
Sec. 301. redesignation of legal aid agency as public defender service
The Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia is redesignated the District of Columbia Public Defender Service (hereafter in this title referred to as the “Service”).
Sec. 302. authority of service
The Service is authorized to represent any person in the District of Columbia who is a person described in any of the following categories and who is financially unable to obtain adequate representation:
Persons charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of six months, or more.
Persons charged with violating a condition of probation or parole.
Persons subject to proceedings pursuant to chapter 5 of title 21 of the District of Columbia Code (Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill).
Persons for whom civil commitment is sought pursuant to title III of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (42
U.S.C. 3411, et seq.) or the provisions of the Hospital Treatment for Drug Addicts Act for the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. sec. 24–601, et seq.).
Juveniles alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision.
Persons subject to proceedings pursuant to section 7 of the Act of August 4, 1947 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–527) (relating to commitment
of chronic alcoholics by court order for treatment).
Persons subject to proceedings pursuant to section 927 of the Act of March 3, 1901 (D.C. Code. sec. 24–301) (relating to
Ante, p. 601.
confinement of persons acquitted on the ground of insanity).
Representation may be furnished at any stage of a proceeding, including appellate, ancillary, and collateral proceedings. Not more than 60 per centum of the persons who are annually determined to be financially unable to obtain adequate representation and who are persons described in the above categories may be represented by the Service, but the Service may furnish technical and other assistance to private attorneys appointed to represent persons described in the above categories. The Service shall determine the best practicable allocation of its staff personnel to the courts where it furnishes representation.
The Service shall establish and coordinate the operation of an effective and adequate system for appointment of private attorneys to represent persons described in subsection (a), but the courts shall have final authority to make such appointments. The Service shall report to the courts at least quarterly on matters relating to the operation of (he appointment system and shall consult with the courts on the need for modifications and improvements.
Upon approval of its Board of Trustees, the Service may perform such other functions as are necessary and appropriate to the duties described above.
The determination whether a person is financially unable to obtain adequate representation shall be based on information provided by the person to be represented and such other persons or agencies as the court in its discretion shall require. Whoever in providing this information knowingly falsifies, conceals, or cover’s up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Sec. 303. board of trustees of service
The powers of the Service shall be vested in a Board of Trustees composed of seven members. The Board of Trustees shall establish general policy for the Service but shall not direct the conduct of particular cases.
Members of the Board of Trustees shall be appointed by a panel consisting of—
the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;
the chief judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
the chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals;
the chief judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and
the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
The panel shall be presided over by the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (or in his absence, the designee of such judge). A quorum of the panel shall be four members.
Judges of the United States courts in the District of Columbia and of District of Columbia courts may not be appointed to serve as members of the Board of Trustees.
The term of office of a member of the Board of Trustees shall be three years. No person shall serve more than two consecutive terms as a member of the Board of Trustees. A vacancy in the Board of Trustees shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term.
Tire trustees of the Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia in office on the date of enactment of this Act shall serve the unexpired portions of their terns as trustees of the Service.
For the purposes of any action brought against the trustees of the Service, they shall be deemed to be employees of the District of Columbia.
Sec. 304. director and deputy director of service
The Board of Trustees shall appoint a Director and Deputy Director of the Service, each of whom shall serve at the pleasure of the Board. The Director shall be responsible for the supervision of the work of the Service and shall perform such other duties as the Board of Trustees may prescribe. The Deputy Director shall assist, the Director and shall perform such duties as he may prescribe. The Director and Deputy Director shall be members of the bar of the District of Columbia. The Board of Trustees shall fix the compensation to be paid to the Director and the Deputy Director without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5 of
80 Stat. 443, 467.
Ante, p. 198–1.
the United States Code, but compensation for the Director shall not exceed the rate prescribed for GS–18 of the General Schedule and compensation for the Deputy Director shall not exceed the maximum rate prescribed for GS–1T of the General Schedule.
Sec. 305. staff
The Director shall employ a staff of attorneys and clerical and other personnel necessary to provide adequate and effective defense services. The Director shall make assignments of the personnel of the Service. The compensation of all employees of the service, other than the Director and the Deputy Director, shall be fixed by the Director without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5 of the United States Code, but shall not exceed the compensation which may be paid to persons of similar qualifications and experience in the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. All attorneys employed by the Service to represent persons shall be members of the bar of the District of Columbia.
No attorney employed by the Service shall engage in the private practice of law or receive a fee for representing any person.
Sec. 306. fiscal reports
The Board of Trustees of the Agency shall submit
Report to Congress.
a fiscal year report of the Service’s operations to the Congress of the United States, to the chief judges of the Federal courts in the District of Columbia and of the District of Columbia courts, and to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia. The report shall include a statement of the financial condition of the Service and a summary of services performed during the year.
Tire Board of Trustees shall annually arrange for an independent audit to be prepared by a certified public accountant or by a designee of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
Sec. 307. appropriations, grants, and contributions
For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, there, are authorized to ire appropriated for each fiscal year, out of any moneys in the Treasury to the credit of the District of Columbia, such sums as may be necessary to implement the purposes of this title. Such sums shall Ire appropriated for the judiciary to ire disbursed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to carry on the business of the Service, The Administrative Office, in disbursing and accounting for such sums, shall follow, so far as possible, its standard fiscal practices. The budget estimates for the Service shall be prepared in consultation with the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
Upon approval of the Board of Trustees, the Service may accept public grants and private contributions made to assist it in carrying out the provisions of this title.
Sec. 308. transition provision
All employees of the Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia on the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be employees of the Service and shall be entitled to the same compensation and benefits as they are entitled to as employees of the Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia.
Sec. 309. repeal
The District of Columbia Legal Aid Act (D.C. Code. secs. 2–2201 to 2–2210) is repealed.
TITLE IV— INTERSTATE COMPACT ON JUVENILES
Sec. 401. findings and purpose
The Congress finds that (1) juveniles who are not under proper supervision and control, or who have absconded, escaped, or run away, are likely to endanger their own health, morals, and welfare, and the health, morals, and welfare of others, and (2) the cooperation of the District of Columbia with the States is necessary to provide for the welfare and protection of juveniles and other persons in the District of Columbia.
The Congress intends, in authorizing the District of Columbia to adopt the Interstate Compact, on Juveniles, to have the District of Columbia cooperate fully with the States (1) in returning juveniles to those States requesting their return, and (2) in accepting and providing for the return of juveniles who are residents of the District, of Columbia and who are found or apprehended in a State.
Sec. 402. authority to enter into compact
The Commissioner of the District of Columbia (hereafter in this title referred to as the “Commissioner”) is authorized to enter into and execute on behalf of the District of Columbia a compact with any State or States legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
“THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON JUVENILES
“The contracting states solemnly agree:
“ARTICLE I— Findings and Purposes
“That juveniles who are not under proper supervision and control, or who have absconded, escaped or run away, are likely to endanger their own health, morals and welfare, and the health, morals and welfare of others. The cooperation of the states party to this compact is therefore necessary to provide for the welfare and protection of juveniles and of the public with respect to (1) cooperative supervision of delinquent juveniles on probation or parole; (2) the return, from one state to another, of delinquent juveniles who have escaped or absconded; (3) the return, from one state to another, of nondelinquent juveniles who have run away from home; and (4) additional measures for the protection of juveniles and of the public, which any two or more of the party states may find desirable to undertake cooperatively. In carrying out the provisions of this compact the party states shall be guided of the noncriminal, reformative and protective policies which guide their laws concerning delinquent, neglected or dependent juveniles generally. It shall be the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and observe their respective responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles and delinquent juveniles who become subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the foregoing purposes.
“ARTICLE II— Existing Rights and Remedies
“That all remedies and procedures provided by this compact shall be in addition to and not in substitution for other rights, remedies and procedures, and shall not be in derogation of parental rights and responsibilities.
“ARTICLE III— Definitions
“That, for the purposes of this compact, ‘delinquent juvenile’ means any juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent and who, at the time the provisions of this compact are invoked, is still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made such adjudication or to the jurisdiction or supervision of any agency or institution pursuant to an order of such court; ‘probation or parole’ means any kind of conditional release of juveniles authorized under the law’s of the states party hereto; ‘court’ means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected or dependent children; ‘state’ means any state, territory or possessions of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and ‘residence’ or any variant thereof means a place at which a home or regular place of abode is maintained.
“ARTICLE IV— Return of Runaways
“(a) That the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody of a juvenile who has not been adjudged delinquent but who has run away without the consent of such parent, guardian, person or agency may petition the appropriate court in the demanding state for the issuance of a requisition for his return. The petition shall state the name and age of the juvenile, the name of the petitioner and the basis of entitlement to the juvenile’s custody, the circumstances of his running away, his location if known at the time application is made, and such other facts as may tend to show that the juvenile who has run away is endangering his own welfare or the welfare of others and is not an emancipated minor. The petition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the document or documents on which the petitioner’s entitlement to the juvenile’s custody is based, such as birth certificates, letters of guardianship, or custody decrees. Such further affidavits and other documents as may be deemed proper may be submitted with such petition. The judge of the court to which this application is made may hold a hearing thereon to determine whether for the purposes of this compact, the petitioner is entitled to the legal custody of the juvenile, whether or not it appears that the juvenile has in fact run away without consent, whether or not he is an emancipated minor, and whether or not it is in the best interest of the juvenile to compel his return to the state. If the judge determines, either with or without a hearing. That the juvenile should be returned, he shall present the appropriate court or to the executive, authority of the state where the juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of such juvenile. Such requisition shall set forth the name and age of the juvenile, the determination of the court that the juvenile has run away without the consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to his legal custody, and that it is in the best interest and for the protection of such juvenile that he be returned. In the event that a proceeding for the adjudication of the juvenile as a delinquent, neglected or dependent juvenile is pending in the court at the time when such juvenile runs away, the court may issue a requisition for the return of such juvenile upon its own motion, regardless of the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody, reciting therein the nature and circumstances of the pending proceeding. The requisition shall in every case be executed in duplicate and shall be signed by the judge. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of such court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a juvenile who has run away, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing him to take into custody and detain such juvenile. Such detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance hereunder. No juvenile detained upon such order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the court demanding him shall have appointed to receive him, unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court in the state, who shall inform him of the demand made for his return and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for him. If the judge, of such court shall find that the requisition is in order, he shall deliver such juvenile over to the officer whom the court demanding him shall have appointed to receive him. The. judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding.
“Upon reasonable information that, a person is a juvenile who has run away from another stale party to this compact without the consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to his legal custody, such juvenile may be taken into custody without a requisition and brought forthwith before a judge of the appropriate court who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for such juvenile and who shall determine after a hearing whether sufficient, cause exists to hold the person, subject to the order of the court, for his own protection and welfare, for such a time not exceeding 90 days as will enable his return to another state party to this compact pursuant to a requisition for his return from a court of that state. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a juvenile who has ran away, there is pending in the state wherein be is found any criminal charge, or any proceeding to have him adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in such State, or if he is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he shall not be returned without the consent of such state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport such juvenile through any and all states party to this compact, without interference. Upon his return to the state from which he ran away, the juvenile shall be subject to such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the laws of that state.
“(b) That the state to which a juvenile is returned under this Article shall be responsible for payment of the transportation costs of such return.
“(c) That ‘juvenile’ as used in this Article means any person who is a minor under the law of the state of residence of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the legal custody of such minor.
“ARTICLE V— Return of Escapees and Absconders
“(a) That the appropriate person or authority from whose probation or parole supervision a delinquent juvenile has absconded or from whose institutional custody he has escaped shall present to the appropriate court or to the executive authority of the state where the delinquent juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of such delinquent juvenile. Such requisition shall state the name and age of the delinquent, juvenile, the particulars of his adjudication as a delinquent juvenile, the circumstances of the breach of the terms of his probation or parole or of his escape from an institution or agency vested with his legal custody or supervision, and the location of such delinquent juvenile, if known, at the time the requisition is made. The requisition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the judgment, formal adjudication, or order of commitment which subjects such delinquent juvenile to probation or parole or to the legal custody of the institution or agency concerned. Such further affidavits and other documents as may be deemed proper may be submitted with such requisition. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of the appropriate court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a delinquent juvenile who has absconded or escaped, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing him to take into custody and detain such delinquent juvenile. Such detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance hereunder. No delinquent juvenile detained upon such order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him, unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of an appropriate court in the state, who shall inform him of the demand made for his return and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for him. If the judge of such court shall find that the requisition is in order, he shall deliver such delinquent juvenile over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him. The judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding.
“Upon reasonable information that a person is a delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, such person may be taken into custody in any other state party to this compact without a requisition. But in such event, he, must be taken forthwith before a judge of the appropriate court., who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for such person and who shall determine, after a hearing, whether sufficient cause exists to hold the person subject to the order of the court for such a time, not exceeding 90 days, as will enable his detention under a detention order issued on a requisition pursuant to this Article. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a delinquent juvenile who has either absconded while on probation or parole or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his legal custody or supervision, there is pending m the state wherein he is detained any criminal charge or any proceeding to have him adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in such state, or if he is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he shall not be returned without the consent of such state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the delinquent juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport such delinquent juvenile through any and all states party to this compact, without interference. Upon his return to the state from which he escaped or absconded, the delinquent juvenile shall be subject to such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the laws of that state.
“(b) That the state to which a delinquent juvenile is returned under this Article shall be responsible for the payment of the transportation costs of such return.
“ARTICLE VI— Voluntary Return Procedure
“That any delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, and any juvenile who has run away from any state party to this compact, who is taken into custody without a requisition in another state party to this compact under the provisions of Article IV(a) or of Article V(a), may consent to his immediate return to the state from which he absconded, escaped or ran away. Such consent shall be given by the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and his counsel or guardian ad litem if any, by executing or subscribing a writing, in the presence of it judge of the appropriate court, which states that the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and his counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, consent to his return to the demanding state. Before such consent shall be executed or subscribed, however, the judge, in the presence of counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, shall inform the juvenile or delinquent juvenile of his rights under this compact. When the consent has been duly executed, it shall be forwarded to and filed with the compact administrator of the state in which the court is located and the judge shall direct the officer having the juvenile or delinquent juvenile in custody to deliver him to the duly accredited officer or officers of the state demanding his return, and shall cause to be delivered to such officer or officers a copy of the consent. The court may, however, upon the request of the state to which the juvenile or delinquent juvenile is being returned, order him to return unaccompanied to such state and shall provide him with a copy of such court order; in such event a copy of the consent shall be forwarded to the compact administrator of the state to which said juvenile or delinquent juvenile is ordered to return.
“ARTICLE VII— Cooperative Super vision of Probationers and Parolees
“(a) That the duly constituted judicial and administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called ‘sending state’) may permit any delinquent juvenile within such state, placed on probation or parole, to reside in any other state party to this compact (herein called ‘receiving state’) while on probation or parole, and the receiving state shall accept such delinquent juvenile, if the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of such delinquent juvenile is residing or undertakes to reside within the receiving state. Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be given to the receiving state to make such investigations as it deems necessary. The authorities of the sending state shall send to the authorities of the receiving state copies of pertinent court orders, social case studies and all other available information which may be of value to and assist the receiving state in supervising a probationer or parolee under this compact. A receiving state, in its discretion, may agree to accept supervision of a probationer or parolee in cases where the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile is not a resident of the receiving state, and if so accepted the sending state may transfer supervision accordingly.
“(b) That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and of supervision over any such delinquent juvenile and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards of visitation and supervision that prevail for its own delinquent juveniles released oil probation or parole.
“(c) That, after consultation between the appropriate authorities of the sending state and of the receiving state as to the desirability and necessity of returning such a delinquent juvenile, the duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any such delinquent juvenile on probation or parole. For that purpose, no formalities will be required, other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the delinquent juvenile to be retaken and returned. The decision of the sending state to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if, at the time the sending state seeks to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole, there is pending against him within the receiving state any criminal charge or any proceeding to have him adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for any act committed in such state or if he is suspected, of having committed within such state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport delinquent juveniles being so returned through any and all states party to this compact, without interference.
“(d) That the sending state shall be responsible under this Article for paying the costs of transporting any delinquent juvenile to the receiving state or of returning any delinquent juvenile to the sending state.
“ARTICLE VIII— Responsibility for Costs
“(a) That the provisions of Articles IV (b), V(b) and VII (d) of this compact shall not be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
“(b) That nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent any party state or subdivision thereof from asserting any right against any person, agency or other entity in regard to costs for which such party state or subdivision (hereof may be responsible pursuant to Articles IV(b), V(b) or VII(d) of this compact.
“ARTICLE IX— Detention Practices
“That, to every extent possible, it shall be the policy of states party to this compact that no juvenile or delinquent juvenile shall be placed or detained in any prison, jail or lockup nor be detained or transported in association with criminal, vicious or dissolute persons.
“ARTICLE X— Suppiementary Agreements
“That the duly constituted administrative authorities of a state party to this compact may enter into supplementary agreements with any other state or states party hereto for the cooperative care, treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent juveniles whenever they shall find that such agreements will improve the facilities or programs available for such care, treatment, and rehabilitation. Such care, treatment and rehabilitation may be provided in an institution located within any state entering into such supplementary agreement. Such supplementary agreements shall (1) provide the rates to be paid for the care, treatment and custody of such delinquent juveniles, taking into consideration the character of facilities, services and subsistence furnished; (2) provide that the delinquent juvenile shall be given a court hearing prior to his being sent to another state for care, treatment and custody; (3) provide that the state receiving such a delinquent juvenile in one of its institutions shall act solely as agent for the state sending such delinquent juvenile; (4) provide that the sending state shall at all times retain jurisdiction over delinquent juveniles sent to an institution in another state; (5) provide for reasonable inspection of such institutions by the sending state; (6) provide that the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the legal custody of said delinquent juvenile shall be secured prior to his being sent to another state; and (7) make provision for such other matters and details as shall be necessary to protect the rights and equities of such delinquent juveniles and of the cooperating states.
“ARTICLE XI— Acceptance of Federal and Other Aid
“That any state party to this compact may accept any and all donations: gifts and grants of money, equipment and services from the federal or any local government, or any agency thereof and from any person, firm or corporation, for any of the purposes and functions of this compact, and may receive and utilize the same subject to the terms, conditions and regulations governing such donations, gifts and grants.
“ARTICLE XII— Compact Administrators
“That the governor of each state party to this compact shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of oilier party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.
“ARTICLE XIII— Execution of Compact
“That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within such state, the form or execution to be in accordance with the laws of the executing state.
“ARTICLE XIV— Renunciation
“That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each executing state until renounced by it. Renunciation of this compact shall be by the same authority which executed it, by sending six months’ notice in writing of its intention to withdraw from the compact to the other states party hereto. The duties and obligations of a renouncing state under Article VII hereof shall continue as to parolees and probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged. Supplementary agreements entered into under Article X hereof snail be subject to renunciation as provided by such supplementary agreements, and shall not be subject to the six months’ renunciation notice of the present Article.
“ARTICLE XV— Severability
“That the provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.”
The Commissioner may enter into and execute on behalf of the District of Columbia the following additional articles to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles:
“ARTICLE XVI— Additional Provision Relating to Return of Minor Children
“This article shall provide additional remedies, and shall be binding only as among and between those party states which specifically execute the same.
“For the purposes of this article, ‘child’, as used herein, means any minor within the jurisdictional age limits of any court in the home state.
“When any child is brought before a court of a state of which such child is not a resident, and such state is willing to permit such child’s return to the home state of such child, such home state, upon being so advised by the state in which such proceeding is pending, shall immediately institute proceedings to determine the residence and jurisdictional facts as to such child in such home state, and upon finding that such child is in fact a resident of said state and subject to the jurisdiction of the court thereof, shall within five days authorize the return of such child to the home state, and to the parent or custodial agency legally authorized to accept such custody in such home state, and at the expense of such home state, to be paid from such funds as such home state may procure, designate, or provide, prompt action being of the essence.
“ARTICLE XVII— Additional Provision Concerning Interstate Rendition of Juveniles Alleged to be Delinquent
“This article shall provide additional remedies, and shall be binding only as among and between those party states which specifically execute the same.
“All provisions and procedures of Articles V and VI of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles shall be construed to apply to any juvenile charged with being a delinquent by reason of a violation of any criminal law. Any juvenile, charged with being a delinquent by reason of violating any criminal law shall be returned to the requesting state upon a requisition to the state where the juvenile may be found. A petition in such case shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in the requesting state where the violation of criminal law is alleged to have been committed. The petition may be filed regardless of whether the juvenile has left the state before or after the filing of the petition. The requisition described in Article V of the compact shall be forwarded by the judge of the court in which the petition has been filed.”
Sec. 403. compact administrator
The Commissioner shall appoint or designate an officer of the government of the District of Columbia (hereafter in this section referred to as the “compact administrator”) to administer the compact. The compact administrator shall serve at the pleasure of the Commissioner.
The compact administrator, acting jointly with like officers of party States, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms of the compact. The compact administrator shall cooperate with all departments, agencies, and officers of the govern-ment of the District of Columbia in facilitating (be proper administration of the compact or of any supplementary agreement entered into by the compact administrator under subsection (c) of this section.
Subject to the approval of the Commissioner, the compact administrator may enter into supplementary agreements with appropriate State officials for the purpose of administering the compact.
Subject to the approval of the Commissioner, the compact administrator may make or arrange for any payments necessary to discharge any financial obligations imposed upon the District of Columbia by the compact or by any supplementary agreement entered into under subsection (c) of this section.
Sec. 404. enforcement
The courts, departments, agencies, and officers of the District of Columbia shall enforce the compact and shall take such action as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and intent of the compart which may be within their respective jurisdictions.
Sec. 405. construction of compact
The compact shall not be construed to prohibit the adoption of any other plan or procedure for the District of Columbia for the return of any runaway juvenile.
Sec. 406. congressional authority
The right to alter, amend, or repeal this title is expressly reserved by the Congress.
TITLE V— LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR OFFICERS OR MEMBERS OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT IN ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL ARREST
Sec. 501. legal assistance for police in wrongful arrest actions
In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Council of the District of Columbia, the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia shall represent any officer or member of the Metropolitan Police Department, if he so requests, in any civil action for damages resulting from an alleged wrongful arrest by such officer or member.
If the Corporation Counsel fails or is unable to represent such officer or member when requested to do so, the Commissioner of the District of Columbia shall compensate such officer or member for reasonable attorney’s fees (as determined by the court) incurred by him in his defense of the action against him.
Sec. 502. effective date
The amendments made by this title shall take effect with respect to civil actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or any District of Columbia court brought after the date of enactment of this Act against a member or officer of the Metropolitan Police Department for damages resulting from an alleged wrongful arrest by such officer or member.
TITLE VI— ABOLITION OF COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Sec. 601. abolition of commision
Title IX of the Act entitled “An Act relating to crime and criminal procedure in the District of Columbia”, approved December 27, 1967 (Public Law 90–226), is repealed.
D.C. Code 22–1122.
TITLE VII— FEDERAL PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION
Sec. 701. federal payment authorization
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, there are authorized to be appropriated to the District of Columbia, in addition to any other amounts authorized to be appropriated to the District of Columbia for such fiscal year, the following amounts:
Not to exceed $3,010,000 for the reorganization of the District of Columbia court system and the District of Columbia Legal Aid Agency provided by titles I and III of this Act.
Ante, p. 475, 654.
Not to exceed $580,000 for facilities for the increased number of court personnel authorized by this Act to be added to the District of Columbia court system.
Not to exceed $350,000 for the expansion of the District of Columbia Bail Agency required to carry out the purposes of chapter 13 of title 23 of the District of Columbia Code (as provided in title II of this Act).
Ante, p. 639.
Not to exceed $1,060,000 (plus any amounts not appropriated under paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) for any other purpose of this Act and for study, prevention, and treatment programs relating to drug users (as defined in section 3 of the Hospital Treatment for Drug Addicts for the District of Columbia (D.C. Code. sec. 24–602)) in the
District of Columbia.
TITLE VIII— MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 801. police mutual aid
The first section of the Act of October 17, 1968 (Public Law 90–587; D.C. Code. sec. 1–820), is amended by striking out all after
“equipment” and inserting in lieu thereof a period.
Sec. 802. repeal of kite flying prohibition
Section 4 of the Act of July 29, 1892 (27 Stat. 322; D.C. Code. sec. 22–1117), is amended by striking out “set up or fly any kite, or”,
TITLE IX— EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 901. effective date
Except as provided in part E of title I, section 502,
Ante, p. 592, 666.
and subsection (b) of this section, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after the date of its enactment.
Title III shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. In the admin is) rat ion of section 303(b) of title 111 during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the effective date specified in subsection (a), the reference to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia shall be considered a reference to the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.
Titles IV, VI, VII. and VIII shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
The amendments made by sections 201 and 205 of this Act shall apply with respect to any person who commits an offense after the effective date of this Act.
Approved July 29, 1970.